OP #281: TEN YEARS AFTER THE BREAKUP: KENNAN INSTITUTE MEETING REPORTS, 1991–2001

Vol. VIII No. 18 1991 provoked. A dissident historian, having The Soviet Coup: Impressions of an Eyewitness talked a few minutes with a lieutenant atop a Kennan Institute Research Associate Mark H. tank, noted with relief, “These guys won’t be Teeter flew into Moscow on August 18th and shooting anyone.” One soldier calmly woke up the next morning to news of a coup. This reprimanded a television reporter with a report was transmitted by him via electronic mail statement of the obvious which everyone from the Institute’s Moscow representational needed to hear: “Hey, I’m human too.” One office. sensed that this was not Prague, not 1968. The events in Moscow of 19–21 August It shortly became clear that the center 1991 were clearly historic. As they began to of events would not be the Kremlin, but unfold, however, one soon came to wonder rather the Russian Federation’s administra- how the clamor, confusion, contradictory tive center, an ungainly white building in the information, and seemingly hourly changes Krasnaia Presnia district. A march down of tide could ever be turned into the kind of Kalinin Prospekt to this newly-christened bound-volume history, neat and compact, White House drew more and more adherents that we pass to succeeding generations. This along the way, but their motives were will surely happen, of course, and there is evidently various. A number of people were little doubt that the accounts of the Carrs, clearly Yeltsin supporters as such, chanting Paleologues, and Trotskys of this August will the Russian President’s name in unison every emerge a good deal sooner after the fact than few minutes. Others felt their democratic did the chronicles of 1917. In the meantime, a principles had little to do with Boris Yeltsin chance foreign observer of some of the events and marched silently, simply voting with can perhaps best be content to pass along a few their feet. Still others apparently joined for notes and impressions from the past week, the spectacle, spontaneity, or pure civil offering the odd tile toward what will later disobedience of it. A young woman with a emerge as a comprehensible mosaic. bullhorn urged bystanders to come along, Moscow, Monday, 19 August. The and a legless man in a wheelchair appeared sudden announcement of the assumption of in the ranks. power by a State Committee on the Extraor- The spectrum of people around the White dinary Situation in the USSR caught virtually House became broader and broader: Siberian everyone off guard—as it was clearly in- Cossacks, Afghanistan veterans, businessmen, tended to. The fabled other shoe had indeed anarcho-syndicalists, and Moscow street punks finally dropped, and apparently hard, but had for their own reasons, and surely for the first there was no practical information as to what time, found a common symbol and a common that actually meant for the daily life of the cause. Makeshift barricades were already up city. On the far north side of town, at least, around the White House by midday. Asked how there were no visible changes from the day they knew this was the right tactic, some barrier before: no troops, no sounds of gunfire, no builders replied, “Vilnius taught us.” obvious beginnings of a civil conflict of any Tuesday, 20 August. The curiosities and sort. Outside one’s window children could be anomalies which accompany any great seen playing in courtyards, a fact which public event continued to pile up. As seemed at once incongruous and reassuring. Monday’s spontaneous barricades were being The subway seemed to function reinforced, a stone’s throw away at the World normally as well, taking one smoothly to the Trade Center foreign professionals and casual center of town—where all was clearly not visitors could chat over espresso and shop for normal. Near the Kremlin the first sight of souvenirs in apparently total isolation from tanks and armored personnel carriers quickly the hectic activity down the street. Despite brought home what the term Extraordinary the transparent sham of “legality” proffered Situation could actually mean: brute force. by the Committee in its press conference of Yet the troops manning the vehicles were not Monday afternoon, many Muscovites voiced brutes. When local citizens approached them sympathy for the enterprise. One former to pose by turns plaintive and challenging university instructor, who had at some risk questions (“Officer, do you have a con- permitted classroom discussion of Aleksandr science?”), the young soldiers were not Solzhenitsyn in the mid-1970’s, could speak 1 now of the inevitability and even necessity of from foreign-currency stores in order to the takeover; the goal of “bringing about ensure that the events underway would be order” could be welcomed by a country documented. On Wednesday morning it was which was, in fact, rapidly descending into by no means clear how much longer it would economic and social chaos. Meanwhile, the take to resolve the issue of the coup. By the phones continued to work, the busses ran, afternoon, however, the atmosphere around and cab drivers haggled over fares even as the White House had grown considerably the most astounding rumors of troop move- brighter. Among other things, there had been ments and martial law spread around the a report that all eight Committee members city. One had the recurring sense that this had been arrested trying to make their way to was either a nightmare or a movie; it couldn’t Vnukovo airport. While this was later proved be real. untrue, people wanted to believe the story, The White House and its immediate many no doubt did, and it fit the spirit of the environs were alternately described as under afternoon on the north side of the building— control and in imminent peril during the shortly to be named the Square of Russian evening and night of the 20th. The sole local Freedom—perfectly. The worst, one wanted non-government radio station, Radio Echo to assume, had passed. In the early evening, Moscow, miraculously stayed on the air with both Radio Echo and Russian (as much of the night, running no small risk of opposed to Central) Television back on the sudden and violent interruption by special air, one could believe that it had. Adrenaline forces after the Committee had twice pro- was still pumping, but deep sighs, laughter, claimed it anathema. People phoned around and the first congratulations could be heard. the city passing news gleaned from Echo, The terms coup d’etat, attempted coup which regularly broadcast live reports by d’etat, putsch, plot, counter-revolution, tragic correspondents and commanders in the events, revolution, victory of democracy, White House itself. Odd as it sounds, the overthrow of Communism, and end of the heroic little station had to beg the indulgence USSR have all been used this week, each of its listeners for tolerance of some appar- probably with some justice. In any event, ently necessary, if incongruous, music virtually everyone in Moscow seems to agree interludes. that the end of last week represented the As the night progressed, with reports beginning of something altogether new here. that there would, then would not, then again Not all in this new era has been appealing. would be a storming of the White House, one The “revolution against monuments” has wondered several things by turns: Does seemed needlessly hurried and even physically anyone during any revolution actually know dangerous at times. The continuing emergence what is really going on? Would this night of self-proclaimed “heroes”—Aleksandr come to represent the first day of a new civil Iakovlev’s explicit warning notwithstanding— war or perhaps the last day of one which had is unpleasant to behold. The closing of Pravda been going on for seventy-four years? and certain other publications which acqui- The first report of casualties came at esced in or openly supported the Extraordi- 12:30 a.m. At 1:15 Radio Echo Moscow nary Committee has struck some people as a suddenly went off the air. Bolshevik remedy to a Bolshevik problem. The Wednesday, 21 August. There had prospects of widespread witch-hunting and a indeed been fatalities, as even the ever- new life for the practice of denunciation have subservient state television admitted, citing been and remain very real concerns. Finally, of hooliganism and alcohol as the causes in a course, the desperate economic shortages and report as cynical as any ever broadcast by unsolved social problems of this country Soviet media. Flowers soon appeared on the remain as desperate and unsolved as they blood-stained pavement near the American were on August 18th. embassy where three “hooligans” and Still and all, one cannot but feel that a “drunks” had died among the tanks. The great and lasting Good has been wrought White House had not been approached in the here—and at a price that could easily have end, and calls went our for new groups of been, in terms of human life, far more tragic people to take the places of some who had (as in Sumgait, Tbilisi, Vilnius, and else- worked the night defense shift. Various anti- where). Perhaps the most notable aspect of Committee groups asked for assistance from the Good one senses at hand is evident in all comers, including even requests for film expressions of a new freedom—not granted 2 from above but won independently by be more terrible than tanks.” He insisted that people themselves, individually and together. an economic confederation must and would This self-liberation, echoed in phrases like “I eventually come into existence, although he stood up to them for the first time,” “Now I stressed no republic should be forced to join can look my grandchildren in the eye,” and it. “The politicians in the various republics “I can finally breathe,” would be inspiring to who advocate complete rejection of the witness anywhere. In Moscow, on one’s historical union which has arisen over the twenty-first visit, it goes beyond that. It centuries in this territory are making a brings a catch to one’s throat. mistake and doing a disservice to their This country is finally finding itself, people,” alleged Suleimenov. He compared replacing false values with real ones. As it the republics to individual organs of a single stands now, in any case, there seems every living body, admonishing them not to cut the reason to come back to Moscow in the future: links which join them, but to analyze their what may well have been one’s last trip to the common Soviet experience and jointly chart a Soviet Union has easily proven the best. path out of the Soviet system. Suleimenov Moscow, 28 August 1991. disdained the transformation of a people’s —by Mark Teeter legitimate struggle for independence into inter-ethnic conflict. “The struggle then takes on its rudest and crudest form, in which a 1991–92 PROGRAM YEAR person desires