A Thesis Entitled Liberalism and the Impact on Religious Identity: Hijab

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A Thesis

entitled

Liberalism and the Impact on Religious Identity: Hijab Culture in the American Muslim

Context

Butheina Hamdah

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Master of Arts Degree in Political Science

______Dr. Renée J. Heberle, Committee Chair

______Dr. Samuel Nelson, Committee Member

______Dr. Ovamir G. Anjum, Committee Member

______Dr. Amanda Bryant-Friedrich, Dean College of Graduate Studies

The University of Toledo

December 2017

This document is copyrighted material. Under copyright law, no parts of this document may be reproduced without the expressed permission of the author. An Abstract of

Liberalism and the Impact on Religious Identity: Hijab Culture in the American Muslim Context

Butheina Hamdah

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Political Science

The University of Toledo December 2017

This paper examines the strategies by which the American Muslim community seeks to normalize its presence within mainstream American culture, and assesses how the social and moral customs of liberal society are internalized and operationalized by

American Muslims as orthopraxy, or correct practice and conduct. Recent trends by

American Muslims toward “inclusivity,” particularly as it requires the prioritization of non-religious, social and/or political understandings of the function and purpose of the hijab, will form the primary focus of this examination. What has become increasingly prevalent is the use of non-religious language pertaining to the hijab, particularly as a religious symbol functioning in and engaging with the public sphere. The central argument will demonstrate exactly how and why the hijab, a key religious symbol, and being a “hijabi,” (an identifier of women who wear the hijab) is being liberalized (and consequently secularized). This liberalization and secularization of the hijab result from the increasing appeal by American Muslim public figures to individualism, autonomy, and other liberal sensibilities over established theological edicts when making sense of why they cover and what it means to cover.

iii

To Riad, who re-ignited the spark in me.

iv Acknowledgements

My ability to complete this thesis would not have been possible without the boundless encouragement of my parents and siblings. My committee chair Dr. Renée

Heberle challenged me intellectually throughout the process, making every effort to think alongside me as objectively as possible and work with me to make my paper more robust.

Dr. Ovamir Anjum, from whom I learned a great deal, helped guide me in my interest in political theory and philosophy while maintaining my Islamic sensibilities. Our discussions, whether they occurred in meetings or in informal chats amongst friends in

Istanbul, significantly informed this paper. The chair of UT’s Department of Political

Science Dr. Samuel Nelson was always accessible for logistical questions and concerns and also provided advice early on in the process, helping me steer my work in the right direction. I thank my dear friends and colleagues Reem Subei and Aisha Sleiman, for their strong insights, and my sister Yasmeen Hamdah for her copy edits. Finally, I am grateful for my spouse Riad Alarian who emotionally and intellectually motivated me for months. An articulate writer himself, Riad lent his precise editing eye whenever I needed it, and countless “kitchen conversations” that prompted light-bulb moments. Each experience with you all led me to the finish line.

v Table of Contents

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements v

Table of Contents vi

Preface viii

I. Debates on Islam and Liberalism 1

A. On Autonomy 3

a. The Linkage Between Moral and Personal Autonomy 4

B. On Individualism 5

C. On Public Reason 8

D. How Liberal Values Pervade the Muslim Community 13

E. Further Critiques of Islam and Liberalism’s Compatibility 15

F. Views in Support of Islam and Liberalism’s Compatibility 18

II. “Liberalizing” the Hijab 21

A. Hijab in Islam 21

B. Contemporary Debates on Hijab 24

a. Introducing “Mipsterz” 27

C. The Hijabi Fashion Industry 33

a. Pushing Back Against These Trends 34

II. Rationale and Implications 39

G. The Legacy of the Veil and Colonialism 39

a. History of Western Liberal Feminism and the Veil 41

H. Hijab Post-9/11 42

vi a. American Muslim Women’s New Public Role 44

I. A Liberal Defense of Islam 45

J. Implications for the Muslim Identity 50

K. Conclusions/Limitations 53

References 57

vii Preface

American Muslims as orthopraxy, or correct practice and conduct. Recent trends by

American context.

Chapter 1 will make a case that philosophical liberalism, while not a religion, is still a belief system and has defining principles and moral customs that form its worldview. I will pay particular attention to the core tenets of autonomy, individualism, and public reason. I will outline the recent viewpoints concerning Islam and liberalism

viii today. My argument is that Muslims have been adopting and internalizing the tenets of liberalism (and these specific notions of autonomy, individualism, and public reason) even with respect to matters of their own faith (an unprecedented occurrence among

Muslims), when seeking inclusion in a pluralist America.

Chapter 2 will discuss current examples of the liberalization/secularization of the hijab in popular culture by contemporary hijabi activists/spokespersons. This will elucidate the transformation of the hijab into a political symbol that appeals to liberal tenets, such as autonomy and public reason, to frame the current debates.

Chapter 3 will attribute this trend to the current wave of activism that emerged in the aftermath of 9/11 and became magnified with the rise of Donald Trump. It will arrive at the implications, and what can be learned/relearned by the reframing of the hijab and appeal to the liberal perspective that has secularized this otherwise historically religious symbolic presentation of self among women in Islam.

ix Chapter 1

Debates on Islam and Liberalism

Perhaps the best preliminary assessment of liberalism in the American Muslim community is found in the works of Sherman Jackson. In “The Impact of Liberalism,

Secularism, & Atheism on the American Mosque,” (2016) Jackson argues that liberalism exists in numerous forms, but maintains three core principles which have influenced the sociopolitical arrangement of American society today. These three principles also form the basis through which current issues within the American Muslim community are essentially negotiated. They consist of: 1) autonomy, or the individual or collective self as the sole authoritative source of morality and socio-political organization,

2) commitment to the individual as the most fundamental unit (rather than family or community), and 3) public reason when negotiating conflict.

As pithy as Jackson’s assessment of liberalism is, it is merely prefatory and requires supplementation. For this, we must direct our attention to the father of classical liberalism, John Locke. The core principles that define the “spectrum of liberalism”

Jackson references date back to Locke’s ideas on reason, the individual, and natural and inalienable rights as contrasted to absolutism. In his Second Treatise on Civil

Government, Locke (1988) contends that people come to understand natural law through reason alone, and that natural law and divine law are not in contradiction to one another but are instead analogous formulations. Under natural law, people are free, equal, and independent of sovereign authority. Locke’s account of the state of nature is that condition in which people live according to the law of reason, rather than any political authority, as regards the rights and responsibilities individuals have toward one another.

1 He writes that men are in a “perfect state of freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions, and persons as they see fit . . . without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man” (p. 269).

Locke (2011) introduces in his moral philosophy the role of human rationalism and reason as determining a person’s moral duty. Humans arrive at knowledge through the utilization of their faculties rather than by innate knowledge. Locke puts forth a rational, empiricist philosophy in arguing that people come to know truths and information through experience. Central to Locke’s principles on moral knowledge is that no moral knowledge is innate, for if it were, then everyone would naturally assent to it.

This includes the knowledge of God, as knowledge of and belief in God is not universal

(Locke & Nidditch, 2011).

Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” (2010) delineates the boundary between matters of religion and matters of civil government, and introduces the concept of a secular government. In the realm of the civil society lie the interests of life, liberty, health, and other matters such as money, land, houses, and the like. Church is a voluntary element of society and an individual ought not to be forced into the church or into matters of faith. Rather, he or she must come to matters of faith through internal belief, not external compulsion. (Locke & Nidditch, 2011) It becomes clear through Locke’s writings that liberalism is in fact a “secularizing doctrine” with profound implications for the public sphere and its orientation. We may credit Locke as well as his philosophical successors for elaborating on liberalism’s features of autonomy, individualism, and public reason. I will now elaborate on these features.

2 On Autonomy

One of the foremost tenets of liberalism, on which Jackson remarks, is autonomy.

Jackson (2016) refers to Immanuel Kant’s notion of moral autonomy, and his rejection of heteronomy (being influenced by a force external to the individual will). In “What is

Enlightenment,” Kant (1996) describes enlightenment as the “human being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority,” and he defines minority (interchangeable with

“immaturity” in this case) as the “inability to make use of one’s own understanding without direction from the other” (p. 17). He writes, “For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the least harmful of anything that could even be called freedom: namely, freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters”

(Kant, 1996, p. 18). In Kant’s view, individuals must always be ready to question authority, especially in matters of religion.

In Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant (1996) sets out the “supreme principle of morality” (p. 47). Dissenting from Locke, he argues that individuals arrive at morality through what they know a priori, or independent of any empirical knowledge or knowledge gained through experience. At the core of Kantian morality is the connection between ethics and the autonomy of the will—with the will functioning as both the source and subject of moral law. “The will of every rational being as a will giving universal law” (Kant, 1996, p. 81) forms the basis for moral obligation. Every rational being should be viewed as an end in and of itself, and the community of rational beings is what Kant refers to as the “kingdom of ends” (p. 83).

Kant writes:

A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when he gives

3 universal laws in it but is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as

sovereign, when, as lawgiving, he is not subject to the will of any other. (p. 83)

The linkage between moral and personal autonomy. At this juncture, it is important to consider whether liberalism in its current iteration remains true to Kant’s moral autonomy of the will as distinguished from personal autonomy. Personal autonomy is often what is invoked in political debates today; it emphasizes personal choice/self- determination and can be independent of any moral quality, unlike Kantian moral autonomy. In my approach I maintain less of a distinction between moral and personal autonomy and argue that they are interlinked, especially in discourse around the hijab.

One could argue that the “modern liberal ethic” relies more on personal autonomy (in the form of personal choice) than moral autonomy. However, in “The Place of Autonomy

Within Liberalism”, Gerald Gaus (2005) argues that liberal morality assumes a Kantian conception of moral autonomy, especially considering the fundamental liberal principle, which is that first, one does not have to justify his or her actions, and second, interference with another’s action requires justification. Simply, if interference cannot be justified, it is morally wrong. Gaus makes the case that this principle is inextricably linked with both morally autonomous agents as well as personally autonomous, or self-directed, ones.

