Perspectives

on Preparedness August 2002 No.11

“THE TWO-HAT SYNDROME”: DETERMINING RESPONSE CAPABILITIES AND MUTUAL AID LIMITATIONS BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REBECCA F. D ENLINGER WITH KRISTIN GONZENBACH TAUBMAN CENTER FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT Imagine that the National Weather However, an unanticipated problem Service has reported a severe surfaces. Many emergency workers, thunderstorm advisory with tornado particularly fire and rescue employees, watches covering the entire metropolitan work at more than one public safety area. As the torrential rains begin in agency. When contacted, many of the county after county, reports of downed off-duty employees are at work on their U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE trees and power lines, trapped people, second jobs at these other agencies. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS OFFICE FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS and damage to buildings start to pour into Calling them in means they will have to 911 centers. A tornado the size of a city abandon assigned duties at private block has touched down in four metro ambulance services, local hospitals, and counties, and is still moving. Emergency neighboring fire departments. Calling in Executive Session on managers are sending fire apparatus, these employees narrows the pool of Domestic Preparedness ambulances, and police in every direction personnel for nearby volunteer fire to assist trapped and injured people, but departments. The Executive Session on Domestic Pre- paredness (ESDP) is a standing task many responders cannot reach incident force of leading practitioners and aca- scenes because trees and debris have “Public safety agency” is an umbrella blocked roads. Counties invoke mutual phrase for a vast group that includes demic specialists concerned with terror- ism and emergency management. Spon- aid from neighboring municipalities and police, fire, emergency medical services sored by the John F. Kennedy School of open emergency operation centers (EMS), 911 communications, public (EOCs). The state activates its EOC and health, emergency management, and Government, Harvard University, and the U.S. Department of Justice, the ESDP begins to receive calls for assistance. sheriff’s agencies. Public safety brings together experts with operational employers are likely to have developed The storm passes. Citizens continue to call-up plans designed to increase the experience in diverse professional fields that are essential to domestic prepared- call for help. Responders are still having number of personnel available to perform ness -- emergency management, law en- trouble traversing blocked roadways, and the agency’s mission in time of disaster. off-duty personnel cannot reach staging Call-up plans assume that off-duty forcement, fire protection, public health, emergency medicine, national security areas. By the time the storm ends, personnel will report to work when and defense, and elected office. devastation extends across 12 counties. contacted to expand the agency’s All these counties call up off-duty capability. The Perspectives on Preparedness series personnel for emergency shifts and aims to provide useful information to the cancel all scheduled days off. concerned professional communities about how the nation can enhance its abil- ity to respond to the threat of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. The ESDP Rebecca F. Denlinger is Chief of the Cobb County, Georgia Fire Department also produces discussion papers and and is a member of the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness (ESDP). case studies. Visit the ESDP website at: Kristin Gonzenbach is a Managing Partner at Callahan Management Strategies, LLC. WWW.ESDP.ORG “THE TWO-HAT SYNDROME”: DETERMINING RESPONSE CAPABILITIES AND MUTUAL AID LIMITATIONS

An informal survey of public safety workers The two-hat syndrome prompts a series of initial found that many have some type of secondary questions: Where does an individual’s primary employment, often at another public safety duty lie when personnel call-ups occur? What agency. This dependence on one another may planning do agencies need to do to overcome critically affect public safety agencies in time their reliance on the same individuals? How of disaster. Of particular concern is that does the two-hat syndrome affect a extended breaks between long shifts allow community’s actual response capability? firefighters and EMS personnel to make commitments to more than one agency. The These questions lead to others, equally “secondary” employer is likely to depend upon compelling and problematic: the employee as much as the “primary” employer. The survey, conducted in the Atlanta • How many of an agency’s employees metropolitan area, found that among 16 fire are military reservists and how would departments, an average of 22.2 percent of their activation affect staffing? employees hold two or more public safety positions. Moreover, a significant percentage • Can communities rely on public safety of the public safety workforce has agencies to increase their capability commitments to the military reserve or National to remain effective in a disaster? Guard. If those agencies activate these employees, other agencies could lose up to • If an employee works for two agencies, 13 percent of their workforce.1 who decides where the employee will report if called up by both agencies? Many firefighters have either emergency medical technician (EMT) or paramedic All these questions must be asked and certification and often use those certifications answered to formulate a successful personnel to work for other public safety agencies, call-up strategy. Furthermore, until public hospitals, or private ambulance companies. safety officials share the information they learn This raises questions about how many EMS when asking these questions, no agency can workers are actually available in a given area be certain it has a reliable call-up plan in place. should these employers need to expand In Cobb County, Georgia, the fire department service. Are two agencies counting on the has renewed the process of planning for major same person to be available when planning for incidents. Among the questions that have a disaster? Does a geographic area actually arisen are: “How many firefighters are available have the number of emergency medical within the jurisdiction at any given time?” and responders necessary to handle a crisis? more importantly, “As Cobb County plans to Every jurisdiction must develop a strategic include mutual aid support, is it taking the two- disaster plan that includes the spectrum of hat syndrome into account?” service providers, or it may be left underserved in a disaster. The Two-Hat Project Survey

