Part I Access Contested: Theory and Analysis
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THE BUSINESS of CENSORSHIP: CONTENT MANAGEMENT and the CHINESE ECONOMY By
THE BUSINESS OF CENSORSHIP: CONTENT MANAGEMENT AND THE CHINESE ECONOMY by JOSHUA CLARK B.A. (Hons.), Queen's University at Kingston, 2009 MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) August 2010 ©Joshua Clark, 2010 Abstract Content control and censorship on the Internet are increasingly important topics for scholars of democratization, media and communications. Most studies have examined the relationship between the Internet, content management and various elements important to democratization such as the formation of civil society organizations. This thesis attempts to expand this discussion by examining the effects of online content management on economic systems, using the People's Republic of China as an example. China features a globally integrated economy that is increasing dependent on manufacturing and services while simultaneously maintaining one of the most extensive online content management systems in the world. This paper attempts to show how the Communist Party of China is able to reconcile the need for connectivity in order to drive their economy while maintaining political control. It also discusses the long-term implications of this strategy. The first section consists of a series of quantitative and qualitative tests to determine how various classes of websites are managed. These tests reveal that in order to maintain the flow of information necessary for a globally integrated economy, the Chinese Communist Party utilizes strategies that manage but not block the information flows related to business. This survey is followed by a case study examining the relationship between Google and China, and the implications of Chinese regulation and control for the broader economy. -
Ronald J. Deibert
April 13, 2013 Ronald J. Deibert A. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 1. PERSONAL Ronald James Deibert, Munk School of Global Affairs, Observatory Site, 313, 416-946-8916 2. DEGREES - Phd 1995 University of British Columbia - Thesis: Hypermedia: Modes of Communication in World Order Transformation Supervisor Professor Mark Zacher. - MA 1990 Queen’s University 3. EMPLOYMENT Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, 2011-present Associate Professor 2001-2011 Assistant Professor 1996-2001 Director, The Canada Centre for Global Security Studies, 2010-present Director, The Citizen Lab (http://www.citizenlab.org/), 2001-present Vice President, Global Policy and Outreach, Psiphon Inc., 2008-2010 4. HONOURS 2013 – Order of Ontario and Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal 2013 - Partners in Research Technology Ambassador Award 2013 -Canadian Library Association Award for the Advancement of Intellectual Freedom in Canada 2011 - UNESCO Press Freedom Award (awarded to Citizen Lab) 2010 - Canadian Journalists for Free Expression Vox Libera Award (awarded to Citizen Lab) 2010 - Carolyn Tuohy Award for Public Policy 2002 - University of Toronto Outstanding Teaching Award 2002 - The Northrop Frye Distinguished Teaching and Research Award 2002-2004 - Ford Foundation Research Scholar of Information and Communication Technologies 5. PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS AND ACTIVITIES Editorial Board: International Political Sociology, International Studies Perspectives, Astropolitics, Explorations in Media Ecology; Security Dialogue. Advisory Boards: Human Rights in China, Access Now, Lake Ontario Waterkeepers, Privacy International. Steering Committee, World Movement for Democracy, National Endowment for Democracy B. ACADEMIC HISTORY 6. A. RESEARCH ENDEAVOURS Director, Citizen Lab, 2001-present Director, Canada Centre for Global Security Studies, 2010-present Founder, Principal Investigator, OpenNet Initiative, 2002-present Founder, Principal Investigator, Information Warfare Monitor, 2002-2012 Co-Inventor, Psiphon B. -
Annotated Bibliography Digital Transnational Repression
Annotated Bibliography Digital Transnational Repression By Noura Al-Jizawi, Siena Anstis, Sophie Barnett, Sharly Chan, Adam Sen, and Ronald J. Deibert Last Updated: May 2021 Copyright Copyright © 2021 Citizen Lab, “Digital transnational Repression,” by Noura Al-Jizawi, Siena Anstis, Sharly Chan, Adam Sen, and Ronald J. Deibert. Licensed under the Creative Commons BY-SA 4.0 (Attribution-ShareAlike Licence) Electronic version first published in 2020 by the Citizen Lab. Citizen Lab engages in research that investigates the intersection of digital technologies, law, and human rights. Document Version: 2.0 New changes in this annual update include: ● Change of terminology from “transnational digital repression” to “digital transnational repression” to align with the discourse ● New summaries collected between October 2020 - May 2021 and added to the document The Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 license under which this report is licensed lets you freely copy, distribute, remix, transform, and build on it, as long as you: ● give appropriate credit; ● indicate whether you made changes; and ● use and link to the same CC BY-SA 4.0 licence. However, any rights in excerpts reproduced in this report remain with their respective authors; and any rights in brand and product names and associated logos remain with their respective owners. Uses of these that are protected by copyright or trademark rights require the rightsholder’s prior written agreement. 2 Acknowledgements The design of this document is by Mari Zhou. About the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Aairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, focusing on research, development, and high-level strategic policy and legal engagement at the intersection of information and communication technologies, human rights, and global security. -