to have land or any other Vol. IX No. 1 1991 goods only for himself or herself and mem- Independence is not Enough bers of the same group, and for no one else,” he observed. “I am and will always be “I believe that the striving for indepen- opposed to this understanding of national dence is in itself always positive, but should independence,” he stated. never be the ultimate goal of the develop- The speaker expected President ment of a people—it can lead to self-isola- Nazarbaev to stand for popular election in tion,” declared Olzhas Suleimenov at a Kazakhstan sometime later this year. Other lecture cosponsored by the Kennan Institute candidates would be free to enter the race, and the Russian Area Studies Program of said Suleimenov, but he expressed the belief Georgetown University on 26 September that Nazarbaev’s high popularity ratings 1991. Suleimenov is Co-Chairman of the within Kazakhstan and the recognition of his Supreme Soviet Committee on Legislation authority by other republics virtually assured and the Observance of Legality and Law and his re-election. In any event, popular elec- Order, Chairman of the Kazakhstan Union of tions are not always the best measure of Writers, and President of the Nevada- democracy in a given country, observed Semipalatinsk Anti-Nuclear Movement. Suleimenov. He noted that President Niazov Speaking with evident conviction, of Turkmenia was the first popularly elected Suleimenov pleaded for a union of voluntary leader of any Soviet republic, preceding even interdependence among the former Soviet Boris Yeltsin’s election to the Russian presi- republics, arguing that independence, if dency. “However,” said the speaker, “in perceived as the end goal of national libera- Turkmenia, to say the least, the word democ- tion, would lead the peoples of the USSR into racy has not acquired its full meaning.” a dead end. The speaker expressed his hope Suleimenov contended that Kazakhstan’s that the various Soviet republics would varied ethnic makeup (42% Kazakh, 38% “throw off the yoke of colonization, go Russian, 20% other nationalities, including one through an intermediate period of indepen- million ethnic Germans) gave the republic dence, and then come to a period of con- better chances for a democratic regime, as scious, voluntary unification.” Kazakhstan stood closer to the “winds of the The most urgent need for the country West” and the traditions of democracy. The as a whole is to adopt a “rational economic question on which all else depends, democracy policy,” declared Suleimenov. Recalling his included, is whether or not Nazarbaev can speech at the September 1991 session of the develop the economy of the republic and ease Supreme Soviet, Suleimenov saluted the conflicts between ethnic groups, he remarked. democratic victory over the attempted Asked about the potential relationship August coup but warned the democrats not between Turkey and Kazakhstan and to squander their victory, as “empty pots will relations within Central Asia as a whole, 3 Suleimenov rejected the notion of a political “We are not guilty, none of us is guilty, of union of Turkic peoples. This would repre- what has happened over the years through- sent nothing less than a restoration of the out our history. But we will be guilty if we Ottoman empire, contended the speaker. allow it to continue.” Turkic peoples should work to develop their —by Peggy McInerny economic and cultural ties and leave the idea of a political union aside, he explained. “I Vol. IX No. 2 1991 believe that political unions can be danger- Power with Republics, not Center ous things...I am against a political union “I believe the ‘Union’ part of the Soviet based on the concept of ‘either/or,’” he said. Union has, in almost all respects, lost its “We need to speak of a union based on the relevance,” contended Ambassador Paul H. concept of ‘both/and.’” Suleimenov then Nitze at the Kennan Institute on 30 September described a vision of the world in which the 1991. Currently Diplomat-in-Residence at the concept of “both/and” (“both Slavs and Turks, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies both Armenians and Azerbaijanis”) widens of the Johns Hopkins University, Ambassador progressively to include all of humanity in a Nitze retired from a distinguished career in union based on the common concerns of all. government service in 1989 after representing Suleimenov spoke extensively on the United States in various capacities at the nuclear disarmament, contending that U.S. Navy, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. instability in the USSR made radical reduc- Disarmament Agency, and as Presidential tion of its 30,000-nuclear-warhead arsenal advisor for close to five decades. Nitze asserted more necessary than ever. The Semipalatinsk that real power in the USSR now lies with the movement, said its leader, advocates retain- republics and called for the United States to ing central control over all nuclear weapons widen its direct contacts with them at the on Soviet soil in order to prevent them from expense of the union government. The devolu- assuming national identities (e.g., Russian tion of power to the republics is in the interests nuclear weapons, Ukrainian nuclear weap- of the U.S. and the West in general, said Nitze, ons, etc.) Suleimenov rejected as prohibitively as a pluralistic community of states poses less expensive the idea of moving nuclear of a threat to Western security than that once weapons in Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and presented by the USSR. Expressing his perplex- Byelorussia onto the territory of the RSFSR. ity at the Bush administrations’s past rudeness Given the uncertain future of democracy in to Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin, Russia, Suleimenov claimed it was more Nitze claimed that Yeltsin, “more than anyone prudent to avoid strengthening Russia’s else, should be the person with whom we seek military might and concentrate instead on to work.” reducing the number of nuclear weapons in Nitze conceded that uncertainty as to all Soviet republics. He urged the U.S. and the course of events in today’s Soviet Union is USSR to reduce their arsenals to the lowest and will continue to be a major problem for possible level required to safeguard security, U.S. policymakers. Nevertheless, he argues a number he specified as somewhere near that U.S. policy could be based on the 1,000 missiles apiece. “In the future, we must reasonable expectation that today’s USSR will recognize that nuclear weapons cannot be a eventually be replaced by a loose confedera- tool of national security and defense,” tion of sovereign states composed of a reflected Suleimenov. “It is our dream that all “handful” of former republics surrounded by nuclear weapons worldwide eventually be several small independent states. The speaker placed under the authority of an interna- called for the U.S. government to encourage tional body such as the U.N. Security Coun- continued economic and democratic political cil.” Suleimenov counseled the “Nuclear reforms in the republics and to work against Club”—the USA, USSR, U.K., France, and any obstacles to the decentralization now China—to close their nuclear testing facilities occurring in the USSR. Although the center and make radical cuts in their arsenals by will most likely remain the key representative 1995 or face the inevitable consequence of a of the Soviet Union in arms control negotia- failure to renew the Nuclear Non-Prolifera- tions and in forums such as the U.N. Security tion Treaty: an arms race among new nuclear Council, Nitze charged that the union govern- powers. Suleimenov’s admonition to the ment now represents little else and that U.S. Soviet republics was, in essence, identical to policy should concentrate on relations with his message to the world’s nuclear powers: the individual republics. 4 Nitze defined the dominant security Emphasizing the continued need for concerns of the United States with respect to deterrence and the consequent need to assure the USSR today as control over the Soviet the reliability of nuclear weapons through nuclear arsenal, the size and power of the testing, Nitze rejected the idea of a compre- Red Army, spillover effects of potential hensive nuclear test ban. He decried Presi- armed ethnic conflicts on neighboring states, dent Bush’s order to take American B-1 and the debilitating impact of a complete bombers off alert status, contending the collapse of the Soviet economy on the states action could create a temptation for a first of Eastern Europe. Preservation of the system strike against the U.S. arsenal and reiterating of central, unified control over the 30,000 his belief that military capability, not a nuclear weapons located on the territory of the relaxed psychological atmosphere, is the best USSR should be the prime objective of U.S. guarantee of security. The speaker also policy, said Nitze. Noting the preference of disdained the idea of a strategic defense most republics for some kind of central control system. “Frankly,” he said, “I think it’s restrained by their veto power, Nitze was impractical to have a really useful defense optimistic about the changes for a reconstituted against anything other than a very small, central government to retain authority over the accidental firing of nuclear weapons.” Soviet nuclear arsenal. He called for the Although he supports continued research on United States to offer this body technical aid strategic defense, Nitze claimed that no and assistance to ensure the safety and research had yet demonstrated its viability. reliability of Soviet command and control Nitze advised against any large-scale systems. At the same time, continued Nitze, economic aid to the Soviet Union at present, the United States should press for deep and claiming such aid “could do no lasting good” stabilizing cuts in both countries’ strategic until the foundations of a market economy nuclear arsenals and a reduction in the have been created, a process which awaits the capabilities of the Soviet Army. outcome of the republics’ current negotia- Nitze expressed his support for Presi- tions on a common economic system and the dent Bush’s recent initiative which would distribution of economic power between the abolish ground-based and remove sea-based republics and the diminishing center. It is this tactical nuclear weapons, but stressed that structural economic problem, not a lack of the United States should seek a comprehen- foreign exchange, which underlies the Soviet sive arms reduction agreement with the debt problem, said Nitze, dismissing the USSR. He argued that START II should do utility of forgiving Soviet debt. The speaker what the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks did, however, support direct U.S. aid for Treaty had failed to do: create a safe and military conversion and the transition of stable strategic balance by sharply reducing military personnel into the civilian economy. the total number of nuclear warheads on the overriding U.S. objective in this area is to both sides. A second START treaty should, reduce Soviet weapons production to as close according to Nitze, ban multiple warhead to zero as possible, said Nitze, though the U.S. ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), cannot directly influence such a decision. “The special-function nuclear warheads, maneu- real problem is to get at the job of increasing vering reentry vehicles, and the testing of Soviet domestic civilian production,” observed missiles specially altered for short flight Nitze, asserting that civilian production could times, as well as further reduce throwweight increase simply by halting the extreme drain on limits, strengthen verification procedures, resources and skilled manpower required by and require the destruction of excess missiles weapons production. rather than their storage. Asked if the United —by Peggy McInerny Kingdom, France, and China should be included in a new round of strategic arms Vol. IX No. 3 1991 negotiations, Nitze replied their inclusion Democrats to Use Authoritarian Measures? would unnecessarily complicate the negotia- “The problem [in the Soviet Union] tion process. It is advisable for the U.S. and today is that some of the new democrats are USSR to maintain arsenals of strategic returning to Bolshevism, as they really nuclear weapons at a level greater than those believe they can use authoritarian measures of the three other countries, claimed Nitze, to introduce democracy,” said Fëdor recommending a limit of no less than 5,000 Burlatskii at the Kennan Institute on 7 missiles for each side. November 1991. Former editor of 5 Literaturnaia gazeta, Burlatskii is currently a benefit from the entire reform process. He Guest Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center. attributed the delay in introducing private Burlatskii argued that the difficulties previously property precisely to the struggle within the faced by Gorbachev are now faced by the bureaucracy and the ruling elite. The reluc- leaders of the republics: implementing reform in tance of members of state and collective farms a conservative society appears to require to assume the risks of private farming is authoritarian measures, measures which another factor delaying the enactment of threaten to end in authoritarianism and not private property, conceded Burlatskii, democracy. Emergency decrees issued by pointing out that the RSFSR parliament has Russian democrats will be no more effective yet to create any credit or technical supply than those of Gorbachev in the past “unless guarantees for individual farmers. they are [enforced by] very harsh measures,” Russia needs at least 30 to 40 years to said Burlatskii. change its society profoundly, contended According to the speaker, the predilec- Burlatskii. “Our generation, who belong to tion for authoritarian approaches shared by the 1960s, will only prepare the platform for such varied politicians as USSR President real, deep change of our society. We de- Gorbachev, Russian President Yeltsin, and stroyed the old system and this is not a bad Moscow Mayor Popov can be traced to the thing, but the formation of a real civil society evolution of communism in the Soviet Union depends on the next generation,” he con- and the peculiar nature of Russian democ- cluded. Russia will most likely follow the racy. Communism in the USSR became example of the last years of the Franco era in identified over time with an authoritarian Spain, said the speaker, in which step-by-step regime and great personal power, explained liberalization will be implemented after the Burlatskii, and these two realities became the formation of an authoritarian regime. guiding beliefs of Communists. The Russian Initiation of genuine market reform today tradition of seeking direct representation and may require authoritarian measures in Russia not parliamentary democracy, he added, also and other former republics because of the creates an attraction for authoritarian diffusion of political power and economic methods. Neither the people nor the politi- disintegration of the Union, he observed. “I cians perceive a need to divide power don’t like [this idea],” he commented, “but it between a leader and a parliament or may be a realistic option.” legislature, he commented; both view an The failure of the August 1991 coup elected leader such as Yeltsin as the agent of destroyed the Communist Party and the KGB the people. Without a restraining balance of a (“the fundamental institutions of the Commu- parliament, this kind of “commonwealth” nist system”), ended the duality of power democracy practically paves the way for an between the republics and the center, and led authoritarian ruler. to the disintegration of the Russian state and In support of his argument, Burlatskii the superpower which once was the Soviet pointed out that the RSFSR parliament had Union, concluded Burlatskii. “Simply speak- recently granted Yeltsin the right to assume ing, Yeltsin won,” he stated, “Gorbachev lost both the post of President and Prime Minister perhaps 80 percent of his power.” He de- of the Russian Republic. Burlatskii was scribed the revolution which followed the alarmed, however, that the parliament coup as a revolution of bureaucratic elites— refused Yeltsin emergency powers to intro- not a popular revolution—which the upper, duce private property. The outcome of this central-level bureaucracy lost power to the refusal could well mean that the state and middle-level bureaucracy especially in the Party bureaucracy, together with the black republics) and middle-level intelligentsia. market, will divide state property among Burlatskii pinpointed four initial themselves before private property is legal- mistakes in Gorbachev’s perestroika: not ized—thus depriving the average citizen of beginning with agricultural reform; avoiding any gain from legalization. direct popular election; declining to divide “This outcome is my biggest fear,” said the Communist Party by removing conserva- Burlatskii, noting that today’s ruling elite tives from the Politburo; and attempting the would then succeed in retaining both power impossible task of forming a federation of and control over real property in Russia. Until republics. The speaker also indicated that he private property is legalized, he emphasized did not believe Gorbachev had expected again, the people will receive no tangible revolutions in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev 6 sought to create a groundswell of support late 1988 to the present, when a crisis situa- from below in these countries in order to tion developed in the Soviet Union. Among fight conservatives in the USSR and launch the causes of the current crisis, Ligachëv reforms in the Soviet Union itself, he argued. listed “a weakening of the democratic and In effect, commented Burlatskii, “Gorbachev social processes of perestroika,” political thought he could create a group of mini- instability, the large military budget of the Gorbachevs” in Eastern Europe. Finally, USSR, and the breakdown of economic ties Burlatskii contended that Gorbachev had between the Soviet Union and the countries of voluntarily turned toward the right in winter Eastern Europe. “If we do not succeed in 1990 because he very much wanted to save the seriously cutting back military expenditures,” Russian state and feared he would bear the he emphasized, “we will not be able to push historical responsibility for its disintegration. through any significant reforms.” He pre- Whereas real revolutions led by anti- dicted that economic and food supply prob- Communists took place in Eastern Europe in lems would become far graver during the 1989, in the USSR Communists themselves led coming winter, especially in large cities and an “anti-Communist revolution,” claimed industrial centers, but declined to predict Burlatskii. The phenomenon of Communists another coup attempt. leading the reform revolution in Russia can be “I don’t agree with those who consider traced to the long erosion of Communism and the worsening economic conditions in the the Communist Party in the USSR. He con- Soviet Union as an inevitable accompaniment tended the Party had been divided into two to perestroika,” declared Ligachëv. “I am very parts since the Stalin-Bukharin discussions of much for serious, deep reform, but I feel it the 1920s: “real Communists who believed in should continue gradually, without improvi- world revolution” and “some sort of social sations, without promises, without saying democrats.” The latter tendency never died out, that in a year and a half we will have Para- argued the speaker, and provided the founda- dise on earth.” According to Ligachëv, two tion from which Khrushchev, and later fundamental political tendencies now exist in Gorbachev, sprang to power. the USSR. One advocates the complete —by Peggy McInerny replacement of the Soviet political and economic system along the lines of the U.S. Vol. IX No. 4 1991 model and the other supports continued Perestroika in Retrospect reform of the Soviet system. He identified “We introduced perestroika not to himself as an adherent of the second ten- replace the Soviet system, but to reform it. It dency, arguing that the Soviet Union must was not in our mind to change the underly- create its own economic system while ing economic and social structures of our studying the examples of other countries. society,” asserted Egor Kuz’mich Ligachëv at Ligachëv identified reform of public the Kennan Institute on 14 November 1991. property as the central issue of further A member of the Politburo of the Communist reform. He observed that most public Party of the Soviet Union from 1985 through property in fact became state property in the 1990, Ligachëv spoke at the Kennan Institute Soviet Union, saying, “I feel we built an on 14 and 15 November. “In my opinion,” extremely statist type of socialism which has continued Ligachëv, “things were proceeding spent itself entirely.” Property reform should much more smoothly while we were reform- focus on collective forms of ownership with ing the system.” The speaker explained that respect to factories, state farms, and collective he had come to America both to break an old farms, he argued, contending this was the tradition of the Politburo by remaining active preference of contemporary workers’ and in public life and to convey to Americans his peasants’ movements in the USSR. Overall, understanding of the processes of perestroika the speaker advocated a mixed market which and reform in the Soviet Union. retained some level of centrally planned The former Secretary of the Central production, but gave private ownership and Committee of the CPSU claimed that market relations