Part II Security Dialogue and Concepts: NATO's Mediterranean Security Dialogue and Security Concept of the European Union

Chapter 5 NATO's Agenda and the Mediterranean Dialogue Nicola de Santis

Chapter 6 A Southern Perspective and Assessment of NATO's Mediterranean Security Dialogue Mohamed Kadry Said

Chapter 7 A European Perspective and Assessment of NATO's Mediterranean Security Dialogue Félix Sanz

Chapter 8 The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative Ellen Laipson

Chapter 9 The Security Concept of the European Union for the Mediterranean Michael Köhler Satellite Image 3: Nile Delta and Suez Canal. Copyright DLR. Printed with permission of DLR-DFD. 5 NATO’s Agenda and the Mediterranean Dialogue

Nicola de Santis1

5.1 actively prepare for inclusion through the Mem- Introduction bership Action Plan. • NATO must continue to work to promote the During the last twelve years NATO has undergone a complementarity of NATO’s ESDI (European Se- major adaptation process to the new Post- curity and Defence Identity) and the EU’s ESDP security realities, to continue providing security and (European Security and Defence Policy), avoiding stability to the Euro-Atlantic area. At its historic No- unnecessary duplication with flexible arrange- vember NATO has pushed its ments to allow the European Allies to deal with transformation even further. In Prague the Alliance military contingencies when NATO as such will launched its second enlargement, it expanded its mis- decide not to act and without undermining the ef- sions, enhanced its military capabilities and strength- fectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. ened its partnerships. In an uncertain and fast chang- • The Alliance must enhance the Mediterranean ing security environment, NATO embodies the trans- Dialogue, moving from dialogue to partnership. atlantic link and remains the cornerstone of Euro- Atlantic security. This transatlantic alliance is a unique I will analyse the main facets of this new NATO source of political-military capabilities to manage suc- agenda and its Mediterranean Dialogue initiative. cessfully unpredictable crises and to build new part- nerships through a new cooperative approach to se- 5.2 curity, while continuing to provide for the security of Political-Military Capabilities to its members. To do so, the Alliance has some key Manage Crises strategic priorities. In this fast changing and unpredictable security envi- • NATO must continue to meet the risks emanating ronment, the first priority for NATO is to continue from instability and unpredictable security devel- to develop those defence capabilities needed to man- opments likely to affect the security of its member age the full spectrum of its post-Cold War crisis man- countries by developing the defence capabilities agement missions. At the 23 April 1999 Washington needed to meet its new post-Cold War missions. Summit, NATO launched the Defence Capabilities • The Alliance must continue to keep engaged its Initiative (DCI), with an aim to achieve lasting im- partners in the Euro-Atlantic area and in the Med- provements of capabilities and interoperability. iterranean, through the EAPC (European Atlantic At the November 2002 Prague Summit NATO's Partnership Council), the PfP (Partnership for Heads of State and Government adopted the Prague Peace) and the Mediterranean Dialogue. Capabilities Commitment (PCC), through which each • It must continue to intensify cooperation with nation took the firm commitment to develop critical Russia and the Ukraine. capabilities in four main areas: chemical, biological, • It should maintain an open door for future mem- radiological and nuclear defence: to protect our forc- bers, helping those aspiring to join the Alliance to es from new threats such as from weapons of mass destruction; command, communication and infor- mation superiority: to ensure that both sensitive de- liberations and operational communication are time- 1 The author's views are expressed on a personal basis ly, reliable, secure and inclusive and make the best of and do not therefore necessarily represent the official battlefield information of all kind; effective engage- view of NATO and its member countries. 178 Nicola de Santis

