CHAPTER ELEVEN Chinese Decision Making

and the Thawing of U.S.~ Relations

Gong Li

THis ESSAY IS AN ANALYSIS of the historical process of China-U.S. rapprochement from the perspective of China's chief decision makers. It examines the decision-making process during the period of rapprochement, analyzes the factors contributing to this process, and explains the dramatic readjustment of China's U.S. policy. It then describes in detail the major policies, methods, and steps adopted by China in the process of rapproche­ ment to transform its relations with the United States and offers a general assessment of the decision-making process regarding relations with the United States.

The Policy~Making Process during the

The Cultural Revolution, which began in I966, disrupted domestic law and order and brought about tremendous changes in elite decision making. Dur­ ing the Cultural Revolution, Chairman 's arbitrariness in­ creased. He would not tolerate any difference of opinion, thus undermining democratic decision making and the leadership of and , who had handled the routine work of the Party.1 In effect, Mao abolished the Politburo and the Secretariat and severely weakened the Mao 322 GongLi

Zedong- foreign policy system. As he weakened the authority of the Party leadership, Mao turned to the Cultural Revolution Leading Group as his personal cabinet. In the latter half of 1966, Cultural Revolution Lead­ ing Group meetings replaced Politburo meetings in handling major national issues.2 Zhou was responsible for briefing Mao on the results of such meet­ ings. , the deputy leader of the group, also briefed Mao. Within the leadership, there were pragmatists, led by Zhou Enlai, and two ultra-leftist factions, represented by and Jiang Qing, respec­ tively. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai maintained a significant influence in foreign affairs, but leftist leaders in the Leading Group opposed his influence. As they became more influential in decision making, they intervened in Foreign Ministry affairs, using the disruptions during the January 1967 seizure oflocal political power. Their main objective was to topple Zhou Enlai and his Foreign Ministry supporters. On August 7, 1967, Wang Li, an important member of the Leading Group, summoned "rebel" representatives of the Foreign Ministry to Diaoyutai/ where he incited them to repudiate , the foreign minis­ ter, and take control of the ministry. Wang said that "the general orientation of ferreting out Chen Yi is certainly right. Why cannot he be ferreted out?" He told the rebels that "Since it is a revolution on such a large scale, it will not do not to change the leadership. Why cannot the leaders be removed?" Further encouraging chaos, he said, "What is so secret and mysterious? Any­ thing that is not favorable to the revolution will have to be done away with. Rigid stratification must be repudiated and transformed."" When the speech was relayed to lower Foreign Ministry officials, the ministry erupted in chaos. Then, on August 16, 1967, the rebels imprisoned vice foreign ministers and in a basement and seized control. The rebels obeyed orders from the Cultural Revolution Leading Group without con­ sulting Zhou Enlai or even Mao. They soon issued orders and directives to overseas embassies, causing serious repercussions. On August 22, under the pretext of protesting persecution of patriotic Hong Kong journalists by the British-Hong Kong authority, the Foreign Ministry presented a note to the British charge d'affaires in containing belligerent demands. That night, rebels from the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute, together with rebels from ten other organizations, demonstrated in front of the office of the British charge d'affaires, holding a "denunciation meet­ ing against the British imperialists for the crimes committed against China."