A Force-in-Readiness, or in Stasis? Five questions about FD 2030 by Bing West

fter U.S. combat in Iraq and Afghanistan sputtered >Mr. West is a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and combat Marine. He has to an unsatisfactory finish, written ten books about Marines in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. His latest is the Marine Corps pivoted to The Last Platoon: A Novel of the Afghanistan War. preparingA for a war with . The pivot, called Force Design 2030, calls for “a nimble force capable of employ- place. Congress and presidents support tions longer than can American soci- ing long-range fires in support of fleet the Marine Corps as a stand-alone Ser- ety. Worldwide shipping will cease, and operations.”1 The key warfighting em- vice. cyber networks will be severely disrupt- ployment envisions seizing and then ed. Will the public endure months of hopping from tiny islands in the South 2. Warfighting Credibility hardships, including the loss of electric China Sea in order to fire missiles at During any pre-war crisis, China will power, massive financial disruption, and Chinese warships. To pay for this, the threaten any nation that grants land- the severe rationing of basic goods? Corps has given up its tanks and many ing rights. So, it is unlikely any nation Rallying his countrymen during artillery tubes. This transformation has will grant permission for Marines to the Nazi 1940 bombing of England, been ongoing for two years. Sufficient land. The Chinese will have a plan for Prime Minister Churchill declared, time has passed to pose five questions: neutralizing every landing spot. Once “I see the spirit of an unconquerable 1. Is the 2030 force vital for sea con- hostilities begin, the Navy must place people.”2 Recently, the historian Niall trol? its amphibious ships in harm’s way to Ferguson wrote, “Americans today ap- 2. Is the 2030 force credible at in its land Marines with scant organic fire- pear to have a much lower tolerance for warfighting mission? power. This means the Navy must bring risk than their grandparents and great- 3. What are the opportunity costs? sustainment. But Wake Island in 1941 grandparents.”3 In a war, our national 4. Can the force so disconcert China showed the Navy might decide not to will is what China will test. that it is worth the opportunity costs? send a relief force. In sum, island hop- An article in the Wall Street Journal 5. Does 2030 force tie into a national ping in enemy waters is very high-risk. opined, “the generation born between policy sustainable for a generation? Separate from capability is the issue 1995 and 2012 is far more risk-averse of strategic credibility. Does the Chi- and more physically safe than its el- 1. Vital for Sea Control? nese fleet really intend to reprise World ders.”4 Does America as a society have Force 2030 assumes the Navy needs War II in the Pacific? Yes, two novels— the grit of “the greatest generation” Marines to prevent the Chinese fleet Ghost Fleet and 2034—have featured during World War II? Would we pull from sortieing across the Pacific. U.S. a Chinese fleet sailing 6,000 miles to together as a nation, or would our sharp admirals will gladly accept the offer of seize and to drop nuclear bombs cleavages result in the acceptance of the 2030 force. But sea control is not in on U.S. cities. But to do so in real-life, Chinese terms? mortal peril without Marine aid. Our those Chinese ships must refuel while naval aviators and attack submariners avoiding our lethal attack submarines 3. Opportunity Costs believe they are quite capable of sink- and carrier battle groups. Why would That existential challenge transcends ing those Chinese vessels. In addition, China throw away its fleet? our military. For the Marine Corps, thousands of missiles are lodged on In war, the center of gravity rests the narrower question is whether the board hundreds of U.S. Navy vessels. upon the determination of the oppos- benefits ofForce 2030 outweigh its op- Conversely, the mission is not needed ing peoples. China, under blockade and portunity costs. Over the past century, to insure the viability of the Marine without fuel, will be ground down—if America has fought six major wars and Corps. The public prizes Marines as American spirit refuses to quit. But the a dozen smaller conflicts. Naval plan- tough, disciplined warriors who without Chinese leadership will be confident ners foresaw the 1942–45 War in the exception have fought in any clime or that their society can endure priva- Pacific; all other wars and crises were not

