Balkans Briefing Tirana/Brussels, 25 August 2000 ALBANIA'S LOCAL ELECTIONS: A TEST OF STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY I. INTRODUCTION Local elections in Albania on 1 October 2000 will mark the first test of popular support for the ruling Socialist-led coalition since it came to power following the violent uprising in 1997.1 The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), whose Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) will be leading the monitoring effort, deems these elections to be of critical importance. Albania’s electoral process has traditionally been bedevilled by the same handicaps encountered in most other institutional areas: namely, inadequate legislation, capacity deficiencies, politicisation of the process, and lack of all round political support. It is vitally important for Albania's democracy and international reputation that this year's elections do not repeat the mistakes of the recent past.2 There is, however, growing concern about political tension in the run-up to the elections, due to increasing political polarisation and the threat of non-participation by the main opposition party. Despite calls from international organisations to avoid extreme confrontation, the country's two main parties – the governing Socialist Party (SP) chaired by former premier, Fatos Nano, and the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) led by former president, Sali Berisha – have opened the debate with characteristically bitter polemics. Three years after he was forced from power in July 1997 in an armed rebellion in which more than 2,000 people were killed, Berisha, now 53, is back on the electoral campaign trail. Since losing power, he has waged a relentless campaign against his Socialist opponents, whom he accuses of rampant corruption, and has repeatedly called for early parliamentary elections.3 The last local elections were in October 1996 and resulted in a sweeping victory for Berisha's Democratic Party. As a result, the DP dominates local government with 80 per cent control over city and district councils and therefore has the most to lose in the polls. In a remark that reveals the importance of the elections for the DP, Berisha claims the poll will be “the most contested elections in the history of Albania because the government has demonstrated that it drew up the law to manipulate them.”4 1 A further round of voting on 15 October will take place for candidates who fail to win a majority in the first round. 2 Ambassador Geert Ahrens, Head of OSCE Presence in Albania, “Democratisation and Institution Building in Albania,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 4 May 2000. 3 Parliamentary elections are officially scheduled for June 2001. 4 Reuters, 13 May 2000, 13:58. Balkans Briefing Paper Albania’s Local Elections: A Test of Stability and Democracy, 25 August 2000 Page 2 A Council of Europe (CoE) resolution at the end of June declared that “the holding of elections in conformity with the new electoral law, in order for them to be fair and for their outcome to be acceptable to all the political parties, is a condition that Albania must meet, given all the promises made before it was accepted into the CoE in July 1995.” This is as much a reference to Berisha as it is to the current government since it was under Berisha's administration that Albania joined the CoE. The persistence of polarisation and confrontation in Albanian political life is manifested by deep divisions within both major parties. The Socialists are divided between supporters of SP chairman Fatos Nano, and the younger element centred around Premier Ilir Meta and former premier Pandeli Majko. Whilst the Socialists are trying to paper over the cracks in order to present a united front to the electorate, the Democrat leadership has basically ignored its breakaway reformist faction, the Democratic Reform Movement (DPRM), now generally referred to as the “Young Reformers.” Both main parties also have problems with their coalition partners. The outcome of the elections is likely to be very close between the two major parties and the results are almost certain to be contested. Despite persistent threats to boycott the entire procedure, the Democrats will most probably take part in the elections but continue to boycott the Central Election Committee (CEC) and not recognise the results announced by the CEC because they believe it is biased in favour of the Socialists. The conduct of the elections and the willingness of the main parties to abide by their outcome will be seen as a measure of the level of political maturity Albania has reached and a valuable indicator that the country is progressing in the right direction. A successful electoral process would enhance regional stability and advance Albania’s candidacy for increased integration into European structures. A serious monitoring effort by NGOs and OSCE governments would raise the prospects for a democratic outcome. II. BACKGROUND TO THE ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS So far, the whole electoral process has been very problematic. The OSCE has endeavoured to accommodate criticisms of the electoral code through a working group – chaired by Ambassador Geert Ahrens, Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania, or his Legal Counsellor – and open to all parties to deal with technical and legislative issues of voter registration and the enactment of the electoral code. Since the beginning of March 2000, the working group has met on an almost daily basis, discussing issues of a legal or technical nature raised by participants. As a result, by mid-April, an amended draft code had been prepared incorporating the changes agreed to by the parties, together with the proposals of international experts. In the view of the OSCE and the international experts on the working group, this text should provide Albania with an internationally acceptable legal basis for the holding of free and fair elections. The Albanian constitution provides for an independent, non-political Central Electoral Commission (CEC), excluding the nomination or participation of members on a party political basis. The constitution also entitles President Rexhep Meidani to appoint two CEC members, while the High Council of Justice, chaired by the president, can elect three commission members. The other two are elected by parliament. Balkans Briefing Paper Albania’s Local Elections: A Test of Stability and Democracy, 25 August 2000 Page 3 Opposition Arguments against the Electoral Procedures Towards the end of last year it became apparent that the opposition planned to attack the proposed arrangements for holding the elections – complaining that they had been inadequately involved in the preparatory process and strongly criticising the constitution of the CEC.5 Complicating the picture was the legacy of the OSCE’s criticism of the conduct of the 1996 general election, which had incited Berisha’s anger and led him to accuse the organisation of a leftist bias and of being under the control of communists. As in 1996, dissent revolves around the composition of the electoral commission. Opposition parties accuse President Meidani of turning the CEC into a politically partisan body in order to assist the Socialist Party in rigging the elections. The DP would prefer the CEC to be reconfigured, with one representative from each of the seven parties who won the most votes in the 1997 general election. Of the seven parties, three might be considered right wing and four left wing. By permitting a representative of each to serve on the CEC, the DP argues, there would be a fairer balance between left and right. However, the composition of the CEC is not within the scope of the technical and legal tasks of the OSCE's working group. Njazi Kosovrasti, head of the DP's Local Government Department, explained his party's opposition to the CEC: “[President] Meidani appointed two independents, cronies of his, and three others were appointed by the High Council of Justice, which is also headed by Meidani. Another was appointed by parliament. These six were appointed prior to the electoral code being passed by parliament on 12 May 2000. Two appointees resigned so there remained three empty places. Both parties' experts signed the electoral code agreeing that five out of seven [members] should agree to any appointment in order that it be legal. Parliament, however, refused to agree. The only possible reason, therefore, is to rig the votes.”6 According to a DP memorandum, the electoral code was approved “only by the vote of the leftist forces, without taking into consideration some amendments that aimed at respecting the previous political agreements presented by other deputies.” In the view of the opposition, the basis of the local electoral law should be that which stood at the time of the 1996 local elections, which produced a landslide victory for the DP. The present code, the DP argues, creates a legal foundation for manipulating the elections and the CEC is invalid since five CEC members were nominated in a one-sided manner, before the code had been even approved and with disregard for the criteria laid down in the code, resulting in a commission that does not enjoy the trust of other political forces participating in the elections.7 An example of the difficulty of ensuring the neutrality of representation between the ruling coalition and the opposition occurred in mid-June 2000, when Fotaq Nano was appointed chairman of the Central Electoral Commission. The appointment outraged DP supporters, who claimed that not only is Fotaq Nano a relative of Socialist Party leader Fatos Nano and a close friend of President Rexhep Meidani, he is also a former Socialist 5 OSCE press statement on the elections by Ambassador Geert Ahrens, 10 April 2000. 6 ICG interview with Njazi Kosovrasti, Head of DP Local Government Department, DP headquarters, Tirana, June 2000.