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Annex No 1 – Election Administration

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Annex No 1 – Election Administration XVIII . ANNEXES ANNEX NO 1 – ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 1.1 Structure of the Independent Election Commission 1.2 Regional structure of the Independent Election Commission 1 1.3 Election timetable Activity Date Election day announcement and Election calendar publication 31.10.2012 Planning for Presidential and Provincial Council Elections 10.11-18.02.2012 First proposal of a polling stations mapping by the IEC to the MoI 04.2013 Starting of the voter registration top-up exercise 26.05.2013 IECC establishment 24.08.2013 Candidate nomination 16.09-06.10.2013 Verification of candidates nomination information 07-18.10.2013 Publication of the preliminary list of candidates 19.10.2013 Display and challenges period 19-26.10.2013 Corrections and adjudication of challenges 19.10-09.11.2013 Candidates withdrawal - deadline 11.11.2013 Candidates final list publication 16.11.2013 Media Commission establishment 16.11.2013 Movement of electoral material to the centres of districts 19.03 - 05.04.2014 Campaign period (Presidential election) 20.02 - 02.04.2014 End of the voter registration top-up exercise 02 .04.2014 Training of the polling staff 20.03 - 04.04.2014 Finalization of Polling Stations mapping 22.10.2012-30.03.2014 ELECTION DAY – Provincial Council Election / Presidential Election 1st round 05.04.2014 Tallying of the results - Presidential Election – 1st round 06 - 20.04.2014 Presidential election complaints period 07 - 25.04.2014 Audit of the results 13 –29.04.2014 Announcement of Preliminary Results of the Presidential election – 1st round 26.04.2014 Adjudication of complaints of the Presidential election 07.04 - 13.05.2014 IECC final decision and submission to the IEC 14.05.2014 Presidential election Final Results Announcement 15.05.2014 Announcement of runoff election and its timeline 15.05.2014 Movement of electoral materials to the provinces 17 - 22.05.2014 Campaign period 22.05 - 11.06.2014 Training of the polling staff 03 – 12.06.2014 Movement of the electoral material to the districts 02 - 13.06.2014 ELECTION DAY – Presidential Election run-off 14.06.2014 Tallying of the results - Presidential election run-off 16.06-06.07.2014 Registration of complaints 03 - 04.07.2014 Beginning of the adjudication of complaints of the Presidential election 05.07.2014 First audit of the results 19 - 29.06.2014 Second audit of the results (599 and 600 votes cast) 01 - 07.07.2014 Announcement of Preliminary Results of the Presidential election run-off 07.07.2014 Political agreement on a full scale audit and a Government of national unity 12.07.2014 Third audit of the results (full scale) 17.07.2014 – 13.09.2014 End of the adjudication process 18.09.2014 Political agreement “regarding the structure of the National Unity Government” 21.09.2014 Announcement of the outcome of the election 21.09.2014 2 ANNEX NO 2 – VOTER REGISTRATION 2.1 Percentage of voters registered from 2003 to 2014 (out of the 2013 CSO estimated settled population) 2.2 Comparison of three voter registration phases: 2003/2005, 2009/2010, and 2013/2014. Total 2003-2005 Total 2009-2010 Total 2013-2014 1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0 3 2.3 Voter Registration timetable / 2013-2014 top-up exercise Period Phases and locations 26.05.2013 > 26.07.2013 Phase I. 75 VRCs – two in each Provincial Capital + 7 additional VRCs in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz. 27.07.2013 > 17.09.2013 Phase II. 41 VRCs at Provincial capitals level (2 additional in Kabul, and one in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz) + 399 in the districts’ capitals. 28.09.2013 > 10.11.2013 Phase II extended 11.11.2013 > 01.04.2014 Phase I extended - 41 VRCs - in each Provincial Capital (+Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz) Phase I: in provincial capitals / Phase II: in provincial and district capitals 2.4 Percentage of voters registered during the 2013-2014 top-up exercise (out of 2013 CSO estimated settled population) 4 ANNEX NO 3 – WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN ELECTION 3.1 Women registration from 2003 to 2014(out of the 2013 CSO estimated female settled population) 3.2 Women registration – comparison of three voter registration phases(2003/2005, 2009/2010, 2013/2014) % VR Female 2003-2005 % VR Female 2009-2010 % VR Female 2013-2014 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 5 3.3 Women registered during the 2013-2014 top-up exercise(out of the 2013 CSO estimated female settled population) 3.4 Turnout of women in the Presidential election run-off 50.0% 45.0% 40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% 6 3.5 Female polling stations affected by a lack of female staff in the Presidential run-off ANNEX NO 4 – SECURITY 4.1 District level risk assessment (MoI – December 2013) 7 4.2 Election