The Two-Hat Syndrome The Two-Hat Project survey, conducted in over 14 metropolitan Atlanta counties, showed that The two-hat syndrome is the dynamic in which communities might not have a firm grasp of public safety workers hold at least two public what personnel will be available in a disaster. safety positions. In an emergency, these None of the agencies was able to readily workers might be called upon to perform both identify the number of employees who wear jobs, or to wear both hats. Because each two or more hats, where these people worked, employee would be able to fill only one position, or how this might affect disaster response public safety agencies should identify which plans. When asked about the likelihood that employees wear more than one hat, and this syndrome would have an impact in his discuss how critical each of those hats is to agency, one respondent stated, “It is not an each employer. issue for us, because our agency is their primary employment.”2

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Other conflicts often arise when career fire and (EMA), police chief of a small city within the rescue personnel compose a considerable county, and head of security for the local portion of volunteer agencies in other hospital. Plans must be in place to determine jurisdictions. If these personnel respond to their who will fill these roles should it be necessary primary employers, fewer will be available to to staff more than one during a crisis. serve volunteer fire departments. Counties and Interviews with chief officials of public safety municipalities also often hire private ambulance agencies revealed that these officials often fit contractors to transport patients in their the two-hat profile, though they had not communities. The Two-Hat Project survey considered the problem or their own limitations found that many of these private ambulance when planning for disaster. Top public safety companies employ significant numbers of off- managers who are also assigned critical roles duty firefighters and EMS workers. In one case in their community EMAs often seemed to fit in Cobb County, 33 percent of an ambulance this description. company’s workforce was off-duty firefighters. Events such as the terrorist attacks at the Owing to a nationwide shortage of health care World Trade Center and the Pentagon, workers, a growing number of EMT’s and Hurricane Andrew’s landfall near Miami in 1992, paramedics are also being recruited for part- and the floodwaters of 1994 in southwest and full-time employment in local hospitals. Georgia required lengthy emergency and This adds to the quandary of whether enough cleanup operations and unusually high EMTs and paramedics are available to respond availability of essential personnel. Any call- in a major crisis. up plan must provide higher-than-normal levels of service over extended periods of time. The two-hat survey also found that some smaller police agencies in the Atlanta Further Survey Results metropolitan area are having a difficult time attracting qualified personnel because the Overall, 47 law enforcement, fire, rescue, 911 salaries they offer are typically lower than those centers, emergency management agencies, in larger neighboring jurisdictions. Some of and private ambulance companies responded these smaller agencies are therefore hiring off- to a request to survey their employees. The duty personnel from larger public safety survey indicated that the two-hat syndrome departments to work on a part-time basis. For most affects fire and rescue, private example, the Police Chief of Powder Springs, ambulance, and emergency management a small suburb within Cobb County, reported agencies, as a significantly higher percentage that 32 percent of his sworn personnel work of their personnel work in other public safety part-time, and that over one-half of those are agencies than do employees of law firefighters and paramedics from other public enforcement agencies and 911 centers. safety departments. Firefighters from other departments also comprise one-third of his According to the survey results, police and SWAT team. A countywide disaster may thus sheriff’s department personnel were the least have a serious impact on Powder Springs’ affected by the two-hat syndrome. Of the 20 ability to field enough personnel. Despite its law enforcement agencies responding, 15 excellent mutual aid relationships with the Cobb reported that less than one percent of their County police and sheriff’s departments, employees had made commitments to another Powder Springs should explore how it will public safety agency. A small city in the address its needs in the event of a wider Atlanta suburbs reported the highest disaster.3 percentage, 11.1 percent.4 However, police agencies would suffer if the number of fire and Another major consideration, particularly in rescue responders is inadequate to cover call more rural regions, is to plan who will wear volume during and after a disaster. Simply which hat in a disaster. For example, in many stated, the less effective any part of the rural areas the local sheriff may also be the workforce required to manage a disaster, the director of the emergency management agency longer it will take to complete a phase of disaster response. 3