When dealing with morality and the law, the interference must be justified to everyone

(drawing on the Kantian categorical imperative as well as public reason). Gaus maintains that liberalism is committed to autonomy as a morality as well as autonomy of the will, and that “the very commitment of liberalism to moral autonomy itself leads to a public commitment to minimal personal autonomy as a capacity the exercise of which is necessary to a moral order based on a fundamental liberal principle” (p. 300). In the

4 context of the veil, this relationship also surfaces through Muslim women asserting their personal autonomy in wearing the hijab. I will demonstrate in the following chapter how this assertion also implies a degree of moral autonomy, especially in the Islamic context.

On Individualism

John Stuart Mill is often credited with expanding upon the idea of individualism within the doctrine of liberalism. In On Liberty, Mill (2002) champions the right of the individual against not merely tyrannical government, but also against oppressive popular opinion, or the “tyranny of the majority” (p. 6).

According to Mill there is a “limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence” (p. 7). The only justification for the interference with the liberty of any individual is when an action causes harm to others (this informs the fundamental liberal principle to which Gaus refers). Mill follows, “In the part which merely concerns himself is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (p. 12). Human liberty is, therefore, all-encompassing. It applies to internal consciousness, freedom of thought and opinion “on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological” (p. 14), and in personal ambition as well.

Mill defends the development of individual spontaneity as an inherently valuable and critical endeavor for human freedom.

He writes:

What little recognition the idea of obligation to the public obtains in modern

morality, is derived from Greek and Roman sources, not from Christian, as,

even in the morality of private life, whatever exists of magnanimity, high-

5 mindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honor, is derived from the purely

human, not the religious part of our education, and never could have grown out of

a standard of ethics in which the only worth, professly recognized, is that of

obedience. (p. 51)

Not only does Mill treat the cultivation of individuality and self-fulfillment as concomitant, but also as essential to arriving at the moral good.

He captures this as follows:

Having said that Individuality is the same thing with development, and that it is

only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-

developed human beings, I might here close the argument: for what more or better

can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human beings

themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? Or what worse can be said of any

obstruction to good, than that it prevents this? (p. 65-66)

On the other hand, communitarian voices (those who adhere to a philosophy that accentuates the individual’s relationship to the collective community) such as Charles

Taylor question the trajectory of such liberal individualism toward what constitutes the good. Taylor (1991) writes of three themes in the Malaise of Modernity, the first of which is liberal individualism, notably the individualism based in self-fulfillment (p. 28).

Through this individualism, people are unbounded by restrictions by any greater hierarchy or order of that which transcends them. What particularly drives the modern moral dilemma of individualism is what Taylor describes as “the moral force of the desire of authenticity” (p. 32). What has emerged is a moral relativism in which everyone’s individual values and opinions are respected and are not to be challenged. I argue that this

6 has led to a “drowning out” of any religious voices for fear of said voices becoming too dogmatic, and this becomes the case in intra-Muslim debates as well. It is precisely this liberal individualism that I later demonstrate has been employed by Muslim women when defending their choice to dress in a particular way.

Taylor’s argument on the consequences of this individualism of self-authenticity is critical:

That the espousal of authenticity takes the form of a kind of soft relativism means

that the vigorous defence of any moral ideal is somehow off limits. For the

implications, as I have just described them above, are that some forms of life are

indeed higher than others, and the culture of tolerance for individual self-

fulfillment shies away from these claims. This means, as has often been pointed

out, that there is something contradictory and self-defeating in their position,

since the relativism itself is powered (at least partly) by a moral ideal. But

consistently or not, this is the position usually adopted. The ideal sinks to the level

of an axiom, something one doesn’t challenge but also never expounds. (p. 33)

Ultimately, this “culture of authenticity” feeds into what Taylor refers to as a

“liberalism of neutrality” that is “neutral on questions of what constitutes the good life”

(p. 33). In other words, moral questions become off-limits for public debate, and become subjective to the experience of the individual. Taylor explains this newfound culture of authenticity has roots in classical liberal philosophy, building on Locke’s individualism as well as Jean Jacques Rousseau’s articulation of morality coming from oneself as a

“self-determining freedom” (p. 47). Taylor’s insights regarding the individualism of self- fulfillment and its relationship to morality inform discussions of how Muslims absorb or

7 uncritically take up liberal positions such as ones advocating for individualism or “self- expression.” In the following chapter, I examine a particular example (that of Noor

Tagouri) of advocating for “authentic self-expression” as an emerging social articulation of Islamic identity.

On Public Reason

The last key underlying element within philosophical liberalism is found in John

Rawls’s construction of public reason. Public reason addresses a question endemic to the modern pluralist society: how to reconcile conflicting moral, ethical, and philosophical doctrines. Rawls’s work marks a departure from utilitarianism (greatest good for the greatest number) as the basis for social justice and ushers in the current prevailing individual rights-based liberalism. Rawls’s liberalism champions public reason as a measure by which most can accept moral or political principles in a pluralist society of diverging notions of the good.

Rawls’s rights-based liberalism is detached from any conception of the good. In

Political Liberalism (1996), Rawls prescribes a political conception of justice that most comprehensive doctrines—whether religious or unreligious, liberal or illiberal—can freely and actively endorse virtues by which they can abide. He refers to this aspiration as an “overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (p. 134).

Political power is justified “only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason” (Rawls, 1996, p. 137).

8 Rawls writes:

The values of public reason not only include the appropriate use of the

fundamental concepts of judgment, inference, and evidence, but also the virtues of

reasonableness and fair-mindedness as shown as abiding by the criteria and

procedures of commonsense knowledge and accepting the methods and

conclusions of science when not controversial. (p. 139)

Public reason is premised on individuals being “free” and “equal” and not answerable to the political or moral authority of others (especially in the case of religion).

According to Rawls (2001), public reason is the ultimate authority and the common denominator among individuals, and a liberal constitutional democracy relies on citizens being able to make political arguments based on public reason rather than their respective religious or secular doctrines.

On the implications of adopting Rawlsian public reason, Taylor (2008) asks:

What are we to think of the idea, entertained by Rawls for a time, that one can

legitimately ask of a religiously and philosophically diverse democracy that

everyone deliberate in a language of reason alone, leaving their religious views in

the vestibule of the public sphere? . . . Rawls’ point in suggesting this restriction

was that everyone should use a language with which they could reasonably expect

their fellow citizens to agree. The idea seems to be something like this. Secular

reason is a language that everyone speaks, and can argue and be convinced in.

Religious languages operate outside of this discourse, by introducing extraneous

premises which only believers can accept. (para. 2)

What underpins this notion is something like an epistemic distinction. There is

9 secular reason, which everyone can use and reach conclusions by—conclusions

that is, with which everyone can agree. Then there are special languages, which

introduce extra assumptions, which might even contradict those of ordinary

secular reason. These are much more epistemically fragile; in fact, you won’t be

convinced by them unless you already hold them. So religious reason either

comes to the same conclusions as secular reason, but then it is superfluous; or it

comes to contrary conclusions, and then it is dangerous and disruptive. This is

why it needs to be sidelined. (para. 3)

In other words, religious discourse and discourse based on reason alone are distinct, with the former being unreliable and approached with skepticism, while the latter utilized to resolve moral and political issues by offering terms on which all can agree.

What has become increasingly prevalent is the use of non-religious language pertaining to matters in the public sphere, or those that engage within the public sphere, such as religious symbols. It is this non-religious, liberal, justification (both principled and linguistic) that I will identify and critique in the following chapter.

Liberalism—as the dominant “modern doctrine”—has been, and continues to be, expressed in various, perhaps mutually exclusive ways. One of the central debates about the nature of liberalism concerns whether it is to be understood as a comprehensive belief system that appeals to deeper philosophical, religious, or other moral beliefs and sensibilities (present in the works of John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Immanuel Kant), or strictly a political ideology and a means by which to organize political life (as defended by John Rawls). For the purposes of this paper, I take Jackson’s position and acknowledge that in its consequences, liberalism permeates through “nonpolitical” realms

10 and impacts the beliefs and articulations of various social groups and communities, including religious groups. Muslims are no exception to this.

So why is appreciation for liberalism as a set of principles and ideas so important for Muslims today? Jackson (2015) argues, that “it is almost certainly a combination of the European past, the decadent, authoritarian Muslim present and the specter of the

American Christian Right that continues to sustain the power and relevance of liberalism today” (para. 2).

Jackson (2016), nevertheless, qualifies liberalism’s scope:

We should note, however, that, especially in its most popular form, liberalism

only aspires to be a political theory, not an overall philosophy of life. In other

words, its primary aim is to regulate relations between individuals and the state

and between individuals and each other in the political sphere. In theory,

therefore, liberal commitments need not govern life outside the political realm,

e.g., in the family, civic organization or religious groups. In reality, however,

liberal society calibrates its basic institutions (e.g., education, government, law,

entertainment) to instill, police and reinforce liberal values and sensibilities. (p. 4)

Despite Jackson's qualification and that he stops short of classifying liberalism as a comprehensive belief system (in that it was never meant to be a way of life), he nevertheless acknowledges the impact of liberalism to be comparable to that of other more comprehensive philosophies both within and beyond the political sphere. This evaluation of liberalism can be juxtaposed to that of Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, who is most renowned for arguing that, with regard to building a conception of morality and ethics, the European Enlightenment was a failure. MacIntyre critiques liberalism and

11 relativism in his book Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) He says that both liberalism and relativism claim neutrality but are in fact espousing a claim to absolute truth. To MacIntyre, clearly, liberalism is an ideology and a tradition, ironically, since it emerged as a reaction to traditional religious establishment.

Sherman Jackson does not entirely reject liberalism, conceding that it has certainly made positive contributions in that its “ideals of freedom, equality, tolerance and rationality have helped lubricate the gears through which modern society has transitioned out of much of the bigotry, insensitivity, insularity, hierarchical blindness and stale categories of the pre-modern world” (Jackson, 2015). Yet, he introduces serious challenges to the liberal conception:

And yet, liberalism remains susceptible to the same idolatry (though it would not

likely call it that) that it decries in religion: the tendency to absolutize and totalize

values, principles and points of view to the extent that liberals often end up

disguising (and thus perpetuating) the very subjugation and domination they claim

to want to eradicate. This is eminently reflected in the most popular form of

political liberalism, which basically requires that individuals vindicate themselves

in public debate by reference to “liberal reason.” (Jackson, 2015)

Jackson disputes the “neutrality” of public reason that the public space supposedly adopts, on the grounds that individuals cannot simply cast aside their respective historical, social, cultural, economic, religious, and other backgrounds which inevitably influence their reasoning. Public reason also neglects interests of power

(favoring the dominant culture) while purportedly claiming universality. One of the most critical challenges Jackson raises is the following: “If tolerance (especially liberal

12 tolerance) can also anesthetize me out of a recognition of my individual or collective distinctness, might not tolerance end up serving the one who “tolerates” me more than it actually serves me” (Jackson, 2015)?

