NPS-CE-17-020

ACQUISITION RESEARCH PROGRAM SPONSORED REPORT SERIES

The Marine Corps Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron of the Future: A Manpower Estimate

December 2016

MAJ Ricardo A. Barton, USMC Thesis Advisors: William Hatch, Senior Lecturer Dr. Robert Mortlock, Lecturer

Graduate School of Business & Public Policy

Naval Postgraduate School

Distribution authorized to Department of Defense and U.S. DOD Contractors only (Critical Technology) (December 2016). Other requests for this document must be referred to President, Code 261, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943-5000 via the Defense Technical Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944, Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218. WARNING – This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Sec 2751, et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979 (Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq), as amended. Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. Disseminate in accordance with provisions of DOD Directive 5230.25.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy Naval Postgraduate School

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Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy Naval Postgraduate School ABSTRACT

The U.S. Marine Corps has articulated its desire to procure an L-class ship capable, Group 4 or 5 UAS. The MAGTF Unmanned Aerial System Expeditionary, MUX, is envisioned to address multiple gaps in Marine aviation. The MUX will be a persistent, long-range UAS configurable for a multitude of missions. Because of the complexity of the system, the MUX will likely affect the manning requirements of the Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU). The goal of this research is to estimate the likely changes to the VMU’s manpower requirements and monetize that difference.

The VMU of today has a table of organization and equipment of 274 Marine and sailors, not including contractors. This work estimated the VMU of the Future will require an additional 19 Marines in the VMU, and an additional 19 MALS Marines to augment detachments when deployed. The additional cost of 38 Marines equates to $3.63 (FY17M) annually and $72.58 (FY17M) over a span of 20 years.

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Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - ii - Naval Postgraduate School ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my wife, Emily, for your understanding and support during our time here at the Naval Postgraduate School. Without your support, I would have not been able to be the student or father that I needed to be. Your patience and sacrifice is appreciated more than words can describe. The genesis of my thesis started with the discussion you shared with me between your CO and lanA about the future of the VMU. I promise to give you back our dining room and dining room table.

To my Army-Navy team that advised me on the potential future of the Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron, thank you. Professor Hatch, your early support and guidance about the subject of UASs was indispensable in getting me on the path I needed to find. Your Marine Manpower class helped me understand the stakeholder relationship in the Marine Corps’ HRDP process and shape my understanding of “space and faces” in a constrained fiscal and manpower environment, and insisting that I speak to CDR Lazzaro was a priceless piece of advice. Professor Mortlock, the knowledge you shared in MN3331 about “Big A” proved to be invaluable as I conducted research about the MUX. Your questions during our meetings helped me hone my understanding of the subject and guided me in directions that I did not think of before. Gentlemen, thank you for your support.

To CDR Lazzaro, thank you for your ear and advice during our conversation about your thesis. To LtCol “Spool” Spataro, thank you very much for engaging with me on a subject that I was a neophyte in. Our relatively brief conversation taught me so much about UASs and their future that I could not, and still cannot, fully imagine.

To the Commanding Officers of VMU-1, the “Watchdogs,” and VMU-2, the “Nightowls,” I send my sincere thanks for your support and the support of your officers. To Captains “Sugar” Rae and Luger of VMU-1, and Captain “POG” Eshleman of VMU- 2, thank you for your willingness to answer questions from a random Major. Your help was truly appreciated and enhanced my SA with regard to the state of the VMU.

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Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - iv - Naval Postgraduate School ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ricardo A. Barton, Major, started his Marine Corps career in 1996 when he attended recruit training at MCRD San Diego. Upon completion of recruit training, he became a Light Armored Vehicle crewman after completing the period of instruction offered at Training Battalion, School of Infantry, West. He served from 1997- 2001 with 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. He earned his commission in 2001 after graduating from the University of California, Los Angeles. After the completion of TBS and flight school, he earned his pilots’ wings in 2004 and then became a CH-46E Sea Knight pilot. He deployed twice with the 22d MEU from , to Iraq with 5th ANGLICO, and with the 31st MEU from Okinawa, Japan. Upon completion of his time in the Fleet, he served as an instructor pilot and maintenance officer with HMMT-164, and served as an exercise planner with the Tactical Exercise Control Group, G-7, I MEF. While at the Naval Postgraduate School, he was in the Defense Systems Analysis curriculum and completed studies for a degree in Master of Science in Management. He graduated from NPS in December of 2016, and his subsequent tour will be with Marine Corps Systems Command.

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Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - vi - Naval Postgraduate School NPS-CE-17-020

ACQUISITION RESEARCH PROGRAM SPONSORED REPORT SERIES

The Marine Corps Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron of the Future: A Manpower Estimate

December 2016

MAJ Ricardo A. Barton, USMC Thesis Advisors: William Hatch, Senior Lecturer Dr. Robert Mortlock, Lecturer

Graduate School of Business & Public Policy

Naval Postgraduate School

Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the federal government.

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Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - viii - Naval Postgraduate School TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 A. AREA OF RESEARCH ...... 1 B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...... 3 1. Primary Research Questions ...... 3 2. Secondary Research Questions ...... 3 C. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY ...... 3 D. SCOPE ...... 3 E. METHODOLOGY ...... 4

II. BACKGROUND OF THE MARINE CORPS UAS ...... 5 A. BACKGROUND ...... 5 1. World War I ...... 5 2. World War II and the ...... 7 3. ...... 8 4. Israeli UASs ...... 11 B. HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS...... 13 C. COMPONENTS AND CATEGORIES OF A UAS ...... 15 1. Unmanned Aircraft ...... 17 2. Payload ...... 17 3. Control Element ...... 17 4. Communications ...... 19 5. Support Element...... 20 6. Categories ...... 20 D. THE MARINE CORPS FAMILY OF UAS SYSTEMS ...... 21 1. Group 1 UASs ...... 21 2. Cargo UAS ...... 22 3. RQ-7B Shadow UAS ...... 23 4. RQ-21 Blackjack ...... 24

III. DOTMLPF OF THE CURRENT MARINE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE SQUADRON ...... 27 A. MARINE CORPS TITLE 10 RESPONSIBILITIES, DOCTRINE, AND ORGANIZATION ...... 27 1. Overview of the Marine Expeditionary Unit ...... 28 2. The MEU’s ...... 29 B. OVERVIEW OF THE MARINE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE SQUADRON ...... 29 1. Mission of the VMU ...... 29

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - ix - Naval Postgraduate School 2. Concept of Operations ...... 30 3. Core and Core Plus Mission Essential Tasks ...... 31 4. Table of Organization ...... 32 C. TRAINING— UAS OPERATORS AND MAINTAINERS ...... 33 1. UAS Officers ...... 33 2. Enlisted UAS Operators ...... 37 3. UAS Avionics/Maintenance Technicians ...... 38 4. Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Minimum Training Standards ...... 39 D. MATERIEL ...... 40 1. Attributes...... 41 2. Capabilities ...... 41 E. LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION ...... 46 1. UAS Operators ...... 46 2. UAS Maintainers ...... 46 F. FACILITIES ...... 47 1. Air Stations ...... 48 2. Ships ...... 48 3. Airspace ...... 49

IV. MARINE AVIATION MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS ...... 51 A. LIFE-CYCLE COST CATEGORIES...... 51 B. COMMON MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS ...... 52 1. Operations ...... 52 2. Maintenance ...... 52 3. Other Unit-Level ...... 53 C. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS IN MARINE SQUADRONS ...... 55 1. Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron...... 55 2. Marine Heavy Squadron ...... 57 3. Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron ...... 59 4. Marine Attack Squadron ...... 62 5. VMU ...... 65

V. MUX MANPOWER ESTIMATE ...... 69 A. ESTIMATE METHODOLOGY ...... 69 B. ASSUMPTIONS ...... 70 1. Assumption—Number of Aircraft in a System ...... 70 2. Assumption—Number of Aircraft Controlled at a Time ...... 70 3. Assumption—Crew Composition ...... 71 4. Assumption—NATOPS Flight Time Limits ...... 72 5. Assumption—UAS Operators Deployment Method ...... 73

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - x - Naval Postgraduate School 6. Assumption—Concept of Employment ...... 74 C. MODEL ...... 75 1. Operators ...... 75 2. Maintenance ...... 77 3. Other Unit Level ...... 90 D. TOTAL COST OF THE FUTURE VMU ...... 99 E. SUMMARY ...... 104

VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, FURTHER RESEARCH ...... 105 A. SUMMARY ...... 105 B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 106 1. Primary Research Questions ...... 106 2. Secondary Research Question ...... 107 C. FURTHER RESEARCH ...... 108

LIST OF REFERENCES ...... 111

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Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xii - Naval Postgraduate School LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Kettering Bug. Source: National Museum of the Air Force (2015)...... 7

Figure 2. Republic Bikini Drone. Source: Parsch (2004)...... 8

Figure 3. BQM-34s loaded on DC-130. Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation (n.d.)...... 10

Figure 4. QH-50 DASH. Source: Gyrodyne Helicopter Historical Foundation (n.d.)...... 11

Figure 5. IAI Scout. Source: Israeli Air Force (n.d.)...... 13

Figure 6. RQ-2 Pioneer. Source: UAV Global (2016)...... 14

Figure 7. UAS Components. Source: ALSA (2015)...... 16

Figure 8. LOS UAS Operational Concept. Source: Government Accountability Office ([GAO], 2010)...... 18

Figure 9. BLOS UAS Operational Concept. Source: GAO (2010)...... 19

Figure 10. CRUAS. Source: HQMC AVN (2014)...... 23

Figure 11. RQ-7B Shadow. Source: HQMC AVN (2014)...... 24

Figure 12. RQ-21A Catapult Launch at NAS Patuxent River. Source: Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) (2013)...... 26

Figure 13. RQ-21A Sky Hook Recovery Aboard USS Mesa Verde. Source: NAVAIR (2013)...... 26

Figure 14. Marine Corps Group 3 UAS Operator Training Flow. Source: DOD (2013)...... 35

Figure 15. Air Force MQ-1/9 Pilot and Sensor Operator Training Flow. Source: DOD (2013)...... 37

Figure 16. Army Group 3 and Above UAS Training Flow. Source: DOD (2013)...... 38

Figure 17. Illustrative System Life Cycle. Source: DOD (2014)...... 51

Figure 18. O-Level Maintenance Department Line and Staff Relationships (Marine Corps). Source: CNAF (2013)...... 54

Figure 19. MV-22B Osprey. Source: USMC (2016) ...... 57

Figure 20. CH-53E Sea Stallion. Source: USMC (2016) ...... 58

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xiii - Naval Postgraduate School Figure 21. AH-1Z Viper. Source: USMC (2016)...... 60

Figure 22. UH-Y Venom. Source: Leake (2015)...... 60

Figure 23. AV-8B Harrier II. Source: USMC (2016)...... 64

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xiv - Naval Postgraduate School LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. UAS Categories. Source: CJCS (2014)...... 21

Table 2. VMU Support to the MAGTFs. Source: HQMC CD&I (2016b)...... 30

Table 3. VMU Mission Essential Task List. Source: HQMC TECOM (2015b)...... 31

Table 4. VMU METs versus Six Functions of Marine Aviation. Source: HQMC TECOM (2015b)...... 32

Table 5. Aircraft, Attributes, and Capability Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2016a); ALSA Center (2015)...... 45

Table 6. Capability Requirement Risk Matrix. Source: HQMC CD&I (2016a)...... 45

Table 7. VMM Core Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012)...... 56

Table 8. VMM Detachment Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012)...... 56

Table 9. HMH Core Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2014b) ...... 59

Table 10. HMH Detachment Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2014b)...... 59

Table 11. HMLA Core Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2015a)...... 62

Table 12. HMLA Detachment Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2015a)...... 62

Table 13. VMA Core Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2014a)...... 63

Table 14. VMA Detachment Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2014a)...... 64

Table 15. VMU Core Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2015b)...... 66

Table 16. VMU Detachment Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2015b)...... 66

Table 17. STUAS Section. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2015b)...... 67

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xv - Naval Postgraduate School Table 18. Minimum Required Crews per Detachments. Adapted from CNO (2009)...... 76

Table 19. Core Airframes and Corrosion Control Branches. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a)...... 82

Table 20. Detachment Airframes and Corrosion Control Branches. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a)...... 82

Table 21. Core and Detachment Avionics Marines by Squadron Type. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a)...... 84

Table 22. Line Mechanics Listed to Core Squadrons. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a)...... 87

Table 23. Line Mechanics Listed to Detachments. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a)...... 87

Table 24. MALS Augments to Deployed Squadrons. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a)...... 89

Table 25. Detachment Admin Personnel by Squadron. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b) ...... 91

Table 26. Detachment Intelligence Personnel. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b) ...... 94

Table 27. Core Logistics Personnel. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b) ...... 97

Table 28. VMU Communications Personnel. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2015b)...... 99

Table 29. Total Personnel by Cost Element...... 101

Table 30. Total Officers by Cost Element...... 101

Table 31. Total Enlisted Marines and Sailors by Cost Element...... 102

Table 32. Annual Unit Level Manpower Cost of VMU(F)...... 103

Table 33. Annual Unit Level Manpower Cost of VMU...... 103

Table 34. Annual Manpower Cost of MALS Augments to VMU(F)...... 103

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xvi - Naval Postgraduate School LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD Anti-access/area denial AAMO Assistant Aircraft Maintenance Officer ACE Aviation Combat Element AEW Airborne Early Warning ALIMS Aviation Logistics Information Management System AMO Aircraft Maintenance Officer ARG Amphibious Ready Group ASO Aviation Safety Officer AVO Air Vehicle Operator BLOS Beyond-Line-of-Sight BUQ Basic UAS Qualification CAS CBA Capabilities Based Assessment CD&I Combat Development and Integration CDQAR Collateral Duty Quality Assurance Representative CSG Carrier Strike Group DAS Deep Air Support DASH Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter DOD Department of Defense DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities DSS Department of Safety and Standardization EO-IR Electro-Optical-Infrared EW Electronic Warfare FAA Federal Aviation Administration FOC Full Operational Capability

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xvii - Naval Postgraduate School GBSAA Ground-Based Sense and Avoid GCE Ground Combat Element GCS Ground Control Station GDT Ground Data Terminal GSE Ground Support Equipment HMH Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron HMLA Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron HMMWV High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps IADS Integrated Air Defense Systems IAF Israeli Air Force ICD Initial Capabilities Document IDF (Control of) Indirect Fires/Israeli Defense Force IOC Initial Operational Capability IR Infrared ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance JMQ Joint Mission Qualification JP Joint Publication JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council KIAS Knots Indicated Airspeed LCE Logistics Combat Element LFOC Landing Force Operations Center LOS Line-of-Sight LRS Launch and Recovery Site MACCS Marine Air Command and Control System MACG Marine Aircraft Control Group MAG Marine Aircraft Group MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xviii - Naval Postgraduate School MAWTS-1 Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One MCAS Marine Corps Air Station MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command MCDP Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication MCWP Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade MEF Marine Expeditionary Force MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit MET Mission Essential Task MMCO Maintenance/Material Control Officer MOS Military Occupational Specialty MPO Mission Payload Operator MTVR Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement MUX MAGTF UAS Expeditionary (MUX) Capabilities NAS National Airspace System NFO Naval Flight Officer NM Nautical Miles NMOS Necessary Military Occupational Specialty O&S Operating and Support OAS Offensive Air Support OCO Overseas Contingency Operations OIC Officer in Charge OPNAVINST Chief of Naval Operations Instruction OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense OTH Over the Horizon OWS Operational Work Station PMOS Primary Military Occupational Specialty PoR Program of Record

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xix - Naval Postgraduate School QA Quality Assurance QAR Quality Assurance Representative RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle RQ Reconnaissance Drone SAM Surface-to-Air Missile SCAR Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance SM Statute Mile SNCO Staff Non-Commissioned Officer STUAS Small Tactical UAS T&R Training and Readiness Manual TBS TFSMS Total Force Structure Management System TO&E Table of Organization and Equipment UAC Unmanned Aircraft Commander UAS Unmanned Aerial System UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle URT Undergraduate RPA Training VMA Marine Attack Squadron VFR Visual Flight Rules VMA Marine Attack Squadron VMM Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron VMU Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron VMU(F) Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron of the Future

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xx - Naval Postgraduate School I. INTRODUCTION

A. AREA OF RESEARCH

An Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) per the Defense Acquisition University’s Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms & Terms states that an ICD, “documents one or more new capability requirements and associated capability gap(s) with a non-materiel solution, materiel solution, or some combination of the two” (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2012, p. B-107). The Marine Corps’ Initial Capabilities Document for Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Expeditionary (MUX) Capabilities published in August 2016, completed the initial step in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process when it “made its way through the functional capabilities board and was approved and recommended for joint capabilities board consideration” (Hudson, 2016).

Headquarters Marine Corps, Combat Development and Integration (HQMC CD&I), the sponsoring organization for the MUX ICD, guided by the Marine Corps’ capstone concept, Expeditionary Force 21, organized working groups of subject matter experts to analyze the Marine Corps’ capabilities and gaps to support the National Military Strategy. The impetus behind the capabilities evaluation was “EF-21’s emphasis on supporting the MAGTF from a sea base in a future high-threat, dynamic, distributed environment” (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Combat Development and Integration [HQMC] CD&I, 2016a, p. 1). The MUX ICD has its basis in the 2015 Marine Air Ground Task Force Aviation Functions Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) and the 2014 Tactical Distribution Transportation CBA.

After reviewing the contribution of the six functions of Marine Corps aviation to various joint capability areas, the most consistent capability gap identified was “Marine aviation’s lack of an all-weather capability with extended operational reach (500+ nautical miles) and persistence (24 hour/day) at that distance” (HQMC CD&I, 2016a, p. iii). Coupled with the requirements to operate from L-class ships or other naval vessels (because of the risks and uncertainties associated with forward basing challenges), deliver air-to-ground ordnance, and conduct tactical transportation, there is no multi-role

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 1 - Naval Postgraduate School platform in the entire Department of Defense (DOD), let alone the Marine Corps, able to satisfactorily meet the capabilities desired.

The performance requirements (e.g., range, persistence, and payload) and mission tasks (e.g., deep air support, close air support, aerial escort, tactical transport) required of the MUX point to the MUX likely being a Group 4 or 5 UAS. The largest UASs currently operated by the Marine Corps are Group 3 UASs. A group 3 UAS weighs no more than 1,320 pounds, flies no higher than 18,000 feet mean sea level (MSL), and goes no faster than 250 knots of indicated airspeed. By contrast, group 4 and 5 UASs operated by the Air Force, Army, and Navy (i.e., MQ-1, MQ-4, and MQ-9) have the performance to accomplish the mission but cannot operate from ships. Both group 4 and 5 UAS weigh more than 1,320 pounds and fly at any airspeed, the difference between the two is that group 5 UASs can operate at altitudes greater than 18,000 feet MSL (CJCS, 2014).

The only non-materiel approach to addressing the capability gap identified in the MUX ICD is to limit the operational range of the MAGTF to 110 nautical miles. This solution is deemed unfeasible because of the threats posed in future non-permissive anti- access/area denial (A2/AD) environments. In short, the MUX ICD identifies a materiel solution to the future capabilities needs of the MAGTF and specifically states “an advanced, short takeoff, and landing (STOL) or vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) UAS will be a required element of the solution set” (HQMC CD&I, 2016a, p. 10).

Planned Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the MUX is 2025, with Full Operational Capability (FOC) achieved by 2034. If the MUX is fielded, it will result in large changes to all aspect of the Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU). The ICD is one step in the acquisitions process, this research focuses on the potential manpower cost of the MUX and how it affects the total life cycle costs of the system.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 2 - Naval Postgraduate School B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Primary Research Questions

• What are the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) considerations associated with incorporating the MUX into Marine aviation? • What are the effects to Operations and Support costs, specifically manpower costs, with procurement of the MUX?

2. Secondary Research Questions

• What are the manpower requirements for incorporating the MUX (i.e., a Group 4/5 UAS) into Marine Corps Aviation? • How would manpower requirements of the MUX compare with those of other Marine Corps squadrons? • What are the DOTMLPF considerations associated with employing the MUX from naval shipping?

C. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY

The development and procurement of a Group 4 or 5 UAS will enhance the lethality of the MAGTF but it comes at a cost. A manpower study, based on a given concept of organization and concept of employment, will help ascertain operating and support (O&S) costs of the MUX. O&S costs are one of four major cost categories of a program’s life-cycle cost, and manpower is usually the largest portion within that category (DOD, 2014).

D. SCOPE

The scope of this study includes the following: a) review and history of unmanned aerial systems; b) review of current UAS platforms, missions, and organization of the VMU; c) DOTMLPF analysis of a materiel acquisition of Group 4/5 UAS; d) an analogous analysis of manpower requirements for the Group 4/5 UAS squadron, various Marine, manned, aviation squadrons, and the current VMU; and e) cost estimation of the mission personnel portion of the Operations and Support phase for the VMU of the future.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 3 - Naval Postgraduate School E. METHODOLOGY

• Conduct a literature review of current warfighting doctrinal publications, documents, instructions, and policies, within the Marine Corps, Department of the Navy (DON), and the Department of Defense.

• Conduct a literature review of the development of the UAS, its incorporation into the Marine Corps, and its envisioned future within Marine Aviation.

• Correspond with key leaders and staff at various VMUs, and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC); collect information on the state of current systems and future capabilities desired by the Marine Corps.

• Conduct a DOTMLPF analysis of today’s VMU.

• Collect various Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) from the Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS) operated by the Total Force Structure Division of CD&I.

• Conduct an analogous analysis of manpower requirements for various squadrons in the Marine Corps, and develop a model for the VMU of the future given a set of assumptions.

• Prepare a cost estimation of the manpower requirements for the VMU of the Future, VMU(F), using the “Military Composite Standard Pay and Reimbursement Rates” as released by the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 4 - Naval Postgraduate School II. BACKGROUND OF THE MARINE CORPS UAS

A. BACKGROUND

The utility of the UAS has been proven a number of times throughout the history of modern warfare only to be neglected until the next war. UASs were neglected for a number of reasons, including poor performance, the requirement to produce more- capable manned platforms, constrained fiscal environments, and the threat perception of traditional pilots against unmanned aircraft. What has never been in question is the UAS’s ability to conduct those missions that are deemed dull, dirty, or dangerous. The DOD’s (2013) Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038, loosely defines those missions that are dull, dirty, and dangerous, and provides examples of why UASs are better suited to undertake those missions:

Dull missions are ideal for unmanned systems because they involve long- duration undertakings with mundane tasks that are ill suited for manned systems. Good examples are surveillance missions that involve prolonged observation. Unmanned systems currently fulfill a wide variety of “dull” mission sets, and the number will increase in all domains as unmanned systems capabilities improve. Dirty missions have the potential to unnecessarily expose personnel to hazardous conditions. A primary is chemical, biological, and nuclear detection missions. Unmanned systems can perform these dirty missions with less risk exposure to the operators. Dangerous missions involve high risk. With advances in capabilities in performance and automation, unmanned systems will reduce risk exposure to personnel by increasingly fulfilling capabilities that are inherently dangerous. (p. 20)

Because they are unmanned, UASs are optimized to perform particular missions that manned aircraft cannot or should not, and they can liberate manned aircraft to perform missions that they are better suited to perform than UASs are. In a family of weapons systems, UASs can, and do, fill particular voids because of the combination of their attributes.