West Censoring East
West Censoring East The Use of Western Technologies by Middle East Censors 2010-2011 Executive Summary The OpenNet Initiative has documented network filtering of the Internet by national governments in over forty countries worldwide. Countries use this network filtering as one of many methods to control the flow of online content that is objectionable to the filtering governments for social, political, and security reasons. Filtering is particularly appealing to governments as it allows them to control content not published within their national borders. National governments use a variety of technical means to filter the Internet; in this paper, we analyze the use of American- and Canadian- made software for the purpose of government-level filtering in the Middle East and North Africa. In this report, the authors find that nine countries in the region utilize Western-made tools for the purpose of blocking social and political content, effectively blocking a total of over 20 million Internet users from accessing such websites. 1 The authors analyze as well the increasing opacity of the usage of Western-made tools for filtering at the national level. Helmi Noman and Jillian C. York authored this report. ONI principal investigators Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain authored the foreword. Noman is a Senior Research Fellow at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, and is a Berkman Center Research Affiliate. York is the coordinator for the OpenNet Initiative at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. The authors would like to thank James Tay of Citizen Lab for technical support and test data analysis. -
Everyone's Guide to Bypassing Internet Censorship
EVERYONE’S GUIDE TO BY-PASSING INTERNET CENSORSHIP FOR CITIZENS WORLDWIDE A CIVISEC PROJECT The Citizen Lab The University of Toronto September, 2007 cover illustration by Jane Gowan Glossary page 4 Introduction page 5 Choosing Circumvention page 8 User self-assessment Provider self-assessment Technology page 17 Web-based Circumvention Systems Tunneling Software Anonymous Communications Systems Tricks of the trade page 28 Things to remember page 29 Further reading page 29 Circumvention Technologies Circumvention technologies are any tools, software, or methods used to bypass Inter- net filtering. These can range from complex computer programs to relatively simple manual steps, such as accessing a banned website stored on a search engine’s cache, instead of trying to access it directly. Circumvention Providers Circumvention providers install software on a computer in a non-filtered location and make connections to this computer available to those who access the Internet from a censored location. Circumvention providers can range from large commercial organi- zations offering circumvention services for a fee to individuals providing circumven- tion services for free. Circumvention Users Circumvention users are individuals who use circumvention technologies to bypass Internet content filtering. 4 Internet censorship, or content filtering, has become a major global problem. Whereas once it was assumed that states could not control Internet communications, according to research by the OpenNet Initiative (http://opennet.net) more than 25 countries now engage in Internet censorship practices. Those with the most pervasive filtering policies have been found to routinely block access to human rights organi- zations, news, blogs, and web services that challenge the status quo or are deemed threatening or undesirable. -
Psiphon User Guide
PSIPHON USER GUIDE Psiphon is a free and open source web proxy that helps internet users bypass content-filtering systems used by governments in countries like China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. It was developed by the Citizen Lab's CiviSec Project at the University of Toronto and was first released in December 2006. In this how to guide, learn how to provide a proxy service to someone behind a firewall with psiphon . If you are behind a firewall and want to learn how to connect to psiphon and access blocked content, check out this how to guide . Psiphon, unlike other circumvention services, is not intended to be a public, open proxy service. It’s based on a “web of trust” system so psiphon nodes are harder to block. What this means is that a person in an unrestricted location (one that is not behind a firewall) provides a psiphon proxy service to a person they are familiar with who is going online in a place where online access is limited. This is known as a psiphonode . A psiphonite is a psiphon user living in a censored country. The psiphonite connects to a psiphonode (set up by someone they know and trust) to access information freely. NOTE: Psiphon only works on Windows and Linux. There is no Mac version yet. Step 1. First, you should be in a location where you have open access to the internet. You should know someone in another location where access is limited. You will be providing a psiphonode for this person. Tip! If you do not know any psiphon users, but still want to provide a psiphonode, you can find users on psiphon’s Facebook page or Twitter page. -