This will be revisited with regard to how American Muslims’ strategies of inclusion, which often use the point of departure of “liberal tolerance,” actually serves the interests of those who champion the dominant liberal values.

How Liberal Values Pervade the Muslim Community

This paper will later highlight Jackson’s three stated principles of liberalism as relevant to the socialization of American Muslims, namely, how they come to answer moral and ethical questions governing their lives through a decidedly “non-Islamic” framework. Although I will later focus on the hijab as a key example of this, it can nonetheless be said that liberalism has penetrated Muslim life and opinion to a larger extent beyond what is most readily apparent and immediately recognizable. For now, it is necessary to briefly concretize what the impact of liberalism (and its three core features) on the Muslim community looks like. Jackson (2016) offers the example of the American mosque to demonstrate how the tenets of liberalism significantly impact the American

Muslim community and its institutions. Liberalism first leads to a “cloud of suspicion over the mosque as an institution intimately connected to the heteronomous authority of religion” (p. 4). In turn, individuals who attend the mosque may consider basic rules or restrictions to be oppressive (such as sensible restrictions on attire or activity that may compromise the purpose of the mosque). These individuals consequently seek a greater sense of autonomy in approaching religious rituals, advocating for an approach to religious practice revolving around the self rather than in relation to authority.

13 These effects certainly extend beyond the mosque, reaching overarching concerns of religious knowledge and authority.

Jackson (2016) illustrates:

Finally, to the extent that “public reason” becomes the basis upon which Muslims

expect to negotiate differences, the concrete and specific dictates of the Qur’ān,

Sunnah and recognized tradition will likely strike them as oppressive or as

unfairly tipping the balance in favor of those who can claim greater knowledge of

the religion. Rather than the Qur’ān, Sunnah or this or that madhhab [Islamic

legal school of thought, of which there are four in Sunni Islam and two in Shi’a

Islam], these Muslims will prefer to negotiate on the basis of such ‘neutral’

concepts as “equality,” “freedom” or whatever seems most effective in

reconciling Islam with the dominant culture. Given the broader society’s greater

purchase on these principles, such lines of argument run the risk of subordinating

Muslims to the dominant society’s view of what constitutes a “reasonable”

argument or a “good” or a “bad” Muslim. (p. 5)

Ultimately, Jackson advocates for American Muslims to view liberalism with a critical eye, noting that there are reconcilable elements within liberalism and

Islam, and that Islam itself “overlaps” with certain liberal tenets, such as the tolerance and accommodation of other groups who espouse different beliefs, values, and lifestyles.

Concurrently, Muslims must also hold conviction and defend their values and not fear dissenting from prevailing liberal societal norms. Muslims have as much of a right to defend their religious doctrine as Christians, Jews, and atheists, among others (Jackson,

2015).

14 Further Critiques of Islam and Liberalism’s Compatibility

Wael Hallaq in The Impossible State (2012) goes further than Jackson does in referring to modernity and its elements, which encompasses the ideas of the

Enlightenment (which laid the groundwork for a multitude of views within liberalism) as a paradigm. Hallaq argues that there are incompatibilities between the defining principles of the modern nation-state and those of the Shari’a (religious law within the Islamic tradition), and attributes much of this to what he calls “modernity’s moral predicament.”

According to Hallaq (2012), the post-Enlightenment modern paradigm entails the separation between the legal and moral, or the Is and the Ought. Hallaq draws on

Kantian philosophy which he believes remains prominent in the modern worldview, despite challenges posed to it.

Representing a cornerstone of the Enlightenment project and expressed

powerfully by the Kantian notion of autonomy, freedom ceases to denote God’s

omnipotence and the capacity of absolute choice and becomes instead an

expression of man’s own natural powers of reasoning…Formerly restricted by the

powers of revelation, reason now becomes free, expanding to overtake the

authority of all scriptural competitors. (Hallaq, 2012, p. 80)

He adds:

But this unprecedented paradigmatic distinction created another significant effect,

namely, the isolation of reason from reasons, reason being a tool of thinking about

the world and reasons representing the substantive “causes” that generate thought

through reason. Whereas before the Enlightenment reason and reasons worked

indistinctly together, after the Enlightenment reason, as distinct from reasons, was

15 elevated to an autonomous status and was expected to generate reasons on its

own. Hence modern moral philosophy’s unwavering insistence that morality must

be justified by autonomous and self-legislative reason, the backbone of the

Kantian conception that rules over the modern moral paradigm. (p. 163)

There exists no such distinction within Islam and the Shari’a. Hallaq emphasizes that there can be no Muslim identity without its “historically grounded paradigmatic moral-legal ethic that defined its identity” (p. 70), with the Shari’a as its source. The

Shari’a is the path to God, the sole sovereign authority. It is of a rich moral tradition and comprehensive, reaching both the individual and community with its moral imperative across all facets of society—whether political, legal, or cultural.

According to Hallaq, liberalism as a doctrine is a product of modernity, and it necessitates a secular framework in order for its principles to thrive. Liberalism is an increasingly secularizing doctrine, and secularism in turn reinforces liberal principles, as

Talal Asad conveys. In Formations of the Secular (2003), Asad shows that the public space has been pre-populated by powers that only invite public expressions of religion as they align with liberal thought. Therefore, only a certain manifestation of religion—one which “bends to modernity’s will”—can enter and engage in rational debate within the public sphere. The experience of religion in private life constitutes an essential discursive background with which individuals eventually enter the public space, and as a result, disrupt existing assumptions in the public space in order to be heard. This is the concern secularists have with religion “invading” their domain because religion is assumed to be authoritative and restrictive (Asad, 2003, 185-186).

16 Joseph Massad’s Islam in Liberalism (2015) tackles interests of power as well, and the depiction of Islam and Muslims through liberalism and colonialism. Massad, along with Hallaq and Jackson, are among those who present critiques of liberalism in its relation to the Shari’a and Islamic worldview. Massad critiques Western assumptions about Islam and liberalism, and how America and Europe attempt to “convert” Muslims to the only legitimate and universal system of values and ideals that comprise liberalism.

He argues that liberalism defines itself in contrast to Islam, citing numerous examples in which Islam is portrayed as despotic, illiberal, antidemocratic, intolerant, misogynist, and homophobic. In actuality, this is a projection of the insecurities the West has when it comes to exhibiting these same characteristics itself, and so that it can present itself as liberal and progressive in juxtaposition. Indeed, it succeeds in “Otherizing” Islam with an aim to repress it with imperialistic motivations.

In his book’s opening chapters, Massad recalls a quote from Talal Asad’s

Geneologies of Religion (1993), in which Asad suggests that Western imperialism,

continues to restructure the lives of non-European peoples, often through the

agency of non-Europeans themselves. And if ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is a

response to that power, then certainly so, even more thoroughly, are the

intellectual currents called ‘modernist Islam’ (which is concerned to adapt

theology to the models of Christian modernism) and ‘Muslim secularism’ (which

is preoccupied less with theology than with separating religion from politics in

national life). And so, too, are the progressivist movements in literature and the

arts, in politics and law, that have arisen in Muslim societies. (p. 229)

17 Views in Support of Islam and Liberalism’s Compatibility

There are, however, a number of academics who have ascribed to the liberal secular framework in the name of protecting freedom of religion (including Islam) and American pluralism. Abdullahi An-Naim in his Islam and the Secular State (2008) advocates for Muslims to embrace a secular state with regard to the public role of the

Shari’a in order to provide cohesion between Islam, the state, and society. He insists that the secular state enables the authentic observance of Islamic religious principles and regulates the role of Islam in the public life of the community in that it would not attempt to impose the Shari’a. An-Naim distinguishes between the state, on one hand, and political principles that he argues citizens can support from their respective religions or philosophies, on the other— principles such as popular sovereignty and democratic governance. He also differentiates between a secular state and secularization as a society, in that the separation of Islam and the state does not mean there should be a total relegation of Islam to the private life. Rather, introducing policy and legislation as motivated by religious principles and values can happen, but only as they agree with what he calls “civic reason” (which he compares and contrasts with Rawlsian public reason).

His proposed framework is a model that integrates constitutionalism, human rights, and citizenship in order to protect the equal status and well-being of all people. In essence,

An-Naim summarizes a position that stands to contradict those of Hallaq and Massad: that secularism and a liberal democratic order is conducive to the Islamic ethos and necessary for free practice of Islam in a modern pluralist setting. In fact, An-Naim believes secularism often necessitates religion in order to provide moral guidance on questions it cannot resolve, and communities need to express moral implications of their

18 faith in the public domain.

In Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus

(2009), Andrew March cites Rawls’s overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines and reflective equilibrium, which Rawls (1999) describes as a method by which one calibrates their preexisting moral presuppositions to ensure they are not in conflict with other moral beliefs (as an underlying principle of justice). March refers to these principles within Rawls’s theory of justice as a framework for reconciling adherence to Islam as a traditional comprehensive doctrine with the obligations of living in a liberal non-Muslim society. He examines the numerous demands that a politically liberal state might make on

Muslims, relative to Islamic doctrine and the approaches of various Islamic scholars and jurists.

March’s analysis as presented is rather nuanced to delve into the full stipulations and solutions offered in his book; therefore, a summary may not do much justice to his argument when presented in this overview. What is most important to note is his viewpoint in which he justifies how the overlap can be found both within philosophical liberal theory as well as in Islamic legal theory. A challenge March encounters is how

Muslims may approach engaging with the liberal state and its social realities. March maintains that the requirements of the liberal state remain minimal such that they not demand of Muslims to forgo their religious values or that they adopt other liberal values beyond simply respecting fellow citizens, no matter their background.