precedence in the service perestroika could roughly be divided into two sector. Contending that particular attention parts: the first part from 1985–88, when needs to be paid to developing infrastructure progress in both domestic and foreign affairs in the agricultural sector, Ligachëv advocated was achieved and people retained a sense of direct American investment in small and hope about the future, the second part from medium-sized factories which would 7 produce the means of production for storage not the way to solve problems in the Soviet and food processing facilities. These projects Union,” he remarked. The speaker repeatedly could begin in the individual republics today, protested as anti-democratic the banning of he declared. the Communist Party and its activities Questioned about the formation of throughout the Soviet Union. He expressed Central Committee commissions at the the conviction that a new party of socialist/ September 1988 Party Plenum, Ligachëv communist orientation will be formed in the responded that their creation had indeed Soviet Union—not on a countrywide basis, meant that “the Secretariat, as the operative but in each of the republics—and that talks center of the Party, which exercised control were already taking place regarding its over personnel and the fulfillment of deci- formation. Ligachëv claimed he would play sions adopted by the Party, was destroyed. only an advisory role with respect to such a This proved to be a major loss to our sys- new party, declaring that leadership would tem—we lost a very, very important organ of belong to the younger generation. our party,” he concluded. Ligachëv gave two —by Peggy McInerny reasons for this move by Gorbachev. First, he asserted, “Whenever conflicts or tensions Vol. IX No. 5 1991 occurred, Gorbachev relied on his favorite The New Political Elite in Russia method: that or reorganization.” Second, A new political elite has come to power Ligachëv claimed that Gorbachev could not in Russia as a result of the failure of the propose the question of replacing Ligachëv August 1991 coup and subsequent collapse of on the Politburo at the September 1988 the Soviet state, argued Pilar Bonet in a Plenum, as “the majority of the Central lecture at the Kennan Institute on 6 Decem- Committee supported my views at the time, ber 1991. Currently a Research Scholar at the and for Gorbachev to have come out with Kennan Institute, Bonet was chief Moscow this proposal would have been very danger- correspondent for the Madrid daily El Pais ous [for him].” from 1983–91. Whereas the former elite was Although he expressly qualified his Soviet, Communist, and defined itself in criticism as “mild,” Ligachëv made clear that relation to USSR President Mikhail he considered Gorbachev to have destroyed Gorbachev, Bonet claimed the new elite is collective leadership. “Collective leadership culturally Russian, non- or anti-Communist, in the Party reached the point that when and defines itself in relation to Russian Gorbachev traveled abroad, he would not Republic President Boris Yeltsin. Bonet leave anyone in charge,” he said. He denied, contended that Yeltsin and the politicians however, that there had even been an who surround him were late to comprehend attempt to unseat Gorbachev as the General the idea of a Russian state. This group Secretary of the CPSU while Ligachëv was a possesses an “in vitro patriotism,” she member of the Politburo. continued, one which differs markedly from Responding to an inquiry regarding his the patriotism of the coup organizers as well involvement in the decision to use force to as that of Russian nationalist circles. end the demonstrations in Tbilisi in April The new Russian political elite has been 1989, Ligachëv claimed that the recommen- in the process of development since Spring dations presented by the Politburo to 1990, explained Bonet, when the national Gorbachev and Shevardnadze upon their Soviet parliament (the USSR Supreme Soviet) return from abroad at that moment “were clearly began to lag behind the political entirely peaceful in nature—they did not in evolution of the country as a whole. This any fashion recommend the introduction of group began to play a major role in Soviet troops.” The speaker also denied any respon- politics only after the coup, when it con- sibility for the publication of the Nina sciously adopted the idea of a Russian state Andreeva article in Sovetskaia Rossiia in as a “practical political decision,” said Bonet. Spring 1987. Although a sense of the Russian state did Reflecting on the failed coup of August develop during the war of laws between the 1991, Ligachëv claimed that the leaders of the USSR and RSFSR governments over the past coup were in no way traitors. “The people year-and-a-half, observed Bonet, “for this somehow tried to bring the country out of its team, Russia was mainly a political arena to crisis, but their methods were anti-constitu- fight against Gorbachev and the bureaucratic tional and, in general, military methods are and centralized state that Gorbachev personi- 8 fied.” This explains Yeltsin’s imprudent out of the government, Rutskoi could find encouragement of local autonomies during support in emotional Russian nationalist his long trip across Russia in the summer of circles.) Returning to Burbulis, Bonet said he 1990, noted the speaker. began his political career as organizer of the According to Bonet, the new Russian Diskusionnaia tribuna debate club in political elite is roughly composed of three Sverdlovsk, now Ekaterinburg. Elected a basic groups: “the disappointed” (reformist deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet in Spring politicians who originally supported 1989, he became one of the leaders of the Gorbachev, but lost faith in the USSR Presi- Democratic Party of Russia along with dent), individuals and social groups who Nikolai Travkin and soon combined this post were too young or not yet able to get in- with responsibilities as Yeltsin’s personal volved in politics during the 1989 all-Union representative to all democratic parties and parliamentary elections (e.g., the indepen- groups in the RSFSR Parliament. By autumn dent trade union movement and the rising 1990, he had become one of the two vice- merchant class), and supporters of Boris presidents of the Senior Advisory Council, a Yeltsin. Bonet stressed, however, the difficult body largely composed of former supporters of categorizing the members of this elite. The (“the disappointed”) of USSR President political science in Russia today is a “muddy Gorbachev who left the Kremlin for the river” in which political groups and new Russian White House. Burbulis was with rules of the game have not yet crystallized, Yeltsin at the White House during the coup she explained. and is the person who brought economists Bonet devoted the majority of her Egor Gaidar’ and Aleksandr Shokin into the remarks to Yeltsin supporters, dividing them Russian government. between people who support Yeltsin because Alex Pravda, Professor of Politics at St. they see him as the main instrument of radical Anthony’s College of Oxford University and reform and those who support him out of a member of the Kennan Institute Academic personal loyalty. The “Sverdlovsk Family” Council, was commentator at the lecture. forms the largest contingent of Yeltsin’s Pravda drew attention to the revolutionary personal followers, explained Bonet, and is process of self-organization and fragmenta- composed of former members of the tion of elites in Russian society today, Sverdlovsk Communist Party nomenklatura as deeming the extent to which elite self- well as Sverdlovsk reformist politicians who organization reaches down into society an met Yeltsin during and after the all-union 1989 important barometer of political cohesion. parliamentary elections. “Until after the coup,” Yeltsin and his team need to build interme- she observed, “reformist-minded politicians diate institutions that can attract potentially paid little attention to Yeltsin’s enduring important interest groups into the policy connections to the Sverdlovsk nomenklatura.” process, argued Pravda. Bonet confirmed But after the coup, the two wings of the that one such group—the new merchant “Sverdlovsk Family” clashed in a battle for class—was not represented in the RSFSR power within the Yeltsin presidential adminis- Parliament. However, she indicated that a tration which drew on throughout September leading representative of this group, Direc- and October. Bonet claimed the battle was tor of the Moscow Commodities and Raw finally decided in favor of the reformist Materials Stock Exchange Konstantin politician wing, represented by RSFSR State Boroboi, was well-aware of the need to Councillor Genadii Burbulis, a professor of support new political institutions. Empha- philosophy who is a Marxism-Leninism sizing the fluid nature of politics in Russia specialist. Burbulis prevailed over the former at present, Bonet argued that although apparatchik wing, represented by Iurii Petrov, Russia lacks the political and social institu- head of Yeltsin’s presidential administration tions normal in the West, embryos of such and former First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk institutions do exist and their representa- Party organization after Yeltsin. tives “are more or less in contact with Burbulis is the number two man in the Yeltsin.” Although she claimed Yeltsin is Russian government today after Yeltsin, only the leader of the second part the contended Bonet; sources in the Russian transition period in Russia, Bonet conceded government have told her that Vice President that today, “Yeltsin is the greatest hope for Aleksandr Rutskoi appears to be on the way change and reform for Russians—he out. (Bonet pointed to the danger that once represents the highest institution with the 9 most legitimacy in a context where legiti- Communist Party of the Soviet Union in macy is mostly lacking.” 