Washington University in St. Louis Washington University Open Scholarship All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) January 2009 Fear and Death in Plato Emily Austin Washington University in St. Louis Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd Recommended Citation Austin, Emily, "Fear and Death in Plato" (2009). All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs). 27. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/27 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS Department of Philosophy Dissertation Examination Committee: Eric Brown, Chair Anne Margaret Baxley Dennis Des Chene John M. Doris Cathy Keane George Pepe FEAR AND DEATH IN PLATO by Emily A. Austin A dissertation presented to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2009 Saint Louis, Missouri ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation would have never come to fruition without the help of many people. First, I thank my advisor, Eric Brown, whose exuberant teaching persona and keen intellect motivated me to make the radical shift from the study of Wittgenstein and Quine to the study of Plato. I thank him especially for his unflagging efforts to help me focus my wide-ranging thoughts and his consistent enthusiasm about the project. To whatever extent this dissertation expresses the virtue of cohesion, he is to be praised. Second, I thank John Doris, who has kept me level-headed and confident, and who continues to keep me focused on where the project needs to go next. Though he does not believe in character, he exhibits an exceptional one. I also thank the other members of my committee—Anne Margaret Baxley, Dennis Des Chene, Cathy Keane, and George Pepe—both for their willingness to serve in that capacity, and for their welcome comments and assistance. The fact that I have so many great friends who are also wonderful colleagues has made it possible to get through this long process. They have helped me talk through and muscle through some of these ideas in the office, in their homes, and in bars. In particular, I thank Sarah Robins, Clerk Shaw, Mariska Leunissen, and Emily Crookston. I owe a debt of gratitude to my undergraduate advisor, Mark Schantz, who initiated my death obsession. If I had not taken his seminar on the history of death in America, I would neither benefit nor suffer from this morbid curiosity. From an institutional standpoint, I am very happy to have completed my degree at Washington University in St. Louis, which has provided outstanding support during my ii graduate career. I thank the graduate school for my first-year fellowship and the Dean’s Dissertation Fellowship. I thank Mark Rollins for his impressive skills as chair of the philosophy department and his consistent advocacy for graduate students. He saved me from a shockingly large amount of library fines, among other things. Finally, I thank my husband, Brian, who more than anyone else, has sustained me through the ups and downs of this project and life at-large. Above all, though, I thank my parents, Tony and Jo Ellen Austin, to whom this dissertation is dedicated. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements 2 Abbreviations of Ancient Works and Authors 5 Introduction 6 Apology: Prudence and the Fear of Death 15 Apology: Security, Attachment, and the Fear of Death 46 Phaedo: The Philosophical Life and How to Die 68 Republic: Auxiliaries and the Problem of Early, Violent Death 112 Republic: Lawless Desires, Grief, and the Indifferent Philosopher 134 Works Cited 163 iv ABBREVIATIONS OF ANCIENT WORKS AND AUTHORS PLATO Ap. Apology [Ax.]* Axiochus Chrm. Charmides Cri. Crito Epin. Epinomis Euthphr. Euthyphro Grg. Gorgias Hp. Ma. Hippias Major La. Laches Lg. Laws Men. Meno Mx. Menexenus Phd. Phaedo Phdr. Phaedrus Ptr. Protagoras R. Republic Smp. Symposium Tht. Theatetus *Dialogues in brackets indicate that scholars generally agree that Plato is not the author of the dialogue. ARISTOTLE EN Nichomachean Ethics Pol. Politics HOMER Il. Iliad Od. Odyssey EPICURUS KD Key Doctrines Ep. Men. Letter to Menoeceus v WELL, YOU JUST WELL TO GET READY, YOU GOT TO DIE. -BLIND WILLIE MCTELL INTRODUCTION Plato should have something to say about the fear of death. First, Plato intends to offer an account of how to live well, and it does not take much imagination to see that the fear of death can affect the course of one’s life. Second, for Plato, courage is a necessary condition for living well, and the courageous person is distinguished by her ability to stand firm in the face of death. Finally, courage is as necessary for a well-ordered polis as for a well-ordered soul. In a political environment