March and An-Na’im are among academics who hold a more forgiving view on the relationship between Islam and the liberal secular state. This body of literature, however, has still been rather scarce especially as the question of liberal theory and Islam

19 is a contemporary one. This paper aspires to contribute to this ongoing analysis of the impact of liberalism on Islam and the Muslim identity, especially in the context of

American Muslim women and the ever-evolving interpretation of the veil, or hijab.

Having identified the core principles of philosophical liberalism (and their origins) as well as an overview of the debate on the compatibility of Islam and liberalism,

I will proceed to draw on some of the most prominent examples of hijab within contemporary popular culture. These examples offer evidence as to my thesis that justifications and rationales for wearing hijab employ language speaking to the liberal ideals of autonomy, individualism, and public reason. This ultimately undercuts the self- awareness of Muslim women centering the religious significance of the hijab. It diminishes the ties that otherwise bind Muslim women who choose to wear hijab to a more religiously centered consciousness and basis, and in turn carries broader implications for their identities. I later maintain this is a symptom of a wider phenomenon of the “liberalization” of the American Muslim identity in the public sphere.

20 Chapter 2

“Liberalizing” the Hijab

This chapter begins with an overview of the religious basis of the hijab as first and foremost a Muslim act of worship and embodiment of modesty, to contrast it with the contemporary unorthodox interpretations and appropriations of the veil in politicized and liberalized ways. I maintain that the social lens in which the veil is being interpreted and rationalized among American Muslims today is otherwise historically unprecedented, that this is a new occurrence. I move now to offer an overview of the religious basis for the hijab in order to contrast it with the contemporary re-visioning of the hijab. My discussion of this distinction will also show that the way popular Muslim female activists interpret the veil is a new development in the modern liberal context.

The Hijab in Islam

The Islamic veil is most commonly referred to as the hijab. Hijab is an Arabic word, meaning partition or barrier, as found in the Qur’an. However, the colloquial meaning is the act of covering as a form of worship and an act of modesty prescribed to

Muslim women in Islam. Multiple names may be ascribed to the head covering. This includes the veil or headscarf, and other variants defined by the shape of the fabric and which parts of the body it covers, such as the khimar, which is a single garment that covers the head, neck, and shoulders. However, I refer to it as the hijab, and the discourse surrounding it will be examined first and foremost as a public physical marker of Muslim identity rooted in these textual mandates, and not focused particularly on its various interpretations.

21 There are two Qur’anic verses cited most frequently as a textual basis for the commandment of covering:

And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their

modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what

(must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their

bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their

husband's fathers, their sons, their husbands' sons, their brothers or their brothers'

sons, or their sisters' sons, or their women, or the slaves whom their right hands

possess, or male servants free of physical needs, or small children who have no

sense of the shame of sex; and that they should not strike their feet in order to

draw attention to their hidden ornaments. And O ye Believers! turn ye all together

towards Allah, that ye may attain Bliss. (Qur’an 24:31, Yusuf Ali)

And those who annoy believing men and women undeservedly, bear (on

themselves) a calumny and a glaring sin. O Prophet! Tell thy wives and

daughters, and the believing women, that they should cast their outer garments

over their persons (when abroad): that is most convenient, that they should be

known (as such) and not molested. And Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.

(Qur’an 33:58–59, Yusuf Ali)

These two verses do not employ the term hijab specifically in reference to women covering, but rather the word khumur, the plural form of khimar, which refers to the head covering that drapes down to the back. It is important to note the context in which

Muslims believe this verse was revealed. Veiling preceded Islam, as a practice that already existed in the beginning of the 7th century around the Mediterranean Basin, and

22 was also customary among women of other faiths like Christianity and Judaism, despite veiling mostly being attributed to Islam (Amer 2014). Women during that time in history were already covering their hair, but left their ears, neck, and chest exposed, so the aforementioned Qur’anic verse is specifically calling on them to pull these garments over their chests (Mulla 2012).

Over time, Muslims have come to adopt the term hijab when referring generally to the covering of one’s head (still distinct from the niqab or burqa which both cover the face), but in the Qur’an the term hijab is used seven times in instances not related specifically to women and their clothing. Rather, it is used to denote a barrier or separation in the metaphysical sense or otherwise as a physical, spatial separation honoring the privacy of the wives of the Prophet Muhammad (Amer, 2014, p. 23-24).

There are also a number of ahadith, or traditional recorded accounts of sayings or practices by the Prophet Muhammad, which supplement the Qur’an with regard to a woman covering.

One notable hadith further clarifying this is contained in one of the six canonical collections of ahadith (titled Sunan Abi Dawud):

Asma, daughter of AbuBakr, entered upon the Messenger of Allah (Peace Be

Upon Him) wearing thin clothes. The Messenger of Allah (Peace Be Upon Him)

turned his attention from her. He said: O Asma', when a woman reaches the age of

menstruation, it does not suit her that she displays her parts of body except this

and this, and he pointed to his face and hands. (Hadith Sunan Abi Dawud 4104)

Citing these Qur’anic verses and hadith, the consensus of traditional Muslim scholars on the hijab is that it is fard, or an obligatory duty, when in the presence of

23 marriageable, or non-mahram men (Mulla 2012). What does differ within these opinions, however, may be the level of conservatism when covering, i.e. whether or not a woman is also required to cover her face.

Briefly, it is important to concede that there is a minority view for which to account that does not consider the hijab as required, but it is important to note that this opinion has been typically issued with contingency to certain sociopolitical realities. One most closely related fatwa, or Islamic legal ruling, that has been issued with regard to the current situation of the Muslim community in the United States is that of Khaled Abou El

Fadl. In his fatwa, Abou El Fadl claims that in the case of American Muslims, given the spike in anti-Muslim sentiment surrounding the election cycle and hate crimes against visible Muslims, hijab is going against its original operative cause (preventing harm and avoiding undue attention) and therefore it is not fard. In other words, Islamophobia and recent hostility to Muslims abrogate the necessity of wearing the hijab (Abou El Fadl,

2016).

In this chapter, the intention is not to delve into the specific scholarly analyses of the texts, but simply to provide the cited justification and context for covering which served as the religious impetus for veiling among Muslim women. Even considering this minority opinion—which is still an opinion within the parameters of Islamic orthodoxy— this paper argues that current interpretations of the veil are not even drawing on that, but rather taking liberalism as orthopraxy.

Contemporary Debates on Hijab

In recent years, several social controversies broke out within the American

Muslim community concerning well-known hijabi (a nickname coined for Muslim

24 women who wear a hijab/cover their hair) activists. The first, which garnered widespread attention, was an interview and profile of then 22-year-old Noor Tagouri, currently a journalist at Newsy, activist, and public speaker, published in Playboy Magazine in 2016.

The purpose behind the Playboy interview is to profile Tagouri among their

“Renegades,” as a “risk-taker and rule-breaker.” The piece, titled, “Media Wunderkind

Noor Tagouri Makes a Forceful Case for Modesty,” describes Tagouri:

As a badass activist with a passion for demanding change and asking the right

questions, accompanied by beauty-ad campaign looks, Tagouri forces us to ask

ourselves why we have such a hard time wrapping our minds around a young

woman who consciously covers her head and won’t take no for an answer. (Del

Gaizo, 2016)

Most of the vocal Muslims consider Tagouri’s appearance and interview to have

“gone too far,” given what Playboy as an outlet represents (sexualized voyeurism). Given

Tagouri’s role as public representative of the Muslim community who aspires to motivate other Muslim women to “reclaim” their narratives and power especially within the media, many considered Tagouri’s posing and interviewing for the magazine as a disappointment and contradiction of Islamic principles of modesty (Ismail, 2016; Uddin

& Younis, 2016). On her website, Tagouri still cites the interview as one of her greatest successes, and elsewhere defends her appearance as authentic self-expression on her part—a celebration of her individuality, breaking norms and barriers, and an opportunity to tell her story as a Muslim woman wearing the hijab.

Tagouri vocally defends her appearance in Playboy in another interview during which one viewer raises the question of whether posing for Playboy contradicts modesty.

25 In defense, Tagouri explains that modesty goes beyond simply clothing but is reflected in one’s character as well. Tagouri then shifts the conversation from the hijab being perceived as a representation of modesty, back to the necessity of presenting her personal narrative (Noor Tagouri Explains Why She Chose To Wear A Hijab In Playboy, 2016).

Asma Uddin and Inas Younis, two Muslim women, author one of the most prominent pieces emerging from the American Muslim community in response to the

Playboy controversy in the Washington Post.

Uddin and Younis (2016) write:

But the Playboy interview is a step too far. It represents Muslim women, as

purportedly represented by Tagouri, not on their own terms but in Playboy’s

terms—and, in the process, mocks the very ethics and morals the hijab is

religiously intended to reflect. (para. 7)

The hijab, though politicized in a variety of contexts, is at its religious core a

symbol of chastity and spiritual connection to God. As one prominent Islamic

scholar has explained, the hijab is “essentially a mode of living” that reflects the

sanctity of privacy and private spaces. In other words, it is a repudiation of the

voyeurism Playboy is fundamentally about. (para. 8)

CNN raises this point by Uddin and Younis when they interview Tagouri following the controversy. Tagouri responds, “The thing with that statement is that it makes it seem like everybody’s connection to God should be the same. Everyone has their own interpretation and practice of the religion, of how they wear the hijab, of what it means to them” (Tagouri, 2016). In response to the point about using Playboy as a platform, she states, “I constantly am talking about the objectification of women,

26 combating the sexualization of women in media today, but me being absolutely myself, wearing what I want, being authentically myself, on the front lines of a publication that’s known to objectify women, that’s breaking that barrier” (Tagouri, 2016).

The manner in which Tagouri’s interview is justified and the language she adopts signifies a shift of the hijab and what it means to wear the hijab from a mere symbol of modesty and devotion to God (as traditionally interpreted in normative Islam) to one of defiance of authority, of self-expression, of individual authenticity. Such a stance signals back to Charles Taylor’s insights on the individualism of self-fulfillment as mentioned in

Chapter 1, especially when Tagouri emphasizes individual paths to religion. This assumes a neutrality of sorts with regard to a “correct” adherence to the faith and its rituals, and it becomes unfitting to challenge one another on what is “proper hijab.”