1969, however, the Procuracy’s focus changed —by Peggy McInerny to protecting the economic interests of the state. Thereafter, the bulk of its activities Vol. IX No. 6 1991 were directed toward prosecuting cases Procuracy Facing Extinction? involving theft of state property, violations of “For seventy-odd years the [USSR] labor discipline, falsification of production Procuracy, as a unified, centralized, and figures, and the like. When Gorbachev came hierarchical organization, has been willing to to power, said Smith, procurators were coexist with the fiction of federalism in the spending most of their time on the telephone Soviet Union. But now that federalism and threatening factory managers to meet the national pressures for power-sharing at production goals of the State Plan. republic and sub-republic levels has become The commencement of the relatively real, it has posed a fundamental challenge to liberal period in the Procuracy corresponded the...whole raison d’être of the Procuracy,” with Mikhail Gorbachev’s entry into law school observed Gordon Smith in a lecture at the at Moscow State University. The law school was Kennan Institute on 9 December 1991. then a leading center of judicial reformers who Professor of Government at the University of advocated using the “General Supervision” South Carolina, Smith described the evolu- duties of the Procuracy to protect the rights of tion of the Soviet Procuracy under perestroika individual citizens. Gorbachev was a student in and the prospects for its future in the Russian the State Law Section (kafedra gosprava) where Republic. Although he expected the “rapid specific courses on the general supervisory decline and dismemberment of what has for duties of the Procuracy were taught, observed seventy years been the premier legal institu- Smith. The experience of Gorbachev and those tion in the Soviet legal system,” Smith’s around him during their years at Moscow State remarks indicated that the 270-year legacy University Law School was undoubtedly of an institution originally created by Tsar recalled by them when they launched Peter I in 1722 could influence the future perestroika, said the speaker, and most likely structure of procuratorial offices in the contributed to the USSR President’s concept of former republics. a law-based state. From its very founding early in the “The Procuracy as an institution was eighteenth century, said Smith, the Procuracy very late in responding to Gorbachev’s policies was not a legal prosecutor’s office in the of glasnost’, perestroika, and democratization. In Western sense of the term, but rather an fact, like other institutions of hierarchical state instrument of state power intended to ensure authority such as the armed forces, the KGB, the implementation of tsarist decrees and and the police, glasnost’ really seems to have occasional Senate legislation—“the eyes and thrown the Procuracy off balance,” remarked the ears of the state in the provinces.” Under Smith. Despite a special Politburo meeting the Soviet regime, the Procuracy was charged devoted to the problems of the Procuracy in not only with the investigation and prosecu- October 1986, a 1987 Central Committee tion of criminal offenses, but also with resolution criticizing the institution, and the supervision of the prison system and places appointment of an outsider, Aleksandr of detention, juvenile affairs commissions, Sukharev, to shake up the bureaucracy as and the activities of the courts. Perhaps the USSR Procurator-General in May 1988, the most intriguing duties of the Procuracy fell Procuracy resisted policy change. Smith under the rubric of “General Supervision.” contended, however, that in 1987–88 personal These tasks permitted the institution to interviews and public opinion polls convinced function in the capacity of an ombudsman for him there was no returning to the days when a brief period between 1955 and 1968, the Procuracy used “General Supervision” to explained Smith, when there was a conscious protect citizens’ rights. By the late 1980s, effort to use the Procurator’s office to investi- continued the speaker, most people viewed gate citizens’ grievances such as violations of the Procuracy like the KGB or the MVD labor rights, illegal imposition of fines, (Ministry of Internal Affairs)—as an instru- housing complaints, and cases of officials ment of state power—and preferred to seek exceeding the authority of their positions. In legal remedies through the courts. compliance with directives from both the Sukharev’s attempted to reform the USSR Politburo and the Central Committee of the Procuracy, as well as the political fallout from 10 the Ivanov and Gdlyan corruption investiga- religious doctrine, claimed Radyshevskii. tion, polarized the institution between adher- People are searching for spirituality and an ents of reform and those who wished to identity apart from communism, and the preserve the institution’s current structure and Russian Orthodox Church—because it is part duties. After Sukharev’s replacement in of the Russian tradition—is the obvious December 1990 by Nikolai Trubin, the scene of choice for many, he said. legal reform shifted to the Russian Republic, Radyshevskii gave an overview of the where RSFSR Procurator Valentin Stepankov impressions gained from covering religious was establishing a new system of interlocking communities in the Soviet Union during the protocols between the Russian Procuracy and last few years, including the Russian Ortho- the independent procuracies of other repub- dox Church, the Baptist Church, and the lics. Although Stepankov has fought to have Hare Krishna sect of Hinduism. Reporting on power devolve from the USSR Procuracy to several Christian denominations was not a the republic level, he evidently resists struc- simple matter of approaching sources and tural reform which would remove any areas of asking questions, said Radyshevskii. A authority from the Procuracy’s domain. Baptist official, for example, would be Whereas Stepankov represents one reluctant to speak frankly with a reporter possibility for the future of the Russian who could not demonstrate knowledge of the Procuracy, public expectations and the Bible. An Orthodox priest, he continued, outspoken RSFSR Minister of Justice Fëderov would likewise expect you to “make your represent an entirely different prospect. In a own statement of faith” before talking freely major speech to Russian judges in October in an interview, which itself required consult- 1991, Fëderov “described the Procuracy as a ing with the priest’s bishop—who would sacred cow created by Stalin and Vyshinskii inquire as to the type of paper for which the as an instrument of state coercion,” said reporter worked. A reporter who did not ask Smith. The only power which Fëderov for a blessing upon meeting an Orthodox believes the Procuracy should retain is that of cleric, moreover, would invariably be treated prosecuting criminal cases, continued the with more caution than one who did. speaker, a view very much in line with the Radyshevskii was the first reporter draft constitution for the Russian Republic permitted to spend time with Russian published in Rossiiskaia gazeta two months Orthodox seminary students at Sergiev ago. The draft constitution transferred the Posad, as well as the first male journalist to Procuracy’s criminal investigatory powers to report from the Orthodox nunnery in a new agency, its general supervisory Kostroma. He described the seminary functions to the new office of People’s students ne met as extremely conservative, Ombudsman (Narodoniy pravozashchitnik), with strong anti-communist sentiments as and its responsibility for supervising the well as strong suspicions of ecumenism and court to the Russian Supreme Court. Smith the democratic movement. The Slavophile implied that the direction of legal reform in convictions of these future priests, Russia rests with Yeltsin and the choice he Radyshevskii held, could do much to makes between the options represented by encourage the repetition of what he viewed Stepankov and Fëderov. as the historic weakness of Russian Ortho- —by Peggy McInerny doxy: limiting the concept of the Orthodox Church to the Russian people and nation. Vol. IX No. 7 1992 Among this younger generation of clergy, Reporting on Religion in Russia however, are people with a talent for public Russian Orthodoxy is replacing relations who are adept at managing the Marxism-Leninism as the predominant Church’s interactions with the outside ideology of Russia today, contended Dmitrii world, he added. Radyshevskii cited in this Radyshevskii in a lecture at the Kennan respect the unusually gifted Father Andrei, Institute on 13 January 1992. Radyshevskii is a 28-year-old seminarian at Sergiev Posad a reporter for the newspaper Moscow News who later became press secretary for and recently worked at Time magazine in Patriarch Aleksii II. Washington, D.C. Thousands of people are An important pedagogical problem of being baptized in the Russian Orthodox the Russian Orthodox Church is its poor Church every day, but this does not always training in apologetics—the Church is simply indicate a conscious choice of a church or not prepared to speak with young intellectu- 11 als, maintained the speaker. If intellectuals and many have a background in philosophi- who question doctrine have no family or cal training, added the speaker. Today they other ties to Russian Orthodoxy, they may have two temples in Moscow and claim turn to the Catholic Church or a Protestant or 15,000 members in the capital alone. Hindu sect, he noted. According to Although there are no official obstacles Radyshevskii, Patriarach Aleksii II is most to the practice of Judaism, claimed worried about the “invasion of Catholics” in Radyshevskii, Jewish religious leaders with Russia and the danger of raskol—a schism whom he has spoken believe there is no between the jurisdiction of the Russian future for Jews in Russia. They advocate the patriarch and the émigré church represented completion of the exodus, he noted. by the Russian Orthodox Synod in New York. Radyshevskii confirmed that there was wide The Vatican has sent eighteen bishops to interest in Slavic pagan beliefs in Russia, Russia in the last year, mostly to areas in mentioning a pagan group within the central Siberia and not to regions formerly Pamiat’ movement as well as the Russian disputed by the two churches, such as Orthodox Herald, a newspaper which regu- western Ukraine. There is now a Jesuit larly publishes the pagan calendar, pagan college in Novosibirsk, related the speaker. medical practices, and pagan beliefs in The Baptist Church is the most impor- addition to interviews with Russian Ortho- tant and popular Protestant church in Russia, dox priests. Queried about Orthodox theol- said Radyshevskii, active in both charity and ogy in Russia in the third millennium of business. However, there has been a split Christianity, Radyshevskii, who plans to within the Baptist Church since at least 1973 enter divinity school in the United States this over the issue of registration with the fall, said he saw a hopeful future for Russian Council(s) on Religious Affairs. There is a Orthodox thought in the direction pursued bitter enmity between those Baptists who by the late Father Aleksandr Men’, a priest registered and those who refused to do so, he whose work “reconciled Russian Orthodox remarked. he noted that unlike the Russian belief and Russian Orthodox doctrine with Orthodox Church, Baptists and other Protes- Western Christianity, Eastern religion, tant sects are very involved in charitable agnosticism, philosophy, and ecumenism.” activities. Seventh-Day Adventists and —by Peggy McInerny Pentecostals are also thriving in Russia, said Radyshevskii, but continue to encounter