China's Cyberspace Control Strategy
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China Papers No. 7 The University of British Columbia China’s Cyberspace Control Strategy: An Overview and Consideration of Issues for Canadian Policy Ronald Deibert February 2010 Canadian International Council Conseil international du Canada www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org www.conseilinternationalducanada.org China Papers No. 7 Abstract China is among the world’s most dynamic countries when it comes to information and community technology research, development and consumer use. It is now the world’s largest national Internet population. China is also the world’s most pervasive filterer of Internet content, engages in widespread electronic surveillance and has been suspected of global cyber-espionage against adversaries abroad. This paper draws upon the experiences of several Canadian-based research and development projects that focus directly upon (and confront) China’s cyberspace control strategy to map out its main features and discuss the challenges they present for Canada. The main part of this paper provides an overview of China’s content filtering, surveillance and information warfare policies and practices. This overview is followed by a consideration of issues for Canada. Like many other countries, Canada depends on economic exchange with China and is home to a large and growing Chinese diaspora community that can be vocal critics of China’s human rights policies. Canada is also the home of some of the leading research and development projects on Internet censorship, surveillance and information warfare that, at times, are antagonistically linked to China. The conclusion considers some of the challenges and opportunities for Canadian interests and presents three recommendations for Canadian policy. Résumé La Chine compte parmi les pays les plus dynamiques en matière de recherche, de développement et de consom- mation des technologies de l’information et communautaires, comme en témoigne notamment sa population Internet nationale, aujourd’hui la plus importante du monde. C’est aussi le pays qui filtre le plus rigoureusement le contenu Internet. Elle pratique en outre la surveillance électronique à grande échelle et est soupçonnée de cyberespionnage à l’encontre de ses adversaires internationaux. Cette étude puise à l’expérience de plusieurs projets de recherche-développement canadiens directement axés sur la stratégie chinoise de contrôle du cyber- space (et la remettant en question) afin de dégager ses principales caractéristiques et les défis qui s’ensuivent pour le Canada. La plus grande partie de l’étude porte sur les politiques et pratiques chinoises touchant le filtrage de contenu, la surveillance et la guerre de l’information. Suit une analyse des enjeux qu’elles soulèvent pour le Canada, qui mise comme de nombreux autres pays sur ses échanges avec la Chine tout en abritant une diaspora chinoise grandissante et parfois très critique à l’égard de la politique chinoise des droits de l’homme. Au Canada se mènent aussi d’importants projets de recherche-développement sur la censure en ligne, la surveillance et la guerre de l’information, dont les résultats impliquent la Chine de façon parfois antagoniste. En conclusion sont présentés certains des défis et possibilités liés aux intérêts canadiens et formulées trois recommandations touchant la politique du Canada. About the Author Ron Deibert received his PhD from the University of British Columbia and is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto. The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary research and development hothouse working at the intersection of the Internet, global security and human rights. Deibert is a cofounder and a principal investigator of The Information Warfare Monitor, an OpenNet Initiative, research and advocacy project that examines Internet censorship and surveillance worldwide, and is a cofounder and director of global policy and outreach for Psiphon Incorporated. Deibert has published numerous articles, chapters and three books on issues related technology, media and world politics, and was one of the authors of the Tracking Ghostnet report of alleged Chinese cyber espionage involving over 1200 computers in 103 countries. Deibert’s research has been featured in newspapers, television, and radio shows, including the New York Times, BBC, The Globe and Mail, CBC, CNN, Al Jazeera, WIRED and the Far Eastern Economic Review. He was awarded the University of Toronto Outstanding Teaching Award (2002), the Northrop Frye Distinguished Teaching and Research Award (2002) and was a China Papers No. 7 Ford Foundation research scholar of Information and communication technologies (2002-2004). He was named to the Macleans magazine honour roll as one of 39 Canadians to have helped make the world a better place in 2006, and to Esquire Magazine’s Best and Brightest list of 2007. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Canadian International Council, its Senate or its Board of Directors. If you would like to download a copy of this report please visit www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org If you would like to be added to our mailing list or have questions about our publications please contact: [email protected] ISSN 1921-9865 (Online) ISSN 1921-9881 (Print) © 2010 Canadian International Council – 3– China Papers No. 7 Introduction When it comes to Internet censorship, few discussions take place without at least a passing mention of China. Home to the world’s largest Internet population, and one of the world’s most dynamic centers of information and communication technology production and innovation, China has also mounted the world’s most ambitious cyberspace control strategy. Its methods range from regulations and policies to technological filters to co-optation of Internet service providers (ISPs) to state-sponsored psychological and propaganda campaigns to targeted offensive operations in cyberspace. Not surprisingly, its cybersecurity strategy has met with widespread resistance, both from within and beyond China’s borders. Chinese citizens use various programs and methods to evade government filtering and surveillance; many of them are supported by American and European government-directed funds. China is perennially singled out for just about every suspected case of cyber-espionage or denial of service attack against sensitive computer systems in the United States, even when actual evidence is lacking. China’s cyberspace ecosystem is thus characterized by a constant dynamic of control and subversion. This paper draws upon the experiences of several Canadian-based research and development projects [see Box] that focus directly upon (and confront) China’s cyberspace control strategy to map its main features and discuss the challenges they present for Canada. The main part of the paper provides an overview of China’s content filtering, surveillance and information warfare policies and practices. This overview is followed by a consideration of issues for Canada. Like many other countries, Canada depends on economic exchange with China, and is home to a large and growing Chinese diaspora community that can be vocal critics of China’s human rights policies. It is also the home of some of the leading research and development projects on Internet censorship, surveillance and information warfare that, at times, are antagonistically linked to China.1 The conclusion considers some of the challenges and opportunities for Canadian interests and presents three recommendations for Canadian policy. These Canadian-based research and development projects include the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), the Information Warfare Monitor (IWM), and Psiphon. The ONI is a collaborative project led by the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto and the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, in partnership with numerous non-governmental organizations worldwide. Using a combination of technical interrogation, data analysis and field research, the aim of the ONI is to document patterns of Internet censorship worldwide. The ONI’s methodology blends “technical Intelligence” that yields quantitative data with field-based contextual research that helps target technical tests and interpret results. The technical data is derived from a suite of software tools that are deployed by researchers in countries under investigation which connect back to databases maintained by the ONI and check accessibility to thousands of websites, keywords and services in English and local languages. Forensic investi- gations of the results, combined with tracing and mapping of network connections, determine what is blocked, where the block is implemented and often the technology that is being used to do the blocking. Country experts then analyze the results and place them in their wider social and political context to give a comprehensive picture of a country’s filtering policies and practices. The ONI has produced three major reports on the state of China’s Internet censorship regime. _______________________________________________________________ 1 See, for example, the CNN interview with the author that presents the release of the Citizen Lab’s Psiphon software as a direct chal- lenge to China, which the author tries to dispel. “Psiphon with Ron Deibert on CNN International,” Youtube, December 1, 2006, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_ADE_uB7SQ (accessed