Internet Service Providers in Thailand
Internet Service Providers In Thailand: Evaluation of Determinants Affecting Customer Loyalty By Student 2 A dissertation submitted for the Masters in Business Administration The Business School University of Roehampton 2011 Declaration Form The work I have submitted is my own effort. I certify that all the material in this Dissertation, which is not my own work, has been identified and acknowledged. No materials are included for which a degree has been previously conferred upon me. Signed Date (Saruta Tangjai) i The Abstract Recently, the Internet service industry in Thailand has been developing and improving their marketing strategies to retain existing customers and create new ones because of a highly competitive market. It is significant for Internet service providers to consider customer satisfaction and customer loyalty in order to help their businesses develop a competitive edge and increase their brand value. In addition, customer loyalty can be a significant factor that helps an Internet service provider increase its profits and create more competitive advantages in the long-term (Oliver, 1999: Lin and Wang, 2006). This research aims to explore the determinants, which affect customer loyalty in the context of Internet service providers in Thailand. A questionnaire survey was conducted with a sample consisting of Thai Internet users in the capital city, Bangkok. The determinants that affect customer loyalty have been tested and analyzed using several approaches so as to explore the significant determinants and understand relationship between the determinants and customer loyalty. The determinants that were analyzed in this research are tangible, reliability, responsiveness, assurance, empathy, pricing, switching cost, trust and brand image. -
History of the Internet-English
Sirin Palasri Steven Huter ZitaWenzel, Ph.D. THE HISTOR Y OF THE INTERNET IN THAILAND Sirin Palasri Steven G. Huter Zita Wenzel (Ph.D.) The Network Startup Resource Center (NSRC) University of Oregon The History of the Internet in Thailand by Sirin Palasri, Steven Huter, and Zita Wenzel Cover Design: Boonsak Tangkamcharoen Published by University of Oregon Libraries, 2013 1299 University of Oregon Eugene, OR 97403-1299 United States of America Telephone: (541) 346-3053 / Fax: (541) 346-3485 Second printing, 2013. ISBN: 978-0-9858204-2-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-9858204-6-6 (English PDF), doi:10.7264/N3B56GNC ISBN: 978-0-9858204-7-3 (Thai PDF), doi:10.7264/N36D5QXN Originally published in 1999. Copyright © 1999 State of Oregon, by and for the State Board of Higher Education, on behalf of the Network Startup Resource Center at the University of Oregon. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/deed.en_US Requests for permission, beyond the Creative Commons authorized uses, should be addressed to: The Network Startup Resource Center (NSRC) 1299 University of Oregon Eugene, Oregon 97403-1299 USA Telephone: +1 541 346-3547 Email: [email protected] Fax: +1 541-346-4397 http://www.nsrc.org/ This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. NCR-961657. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. -
Information & Communication Technologies Thailand Market Study
Information & Communication Technologies Thailand Market Study APRIL 2018 © Copyright EU Gateway | Business Avenues The information and views set out in this study are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Neither the European Union institutions and bodies nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of EU Gateway | Business Avenues and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union. The purpose of this report is to give European companies selected for participation in the EU Gateway | Business Avenues Programme an introductory understanding of the target markets countries and support them in defining their strategy towards those markets. For more information, visit www.eu-gateway.eu. EU Business Avenues in South East Asia Central Management Unit Thailand Market Study April 2018 Submitted to the European Commission on 6 April 2018 Information & Communication Technologies – Thailand Market Study - Page 3 of 207 Table of Contents_Toc511739543 LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... -
Deep Packet Inspection and Internet Censorship: International Convergence on an ‘Integrated Technology of Control’1