Vol. IX No. 8 1992 difficulties with legal registration. He Self-Determination the Answer? observed that provincial Councils on Reli- “We need to rethink the idea of human gious Affairs, who once called the local rights in order to incorporate the right of all Communist Party committee for permission nations to self-determination,” contended to register new religious organization, often Elena Bonner at a lecture cosponsored by the now call the local Russian Orthodox bishop. Kennan Institute and the Russian Area Unfortunately, he continued, bishops have Studies Program of Georgetown University been known to respond that the Russian on 14 January 1992. A human rights activist Orthodox Church answers all the spiritual of international renown, Bonner argued that needs of the local population. the question of self-determination was crucial According to Radyshevskii, two for the world’s future, affecting not only the religious communities in Russia have been nations and peoples of the former Soviet severely repressed in the recent past: Hare union, but those of Yugoslavia and Northern Krishnas and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Jehovah’s Ireland, as well as the Basques of Spain and Witnesses suffered greatly for their position the Kurds of the Middle East. as conscientious objectors and were often “We have mixed up the problems of tried and imprisoned several times for their self-determination and the inviolability of refusal to serve in the Soviet Army. During borders in both the Soviet Union and the the late 1970s and early 1980s, Hare Krishnas West,” she maintained. This paradox can were also widely arrested, imprisoned, or only be resolved by the development of a placed in psychiatric hospitals, often on the new concept of human rights, asserted grounds of being vegetarian. They were Bonner, one which she believes will be accused of starving themselves to the level of achieved only after much bloodshed. disability, explained Radyshevskii. A great “It is hard to me to understand,” said number of Hare Krishnas are intellectuals Bonner, “that Russia, in order to bloom, must 12 first divide into parts.” Bonner firmly supported Bonner also spoke extensively about the right of nations to democratically choose political and economic conditions in the their own form of government. She claimed the former Soviet Union. She argued that right of self-determination is implicitly recog- Gorbachev failed because he attempted to nized in the third paragraph of the United reform the USSR’s totalitarian economic Nations’ Universal Declaration on Human system without changing the totalitarian Rights, which prohibits governments to govern essence of its political system: the unified, in a manner so cruel as to provoke rebellion. centralized government. The democratic Only the people living on the territory of a movements born under perestroika were specific place can decide the question of their doomed to fail as well because they were political system, insisted Bonner, specifying that oriented toward the past, i.e., toward pre- once they have done so by democratic means, serving the empire, rather than toward the they must then guarantee the rights of minori- formation of the new states we see today, ties within their chosen system. asserted Bonner. Although she found the “People will agree to unite only in collapse of the USSR “a positive and progres- freedom,” she observed, citing the example sive fact,” she lamented the absence of of Western Europe, whose nations are now constitutions and law in the Soviet Union’s voluntarily choosing greater unity only after successor states. “As we move toward existing as independent states. Asked if she economic reform, all these states are left understood the universal right of self- without law,” she observed. determination to imply the right to secession, Democratic reforms under Gorbachev the speaker conceded that she did not have destroyed the country’s monetary system, an answer to the predicament in which the leaving the new states of the Commonwealth right to secession leads to the right to self- born into extreme poverty, asserted Bonner. The defense—and thus, often to violence. She gold and hard currency reserves of 1989 which insisted, however, that self-determination would have enabled them to implement was a necessary step towards eventual economic reforms are gone, she remarked. integration, citing Andrei Dmitrievich Bonner pointed out that under the cover of the Sakharov’s idea of world government as the democratic movement, “the greatest theft in ultimate goal of this political process. human history” took place: the assumption of Bonner was critical of the West’s long control over state factories and enterprises by resistance to the USSR’s collapse into inde- former Communist Party apparatchiks and pendent states, as well as its refusal to members of the military-industrial complex, recognize the right of self-determination of with Arkadii Volskii at their head. peoples within these states, such as the Bonner predicted that a new wealthy populations of Nagorno-Karabakh and South elite—“the top 200 families” of a new Ossetia. “When the West refuses to stand up system—would emerge in the new states of for this right, it eases the path toward the Commonwealth from among those who violence and civil war,” she asserted. Bonner surrounded Gorbachev in the democratic claimed the West could play a great role in reform movement. These families will be the the development of democracy in the motor of a new economic system, she Commonwealth of Independent States by surmised, playing much the same role as the holding the leaders of its member states to robber-baron families of industrial America. universal criteria of human rights, especially Asked to comment on democratic with respect to the protection of minority leaders active in Russia, Bonner said, “Yeltsin rights. is the most important and interesting demo- The speaker drew particular attention cratic leader in Russia today.” She contended to the situation of Nagorno-Karabakh, an that Yeltsin’s memoirs, in contrast to those of Armenian enclave within the Republic of leading figures of the perestroika era, rang Azerbaijan which has declared its indepen- true. Pointing out that he is the legally dence after a democratic referendum. elected leader of Russia and was, until quite Armenia and Azerbaijan are not in conflict, recently, trusted by the great mass of the insisted Bonner, but there are continuing Russian people, Bonner said she found large-scale violations of the human rights of Western mistrust of Yeltsin really to be Armenians on the territory of Azerbaijan. mistrust of Russians themselves. The West’s “How long will it take civilization to recog- continued support of former USSR President nize this genocide?” she asked. Mikhail Gorbachev long after the majority of 13 people of the USSR had lost their faith in him recruits, the Soviet educational system, the is simply inexplicable, she said. Today, issue of a draft versus professional military, argued Bonner, this is a serious issue with and increased contact with the USSR’s regard to Yeltsin. “The rest of the world traditional enemy, the West. needs to pay attention and heed the opinion Herspring suggested that the August of the people of Russia,” she concluded. 1991 putsch was not a military coup at all. By —by Peggy McInerny its refusal to become involved and by deploying forces around the Russian parlia- Vol. IX No. 9 1992 ment, the military saved the reform process, The Commonwealth and the Military he asserted. The military did not become The strategic threat presented by the involved in the coup because it did not want Soviet military over the past forty years is responsibility for the mess, argued the largely a thing of the past, contended Dale speaker. He cited a professional ethic, Herspring in a lecture at the Kennan Institute complacency, and divisions within the armed on 3 February 1992. Herspring, a former forces as additional reasons for their non- Foreign Service Officer, is currently a Fellow participation. The internal divisions turned at the Woodrow Wilson Center. In coming out to be even deeper than we had antici- years our attention will shift to the role pated, noted Herspring. played by the militaries of the various In the post-coup period the government republics on the domestic and regional purged the military of many high-ranking fronts, noted Herspring. There is little danger officers who had been neutral or not com- of praetorianism as classically defined in the pletely supportive of reformers during the former Soviet Union, he argued, but great coup. The military budget was substantially danger of “warlordism.” cut and the size of the force structure de- Herspring applied to his analysis of the creased from 4 to 3 million. According to Soviet military the conceptual framework of Herspring, all indications suggest the Soviet Samuel Huntington’s new book The Third army will shrink further to between 1.2 and Wave, in which Huntington suggests that 1.5 million men. Military exercises have been countries moving towards democratization curtailed, military preparedness has de- go through specific stages. In the first stage— creased, and naval deployments are at an all seizure of power—old forces are removed time low. Even without an articulated policy, it from power but do not disappear: the task is is clear that the government’s approach to the to get rid of the old power structure. This first military is divide and conquer, he observed. state began in the last 1980s in the Soviet “Can the democratic process be re- Union when traditional factors of cohesion versed?” Herspring asked rhetorically. There is were no longer functioning, contended no danger of a coup in the classic sense; the Herspring. Ideology simply became irrel- failure of the August putsch ended that threat, evant and the common bureaucratic element, he answered. The military is too divided, the CPSU, began to break up. A struggle cohesion is too low, he added. The danger now between reformers and what Huntington stems from charismatic colonels who could calls the “stand patters” was well under way, seize parts of the country in the event of a civil continued the speaker. Furthermore, he war or public disorder. For that reason, added, problems started to appear in the concluded Herspring, the situation is still in main elements of cohesion of the Soviet what Huntington identified as the “seizure of system—the military and the KGB, two power” stage. Most Central and East European bodies which served not only as a control countries have moved beyond this stage in device but, in a multinational state, as a their progress toward democratization, but in political socializing device. the former Soviet Union the entire situation The military’s response from 1985 to the could be reversed, he argued. time