OPEN TRANSCENDENTALISM ANDTHE NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF METHODOLOGY

H. G. CALLAWAY Universität Erlangen

1. Lauener, Ferdinand Gonseth, and Kant

Lauener says his "open transcendentalism, has its roots in the philoso• phy of Kant and Gonseth" (Lauener 1982, p. 354). Still, contrary to Kant, "radical anti-fundamentalism" (anti-foundational-ism) is a key element in his approach to philosophical problems of the sciences. Lauener remarks that Gonseth's methodology "on fIrst sight" shows "many similarities with the views of Karl Popper" (Lauener 1977, p. 113). Gonseth insists on the importance of "technical devices" in strenuous tests of hypotheses and "on the fruitlessness of any attempt to find absolute and defInite foundations for human knowledge". These points appear to have influenced Lauener's thought, since he claims "it is vain to seek certitude or ultimate elements of any kind" (1982, p. 354), and because of the prevalence of technical devices, put to good use, in Lauener's work. Like Gonseth, Lauener complains of philosophy which teIls us nothing of signifIcance regarding "existential, ethical, and social problems" (1977, p. 113). Even among post-positivist analytic philosophers, Lauener sees many "embarked on a modem scholasticism doomed to sterility" (1982, p. 354). There is a practical orientation in Lauener's work, and this orientation to practice is reflected in his concem with nonnative elements of science and scientific methodology. How are we to understand the 'transcendentalism' of Lauener's 'open transcendentalism' and its relation to Kant? Many will sense a tension between "transcendental" elements of any kind and Lauen• er's pragmatic themes. According to Lauener, the Kantian concep• tion of transcendental arguments, is to be "pragmatically relativ i- 2 zed" (Cf. Lauener 1990a). Lauener's transcendentalism is "metho• dological, not doctrinal", and "the notion of rationality must be rela• tivized to a panicular historical situation and be applied to activities" (1982, p. 355). In Lauener 's hands, the transcendental becomes, from a scientific point of view, the metatheory of science and sciences. "As against Kant", says Lauener, "I share Quine's con• viction that there can be no once-and-for-all valid and final justifi• cation of scientific theories" (Lauener 1984, p. 113). Still, in his own philosophy, he defends an "open" (i.e., fallibilistic) conception of the apriori "against Quine's naturalism", and he holds that we must presuppose "analytic sentences, valid independent of experience", as "indispensable to our constitutive activities in science" (ibid.). Since Lauener avoids absolutism regarding presuppositions or conditions of the possibility of inquiry, we expect either a methodological relativism, conditioned by traditional transcendentalism, or that methodological reflections will be more fully drawn into the continuity of inquiry. (Cf. my argument against Gochet's defense of a language-relativized notion of analyticity, Callaway 1988b, p. 49.) Lauener does not see foundationalism as basic in Kant's notion ofthe transcendental but the idea ("Kant's attempt to save the insight of classical rationalism") that "percepts without concepts are blind". Knowledge via sense experience is not possible without some presupposed concepts (or other) in any given scientific situation, and these constitute a contextual or relative apriori, including a logic and particular analytic truths - sentences true "by fiat", as Lauener puts it, though the phrase can be misleading. A quotation from Gonseth, (Lauener 1977, p. 114) suggests an interpretation of Lauener's overall view of the sciences. Gonseth conceived of scientific disciplines as "dialectical", so that any supposed "transcendental" or purely conceptual element has a pro• visional status: A dialectic is an arbitrated set of significant statements; it is informed by OUT experience of a certain cognitive level, an experience which partly remains implicit. It is governed by strict roles and a system of concepts logically linked together which have proved efficient in a demanding practical activity; and therefore these roles are reliable. Moreover, a dialectic is always conditioned by the ends in view of which it has been conceived. (Gonseth 1947, p. 35)