1. World War I

The advent of the first unmanned aerial vehicles occurred around World War I, when they were first designed to fill a limited number of roles. As with manned aviation at the turn of the century, unmanned aviation was developing in leaps and bounds.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 5 - Naval Postgraduate School However, because of the greater technological demands required to fly unmanned aircraft autonomously, manned aviation developed at a much quicker pace. Despite the slower evolution, early pioneers of unmanned aviation recognized its potential and utility, and did their best to support this growing field.

The first unmanned aircraft were developed to serve as remotely-piloted aircraft targets for aerial gunner training. Subsequent development led them to serve as “flying torpedo[s]” to take down opposing aircraft (Darling, n.d.) or to serve as rudimentary guided bombs. Regardless of the specified role of unmanned aircraft, they had to successfully master “three critical technologies, in addition to that of flight itself: 1) automatic stabilization, 2) remote control, and 3) autonomous navigation” (Newcome, 2004, p. 15) in order to fly. A pilot, if flying in an aircraft with sufficient power and stability, does all three functions that had to (and still have to) be designed into unmanned aerial vehicles. Charles Franklin Kettering’s “Bug” used “a combination of pneumatics, electricity, and gears” (Newcome, 2004, p. 24) to control flight control surfaces, while other pioneers focused on radio communications and controls to pilot unmanned aircraft, as shown in Figure 1. Other innovators focused on a variety of means to tackle the autonomous navigation issue, like using a combination of gyroscopes and gears to fly pre-programmed, dead reckoning routes.

Newcome’s (1998) description of how Kettering’s Bug was designed to fly and then deliver ordnance on a specific target provides a great example of the engineering behind early, unmanned aircraft.

Altitude was controlled by an aneroid barometer that could be preset to a given height at which it would trip a switch to turn control over to Sperry’s gyroscope to maintain its preset altitude via a link to the elevators. Direction was maintained by the gyroscope, based on its prelaunch alignment, deflecting without touching small pneumatic valves linked to the rudder. The vacuum was produced by a bellows activated by suction produced by the engine crankcase. Distance was measured by a wing-mounted anemometer tied to pneumatically operated subtracting counter. The counter would be preset to the desired number of clicks, each corresponding to 100 yd, which on reaching zero short-circuited the engine ignition, causing the Bug to dive on its target. (p. 24)

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 6 - Naval Postgraduate School

Figure 1. Kettering Bug. Source: National Museum of the Air Force (2015).

2. World War II and the Cold War

During World War II, advances in technology allowed the performance of unmanned aircraft to improve in all regards. Nevertheless, unmanned aircraft played a peripheral role in World War II. The primary mission of unmanned aircraft during World War II was to serve as aerial targets for gunnery training. One notable exception was the month-long operation of 50 U.S. Navy TDR-1 Assault Drones, of Special Task Air Group One (STAG-1), in combat. These aircraft were employed in one of two ways—a) to dive into their targets while armed with 2,000-pound bombs, or b) to act as unmanned bombers. Of the 50 deployed, “15 were lost to mechanical/technical causes, three to enemy fire, and 31 hit or damaged their targets” (Newcome, 2004, p. 69).

After World War II and during the 1950s, the advent of the ballistic missile and nuclear weapons hastened the development of autonomous navigation (one of the three technical challenges required for successful unmanned aircraft operations). The diffusion of various navigation technologies made its way to the unmanned aircraft community. Reconnaissance missions flown in “dirty” nuclear environments or in high-threat environments naturally made unmanned aircraft ideal aircraft to operate in these environments. With no onboard aircrew to risk, unmanned aircraft could operate in environments that were risky to humans. By risking only machine and not man, losses

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 7 - Naval Postgraduate School from hostile actions, radiation poisoning, and political fall-out, like the Francis Gary Powers U-2 shoot-down, could be avoided.

Thousands of unmanned aircraft were deployed throughout the services. The U.S. Army operated well over 1,400 smaller drones for use at the tactical level. The U.S. Air Force attempted to develop more advanced, strategic drones for reconnaissance missions but all were cancelled prior to reaching IOC. The U.S. Marine Corps initiated its own unmanned aircraft program to serve at the battalion level. Initiated in 1959, the Republic “Bikini” entered operational evaluations in 1963 at Marine Corps Base Twenty-Nine Palms (CA) but was cancelled by 1967 (Newcome, 2004), as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Republic Bikini Drone. Source: Parsch (2004).

3. Vietnam War

The Vietnam War was the conflict in which unmanned aircraft truly came into their own. It was the first conflict in which unmanned aircraft were used as reconnaissance platforms and the first conflict in which they flew quite extensively. From their initial deployment in August 1964 to re-deployment in June 1975, unmanned aircraft flew, on average, at least one flight per day. The two unmanned aircraft that were most notable in this conflict were the Ryan AQM-34 Lightning Bug and the Gyrodyne QH-50 Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter (DASH) (Newcome, 2004).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 8 - Naval Postgraduate School a. AQM-34 Lightning Bug

The AQM-34 Lightning Bug, a variant of the BQM-34 Firebee, was the most prolifically employed unmanned aircraft of the Vietnam War, as shown in Figure 3. It was a second-generation Ryan unmanned aircraft. It was originally developed from the Q-2C Firefly reconnaissance aircraft. The Q-2C itself was first developed as an aerial target drone, but evolved to become a reconnaissance platform in 1962 after showing promise in such a capacity and in response to the shoot-down of a U-2 piloted by Gary Powers in May 1960 (Newcome, 2004).

During the war, “1016 AQM-34s flew 3435 combat sorties during which 544 were lost, approximately two-thirds to hostile fire and one-third to mechanical malfunctions, for an overall mission success rate of over 84%” (Newcome, 2004, p. 86). The Lightning Bugs flew autonomously with pre-programmed routes, or were controlled by pilots either airborne in DC-130s or ground-based via ground control stations (GCSs). They conducted a wide variety of missions from: photo reconnaissance, electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), strike, and psychological operations. In the strike role, they employed the newly developed Maverick air-to-ground missile; in the psychological operations role they dropped leaflets. Throughout the war, the Lightning Bugs’ tactics, techniques, and procedures, evolved allowing them to prove the utility of unmanned aircraft. So useful is the AQM-34 design that, over 50 years after initial development, they are still being used by a host of nations, including the United States. To date, over 8,500 Firebees have been manufactured, 2,000 of which are non-target variants like the Lightning Bug (Northrop Grumman, n.d.).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 9 - Naval Postgraduate School

Figure 3. BQM-34s loaded on DC-130. Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation (n.d.).

b. Gyrodyne QH-50 DASH

The QH-50 DASH, unlike its predecessor and contemporary unmanned aircraft, was a rotary-wing unmanned aerial vehicle, as shown in Figure 4. The DASH, first developed as a small helicopter for the Marine Corps in the mid-1950s, answered the Navy’s capability gap for extended anti-submarine warfare. As sonar developed the capability to detect targets at greater distances than torpedoes could hit, the Navy envisioned the DASH as a way to attack enemy submarines at those greater distances.

The Navy first operationally deployed the DASH in January 1963 aboard the USS Buck (DD-761), and would take delivery of over 771 QH-50 Cs and Ds over the next six years (Newcome, 2004). By 1971, however, the DASHs were phased out from naval service not only because of potential competition from the manned, Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System, but also just as likely from its extremely high loss rate (i.e., 383 of the 771) during operations.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 10 - Naval Postgraduate School

Figure 4. Gyrodyne QH-50 DASH. Source: Gyrodyne Helicopter Historical Foundation (n.d.).

During its relatively short operational career, the DASH evolved from an ASW platform to a reconnaissance platform to a hunter-killer/armed reconnaissance platform. Project Snoopy outfitted the DASH with a television camera and datalink to enable surveillance and target acquisition for attack by naval surface fires; Nite Panther added a low-light television, a laser rangefinder, and a laser target designator to enable target acquisition and target designation during night and all-weather conditions; and Nite Gazelle added rockets, miniguns, and bomblets to the DASH, enabling it to successfully attack North Vietnamese troops at night. Newcome (2004) states that the DASH was

1) The first rotary wing UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] produced. 2) The first UAV to take off and land back aboard a vessel at sea. 3) The first unmanned reconnaissance helicopter. 4) The first hunter-killer UAV (Project DESJEZ, employing sonobouys and torpedoes from the same drone). (p. 88)

4. Israeli UASs

At the same time that the United States was heavily involved with fighting in Southeast Asia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Israel found itself surrounded by unfriendly nations that were poised to threaten the Israeli Air Force (IAF) with increasingly sophisticated integrated air defense systems (IADS). The Israelis, feeling threatened by the deployment of the Soviet-made SA-2 surface-to-air (SAM) in Egypt

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 11 - Naval Postgraduate School and Syria in 1965, began considering the use of unmanned aircraft to serve in a reconnaissance role. Israel compared manned aircraft like the Mirage III, which flew low but fast, the U-2 which flew very high but slowly, or unmanned aircraft like the French R.20. The Israelis also desired a system that was mature and ready for deployment. When the procurement of the R.20 did not happen, and with the downing of two RF-4 Phantoms by Egyptian SAMs in 1970, the Israelis turned to the United States and received its first deliveries of the Firebee in 1971 (Newcome, 2004).

Israel used its newly received Firebees during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The losses of fighter aircraft to Egyptian SA-2s and SA-6s during the war precipitated the “increased IDF [Israeli Defense Force] interest in UAV development and employment, spurring the creation of a UAV division within IAI [Israeli Aircraft Industries] and the formation of native UAV companies” (Newcome, 2004, p. 95). By the early 1980s, Israeli companies had already developed several successful designs, including the Tadiran Mastiff and the IAI Scout, as shown in Figure 5. These two designs were twin- boom, high aspect ratio aircraft with pusher-type propellers. During the1982 Lebanon War, the IAF initially used its unmanned aircraft as decoys and then as reconnaissance platforms, enabling its forces to devastate the Syrians’ IADS and aircraft operating in and around the Beka’a Valley.

Israel named its invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982 “Operation Peace for Galilee.” Israel launched its offensive on June 6 and made the destruction of 19 Syrian SA-6s SAM batteries in the Beka’a Valley its first priority. The IAF launched multiple unmanned aircraft throughout southern Lebanon to serve as decoys in an attempt to get the Syrian IADS to track and engage the decoys— it worked. Without properly identifying their targets and through poor fire discipline, the Syrians fell for the Israeli trap and unleashed a fusillade of SAMs at the decoys. This enabled Israeli ELINT platforms to identify the locations of the SAM batteries, engage them with cannon artillery, artillery, and SEAD aircraft using anti-radiation missiles, Mavericks, and bombs. Scouts and Mastiffs provided continuous video coverage to the IAF, enabling attacks on target, and there is one account in which an unmanned aircraft sent live video coverage, through datalink, to IAF headquarters of aircraft taxiing and then taking off from various airbases. With enhanced situational awareness, the IAF

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 12 - Naval Postgraduate School command and control structure was able to vector IAF fighters to engage and destroy Syrian aircraft. By the end of the June 6, 17 of 19 SA-6 systems in the Beka’a Valley were destroyed, and numerous other SA-2 and SA-3 system were attacked and destroyed (Lambeth, 1984).

Figure 5. IAI Scout. Source: Israeli Air Force (n.d.).

B. HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

U.S. interest in unmanned aircraft was rekindled when the IAF used them in the Lebanon War. In particular, the Department of the Navy was interested in using unmanned aircraft to better enable target acquisition and control of naval surface fires. The Marines ashore in Lebanon, and the Navy afloat with the carriers and battleships in the Mediterranean, saw first-hand the utility of unmanned aircraft and entered into negotiations to procure Israeli unmanned aircraft. The Mastiff was procured by the U.S. Navy and delivered by the summer of 1984 (Newcome, 2004).

CD&I states in Unmanned Aircraft System Operations (2016b) that “the Marine Corps first conducted successful, sustained unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations in the early 1980s when the RQ-2B Pioneer was used as a spotting platform for naval gunfire and artillery” (p. 1–1). The lineage of the Marine Corps’ first UAS unit (i.e. Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2) can be traced to June 1984, when it was first organized as “Detachment T, Target Acquisition Battery, 10th Marine Regiment, 2d

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 13 - Naval Postgraduate School Marine Division” (Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron Two [VMU-2]: About, 2016). That unit, shortly afterward, was re-organized; re-assigned a different higher headquarters; and was re-designated as the 1st Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Platoon, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division. First RPV’s initial training occurred on the Israeli Mastiff RPV system and received its first UAS in the form of the RQ-2B Pioneer, as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6. RQ-2 Pioneer. Source: UAV Global (2016).

From 1984 to 1990, the number of RPVs in the Marine Corps increased, the size of the units increased from platoon-sized to company-sized units, the mission changed from an exclusive indirect fire (IDF) spotting system to one that served as a “designated reconnaissance asset” (CD&I, 2016b, p. 1–1), 1st RPV Platoon was re-designated as 2nd RPV Company (VMU-2: About, 2016), and a second RPV Company, 1st RPV Company, was established.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, both RPVs flew a combined 1,200 combat hours (CD&I, 2016b) in support of combat operations by detecting “[enemy] troop movements, artillery positions, armored formations, surface-to-surface missiles, and air defense sites” (VMU-1: History, 2016). Both companies did well during the conflict and proved the utility of the weapon system. After the war, both companies continued to support combat and contingency operations, whether it was during

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 14 - Naval Postgraduate School Operation Provide Comfort (i.e., humanitarian assistance in Iraq) or Operation Joint Endeavour (i.e. NATO mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Both units, now renamed VMUs, deployed to in support of Operation Southern Focus and then eventually participated in the invasion of Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

VMU-2 was the last unit from 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) to return to the United States from Iraq in September 2003; however, it was redeployed to Iraq in February 2004. From that time forward until VMU-2 deployed to in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2009, VMU-1 and VMU-2 swapped duties as the sole Marine VMU in Iraq (VMU-1, 2016; “VMU-2” 2016). During OIF, both VMUs would add capacity by adding Scan Eagle UAS detachments (a Group 2 UAS) in addition to the Pioneer, and eventually replaced their RQ-2 Pioneers with RQ-7B Shadows.

VMU-3, the Marine Corps’ newest active component VMU, was activated in September 2008, and by January 2010, it deployed detachments to support Shadow UAS operations in Afghanistan and Scan Eagle UAS operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously (VMU-3 2016). By adding this third VMU, the Marine Corps relieved some of the high operational tempo that had been consistently applied to VMU 1 and 2 prior to the onset of hostilities in Iraq in 2003. According to HQMC CD&I (2016b), “two VMU’s continuously rotated between Operations OIF and OEF, providing vital intelligence on insurgent activity, spotting for artillery fire, coordinating , and providing battle damage assessment” through 2011 (p. 1–2).

VMU-4, the sole Reserve component VMU, was activated in 2011. Per the 2015 Marine Aviation Plan (HQMC Department of Aviation [AVN], 2014), the Marine Corps intends to activate VMU-5(-) in fiscal year 2023 and “has begun deliberate planning to locate each VMU aboard a Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)” (p. 2.7.2).

C. COMPONENTS AND CATEGORIES OF A UAS

JP 3–30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2014) defines a UAS as a “system whose components include the necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft” (p. GL-7) The term UAS is synonymous with the terms “unmanned aircraft [UA]-An aircraft that

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 15 - Naval Postgraduate School does not carry a human operator and is capable of flight with or without human remote control,” unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) a term the U.S. Air Force uses to “differentiate its operators who have been trained to similar standards as manned aircraft pilots” (CJCS, 2014, p. III-30). Common terminology changed in 2008 to UAS in order to reflect the importance of the entire system required to operate the aerial vehicle and to not focus solely on the aerial vehicle itself. In order to allay confusion and standardize terminology in this work, the term “UAV” is used when referring to the aerial vehicle portion of the system, and “UAS” will be used when discussing the entirety of the system. Another important aspect when considering the nature of UASs, is that they are distinguished “from munitions, decoys, and other entities capable of unmanned flight in that they are generally intended for recovery and reuse after each mission” (HQMC CD&I, 2015, p. 1–2). They consist of the unmanned aircraft, payload, control element, communications, and support element, as depicted in Figure 7.

Figure 7. UAS Components. Source: ALSA (2015).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 16 - Naval Postgraduate School 1. Unmanned Aircraft

The unmanned aircraft portion of the UAS is the actual aerial vehicle portion of the system. The vehicle can come in the form of a rotary-wing, tilt-rotor, fixed-wing, or lighter-than-air vehicle, and it does not have an on-board crew (HQMC CD&I, 2015).

2. Payload

Payloads are those sub-systems that are not required to actually propel, fuel, control, or navigate the UAV. Items such as: sensors, weapons, and communications relays are examples of payloads (HQMC CD&I, 2015).

3. Control Element

The control element is what controls the UAV during the execution of flight operations, and the Ground Control Station (GCS) is where UAS operators are physically located when they are controlling the UAV and conducting the mission. They can be “ground-based, sea-based, or airborne” and they range in size (i.e., “laptop computer, large control van, shipboard module, or fixed facility;” HQMC CD&I, 2016b, p. 1–3). Some GCSs can control more than one UAS at a time; they can be geographically co- located with the aircraft in theatre and use line-of-sight (LOS) communications as depicted in Figure 8, or can be geographically separated (e.g., CONUS-based). When a UAS is operated in a geographically-separated manner, as is usually the case with larger UASs (i.e., Group 4 or 5), the UAV takes off from a launch and recovery site (LRS) using LOS communications and at some point during the flight the GCS takes control of the aircraft using beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communications, as depicted in Figure 9.

The UASs in service today with the Marine Corps operate via LOS. The UAV is controlled by the GCS, located at the LRS, for the entire duration of the flight. LOS operations do not require satellite communications to communicate between the UAV, GCS, and ground troops.

The range of the UAV is typically limited by how far the GCS can effectively communicate with the UAV. Factors that affect the GCS’ ability to communicate with the UAV can be the power output of the antenna(s); the topography and weather not only at

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 17 - Naval Postgraduate School the LRS, but also at the objective area/target site and along the route of flight during ingress and egress.

Figure 8. LOS UAS Operational Concept. Source: Government Accountability Office ([GAO], 2010).

The U.S. Air Force operates its Group 4 (i.e., MQ-1 Predators) and Group 5 UASs (i.e., MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-4 Global Hawk) via BLOS communications. By operating a UAV using BLOS, the range of the UAV and its employment options are greatly expanded.

BLOS operations allows UAS operators to be stationed separate from the aircraft, thereby reducing the logistical footprint forward in theatre and reducing personnel costs associated with forward deployment of forces. It allows more flexibility for the scheduling of aircrew to support multiple missions throughout the globe, it reduces UAS pilot and system operator requirements by consolidating control in fewer locations, and it reduces equipment and materiel needs for GCSs by consolidating the GCSs in fewer locations.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 18 - Naval Postgraduate School Disadvantages of using BLOS communications range from the numbers and capacity of existing (and future) satellites to support the requirements, susceptibility to anti-satellite operations/electronic warfare, and integration of UAV operators and those being supported during the planning process.

Figure 9. BLOS UAS Operational Concept. Source: GAO (2010).

4. Communications

Communications equipment aboard UASs consist of voice and data link communications. They are LOS- or BLOS-capable, and they provide voice communications between the personnel on the ground via the UAV to the UAS operators at the GCS, or “imagery and associated metadata via direct LOS downlink to a remote video terminal (RVT)” (HQMC CD&I, 2015, p. 1–3). Imagery collected and/or transmitted from a UAS can be sent via the distributed common ground systems (DCGSs), the Global Broadcast Service, or via the Department of Defense Information Network. (HQMC CD&I, 2015).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 19 - Naval Postgraduate School 5. Support Element

The support element consists of those ancillary pieces of equipment required to “deploy, transport, maintain, launch, and recover the unmanned aircraft and enable its communications” (HQMC CD&I, 2015, p. 1–3). As with manned aircraft, UAVs require a large logistical support structure in order to realize the full potential of the system. As systems get larger and more complex, they require more ground support equipment to conduct maintenance, and the more expeditionary the UAV and/or the GCSs become, the more tactical transport is required to move the personnel and systems throughout the battlespace.

Equipment considered support element in the case of the RQ-7 Shadow include the launcher, the Tactical Automated Landing System, the air vehicle transport, and arresting gear.

6. Categories

There are five distinct categories of UASs in the DOD (i.e., Groups 1–5). The groups are divided up by a combination of the UAVs’ maximum gross take-off weight (i.e., pounds), their normal service ceiling (i.e., feet of elevation, above ground level [AGL] or MSL), and the speed at which they operate (i.e., knots of indicated airspeed- KIAS). See Table 1 for an overview of the five categories. The capabilities of each group are as follows: • Group 1: 0–20 pounds, <1,200’ AGL, <100 KIAS

• Group 2: 21–55 pounds, <3,500’ AGL, <250 KIAS

• Group 3: 56–1,320 pounds, <18,000’MSL, <250 KIAS

• Group 4: >1,320 pounds, <18,000’ MSL, Any airspeed

• Group 5: >1,320 pounds, >18,000’ MSL, Any airspeed

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 20 - Naval Postgraduate School Table 1. UAS Categories. Source: CJCS (2014).

D. THE MARINE CORPS FAMILY OF UAS SYSTEMS

Because the Marine Corps is an infantry-focused military force, its equipment and organization is focused on support of the infantry. The support provided by UASs to the infantry comes in the form mainly in the form of small, non-weaponized, tactical UASs (e.g. Group 1–3) operated by all main support elements of the MAGTF.

1. Group 1 UASs

The Marine Corps possesses over 461 Group 1 UASs/Small UASs (SUASs) and has fielded the preponderance of its systems to the ground combat element (GCE) of the Marine Corps (i.e., Marine Divisions) but is in the process of fielding systems to aviation combat element (ACE) and logistics combat elements units as well. Group 1 SUASs in the Marine Corps include the: RQ-11 Raven, RQ-12 Wasp, RQ-16 T-Hawk, and RQ-20 Wasp (versions III and IV). Some of the SUASs in the Marine Corps inventory are Programs of Record (PoR; i.e., RQ-11 Raven), but the others are not and instead were

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 21 - Naval Postgraduate School funded through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) fund. Initial training for SUAS takes 5 to 10 days, occurs at one of two UAS Training and Logistics Support Activity centers, and does not result in the earning of an additional military occupational specialty (MOS; HQMC AVN, 2014). The VMU and its operators are not operators of SUASs.