marked by frequent war, plagues, and the imminent possibility of violent regime change, death is an ever-present concern. Any polis with a hope of survival must reckon with death in order to preserve itself. Once one recognizes that Plato should say something about the fear of death, one will discover that he says quite a lot, and what he says is interesting and contentious. At the most general level, Plato consistently argues the following: 1) a virtuous person will not fear her own death; 1 2) a virtuous person will not fear or grieve the death of her family and friends; 2 and 3) a virtuous political organization will train its citizens not to fear death and will prohibit public manifestations of grief. 3 It is by no means self- evident, however, that ridding oneself of the fear of death, even if possible, is ethically or psychologically beneficial. I organize this dissertation, then, around three questions: 1 Ap. 28b-29b, 35a-b, 37b, 40a-42a; Phd. 63e-64a, 67e, 68b, 68a-69a, 84d-85b, 117a; Grg. 522de; R. 3: 386ab, 6:486a 2 Phd. 116a; 115e-116a; 117d-e; R. 3:387c-388d; 3:397d-e, 10:603e-606c 3 R. 3: 387c-388d, 9: 578a, 10:603e-606c; Ap. 35ab; Mx. 247c; Lg. 12: 958c-960b, 12:949b, 7: 732c, 7:800c-e, 2 1. Why does Plato think that the fear of death is ethically inappropriate? 2. What are the impediments to removing the fear of death? 3. Why does he think acquiring and sustaining the appropriate attitudes towards death depends on favorable political circumstances? I address these questions within the individual context of three dialogues—the Apology, Phaedo, and Republic. In this introduction, I briefly motivate the questions at a more general level, provide a chapter outline, and discuss my methodological approach to Plato’s dialogues. OVERVIEW OF THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS The fear of death is an ethical concern for Plato for two reasons. First, Plato, like most ancient ethicists, thinks the aim of a good life is achieving a harmonious soul, which is comprised of a coherent set of beliefs and desires that manifest themselves in action. It depends, in short, on psychological health. Thus, our contemporary thought that one’s attitudes towards death are a matter of psychological health makes it de facto an ethical question for the ancients. Second, an inharmonious soul is an unvirtuous soul. The fear of death not only threatens the unity of the soul, then, but it makes agents prone to unvirtuous acts. For Plato, I argue, the fear of death makes unjust activities appear prudent, as injustices both great and small can prove sufficient to save one’s own life or the lives of those for whom 3 one cares. In addition, since the traditional conception of courage involves standing firm in the face of death, an extreme fear of death compromises one’s ability to act courageously, whether in battle, in sickness, or on the sea. The fear of death can also foster intemperance, since life’s finitude tempts individuals to maximize pleasures, and one might seek to unjustly amass wealth and power with the hopes that they will protect one against violence. Finally, for Plato, the fear of death keeps one from gaining wisdom, not only because wisdom rises and falls with the other virtues, but also because the avid pursuit of goods and security cuts in on time that should be spent in study. Even if the fear of death compromises virtue, however, one might nevertheless contend that it is hard-wired into our psychology and that many manifestations of the fear of death are not open to alteration. In this dissertation, I argue that Plato believes that the fear of death, though it can be masterfully controlled, can never be eliminated, because it feeds on two desires that are beyond the reach of rational persuasion. First, human beings have a natural desire for protection against the violence of others. Second, we foster and enjoy attachments to people and projects, and death serves as the ultimate threat to those attachments. In an unstable political environment, a host of anxieties accompany efforts to defend oneself and those for whom one cares against violence and to extend the length of one’s life for the sake continuing one’s relationships. Success often depends on one’s willingness to act unjustly. Thus, I argue that Plato organizes the Republic’s ideal city with these two ineliminable desires in mind. First, the ideal city is distinguished by its freedom from faction—it is perfectly safe and secure. Citizens do not fight or seek protection against 4 one another’s violence. Second, individuals are educated from the outset in a way that fosters the appropriate attitudes towards death.