of the coup was one of confusion, Herspring highlighted several implica- remarked Herspring. It could not understand tions for Western policymakers. First, the the vehemence of public media attacks nature of the security threat has changed. The permitted under glasnost, he said. Media Russian nuclear threat remains, but at a attention forced the military to deal with much lower level. The real danger, according many longstanding problems: hazing, to Herspring, is the threat to nuclear power nepotism, questions of ethnicity, the Russian stations and chemical factories should civil language issue, the ineptitude of many war break out in Russia or other former 14 republics. Second, the movement toward definitionally biased,” asserted Martha Brill eleven sovereign national armies means a Olcott in a lecture at the Kennan Institute on much less modern, less threatening conven- 10 February 1992. Currently a Carnegie tional military force. Given recent budgetary Fellow at the Center on East-West Trade at considerations, the Russian military has Duke University, Olcott is Professor of Political accepted a semi-permanent status as a Science at Colgate University. technologically second-class power, pointed out The assumptions the United States the speaker. Finally, whatever military made about decolonization in Africa and emerges, regardless of whether it is Russian or Asia are simply not being applied to events Commonwealth, it will be smaller and more in the former Soviet Union today, argued professional. This reversal means that the Olcott. She contended that the United States, impact of Western diplomacy on the internal due to an implicit sympathy for Russia as a policy of the Commonwealth states will great power and lack of day-to-day contact probably be considerable, Herspring noted. with the successor states of the USSR, views Internal stability and the danger of these states through Russian eyes. As a result, warlordism have now become our key she said, there exists fundamental confusion concerns, emphasized the speaker. If Russia over what U.S. policy seeks to achieve in continues to drift and deteriorate, and the Russia and the newly-independent countries military cannot find the sense of direction and of the Commonwealth. order it craves, Herspring predicted further Two processes are occurring simulta- splits in the army and increased danger from neously in the former USSR today, said charismatic colonels. To these he added the Olcott: decolonization and decomposition of dangers of regional conflicts within the the old regime, with the latter complicated by Commonwealth and around its periphery and attempts to introduce a market and democ- “nuclear leakage,” or proliferation. racy in its place. The key to defining standards What should American policy be? of human rights and democracy which U.S. Former Soviet military officers in any of the policy can support in the former USSR is in republics are at their most malleable stage, choosing how to interpret the changes taking particularly in the mid-level officers, argued place there, she claimed. If one continues to Herspring. They do not understand the view the region as a single “space,” explained world or how to deal with it; we have a much Olcott, be it a single economic space or a greater ability to shape events than many of single defensive space, then decolonization in us believe, he insisted. He urged the United the former republics appears to threaten States to consider the problem of the former economic reform and democratization. If, Soviet military as a regional security issue, however, the phenomenon of decolonization is one in which military forces are viewed recognized, then the efforts of the Baltic and against the backdrop of changes in Central Commonwealth states to take control of their and Eastern Europe and the potential for national economies and downgrade the interregional conflict. We should work to political rights of Russian citizens makes eliminate the danger of conflict in this region, practical political sense. concluded Herspring, by increasing Russia’s Citing changes in the official languages military ties with the EEC, granting it of the former republics and, in former associate status within NATO, developing Muslim republics, the change of state closer military-to-military contacts, and holidays from Christian to Muslim holy days, cultivating greater economic ties between the Olcott asked: “Is this democratic or non- West and the former USSR. democratic? If you see it as a single space and —by Dan Abele a single regime, then yes, it’s very non- democratic. But if the region is decolonizing, Vol. IX No. 10 1992 then there are winners and there are losers, The Decolonization of the USSR and colonial settlers are classically [the] “[The United States] would have never losers.” allowed the French to speak for the Algerians The successor states of the USSR all face in 1962 or 1963—we would have viewed the the problem of creating a basis for political French position in Algeria as definitionally legitimacy and stability, argued Olcott. biased. Yet we have not assumed that the Although the Communist elite renounced its Russian position in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, ideology after the August 1991 coup, the Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Turkmenistan is speaker pointed out that this elite remains in 15 power in most Commonwealth states. Kazakhstan, she argued, as Kazakhstan does Renunciation of ideology does not, however, not seek independence so much as economic create legitimacy, she observed. “Everyone is union with Russia. the success or failure of assuming that economic recovery will be the economic reform in Russia will be crucial to key to creating political stability,” noted direction of future development in the Olcott. She disagreed with this assumption, region, she insisted. “If Russia fails to arguing that “the key to recovery...is the develop, that will simply push Central ability to define national self-interest in a way Asia—with a much more impoverished that creates a sufficient degree of political standard of living—further south,” noted loyalty to get one through a period of trying Olcott. Central Asian regimes not only face economic recovery.” the task of creating a widely-shared defini- The crisis of legitimacy is less acute in tion of national interest, said the speaker, but non-Russian lands than in Russia, noted will have to fight to define Islam as well. Olcott, as decolonization in the non-Russian Asserting that Islam was an important republics gives former Communist leaders element of state-building and would create some grounds for legitimacy. People are more the transition to decolonization in these willing to suffer the dislocations of state- states, Olcott remarked, “Islam is going to be building and economic reform if they believe the battleground in Central Asia.” they are achieving national independence in The speaker pointed out that the elites the process, she explained. The drive for of new Central Asian states are both smaller independence is absent in Russia, she said, and more inexperienced than the new making it much more difficult for the Yeltsin Russian elite. “No trained alternative elite, no regime to foster the political loyalty needed democratic opposition capable of assuming to weather economic reform. The crisis of power and ruling stably, exists in these building political legitimacy in Russia is countries,” she said. She urged the United further exacerbated by the quandary of States to recognize the Central Asian nations Russian self-definition. “What is Russia and and work with their present rulers, saying: what space does Russia occupy?” asked “We have to accept what these people are— Olcott. it is uncertain whether Russia can that they are not European societies and that hold together even within its current borders, they are decolonizing—and then set our said the speaker, citing the ethnic and sub- human rights goals within those conditions. regional loyalties of its population. —by Peggy McInerny “It is a mistake to assume that a recovery predicated on Russia will work, or Vol. IX No. 11 1992 that Russia will have the easiest time recover- Unrealistic Expectations a Danger ing,” concluded Olcott. The United States The West is poised to do great harm by must redefine its security interests in the contributing further to unrealistic expecta- region and develop policies to protect those tions in the former USSR and the countries of interests in the case Russia proves unable to Central and Eastern Europe, asserted recover. Instead of viewing Russia as the Zbigniew Brzezinski at George Washington element which will draw former republics University on 20 February 1992. There is a inward, she argued that the United States danger, he contended, that the inhabitants of should focus on the forces which are pulling the former Communist world will be seduced these new states outward—primarily the by procedural mechanisms sold to them by neighbors of the former Soviet Union. Olcott the West, such as plans for transition to a claimed four strategic zones are likely to market economy, which promise utopia in a emerge in the former USSR during the next short period of time. The reality is that it will twenty to fifty years: a Central European require a very long time to overcome the zone encompassing the Baltic states and political and social legacy of communism, Ukraine, the Southern Tier (including the said Brzezinski. The West, he insisted, must states of the Caucasus and Central Asia), an act responsibly and not encourage false autonomous economic unit in the Far East of expectations of rapid recovery. Brzezinski, Russia, and Russia itself. Counsellor at the Center for Strategic and Turning to Central Asia, Olcott con- International Studies and Osgood Professor tended these states must struggle to define of American Foreign Policy at the Paul H. their identities and plan self-propelled Nitze School of Advanced International development. Unique among them is Studies, was the keynote speaker at a confer- 16 ence on the social legacy of communism reaction to the Soviet Army crackdown in cosponsored by the Kennan Institute and Lithuania, the attempted putsch, and the East European Studies Program of the formation of the Commonwealth of Indepen- Woodrow Wilson Center and the Institute for dent States, respectively. In December, Yeltsin European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies and swallowed his chagrin and accepted the the Russian and East European Program of Ukraine as an equal partner; it is now up to George Washington University. Russia as the stronger party to take the lead Given the collapse of the utopia in negotiations with Ukraine, maintained promised by communism, political life in the Brzezinski. In contrast to Yeltsin, he noted former communist nations