2. Cargo UAS

The Marine Corps also operates Group 4 UASs in the form of a Kaman K-Max cargo helicopter. The K-Max can be operated by an onboard/manned or unmanned crew. When operated as a UAS, the K-Max is known as a Cargo UAS (CRUAS) and was designated the CQ-24A (Trimble, 2015). The development of the CRUAS was “in response to 2009 UUNS [Urgent Universal Needs Statement] and JUONS [Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement]” (HQMC AVN, 2014, p. 4.1.19) in which the Marine Corps was designated the lead service. Two contracts were initially awarded. The K-Max of Kaman/Lockheed Martin ultimately deployed to Afghanistan in 2011 and delivered more than 4.5 million pounds of cargo and conducted thousands of resupply sorties in just under three years in support of OEF (Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2014), whereas Boeing received a stop work order and never deployed its entrant, the A160T, in late 2011 (Munoz, 2012).

The CRUAS consists of two UAVs (Kaman K-2000, aka K-Max), one GCS, and three remote GCSs. (HQMC AVN, 2014). When operated during OEF, the UAVs were operated by contractors, but commanded by unmanned aircraft commanders (UACs) from the deployed VMUs. HQMC AVN (2014) states in 2015 Marine Aviation Plan that a “working issue” for the CRUAS was the “establishment of [an] IPT [integrated product team] to review future Program of Record suitability” (p. 4.1.19). Even though it is not a PoR, Lockheed-Martin did send its two CRUASs to MCAS Yuma in May of 2016 in order to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for the CRUAS (King, 2016) and to better inform the Marine Requirements Oversight Committee of a PoR recommendation.

The CRUAS, as shown in Figure 10, was a successful integration of commercial- off-the-shelf, manned aircraft that was configured for unmanned flight. The CRUAS operated with the VMU much the same way the Scan Eagle during OIF, not as a program of record but more as a proof of concept. Both systems were contractor operated but

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 22 - Naval Postgraduate School commanded by VMU UACs. The only two UASs in service with the VMU today are the RQ-7 Shadow and the RQ-21 Blackjack.

Figure 10. CRUAS. Source: HQMC AVN (2014).

3. RQ-7B Shadow UAS

The UAS that is fielded to all VMUs is the RQ-7, as shown in Figure 11. The Shadow is a Group 3 UAS, and per HQMC CD&I (2016b), the “RQ-7B Shadow is a lightweight, rapidly deployable, short-range airborne system. An organic VMU asset, this system is operated by an aircrew of three Marines: an unmanned aircraft commander (UAC), air vehicle operator (AVO), and the mission payload operator (MPO)” (p. 2–3), and will typically be augmented by an intelligence analyst (0231) or imagery analyst (0241) when conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. A RQ-7B Shadow UAS “consists of four aircraft; nine high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles [HMMWVs] (two with GCSs); and towed equipment that includes equipment trailers, generators, and launch and recovery equipment” (HQMC CD&I, 2016b, p. 2–4).

The GCS communicates with the UAV via the ground data terminal (GDT). The GDT consists of the directional and omnidirectional antennas, and the datalink interface box, or DIB, which convers analog and digital information between the GCS and the UAV. In addition to the two GCSs that are part of an RQ-7B system, the UAVs can also be controlled by a Portable GCS (PGCS). The PGCS performs the same functions as the GCS but at a reduced range (maximum of 31 km vice 109 km) because it utilizes a

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 23 - Naval Postgraduate School different, more portable but less capable directional antenna than the GCS, and has a smaller work station for use by the AVO and MPO. To launch the UAV, the Shadow system uses a pneumatic-powered, electro-hydraulic launcher, and to recover the UAV, the Shadow system utilizes the Tactical Automated Landing System, which sends signals to bring the UAV to a desired touch-down point on a runway where the UAV catches an arresting gear wire to stop the vehicle (Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One [MAWTS-1], n.d.).

The RQ-7B carries an electro-optical-infrared (EO-IR) in-flight selectable camera, a laser IR pointer, and a laser target designator for guidance of laser-guided ordnance. It is radio relay capable (SINCGARS) and has an endurance of six hours (MAWTS-1, n.d.). Its EO-IR camera can conduct “target surveillance out to 10 km, and target recognition out to 7km” (CD&I, 2016b, p. 2–4).

Figure 11. RQ-7B Shadow. Source: HQMC AVN (2014).

4. RQ-21 Blackjack

HQMC CD&I (2016b) states that “the RQ-21A Blackjack is a small, flexible, and rugged expeditionary system capable of operating from austere land-based locations as well as from amphibious ships. It is ideally suited for supporting Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) operations from ashore and afloat” (p. 2–4). The Blackjack, also known as the STUAS (Small Tactical UAS), achieved IOC in 2016 (Insitu, 2016) with VMU-2 and

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 24 - Naval Postgraduate School will replace, once it achieves FOC, the RQ-7B Shadow UAS in the Marine Corps. As opposed to the Shadow, the Blackjack is operated by a crew of two, a UAC and UAS operator vice three; the UAS operator performs the responsibilities of both the AVO and the MPO. As with the Shadow, the UAS crews are oftentimes augmented by intelligence Marines.

The Blackjack UAS consists of five UAVs, two GCSs, four HMMWVs, a launcher, the Sky Hook recovery system, and associated support and communications equipment per system (HQMC AVN, 2014). The RQ-21 has a 150-pound max-gross weight (i.e., basic weight plus usable fuel and payload weight), and it possesses a wide and varied modular/scalable payload configuration. Examples of the various payloads it can carry and the potential capabilities it can bring to the battlefield are, “Hyperspectral payloads capable of detecting explosives, Signals Intelligence Payloads capable of monitoring spectrum, synthetic aperture radar (SAR)/ground moving target indicator (GMTI) capable of detecting targets through clouds and tree cover, and cyber payloads capable of affecting enemy electronics” (HQMC AVN, 2014, p. 2.7.3).

The RQ-21 UAV is launched via a vehicle-mounted, pneumatic rail-launcher, is controlled via LOS communications by the GCS, and is recovered with a Sky Hook system, essentially a vertically positioned/hanged wire that the UAV flies its wing into in order to terminate its flight. Like the RQ-7 Shadow it is communications relay capable, and possesses an IR marker and an EO-IR camera. It has a reduced range of only 50 nautical miles (NM) but it can take-off and land in vastly smaller spaces than a Shadow, and its endurance of 10 hours easily exceeds the Shadow’s six-hour endurance (AVN, 2014). HQMC AVN (2014) has states that the “four highest priorities for Blackjack improvements are a laser designator, a high-reliability, purpose built engine, a beyond- line-of-sight (BLOS) control capability, and an increased launch weight” and that it is in the “process of changing the naming convention to MQ-21 since it will have more payload than simple reconnaissance” (p. 2.7.3). The RQ-21A Blackjack is pictured in Figure 12, and the Sky Hook recovery system it uses is pictured in Figure 13.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 25 - Naval Postgraduate School

Figure 12. RQ-21A Catapult Launch at NAS Patuxent River. Source: Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) (2013).

Figure 13. RQ-21A Sky Hook Recovery Aboard USS Mesa Verde. Source: NAVAIR (2013).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 26 - Naval Postgraduate School III. DOTMLPF OF THE CURRENT MARINE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE SQUADRON

A. MARINE CORPS TITLE 10 RESPONSIBILITIES, DOCTRINE, AND ORGANIZATION

As enumerated in the United States Code, Title 10, Chapter 507, Section 5063,

The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

As codified in law, the purpose of the Marine Corps is to serve as sea-going, maritime force. The Marine Corps is optimized to be a forward-deployed, relatively “light” fighting force that is capable of amphibious operations in the littorals and subsequent operations ashore.

The Marine Corps’ warfighting doctrine is espoused throughout Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication-1, Warfighting (HQMC MCCDC, 1997); it is a doctrine “based principally on warfare by maneuver” (p. 39). HQMC MCCDC (1997) states that

maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. (p. 73)

Maneuver warfare lies at the opposite end on the spectrum of warfare from attrition-type warfare. Attrition and firepower are essential to maneuver warfare, but maneuver warfare relies on speed (both in time and space), tempo, and surprise to achieve success. Maneuver warfare does not seek the “cumulative destruction of every component in the enemy arsenal, the goal is to attack the enemy ‘system’—to incapacitate the enemy systemically” (HQMC MCCDC, 1997, p. 37). This is done by identifying an enemy’s center(s) of gravity (i.e., strengths) and its critical vulnerability/ vulnerabilities. HQMC MCCDC (1997) defines a critical vulnerability as “a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy’s ability to resist us” (p. 47). The way to achieve success is to avoid attacking an enemy’s strength head-on,

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 27 - Naval Postgraduate School but instead viciously attack the enemy through surprise and massed firepower at the weakest point(s) in order to disrupt operations, gain access to the enemy’s center(s) of gravity, and exploit the ensuing chaos. (HQMC MCCDC, 1997).

The Marine Corps fulfills its Title 10 responsibilities through the doctrine of Maneuver Warfare and is organized to be a forward-deployed, expeditionary, amphibious force. It organizes, deploys, and employs its forces through integrated task forces known as the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). MAGTFs vary in size but they usually consist of the same elements.

The elements of the MAGTF consist of the Command Element, GCE, ACE, and Logistics Combat Element (LCE) regardless of the size of the MAGTF. The largest MAGTF, the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), consists of the MEF Command Element (CE), Marine Division, MAW, and Marine Logistics Group. The next largest MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), consisting of the MEB CE, a reinforced Marine regiment, a Marine Aircraft Group (MAG), and a Marine Logistics Regiment. The smallest MAGTF is the MEU.

1. Overview of the Marine Expeditionary Unit

The MEU consists of the MEU CE, a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), a reinforced Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM), and a Combat Logistics Battalion. There are seven MEUs in the Marine Corps: the 31st MEU forward-deployed in Okinawa, Japan; the 11th, 13th, and 15th MEUs from the west coast of the United States (principally California- and Arizona-based units), and the 22nd, 24th, and 26th MEUs from the east coast (primarily North Carolina-based units). The MEU deploys on amphibious, L-Class ships of the U. S. Navy. Three L-Class ships, usually an LHD, LPD, and LSD, typically make up the Amphibious Ready Group. When aggregated, the ACE can be found on the LHD. When conducting disaggregated operations, a detachment of aircraft (MV-22Bs, CH-53Es, or AH-1W/Z and UH-1Y) can be found aboard the LPD- class ship.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 28 - Naval Postgraduate School 2. The MEU’s Aviation Combat Element

The baseline ACE consists of Marines, Sailors, aircraft, and equipment of the VMM comprising 12 MV-22Bs Ospreys reinforced by four CH-53E Sea Stallions, four AH-1W Super Cobra or AH-1Z Viper attack , two to three UH-1Y Venom utility helicopters, six AV-8B Harriers, and one RQ-21A Blackjack system. These aircraft come from different squadrons and are also joined by a Marine Air Control Group (MACG) detachment (consisting of multiple subordinate MACG squadrons), a Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) detachment, and a Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) detachment. These detachments are transferred from the operational control of their higher headquarters to the MEU CE for execution of the Pre-deployment Training Plan and then deployed (usually) six months afterwards (HQMC PPO, 2015).

B. OVERVIEW OF THE MARINE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE SQUADRON

This section includes a summary of the Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU), including the mission, concept of operations, mission essential tasks, and organizational structure.

1. Mission of the VMU

HQMC TECOM states in the RQ-21A Training and Readiness Manual (NAVMC 3500.122; 2015b) that the mission of the VMU is to “support the MAGTF commander by conducting electromagnetic spectrum warfare (EW), multi-sensor reconnaissance and surveillance, supporting arms coordination and control, and destroying targets day or night under all-weather conditions, during expeditionary, joint, and combined operations” (p. 1–3). The change in mission statement from “conduct day and night unmanned aerial Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) in support of Marine Air- Ground Task Force” (HQMC TECOM, 2010b, p. 1–3) occurred in 2014, coincided with the movement of the VMUs from the MACG to the MAG and “lays the foundation for the incorporation of a persistent, digitally interoperable architecture for the MAGTF, the assumption of the airborne electronic warfare mission, and the execution of full spectrum offensive air support” (HQMC AVN, 2014, p. 2.7.2). Not all VMUs are able to fully conduct their mission in its newly stated form since the preponderance of UASs in the

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 29 - Naval Postgraduate School VMU are the Shadow UAS vice the Blackjack, but the VMUs moved towards the full ability to execute their Mission Essential Tasks (MET) as the Blackjack achieved IOC in 2015.

2. Concept of Operations

There is a total of four VMUs in the Marine Corps- three active-duty, one reserve. VMU-1 falls under MAG-13, (MAW), is located aboard MCAS Yuma, AZ and supports I MEF. VMU-2 falls under MAG-14, 2nd MAW, is located aboard MCAS Cherry Point, NC, and supports II MEF. VMU-3 falls under MAG-24, 1st MAW, is located aboard MCAS Kaneohe Bay, HI, and supports III MEF. VMU-4, the lone Marine Corps reserve component VMU, falls under MAG-41, 4th MAW, is located aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, CA, and supports Marine Corps Forces, Reserve (HQMC AVN, 2014).

HQMC CD&I (2016b) states that “a fully staff equipped VMU has sufficient personnel to operate three independent RQ-7B Shadow systems and nine RQ-21A Blackjack systems” (p. 2–5). The VMU and its detachments are task-organized by the MAGTF, as are the support relationships (i.e., direct or general support). As the VMU transitions from the Shadow to the Blackjack, there will be overlap between the number of systems in each squadron until the VMUs achieve FOC with the Blackjack and the Shadow is completely withdrawn from Marine Corps service. A template for support of the MAGTF, as depicted in Table 2, is MEF: three RQ-7B Shadow detachments, nine RQ-21B Blackjack detachments; MEB: one RQ-7B Shadow detachment, three RQ-21B Blackjack detachments; and MEU: one+ RQ-21A Blackjack detachments (HQMC CD&I, 2016b).

Table 2. VMU Support to the MAGTFs. Source: HQMC CD&I (2016b).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 30 - Naval Postgraduate School 3. Core and Core Plus Mission Essential Tasks

The VMU conducts Mission Essential Tasks (METs), whether Core (“Core METs are those tasks that a unit is expected to execute at all times”) (HQMC TECOM, 2015b, p. 1–2) or Core Plus (“Core Plus METs identify additional capabilities to support missions or plans which are limited in scope, theater specific, or have a lower probability of execution”) (HQMC TECOM, 2015b, p. 1–2]) within five of the six functions of Marine aviation (i.e., Anti-Air Warfare, Electronic Warfare, Offensive Air Support, Aerial Reconnaissance, Assault Support). These functions of Marine aviation in turn support five of the six warfighting functions of Force Protection, Fires, Intelligence, Maneuver, and Logistics (HQMC CD&I, 2016b). It is debatable if VMU actually supports all six functions of Marine aviation because a UAS “controls” aircraft when conducting Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR; TECOM, 2015b); HQMC CD&I (2016b) explicitly states, however, that “because UASs are not Marine air command and control system [MACCS] assets and are not tasked to perform air control or air direction, they do not directly contribute to the control of aircraft and missiles function” (p. 1–9). See Table 3 for a list of VMU’s current Core and Core plus METs. See Table 4 for the relationship of these METs and how they relate to, and support, the Marine Corps’ warfighting functions.

Table 3. VMU Mission Essential Task List. Source: HQMC TECOM (2015b). VMU RQ-21 A/C MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (METL) CORE MET DESCRIPTION MCT 2.2.5.2 Conduct Aviation Reconnaissance and Surveillance (AREC) MCT 6.1.1.11 Conduct Aerial Escort (AESC) MCT 3.2.5 Control Supporting Arms (SARM) MCT 3.2.3.1.2.3 Conduct Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR) MCT 3.2.3.1.1.1 Facilitate Close Air Support (CAS) MCT 1.3.3.3.2 Conduct Aviation Operations from Expeditionary Shore-Based Sites (EXP) CORE PLUS MET DESCRIPTION MCT 6.2.1.1 Conduct Aviation Support of Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) MCT 1.3.3.3.1 Conduct Aviation Operations From Expeditionary Sea-Based Sites (CQ) MCT 5.3.4.2 Coordinate Electronic Warfare Capabilities within a Combined Arms Framework (EW) MCT 3.2.3.2.1 Conduct Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 31 - Naval Postgraduate School Table 4. VMU METs versus Six Functions of Marine Aviation. Source: HQMC TECOM (2015b). VMU RQ-21 A/C MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK (MET) TO SIX FUNCTIONS OF MARINE AVIATION CORE SIX FUNCTIONS OF MARINE AVIATION MET OAS ASPT AAW EW CoA&M AerRec MCT 2.2.5.2 (AREC) X X X X MCT 6.1.1.11 (AESC) X X MCT 3.2.5 (SARM) X X MCT 3.2.3.1.2.3 (SCAR) X X X MCT 3.2.3.1.1.1.1 (CAS) X MCT 1.3.3.3.2 (EXP) X X X X CORE PLUS

MCT 6.2.1.1 (TRAP) X X X MCT 1.3.3.3.1 (CQ) X X X MCT 5.3.4.2 (EW) X MCT 3.2.3.2.1 (SEAD) X X X

4. Table of Organization

The VMU is organized much in the same way other Marine squadrons are, but with a few differences. Per the VMU Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) report, a VMU possesses a headquarters element, the Department of Safety and Standardization, an S-1 (administration department), an S-2 (intelligence department), an S-3 (operations department), an S-4 (logistics department), an S-6 (communications department), a medical department, and a maintenance department.

The first difference in a VMU’s TO&E as compared to other squadrons is that a VMU has a dedicated S-6 with Marines (officer and enlisted alike) from the 06 occupational field; no other aircraft squadron has a “true” S-6. Other squadrons do maintain an S-6 shop, but those Marines are manning that shop as collateral billets. The S-6 in a VMU is very robust in comparison because of the unique requirements associated with setting up and maintaining the GCS, GDTs, and man-portable radios associated with the UAS.

Other differences include the size of the S-2, S-4, S-6, and the maintenance department. Again, because of the unique nature of the mission and equipment inherent to the VMU their S-2, S-4, and S-6 sections are far larger than other Marine squadrons. The S-2 of a VMU is larger because it provides real-time analysis of data collected

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 32 - Naval Postgraduate School during missions vice post-mission analysis of data. The S-4 is larger because of the requirements to operate and maintain rolling stock (i.e., HMMWVs and MTVRs/7-tons) and support equipment (e.g., truck trailers, generators, tents, etc.). The S-6 is larger because it supports the control element with all of the communications gear required to communicate with both the UAV and supported units. During operations in a manned squadron, flight crews communicate with supported units via radio (or datalink) using radios integral to the aircraft. Additionally, there is usually a sole Operations Duty Officer monitoring one radio and tactical “chat” networks for updates on the status of aircraft or missions; there is no need to have a robust command and control section to communicate with the various fire support coordination centers/air direction centers because the aircrew receive status updates themselves. Lastly, when ground vehicles operate, they need tactical radio sets to communicate within their convoy and externally to battlespace managers. The very nature of mobile/expeditionary UAS units that deploy as detachments requires a robust communications section.

Whereas the S-2, S-4, and S-6 are larger than other Marine squadrons, the maintenance department is smaller in the VMU with fewer MOSs present. These differences are attributable to the complexity of the larger, manned aircraft of other squadrons, and because Marines that are part of the support element of the UAS are found in the S-4 vice the maintenance department.

C. TRAINING— UAS OPERATORS AND MAINTAINERS

This section provides an overview of the training pipeline for UAS officers, UAS operators, and UAS maintainers. Additionally, it provides background on the Joint training standards for UAS operators.

1. UAS Officers

The core of the VMU officer population consists of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) MAGTF Electronic Warfare officers. Until recently, the UAS officer MOS, 7315, was a necessary military occupational specialty (NMOS) and not a primary military occupational specialty (PMOS; HQMC TECOM, 2011; HQMC TECOM, 2015a). The reason that distinction is important is because all UAS officers came from outside the

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 33 - Naval Postgraduate School UAS community to serve as UACs for one tour prior to returning to their PMOS, often to never return to the UAS community again. HQMC TECOM (2015a) states that an NMOS serves to “identify a particular skill or training that is in addition to a Marine’s PMOS, but can only be filled by a Marine with a specific PMOS,” whereas a PMOS is “used to identify the primary skills and knowledge of a Marine” (p. xiii).

UAS officers came from two primary occupational fields, the 7200 field (Air Control/Air Support/Anti-Air Warfare/Air Traffic Control) and the 7500 field (i.e., pilots and naval flight officers) (HQMC TECOM, 2011). Some UAS officers were pilots (both fixed-wing and rotary wing), Naval Flight Officers (NFO; i.e., Weapons Systems Officers [WSO] or Electronic Countermeasure Officers [ECMO]), and MACCS officers (e.g., Low Altitude Air Defense Officer [7204] and Air Support Control officers [7208]), and though a breadth of experience can be an enabler, most UAS officers stayed in the community for just two or three years before they returned to their primary specialties. This constant change prevented the growth of a large, professional cadre of UAS officers as compared to other fields in the Marine Corps, but especially within Marine aviation.

The UAS officer community today is a growing population fed from initial accessions, field accessions of Marine officers doing a lateral move into the community from other occupational fields and MOSs, and the transition of ECMOs from the EA-6B Prowler community as that community retires its aircraft. The increased professionalization of the community is now recognized with the 7315 MOS being a PMOS, the initial training required of accession Marines, and the title and duties required of the UAS officers of today. By making the 7315 MOS a PMOS, Marine officers access into the field upon completion of the Basic School (TBS), compete for augmentation within their field, and they return to the VMU upon completion of career- and/or intermediate-level professional military education or after serving in B-billets.

As stated by the DOD (2013), “the Marine Corps utilizes Army, Navy, and Air Force schools to train its VMU personnel, including maintenance personnel” (p. 105). As with the Air Force, the Marine Corps is taking a two-pronged approach to achieve manning for its unmanned officer communities; the first is through initial accessions, the other is through the transitioning of pilots and NFOs to serve in the UAS community.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 34 - Naval Postgraduate School Newly accessed Marine officers will undergo the U.S. Air Force Undergraduate Remotely Pilot Aircraft Training (URT) program upon completion of TBS. From there they attend the three-week long RQ-7B UAC Course at Fort Huachuca, AZ, before joining a VMU in the operating forces. If they join a VMU that operates the Blackjack, they are trained to operate the Blackjack by a mobile training team while at their units, as depicted in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Marine Corps Group 3 UAS Operator Training Flow. Source: DOD (2013).