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The survey also indicated that a military call- that 25 percent of critical county emergency up would affect police and sheriff agencies more management agency personnel are also key than fire and rescue agencies. One law officials in their fire or other public safety enforcement agency reported that 13 percent departments, while adjacent Cobb County of its personnel have military obligations.5 found 50 percent of such personnel wear two hats.8 The smaller the agency, the greater the On average, fire and rescue departments impact will be if those wearing two hats do not indicated that 22.2 percent of their fire and report for duty during a disaster. And in the rescue personnel work for at least one other case of large jurisdictions, a disastrous incident public safety agency. A fire department where is likely to magnify the impact of absent or 56.2 percent of its personnel work at another overworked personnel. public safety agency was the most dramatic example. In another agency, 38 percent fit the Few agencies indicated what would occur if two-hat syndrome description, and of those the county’s emergency operations center individuals, 25 percent work full-time at another were activated and the EMA director is also agency.6 This particular city is not surrounded the fire chief, for instance. Have provisions by well-staffed fire departments from which it been made to fill the chief’s role if he or she is can immediately draw significant mutual aid. lost to the emergency operations center? As It is critical that this city’s disaster plan includes a result of shift work, public safety provisions to address this problem. The city organizations have built in redundancy at many must plan realistic call-up procedures, levels and positions but in top command ranks, determine how long personnel might take this is almost never the case. No second or before returning to its resource pool, and third shift of chiefs and deputy chiefs remains consider what effect a call-up might have on at home while another is at work. When other local public safety agencies. disaster strikes, chief officers must be prepared to immediately break into shifts, to maintain As in many jurisdictions, one of the largest command capability. counties in the Atlanta area maintains several private ambulance contracts. As a result of Miami-Dade County Fire and Rescue found it the study, the county discovered that 33 necessary to change its disaster plan after percent of one ambulance firm’s 42 employees Hurricane Andrew struck. U.S. Fire also work full-time as firefighters in the same Administrator Dave Paulison, Miami-Dade Fire county.7 When the county fire department and Rescue chief at the time, reported that became aware of this conflict, it reexamined after the first week of disaster operations its strategic disaster response plan and will following Andrew’s landfall, his staff had burned rework it to address the potential shortage of out from managing a spike in emergency calls firefighters and ambulance personnel. In a from the typical 400–500, to over 3,000 per disaster, ambulance company managers will day. Following this experience, Miami-Dade work with officials in the county emergency changed its hurricane plan to an all-hazards operations center to staff and dispatch disaster plan. Among other adjustments, the ambulances from fire stations until personnel plan now calls for command staff to issues stabilize. immediately form two platoons that work in 12- hour shifts. Interestingly, Miami-Dade Fire and A major finding from the survey is the high Rescue’s line personnel remain in standard percentage of employees of emergency three-platoon format even during disaster management agencies who fit the two-hat operations, working 24-hour shifts, an aspect syndrome description. Few agencies have the of the plan that the Chief and his staff did not financial resources to fund a fully staffed and find it necessary to change after Hurricane separate EMA, and this is not unique to smaller Andrew.9 agencies. Even in large municipalities, personnel find themselves wearing two hats in Agencies such as 911 centers and state public a disaster and even during routine operations. safety agencies are not immune from the two- For example, Atlanta’s Fulton County found hat syndrome, although this survey did not