Introducing “Mipsterz.” Tagouri’s Playboy feature is not the first time she is caught in an intra-community media controversy. In fact, several years prior, Tagouri, among other hijabi Muslim women, received criticism for appearing in a music video which uses rapper Jay-Z’s song “Somewhere in America” and features a diversity of

Muslim women (all of them in hijab) in New York City and Los Angeles, engaged in a variety of activities from skateboarding in heels, posing on the streets, and taking “selfie” photos. It also shows American Olympic fencer Ibtihaj Muhammad fencing while donning an American flag hijab. This video introduced the name “Muslim hipsters,” or

“Mipsterz” for short (Assefa, 2015). “Mipsterz” are considered a cultural movement of young Muslim “millennials” that originated in 2012. When the video was released in

2013, it too received mixed reviews, with some praising it, and others claiming the video fell into the same objectification of women (this time, hijabi women). Others also assert

27 that the video demonstrates that Muslims are too focused on appearing to be “normal” and enjoying activities any young American would enjoy, and in doing so they are assimilating and denying what distinguishes them as Muslims. Hijab is present in the video, but within a different context.

Sana Saeed, a journalist, pens a powerful response to the “Mipsterz” video in The

Islamic Monthly:

In the name of fighting stereotypes it seems we’re keen to adopt – especially for

Muslim women who wear headscarves – tools and images that objectify us (either

as sexualized or desexualized; as depoliticized or politicized) rather than support

us where we need that support. We’re so incredibly obsessed with appearing

“normal” or “American” or “Western” by way of what we do and what we wear

that we undercut the actual abnormality of our communities and push essentialist

definitions of “normal”, “American” and “Western.” In that process of searching

for the space of normalcy, we create ‘normal’ and through that a ‘good’

Muslim. And in all of this, we might just lose that which makes us unique: our

substance. (Saeed, 2013)

Tagouri’s Playboy interview as well as the “Mipsterz” video raise questions of blurred boundaries between the strategies of inclusion American Muslims practice and the actual effects of liberalism that often occur at the expense of what sets these Muslim women apart in the first place. What results is the use of language championing liberal understandings of individualism and autonomy of each Muslim hijabi in order to align with “American values” (a “normalizing” of the hijab) while compromising the traditional meanings behind religious symbols.

28 What also occurs in Tagouri’s example (although not exclusive to her case) is the use of public reason as a method of negotiation. Tagouri’s response to the question raised regarding the religious justification of the hijab (as one of modesty), and its supposed contradiction with the platform she seeks, is an espousal of public reason which assumes there are literally boundless differences in religious practice and values. In this case, the appeal to public reason is an indication of an awkward, and indeed baseless, “intra- perennialist” approach toward textual interpretation within the American Muslim community. Tagouri’s assertion that each person has “their own path to God” is arguably a claim against the idea that there exist established boundaries of both orthodoxy and orthopraxy. Thus, differences in interpretation (whether on the hijab or whatever else) may become rooted in a liberal conception of individual preference and are no longer negotiated by invoking an established religious basis (such as the Qur’an, in this case).

Given that the overwhelming majority of Americans are not Muslim and therefore cannot be expected to agree on the Qur’an as an example of a comprehensive doctrine, let alone what the Qur’an itself says about hijab, what is a principle on which all Americans ideally should agree with regard to the hijab? The answer: that a woman is an autonomous individual free to choose to wear it and define it by her own terms. That becomes the basis by which Muslim women negotiate their presence—a sort of “non- religious religious” language.

The most recent video that further entrenches this “modern" narrative behind the hijab is that of “hijabi rapper” Mona Haydar. While there may be lesser-known hijabi women who rap informally or in local audiences, Mona Haydar received attention both among Muslims as well as in mainstream media outlets with her first rap video creatively

29 tackling the subject of the hijab. Titled, “Hijabi (Wrap my Hijab),” this song speaks of hijab both as an article of clothing as well as an identity. Haydar’s lyrics also contain a feminist theme, of the liberation of women and women who wear the hijab. She musically expresses that in spite of any public resistance she will continue to “wrap her hijab” (Mona Haydar, 2017).

The attention and responses to Haydar’s video were both of strong praise and criticism, with many Muslims applauding Haydar’s self-expression and rebelliousness and many criticizing her for what they saw as “immodest” behavior in the rap video.

What some others have also considered problematic are the subtle sexual overtones in the video, which seem to defy the very foundation of hijab as an embodiment of modesty.

The noteworthy themes within the video are feminist liberation, body autonomy (lyrics asserting that she is not obligated to show anyone what her hair looks like), self- expression and individuality, as well as verbiage of anti-establishment.

In “Hijabi,” Haydar raps:

What that hair look like

Bet that hair look nice

Don’t that make you sweat?

Don’t that feel too tight?

Yo what yo hair look like

Bet yo hair look nice

How long your hair is

You need to get yo life

You only see Oriental (Mona Haydar, 2017)

30 Haydar’s attitude toward the hijab in the video represents a larger phenomenon in which many hijabis (especially activists and spokespersons) have come to know and define their identity as one of resistance, except that Haydar seeks a more artistic outlet to communicate it. Even the title of the song solidifies being a hijabi as an emerging identity rather than just a physical head covering or act of religious devotion.

This theme surfaces time and time again in the media. Namely, a video titled

“Hijabs Q&A,” which forms part of a series called “The Secret Life of Muslims” published by USA Today and Vox, features a variety of well-known public Muslim faces including activist Linda Sarsour, academic Reza Aslan, MuslimGirl online magazine

Editor-in-Chief Amani Al-Khatahtbeh, Olympian Ibtihaj Muhammad, and several others that wear the hijab in the spotlight. The video defines hijab in a religious and moral context, as well as the recurring theme of emancipation and reclaiming one’s personal identity (especially in the public space). Reza Aslan, one of the executive producers of the series, says in the video, “A hijab is a thing that a male Muslim should have absolutely no opinion about” (Seftel & Aslan, 2017). Al-Khatahtbeh remarks, “For me, putting on a headscarf was emancipation because that was the moment that I reclaimed my identity.” Sarsour states, “My hijab takes nothing away from my intellect, takes nothing away from my passions and my values and the principles that I hold.”

Interestingly, Sarsour’s statement takes a seemingly reactive stance, in which the hijab is assumed to be a hindrance to the full expression of one’s values. It frames the hijab as a practice that upholds negative liberty, in that it does not in any sense present a barrier to going about one’s passions and activities (Seftel & Aslan, 2017).

Even if not in provocative videos, the most usual articulations of hijab adhere

31 to the same liberal framework. In light of the political climate, attempted restrictions on the hijab in Europe, and the rising Islamophobic sentiment in America, writers at The

Huffington Post launched the hashtag #HijabToMe, “to show how beautifully diverse the hijab can be” (Nouh, 2016) and asked Muslim women to post a photo of themselves and their narratives using the hashtag. One woman wrote as a caption beneath a photo of herself in soccer gear: “#HijabToMe I support choice. I support an (un)veiled woman's right to body autonomy. Also, men need to step back.” Another wrote, “I am posting to support @huffingtonpost's #HijabtoMe on their great initiative to introduce diversity in hijab. Hijab to me reflects personal identity, and not where you stand in your religion. . . .

Freedom is all in the heart and mind and not in the body. We are not tied down by hijab, but by people's conception of how a hijabi should look and act like” (Nouh, 2016).

One last noteworthy contribution was that of hijabi fashion designer and entrepreneur Amirah Aulaqi, CEO of Amirah Couture Inc.:

#Hijabtome is the freedom to choose my lifestyle in a world that's constantly

trying to get you to be someone else. Wearing the Hijab at the age of 8 was a

choice based out of love and beauty because I wanted to emulate my single mom

who struggled to raise three girls alone. I developed my American Identity before

I even understood the religious obligation that came with wearing the Hijab. Hijab

to me is beauty, sincerity, struggle, identity, strength, challenge, meaning,

purpose, and most importantly my choice! (Nouh, 2016)

The remaining posts echo these sentiments, containing dominant themes of liberation, of rebellion, of personal choice, of body autonomy—themes mostly revolving around the identity of the individual. The Huffington Post article remains one of countless

32 examples of the portrayal of hijab from Muslim women. These extend to the flourishing hijabi fashion culture forming a significant part of hijab as an identity.

The Hijabi Fashion Industry

The emerging hijabi fashion consumer culture is two-fold: a rise in Muslim women entrepreneurs developing fashion lines and brands of their own, as well as mainstream brands beginning to cast hijabi models, recognizing the spending power of

Muslims, particularly Muslim women. The most recent statistics on this were provided by the Muslim Council of Britain, estimating the Muslim market to be worth 20.5 billion

British pounds a year, and Reuters and Dinar Standard estimating the global Muslim expenditure on fashion to be worth 484 billion U.S. dollars by the year 2019 (Aly, 2017).

An analysis of hijabi consumerism merits a further study on its own as it relates to capitalism (not just liberalism) and religion. However, for now it is important to highlight that this hijabi fashion industry, as a form of self-expression and representation within the mainstream, is strongly motivated and shaped by liberal principles.

Emma Tarlo and Annelies Moors (2013) provide a necessary caveat to this discussion, warning that one must not fall into the false dichotomy of Islamic fashion only being discussed within the confines of tradition and rigidity, while Western fashion is capable of being examined in a complex and nuanced way. Such a juxtaposition risks secularizing fashion and “Otherizing” Islamic fashion (p. 25). Islamic fashion does not occur in a vacuum or in isolation. Rather, Islamic fashion is in interaction with external political and social influences much like every other form of fashion. In prefacing the discussion on Islamic fashion with this point, and as Tarlo and Moors acknowledge, one cannot discuss either “Western” or “Islamic” fashion as isolated instances. To what

33 extent does the former within a liberal paradigm influence the latter, and where does the boundary between seeking individual visual expression of self and conformity end? In a social media obsessed age, the burgeoning of hijabi fashion subculture on Instagram (the popular photo social media platform) is “too big to ignore,” and hijabi fashion and lifestyle bloggers come to the forefront as popular personalities and influencers. As hijab increasingly emerges within the mainstream, as supermodel Halima Aden appears as the first hijabi model on the New York Fashion Week runway, as Nike creates a hijab specifically designed for athletic activity, and as other major fashion brands and department stores begin catering to their modest clientele (Aly, 2017), is hijab on the fast-track to conformity and absorption for capitalistic regurgitation? And how has a liberal notion of hijab facilitated this?