The preponderance of training time for accession UAS officers occurs within the Air Force’s URT pipeline (approximately 21 weeks versus 3 weeks). After completion of TBS, prospective UAS officers report to the 558th Flying Training Squadron located aboard Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, where preparations are made for students to attend the RPA Flight Screening course held in Pueblo, CO. The RPA Flight Screening course is seven weeks in duration, consists of 39 hours of flight time (DOD, 2013), and is where the Air Force sends prospective “pilots, combat systems officers, and RPA pilots” (Mattek, 2015, p. 44) if they do not already possess a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pilot’s rating. As at any other introductory flight school, the trainees learn basic airmanship, navigation, and air traffic control rules in order to operate in visual meteorological conditions following Visual Flight Rules (VFR). Like U.S. Navy primary flight school, attrition is primarily attributed to not meeting airmanship or academic benchmarks, and dropping on request; but physiological adaptability/medical issue like airsickness are also significant sources of attrition (Mattek, 2015; M. Salas, personal communication, April 25, 2016).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 35 - Naval Postgraduate School Upon completion of RPA Flight Screening, prospective UAS officers then attend the RPA Instrument Qualification Course held aboard Randolph Air Force Base. The first three weeks are exclusively academic, after which simulator events are added to the academic workload. All the flight events are conducted in a “T-6 Texan II simulator, where the focus is on instrument flight rules, navigation, and various approaches” (Mattek, 2015, p. 45). The RPA Instrument Qualification Course averages 2.5 months and entails approximately 49 hours of simulated flight (DOD, 2013).

After the RPA Instrument Qualification Course is completed, prospective UAS officers then attend the five-week long RPA Fundamentals Course. This course focuses on the tactical employment of a UAS vice the aeronautical skills required to pilot a UAS. It consists of 110 hours of instruction and four labs/missions (DOD, 2013) flown in MQ- 9 Reaper simulators. Examples of items covered during the course are: “electro-optical and infrared sensor theory; radio frequency data links; electronic warfare; intelligence; surveillance and reconnaissance; GSP; air defense; munitions employment; and close air support” (Mattek, 2015, p. 46). Upon completion of the RPA Fundamentals Course, USAF RPA pilots transition to their platforms (i.e., MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, RQ-4 Global Hawk) as do the Marine UAS officers (RQ-7). The “RPA Pilots” box as depicted in Figure 15 is the pipeline Marine UAS officers follow in their initial training with the USAF.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 36 - Naval Postgraduate School

Figure 15. Air Force MQ-1/9 Pilot and Sensor Operator Training Flow. Source: DOD (2013).

Marine UAS officers are introduced to their duties as Unmanned Aircraft Commanders for the RQ-7B Shadow at the three-week-long UAC Course taught by the U.S. Army. The course starts with academics, transitions to simulator events then actual flight events, and is completed with a check-ride. Once this course is complete, prospective Marine UAS officers finally earns their primary MOS of 7315.

2. Enlisted UAS Operators

Enlisted Marine UAS Operators, unlike Marine UAS officers, have not experienced tumult with their occupational specialty. The MOS of 7314, UAS Operations Specialist, was established well before that of 7315s as a PMOS. Enlisted Marines who are UAS operators grow up in their community, are promoted by their PMOS, and go back to VMUs if, and when, they are ordered to serve on B-billets.

Like Marine UAS officers, initial training for enlisted Marine UAS operators is conducted by another service, not the Marine Corps. In the case of 7314s, initial training is conducted by the U.S. Army’s 2nd Battalion, 13th Aviation Regiment, in Fort

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 37 - Naval Postgraduate School Huachuca, AZ. Training to become a UAS operator occurs in two phases as depicted in Figure 16. The first phase, known as “Common Core,” is approximately nine weeks in duration and is where initial training about UASs and their missions occurs. Phase II, “In Go-to-War Aircraft” is where trainees are given instruction on their specifically assigned aircraft (i.e., RQ-7 Shadow for enlisted Marines). During Phase II, which lasts more than 12 weeks, Marine trainees conduct 97 hours of flight operations— 22 actual, 75 simulated. (DOD, 2013). Upon completion of training at Fort Huachuca, Marine trainees are officially designated 7314s.

3. UAS Avionics/Maintenance Technicians

Like their operator counterparts, Marine UAS avionics/maintenance technicians are trained by the U.S. Army in Fort Huachuca. UAS avionics/maintenance technicians are enlisted Marines that attend the Navy’s Avionics Technician O-Level Class A1 course at NAS Pensacola, FL (HQMC TECOM, 2015a) prior to training with the Army. The course taught at Fort Huachuca is 17 weeks in duration and it is where the Marine trainees will learn to maintain the RQ-7 Shadow. Once prospective UAS avionics/ maintenance technicians pass the prescribed training they are awarded the PMOS of 6314.

Figure 16. Army Group 3 and Above UAS Training Flow. Source: DOD (2013).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 38 - Naval Postgraduate School 4. Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Minimum Training Standards

In 2009, the Joint Staff first released CJCSI 3255.01, Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Minimum Training Standards [JUMTS], to accomplish two things. The first was to answer a JROC recommendation “to prepare aircraft crewmembers to perform in a joint environment by standardizing training and certification”‘ (CJCS, 2011, p. 1) and to “meet or exceed existing manned aircraft Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) standards to facilitate UAS access into the National Airspace System (NAS)” (p. 1). CJCSI 3255.01 delineates five critical “skills sets required to effectively operate and employ UAS, regardless of operational environment” (p. 2) but this work only discusses two: Basic UAS Qualification (BUQ) and Joint Mission Qualification (JMQ).

CJCSI 3255.01 defines BUQ as “general aviation knowledge and UAS knowledge-based skills to operate UAS safely as required by crew duties or position” (p. 2) and JMQ as the “general knowledge of the UAS mission/objective. This is critical to ensure the crews understand their role in accomplishing a larger military objective” (p. 2).

BUQ Level II requires the possession of those skills and knowledge to operate in VFR in Class D, E, and G airspace below 18,000’ MSL. BUQ Level III consists of those skills of BUQ Level II with the additional abilities to operate in Class B and C airspace. BUQ Level IV is the highest BUQ level and consists of BUQ Level III with the additional abilities and skills to operate using instrument flight rules and up to Flight Level 600 (CJCSI, 2011).

JMQ-A are the required qualifications for a UAS crewmember to “support unit- level ISR and Fires in support of the JFC [Joint Force Commander]” (CJCS, 2011, p. B- 1). It consists of the basic military skills required to operate small UASs in a tactical environments (though it does recommend, not require, the ability to control IDF). JMQ-B qualifications build on the skills required of JMQ-A by adding additional military skills for the conduct of more mission sets. Examples of the advanced skills required are the ability to conduct reconnaissance (route, zone, area), conduct target surveillance, track both stationary and moving targets, and do battle damage assessments. JMQ-C is the most advanced JMQ and builds upon JMQ-B by requiring UAS crewmembers to do such

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 39 - Naval Postgraduate School things as facilitate close air support (CAS) by either marking targets or designating targets, perform weapons employment in a CAS and deep air support (DAS) role, do battlespace coordination (e.g., SCAR), and facilitate combat /personnel recovery.

To achieve a certain level of BUQ and JMQ, all the tasks of the lower BUQ/JMQ must be achieved (e.g., to be BUQ II, a UAS crewmember must achieve all the task of BUQ I). The minimum training standards are BUQ II and JMQ-B for a Group 3 UAS, BUQ III and JMQ-B for a Group 4 UAS, and BUQ IV and JMQ-B for a Group 5 UAS.

D. MATERIEL

Depending on what element of the UAS one is analyzing (i.e., aircraft, payload, control element, communications equipment, and support element), it becomes apparent that some elements are quite mature while others are rapidly evolving with changes in technology. This section focuses on the materiel shortcomings of the aircraft and ordnance payload of current systems (RQ-7 and RQ-21) and the logistical footprint of the current VMU with regard to the communications equipment and support. Because it is beyond the scope of this work, the technological gaps associated with the control element are not discussed beyond the assumption that the MUX’s control element operates BLOS during all flight operations except for those conducted at the LRS using LOS communications for taxi, take-off, and landing operations.

As stated in Chapter I, the impetus behind the MUX ICD was Marine Aviation’s lack of an aircraft that had an operational reach of 500+ nautical miles, was all-weather, and persistent. The MUX ICD further analyzed seven particular capabilities, reviewed the Joint Force’s and MAGTF’s abilities to meet the capability requirements, assessed the Joint Force’s and MAGTF’s ability to perform particular missions, analyzed the risk impact to mission accomplishment using various platforms, and lastly analyzed which aircraft (if any) could perform the particular mission given certain constraints.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 40 - Naval Postgraduate School 1. Attributes

The Marine Corps’ role as a naval, expeditionary force in readiness requires it to deploy aboard warships. A key attribute for the MUX is the ability to deploy aboard amphibious warships (i.e., L-class ships). Without this attribute, many of the capabilities desired by the Marine Corps could easily be fulfilled by the MQ-9 Reaper or a similar unmanned aircraft. With regard to range, the 500+ NM range attribute is desired in order to mitigate the threat an ARG would face in an advanced A2/AD environment. The attribute of “persistent” equates to 24-hour flight operations. The last attribute included for comparison in Table 5 is ordnance delivery. Neither the RQ-7 nor the RQ-21 can fire air-to-ground ordnance. The MV-22B and CH-53E are armed with medium and heavy machine guns, but those weapons are used in self-defense; they are not used for the purposes of offensive air support (OAS). Ordnance in this case are rockets, missiles, bombs, and guns used in an offensive manner. Ordnance widely used by American UASs are the AGM-114 Hellfire, the GBU-12, and the GBU-38 (Air Land Sea Application [ALSA] Center, 2015).

2. Capabilities

The MUX ICD identified gaps in desired capabilities “based on the operational context provided by EF-21 [Expeditionary Force 21], as well as an assessment of the operational scenarios, threats, and the associated CBAs” (HQMC CD&I, 2016a, p. 4). The MUX ICD further identified a platform’s ability to perform the capability to the desired threshold of objective standard and the result/impact of its ability (or inability) to perform, as shown in Table 5. If the MUX ICD identified a platform’s ability to perform a task and/or the impact risk to be “extreme” or “high,” the platform, in this work, is assessed as not having the capability as shown in Table 6. The MUX ICD evaluated only those platforms that could provide the capability in some measure. Various attributes and assessments of the capacity to fulfill a desired capability can also be found on Table 5. For comparison’s sake, the RQ-7 and RQ-21 were listed in Table 5 even though they were not analyzed in the MUX ICD because they represent the status quo (i.e., the UAS types currently serving in the VMUs). The MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper were also included as a measure to compare the MUX. The MQ-1 is a Group 4 UAS; the MQ-9 a

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 41 - Naval Postgraduate School Group 5. The remaining aircraft listed (F-35B, AV-8B, UH-1Y, AH-1Z, MV-22B, and CH-53E) are those that do, or will (i.e., F-35B), operate as part of the MEU ACE. The EA-6B was not listed because it cannot operate from L-class ships and will soon be retired. Lastly, the F/A-18 and KC-130J were not listed because they, too, cannot operate from L-class ships.

a. Airborne Electro-Magnetic Spectrum Operations

The operational attribute for airborne electronic spectrum operations (i.e., electronic warfare [EW]) is the capability to perform EW at the combat radius of the MV-22B with one (690NM) for 24 hours, 7 days a week. The F-35B and the AV-8B do not meet the threshold without “significant squadron effort (12-18 dedicated sorties)” (HQMC CD&I, 2016a, p. 6) and because they do not meet the distance or persistence threshold. The EA-18G Growler is the platform most able to do the mission, but it is a Navy platform; the carrier strike group (CSG) must be within a reasonable distance of the ARG/MEU, and its use must be allocated by the Joint Force to the ARG/MEU; additionally, it does not meet the distance or persistence threshold.

b. Air Reconnaissance and Surveillance

With regard to airborne reconnaissance and surveillance, the desired threshold for persistence and distance is the same as that of EW. The F-35B, again, was assessed as not being able to accomplish the mission because of significant squadron effort and the inability to meet the distance and persistence threshold. It can conduct air recon and surveillance, but it has limited ability for “real time processing, exploitation, dissemination, and relay” (HQMC CD&I, 2016a, p. 7) unlike the capabilities possessed by UASs.

Joint, unmanned ISR assets like the MQ-1, MQ-9, and RQ-4 can better accomplish the mission but they have the constraint of requiring host nation basing support, their use must be allocated to the ARG/MEU, and the dissemination and exploitation of data and intelligence between the Joint asset and the MAGTF are limited (HQMC CD&I, 2016a).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 42 - Naval Postgraduate School c. Information Transport

The information transport capability as defined by the MUX ICD is to “provide digitally interoperable network bridge and secure communications relay, airborne router, and data management capabilities between elements of the MAGTF, joint forces and coalition partners” (HQMC CD&I, 2016a, p. 7). The MV-22 was assessed as not meeting the threshold because it can only provide the capability for up to 10 hours per day (i.e., the crew day limits for the ship’s flight deck crew) and only when assets are aloft.

d. Aerial Escort to Assault Support Missions

The aerial escort to assault support missions capability has two distinct mission profiles. The first is aerial escort to provide suppressive fires and/or EW effects to assault support flights or ground convoys for up to 8 hours and 690 NM. The F-35B can provide EW effects and suppressive fires but cannot do so for the duration and distance desired. The AH-1Z and UH-1Y, too, can provide fires but they cannot deliver EW effects, nor can they provide escort for the distance or duration desired (HQMC CD&I, 2016a).

The second aerial escort capability desired is the ability to velocity match the MV-22B, essentially flying attached escort during the flight portion of an assault support mission. Because the F-35B is faster than the MV-22B and possesses less endurance, it can provide suppressive fires and EW support for an MV-22B assault flight but in a detached manner. It would require multiple aircraft flying multiple sorties, aerial refueling support, and could provide escort for two to four hours (HQMC CD&I, 2016a).

The AH-1Z and UH-1Y can provide aerial escort but because they are slower they would need to fly detached escort as well. They also possess a very small operational radius in comparison to the MV-22B, so they require refueling support afloat or a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) ashore if they did not want to constrain the MV-22B assault package to their limited radius.

e. Offensive Air Support

The capability to conduct OAS, both CAS and DAS, is resident in the MEU ACE with the F-35B, AH-1Z, and UH-1Y. These aircraft are optimized for these missions, but they do not have the range or persistence to conduct OAS for up to 12 hours and 690NM

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 43 - Naval Postgraduate School as desired in the MUX ICD. Navy OAS assets from the CSG or MQ-1/9s from the Air Force can conduct OAS in support of the ARG/MEU, but with reduced persistence, and their use would have to be allocated to the ARG/MEU (HQMC CD&I, 2016a).

f. Over-the-Horizon, Airborne Early Warning

The Over-the-Horizon, Airborne Early Warning (OTH AEW) capability sought in the MUX ICD is to “provide OTH Airborne Early Warning threat and targeting information to air, ground, and surface (ship) targeting networks” (HQMC CD&I, 2016a, p. 8). The F-35B was assessed as possessing a moderate capability to meeting the desired threshold. This capability is akin to the capabilities the E-2D Hawkeye provides to the CSG.

g. Tactical Transport of Materiel

The last capability discussed in the MUX ICD is related to the risk reduction to personnel when conducting resupply missions. In high risk environments (degraded weather or severe terrain) or in non-permissive threat environments, ground transport and re-supply by assault support aircraft like the MV-22B, CH-53E, or UH-1Y proved to have too high (<1/1000) a probability of mishap, leading to death of Marines (HQMC CD&I, 2016b). The threshold for delivery of supplies to a landing zone is operations with a 200’ ceiling and 1/2 statute mile (SM) of visibility.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 44 - Naval Postgraduate School Table 5. Aircraft, Attributes, and Capability Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2016a); ALSA Center (2015). Range: L-class Persistent Persistent Persistent Info. Aerial Escort- OAS- Over the Aslt. Endurance >500N ship EW- ISR- Transport- Persistent; 12H, horizon, Transport Aircraft (Hours) M Ordnance cap. 690NM 690NM 690NM Attached 690N AEW 200- 1/2 RQ-7B 9 N N N N N N N N N N MQ-21 >12 N N Y N N N N N N N MQ-1B 24 Y Y N N Y Y N Y N N MQ-9 14-17 Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N N F-35B 6.5* Y Y Y N N N N Y Y N AV-8B 6.5* Y Y Y N N N N N N N AH-1Z 2 N Y Y N N N N N N N UH-1Y 3 N Y Y N N N N N N N* MV-22B 12* Y N* Y N N N N/A N N N* CH-53E 12* Y N* Y N N N N/A N N N* Endurance: Because the F-35B, AV-8B, MV-22B and CH-53E are AAR capable, endurance is limited to OPNAVINST 3710.7U “Flight Time” limits. Consideration is not made for mechanical limits or Wing, MAG, or Squadron flight operations SOPs. Ordnance: This is defined as weapons systems designed for OAS, not “self-defense.” Assault Support: The UH-1Y, MV-22B and CH-53E are capable of assault transport, but not in 200’ ceilings and 1/2SM visibility without high risk to personnel and aircraft.

Table 6. Capability Requirement Risk Matrix. Source: HQMC CD&I (2016a).

Ability to Perform: Platform’s ability to perform to the capability requirement’s attribute Low: Very Likely can Moderate: Significant: High: Extreme: achieve at least 80%- Likely can achieve Questionable that Unlikely that can No capability 100% of desired 50% to 80% of can achieve 20% to achieve 1% to 20% attribute and high desired attribute. 50% of desired of desired attribute. likelihood of system Moderate attribute. Low Unlikely mission availability and expectation of expectation of assignment. assignment mission assignment mission assignment or availability. or availability. Impact Risk to Capability Requirement: Operational impact of inability to achieve attribute metric Low: Some Minimal Moderate: Severe Significant: Loss of High: Loss of Extreme: Loss of Mission impacts or Injury or Significant Mission and/or Life Mission and/or Life Mission and/or Operational Mission with tactical with Strategic or numerous lives with Challenges degradation. mission impact. Operational impact Strategic or Operational impact

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 45 - Naval Postgraduate School E. LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION

The technical and tactical development of UAS operators and maintainers is very similar to Marines of other aviation fields. In addition to the normal administrative items required for promotion, Marines in aviation fields must progress through their respective T&R manuals and/or Maintenance Training Management and Evaluation Program (MATMEP) curricula in order to earn MOS credibility. Mission qualifications and flight leadership designations are important to operators, as maintenance qualifications, licenses, and certifications are to maintainers.

1. UAS Operators

For operators, both officers and enlisted alike, the Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) designation is the most prestigious and difficult designation to earn. If candidates successfully complete the WTI course given at MAWTS-1, they will earn the NMOS of 7377.

Another NMOS that can be earned by UAS officers that is found in every aviation squadron is that of Aviation Safety Officer (ASO). Candidates earn the ASO MOS by successfully completing the ASO course given at the School of Aviation Safety.

In addition to NMOSs that can be earned by operators, the earning of various instructor qualifications and flight leadership designations are important toward career development and longevity. These different qualifications and designations do not yet result in the awarding of a NMOS, but there is movement in that direction spearheaded by the Deputy Commandant of Aviation.

2. UAS Maintainers

UAS maintainers (6314s), like mechanics on other type-model aircraft, progress through their respective MATMEP curriculum in order to achieve various qualifications, certifications, and licenses (QCL). Earning various QCLs in and of themselves does not result in Marines earning an NMOS; they instead show increasing ability and responsibility to perform more advanced maintenance procedures. As Marines mature and their technical skills increase, they transition from the roles of workers to one of leaders, supervisors, and mentors. An important certification for young, aviation

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 46 - Naval Postgraduate School maintenance Marines is that of Collateral Duty Inspector (CDI). CDIs are Marines that work in production work center (i.e., airframes, avionics, flight line, and ordnance) but are “responsible to the QA [quality assurance] Officer when performing QA functions” (Commander, Naval Air Force [CNAF], 2013, p. 7–11). Through time and experience, a few CDIs may progress to be Collateral Duty Quality Assurance Representatives (CDQARs). CDQARs “function in the same capacity as QARs and shall meet the same qualifications” (CNAF, 2013, p. 7–11), but they, like CDIs, are found in the work centers. The last inspection certification found in aviation maintenance is that of Quality Assurance Representative (QAR). To be considered for QAR, Marines must be a well- rounded, capable maintainers, and Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCO; CNAF, 2013). If a Marine become a QAR, they are moved to the Quality Assurance shop and are awarded the NMOS of 6018, Aviation Quality Assurance Representative (QAR)/Inspector. Earning the 6018 MOS is an important milestone for aviation- maintenance Marines; an equally important milestone is earning the 6012 NMOS, Aviation Maintenance Controller/Production Controller.

According to the MOS Manual (HQMC TECOM, 2015), “Aviation Maintenance Controllers/Production Controllers are responsible for planning, directing, and controlling the performance and execution of Aviation Maintenance Department functions at the organizational and intermediate levels” (p. 3–513). In short, maintenance controllers are the nerve center for the aviation maintenance department. Arguably, Maintenance Control is the most important shop in the aviation maintenance department, and maintenance controllers are the most critical personnel to the safe and efficient conduct of aviation maintenance. They, like QARs, should be SNCOs but on occasion exemplary Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) are selected to be trained as 6012s or 6018s.

F. FACILITIES

The facilities that support UAS operations are their home bases, ships from which they deploy, and special use airspaces (i.e., restricted air space). Three of the four Marine VMUs are stationed at an air station. VMU-4 is stationed at a small camp in the northern section of MCB Camp Pendleton but as stated by HQMC AVN (2014) in the 2015

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 47 - Naval Postgraduate School Marine Aviation Plan, deliberate planning has begun to move that squadron to MCAS Camp Pendleton (an air station in the southern section of Camp Pendleton).

1. Air Stations

The active duty VMUs (-1, -2, and -3) are located at air stations, but existing hangars and ramp spaces will need to be modified if the MUX is to be procured. The UAV portions of current systems are housed in containers designed to move the vehicle by ground transportation to the LRS. The MUX will be a large aircraft, and with multiple aircraft assigned to a squadron, hangar spaces will need to be modified in order to facilitate heavy maintenance like the removal and re-installation of engines, rotor systems, and wings. Ramp spaces will need to be added as well because, as opposed to the smaller Blackjack, the MUX will likely not be disassembled, stored, and reassembled for every flight operation; most likely, the MUX will be parked on the ramps adjacent to hangars or hangared.