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PERSPECTIVES ON PREPAREDNESS / NO. 11 / AUGUST 2002 “THE TWO-HAT SYNDROME”: DETERMINING RESPONSE CAPABILITIES AND MUTUAL AID LIMITATIONS include adequate responses from these types Disasters With and Without Notice of agencies to draw firm conclusions. Interviews with chief administrators from several Overall, the survey reveals that the two-hat public safety agencies who have been involved syndrome is a concern for most public safety in major incidents explored how disaster plans agencies, directly or indirectly. Awareness of worked during a crisis, and how the the problem is the first step in identifying and administrators changed their plans in light of addressing any significant impact it may have. these experiences. These administrators emphasized the need to prepare before an The Planning and Preparation incident and review and revise plans after every Process major incident. Following are two accounts of disaster responses that highlight how managers As jurisdictions develop their strategic plans have changed their disaster preparedness plans for responding to disasters, they should since the events transpired. practice their departments’ call-up plans and reassess them based on the outcomes. Disaster with Notice Should agencies lose employees to military commitments, plans should address who will In 1994, Crisp County was one of several back up any critical positions left vacant. Local counties in southwest Georgia devastated by governments must also coordinate disaster massive flooding of the Flint River. Community plans with private ambulance companies, leaders had as many as three days to prepare public health officials, and local hospitals. If a for this disaster. Crisp County, one of nine hospital’s employees work for other public counties hit hardest by the flooding, was able safety agencies, it should compare call-up to evacuate thousands of people from their plans with those agencies. homes in advance, request that state agencies prepare to implement disaster plans, and Jurisdictions must also determine whether organize emergency command centers. each plan is practical. On September 11, 2001, Authorities also inventoried their resources, New York City firefighters and police faced located and reinforced weaknesses in their multiple high-rise building fires, two plane response plans, and activated evacuation plans crashes, structural collapses on a scale never for hospitals, jails, schools, and other facilities.12 before experienced, a monumental rescue problem, and major uncertainty about what was When the flooding occurred, authorities in going to happen next. Emergency managers various counties implemented their disaster decided to call-up all off-duty fire and rescue plans. Crisp County authorities had already personnel in the first recall of the entire fire asked the National Guard to supplement the department in more than 50 years.10 This county’s police presence. After the floodwaters created a tremendous management problem receded about ten days later, the county concerning how to deploy and feed all of the requested additional support for cleanup personnel who reported, and how to ensure operations. In a major cooperative effort, that they remained rested. A transition plan agencies from as far as 200 miles away made to move to a split work force had to be executed mutual aid to flood-damaged areas available for as the fire department changed its shifts to 24 weeks.13 hours on and 24 hours off to sustain operations over the ensuing days and weeks.11 Owing to Crisp County Sheriff Donnie Haralson reported the number of firefighters missing in the that by identifying available personnel resources destruction, many surviving firefighters refused and calling for mutual aid and state assistance, to go home for days at a time, further the county maximized its ability to mitigate the challenging the department to ensure that flood’s dangers and its aftereffects. The county these members could perform their duties has further developed its policies and safely. procedures for managing a disaster. For example, the county’s disaster plan now details the locations of emergency operations centers,

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alternate locations for those centers, the personnel to three platoons, working 12-hour number, type, and sources of vehicles needed, shifts, with 24 hours rest between shifts.16 and what resources other communities may make available. Crisp County has also In this case, Chief Plaugher was also the identified its personnel resources and knows county disaster coordinator for the Arlington how long it will take to activate them, as well emergency management agency. He stated as how long it can provide in-house personnel that in many situations filling both roles can before requesting mutual aid. Sheriff Haralson work well. In the attack on the Pentagon, further noted that a thorough plan should include however, each role became a full-time job. the ability to change gears if necessary during Because staffing strategic centers with officials a crisis. The 1994 flooding has helped the from assisting agencies took nearly 21 hours, county develop procedures and chronologies Chief Plaugher admitted that after ten or twelve for various scenarios. Sheriff Haralson reports hours it was difficult to manage both roles well. that today the community is comfortable with In a true disaster, additional trained personnel its disaster plan and confident in its personnel should be available to take over key roles call-up strategy.14 assigned to individuals wearing more than one critical hat, and planning should account for Disaster without Notice this type of long-term incident management.17