For instance, in one video capturing one of the largest Islamic fashion events hosted by “PFH (Pretty for Her),” Muslim hijabi women articulate the empowerment that they find within fashion as an expression. Marwa Atik, founder of Vela, a company which designs and sells fashion forward scarves, is quoted in the video saying, “Muslim women are empowered within ourselves and we do our own thing, and for us, it’s like

Islam is just a part of our identity” (The PFH event empowers Muslim women to celebrate what makes them unique, 2017).

Pushing back against these trends. Both Islamic fashion and its external liberal- secular context reinforce one another, and the proliferation of Islamic fashion, if anything, makes the hijab more prominent within the public sphere. It is of no surprise that the hijab is so widely debated to this day and has inherited ideological and political meanings. It is hence important to lend credence to what Tarlo and Moors (2013) call

34 Islamic “anti-fashion,” which is a wave of Muslim opinion that critiques fashion as compromising the practice of modesty and piety through dress when worn in excess and attracting attention. With emerging liberal conceptions of hijab, there is a simultaneous resistance from some Muslim women.

Editor-in-Chief of Muslimah Diaries Aisha Hasan asserts that the meaning of the hijab is now inverted:

The hijab is no longer seen as something which hides women’s beauty, but rather

a way in which Muslims express their identity. Wearing a hijab does not prevent

you from doing anything they say, one can be beautiful, a hijab is not a perfect

Muslim, she does not fit into the narrow definition the broader public perceive she

fits into. (Hasan, 2017)

Hasan argues that in seeking to break stereotypes, Muslim women have internalized an understanding and practice contradictory to Islamic values of modesty and

God-consciousness:

How many posts on social media have we seen about how modesty is in more

than just your dress, it is your behaviour; but when is that understanding ever

embodied? Has society today not normalised the sexualisation of Muslim women,

such that any kind of shame is seen as backward?

This is not the fault of any individual woman, nor is this meant to shame any

individual. This is to raise awareness of a culture that is being propagated; the

redefinition of what it means to be a modern Muslim woman in the 21st century.

The perception promoted, specifically after 9/11, that Muslim women are

supposedly ugly, boring, and oppressed has motivated the community to break

35 those misconceptions over the past 15 years. But we have gone into overdrive.

(Hasan, 2017)

Hasan is not alone in her vocal criticisms. In another op-ed titled, “The Problem with ‘Hijab Fashion,’” Mahfuja Ahmed frames the problem with hijabi fashion and

“fashionistas” being that it is beyond a private personal journey, but a public one concerned with the Muslim community and youth.

Ahmed strongly asserts,

I completely understand Muslim women fall into many many categories when it

comes to implementing the hijab in its entirety, and by that I do not mean just the

headscarf. I understand the difficulties in implementing hijab (been there, done

that). I understand all the thought processes before finally making the decision to

implement hijab outwardly and inwardly. I also understand wanting to look nice

and presentable.

What I do not accept nor understand is the category of women who outright reject

the command. Our attire and what we have been commanded to wear is clear cut,

stated in the Qur’an and ahadith. It’s fine for you to do business, also fine for you

to cater for Muslim women as there is a huge market, but I feel somewhere in all

this business and making a name, the true essence and identity of a Muslimah is

getting lost behind makeup, pouts and excessiveness. (Ahmed, 2017)

Ahmed writes of three concerns: the complicity in the commercialization of hijab, that the visual display that fashion catwalks allow contradicts modesty, and hijab styling—how it is not “really hijab.” Hasan and Ahmed signify the ambivalence and discomfort some Muslim hijabi women feel when exposed to this growing hijabi

36 subculture.

The examples illustrated above capture the undeniable shift in the notion of hijab occurring among American Muslims. There is an emerging narrative primarily within the media but also within other channels to revise both the definition of and motivations behind wearing the hijab. These most closely align with the core principles of liberalism previously cited: individualism, autonomy, and public reason. These dominant values within the American context as rooted in classical liberalism effectuate the

“liberalization” and consequently a “secularization” of the hijab. The aforementioned

Muslim women derive a notion of the hijab primarily from the self in that they describe their identity becoming whole, or discovering themselves through the hijab. The hijab’s association with a commitment to faith or connection with God seems to be less prominent in these descriptions. Modesty as a term also seems to be “undone” from past understandings in association with clothing or covering up and is redirected in the form of one’s character. Hijab instead functions as a path to self-fulfillment or self- actualization.

While these Muslim women speak primarily of personal autonomy, I argue (as I did in the previous chapter) that this is inextricably linked with the Kantian moral autonomy, especially considering Islamic notions of worship that do not separate the physical from the spiritual. In Islamic creed, the bodily form is subservient to God, reflected in forms of worship including the commands of physically performing the five prayers, fasting, and performing the hajj pilgrimage (which takes a significant toll on the body). God remains the authority on the body, and the source of divine law. It follows that removing the centrality of the body as associated with a divine authority—an

37 authority external to the self—in pursuit of autonomy means that one is pursuing a degree of moral autonomy. The hijab, while one of many forms of worship prescribed by Islam, is no exception to this. It is through this notion of autonomy as well as the use of public reason (as opposed to drawing from religious tradition to contest what hijab means) within these recent articulations of the hijab that further catalyze a secularization of the hijab. Personal autonomy is, in this case, an extension of moral autonomy.

The following chapter will draw conclusions about how the hijab has come to be understood in this lens over time. My key contention will be that the “liberalization” and

“secularization” of the hijab is a contemporary phenomenon specific to Muslims in the

West, bearing roots in historical Western narratives of Muslim women. Muslim women today react to the current Islamophobic climate that still intentionally recycles the very same narratives. Finally, I will consider implications of this trend.

38 Chapter 3

Rationale and Implications

How and why was it that women began justifying the veil in liberal terms of freedom and choice, as evidenced by the examples in the previous chapter? Muslim women have struggled to justify their existence in the United States—a society that has antagonized their individual identities as well as the collective identity of Islam. In seeking inclusion in reaction to a history of “Othering,” Muslim women seek to counter the stereotypes that associate the veil with religious fundamentalism, political militancy, oppression, and ignorance/naiveté. Yet, in doing so, they have effectuated liberalism’s aim to transform the Muslim identity to one that aligns with liberal ideas. My claim is that this happens at the expense of Islamic values. The struggle over the terms on which the hijab is worn, displayed, represented, and talked about is a concrete example of this liberalization of Islamic identity.

To better understand the sociopolitical context to which Muslim women are responding, it is important to begin with the acknowledgement that these stereotypes were informed by the history of colonialism. The Islamophobic rhetoric present today is reminiscent of the discourse about Muslim women and the veil that emerged in the context of colonial expansion. Thus Muslim women today respond to stereotypes informed by these origins.

The Legacy of the Veil and Colonialism

Yvonne Haddad (2007) describes how the hijab has repeatedly taken on new

meanings:

Over the centuries, Muslims and Westerners have engaged in endless debates over

39 whether the veil should be vilified or defended. For every criticism raised in the

West, a counter argument was developed in defense of Muslim womanhood. The

most prominent feature of Islamic literature on women written during the 20th

century is its dialogical and/or apologetic nature, regardless of the gender or

ideological orientation of the author. As such, it bears the imprint of the colonial

experience. (p. 256)

Citing Zayzafoon (2005), she continues:

Most of the discourse appears to be beholden to ever changing Western values

and norms. It mirrors Western discourse in upholding the importance of women's

empowerment. At the same time, it refutes Western norms that debase women by

treating them as sex objects and argues that Islam has liberated women and

elevated their status. With each encounter, the veil has acquired new meaning and

significance as it has been appropriated as a symbol of an identity threatened by a

ruthless enemy. (p. 256)

By “imprint of the colonial experience,” Haddad refers to the depiction of

Muslim women and the veil dating back to European colonial expansion in the Middle

East in the nineteenth century. The European preoccupation with the veil characterized the Muslim woman as subordinate to Muslim men, producing a narrative of an obligation to “save” and “liberate” these Muslim women. This was otherwise known as the “white man’s burden” (Haddad, 2007, p. 257). Veiled women were also depicted in art, music, and film as possessing an exotic, sexual mystique, entrapped in harems awaiting rescue by white men from brown men (Kahf, 1999).

40 History of Western liberal feminism and the veil. Modern versions of feminism as a movement initiated in Western democratic states have long been grounded in liberal ideals. Ahmed (1992) explains the role of liberalism and feminism (the two versions that share a history) as they were incorporated into colonial objectives in the latter half of the nineteenth century. These narratives were born from the merging of Orientalist narratives of Islam (on which Edward Said expands in Orientalism) and narratives which affirmed the superiority of European culture over “Other” cultures. This new narrative centered the issue of women (p. 150).

As Ahmed (2002) elaborates, while feminism was being countered by dominant paternalistic norms beginning in the Victorian era, the language of feminism was co-opted and joined with the claim to Western superiority and subsequent domination of Muslims; the rationale for superiority and dominance became that, as signified by the “tradition” of the veil, Islam is oppressive to the Muslim woman (p. 152).

Non-Western women and their sexual embodiment producing the “wrong kind of desire” in harems became a counter-ideal to which a new Western female image developed

(Kahf, 1999, p. 117).

Both Kahf and Massad also draw the connection between early and modern liberal feminist discourse. They both cite the writings of early British feminist Mary

Wollstonecraft, who argued against European Christians’ treatment of women by drawing comparisons to the enslavement and subjugation of women in the “Eastern

Orient.” At the center of her arguments for women’s rights is the image of the enslaved

Muslim woman within the despotic Orient. If the West would only do away with its

“Oriental” ways, it would become more enlightened and reasonable (Kahf, 1999, p. 149-

41 151; Massad, 2015, p. 125-127).

To leave out an account of the veil as it was viewed and portrayed in the colonial era and in relation with the ideals of liberalism and Western liberal feminism would render this historical overview insufficient. The debates about the veil today, in the post

9-11 era, echo the colonial discourses of Muslim women’s oppression as linked to the veil. I will return to more contemporary feminist debates on the veil later in this chapter.