2. Ships

To facilitate shipboard operations, the San Antonio class LPDs have been modified, or are in the process of being modified, to support RQ-21 operations (HQMC AVN, 2014). As stated in the Director, Operational Test &Evaluation FY15 Annual Report (Director of Operational Test and Evaluation [DOT&E], 2016), “the Navy permanently installed some RQ-21A ground components (antennae interface modules, datalink antennae) on selected ships” (p. 284). This hardware, located in the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC) of the ship, connects with the operational work stations (OWS) of the Blackjack’s GCS (J. Eshleman, personal communication August 23, 2016). To enable split or disaggregated MEU operations, hardware for the control element and communications equipment will need to be installed not only on LPDs, but on LHAs/ LHDs as well.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 48 - Naval Postgraduate School 3. Airspace

With regard to airspaces, because of the airworthiness certifications required of aircraft and the requirement to see-and-avoid, most UASs operate exclusively in active Warning or Restricted airspaces. There is a waiver request process to fly in other airspaces that are not restricted, but it is a cumbersome and time-consuming, process between the FAA and the DOD.

Marine Blackjack and Shadow systems do sometimes operate in Class D airspace, but that is coordinated well in advance and is done at their home air stations. Marine UASs typically do not transit between airspace or out of restricted areas, though in North Carolina, the Marine Corps has been using a Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) system since approval was received from the FAA in mid-2013. This GBSAA uses existing surveillance radar to enable flight of a UAV from MCAS Cherry Point to an adjacent restricted area (i.e., R-5306A&C) and has helped increase the number of sorties flown (HQMC AVN, 2014).

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Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 50 - Naval Postgraduate School IV. MARINE AVIATION MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. LIFE-CYCLE COST CATEGORIES

In the life-cycle of a program there are four major cost categories: 1) research and development costs, 2) investment costs, 3) O&S costs, and 4) disposal costs, as depicted in Figure 17. O&S costs are usually the largest (DOD, 2014) of the four major categories.

Figure 17. Illustrative System Life Cycle. Source: DOD (2014).

As a percentage of total life-cycle costs, O&S costs of UASs average 55%. The O&S costs for fixed wing aircraft are, on average, 63% and 68% for rotary-wing aircraft (DOD, 2014). O&S costs are affected by a litany of factors, some of the largest being the cost of petroleum, consumable parts, repairable parts, etc. The largest cost factor, though, is usually associated with manpower costs.

When the DOD conducts cost estimates for O&S costs, it uses the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) standard O&S cost element structure. The cost element structure breaks O&S costs into six major categories: 1) unit-level manpower, 2) unit operations, 3) maintenance, 4) sustaining support, 5) continuing system improvements,

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 51 - Naval Postgraduate School and 6) indirect support (DOD, 2014). This work will focus on the first major category, unit-level manpower.

B. COMMON MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

Unit-level manpower costs are defined by OSD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation as the “costs of all operator, maintenance, and other support manpower at operating units (or at maintenance and support units that are organizationally related and adjacent to the operating units)” (p. 6–3). Unit-level manpower is the first element, at the first level, of the cost element structure. Operator, maintenance, and other unit-level costs are second-level elements within the unit-level manpower cost element.

1. Operations

Element 1.1, Operations, are “the costs of all military, civilian, and contractor manpower required to operate a system” (DOD, 2014, p. 6.6). An example given was aircrew for aircraft. In the case of UAS operations, the operators are the UAS officers and UAS operators that directly operate the unmanned aircraft.

2. Maintenance

Element 1.2, Unit-Level Maintenance, consists of “the costs of all military, civilian, and contractor manpower that performs unit-level maintenance on the primary system. This element includes the costs of organizational maintenance manpower (often resident in the system operating unit) and unit-level intermediate maintenance personnel” (DOD, 2014, p. 6.6). Depot-level maintenance (element 3.4) is not included in this element nor is intermediate maintenance (external to unit-level) (element 3.3).

In the case of Marine squadrons, maintenance can be further divided into production divisions (i.e., airframes, avionics, line, and ordnance) or non-production divisions. Production divisions are direct labor/“touch labor,” and non-production divisions are those that are indirect labor but are still involved with the production/ maintenance function of the squadron. Of note, maintenance in the VMU does not include maintenance of the control element, communications equipment, or support element; maintenance of the other elements will be handled by Marines in other sections/

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 52 - Naval Postgraduate School departments in the squadron. Maintenance in the case of the VMU refers to maintenance of the unmanned aircraft and payload (i.e., sensors or ordnance). Figure 18 depicts the maintenance department of an O-level Marine squadron. If the squadron’s aircraft do not have particular systems then that work center will not exist in that squadron (e.g., propeller work center in a jet squadron, photo/reconnaissance in a VMM, aviation life support systems in a VMU, etc.). A separate UAS division is depicted but does not normally exist in a manned squadron unless UASs are attached.

3. Other Unit-Level

Element 1.3, Other Unit-Level, consist of “the cost of all military, civilian, and contractor manpower that performs administrative, security, logistics, safety, engineering, and other mission support functions at the unit level” (DOD, 2014, p. 6–6). In the case of Marine squadrons, this element consists of those Marines in the S-shops, Department of Safety and Standardization (DSS), and medical department. If one was to think of a squadron in terms of a business entity, other unit-level personnel costs are “selling, general, and administrative,” personnel.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 53 - Naval Postgraduate School

Figure 18. O-Level Maintenance Department Line and Staff Relationships (Marine Corps). Source: CNAF (2013).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 54 - Naval Postgraduate School C. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS IN MARINE SQUADRONS

In this section, the missions, deployment concepts, number of aircraft assigned, and the number of personnel of the a) Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM), b) Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH), c) Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA), d) Marine Attack Squadron (VMA), and e) VMU will be discussed. The term “chargeable” refers to those billets that personnel fill that go against the authorized strength of the unit, whereas “non-chargeable” billets are collateral billets and are not counted against the unit (J. Cox, personal communication October 18, 2016).

1. Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron

The VMM is the core of the MEU’s ACE, is the backbone of the Marine assault support community, and is the most numerous squadron in the Marine Corps. The mission of the VMM is to “support the MAGTF commander by providing assault support transport of combat troops, supplies, and equipment, day or night, under all weather conditions during expeditionary, joint, or combined operations” (CD&I, 2012, p. 1). The VMM is normally assigned 12 MV-22B Ospreys, as shown in Figure 19. When conducting most operations, the normal crew complement is two pilots (PMOS- 7532), one crew chief (PMOS-6176), and a second enlisted crewmember (crew chief or an aerial observer/gunner). Operations can be conducted with one crew chief but those are usually functional test flights, familiarization, or instrument flights where visibility to the rear of the aircraft, or workload within the cabin of the aircraft, is not as time critical as those operations in confined areas, reduced visibility environments (e.g., night, white- or brown-out conditions), or where troops and/or equipment are being transported.

The VMM usually deploys as an integral unit whether on the MEU or as a subordinate squadron to a MAG but structure has been designed in the TO&E to operate in a detachment of six aircraft. The total manpower requirement of a VMM is 32 officers (31 Marine officers [MO], 1 Navy officer [NO]) and 144 enlisted Marines and sailors (141 Marine enlisted [ME], 3 Navy enlisted [NE]); when augmented by MALS Marines the total increases by an additional 28 enlisted Marines. The core/squadron (-) consists of 18 officers (17MO, 1NO) and 73 VMM Marines and sailors (72ME, 1NE) augmented by 17 enlisted MALS Marines, as shown in Table 7. The six-aircraft detachment for a VMM

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 55 - Naval Postgraduate School consists of 14 officers and 71 VMM Marines and sailors (69ME, 2NE) augmented by 11 enlisted MALS Marines, as shown in Table 8. The total for the entire VMM is found by adding the subtotals of Table 7 and Table 8.

Table 7. VMM Core Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012).

Table 8. VMM Detachment Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012). Officer Enlisted Department Requirement Requirement HQ 0 0 DSS 0 0 S-1 0 2 S-2 0 1 S-3 13 3 S-4 0 2 Medical 0 2 Maintenance 1 61 Subtotal 14 71 MALS Augment 0 11 Total 14 82

The preponderance of the officers found in a VMM are the MV-22B pilots (PMOS- 7532). There are 28 pilots in a squadron, 3 aviation ground officers, and a Navy flight surgeon. With the exception of the CO and XO all pilots are found, by TO&E, in the operations department. In practice, these officers are found throughout the squadron

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 56 - Naval Postgraduate School filling collateral duty/non-chargeable billets as shop, division, and department officers in charge (OICs). The two collateral duty billets that require an additional MOS for officers are for the pilot training officer who is normally a WTI and the ASO.

Figure 19. MV-22B Osprey. Source: USMC (2016)

2. Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron

The HMH is the second most numerous assault support squadron in the Marine Corps. The mission of the HMH is to “support the Marine air ground task force (MAGTF) commander by providing assault support transport of heavy equipment, combat troops, and supplies, day or night, under all weather conditions during expeditionary, joint, or combined operations” (CD&I, 2014b, p. 1). The HMH is assigned 16 CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters in total, as shown in Figure 20. The CH-53E, like the MV-22B, usually operates with a crew of two pilots (PMOS- 7566), one crew chief (PMOS- 6173), and a second enlisted crewmember (crew chief or an aerial observer/ gunner).

Like the VMM, the HMH can operate as a subordinate unit to the MAG, but unlike the VMM, it is optimized to operate as a squadron (-) with two separate, four- aircraft detachments. These four-aircraft detachments are normally attached to the

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 57 - Naval Postgraduate School reinforced VMM when a MEU is assembled. The core operates the remaining eight aircraft. The total manpower requirement of an HMH is 42 officers (41MO, 1NO) and 241 enlisted Marines and sailors (238ME, 3NE); when augmented by MALS Marines the total increases by an additional 59 enlisted Marines. The core consists of 22 officers (21MO, 1NO) and 119 HMH Marines and sailors (118ME, 1NE) augmented by 28 enlisted MALS Marines, as shown in Table 9. Detachment #1 consists of 10 officers and 61 Marines and sailors (60ME, 1NE) augmented by 15 enlisted MALS Marines, as shown Table 10. Detachment #2 is larger by one Marine when MALS augments are included in the total. The rank and MOS mix are slightly different between the two detachments but the totals are the same for HMH Marines and sailors.

The preponderance of the officers (i.e., 38 of 42) found in an HMH are the CH- 53E pilots (PMOS- 7566). Like the VMM, the remaining four officers are the three aviation ground officers, and the Navy flight surgeon. Unlike the VMM where the CO and XO are the only chargeable billets for pilots not found in the operations department, the HMH has chargeable billets for detachment OICs and assistant OICs programmed into the TO&E. The remainder of the pilots are listed in the operations department.

Figure 20. CH-53E Sea Stallion. Source: USMC (2016)

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 58 - Naval Postgraduate School Table 9. HMH Core Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2014b)

Table 10. HMH Detachment Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2014b).

3. Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron

The HMLA is a very versatile squadron given its METs, and a large squadron in terms of the number of personnel and aircraft assigned. The mission of the HMLA is to “support the MAGTF Commander by providing offensive air support, utility support, armed escort, and airborne supporting arms coordination, day or night during expeditionary, joint or combined operations” (CD&I, 2015a, p. 1). The HMLA is assigned 27 aircraft total: 15 AH-1Z Viper and 12 UH-1Y Venom helicopters, as shown in Figures

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 59 - Naval Postgraduate School 21 and 22. Not all HMLAs have their full complement of aircraft by type since the Marine Corps is in the midst of the transition plan from the AH-1W to AH-1Z and UH-1N to UH- 1Y. At the time of this writing, the UH-1Y has largely replaced the UH-1Ns in service with HMLAs but the transition from the AH-1W to the AH-1Z is far from complete.

Figure 21. AH-1Z Viper. Source: USMC (2016).

Figure 22. UH-Y Venom. Source: Leake (2015).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 60 - Naval Postgraduate School The UH-1Y, like the MV-22B and the CH-53E, usually operates with a crew of two pilots (PMOS- 7563), one crew chief (PMOS-6174), and a second enlisted crewmember (crew chief or an aerial observer/gunner). The AH-1Z operates with a crew of two pilots (PMOS- 7565).

Like the HMH, the HMLA can operate as a subordinate unit to the MAG, but it is optimized to operate as a squadron (-) with two separate, nine-aircraft detachments (5 x AH-1Z, 4 x UH-1Y). The squadron (-)/core operates the remaining nine aircraft. The normal HMLA attachment to a MEU ACE is 4xAH-1Zs and 3xUH-1Ys. The numbers that are presented in this work are those taken directly from CD&I’s TO&E for an HMLA. The total manpower requirement of an HMLA is 71 officers (71MO, 1NO) and 311 enlisted Marines and sailors (307ME, 4NE); when augmented by MALS Marines the total increases by an additional 89 enlisted Marines. The core/squadron (-) consists of 29 officers (28MO, 1NO) and 127 HMLA Marines and sailors (125ME, 2NE) augmented by 33 enlisted MALS Marines, as shown in Table 11. Detachment #1 consists of 21 officers and 95 enlisted Marines and sailors (94ME, 1NE) augmented by 28 enlisted MALS Marines, as shown in Table 12. Detachment #2 is has two fewer Marines than detachment #1; the rank and MOS mix are slightly different between the two detachments.

The preponderance of the officers (i.e., 66 of 71) of an HMLA are AH-1W/Z pilots or UH-1Y pilots. Like the VMM and HMH, the HMLA has one Navy flight surgeon but, unlike the VMM and HMH, has an additional aviation ground officer. In addition to the CO, XO, detachment OICs, and assistant OICs, the HMLA also has chargeable billets reserved for pilots in the DSS and the S-1.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 61 - Naval Postgraduate School Table 11. HMLA Core Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2015a). Officer Enlisted Department Requirement Requirement HQ 2 1 DSS 1 0 S-1 1 5 S-2 0 2 S-3 20 5 S-4 0 5 Medical 1 2 Maintenance 4 107 Subtotal 29 127 MALS Augment 0 33 Total 29 160

Table 12. HMLA Detachment Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2015a). Officer Enlisted Department Requirement Requirement HQ 2 0 DSS 0 0 S-1 0 1 S-2 0 1 S-3 19 1 S-4 0 1 Medical 0 1 Maintenance 0 90 Subtotal 21 95 MALS Augment 0 28 Total 21 123

4. Marine Attack Squadron

The VMA is a fixed-wing squadron unlike all the previously discussed squadrons. The mission of the VMA is to “support the Marine Air Ground Task Force Commander by destroying surface targets and escorting friendly aircraft, day or night, under all weather conditions, during expeditionary, joint, or combined operations” (CD&I, 2014a, p. 1). The VMA is normally assigned a total of 16 AV-8B Harrier II aircraft, as shown in Figure 23. It can function as integral, subordinate squadron to a MAG, or as a squadron(-)

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 62 - Naval Postgraduate School with a separate six-aircraft detachment. When a detachment is attached to a reinforced VMM, it attaches six aircraft and the Marines and sailors to operate and support them. The AV-8B is crewed by a sole pilot (PMOS- 7509).

The total manpower requirement of a VMA is 27 officers (26MO, 1NO) and 217 enlisted Marines and sailors (214ME, 3NE); when augmented by MALS Marines the total increases by an additional 75 enlisted Marines. The core/squadron (-) consists of 17 officers (16MO, 1NO) and 144 VMA Marines and sailors (141ME, 3NE) augmented by 43 enlisted MALS Marines, as shown in Table 13. The six-aircraft detachment consists of 10 officers and 73 enlisted Marines augmented by 32 enlisted MALS Marines, as shown in Table 14.

The preponderance of the officers found in a VMM are the AV-8B pilots. There are 22 pilots in a VMA, 4 aviation ground officers, and a Navy flight surgeon. With the exception of the CO, XO, detachments OICs, and assistant detachment OICs, all pilots are found, by TO&E, in the operations department.

Table 13. VMA Core Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2014a). Officer Enlisted Department Requirement Requirement HQ 2 1 DSS 0 0 S-1 0 5 S-2 0 1 S-3 10 3 S-4 0 3 Medical 1 3 Maintenance 4 128 Subtotal 17 144 MALS Augment 0 43 Total 17 187

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 63 - Naval Postgraduate School Table 14. VMA Detachment Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2014a). Officer Enlisted Department Requirement Requirement HQ 2 0 DSS 0 0 S-1 0 0 S-2 0 1 S-3 8 2 S-4 0 1 Medical 0 0 Maintenance 0 69 Subtotal 10 73 MALS Augment 0 32 Total 10 105

Figure 23. AV-8B Harrier II. Source: USMC (2016).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 64 - Naval Postgraduate School 5. VMU

As stated in the Department of Aviation’s 2015 Marine Aviation Plan, the VMU’s “tables of organization are structured and manned to support the both the RQ-7B Shadow and MQ-21A Blackjack” (p. 2.7.5). A stated in Chapter III, the VMU is currently structured to operate three Shadow systems and nine Blackjack systems. Like other squadrons, the VMU concept of organization allows it serve as integral unit subordinate to the MAG (or higher ACE) or deploy multiple detachments. What makes the VMU unique is its ability to deploy multiple detachments, and to maneuver with a supported unit. As opposed to all other squadrons with aircraft, the VMU possesses well over 20 organic vehicles in the form of MTVRs and HMMWVs making it “capable of transportation with its own vehicles” (CD&I, 2015b, p. 2).

The total manpower requirement of a VMU is 24 officers (23MO, 1NO) and 250 enlisted Marines and sailors (247ME, 3NE). The VMU does not deploy with a MALS detachments but relies on contractor logistics support for both organizational field and intermediate field levels of maintenance for the Shadow and Blackjack aircraft (CD&I, 2015b). This work does not take into account the numbers of contractors assigned to individual VMUs; the only manpower numbers reviewed are those found in the VMU TO&E.

The core/squadron (-) consists of 11 officers (10MO, 1NO) and 37 Marines, as shown in Table 15. Detachment One and Two consist of 2 officers, 46 enlisted Marines and sailors (45ME, 1NE) each, as shown in Table 16. Detachment Three has an additional officer on the TO&E. The STUAS Section consists of 6 officers and 75 enlisted Marines. The section is comprised of three detachments (A, B, C) all of which have three section of their own (1st, 2nd, 3rd). The three detachments have a pair of UAS officers to serve as the detachment OICs, assistant detachment OICs, and as UAS mission commanders. All sections have eight to nine Marines (Det A and B’s-eight; Det C’s- nine) bringing the total to 24 Marines per detachment for Detachments A and B, or 27 Marines for Detachment C, as shown in Table 17.

The preponderance of the officers found in a VMU are the UAS officers. Like the other squadrons, the VMU has a naval officer to serve as the flight surgeon but has only

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 65 - Naval Postgraduate School two aviation ground officers (vice three or four). Notable additions, not found in the manned aircraft squadrons, are the assignment of three Marine ground officers (i.e., intelligence, logistics, and a communications officer).

Table 15. VMU Core Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2015b). Officer Enlisted Department Requirement Requirement HQ 2 1 DSS 3 2 S-1 0 2 S-2 1 3 S-3 0 3 S-4 1 9 S-6 1 8 Medical 1 0 Maintenance 2 9 Subtotal 11 37 MALS Augment 0 0 Total 11 37

Table 16. VMU Detachment Manpower Requirements. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2015b). Officer Enlisted Department Requirement Requirement HQ 1 0 DSS 0 0 S-1 0 1 S-2 0 6 S-3 1 8 S-4 0 9 S-6 0 6 Medical 0 1 Maintenance 0 15 Subtotal 2 46 MALS Augment 0 0 Total 2 46

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 66 - Naval Postgraduate School

Table 17. STUAS Section. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2015b). Officer Enlisted Det/Section Requirement Requirement Det A HQ 2 0 1st Section 0 8 2nd Section 0 8 3rd Section 0 8 2 24 Det B HQ 2 0 1st Section 0 8 2nd Section 0 8 3rd Section 0 8 2 24 Det C HQ 2 0 1st Section 0 9 2nd Section 0 9 3rd Section 0 9 2 27 Total 6 75

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Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 68 - Naval Postgraduate School V. MUX MANPOWER ESTIMATE

A. ESTIMATE METHODOLOGY

There are three methodologies used to perform a cost estimate, a) analogy, b) parametric and c) engineering build-up. An analogy is a relatively simple estimate that uses “a single analogous historical data point” (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 49) whereas a parametric cost estimate finds that ‘cost is a function of physical and performance characteristics, which are also called “explanatory variables”‘ (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 50). An engineering build-up is a very detailed, bottoms-up approach to calculating the cost of a system by totaling the sum of labor and material.

The analogy methodology generally uses one historical program because there is only one program to compare it against. An example would be when estimating a second generation program and using the first generation’s costs to make the estimate. When doing an analogy cost estimate, a system that closely resembles the new system should be used and appropriate cost drivers identified. Once the cost driver is identified, a ratio of the cost to drivers will be determined and the ratio will be applied to the original system’s cost to derive the estimate for the new system (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015).

The cost driver in this work is the mission of the MUX-equipped VMU(F), and the resultant manpower requirements to operate and maintain the system. In doing the manpower cost estimate for this work, an analogy-type approach is used but with a few distinct differences. The MUX’s characteristics and attributes are quite distinct when compared to current systems but some of its presumed subsystems are, or will be assumed to be, analogous.

The MUX is in an embryonic stage of development at the time of this writing; a JROC decision has yet to be made allowing for the development of this program. There are scant details as to the exact technical requirements the VMU(F)’s mission will require. This work uses various assumptions to establish the mission and environment in which the MUX, and VMU(F), will operate. Those assumptions will in turn drive the resultant manpower requirements of the VMU(F). This work’s model seeks to estimate the table of organization for the VMU(F).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 69 - Naval Postgraduate School B. ASSUMPTIONS

1. Assumption—Number of Aircraft in a System

As an estimate for the number of MUX aircraft to deploy in a detachment, the number of aircraft used in the MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-1 Predator systems will be used as a baseline, four (Drew, 2005). The number of aircraft that are deployed in detachments is tailorable given such restraints and constraints like: the number of operators, maintainers, and support personnel available; number and types of parts deployed with; ease of resupply; desired service rate (i.e., percent coverage in the target area); and desired mission profiles.

Given the MUX ICD’s desire for 24-hour coverage in the objective area, with 100% coverage, a minimum two aircraft are needed. During operations requiring 100% coverage, there will be times when two aircraft are aloft at once. When one aircraft is in the operating area and awaiting replacement, the second aircraft must arrive on station prior to the first one departing.

