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West's Code of Georgia Annotated Currentness Title 23. Equity Chapter 3

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West's Code of Georgia Annotated Currentness Title 23. Equity Chapter 3 Ga. Code Ann., § 23-3-90 Page 1 West's Code of Georgia Annotated Currentness Title 23. Equity Chapter 3. Equitable Remedies and Proceedings Generally Article 4. Equitable Interpleader § 23-3-90. Grounds for grant of interpleader (a) Whenever a person is possessed of property or funds or owes a debt or duty, to which more than one person lays claim of such a character as to render it doubtful or dangerous for the holder to act, he may apply to equity to compel the claimants to interplead. (b) If the person bringing the action has to make or incur any expenses in so doing, including attorney's fees, the amount so incurred shall be taxed in the bill of costs, under the approval of the court, the court in its discretion determining the amount of the attorney's fees, and shall be paid by the parties cast in the action as other costs are paid. CREDIT(S) Laws 1952, p. 90, § 1. Formerly Code 1863, § 3156; Code 1868, § 3168; Code 1873, § 3235; Code 1882, § 3235; Civil Code 1895, § 4896; Civil Code 1910, § 5471; Code 1933, § 37-1503. CROSS REFERENCES Civil procedure, interpleader, see § 9-11-22. LIBRARY REFERENCES Interpleader13, 35. Westlaw Key Number Searches: 222k13; 222k35. C.J.S. Interpleader §§ 12, 53 to 57. RESEARCH REFERENCES Forms 2 Brown Georgia Pleading, Prac. & Legal Forms Anno. § 9-11-21, Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties (Text of Code Section). © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Ga. Code Ann., § 23-3-90 Page 2 2 Brown Georgia Pleading, Prac. & Legal Forms Anno. § 9-11-22, Interpleader (Text of Code Section). 6 Brown Georgia Pleading, Prac. & Legal Forms Anno. § 23-3-90 Form 1, Petition for Interpleader. 6 Brown Georgia Pleading, Prac. & Legal Forms Anno. § 23-3-90 Form 3, Order Directing Interpleader. Georgia Law of Damages with Forms § 9:5, Attorney's Fees--Amount. Georgia Law of Damages with Forms § 9:7, Statutory Provisions--Civil Practice Act. Handbook on Georgia Practice with Forms § 7-8, Interpleader. Handbook on Georgia Practice with Forms § 24-24, Equitable Interpleader. Handbook on Georgia Practice with Forms § 24-25, Equitable Interpleader--Form: Complaint for Equitable In- terpleader. Treatises and Practice Aids Davis and Shulman's Georgia Practice and Procedure § 29:8, Definition and Nature of Equitable Interpleader. Davis and Shulman's Georgia Practice and Procedure § 4:16, Interpleader. Davis and Shulman's Georgia Practice and Procedure § 4:17, Intervention. Georgia Procedure Considerations in Initiating Suit § 16:5, Relation to Joinder and Equity Interpleader. Georgia Procedure Special Remedies and Proceedings § 1:7, Equitable Interpleader. Georgia Real Estate Finance and Foreclosure Law § 8-7, Distribution of Sale Proceeds. NOTES OF DECISIONS In general 1 Affidavit negating collusion 10 Attorney fees 26 Construction and application 3 Costs 25 © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Ga. Code Ann., § 23-3-90 Page 3 Counterclaims or cross-bills of interpleader 9 Discovery 18 Disinterest and impartiality, persons entitled to compel interpleaders 6 Doubtful or dangerous to act, persons entitled to compel interpleaders 7 Existence of adequate remedy or defense at law 8 Injunctions 11 Jurisdiction 19 Law governing 4 Necessity of hearing 15 Parties 20 Persons entitled to compel interpleaders 5-7 Persons entitled to compel interpleaders - In general 5 Persons entitled to compel interpleaders - Disinterest and impartiality 6 Persons entitled to compel interpleaders - Doubtful or dangerous to act 7 Purpose 2 Questions for court 22 Questions for jury 23 Relief awarded 16 Review 27 Service 17 Sufficiency of evidence 24 Sufficiency of pleadings 21 Timing of bill of interpleader 13 Unliquidated claims 12 Verification of bill of interpleader 14 1. In general An interpleader suit consists of two phases, in the first of which it must be determined whether the bill will lie, and final decree should be entered so far as the prayers of the petitioner are concerned, and in the second of which defendants are required to interplead and litigate matters in dispute between themselves. Smith v. Folsom, 1940, 190 Ga. 460, 9 S.E.2d 824; Smith v. Horton, 1916, 144 Ga. 496, 87 S.E. 655. The claimant in an interpleader case is in a position similar to that of plaintiffs in other possessory actions, where recovery must be had on strength of their own title rather than on weakness of their adversary's title. Whatley v. Alto Corp., 1955, 211 Ga. 718, 88 S.E.2d 398; Conway v. Caswell, 1904, 121 Ga. 254, 48 S.E. 956, 2 Am.Ann.Cas. 269. Interpleader is of equitable nature. Sanders v. Carney, 1968, 117 Ga.App. 645, 161 S.E.2d 380, transferred to 224 Ga. 429, 162 S.E.2d 351, transferred to 118 Ga.App. 576, 164 S.E.2d 856; National Auto. Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 1958, 213 Ga. 806, 102 S.E.2d 1. The “adverse claims” that authorize interpleader are those which might be brought against the stakeholder by the various claimants to the fund which he holds; thus, where the “adverse claims” on a fund have in fact been inter- © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Ga. Code Ann., § 23-3-90 Page 4 pleaded, it is proper to dismiss the holder of the disputed fund as a party to the action, assuming that no further relief against the holder is being sought or necessary. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-22. Glisson v. Freeman, 2000, 243 Ga.App. 92, 532 S.E.2d 442; Thompson v. Bank of South, 1984, 172 Ga.App. 579, 323 S.E.2d 877. Statutory interpleader does not require a pre-existing legal action. Penland v. Corlew, 2001, 248 Ga.App. 564, 547 S.E.2d 306. Interpleader 15 The complainant in a bill of interpleader merely stirs up a war and then leaves real belligerents to fight it out, he retiring from the scene to repose in dignified ease. Whatley v. Alto Corp., 1955, 211 Ga. 718, 88 S.E.2d 398. In- terpleader 1 “Petition in nature of petition for interpleader” lies to ascertain and establish petitioner's rights in property to which there are conflicting claims between third persons, but such interest must be equitable, vested, and sub- sisting. Campbell v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 1943, 197 Ga. 37, 28 S.E.2d 471, 152 A.L.R. 1111. Interpleader 8(1) Where there is a bill of interpleader, and the defendants answered, admitting on both sides the fact of the dis- pute, and the absence of any interest in the stakeholder, the Court will, if possible, take such action as will pro- tect the stakeholder, without delay, leaving to the parties disputing, to litigate between themselves as to their rights. Perkins v. Trippe, 1869, 40 Ga. 225. Interpleader 11 2. Purpose Purpose of provision of Civil Practice Act relating to interpleader is to bring in additional parties in action at law where there is a possibility of double liability to party plaintiff or defendant. Code, § 81A-122(a). Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 1970, 121 Ga.App. 427, 174 S.E.2d 211. Interpleader 1 3. Construction and application Interpleader provisions should be liberally construed in order that their utilitarian purposes may be best effectu- ated. Penland v. Corlew, 2001, 547 S.E.2d 306, 248 Ga.App. 564; C & S Land, Transp. & Development Corp. v. Grubbs, 1977, 141 Ga.App. 393, 233 S.E.2d 486; Algernon Blair, Inc. v. Trust Co. of Georgia Bank of DeKalb, 1968, 224 Ga. 118, 160 S.E.2d 395. Interpleader provisions are remedial in nature and therefore should be liberally construed in order that their util- itarian purposes may be best effectuated. American General Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Vance, 2009, 2009 WL 1176383. Interpleader 1 4. Law governing Where petition was filed prior to effective date of interpleader provision of Civil Practice Act, case was properly treated as governed by Civil Practice Act in absence of finding that its application in the particular circum- stances would not be feasible or would work injustice. Code, §§ 81A-122, 81A-186. Algernon Blair, Inc. v. © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Ga. Code Ann., § 23-3-90 Page 5 Trust Co. of Georgia Bank of DeKalb, 1968, 224 Ga. 118, 160 S.E.2d 395. Interpleader 1.5 5. Persons entitled to compel interpleaders--In general The right to statutory interpleader depends merely upon the stakeholder's good-faith fear of adverse claims, re- gardless of the merits of those claims or what the stakeholder bona fide believes the merits to be. Penland v. Corlew, 2001, 547 S.E.2d 306, 248 Ga.App. 564; Gilbert v. Montlick & Associates, P.C., 2001, 248 Ga.App. 535, 546 S.E.2d 895, certiorari denied ; Thompson v. Bank of South, 1984, 172 Ga.App. 579, 323 S.E.2d 877; Algernon Blair, Inc. v. Trust Co. of Georgia Bank of DeKalb, 1968, 224 Ga. 118, 160 S.E.2d 395. A stakeholder is not entitled to protection by a court of equity to extent of being saved from all shadow of risk, and if he is in possession of all facts and there is no question of law reasonably debatable, he is not entitled to interpleader. Calhoun v. Lawrence, 1961, 217 Ga. 423, 122 S.E.2d 576; Lilley v. Nixon, 1958, 214 Ga. 548, 105 S.E.2d 716; Lowery v. Independent Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 1953, 209 Ga. 753, 76 S.E.2d 5; Citizens Bank of For- syth v. Middlebrooks, 1952, 209 Ga. 330, 72 S.E.2d 298.
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