Marine Corps Gazette • August 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 49 Ideas & Issues (Future Force Design)

anticipated. So, the odds are about five peninsula. In response, a thoroughly mine. Simply propose an exercise, to to one that the next conflict will not be alarmed Russian CNO pleaded with include landing rights, inside the South a naval conflict with China.Force 2030 the Politburo for a major increase in China Sea. If the White House approves may be a force in stasis, never employed. funding. Instead, Gorbachev became and through diplomacy secures land- Force 2030, however, did give up more convinced that could not ing rights, then Force 2030 will move tanks and many howitzers. Defense compete militarily against America, from a paper concept to an operational Secretary Jim Mattis and retired Gen thus hastening the end of the Soviet reality that will genuinely disconcert Robert Neller invested heavily to Union. China. If the answer is no, then we do modernize the essence of the Marine Similarly, Force 2030 should apply not have a firm policy to check Chinese Corps—the squad. Their shared as- such horizontal escalation, publicly ad- irredentism. In that case, the Marine sumption was that close-in combat vertising that its long-range missiles are Corps should not devote more resources remained the lodestone of the Marine not merely anti-ship; instead, they can that degrade the Marine ethos of being Corps. Under Force 2030, the squad also strike targets inside the Chinese ready for combat in any clime or place. will fight without tanks or continuous homeland. If Chinese warships hid in Put bluntly, our policy toward China close-in fire support. Marines employed port, Marine missiles would still go in is too erratic to sustain Force 2030 for tanks in Vietnam, in DESERT STORM, after them. No sanctuary would be giv- the next twenty and more years. Because and in the march to Baghdad. If the en. Force 2030 would then get ’s our national policy dares not risk even next conflict requires tanks or sustained full attention, resulting in much diplo- an amphibious exercise in the South fire support, Marines will have to task matic sputtering and a heavy Chinese China Sea during peacetime, it is highly organize with Army units, lining up in investment in defense. Thus, during unlikely our ships would operate there a queue alongside the National Guard. peacetime, explicit horizontal escalation during war. My novel, The Last Pla- Command relationships will be com- by Force 2030 would have an outsize toon, described the heroic futility of Ma- plex and time-consuming, enervating effect enhancing deterrence, just as the rines pursuing a wrong-headed policy the Marine core concept of maneuver Maritime Strategy had upon the Soviet in Afghanistan. Let us not repeat that warfare. Force 2030 runs the risk that Union. Viewed through this geopoliti- mistake. There is no policy that firmly the next conflict will require what has cal aperture, Force 2030 is a bargain for supports island-hopping in the South been discarded, meaning Marines will America’s security. China Sea. not be the first to fight. 5. Is Force 2030 Tied To a Firm Na- 4. Disconcerting China tional Policy? Notes Nonetheless, because China poses However, unlike in the case of the 1. Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030, the largest threat to American inter- Maritime Strategy, our national policy (Washington, DC: March 2020). ests, Force 2030 is a bargain if it deflects does not support Force 2030. For a quar- China from its incremental, irredentist ter of a century, presidents from both 2. Eric Larson, The Splendid and the Vile, (New aggression. The historical precedent parties have chosen not to take action York, NY: Crown, 2020). for this is the Maritime Strategy, circa as China built its littoral forts. U.S. 1978–88. Following the fall of South combatant ships occasionally venture 3. Niall Ferguson, “How a More Resilient America Beat a Midcentury Pandemic,” Wall Vietnam in 1975, the Pentagon shifted into the South China Sea to support Street Journal, (April 2021), available at https:// from to deterring international transit rights, but no ef- www.wsj.com. a Soviet blitzkrieg against NATO. fort has been made to quarantine or Funding and strategy concentrated on otherwise apply leverage to force China 4. Abigail Shrier, “To Be Young and Pessimis- an anti-armor defense along the inner- to deconstruct its forts. tic in America,” The Wall Street Journal, (May German border, with the Navy playing Instead, in a feat of policy jiu-jitsu, 2021), available at https://www.wsj.com. a small role and reduced funding. the administration has used the island- The Navy responded with a study hopping strategy to shrink the overall 5. Mark Cancian, “ Stormy Waters Ahead for called Sea Plan 2000 that advocated size of the amphibious force. The Ma- Amphibious Shipbuilding Plan,” Breaking De- horizontal escalation. While Soviet ar- rine Corps recommended constructing fense, (July 2021), available at https://breaking- mor was attacking south against West eight light amphibious ships to trans- defense.com. Germany, American carriers and subma- port small packets of Marines among rines would surge north, sinking Soviet the contested islands, rather than risk ships and submarines, including those sending in large amphibs. The admin- with nuclear missiles. After wargam- istration decided that light amphibs ing, this evolved into the “Maritime could substitute for the construction Strategy,” embraced by the CNO and of larger amphibs.5 The Marine Corps Secretary of the Navy. President Rea- was penalized for its strategic initiative. gan authorized carrier exercises in the Whether our policymakers place real Norwegian Sea, threatening the Kola value in Force 2030 is easy to deter-

50 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • August 2021