To maintain 100% coverage and protect against uncertainties associated with hostile threats, weather, and maintenance, two full-mission capable aircraft (at a minimum) will be required for every launch, a primary and a back-up. Lastly, because the MUX will deploy in corrosive, maritime environment, and because the aircraft will accrue a large amount of flight hours, extensive maintenance evolutions like phase inspections will be required periodically thereby requiring a fourth aircraft.

2. Assumption—Number of Aircraft Controlled at a Time

Technology makes it possible for one control station (ground, seaborne, or airborne) to control multiple aircraft simultaneously, but for this model the assumption is that one control station will control one aircraft at a time. The one exception is when an aircraft is launched to replace another that is conducting surveillance. When that is the case, two aircraft will be controlled by one crew simultaneously. This evolution will take approximately four hours allowing for take-off and transit of the replacing aircraft, swap in target area, and transit and landing of the replaced aircraft.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 70 - Naval Postgraduate School The control elements and communication equipment of different UASs vary in size because of operations requirements. To control the MUX, the communications equipment will be comparable in size to the MQ-1 and MQ-9 vice the RQ-21. The MUX will not only require LOS communications and control within the immediate vicinity of the ship during take-off and landing but will also require BLOS communications and control when operating OTH. Because of two types of control used, the footprint will be larger than what the RQ-21 currently requires.

The current location for the Blackjack’s OWS is the LFOC which makes sense. Intelligence drives operations, and there is no better location for the GCS to be located. The LFOC is the operations center for the MEU, and is co-located with the Supporting Arms Coordination Center. If the GCS is located there, the UAS crew and intelligence Marines, can very easily communicate, real-time, what they are seeing and doing. Because current L-class ships were not originally designed with extra space available for UAS GCSs, space on the ship is at a premium. If extra space could be found for two GCSs that would be ideal. The assumption that only one GCS operates in the LFOC will be assumed for this work’s manpower model.

3. Assumption—Crew Composition

The crew composition of the MUX will be similar to that of the Blackjack construct, one UAC/pilot and one UAS operator. The crew construct mirrors how both the Marine Corps and Air Force operate today. Varying levels of autonomy (i.e., human in the loop, human on the loop, and human out of the loop) make it possible for unmanned aircraft to be flown by a pilot with varying degrees of control from total to no control. The assumption will be made that a human can and will control the MUX during different portions of the mission augmented by automation to control the flight of the aircraft. Because the MUX will be weaponized its minimum crew composition will be one. In accordance with DOD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, UASs are not permitted to autonomously select and engage targets without the permission of an “authorized human operator” (OUSD-P, 2012). A human must, at a minimum, remain “in the loop.”

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 71 - Naval Postgraduate School Manpower savings could be realized by making the MUX a single-crewed aircraft. Given the number of tactical and controlling agencies the MUX crew must communicate by multiple means (e.g., radio, NIPRNET, SIPRNET, chat, etc.), combined with the added requirements to employ weapons and perform EW, human systems integration factors cause the MUX to remain a multi-crewed platform. There will be times when the workload may be assumed by one crewmember but that will likely only occur during times of transit—an estimated total of 4 hours out a 24-hour mission (not including mission preparation or debrief).

Because of various considerations like rank gradient issues between crewmembers, employment of weapons systems, and the increased professionalization of the 7315 community, the assumption for this model is that the UAS crew will be commanded by a commissioned officer.

4. Assumption—NATOPS Flight Time Limits

The CNO (2009) in OPNAVINST 3710.7U, Naval air training and operating procedures standardization (NATOPS) general flight and operating instructions, section 3.16, “Unmanned Aircraft System(s),” states that, “additional UAS policy is currently being developed for incorporation into this instruction. This instruction may need to be changed or waived to reflect the realities of UAS operations” (p. 3–27). This work takes the previous statement and models recommended flight limits for a MUX crew. The assumption that will be used for UAS flight times limits are those that are the most lenient flight time limits currently used in the OPNAVINST 3710.7U, those for “Multi- Piloted Pressurized Aircraft,” as found in section 8.3.2.2 of OPNAVINST 3710.7U.

It is common practice for Wing, MAG, or squadron flight operations SOPs to be more stringent than the OPNAVINST 3710 but it will be used as a baseline to establish flight time limits. The flight limits used for this assumption are more in line with what an MUX crew will endure during surge operations. During normal operations in an operational squadron, OPNAVINST 3710 flight limits are very rarely reached. If a crewmember approaches the maximum prescribed flight time limits, their physical state will be assessed by the flight surgeon, and if found fit, a waiver will be submitted and the crewmember continues to fly. During a normal deployment, MUX crews will likely never

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 72 - Naval Postgraduate School come close to meeting or exceeding the above flight hours because of the normal constraints of budgeted flight hours for training, limited flight deck window time on the ship, trying to make the ship’s point of intended movement, etc.

An argument can reasonably be made that the MUX is a single-piloted aircraft thereby requiring the crew to adhere to the more stringent single-piloted limits. The reason why that argument was not used for this assumption is because the OPNAVINST 3710 was originally designed for manned flight. The hazards of flight, especially in dangerous environments, take a mental and physiological toll on flight personnel that are not experienced by UAS crews on deck. That is not to say that UAS operators are not immune to stressful situations, but to pilot or crew an aircraft in hazardous, maritime environments in reduced visibility environments is more stressful that operating a UAS from the LFOC.

5. Assumption—UAS Operators Deployment Method

The assumption for the deployment method for the UAS operators of the VMU(F) is that they will deploy along with MUX and the maintainers vice remaining in CONUS to conduct operations. Detractors of this assumption will disagree with this deployment method, mostly, because of monetary reasons.

Technology has enabled the military to control UAVs half-way across the globe using BLOS technology. Employing UASs in this manner has many benefits including manpower cost savings in terms of reducing the number of personnel that are paid imminent danger pay, hazardous duty pay, per diem, and other pays associated with deploying to combat zones. Additionally, by reducing the number of personnel forward deployed, there is a reduction in the logistical footprint of a unit, the cost of supplying said footprint, a reduction in overall risk to personnel by having fewer personnel forward deployed, and host nations sensitivities are reduced because fewer Americans are forward-deployed in countries that are ambivalent at best, and hostile at worst, to the presence of American armed forces.

Manpower cost savings are also made by consolidating manpower in fewer locations. As is the case with inventory management of supplies, a business entity must

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 73 - Naval Postgraduate School maintain a certain level of safety stock in order to provide a certain level of service. When a certain level of service is decided upon, and applied to a given level of inventory and time for resupply, the amount of safety stock can be calculated. When the number of inventory points is reduced, various safety stocks can be consolidated resulting in the same level of service with less safety stock required. This safety stock principle can be applied to manpower.

If operators are consolidated in CONUS, instead of being forward deployed with the LRSs, fewer UAS officers and operators are required to operate the systems. This is exactly how the Air Force employs its UAS force. Air Force UASs are mainly Group 4 or 5 UASs, theatre-level assets; those employed by the Marine Corps (i.e., Group 3) and most of those employed by the Army, are brigade/regimental-level equivalents or lower.

There are numerous reasons against this assumption but the value of deploying a unit as a whole, where trust, initiative, and implicit communication, cannot be monetized. When MEUs undergo the pre-deployment training cycle, invaluable lessons are learned by all. Relationships are formed between all units, at all levels, and between the Navy and Marine Corps team. To fully employ the MUX using a maneuver warfare mindset requires the operators to train and deploy with their fellow Marines.

6. Assumption—Concept of Employment

The assumption for the concept of employment with regard to ground maneuver is that the VMU(F) requires ground transportation for its communications equipment and control element but the total number of ground vehicles required will be fewer than the number required by the VMU.

The VMU’s transportation capabilities enable it to fulfill its own transportation requirements. Because of the simplicity and size of the Shadow and Blackjack systems, the VMU can maneuver about the battlespace like other units with MTVRs and HMMWVs. This capability supports maneuver warfare at the tactical level of war. If required, the VMU can move with its supported unit, and ideally co-locate its control element with the headquarters of the support unit. This concept of employment stands in contrast to the employment of the MUX and the VMU(F).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 74 - Naval Postgraduate School Because of the anticipated size of the MUX system, it will not be nearly as ground transportable as the Shadow and Blackjack systems but need not be. The MUX air vehicle will likely not be containerized for storage as the Group 3 UAVs are. It will likely be hangered or parked like larger manned aircraft. Additionally, the VMU(F) will not be required to transport all of its Marines, supplies, ground support equipment, and air vehicles as the VMU can. It will only require sufficient transport to move its larger pieces of equipment when offloading from ARG shipping or when airlifted into a new theatre of operations.

C. MODEL

In this section, a requirements estimate for the MUX-equipped VMU is presented with given explanations. The numbers of personnel by squadron, shop, and department were extracted from the same HQMC CD&I-produced TO&E reports as used in Chapter IV of this work (i.e., HQMC CD&I, 2012 [VMM]; HQMC CD&I, 2014b [HMH]; HQMC CD&I, 2015a [HMLA]; HQMC CD&I, 2014a [VMA]; and HQMC CD&I, 2015b [VMU]). The term “manned aircraft squadrons” is used to refer to the VMM, HMH, HMLA, and VMA as a whole unless specifically stated otherwise.

1. Operators

In order to meet the minimum 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio as desired by the Marine Corps, the VMU(F) will be manned and organized with three equally-sized detachments and a squadron (-)/core component. Having three detachments enables the squadron to be organized for incorporation into the MEU cycle or to serve in three separate geographic locations when deployed as an integral unit.

There are three MEUs on each coast. During normal operations, one MEU is usually deployed, the next MEU is conducting the pre-deployment training plan (PTP), and the third is in its post-deployment rest and refit phase. Having three VMU(F) detachments provides sufficient time to meet, and achieve, individual, and unit T&R standards prior to CHOP to the MEU while also meeting the Marine Corps’ threshold goal for the 1:2 deploy-dwell time.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 75 - Naval Postgraduate School In order to sufficiently man the detachment for 24-hour operations and adhere to OPNAVINST 3710.7U limits for multi-piloted crews, a minimum of eight crews is required. The recommended maximum number of hours to be flown by a member of a multi-piloted, non-pressurized aircraft is 12 hours in one day, 50 hours in 7 days, 120 hours in 30 days, 320 hours in 90 days, and 1120 hours in one year (CNO, 2009), see column three of Table 18. Column two of Table 18 is the period in days converted to hours. Column four displays the minimum number of crew needed in order to not exceed the limits in column three. The values in column four are derived by dividing the values in column two by the limits in column three. Because a total of eight crews are needed per detachment and the squadron has three detachments, a total of 24 crews are required for the VMU(F). The commanding officer and executive officer are operators as well bringing the total of UAS officers to 26 officers (one Lieutenant Colonel [O-5], four Majors [O-4], nine Captains [O-3], and twelve First Lieutenants [O-2]). An additional Master Sergeant (E-8)will be listed to the core as the senior UAS operator bringing the total of enlisted UAS operators to 25 (one Master Sergeant, three Gunnery Sergeants [E- 7], three Staff Sergeants [E-6], three Sergeants [E-5], six Corporals [E-4], nine Lance Corporals [E-3]).

All operators with the exception of the CO and XO are reflected in the TO&E as under the Operations section. The CO and XO will be reflected in the Headquarters subsection of the Admin section.

Table 18. Minimum Required Crews per Detachments. Adapted from CNO (2009). 3710.7U Limit for Crews required per Period in Hours per given Multi-Piloted period given 3710 Days period Pressurize Aircraft limit 1 24 12 2 7 168 50 3.36 30 720 120 6 90 2160 320 6.75 365 8760 1120 7.821428571

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 76 - Naval Postgraduate School 2. Maintenance

The aircraft maintenance department, as in all aircraft squadrons of the Marine Corps, has the largest personnel requirements and increases as the number of aircraft in a squadron increase. Some MOSs and shops will not vary significantly in size with the number of aircraft in a squadron, these are indirect labor requirements and generally fixed. Other divisions are the direct labor components of the maintenance department, and the numbers required are generally variable given the number of aircraft required to be maintained.

a. Production and Non-Production Work Centers

The term production work center is used to describe those work centers or branches in the O-level maintenance structure that normally inspect, maintain, or repair the aircraft (CNAF, 2013); the quality assurance branch inspects the work of other branches as required but they do not work on the aircraft as the production work centers do. The production work centers/divisions are a) Airframes, b) Avionics, c) Line, and d) Ordnance. Non-production work centers are those centers that do not inspect, maintain, or repair aircraft. The non-production work centers are a) Maintenance/Materiel Control, b) Maintenance Admin, c) Tool Control, and d) Quality Assurance. See the third and fourth levels of Figure 18. Because the VMU is structured slightly differently than the manned aircraft squadrons are, it will be discussed separately after the manned aircraft squadrons.

b. Maintenance Control

Maintenance Control is the “functional organization within the OMA [organizational maintenance activity] responsible for workload control” (CNAF, 2013, p. A-40). For the simplicity of the model, the maintenance department’s leadership (i.e., aircraft maintenance officer [AMO], assistant aircraft maintenance officer [AAMO], and aircraft maintenance chief) will be listed under maintenance control. The maintenance department is headed by the AMO who is an operator of the type of aircraft found in the squadron. The AMO billet, as found in all the TO&Es analyzed, was a non-chargeable/ collateral billet. The remaining officer positions found in a squadron are, the AAMO,

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 77 - Naval Postgraduate School Maintenance/Material Control Officer (MMCO) and Maintenance Control Officer. Depending on the number of operators available in a squadron, a second operator, if added to maintenance control will fill the billet of AAMO. The remaining positions are filled by two, aircraft maintenance officers. The first aviation ground officer in the maintenance department is a First Lieutenant or Captain, aircraft maintenance officer (PMOS 6002), and the second is a CWO2 or CWO3, aircraft maintenance engineer officer (PMOS 6004). In terms of function, the AAMO role is akin to being the executive officer and training officer of the maintenance department, and the MMCO is akin to being the operations officer of the maintenance department. All manned squadrons, with the exception of the VMM, have the MMCO position manned by a First Lieutenant, 6002, and the maintenance control OIC by a CWO2 (HMH, VMA) or CWO 3 (HMLA). The VMM listed their 6002 officer as a Captain filling the role of AAMO, and a CWO2 filling the role of MMCO. The VMU(F) will have a First Lieutenant, 6002, and CWO2, 6004, listed to the core unit.

All squadrons had an aircraft maintenance chief, MOS 6019, programmed into its TO&E but numbers and ranks differed. The HMH and VMA had one Master Sergeant programmed as the aircraft maintenance chief, the HMLA a Master Gunnery Sergeant (E-9), and the VMM had two chiefs programmed, one Master Gunnery Sergeant (with the detachment) and one Master Sergeant (with the core). The likely reason two aircraft maintenance chiefs were programmed to the VMM is because it is the base squadron for a MEU ACE. When composite, a VMM increases in size by approximately three. The likely reason the HMLA has a Master Gunnery Sergeant is because of the large size of the maintenance department in terms of the number of aircraft and personnel. For this work’s model, the VMU(F) will have one, Master Sergeant, listed to the core as the aircraft maintenance chief.

The maintenance control branch of every manned aircraft squadron’s core was relatively the same size and composition with the exception of the VMM. The HMH and HMLA had the same number of Marines, nine, though their rank structure and MOS mixed was different. Each had one maintenance control chief (NMOS 6012), three maintenance controllers (NMOS 6012; one each from airframes, avionics, and line), one aviation data analyst (NMOS 6049), one aviation maintenance data specialist (PMOS

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 78 - Naval Postgraduate School 6046), one aviation logistics information management system (ALIMS) chief, MOS 6694, and two “expeditors.” One expeditor is an aviation supply specialist, MOS 6672, and the second a mechanic/technician from a production work center. The VMA had an additional avionics Marine in the maintenance control branch bringing their total to 10. The VMM, when the core and detachment maintenance control branches are combined have a total of 11 Marines; it, like the VMA, had an additional avionics Marine in maintenance control as well as an additional expeditor.

The maintenance control branches of the detachments ranged in size from six to eight Marines. That variation was due to some squadrons having a fourth maintenance controller, an expeditor and/or a maintenance aviation maintenance data specialist listed with maintenance control. The base of every detachment’s maintenance control had a senior maintenance controller listed as the maintenance control chief, two additional maintenance controllers, and a combination of individual material readiness list (IMRL) managers and tool control clerks.

For this model, the VMU(F)’s detachments will have one maintenance control chief, two additional maintenance controllers, one expeditor, and two tool control clerks. The total for the VMU(F) detachments’ maintenance control branches is 18 (three Gunnery Sergeants, six Staff Sergeants, three Sergeants, three Corporals, and three Lance Corporals). The core will have two additional two IMRL managers listed (one Corporal, and one Lance Corporal) as well as one Sergeant, ALIMS chief. The total for VMU(F)’s core and detachment maintenance control branches is two officers and 22 enlisted Marines.

c. Maintenance Admin

The maintenance admin branch in a squadron consists exclusively of aviation maintenance data specialists (6046) and those Marines who have conducted additional training to earn the NMOS of 6049, aviation data analyst. Aviation maintenance data specialists are found not only in maintenance admin but in maintenance control and quality assurance. An aviation maintenance data specialist maintains “aircraft logbooks, aircraft maintenance publications/files, and prepare[s] reports, log records, directives, and correspondence within aircraft maintenance and repair activities” (HQMC TECOM,

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 79 - Naval Postgraduate School 2015a, p. 3–518). Amongst all squadrons, core or detachments, there was no consensus as to the number of aviation admin specialists and/or analysts listed in the maintenance control or maintenance admin branches. The aggregated number between the two branches averaged one specialist for every two aircraft. For the VMU, there was one specialist listed per system and one analyst in the core. For the VMU(F), because of the assumed complexity of the system, there will be a total of six aviation maintenance data specialists and/or analysts listed in maintenance admin section of the squadron (one Staff Sergeant, two Sergeants, and three corporals). One admin specialist and one analyst listed in the maintenance admin branch of each detachment with no additional specialists or analysts listed in the core.

d. Quality Assurance

The quality assurance branch, much like maintenance control, is a non-production work center that is manned by experienced mechanics and a few aviation maintenance data specialists. The mechanics found in QA are quality assurance representatives (QARs) that have earned the 6018 NMOS. The QARs in a maintenance department are the driving force behind the department’s safety culture and maintenance practices; they are the managers for certain programs and are monitors of every manager of a maintenance program; they are inspectors of post-phase maintenance inspections; and brief pilots when an aircraft is being tested on a functional checkflight (FCF) (CNAF, 2013). In the VMU core, the only Marine listed to QA is a Staff Sergeant, 6314, UAS avionics/maintenance technician; in the detachments, two 6314s are listed to QA, one Staff Sergeant and one Sergeant. The manned aircraft squadron’s QA branches are more robust that than of the VMU.

All QA shops analyzed had the common feature of having most, if not all, production work center represented. Differences included the number of QARs assigned, and the number of maintenance admin specialists assigned and to which element (core and/or detachment. The VMM core and detachment, like nearly all shops in the squadron was split in half; the core had three Marines listed, the detachment four. The HMH core had seven Marines listed in the core whereas the detachment had six. The HMLA was

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 80 - Naval Postgraduate School equal across the board with six each. The VMA had eight QA Marines listed in the core, and only three listed in the detachment.

The total number of QA Marines listed in the VMU(F) will be 18 Marines (one Gunnery Sergeant, three Staff Sergeants, eight Sergeants, three Corporals, and three Lance Corporals. The VMU(F) will have four QARs (one from each production work center [airframes, avionics, line, and ordnance]) and two aviation maintenance data specialists listed to each detachment. No additional QA Marines will be listed in the core.

e. Airframes

The airframes division in all of the manned aircraft squadrons studied were either the largest or second largest divisions in the maintenance departments. If the crew chiefs found in the helicopter squadrons were removed from the respective TO&Es, the airframes division would be the largest division across the board. The airframes division, as depicted in Figure 18, consists of multiple branches within it. All manned squadrons had the airframes branch, corrosion control branch, phase maintenance branch, and the flight equipment branch. Because the AV-8B has ejection seats, the VMA has a “seat shop” whereas the others do not. The VMU does not have an airframes division. For the development of the VMU(F) TO&E it is assumed there will be no seat shop or flight equipment branch because there is no need to support a human on a UAV; the number of flight equipment specialists and seat mechanics are not included in the total of the airframes division manpower requirements.

None of the airframes divisions studied had an aviation maintenance officer listed in it by the TO&E. The OIC of the division is an officer-operator whose billet is listed as a collateral/non-chargeable billet al.l phase maintenance coordinators were Staff Sergeant, line mechanics. Phase coordinators were listed in the core of every squadron but with regard to detachments only the HMH and HMLA detachments had a phase coordinator listed.

The airframes branch in the core squadrons ranged from 9 Marines in the VMM to 18 in the HMLA. The average number of personnel weighted by aircraft assigned was 1.84, as show in Table 19. For the detachments, the range of personnel was 9 in the

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 81 - Naval Postgraduate School VMM and VMA, to 16 in the HMLA. The average number of personnel per aircraft weighted by the number of aircraft was close to that of the core, 1.76, as shown in Table 20. The airframes branch was composed of airframes mechanics specific to their aircraft type, and a few Marines the rank of Sergeant and above that have earned the non- destructive inspector NMOS (6033).

The corrosion control branch in the core squadrons ranged from three Marines in the VMM to eight in the VMA. The average number of personnel per aircraft weighted by aircraft assigned was .66, as shown in Table 19. For the detachments, the range of personnel was three in the VMM to six in the VMA with a weighted average of 0.76 Marines per aircraft, as shown in Table 20. Of note, whereas the airframes branch was composed of only airframes mechanics, the corrosion control branch not only had airframe mechanics listed in it but had other production work center Marines (i.e., line, avionics, and ordnance) listed in it.

Table 19. Core Airframes and Corrosion Control Branches. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a). Core Squadron # Aircraft Airframes Pers./AC Corrosion Pers./AC VMM 6 9 1.5 3 0.5 HMH 8 17 2.125 6 0.75 HMLA 9 18 2 5 0.5555556 VMA 10 17 1.7 8 0.8 Mean: 1.8484848 0.6666667

Table 20. Detachment Airframes and Corrosion Control Branches. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a). Detachment Squadron # Aircraft Airframes Pers./AC Corrosion Pers./AC VMM 6 9 1.5 3 0.5 HMH 4 10 2.5 5 1.25 HMLA 9 16 1.7777778 5 0.5555556 VMA 6 9 1.5 6 1 Mean: 1.76 0.76

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 82 - Naval Postgraduate School Given the average number of airframes mechanics per aircraft and the likely size, number of subsystems, and missions of the MUX, each VMU(F) detachments will have eight airframes mechanics listed. The total number of VMU(F) airframe mechanics in the listed in airframes branch will be 24 Marines (one Gunnery Sergeant, three Staff Sergeants, six Sergeants, seven Corporals, and seven Lance Corporals).