By 9 a.m. EST on September 11, 2001, much Arlington County is unique in that it maintains of the world was watching a series of horrifying a full-time emergency management agency events unfold in New York City. Then, at 9:43 (EMA) staff, which reduced some of the a.m. a jetliner hit the Pentagon. Arlington demands on Chief Plaugher. However, most County, Virginia, which provides fire protection agencies cannot afford to fund a dedicated EMA for the Pentagon, promptly dispatched its fire staff. This is one reason why so many key department. Although the county typically officials take on multiple disaster roles, and responds to at least one call for service at the then must deal with all of the associated Pentagon daily, the department’s familiarity with responsibilities during a major incident. the complex did not prepare responders for the scene they encountered that morning.15 The Chief Plaugher believes that secondary scale of devastation and injuries exceeded the employment commitments were not an issue capacity of the department’s resources. for Arlington County during this crisis, and was unaware if Arlington County Fire’s total The Washington-area news media were already personnel call-up had a negative impact on any poised to cover the disaster. Within minutes, other agency. He says that Arlington County every television network nationwide was Fire employees must consider the agency their reporting the Pentagon crash. As in New York, primary employer. He added that this incident Arlington administrators made the decision to was the call of a career for most firefighters, call-up all of their personnel. Because the and that “they weren’t going to miss it for county’s dispatch center was inundated with anything.”18 This insight reinforces the concern calls and unable to take the time to notify fire that firefighters on duty at one employer may personnel, administrators enlisted the media’s be likely to leave those assignments to report help. Within one-half hour, television and radio to a second employer during a major incident. stations across metropolitan Washington had While the jurisdiction suffering the disaster broadcast the call-up to viewers and listeners. would enjoy its full complement of employees, Over 95 percent of the county’s personnel the other employer may no longer be prepared received these messages and reported to to respond to a secondary strike, to maintain stations and staging areas within two hours. normal service levels, or to provide mutual aid The Arlington Fire Department realized almost to a stricken jurisdiction. Identifying the number immediately that it would have to transition to of employees holding more than one public a platoon schedule to sustain lengthy round- safety position and exploring how that situation the-clock operations. The department assigned may affect both agencies is critical.

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Plaugher advised that most fire and rescue What Other Disasters Can Teach Us agencies surrounding Arlington County are career departments, which may minimize the Agencies can learn about the two-hat syndrome likelihood that many of his employees hold from the problems encountered in managing another position of firefighter in a nearby these recent disasters. First, agencies must department. He did indicate, however, that plan to rotate personnel on and off shift to volunteer agencies are prevalent across the maintain a strong and alert work force, and take state, and that he might have to look further into account employees who have off-duty into this question.19 Also, in the past year, the obligations of any type. Second, a thorough International Association of Fire Fighters and well-communicated personnel call-up plan passed a rule prohibiting its members from will manage employee expectations and serving as volunteer firefighters. In a region with preparation before a disaster occurs. Third, a unionized workforce, this rule might reduce practicing these call-up plans will help reveal the likelihood that firefighters would hold more any problems, including those that result from than one firefighting position. However, the rule the two-hat syndrome, and will allow agencies will not limit, and may indeed increase, the to develop solutions for those problems. possibility that firefighters will hold other types of secondary employment. Cobb County Fire and Emergency Services is developing a call-up plan capable of providing The Arlington County Fire Department has also half its total staff for immediate duty while made a number of policy and procedural making the other half of the work force available changes in its disaster plan since the Pentagon in 12 to 24 hours. All personnel will then work incident. It has changed its call-up strategy to 12 hours on and 12 hours off, or 24 hours on add the ability to build up its force gradually and 24 hours off, with leave canceled until rather than calling in all off-duty personnel at normal operations resume. once. The department has also begun utilizing an automated telephone system for notifying Although a major emergency might tempt Cobb personnel, thereby removing this critical and Fire’s administration to execute a total staff-intensive assignment from its dispatch personnel call-up, the department has opted center—a sort of second hat. Chief Plaugher to develop the ability to hold half its force in and his staff also do not want to rely again on reserve to provide a sustained response. the media to notify personnel, as in the Supporting elements include mutual aid from Pentagon incident. The department is also Cobb County’s immediate neighbors, and the developing a different approach for deploying Georgia Mutual Aid Group, a seasoned technical teams for lengthy operations, as the organization that can draw on the resources of numbers of these trained personnel are limited over 50 fire and EMS departments from around and they must be fed and sheltered on site or the state. A region-wide survey is being nearby. The department is amending its plan conducted to identify and address problems to address those needs.20 the two-hat syndrome may cause in Cobb County’s or others’ call-up plans. When asked about the impact of the Pentagon incident on the Arlington County budget, Chief Part of Cobb’s call-up plan takes into account Plaugher pointed out that county administrators reasonable travel time. If off duty, many of the knew about the call-up plan, and that they county’s firefighting personnel must travel an viewed the extra cost as a necessary expense. extended distance to reach their Cobb Plaugher said that he had exercised authorized assignments. The plan also recognizes that a discretion, and he is confident of the parameters number of the department’s employees may set for department managers in his jurisdiction. be called up for military service. A practice Clearly, developing and discussing disaster run-through of this call-up plan will reveal how plans are keys to successfully managing such quickly half the total staff actually become a major incident.21 available, and administrators can modify the plan accordingly. Activation plans should be