Hijab Post-9/11

While it is not within the scope of this paper to undertake an exhaustive history of

American Islam or pinpoint exactly when Muslims began utilizing liberal thought in defense of the hijab (among other beliefs), we can identify a rise of this phenomenon in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Part of the consequences of the War on Terror is that the lives of Muslim women and the veil (as a presumed symbol of their subjugation and oppression) became a center of attention in Western societies, with government and media emphasizing concern over the treatment of women in Afghanistan (Haddad, 2017, p. 225). Then-first lady Laura Bush gave a radio address after 9/11, stating, “The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women,” and advocating for their liberation (Amer, 2014, p. 4; Haddad, 2017, p. 255; Massad, 2015, p. 124). The veil, especially the niqab/full burqa was later recast as a symbol of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism. Muslim women in the U.S. felt the impact of this intensified

Islamophobic rhetoric.

Massad (2015) maintains and substantiates that saving and defending Muslim women was a mission of Western liberal feminism to this day, “culminating in the arguments of the Bush administration and its neoconservative allies to invade

42 Afghanistan to save and rescue Afghani women following the events of September 11,

2001” (p. 124). It is “Western liberalism’s project of also transforming Muslim cultures into cultures that are in line with Western liberal variants” (p. 124-125). Involved in this transformation, Massad says, are “linguistic and cultural translations” (p. 125). The hijab was certainly an object of this “linguistic and cultural translation.” I maintain that the use of non-religious (secular) liberal language being increasingly used to justify the presence of the hijab (as a strategy of inclusion by Muslim women) is a symptom of this translation that Massad describes. Under the guise of promoting tolerance and inclusion in the interest of Muslims, this deployed language and strategy ultimately serves secular liberal enterprises.

Secular feminists during the second half of the 20th century, Haddad (2007) argues, take the same mentality of “American exceptionalism” as did the Christian missionaries of the 18th and 19th centuries. Both groups (attempted) set out to “rescue”

Muslim women, “striving to refashion the women of Islam into their own image” (p.

260). Even when encountering Western liberal feminism, similar tensions arise, given that post-colonial new wave feminism condemns the desexualized nature of the hijab, what the movement considers patriarchal features within Islam and adherence to gender disparities. This dichotomy between the ideal “free” Western woman and the oppressed

Eastern Muslim woman still lingers until today in the name of advancing individual rights and egalitarianism for women, with the veil once again appearing at the center of the debates.

There is an evident degree of the continuity between notions of the veil in the times of colonialist expansion in the Middle East and in current times. These

43 Islamophobic prejudices are fueled by ongoing War on Terror and the rhetoric of Donald

Trump. While the prevailing stereotypes re-emerged long before Donald Trump’s arrival, in some ways the 2016 U.S. presidential election has set the clock back, doubling down on the negative attitudes toward Muslims. Since then Trump has attempted to enact anti- immigration policies (targeting Muslim majority-countries). His rhetoric reinforces the dichotomy of Islam versus the West, with his claim “I think Islam hates us” (Johnson &

Hauslohner, 2017) reviving suspicion of Muslims and mosques.

Domestically, the increased number of hate crimes as well as the rise in anti-

Muslim sentiment among the American public undoubtedly factor into Muslims’ greater public role and strategy. The FBI reported 257 anti-Muslim hate crimes in 2015, up by

67% from 2014 (Levin 2016). PEW found that at least half of Americans believe at least some of U.S. Muslims are anti-American, and that about 46% believe Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence (Republicans prefer blunt talk about

Islamic extremism, Democrats favor caution, 2016). Subsequent polls conducted around the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election cycle found that 37% of American adults have a

“somewhat unfavorable” or “very unfavorable” view of Islam (Flitter & Kahn, 2016).

American Muslim Women’s New Public Role. Haddad (2007) argues that “re-

Islamization” (increased religiosity both in the private and public realms) among

American Muslims has fast-tracked post 9/11. This particularly manifested in the public appearance of the hijab, that the hijab became a symbol of American Islamic identity.

The sociopolitical context invigorated the consciousness and public role of American

Muslim women.

44 Haddad (2007) describes the immediate climate and Muslim women’s heightened and more visible role in the wake of 9/11:

Some Muslim women who had been wearing a hijab prior to 9/11 removed it as a

precaution, as many were counseled to do, in order to avoid harassment or worse.

Some Muslim scholars overseas even issued fatwas (religiously-based legal

opinions) sanctioning the removal of the hijab if a Muslim's life is threatened.

Other Muslim women became convinced that wearing a headscarf is not pre

scribed in the Qur'an. Rather, they argued, it is a matter of choice. Some

continued to insist that wearing a hijab is a witness to the faith, even in times of

stress. By this interpretation, wearing the hijab can be seen as a personal struggle,

a jihad, as the wearer is tested daily in the public square. Other women chose to

wear the hijab to witness that they are proud Muslims and are not afraid to say so.

(p. 262-263)

While some Muslim women may have decided to take off the hijab, more women have set out to “reclaim” it. Since then, and especially now amid the heightened anti-

Muslim rhetoric during the 2016 election cycle and Trump presidency, Muslim women have visibly entered a new phase of activism.

A Liberal Defense of Islam

The featured hijabi women in Chapter 2 typically present their narratives without concretely defining what exact “authority” they are contravening, resorting to more ambiguous terms of resistance. It is, however, implied that they are responding to both

Western liberalism on the whole as well as the specific claims of Western liberal feminism.

45 While Muslim women may be reacting to the lingering impact of colonialism and

Orientalism that have historically associated the Muslim veil with subjugation, suppressed sexuality, inferiority, and harem culture, this reaction does not, in any obvious way, refer back to pre-colonial conceptions of the hijab in the Islamic tradition. Indeed, it is a distinctly “modern” attempt to justify the veil. Although they are reacting to liberalism, they fundamentally utilize a liberal vernacular. In other words, by defending their identities from within the confines of liberal thought, these women assume what might be described as “a liberal defense of Islam,” rather than a truly “Islamic” defense of Islam. Some of the most vocal hijabis in the public eye are reproducing an understanding of the hijab as something that transcends a theological and historical context—something distanced from religion, and perhaps from the Islamic tradition altogether. The examples in Chapter 2 indicate a trend toward a particular worldview distinct from Islam that these Muslim women evoke when justifying their existence and their identities.

To further illustrate this, I will draw on a specific claim liberal feminists often make in the hijab debate. Western liberal feminists typically suggest that these Muslim women, in confronting patriarchy in the West (and the male gaze which sexualizes women), are still upholding an oppressive patriarchal Islamic tradition of requiring the veil. Some strands of liberal feminism may claim that there is no “public reason,” so to speak, for anyone who believes in covering in the public. In turn, Muslim women respond to the assumption that covering is inherently patriarchal by claiming they are covering on their own terms and according to their own choice.

Rather than taking to the Islamic textual sources to address the accusation of

46 patriarchy, Muslim women point to the contradiction of feminism championing a woman’s right to wear less while simultaneously rebuking hijabi women for wearing more. As feminism in the Anglo-sphere became more pronounced as a movement, feminists challenged undergarments as a patriarchal imposition seeking to re-form their bodies with corsets, girdles, and brassieres. The “un-polished,” “real,” and perhaps

“unmasked” woman was therefore considered “liberated,” unlike the rest. Yet, feminism neglects to distinguish between the “choice” and “right” not to wear “restrictive” attire

(in the name of showing women’s bodies for what they are rather than confirming to artificial standards of beauty or “proper” appearance) and the “choice” to wear the hijab

(which is grounded in theological interpretations of the body). Western feminists tend to confuse different standards of dress as being oppressive, rather than offering nuanced and historical ideas about how fashion or dress (and the act of physically covering more generally) have meaning that far exceeds any “practical” purpose or even “rational” public purpose. In other words, feminist theory on covering fails to capture the depth of meaning dress (religious dress in particular) takes on.

Equally important is questioning assumptions regarding freedom and liberation within feminist and secular liberal thought.

Mahmood (2005) challenges this:

It becomes quite clear that the idea of freedom and liberty as the political

ideal is relatively new in modern history. Many societies, including Western

ones, having flourished with aspirations other than this. Nor, for that matter,

does the narrative of individual and collective liberty exhaust the desires

with which people live in liberal societies. If we recognize that the desire for

47 freedom from, or subversion of, norms is not an innate desire that motivates

all beings at all times, but is also profoundly mediated by cultural and

historical conditions, then the question arises: how do we analyze operations

of power that construct different kinds of bodies, knowledges, and

subjectivities whose trajectories do not follow the entelechy of liberatory

politics? (p. 14)

Mahmood writes that feminism tolerates “illiberal” actions (such as covering) when still practiced under the overarching liberal conception of freedom and choice (p.

11). She points to “the overwhelming tendency within poststructural feminist scholarship to conceptualize agency in terms of subversion or resignification of social norms” (p. 13-

14). In other words, poststructural liberal feminism attaches agency/liberation to modes of power. This is the critical point at which the two traditions (Islamic and liberal) diverge on the meaning of liberation. In the Western progressive feminist’s view, a woman covering may be an act of acquiescence to patriarchal demands. On the other hand, the specific historical conditions in which the Qur’anic verses were revealed may invert what it means to be free — that Muslim women were liberated once they began to heed the commandment of covering which existed for their safety and protection.

Indeed many of the most vocal activists and “influencers” within the upcoming generation of Muslim women are calling themselves feminists, relying on reimagining liberation, but still relying on the tenets of liberalism as a crutch. They do not invoke what it means to be “free” in the Islamic sense as I suggest above. Among these women are Noor Tagouri who is hailed as an advocate of feminism (especially after the Playboy feature) and Amani Al-Khatahtbeh (founder of MuslimGirl online magazine) who

48 proudly displays her affiliation as a “Muslim feminist.” In one online interview, Al-

Khatahtbeh argues, “The basic tenets of Islam are inherently feminist, so identifying as a feminist goes hand in hand with my identity as a Muslim woman” (Naili, 2015). Al-

Khatatbeh proceeds to criticize Western feminism, saying, “I would argue that

‘feminisms’ that disregard the intersections of race, class, and gender are not only anti- feminist, but even uphold systems of oppression that feminism claims to defy” (Naili,

2015).