The corrosion control branch of each detachment will have four Marines listed in it, a combination of three Marines from the four production work centers supervised by an airframes mechanic Staff Sergeant. The total number of personnel listed in the corrosion control branches for the entire VMU(F) will be 12.

One Staff Sergeant, line mechanic will be listed as the phase coordinator in each detachment. The VMU(F) will have a total of three Staff Sergeants serving as phase coordinators.

f. Avionics

Marines in the organizational avionics maintenance occupational field, 63, are responsible for the maintenance and repair of communications, navigation, electrical, and radar subsystems of aircraft (HQMC TECOM 2015a). A Marines specialty is dictated by what type of aircraft they are assigned to maintain.

All squadrons analyzed, to include the VMU, had a CWO2, (PMOS 6302), Avionics Officer listed in the core of their respective squadrons; there were no additional avionics officers listed to the detachments. All squadron cores had a Master Sergeant listed as the avionics department SNCO in charge with the exception of the VMM which had a Master Sergeant listed to the detachment.

The number of Marines in the avionics departments of the core, manned squadrons numbered as few as 11 in the VMM to 19 in the VMA. The average number of avionics Marines per aircraft ranged from 1.83 in the VMM to 2.0 in the HMLA, as shown in Table 21.

The number of Marines in the avionics sections of the detachments of manned aircraft squadrons numbered as few as 9 for the HMH to as many as 17 for the HMLA.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 83 - Naval Postgraduate School The average number of avionics Marines per aircraft ranged from 1.88 for the HMLA to 2.25 for the HMH, as shown in Table 21.

The range of average number of avionics personnel listed per aircraft was relatively constant at two Marines whether it was in the core or the detachments of the manned squadrons.

With regard to the VMU, the core did not have avionics Marines listed to it with the exception of the avionics OIC. As for the detachments, the avionics department had five avionics/maintenance technicians, MOS 6314, listed to it. It is interesting to note that the line section, too, had five Marines with the MOS 6314 listed to it. In the manned aircraft squadrons, avionics technicians and line mechanics have distinct MOSs, and in fact, have different occupational fields (i.e., Occupational Field 63, Organizational Avionics Maintenance versus Occupational Field 61, Aircraft Maintenance [Rotary Wing], Occupational Field 62, Aircraft Maintenance [Fixed Wing]; HQMC TECOM, 2015a).

Given that the average number of avionics Marines is relatively the same across the manned aircraft squadrons, the VMU(F) will have two avionics Marines listed per aircraft. Given that there are four aircraft per system, each detachment will have eight enlisted avionics Marines listed to it. The core will have a CWO2 and Master Sergeant listed to it giving the VMU(F) a total manpower requirement of one officer and 25 enlisted Marines (one Master Sergeant, one Gunnery Sergeant, two Staff Sergeants, three Sergeants, nine Corporals, and nine Lance Corporals).

Table 21. Core and Detachment Avionics Marines by Squadron Type. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a). Core Detachment Squadron # Aircraft Personnel Pers./AC # Aircraft Personnel Pers./AC VMM 6 11 1.8333333 6 12 2 HMH 8 15 1.875 4 9 2.25 HMLA 9 18 2 9 17 1.8888889 VMA 10 19 1.9 6 12 2 Mean: 1.9090909 Mean: 2

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 84 - Naval Postgraduate School g. Line

Like airframes branch Marines, the majority of line branch Marines belong to the aircraft maintenance occupational fields 61and 62. Like airframes mechanics, line Marines are responsible for the maintenance and repair of the airframe (HQMC TECOM, 2015a) but they differ in what particular subsystems they maintain and repair, and what programs their divisions are responsible for. Line division is usually responsible for the daily and turnaround inspections of aircraft prior to flight operations, and organizational- level maintenance procedures for engines. The airframes branch concentrates on the airframe itself and hydraulic systems.

The two types of line Marines that are found in helicopter squadrons are line mechanics and crew chiefs. Crew chiefs are enlisted Marines that serve aboard aircraft during flight operations but they are also school-trained mechanics. Because they are tasked with flight operations they may not perform as much corrective maintenance as mechanics but they still earn their maintenance qualifications and designations (e.g., CDI, CDQAR, etc.) as mechanics do.

In the core of manned aircraft squadrons, the number of mechanics ranged from 8 in the VMM to 22 in the VMA. The number of crew chiefs ranged from 7 in the HMLA to 12 in the HMH; the VMA does not have crew chiefs. The totals for both mechanics and crew chiefs in the VMM were 17; HMH, 29; HMLA, 27; and 23 mechanics in the VMA. The number of personnel to aircraft listed (in the core) was 2.2 (VMA) to 3.63 (HMH). When crew chiefs were removed from the total numbers, the ranges change only for the helicopter and tiltrotor squadrons; the VMM has the lowest ratio at 1.33, the VMA the highest at 2.2. Of note, because the HMLA has a 5:4 ratio of AH-1s to UH-1s, they have a reduced crew chief requirement as a proportion of aircraft assigned when compared to the VMM and HMH. Lastly, the core of the VMA has one Sergeant, 6222, powerplant mechanic, listed to it. This sole powerplant mechanic was included with the other line mechanics for the AV-8B Harrier, as shown in Table 22.

With regard to the detachments, the VMA again has the fewest number of Marines listed per aircraft (i.e., 2.17). When crew chiefs are included in the totals, the HMH has the highest (i.e., 3.5). When crew chiefs are removed from the totals, again, the

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 85 - Naval Postgraduate School VMM has the lowest number of line mechanics per aircraft at 1.33, and the VMA the most at 2.17, as shown in Table 23.

Because the VMA has no crew chiefs and thereby a more stable, and predictable, manpower to aircraft requirement mix, the ratio of two mechanics per one aircraft will be used to ascertain the MUX requirement. With four aircraft assigned per VMU(F) detachment, eight line mechanics will be listed to each detachment’s line branch giving the VMU(F) a total of 24 (one Gunnery Sergeant, two Staff Sergeants, three Sergeants, nine Corporals, and nine Lance Corporals).

Aircraft maintenance support equipment electrician/refrigeration mechanic (MOS 6073; “GSE [ground support equipment] mechanic”) are also listed by TO&E to the line division. GSE mechanics “install, inspect, test, maintain and repair aircraft support equipment (SE), electrical/instrument and refrigeration and air conditioning equipment, systems and accessories” (HQMC TECOM, 2015a, p. 3–522).

In the core of manned aircraft squadrons, two GSE mechanics were found in the VMM and VMA, one in the HMH and HMLA. In the detachments of all manned aircraft squadron types, there was one GSE Marine listed. For the VMU(F), there will be one GSE mechanic listed to each detachment with none listed to the core giving the VMU(F) a total of three Corporal, GSE mechanics in the line division.

As for the VMU, there were no line mechanics or GSE mechanics listed but as previously mentioned in the avionics subsection of this chapter, five 6314s, UAS aircraft/ maintenance technicians, were listed.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 86 - Naval Postgraduate School Table 22. Line Mechanics Listed to Core Squadrons. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a). Pers:AC Pers:AC Sqd. # AC Mech. CC Total (w/CC) (w/o CC) VMM 6 8 9 17 2.83 1.33 HMH 8 17 12 29 3.63 2.13 HMLA 9 19 7 26 2.89 2.11 VMA 10 23 0 23 2.30 2.30

Table 23. Line Mechanics Listed to Detachments. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a). Pers:AC Pers:AC Sqd. # AC Mech. CC Total (w/CC) (w/o CC) VMM 6 8 10 18 3.00 1.33 HMH 4 7 7 14 3.50 1.75 HMLA 9 18 6 24 2.67 2.00 VMA 6 13 0 13 2.17 2.17

h. Ordnance

The numbers of aircraft ordnance technicians (PMOS 6531), varies greatly by squadron type. In the VMU, where at present there is no UAS capable of delivering ordnance, there are no ordnance technicians. In the VMM and HMH, where the weapons systems employed are medium or heavy machine guns, there are a total (core and detachments combined) of three and seven ordnance Marines listed respectively. The two squadrons whose primary mission is OAS, the HMLA and VMA, have many more aviation ordnance technicians listed on their TO&Es.

In addition to the enlisted aviation ordnance technicians listed, the core of both the HMLA and VMA have one CWO2, ordnance officer listed, and one (VMA) to two (HMLA) aviation ordnance chiefs (PMOS 6591), listed. The total number of enlisted aviation ordnance technicians (6591s included) in the core of the HMLA is 14 and 18 for the VMA. Each HMLA detachment, and the VMA detachment, has nine aviation ordnance technicians and one chief listed.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 87 - Naval Postgraduate School The MUX will be capable of delivering ordnance but because of the likely ordnance payload, the type of OAS missions it will undertake, and mission profiles, the VMU(F) will likely need fewer aviation ordnance Marines than both the VMA and HMLA. The number of aviation ordnance technicians per aircraft in the core of the HMLA is 1.5, and 1.8 for the VMA. In the detachments, the numbers go down to 1.1 for the HMLA and 1.67 in the VMA. Because the MUX will be aloft for 24hrs+ and fewer UAVs will be aloft concurrently, the number of arming and de-arming evolutions will likely be fewer than with either manned aircraft type. The VMU(F) core will have one CWO2, ordnance officer listed. The detachments will have one Gunnery Sergeant, 6591, aviation ordnance chief, and four, aviation ordnance technicians, listed giving the VMU(F) a total of 15 enlisted ordnance Marines (thee Gunnery Sergeants, one Staff Sergeant, two Sergeants, three Corporals, and six Lance Corporals).

i. MALS

The MALS is the squadron that conducts intermediate-level aviation maintenance for squadrons of a MAG. The MALS, in terms of manpower, are the largest squadrons in their respective MAGs, and have a wide a variety of MOSs to support the different type aircraft assigned to the MAGs. When an aircraft squadron or detachment deploys, the MALS oftentimes will attach its Marines to the aircraft squadrons in order to provide intermediate-level maintenance at the organizational-level that organizational-level maintainers are untrained to perform, and to provide aviation supply liaison.

Analysis of the TO&Es indicates that the VMU did not have MALS Marines listed to its core or detachments. The manned aircraft squadrons, however, have ranges of 17 (VMM) to 43 (VMA) Marines listed to the core, and 11 (VMM) to 32 Marines listed to the detachments. No Marine officers from the MALS are augmented to the squadrons, and in total there are 18 separate MOSs found in the MALS augments to the squadrons. Of those 18, 10 are found in all squadrons, 3 are found in three quarters of the squadrons, 2 are found in half of the squadrons, and 1 is found in three quarters of the squadrons, as shown in Table 24. Some MALS augments are Marines that possess MOSs that are normally present in the squadrons in normal operations (e.g., GSE mechanics, NDI

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 88 - Naval Postgraduate School technicians, and flight equipment technicians) but for the most part, the MALS augments possess MOSs that are intermediate-level maintenance or aviation supply related MOSs.

The estimated number of MALS augments to a VMU(F) detachment is 19 (one Staff Sergeant, three Sergeants, seven Corporals, eight Lance Corporals). See the last column of Table 24 and add one Marines for the yet to be determined MOS for the MUX powerplant. Most quantities were derived by a making a comparison of current MOSs present, weighted by the number of aircraft, but there were some exceptions. A welder was not selected because the assumption is made that the MUX will be made of composite materials vice metal; a dynamic component mechanic was selected because the MUX will be a tiltrotor or rotary-wing design and dynamic component mechanic is specifically trained to “to inspect, maintain, test and repair helicopter/tiltrotor dynamic components” (HQMC TECOM, 2015a, p. 3–530); a flight equipment technician was not selected because the MUX is an unmanned system and there is not a requirement for the maintenance of flight equipment.

Table 24. MALS Augments to Deployed Squadrons. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a). VMM HMH HMLA VMA VMU(F) MOS Specialty Core Det Core Det Core Det Core Det Det 6033 NDI Tech/ Structural Mechanic (6092D) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6043 Welder 1 1 2 2 1 1 6048 Flight Equipment Technician 1 1 1 1 1 1 6062 Hydraulic Mechanic 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 6073 GSE Mechanic 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 6092 Structural Mechanic 1 2 1 1 6123 Powerplant Mechanic (T-64 turboshaft engine) 4 1 6124 Powerplant Mechanic (T-400/T-700 turboshaft engine) 3 3 6132 Dynamic Component Mechanic 1 1 3 1 1 1 6222 Powerplant Mechanic (F402 turbofan; AV-8B engine) 4 2 6423 Micro Miniature Repair Technician 1 1 1 6432 Electrical/Instruments/Flight Control Technician 1 1 3 2 2 2 3 2 6469 RTCASS Technician 1 3 3 11 4 2 6483 Cryptologic/ECM Systems/Comm./Nav. Technician 3 1 4 3 8 3 2 4 1 6492 Precision Measurement Equipment Tech. 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 6541 Aviation Ordnance Systems Technician 2 1 2 2 6 6 7 6 3 6672 Aviation Supply Specialist 3 2 4 1 2 2 5 2 2 6694 ALIMS Specialist 1 1 1 1 1 Total MALS Personnel 17 11 28 15 33 28 43 32 18 (+1) Number of aircraft by core/det type 6 6 8 4 9 9 10 6 4 Number of MALS Marines per aircraft 2.83 1.83 3.5 3.75 3.67 3.11 4.3 5.33 4.75

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 89 - Naval Postgraduate School 3. Other Unit Level

Other unit level manpower for this model are the headquarters/command element, DSS, administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, medical, and communications departments.

a. Headquarters

The headquarters element of the VMU(F) will consist of a commanding officer, executive officer, and a senior enlisted advisor. The commanding officer will be Lieutenant Colonel and the executive officer will be a Major; both will be UAS officers. The senior enlisted advisor will be a Sergeant Major (E-9). The CO and XO billets are accounted for in the “Operators” element of the estimate.

b. Department of Safety and Standardization

As is the case with the VMM, HMH, and VMA, there will be no chargeable billets in the DSS. The HMLA has a chargeable billet for the Director of Safety and Standardization, but it is an operator. The VMU currently has three officer billets and two enlisted billets allocated to it but all of those billets are filled by Marines who are either a) operators or b) maintainers. For this model, the VMU(F) TO&E will not have billets allocated to it.

In practice, the squadron (-)/core DSS will be filled with operators that have recently returned from deployment or are newly joined Marines that have entered the squadron to replace attrition due to permanent change of station moves, etc. The requirements to fill all the collateral billets in DSS will be filled by operators that have such NMOSs and/or qualifications.

c. Administration

In every squadron analyzed there were two MOSs present in the S-1 department, 0111, administrative specialist, and 4821, career planner.

A career planner is a PMOS that runs from the rank of Sergeant to Master Gunnery Sergeant, and is the “Commander’s advisor for enlisted retention matters” (HQMC TECOM, 2015a, p. 3–429). In every squadron analyzed there was one career

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 90 - Naval Postgraduate School planner listed to the core with none in the detachments. The VMU(F) will have one, Sergeant, career planner listed.

In every squadron analyzed there were no administrative officers listed. The core of every squadron had one SNCO administration specialist, 0111, listed as the administrative chief and anywhere from one (VMM) to three additional administrative clerks (HMLA and VMA) listed.

For every detachment structure there was no common ratio guiding the number of administrative specialists listed. The RQ-7 detachments for the VMU, and the HMLA and HMH detachments, each had one administrative specialist listed. The VMA had none listed, and the VMM had two listed. Every administrative specialist listed, with the exception of the VMM’s second administrative specialist, was the rank of Corporal. Given the total number of detachment personnel and the number of administrative specialist listed did not yield a common ratio, as shown in Table 25.

For this work’s model, one Gunnery Sergeant, 0111, is listed as the administrative chief; one Corporal, administrative specialist (i.e., PMOS 0111) will be listed per detachment. The total for administrative specialists in the VMU(F) is four.

Table 25. Detachment Admin Personnel by Squadron. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b)

Det Admin Personnel Total Det # of Personnel Squadron Officers Enlisted Personnel per 0111 VMU 0 1 33 33 VMM 0 2 23 11.5 HMH 0 1 15 15 HMLA 0 1 26 26

VMA 0 0 15 ***

d. Intelligence

In every squadron analyzed, with the exception of the VMU, there were no officers from the intelligence occupation field listed. With regard to enlisted Marines,

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 91 - Naval Postgraduate School because manned squadrons had different rank and MOS mixes than the VMU they will be discussed separately from the VMU.

Every manned aircraft squadron core had one intelligence chief listed that was an intelligence specialist (PMOS 0231), and was the rank of Staff Sergeant with the exception being the HMH, whose intel chief was a Corporal. No squadron had a second intelligence specialist listed with the exception of the HMLA who had a Lance Corporal listed.

The VMU core differed from the manned squadrons in a number of ways. The VMU not only had an intelligence officer (i.e., PMOS 0202) listed to it but had three SNCOs listed as well. The intelligence chief for the VMU is a Staff Sergeant, 0239, intelligence analyst. The distinction between the 0239 and 0231 MOSs is important. The 0231 PMOS is an entry-level MOS whereas 0239 is a NMOS. An intelligence analyst (i.e., 0239) receives additional training beyond PMOS training and “is an all-source intelligence analyst specifically trained to advise and assist in the planning, collection, and implementation of all intelligence disciplines across the full spectrum of intelligence operations” (HQMC TECOM, 2015a, p. 3–22). Additionally, the VMU had a Gunnery Sergeant, imagery chief and an assistant imagery chief both with the 0241 PMOS, imagery analysis specialist. None of the manned aircraft squadrons had an imagery specialist listed.

The difference with regard to the intelligence departments is most stark once the manpower requirements for the detachments are analyzed. Because the VMU analyzes imagery collected real-time versus post-mission, the requirements for a VMU are significant in comparison to manned squadrons, as shown in Table 26.

With regard to manned squadrons, VMM and VMA detachments both have one, Lance Corporal, intelligence specialist listed to it. Both squadrons are organized to deploy only one detachment. The total (i.e., sum of core and detachment) intelligence manpower requirements for the both VMM and VMA are two intelligence Marines. With regard to the HMH and HMLA detachments, both squadrons are organized to deploy two detachments in addition to operating their cores. Both squadrons deploy one Lance

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 92 - Naval Postgraduate School Corporal, intelligence specialist per detachment. The total number of intelligence Marines listed to the HMH was three, and four for HMLA.

The number of detachments in a VMU is three RQ-7 Shadow detachments and one large RQ-21 section. In each of the Shadow detachments there are three Sergeant, imagery analysis specialists and three intelligence specialists (Sergeant, Corporal, and Lance Corporal) listed making the subtotal for the RQ-7 detachment 18 Marines.

The RQ-21 section is comprised of three detachments. Those three detachments are in turn comprised of three sections. In each section there are two Sergeant, imagery analysists listed. This brings the subtotal of intelligence Marines in the RQ-21 section to 18.

The combined total for intelligence personnel in the VMU is 40 Marines; one officer and three SNCOs in the core, and 36 detachment personnel. The VMU(F) will be organized to have three detachments operating for 24 hours per day. Imagery analysts are not officially part of the UAS aircrew but do assist them during the mission. As such, this work will constrain them to the number of hours a UAS aircrew operate. Table 18 can be used to estimate the number of intelligence analysts required per detachment, eight Marines. The mix of ranks and MOS will mirror that of the VMU detachment.

The VMU(F) detachment is estimated to require four, Sergeant, imagery analysis specialists, and four intelligence specialists (two NCOs [Sergeant, Corporal], and two Lance Corporals). Additionally, the VMU(F) core will mirror the core of the VMU, one officer and three SNCOs (with the same MOS mix). In total, the VMU(F) is estimated to require 28 Marines: 1 Marine officer, 3 SNCOs, 13 Sergeants, 5 Corporals, and 6 Lance Corporals.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 93 - Naval Postgraduate School Table 26. Detachment Intelligence Personnel. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b)

Intel Personnel per Det Total Intel. Det Squadron Officers Enlisted # of Dets Personnel Rank and MOS mix per detachment VMU (RQ-7) 0 6 3 18 3xSgt 0241; 3x 0231 (Sgt, Cpl, LCpl) VMU (RQ-21) 0 6 3 18 All Sgt, 0241 VMM 0 1 1 1 LCpl, 0231 HMH 0 1 2 2 LCpl, 0231 HMLA 0 1 2 2 LCpl, 0231 VMA 0 1 1 1 LCpl, 0231 e. Operations

The occupational field most prevalent in the operations department of all squadrons analyzed were the operators of the squadrons’ aircraft. In the case with officer- operators, per the TO&Es, they are listed to the operations department but are in practice assigned throughout the squadron to fill collateral duties as work center/branch OICs and/ or program managers. The number of enlisted operators listed to the operations department varies by squadron type.

In the VMU, UAS operators are listed to the operations department and stay with the operations department. In the VMA, because the AV-8B is a single-seat aircraft piloted by officers, there are no enlisted operators. In the VMM, HMH, and HMLA, the majority of enlisted operators in fact are found in the maintenance department. Their billets as operators are found in the TO&Es as collateral duties in the operations department but their primary jobs as crew chiefs are found within their respective line departments. Those few enlisted operators listed to the operations department are WTIs serving as the enlisted aircrew training chiefs. The second-most prevalent MOS in the operations department are aviation operations specialists (PMOS 7041) followed by a line mechanic listed as a training SNCOs in the HMLA and HMH core.

In the core of all squadrons, to include the VMU, there were two to three aviation operations specialists listed. In the detachments of the VMM and VMA, two aviation operations specialists were listed. One aviation operations specialists was listed in each detachment of the HMH and HMLA, and none in the detachments of the VMU.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 94 - Naval Postgraduate School In the VMU(F), the total number of aviation operations specialists listed will be four. The core will have one Staff Sergeant, aviation operations specialist listed, and each detachment will have one with the rank of Corporal of Lance Corporal. No line mechanics will be listed to the operations department to serve as training SNCO.

f. Logistics

Much like the analysis of the intelligence section of the analyzed squadrons, the VMU’s logistics manpower differed quite a bit from that of manned aircraft squadrons. In every squadron analyzed, with the exception of the VMU, there were no officers from the logistics occupation field listed. For enlisted Marines, manned squadrons had different rank and MOS mixes than the VMU because of the VMU’s requirement to have a robust support element.