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practiced to determine their true feasibility and This project was supported by Grant No. 1999- allow for necessary adjustments. MU-CX-0008 awarded by the Office for Domes- tic Preparedness, Office of Justice Programs, Planning Is Key U.S. Department of Justice. The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, Communities depend on public safety agencies coordinates the activities of the following pro- to respond effectively to any disaster, and most gram offices or bureaus: the Bureau of Jus- have developed some type of strategic disaster tice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statis- response plan. The Federal Emergency tics, the National Institute of Justice, the Of- Management Agency has recently tied federal fice of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Pre- disaster funding to the development of a vention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. detailed strategic plan that identifies risks in a Points of view or opinions in this document community, details how to protect important are those of the authors and do not necessar- assets, and develops plans for handling an ily represent the official position or policies of emergency response. Public safety officials the U.S. Department of Justice. should look within their organizations to determine whether the two-hat syndrome is a problem. Officials must also share this information with agencies that provide mutual aid.

Agencies must practice any activation plan to test its effectiveness. Every official contacted during the research stated that she or he had made changes to call-up plans after using them in a disaster. As a result of the policy and procedural changes Miami-Dade County fire officials made after Hurricane Andrew, when a ValuJet airliner crashed nearby four years later emergency personnel managed a much more effective response.22

If a community discovers that the two-hat syndrome would significantly affect disaster mitigation, informed planning and preparation are the keys to overcoming its effects. The biggest obstacle for any agency is the unverified belief that it operates in isolation. Because virtually every public safety agency depends on other agencies for support during a crisis, the chance that the two-hat syndrome will directly affect every agency increases significantly. Agencies should be aware of their mutual aid capabilities and limitations, and prepare for how those may dictate changes in their strategy. Public safety administrators who fail to gain insight into the two-hat syndrome, and consider, consult, and cooperate accordingly, may fail their communities in the face of disaster.

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Bibliography

Black, Ellen and Denlinger, Rebecca. “Two-Hat Project Survey.” Survey of 47 public safety agencies in the Metropolitan Atlanta region, June 2002.

Cobb County Fire and Emergency Services. 2002. “Contingency Planning for Major Incidents – Shift Scheduling and Personnel Notification.” Policy directive draft.

Eisner, Harvey. “Terrorist Attack at New York World Trade Center.” Firehouse magazine, April 2002.

Graham, Louis. Chief deputy sheriff, Sheriff’s Department, Dekalb County, Georgia. Telephone interview, 9 May 2002.

Haralson, Donnie. Sheriff, Crisp County, Georgia. Telephone interview, 9 and 15 May 2002.

Paulison, David. Fire administrator, U. S. Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and retired fire chief, Miami-Dade County, Florida. Telephone interview, 10 May 2002.

Plaugher, Edward. Fire chief, Arlington County, Virginia. Telephone interview, 13 May 2002.

Richardson, L. Rick. Police chief, Powder Springs, Georgia. Telephone interview, 15 May 2002.

Notes

1 Excerpt of Two Hat Project survey, Cobb County Fire and Emergency Services, June 2002.

2 Louis Graham, chief deputy sheriff, Dekalb County, Georgia, interview, 9 May 2002.

3 L. Rick Richardson, police chief, Powder Springs, Georgia, telephone interview, 15 May 2002.

4 Excerpt of Two-Hat Project Survey, Cobb County Fire and Emergency Services, June 2002.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 David Paulison, U. S. fire administrator, telephone interview, 10 May 2002.