related incidents- first round 4.3 Election related incidents – run-off 8 4.4 Polling stations closed on Election day – compared to the number of election related incidents (first round) Final Total PS affected by E-day closures Elecon related incidents E-day 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 4.5 Total number of incidents– compared to the number of election related incidents (first round) 50 Total incidents E-day Elecon related incidents E-day 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 9 ANNEX NO 5 – POLLING STATIONS MAPPING 5.1 Polling stations status in comparison with the initial mapping – first round 5.2 Polling stations status in comparison with the initial mapping – run-off 10 5.3 Evolution of the polling station mapping between the two rounds of the Presidential election Province Round 1 Run-off Diff. Percentage Province Round 1 Run-off Diff. Percentage Badakhshan 752 838 86 11% Laghman 253 334 81 32% Badghis 331 389 58 18% Logar 251 334 83 33% Baghlan 633 904 271 43% Nangarhar 995 1,241 246 25% Balkh 989 1110 121 12% Nimroz 165 166 1 1% Bamyan 462 495 33 7% Nuristan 108 143 35 32% Daykundi 486 534 48 10% Paktya 567 705 138 24% Farah 327 430 103 31% Paktika 510 783 273 54% Faryab 562 713 151 27% Panjshir 265 294 29 11% Ghazni 829 906 77 9% Parwan 406 449 43 11% Ghor 566 620 54 10% Samangan 329 370 41 12% Helmand 622 689 67 11% Sar-e-Pul 376 403 27 7% Herat 1,261 1,512 251 20% Takhar 795 854 59 7% Jawzjan 448 477 29 6% Uruzgan 185 237 52 28% Kabul 2,416 2,892 476 20% Wardak 248 474 226 91% Kandahar 793 1,080 287 36% Zabul 134 192 58 43% Kapisa 250 282 32 13% TOTAL 18,824 22,778 3,954 21% Khost 490 730 240 49% Kunar 352 422 70 20% Kunduz 668 776 108 16% 11 5.4 Contingency kits released (additional PSs opened on Election day) – first round 5.5 Contingency kits released (additional PSs opened on Election day) – run-off 12 5.6 Comparison between the closure of PSs with the contingency kits realised on Election day (first round) Total PS affected by Eday closures Conngency released 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 GHOR ZABUL BALKH KABUL HERAT KHOST FARAH LOGAR KUNAR KAPISA FARYAB PAKTYA GHAZNI TAKHAR NIMROZ PAKTIKA KUNDUZ BAMYAN BADGHIS WARDAK PARWAN JAWZJAN PANJSHIR BAGHLAN UROZGAN HELMAND SAR-E-PUL LAGHMAN DAYKUNDI KANDAHAR NOORISTAN SAMANGAN NANGARHAR BADAKHSHAN 5.7 Herat – distribution of PSs closed before and on Election day with the contingency kits released (First- round) cf. EU EAT Geographical Information system: http://www.eueat-afghanistan.eu/maps/index.html 13 ANNEX NO 6 – BALLOT PAPERS DISTRIBUTION 6.1 Ballot paper distribution – first Round 6.2 Ballot paper distribution – run-off 14 ANNEX NO 7 – PRELIMINARY RESULTS 7.1 Turnout – first round 7.2 Turnout – run-off 15 7.3 Comparison between the turnouts observed in the first and second rounds of the Presidential election Total number of votes cast per province – comparison first and second rounds of the Presidential election Total votes (valid+invalid) 1st round Total votes (valid+invalid) Runoff 1000000 800000 600000 400000 200000 0 Evolution of the turnout per province – comparison first and second rounds of the election Ballot papers cast out of the total number of available ballot papers in the polling stations 100% FIRST ROUND Runoff 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 16 7.4 Results in percentages obtained– Final Results of the first round / Preliminary Results of the run-off FIRST ROUND RUNOFF Province Abdullah Ashraf Zalmai Rasool Qutbuddin Gul Agha Daoud Amin Abdullah Ashraf Abdullah Ghani Rassoul Sayyaf Hilal Sherzai Sultanzoy Arsala Abdullah Ghani Total 45.00% 31.56% 11.37% 7.04% 2.75% 1.57% 0.46% 0.23% 43.56% 56.44% Badakhshan 64.85% 14.43% 9.51% 8.66% 1.99% 0.07% 0.34% 0.16% 79.32% 20.68% Badghis 67.52% 9.80% 5.44% 12.98% 3.09% 0.37% 0.52% 0.27% 65.50% 34.50% Baghlan 60.14% 20.48% 11.19% 3.95% 2.98% 0.76% 0.36% 0.15% 55.19% 44.81% Balkh 60.92% 28.01% 8.19% 1.15% 0.53% 0.41% 0.56% 0.23% 63.11% 36.89% Bamyan 67.93% 11.05% 12.42% 4.61% 0.22% 2.84% 0.60% 0.34% 75.64% 24.36% Daykundi 75.05% 11.14% 11.61% 0.46% 0.16% 0.76% 0.60% 0.22% 77.49% 22.51% Farah 31.78% 40.03% 13.17% 10.60% 1.60% 1.62% 0.78% 0.41% 53.24% 46.76% Faryab 29.31% 65.39% 2.46% 1.61% 0.23% 0.59% 0.27% 0.14% 34.20% 65.80% Ghazni 54.01% 19.00% 16.90% 6.27% 1.72% 1.46% 0.49% 0.17% 58.47% 41.53% Ghor 59.51% 13.09% 8.94% 16.02% 0.85% 1.16% 0.32% 0.10% 72.48% 27.52% Helmand 17.29% 32.94% 27.46% 3.84% 4.16% 12.98% 0.74% 0.58% 30.64% 69.36% Herat 61.15% 11.08% 11.41% 13.78% 0.64% 1.24% 0.52% 0.17% 63.65% 36.35% Jawzjan 19.94% 69.23% 6.81% 2.05% 0.50% 0.38% 0.57% 0.52% 19.35% 80.65% Kabul 49.62% 31.62% 8.26% 7.53% 1.84% 0.50% 0.45% 0.19% 48.17% 51.83% Kandahar 10.61% 13.90% 53.96% 1.67% 2.80% 16.02% 0.55% 0.49% 15.99% 84.01% Kapisa 78.81% 4.12% 5.62% 5.74% 5.04% 0.16% 0.31% 0.20% 87.36% 12.64% Khost 3.57% 74.01% 7.62% 2.34% 11.92% 0.18% 0.13% 0.23% 2.91% 97.09% Kunar 12.35%
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