Deep Packet Inspection and Internet Censorship: International Convergence on an ‘Integrated Technology of Control’1 Ben Wagner, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München and Universiteit Leiden Introduction* The academic debate on deep packet inspection (DPI) centres on methods of network management and copyright protection and is directly linked to a wider debate on freedom of speech on the Internet. The debate is deeply rooted in an Anglo-Saxon perspective of the Internet and is frequently depicted as a titanic struggle for the right to fundamentally free and unfettered access to the Internet.2 This debate is to a great extent defined by commercial interests. These interests whether of copyright owners, Internet service providers, 1 (Bendrath 2009) * A first draft of this paper was presented at the 3rd Annual Giganet Symposium in December 2008 in Hyderabad, India. For their advice and support preparing this paper I would like to thank: Ralf Bendrath, Claus Wimmer, Geert Lovink, Manuel Kripp, Hermann Thoene, Paul Sterzel, David Herzog, Rainer Hülsse, Wolfgang Fänderl and Stefan Scholz. 2 (Frieden 2008, 633-676; Goodin 2008; Lehr et al. 2007; Mueller 2007, 18; Zittrain 2008) Deep Packet Inspection and Internet Censorship: International Convergence on an ‘Integrated Technology of Control’1, by Ben Wagner application developers or consumers, are all essentially economic. All of these groups have little commercial interest in restricting free speech as such. However some might well be prepared to accept a certain amount of ‘collateral damage’ to internet free speech in exchange for higher revenues. It can be argued that more transparent and open practices from network service providers are needed regarding filtering policy and the technology used. -
The Internet and Elections: the 2006 Presidential
ONI Internet Watch 001 2 About OpenNet Initiative’s Internet Watch Reports Internet Watch reports investigate emerging trends in Internet filtering and control. These occasional reports take a detailed look at events, policies, technologies and countries where filtering and content controls are occurring in new and unexpected ways, or where filtering has been alleged but undetected using conventional ONI testing methodologies. They are designed to test hypotheses, refine monitoring techniques, and report on the cutting edge of the global informational battle space. Internet Watch reports are available in download or hard copy from the ONI. ONI Internet Watch 001 3 Executive Summary As Internet penetration increases globally, so too does its importance to political contests. Both the Internet and cell phones were used to mobilize the masses during the recent “colour revolutions” in the former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, which brought down long-standing authoritarian regimes. This first Internet Watch report, which focuses on election monitoring, represents a pilot venture for the OpenNet Initiative. The motivating hypothesis is that in democratically-challenged countries, the openness of the Net is likely to come under increasing pressure at key political times. One key conclusion thus far is that state tampering with the Internet during election periods is likely to be multi- faceted, elusive, less direct, and more difficult to prove than outright filtering and blocking. A second conclusion, based on the first, is that monitoring the Internet for openness during elections is an extremely slippery task that requires the development of new testing methodologies and monitoring capabilities. This report presents the findings of ONI’s efforts to monitor the Internet during the March 2006 presidential elections in Belarus. -
The International Politics of Authoritarian Internet Control in Iran
International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 3856–3876 1932–8036/20180005 Transforming Threats to Power: The International Politics of Authoritarian Internet Control in Iran MARCUS MICHAELSEN1 University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Authoritarian Internet control is generally explained by domestic power preservation: to curtail dissent within their borders, authoritarian regimes censor, monitor, and shape online communications. Yet this focus neglects important external factors. As a global communication technology, the Internet carries strategic and normative interests of competing international actors. This article investigates the influence of international politics on practices of Internet surveillance and censorship. Using the case of Iran, I analyze how opposition to the West, and particularly to the United States, led the Iranian state to perceive the Internet as a strategic battleground for regime stability. I argue that external threats in the form of democracy promotion, cyberattacks, and sanctions have created conditions enabling the Iranian state to advance and justify capabilities for censorship and surveillance. They have also pushed the regime to build a “national Internet” that is more resistant to outside influence and open to state control. Authoritarian practices are thus produced in international struggles over the use, content, and infrastructure of digital technologies. Keywords: information and communication technologies, censorship, surveillance, authoritarianism, international relations, Iran The fundamental aim of authoritarian rulers is to maintain and expand political power. In the field of Internet politics, authoritarian power holders have pursued this aim by establishing sophisticated systems of Internet control to curb alternative information and dissent perceived as challenge to their rule. They have also come to benefit from digital communication technologies for information manipulation, monitoring, and surveillance.