On reconciling veiling, Islam, and feminism, Al-Khatahtbeh responds with the following claim:

The whole premise of feminism is to empower women’s individual choices and

autonomy of their own lives. It’s interesting how Western feminism has always

been gung-ho about this concept unless it is applied to Muslim women. Not only

does the misconception of Islam’s relationship with feminism reveal a very

politicized and stereotypical image of Muslim women, but it also infantilizes us as

though we are incapable of thinking or making decisions for ourselves. As a

Muslim woman, my hijab is my feminism; both in asserting my authority over my

body as well as defying post-9/11 Islamophobia, racism and stereotypical

expectations. (Naili, 2015)

What happens is a re-visioning of feminism but also a re-visioning of hijab. Al-

Khatahtbeh testifies that Islam is feminist by appealing to individualism and autonomy.

Once again, this makes her defense a liberal defense of Islam, not an Islamic defense of

Islam. By the same token, her critique of liberalism, of the Islamophobia, racism, and stereotypes on which liberal democracies are built, is a “liberal” one, not an “Islamic”

49 one. While challenging Western liberal feminism’s platform, Al-Khatahtbeh still relies on the very principles in which the movement is rooted. She articulates a defense of the

Islamic tradition and produces a critique of liberal intolerance by appealing to tenets belonging to the liberal tradition itself — not liberation as it exists in the Islamic tradition.

Implications for the Muslim Identity

It warrants an explanation as to why hijab constitutes the bulk of this paper and argument. Many may argue that it is merely a “cloth” and that it is time for an end to scrutinizing and policing women’s clothing. Muslims committed to improving their circumstances and life in the United States may be tempted to brush off such debates. As one Muslim academic explained to me (paraphrased), we cannot nitpick every strategy and every word some Muslim activists use—what is most important is the collective effort toward inclusion in pluralist America. This in part illustrates that presenting the collective Muslim identity as it is rooted in the Islamic tradition is no longer the priority, at least in the public (it is not my place to comment on practices and beliefs within the private realm).

The reality is that hijab has never been “just” a piece of cloth. Hijab in the context of the global “re-Islamization” movement carries religious, cultural, political, and social dimensions. The argument that reduces hijab to a “piece of cloth” may fulfill a purpose when it comes to asserting that a woman has every right to cover her body, just as any other woman has a right to wear as little as she wants. This is especially useful as a logical/rights-based argument in countries that have either partially or completely banned the burqa and niqab (like France and Belgium). Otherwise, this argument still leaves

50 something to be desired. When examining hijab on the whole, reducing it to a “piece of cloth” contradicts every example presented in Chapter 2 that renders hijab something more.

It seems for the hijab to comfortably sit within the public space and in order to

“qualify” for inclusion in the sphere of what constitutes grounds for public reason, it has to be secularized and represent something other than its essential meaning. This reinforces Talal Asad’s contention referenced earlier in this paper about how the public sphere is already occupied and sets limits to what can enter it. The hijab assumes a new meaning as protagonists engage rationally within the public space. Only under the veneer of these new meanings can it be rationalized and negotiated in the terms of public reason.

Such prerequisites are not limited to the hijab, but apply to the Muslim identity in general. This appeal to liberal edicts when defining and justifying hijab is an unprecedented and developing occurrence, and is contributing to the wider liberalization of the Muslim identity. Within a Western liberal paradigm in which principles such as autonomy, individualism, and public reason have become self-evident truths, there is now a normalization of a particular type of acceptable Muslim identity (i.e. an increasingly secular, liberal one).

This new Muslim identity draws more upon modern American cultural norms than the precedents of the Islamic tradition. By calling it a “cultural” Muslim identity, that is not an evaluation of the personal private spirituality or religious practice, but rather its public elements that speak to what it means to be a Muslim living in America and functioning in a larger Muslim community (or communities). This “culturally” Muslim identity exists on the terms of the Western liberal paradigm and not on those of Muslims;

51 liberalism dictates public manifestations of Islam.

As Saba Mahmood (2003) points out in her online essay titled “Questioning

Liberalism, Too,” fear of Islamist revivalist movements compounds the uneasiness of secular-liberals at any public manifestation of religion. I infer that this results in relegating religion to the private realm, thereby limiting the terms of existence for the hijab in the public realm. Perhaps this is what distinguishes American secular-liberalism from European secularism, particularly French secularism/laïcité: rather than a ban on certain forms of hijab in the public sphere, what occurs is a recalibration of its meaning to align with public consensus in the US—through individual autonomy or “right to self- expression.”

Mahmood (2003) astutely challenges scholars who assert that Islam is compatible with liberalism, in this case with Khaled Abou El Fadl, but applicable more broadly:

What’s curious to me is that in these explorations by Muslim scholars Islam bears

the burden of proving its compatibility with liberal ideals, and the line of question

is almost never reversed. We do not ask, for example, what would it mean to take

the resources of the Islamic tradition and question many of the liberal political

categories and principles for the contradictions and problems they embody? Or,

how would one rethink these problems by bringing the resources of Islamic

political history to bear upon them? For instance, many of the aforementioned

authors, including Khaled Abou El Fadl, urge that liberal conceptions of

individual autonomy, human rights, and individual freedom be incorporated into

Islam. (Mahmood, 2003)

The liberalization and secularization of the hijab illuminates the problem

52 Mahmood describes—Islam does not enter the debate on its own terms, a recurring absence indicative of the paradox faced by Islam in America.

Conclusions/Limitations

It is important to acknowledge that this analysis in itself may very well be the sort of “liberal critique of liberalism” I mention earlier, in that it still draws from the liberal background and experience rather than drawing on a theological argument. Nonetheless, the arguments presented are meta-cognizant of this, perhaps unlike many popular critiques of liberalism. In this paper I refer to Massad’s Islam in Liberalism multiple times because he authored an extensive work on how liberalism reconstitutes Islam, doing so through broad historical analysis dating from colonialism to present-day.

Massad critiques the idea of the liberalization and liberal understandings of Islam through analyzing broad power structures. All the same, Massad’s work is undeniably an “intra- liberal critique”—a liberal critique of liberalism—and perhaps a “liberal defense of

Islam.” My reliance on this text indicates I may be falling into the same “trap.”

However, this “trap” should indicate that engaging in a critique of liberalism, especially when one’s worldview is inevitably informed by liberalism, is like repeatedly peeling layers and rarely addressing solutions. Such a critique appears to only contribute to a pessimistic outlook for an Islamic individual and collective identity. What it would take for this not to be the case would be a comprehensive justification of the hijab within the Islamic tradition and approaching it through that lens, looking toward the moral resources of the Islamic tradition. This requires a deliberate effort to undo many socialized preconceptions.

53 It is important to state that I do not argue that individualism, autonomy, and reason are, at their core, directly incompatible with Islam. I do not intend to present them in a dichotomous relationship. My concern is with specifically liberalized conceptions of these principles, and how liberalism historically (but not fundamentally) is at tension with

Islam.

This is also not to say that one cannot be an individually freely exercising their autonomy and faculties while also being a devout practicing Muslim. What therefore merits further exploration are non-liberal conceptions of liberty, freedom, and individualism, particularly those which exist in the Islamic tradition. Islamic creed

(aqeedah) contains within itself the notion of a self-directing, autonomous individual with the freedom to make choices (although not morally relativist). This can be distinguished from a specifically liberal individualism which, in its effects, have contributed to a modern morality derived from the self and centered around the self.

Liberalism, and liberal conceptions of ideas such as freedom and individualism, become the end, as opposed to developing those ideas relative to submission to a higher divine authority which transcends them. All in all, the key distinction between Islam and liberalism is their employment of these terms in how they respectively approach moral questions of the good life.

Tesneem Alkiek and Nour Soubani (2017) of Yaqeen Institute phrase it well in their suggestions for Muslims uncritically jumping on “ideological bandwagons”:

There may well be many ideas advanced under the label of ‘feminism’ that pose a

problem for Muslims—and some that may even be antithetical to Islam. But the

truth is that there are many secular ideologies that, when taken to their extremes,

54 clearly contradict Islamic religious and moral creeds. The only way we can avoid

the pitfalls of these ideologies is by looking beyond labels, evaluating the

concepts themselves, and approaching them from a firm foundation in our

tradition. If we are confident in Islam and its sources and methodology, we can

face these dogmas head-on. Only then can we sort through complex theories to

affirm what is good and discard that which does not align with our religion. (para.

18)

It is evident why we Muslim women, when exposed to a multitude of global debates, want to “take back” the narrative. It is precisely these debates to which we seek to respond. Yet, as I have argued, we find ourselves adopting the same terms of argument we purportedly seek to challenge. The inescapable reality is that we Muslim hijabi women are living in a liberal America and find ourselves increasingly having to defend our existence and render our practices adaptive to the sociopolitical climate. We need to do this while simultaneously maintaining the integrity of an Islam we know is compatible and has a place within American culture.

As a Muslim woman who wears the hijab myself, bearing witness to the hijab as it is entwined in debates about identity rather than religion growing into an identity, I would attest to the fact that liberalism does not have all the answers. Still it seems to be required of us Muslim women, in order to rationalize our existence and right to cover, that we must assume the centrality and universality of liberal claims. This condition does not speak to simply “covering,” but fundamentally to moral questions.

While several academics and activists may argue that Islam and liberalism may complement one another when necessary, the real challenge emerges when the former

55 seeks to replace the latter in addressing ultimate questions of the good life. It might not be what we hijabis are looking for in the long-term, even if it might be used as a short- term strategy for a better livelihood in the United States. The liberalization of the hijab and Muslim identity is just a symptom of the larger challenge in sustaining an Islamic identity within an Islamic worldview outside of an “Islamic context.” The issues raised in the paper are certainly compounded by the lack of religious literacy that Muslims in

America have today. A growing lack of trust in Islamic leadership and scholarship may also prove to be an inhibitor (for a number of reasons). We walk a tightrope to navigate the challenge of deeply rooted stereotypes and work toward inclusion all the while looking inward in the Islamic tradition for guidance in doing so.

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