In the core of all squadrons there was at least one logistics/embarkation specialist (PMOS 0431) listed, that is, however, where the similarities stopped. There was no commonality as to the number and ranks of additional logistics/embarkation specialists listed, as shown in Table 21. Another common theme was the assignment of a Lance Corporal, infantry weapons repairer (PMOS 2111; armorer) to the core of every squadron with the exception of the VMM, its armorer is listed with the detachment.

The logistics personnel found in the VMU core, as seen in Table 27, differed from that of manned squadrons in four distinct ways a) the assignment of a logistics officer (i.e., PMOS, 0402), b) the total numbers of logistics Marines in the VMU than the other squadrons (2-4 times the size), c) the inclusion of motor transport Marines, and d) the inclusion of utilities Marines. The ground-mobile, expeditionary nature of the VMU is clearly reflected in the logistics section with its large number of Marines, and the varied, seemingly unrelated mix of occupational fields.

The differences between the VMU and manned squadrons extends to its detachments as well. Every manned squadron’s lone logistics Marine was a Corporal, logistics/embarkation specialist. The VMU’s RQ-7 detachments each had nine logistics Marines listed including logistics/embarkation specialists, motor transport operators and mechanics, electricians, and an added supply specialist not present in the core. The VMU

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 95 - Naval Postgraduate School dwarfs all those squadrons with a total of 37 Marines (1MO, 36ME) versus the range of four-eight Marines in the manned squadrons. In total, the logistics section of the VMM has four Marines; the HMH, five; the HMLA, eight; the VMA, four.

For this model, because the VMU(F)’s concept of employment will not be that of a highly-mobile, self-transportable UAS unit, the VMU(F)’s logistics sections will differ from that of the VMU’s but will still be larger than the manned aircraft squadrons’. In MEU operations, the ACE is trained to operate afloat and ashore. Given that the MEU may have to operate in highly contested littoral environment it is very likely that the entire MEU will have to offload from the ARG. If an entire offload is completed, the VMU(F) detachment will need transportation for its control stations, ground data terminals, and its communications equipment. The VMU(F) will not need organic transportation for all its gear and personnel, as they will likely be transported via other means, but it will need its own transport for these critical pieces of equipment. The VMU(F) will have a requirement for utilities support but that will be furnished by the Marine Wing Support Squadron (if deployed) or the MEU’s logistics combat element. It is a question if that is relevant or irrelevant cost because of the unknown effects to the MWSS manpower requirements and their capacity to fulfill such a requirement but with regard to the VMU(F) it will result in manpower cost savings.

For the VMU(F) model, one logistics officer (Captain) will be listed to the core as well as one Gunnery Sergeant, motor transportation chief; one Staff Sergeant, motor transport maintenance chief; one Staff Sergeant, logistics/embarkation chief and one Lance Corporal, armorer. For each detachment one Corporal, logistics/embarkation specialist; two automotive mechanics, and two motor transport operators will be listed per detachment. In total, the VMU(F)’s logistics department will consist of one officer and 19 enlisted Marines (one Gunnery Sergeant, two Staff Sergeants, six Corporals, and ten Lance Corporals).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 96 - Naval Postgraduate School Table 27. Core Logistics Personnel. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b)

Sqd Q Rank PMOS Description VMU 1 Capt. 0402 Logistics/Embarkation Off. 1

1 GySgt. 3537 Motor Transport Chief 1 SSgt. 3529 Maintenance Chief 2 Cpl. 3521 Automotive Mechanic 1 LCpl. 3521 Automotive Mechanic 1 Cpl. 1142 Utilities NCO 1 LCpl. 1141 Electrician 1 LCpl. 2111 Armorer 1 LCpl. 3531 Motor Transport Operator 9

VMM 1 GySgt. 0491 CSS Chief 1 LCpl. 0431 Log./Embark. Spec. 2

HMH 1 GySgt. 0491 Log./Embark. Chief 1 Cpl. 0431 Log./Embark. Spec. 1 LCpl. 2111 Infantry Weapons repairer 3

HMLA 1 SSgt. 0431 Log. Embarkation Chief 1 Sgt. 0431 Log. Embarkation NCO 2 LCpl. 0431 Log./Embark. Spec. 1 LCpl. 2111 Infantry Weapons repairer 5

VMA 2 Cpl. 0431 Log./Embark. Spec. 1 LCpl. 2111 Infantry Weapons repairer 3

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 97 - Naval Postgraduate School g. Medical

All squadrons analyzed have roughly the same number of personnel in the medical department. Every squadron (-)/core analyzed had a Navy Lieutenant (O-3) flight surgeon listed to it. With regard to enlisted Hospital Corpsman (i.e., medic) in the respective squadron (-), the VMU has zero HMs listed; the VMM, one HM2 (E-5; aeromedical technician); the HMH, one HM1 (E-6; aeromedical technician); the HMLA, one HM1 (field medical technician) and one HM2 (aeromedical technician); the VMA, one HM1 (field medical technician), one HM2 (field medical technician), and one HM2 (aeromedical technician).

In every detachment structure there was no common ratio guiding the number of Corpsmen listed, and there we no officers listed. The RQ-7 detachments for the VMU, and the HMLA and HMH detachments, each had one Corpsman listed. The VMA had none listed and the VMM had two. Every Corpsman listed was the rank of HM1 or HM2. Given the total number of detachment personnel and the number of Corpsman listed did not yield a common ratio, and the numbers and ratios were the same number as found in the administration sections of all the detachments.

As such, for this model, one Navy Lieutenant flight surgeon will be listed to the core. One HM will be listed per detachment; one of those HMs will be an HM1, the other two will be HM2s.

h. Communications

The VMU was the only squadron analyzed that had communications department, and Marines from the communications occupational field listed to it. All manned squadrons have an S-6 shop in practice but these shops are manned by Marines as a non- chargeable/collateral billet. The VMU has a relatively robust communications manpower requirement in order to install, maintain, and repair the communications equipment associated with the GCS and the UAV.

The core of the VMU had a First Lieutenant, communications officer (PMOS 0602) listed as well as eight enlisted Marines; a radio chief (PMOS 0629); two field radio operators (PMOS 0621); one cyber network systems chief (PMOS 0659); one

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 98 - Naval Postgraduate School communication/electronics maintenance chief (PMOS 2862); two ground radio repairers (PMOS 2841); and one computer repairer (PMOS 2847). The VMU detachments each had six enlisted Marines listed to them; three field radio operators; one satellite communications operator; and two cyber network operators, as shown in Table 28.

The VMU(F) will mirror the VMU with the exception of the two field radio operators in the core who will be removed. The total communications manpower requirement for the VMU(F) will be one Marine officer (First Lieutenant) and 24 enlisted Marines (one Gunnery Sergeant, two Staff Sergeants, three Sergeants, two Corporals, and sixteen Lance Corporals).

Table 28. VMU Communications Personnel. Adapted from HQMC CD&I (2015b). Core Detachment Officer Q Rank PMOS Description Q Rank PMOS Description 1 1stLt. 0602 Communications Officer None assigned 1

Enlisted 1 GySgt. 0629 Radio Chief 1 Sgt. 0621 Field Radio Operator 1 SSgt. 0659 Cyber Network Sys. Chief 2 LCpl. 0621 Field Radio Operator 1 SSgt. 2862 Comm. Electronics Maint. Chief 1 LCpl. 0627 SatCom. Operator 1 Cpl. 2841 Grd. Radio Repairer 2 LCpl. 0651 Cyber Network Operator 1 Cpl. 2847 Computer Repairer 2 Cpl. 0621 Field Radio Operator 1 LCpl. 2841 Grd. Radio Repairer 8 6

D. TOTAL COST OF THE FUTURE VMU

The total annual unit-level cost of the VMU(F) is ascertained by summing the products of the total number of personnel, by grade, multiplied by the “Military Composite Standard Pay and Reimbursement Rates, Department of the Navy, For Fiscal Year 2017” as published by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD-C) as shown in Equation 1. Published annually via memorandum, the composite pay and reimbursement rates “will be used when determining the military personnel appropriations cost for budget/management studies, but should not be considered as the fully-burdened cost of military personnel for the purposes of workforce-mix decisions”

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 99 - Naval Postgraduate School (OUSD-C, 2016, Tab K-1). The military composite standard pay and reimbursement rates vary by service but they all include the average basic pay plus retired pay accrual, a $3,886 accrual cost for Medicare-eligible retiree health-care, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, incentive and special pays, permanent change of station costs, and miscellaneous pays (OUSD-C, 2016).

Equation 1. Total unit-level manpower cost.

totalmanpowercos ts =++ $198,950( ) $176,759( )..... $54,602( ) XXOO−−54 X E − 3

The VMU(F) has a requirement of 33 Marine officers, 1 Navy officer, 256 enlisted Marines, and 3 enlisted sailors totaling 293 sailors and Marines. The number of VMU(F) Marines and sailors by cost element is 51 operators, 156 maintainers, and 86 other unit level personnel, as shown in Table 29. By cost element, the total number of officer is 26 operators (including the CO and XO), four maintenance, and four other unit level, as shown in Table 30. By cost element, the total number of enlisted Marines and sailors is 25 operators, 152 maintenance, and 82 other unit level, as shown in Table 31.

The total annual manpower cost for the VMU(F) is $23.90 (FY17M), as shown in Table 32. When MALS Marines are added to unit manpower cost of the VMU(F) the total increases by an additional $1.24 (FY17M), as shown in Table 34. The total cost of the VMU’s 274 Marines is $21.52 (FY17M), as shown in Table 33. The difference between the VMU(F) and VMU in terms of manpower cost is $2.385 (FY17M), or 11%, annually and increases by $1.23 (FY17M) to $3.63 (FY17M) with the inclusion of MALS Marines. Given the 20 year nominal service life for UASs (DOD, 2014), the total difference for manning one VMU(F) vice a VMU is $47.70 (FY17M) without MALS augments included to $72.58 (FY17M) with the inclusion of MALS augments. The estimated total unit-level manpower costs (including MALS Marines) over a 20 year period for this model is $503 (FY17M).

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 100 - Naval Postgraduate School Table 29. Total Personnel by Cost Element.

Manpower Cost Element Officer Enlisted Operators 26 25 Maintenance 4 152 Other Unit Level 4 82 Subtotal Personnel 34 259

Total Squadron Personnel 293

Table 30. Total Officers by Cost Element.

Manpower Rank Element O5 O4 O3 O2 CWO2 Total Operators UAS Officers 1 4 9 12 26 Maintenance Maint Control 1 1 2 Avionics 1 1 Ordnance 1 1 Total Maintenance: 4 Other Unit Level S-2 1 1 S-4 1 1 S-6 1 1 Medical 1 1 Total Other Unit Level: 4 Total Officer Requirements 1 4 12 14 3 34

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 101 - Naval Postgraduate School Table 31. Total Enlisted Marines and Sailors by Cost Element.

Manpower Rank Element E-9 E-8 E-7 E-6 E-5 E-4 E-3 Total Operators UAS Operators 1 3 3 3 6 9 25 Maintenance Maint. Control 1 3 6 4 4 4 22 Maint. Admin. 1 2 3 6 QA 1 3 8 3 3 18 Airframes 1 3 6 7 7 24 Corrosion 3 4 5 12 Phase 3 3 Avionics 1 1 2 3 9 9 25 Line 1 2 3 12 9 27 Ordnance 3 1 2 3 6 15 Total Maint.: 152 Other Unit Level HQ 1 1 S-1 1 3 4 S-2 1 2 13 5 6 27 S-3 1 1 2 4 S-4 1 2 6 10 19 S-6 1 2 3 2 16 24 Medical 1 2 3 Total Other: 82 Total Enlisted Requirements 1 3 17 35 49 68 86 259

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 102 - Naval Postgraduate School Table 32. Annual Unit Level Manpower Cost of VMU(F). Pay Grade Rank Annual Composite Rate Requirement Total Cost O-5 LtCol. $ 198,950.00 1 $ 198,950.00 O-4 Maj. $ 176,759.00 4 $ 707,036.00 O-3 Capt. $ 151,878.00 12 $ 1,822,536.00 O-2 1stLt $ 121,988.00 14 $ 1,707,832.00 WO-2 CWO2 $ 133,467.00 3 $ 400,401.00 E-9 SgtMaj. $ 147,032.00 1 $ 147,032.00 E-8 MSgt. $ 124,374.00 3 $ 373,122.00 E-7 GySgt $ 112,385.00 17 $ 1,910,545.00 E-6 SSgt. $ 97,742.00 35 $ 3,420,970.00 E-5 Sgt. $ 82,191.00 49 $ 4,027,359.00 E-4 Cpl. $ 66,101.00 68 $ 4,494,868.00 E-3 LCpl. $ 54,602.00 86 $ 4,695,772.00 Total Personnel Requirement and Cost 293 $ 23,906,423.00

Table 33. Annual Unit Level Manpower Cost of VMU. O-5 LtCol. $ 198,950.00 1 $ 198,950.00 O-4 Maj. $ 176,759.00 2 $ 353,518.00 O-3 Capt. $ 151,878.00 15 $ 2,278,170.00 O-2 1stLt $ 121,988.00 5 $ 609,940.00 WO-3 CWO3 $ 151,367.00 1 $ 151,367.00 E-9 SgtMaj. $ 147,032.00 1 $ 147,032.00 E-8 MSgt. $ 124,374.00 2 $ 248,748.00 E-7 GySgt $ 112,385.00 11 $ 1,236,235.00 E-6 SSgt. $ 97,742.00 19 $ 1,857,098.00 E-5 Sgt. $ 82,191.00 66 $ 5,424,606.00 E-4 Cpl. $ 66,101.00 67 $ 4,428,767.00 E-3 LCpl. $ 54,602.00 84 $ 4,586,568.00 Total Personnel Requirement and Cost 274 $ 21,520,999.00

Table 34. Annual Manpower Cost of MALS Augments to VMU(F). Pay Grade Rank Annual Composite Rate Requirement Total Cost E-6 SSgt. $ 97,742.00 1 $ 97,742.00 E-5 Sgt. $ 82,191.00 3 $ 246,573.00 E-4 Cpl. $ 66,101.00 7 $ 462,707.00 E-3 LCpl. $ 54,602.00 8 $ 436,816.00 Total Personnel Requirement and Cost 19 $ 1,243,838.00

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 103 - Naval Postgraduate School E. SUMMARY

This chapter presented the methodology used to derive the manpower requirements of the VMU(F). A set of assumptions was used to establish the environment in which the VMU(F) was to operate. Using the cost element structure, analysis of other squadrons was used to formulate the VMU(F) model for the operator, maintainer, and other unit-level personnel requirements. Without access to more precise maintainability and/or reliability measures for maintenance, or the MUX’s Cost Analysis Requirement Description, comparisons to other Marine squadrons was used to approximate the requirements to support the MUX.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 104 - Naval Postgraduate School VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, FURTHER RESEARCH

A. SUMMARY

As with any program of record, the development of a weapon system is dictated by the performance parameters required but is constrained by the limits of technology, fiscal constraints, and time. The MUX ICD that the Marine Corps has drafted is, at the time of this writing, working its way through the Joint Staff for approval by the JROC. The procurement of UASs is not dictated by policy requirements to procure a given number of systems but is dictated by their proven utility in the skies above the battlefield. The type of system the Marine Corps desires, as articulated in the MUX ICD, is a leap in technology and capability resident in the VMU today. If the MUX is procured there will be change to the manpower structure of Marine aviation. A primary goal of this work was determine the potential impacts and effects the MUX would have on Marine Corps manpower.

The type of UAS described in the MUX ICD is fundamentally different than the Shadow and Blackjack in use by the VMU today. The change in unmanned aircraft type is the not the only effect the MUX may have on the VMU. Changes to the concept of employment and deployment will have impacts to costs required to support the system both in terms of personnel and materiel support. One goals of this work was to determine a manpower model for the VMU(F) and approximate its cost in real dollars.

Analysis of the current VMU was conducted using a DOTMLPF construct. Estimates for manpower were derived by the taking the MUX’s desired flight endurance and estimating the required crew by using the CNO’s recommended minimum flight time limits as set forth in the NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instruction. Maintenance personnel requirements were ascertained by comparing the manpower requirements of manned aircraft squadrons. Other unit level personnel requirements were derived primarily by comparison with the VMU and other manned aircraft squadrons.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 105 - Naval Postgraduate School B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Primary Research Questions

The primary research questions asked were, “what are the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) considerations associated with incorporating the MUX into Marine aviation?” and “what are the effects to Operations and Support costs, specifically manpower costs, with the procurement of the MUX?”

The research of the current VMU shows the increasing professionalization of the UAS officer corps, the movement of VMUs to air stations, and the training pipelines of UAS operators and UAS maintainers. Additionally, difficulties imposed by FAA ‘see- and-avoid’ requirements and airworthiness requirements to operate in the National Airspace System were discussed.

a. Conclusion

Given that the Marine Corps typically deploys its forces as integrated task forces, the incorporation of the MUX will not require radical changes to doctrine or organization. The VMU(F) will likely have a different concept of employment with regard to ground mobility than the current VMU; the VMU(F) will require fewer motor transport Marines, vehicles, communications Marines, and tactical radios (e.g. AN/MRC-148s, AN/PRC- 117Fs, etc.) than today’s VMU. Most Marine squadrons are designed with a detachment model, the VMU(F) will be no different. In terms of training, leadership and education, and personnel, the current model is satisfactory for today’s VMU but will likely need changing with incorporation of the MUX. With regard to facilities, the VMUs have moved, or will soon move, to facilities aboard air stations. The types of facilities are sufficient for Group 3 UASs but will not be for a Group 4 or 5 sized UAS.

With regard to the second primary research question, the effects to O&S costs specifically manpower costs, manning the VMU(F) vice the VMU is estimated to cost an additional $2.38 (FY17M) annually per transitioned squadron. With the addition of MALS manpower, the change increases to $3.6 (FY17M) annually.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 106 - Naval Postgraduate School b. Recommendations

Design the VMU(F) to operate three detachments capable of conducting all mission essential tasks of the VMU(F) independently. Continue to maintain a mixed crew of an officer and enlisted operator for the MUX, and continue to train operators and maintainers in the same training pipelines as today. Efficiencies in training cost have been leveraged by training Marine UAS operators and maintainers with the other services.

Consider making a warrant officer pipeline for UAS officer operators in order to reduce manpower costs, and monitor the progress of the U.S. Air Force’s nascent program to allow career, enlisted Airmen to become RPA pilots for the unarmed but very large Group 5 UAS, the RQ-4 Global Hawk.

Research transitioning one VMU, possibly two, to the MUX vice the Blackjack or Shadow systems. The increased cost in terms of personnel is 19 Marines. The addition of aviation ordnance Marines accounts for 15 of those Marines. The increase in capabilities is worth the increase in manpower costs.

2. Secondary Research Question

The secondary research questions asked, a) “What are the manpower requirements for incorporating the MUX (i.e., a Group 4/5 UAS) into Marine Corps Aviation?” b) “How would manpower requirements of the MUX compare with those of other Marine Corps squadrons? And c) “What are the DOTMLPF considerations associated with employing the MUX from naval shipping?”

a. Conclusions

What this research showed with regards to manpower requirements for the VMU(F) is the increase in capabilities of the MUX-equipped VMU(F) comes at a modest increase of 19 core Marines, and additional 19 MALS Marines, to gain enhanced capabilities not only for the MAGTF but the ARG and Joint Force as well. As for its size in comparison to manned squadrons, it is comparable as a function of the number of aircraft the squadron operates. Because of the advanced nature of the MUX in

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 107 - Naval Postgraduate School comparison to Group 3 UASs, the MUX will likely require as much maintenance as larger, manned platforms.

As for the DOTMLPF considerations associated with employing the MUX from naval shipping, there are many. The Marine Corps must first decide how many VMUs to transition to the MUX, on which coast(s) should they be permanently stationed, and how shall the VMU(F) detachment conduct the pre-deployment training plan. The Marine Corps and Navy team additionally must decide on which ships the MUX will operate from afloat. Because of the frequency of split-MEU operations, a decision must be made to operate the MUX from the LHD and/or LPD because of the requirements to procure and maintain control stations afloat. Lastly, because of the possibility of a MEU offload, whether it is a combat or non-combat offload, the organic transportability of the MUX GCS must be decided upon. At a minimum, three MTVR/7-ton vehicles are likely to be required to move one MUX ground control station and associated datalinks.

b. Recommendations

Because of its larger size and better support facilities, the VMU(F) should be deployed aboard the LHD/LHA class ship. Coordinate with the U.S. Navy the maintenance responsibilities of the control stations and communications equipment when the Marines are and are not embarked. Conduct modeling simulations of the MUX’s ability to support multiple ships when in operating in a split-fashion. Determine the operational control doctrine of the MUX when conducting various missions.

C. FURTHER RESEARCH

• Validation of this work’s manpower model estimate using subject matter expert opinions should be performed once key performance parameters have been identified. Determine which, if any, manpower requirements can be merged through additional training whether in the initial training of accession Marines or through earning NMOSs while in the Fleet Marine Forces. Determine which billets may be eliminated in order to save costs but also determine the risks factors of making such decisions and potential effects to mission accomplishment.

Acquisition Research Program Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 108 - Naval Postgraduate School • Conduct a cost benefit analysis and capabilities based assessment of transitioning not only the VMU but other manned aviation squadrons to the MUX. If a top-line adjustment to manpower and structure is not undertaken MUX Marines must be sourced from current manpower structure.

• Once the concept of employment with regard to the level of ground maneuverability is determined for the VMU(F)’s GCSs, conduct an O&S cost estimation. If the VMU(F) is to have a reduced ground mobility requirement there will likely be cost savings related to logistics and communications personnel; reduction in vehicles numbers and support costs associated with that reduction; and a reduction in communications equipment requirements for the GCS and ground vehicles.

• Determine which VMUs should transition to the MUX and which, if any, should continue to operate Group 3 UASs. The capabilities of the MEFs on each coast should be closely aligned but the size and number of restricted areas on the west coast, in addition to the favorable weather, make VMU-1 a likely choice to transition.

• Determine an alternative operator manpower model and its associated cost savings. If an all-enlisted, or warrant officer/enlisted combination, can operate the MUX supervised by a commissioned officer acting as an operations duty officer/fire control officer the requirement of commissioned officers in a VMU(F) may be reduced.

• Analyze the TO&E of the MALS, compare it with the requirements of those TO&Es found in this work, and determine the necessity of adding Marines to a given MALS. When a squadron detachment deploys they will most likely take a MALS contingent with them depending on the length of the deployment. If multiple detachments are deployed together (e.g., the MEU ACE) the MALS detachment usually mergers requirements in order to more efficiently utilize the capacity of the MALS mechanics.

• Conduct a study to determine the likely hangar and ramp parking required for the MUX, and the military construction required to re-configure current spaces for future MUX operations.

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