ment: to enable our forces to engage effectively an In this uncertain security environment NATO may adversary across the full spectrum of possible military again need in the future to project military power circumstances; mobility, rapid deployment and sus- outside the borders of its member countries, to deal tainability of forces: to deploy rapidly our forces in a with new threats such as, for example, the prolifera- theatre of operations and to provide our deployed tion of weapons of mass destruction. It is vital there- forces with the logistical support they need regardless fore that NATO possesses the military capabilities to of the environment. These 400 plus commitments, counter these new threats. one-third of which will be implemented before 2005, To this end, another important decision adopted will significantly enhance NATO’s overall military ca- at the Prague Summit to meet future threats has been pabilities, for example: quadrupling the current total the establishment of the NATO Response Force of 4 outsize transport aircraft available nationally or (NRF), to provide the Alliance with rapidly deploy- collectively to non-US NATO countries, increasing by able, high capability cutting edge to deal with the full around 40% the non-US holdings of precision guided range of today's threats. The NRF will enable NATO weapons, increasing by 40% the number of air tanker to react immediately with robust, tailored forces aircraft available nationally or collectively to NATO's wherever it is called upon. It will also serve as a European member countries, accelerating program- mechanism for focusing and promoting capability im- mes to provide NATO with UAV’s and radar jamming provements, thus reinforcing the Prague Capabilities pods and, last but not least, allowing nations to pro- Commitment. vide NATO with guaranteed access to sealift for all At the January NATO’s missions. NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment Heads of State and Government acknowledged the will also need to be mutually reinforcing with the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass EU’s Headline Goal, as the Alliance is working to destruction and their delivery means. The North At- promote the complementarity between NATO’s lantic Council established the Political Military Group ESDI and the EU’s ESDP. on Proliferation to address the political dimension of But all of the above will not be achieved if NATO this issue, while the Senior Defence Group on Prolif- countries do not spend more and better. The defence eration was established to address the military dimen- spending of NATO nations, taken as a share of the sion of the problem. GDP, has fallen by nearly half during the last decade. At the April , NATO Only 19 % of Alliance nations’ defence spending goes leaders decided to build on the decisions of the Brus- to procurement and new equipment, while 40 % of sels Summit and established a Weapons of Mass De- NATO defence budgets still goes to cover personnel struction Center within the International Staff to in- and infrastructure costs. crease the quantity and quality of information and in- To address this issue successfully will not only telligence sharing among the Allies and, to increase have positive effects on NATO but also on the EU, as the public awareness on the challenges deriving from the deadline to equip itself by 2003 with a 60,000 WMD proliferation. men and women rapid reaction force, with the Head- In June 2002 NATO’s Defence Ministers en- line Goal, is not that far away. One thing should be dorsed the NATO Nuclear, Biological and Chemical clear: if the capabilities are available for NATO they Defence Initiatives, developed by the Senior Defence will also be there for the EU. But if the capabilities Group on Proliferation. These Initiatives were de- are missing for NATO they will not be there for the signed to serve as a first step in addressing the most EU. critical deficiencies in NATO's NBC defences, em- NATO capabilities are the reason why: the Cold phasising multinational participation and the rapid War is over; two major military crises such as Bosnia fielding of enhanced defence capabilities. They com- and were managed successfully; Miloševic is prise: a Disease Surveillance System, an NBC Event before the ICTY; NATO continues to provide for a Response Team, a Deployable NBC Analytical Labo- security environment in which the political, social ratory, a NATO NBC Defence Stockpile and expand- and economic reconstruction of the Balkans can take ed NBC Defence Training. place and why seven new countries decided to join We are confronted today with a diverse group of the Alliance. NATO’s capabilities are crucial if the Al- states seeking weapons of mass destruction and long- liance is to continue to guarantee security and stabili- er-range ballistic missiles. These countries conceive ty for the years to come. these weapons as a useable military tool against neigh- bouring countries, and as a tool of coercive diplomacy NATO’s Agenda and the Mediterranean Dialogue 179 to: prevent the NATO Allies from coming to the as- 5.4 The Mediterranean Region and sistance of friends, counter our conventional forces, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue break the cohesion of Allied coalitions. For example one can only imagine what would have happened if An important facet of NATO’s external adaptation Miloševic had weapons of mass destruction at the and of its cooperative approach to security is also re- time of the Operation Allied Force, and what military presented by NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, and political consequences this would have had. which was launched at the December 1994 Brussels Ministerial meeting and currently involves seven non- 5.3 NATO Mediterranean nations: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, NATO's New Partnerships Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. In today’s post-Cold War security environment, the Mediterra- But NATO is not only about military capabilities. nean is an area of central geo-strategic interest to This is the only international security organisation NATO. Six of its member countries are Mediterrane- able to mobilise not only military but also political an nations, while all others have important and vital and diplomatic capabilities, to build new partnerships interests in the region. In addition, the Mediterrane- in a cooperative approach to security, projecting sta- an has become the center of increased transatlantic bility through dialogue and cooperation in the securi- cooperation in the security field within NATO and ty field. With the end of the Cold War, NATO ex- with non-NATO actors of the region. tended the hand of friendship to all countries of NATO has always been a Mediterranean Alliance. Central and Eastern Europe, to the successor states of Since its inception, one of its most important Region- the former Soviet Union, and to Russia as well, open- al Commands: AFSOUTH was established in 1953 in ing an unprecedented new era of cooperation and Naples, directly in the Mediterranean. We all recogn- partnership throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. ise today the importance of this choice, since the NATO’s new cooperative approach to security Commander in Chief of AFSOUTH has overall re- has been inclusive rather than exclusive. It has been sponsibility for the theatre of operations in which aimed at not marginalising anyone in Europe but SFOR, KFOR and Operation Allied Harbour are de- rather to include all in “variable geometry” partner- ployed. ships, going from the NACC, the Partnership for With the end of the Cold War, NATO has better Peace, the EAPC, to the Mediterranean Dialogue with defined its Area of Responsibility (AOR) and also its seven non-NATO Mediterranean Countries, to the Area of Strategic Interest (AOSI), encompassing to- NATO -Russia Council at 20; while at the same time day a broader area which includes the Southern and including in NATO three new members in 1999 and Eastern Mediterranean, as well as South-Eastern Eu- seven more in 2004, maintaining the door open for rope up to the Caucasus. future invitations to join the Alliance through the Increasingly NATO must factor in developments Membership Action Plan. NATO also continues to in- in contiguous and adjacent territories surrounding tensify its cooperative ties with Russia and the the Alliance, which are likely to affect its security. It is Ukraine. also evident that the Mediterranean region is today Through PfP and the EAPC, NATO has promot- the centre of interaction of socio-economic imbalanc- ed a new culture of cooperation throughout the es, as well as of security-related issues, and that ten- Euro-Atlantic area, aimed at achieving: the democrat- sions and conflicts are often a consequence of the in- ic control of the armed forces, the transparency of stability produced by turbulent political and social defence budgets and the interoperability necessary to change in the region. allow our cooperation partners to participate togeth- Moreover, the old distinction between European er with NATO in crisis management and peace sup- and Mediterranean security has also disappeared due port operations. In Bosnia and Kosovo NATO has to the grown volume of interaction between the two been able to organise under the unified command of shores of the Mediterranean in all sectors. Security in its integrated military structure, the formidable re- the area has taken a different shape as a consequence sponse of the international community to the Bos- of the end of the Cold War. The “Southern periph- nian and Kosovo crises, bringing peace and security ery” of the Alliance has also been the centre of two to a very troubled region, while also preventing the conflicts, in which we have seen NATO intervene in outbreak of a third conflict in the Former Yugoslav Bosnia and Kosovo. NATO’s strategic realities have Republic of Macedonia, in concert with the EU. evolved to the point that the Mediterranean and 180 Nicola de Santis