10 Harvey Eisner, “Terrorist Attack at New York World Trade Center” Firehouse magazine, April 2002, p. 61-62.

11 Ibid.

12 Donnie Haralson, Sheriff, Crisp County, Georgia, telephone interview, 9 and 15 May 2002.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ed Plaugher, Fire Chief, Arlington County, Virginia, telephone interview, 13 May 2002.

9 PERSPECTIVES ON PREPAREDNESS / NO. 11 / AUGUST 2002 “THE TWO-HAT SYNDROME”: DETERMINING RESPONSE CAPABILITIES AND MUTUAL AID LIMITATIONS

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 David Paulison, United States Fire Administrator, Former Fire Chief, Miami/Dade County, Florida, Telephone Interview. 10 May 2002.

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Executive Session Members

Professor Graham T. Allison Major General Bruce M. Lawlor Professor of Government and Director Senior Director for Protection and Prevention Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Office of Homeland Security Kennedy School of Government Dr. Marcelle Layton Professor Alan Altshuler Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Communicable Professor of Urban Policy and Planning and Director Disease, New York City Department of Health Taubman Center for State and Local Government Kennedy School of Government Dr. Scott Lillibridge Professor and Director, Center for Biosecurity Mr. Thomas Antush University of Texas Health Science Center Senior Program Analyst School of Public Health Transportation Security Administration U.S. Department of Transportation Mr. John Magaw Undersecretary of Transporation for Security Dr. Joseph Barbera U.S. Department of Transportation Clinical Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine George Washington University Chief Paul Maniscalco Deputy Chief, New York City Emergency Medical Mr. Bruce Baughman Services Command Director, Office of National Preparedness Federal Emergency Management Agency Mr. Gary McConnell Director, Georgia Emergency Management Agency Mr. Peter Beering Indianapolis Terrorism Preparedness Coordinator Mr. Stanley McKinney Vice President for Business Continuity Management Lieutenant General (Ret.) Thomas N. Burnette, Jr. Bank of America Former Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command Professor Matthew S. Meselson Professor of the Natural Sciences, Harvard University Professor Ashton B. Carter Professor of Science and International Affairs, Dr. Steven Miller Kennedy School of Government Director, International Security Program, Kennedy School of Government Mr. Hank Christen Emergency Response Consultant, Mr. Andrew Mitchell Unconventional Concepts, Inc., FL Deputy Director, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice Chief Rebecca Denlinger Chief, Cobb County Fire Department, GA Major General Paul D. Monroe, Jr. Adjutant General, California National Guard Major General (Ret.) John Fenimore Former Adjutant General, New York National Guard Major General Phillip E. Oates Adjutant General, Alaska National Guard Ms. Ellen Gordon Administrator, Iowa Emergency Management Division Chief Charles Ramsey Chief, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, DC Dr. Margaret Hamburg Vice President for Biological Programs Lieutenant General (Ret.) James Terry Scott Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC Partner, Watson and Associates, TX Mayor Clarence Harmon Ms. Leslee Stein-Spencer Former Mayor, City of St. Louis, MO Chief, Division of Emergency Medical Services and Highway Safety, Illinois Department of Public Health Mr. Francis X. Hartmann Executive Director, Program in Criminal Justice Policy/ Chief Darrel Stephens Management and Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy, Chief, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, NC Kennedy School of Government Dr. Jessica Stern Professor Philip Heymann Lecturer in Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government Professor of Law, Harvard Law School Chief Steve Storment Dr. Arnold M. Howitt Assistant Chief, Phoenix Fire Department, AZ Executive Director, Taubman Center for State and Local Government, Kennedy School of Government Sheriff Patrick J. Sullivan, Jr. Sheriff, Arapahoe County, CO Ms. Juliette Kayyem Executive Director, Executive Session on Domestic Mr. Ralph Timperi Preparedness, Kennedy School of Government Assistant Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Public Health and Director, Massachusetts Department of Dr. Robert Knouss Public Health State Laboratory Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Chief Alan D. Vickery Deputy Chief, Special Operations, Peter LaPorte Seattle Fire Department, WA Director, District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency Dr. Frances Winslow Director, Office of Emergency Services, San Jose, CA

Executive Session Staff Arnold M. Howitt Rebecca Storo Patricia Chang Director Assistant Director Research Assistant Rebecca Horne Juliette Kayyem Robyn Pangi Executive Director Research Associate Project Assistant

PERSPECTIVES ON PREPAREDNESS / NO. 11 / AUGUST 2002