South-Eastern Europe can no longer be considered the Mediterranean Dialogue. An annual Work Pro- “out of area”, as security developments there directly gramme now covers a wide range of cooperative activ- affect the security of NATO member countries. Con- ities: Information and Press, Science and the Environ- sequently, our governments and peoples will need to ment, Civil Emergency Planning, Crisis Management refine periodically their definition of what constitutes and Military activities. Since October 2001, periodical risks to national and international security. NATO 19+7 multilateral Ambassadorial meetings also take through AFSOUTH has monitored for fifty years se- place, between the and the curity and military developments in the Mediterrane- Brussels based Ambassadors of the 7 Mediterranean an in the context of its defence dimension. Dialogue countries, under the chairmanship of the Secretary General of NATO. Occasionally, high level 7 5.5 representatives from capitals of the Mediterranean The Mediterranean Dialogue’s Dialogue countries, also join their Brussels based Am- Rationale bassadors at these NAC or MCG meetings. At their May 2002 meeting in Reykjavik, NATO The defence dimension of NATO however must not Foreign Ministers decided to upgrade the political be confused with the goal and rationale of the Medi- and practical dimensions of NATO’s Mediterranean terranean Dialogue, which is indeed, primarily a po- Dialogue, by introducing a number of new items in- litical dialogue initiative with clear goals. The Dia- cluding consultation on security matters of common logue reflects the Allies’ view that security in Europe concern, including terrorism-related issues. In July is closely linked to security in the Mediterranean re- 2002, the North Atlantic Council decided that the gion. The aim of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is strengthening and deepening of NATO’s relations to promote better mutual understanding and confi- with Mediterranean Dialogue countries is among the dence, as well as good and friendly relations across highest priorities of the Alliance. At their November the Mediterranean. In addition, the Dialogue helps 2002 Prague Summit, NATO’s Heads of State and correct misperceptions in non-NATO Mediterranean Government adopted an inventory of possible areas countries of NATO’s policies, thus representing its of cooperation to upgrade the political and practical contribution to Mediterranean stability and security. dimensions of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. The Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue also com- A particular effort is made in order to provide in- plements other international initiatives, primarily the formed opinions on NATO’s current policies and EU’s Barcelona Process which aims at tackling the so- goals. NATO is not always well perceived in Mediter- cio-economic imbalances of the region that often are ranean Dialogue countries. The situation there is dif- the root causes of tensions and conflict in the area. ferent from the positive public perception the Alli- The EU certainly has the lead in addressing this so- ance has in Central and Eastern European Countries. cio-economic dimension, while NATO can comple- Through NATO’s Information activities, the Alliance ment such an effort in the security field (ch. 9). aims at overcoming misunderstanding and to confirm The Dialogue is a phased approach: In early 1995 or realign perceptions in the civil society of Mediter- NATO invited five countries to participate; Jordan ranean Dialogue countries. This is why we are also, was invited in late 1995 and Algeria in 2000. The Dia- through our information programmes, engaging aca- logue is therefore open to the participation of other demics, parliamentarians, policy makers, the media non-NATO countries willing and able to contribute and other representatives of the civil society from Me- to security and stability in the Mediterranean Region, diterranean Dialogue countries, as well as co-sponsor- to be chosen by consensus. Through the Mediterra- ing international conferences and seminars such as nean Cooperation Group (MCG), established at the this one in Canterbury to promote mutual understan- July , NATO nations are directly ding and trust, and to discuss issues of common con- involved in the political discussions with representa- cern. tives of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, The very positive response of our Mediterranean through the 19+1 and 19+7 format of multi-bilateral Dialogue partners encourages us to continue this ef- meetings, taking place on a regular basis. fort to intensify our partnership in the interest of the At the April 1999 Washington Summit NATO’s stability and security of the Mediterranean region as Heads of State and Government decided to enhance a whole.