is likely to become that Russian Vice-President Rutskoi seeks to more unstable in the future as leaders find preserve some greater notion of Russia, as themselves driven by Brzezinski. Although Rutskoi’s criticisms of the Yeltsin government he claimed that Hungary, Czechoslovakia, ultimately focus on retaining or reviving the and Poland will find salvation in integration empire. Brzezinski encouraged Russia to with Western Europe, possibly by the end of grant maximum self-definition to its autono- this century, he specified that recovery mous regions and ethnic groups, arguing that elsewhere in Central Europe would be slow such groups must themselves learn that and in the Soviet Union would require no complete separatism is neither economically less than a quarter of a century. He estimated nor politically viable. at least one year of recovery would be Reflecting on the greater meaning of the needed for each year of communism in any collapse of communist regimes, Brzezinski given country. Recovery in the former USSR, declared that communism was ideologically he continued, will be far more difficult and dead. “Communism,” he contended, “was a prolonged than in Central Europe, with tragic perversion of the idealism and realism democracy most likely put off for some time of the crowning event of the 18th century— to come. Ukraine might achieve integration namely, the French Revolution.” A curious with Western Europe by the end of the first parallel can be drawn between the years 1789 decade of the twenty-first century, he specu- and 1989, he mused. In the two centuries lated, and, in the best case scenario, Russia which have intervened since the French by the end of the second. Revolution, he said, “we have witnessed an “The central internal issue [of Russian enormous rise in the alert political conscious- politics] in the immediate future will be ness of citizens” stemming from heightened whether it resumes efforts to remain an idealism and a faith in rationality. Calling imperial state or successfully abandons this Communism and Nazism the “bastard idea,” remarked Brzezinski. The problem of offspring of the French Revolution,” Russia, he said, is similar to that posed by the Brzezinski claimed both ideologies denied the concept of Britain and England: England is a inherent imperfection of man and the piece- country, whereas Britain encompasses a meal nature of real change. Communism, he greater notion. Rossiia (the Russian word for continued, was “an ideology which took Russia), he explained, implies both Britain idealism and rationality to inhuman extremes and England, both empire and nation. What and created enduring illusions which denied must be decided is whether Rossiia will come reality,...an extreme rationality translated into to mean a modern, European nation-state or social engineering. In the end, the Communist continue to refer to some larger entity, he experience will be perceived as the human remarked. “We must recognize that democ- equivalent of what is known in astrophysics as racy is simply not immediately attainable in the ‘black hole,’” he concluded. Russia,” said Brzezinski, claiming Russia’s Brzezinski defined the final legacy of most imperative need is to become a non- communism as the West’s need to develop a imperial state in the international system. new way of looking at the world. “We are For all the criticism of Russian Presi- seeing [today] a global political process which dent Boris Yeltsin as a populist, he clearly greatly differs from the system of international possesses the instinct that Russia can no relations of the nineteenth and twentieth longer afford to be an imperial state, said centuries,” he said. In a world characterized Brzezinski. Yeltsin demonstrated his disincli- by greater interaction and interdependence nation to pursue imperial policies in January, between national states, where internal and August, and December of 1991, said the external politics are more closely related than speaker, referring to the Russian leader’s in the past, he maintained that the concepts of 17 socialism, capitalism, and communism have odnorodnye vlecheniia: “Only now, for the first lost their analytical usefulness. The West time, Pierre came fully to appreciate the needs to rethink its analytical categories, said pleasure of food when he felt hungry, of drink Brzezinski. If it has the awareness to do so, he when he felt thirsty, of sleep when he was reflected, the West will have derived the most tired. The satisfaction of one’s needs—good useful lesson of the communist legacy. food, cleanliness, freedom—now that he was —by Peggy McInerny deprived of these things, seemed to Pierre perfect happiness.” Tolstoy’s descriptions of Vol. IX No. 12 1992 the French Army during the Battle of Tolstoy’s Philosophy of History Borodino further illustrate how the “uniform “The central idea of Tolstoy’s philoso- inclinations of men” drive history, noted phy of history is the dependence of historical Luria. In War and Peace, he pointed out, French circumstances on the coincidence of countless soldiers plunge into battle so that they may numbers of causes,” declared Jakov Luria in eat and rest afterwards as conquerors in a lecture at the Kennan Institute on 12 March Moscow. 1992. “Without each of these causes, [no “Tolstoy’s explanation of the actions of historical event] would happen, so that all of the French Army helps us to understand the these causes—millions of causes—coincide to more general idea of Tolstoy—that in order for bring about history,” he said. Currently a wars to begin, it is necessary that millions of Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Luria men should consent to carry out the will of is Professor Emeritus at the Institute of those weak individuals such as Napoleon and Russian Literature (Pushkin House) of the Aleksandr,” remarked Luria. Although Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Peters- Tolstoy shared a deterministic view of history burg. He based his lecture on an analysis of with Hegel and Marx, said Luria, he rejected Tolstoy’s novel War and Peace, lamenting the both the Hegelian “worship of progress” and fact that the vast majority of readers do not the idea that great personalities are the bearers read the historical parts of the book, namely, of historical progress. Neither did he share the chapters preceding the author’s narrative Marx’s conviction that the role of the philoso- of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia and the pher is to change the world. Tolstoy, said Battle of Borodino, as well as the book’s Luria, believed it is impossible for any man to second epilogue. Luria noted that Tolstoy’s change the world and denied all forms of views of history have in general received utopianism and social engineering. Chal- little attention by serious scholars and were lenged to defend his assertion that Tolstoy rejected outright by many critics. was not a utopian, given the author’s later “For Tolstoy,” remarked Luria, “‘great work and life, Luria responded that although men’ are labels which give names to events contradictory “utopian tendencies” existed in and, like labels, they have but the smallest his later thought, Tolstoy fully understood connection with the event itself.” As he the futility of any attempt to force change discounted the role of‘ “great men,” so too did upon the world. Tolstoy doubt the role of ideas in history, said The speaker insisted that Tolstoy’s ideas the speaker. According to Luria, Tolstoy of free will and historical necessity were not believed history was moved by “the coinci- contradictory. For Tolstoy, observed Luria, dence of wills of all who take part in [historical] “the integration of the differentials of history events.” The predetermination of this coinci- determines historical necessity, but every one dence lies in what Tolstoy called the “differen- of these differentials is an infinitesimal unit tials of history—the uniform inclinations of of freedom.” Luria claimed Eduard Vesiolek men (ornorodnye vlecheniia liudei),” which he had correctly interpreted Tolstoy’s idea of understood as the satisfaction of man’s basic free will, claiming Tolstoy believed that man necessities of survival: food, drink, clothing, cannot freely move history, but he can move and shelter. Tolstoy believed that general laws freely in history. Tolstoy, related Luria, of history could be formulated only by integrat- considered the laws of mortality and the laws ing countless numbers of infinitesimal units of of history to be independent of one another— observation, or millions upon millions of parallel lines which do not intersect and “uniform inclinations of men,” explained Luria. cannot be moved closer to one another. Luria quoted Tolstoy’s description of Mark Popovsky, writer and former Pierre Bezukhov’s captivity in War and Peace in Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, served order to demonstrate the role played by as commentator for Dr. Luria’s lecture. He 18 pointed out that, in addition to Tolstoy’s Armenia should renounce all claims against contemporaries and critics, the Bolsheviks for Turkey in order to gain its friendship, or different reasons also denied the author’s preserve its ties with Russia as insurance value as a philosopher. The Bolsheviks rightly against Turkey. The extent of the controversy perceived that Tolstoy’s philosophy was anti- among non-Communist political forces in utopian, recognizing that his ideas concerning Armenia over this question has lessened in the forces which drive history were antitheti- recent months, said the speaker, and there are cal to Bolshevik ideology. Unable to deny his hopeful signs that a vague national consen- greatness, said Popovsky, the Bolsheviks sus on Armenia’s relations with Turkey may sought to define Tolstoy purely as a great be emerging. literary figure for Soviet readers, and thus for President Ter-Petrossian appears to several generations of Russian cultural life have concluded that Turkey will not seri- Tolstoy the writer was separated from Tolstoy ously negotiate a compromise with Armenia the philosopher. Popovsky concurred with on issues such as responsibility for the 1915 Luria on the importance of Tolstoy’s convic- Armenian genocide or Armenian territorial tion that the power of the state was impossible claims, observed Soghomian. At the same without murder and, by using morality as a time, the opposition seems to have realized political tool, the state reaches the lowest level that Armenia cannot survive as an indepen- of amorality. dent state without some kind of modus Returning to Tolstoy’s belief that great vivendi with Turkey. In Soghomian’s opinion, historical personalities play a very small role consensus on the Armenian-Turkish issue in history, Luria contended, “Napoleon did could pave the way towards more coopera- not make history. He acted as a child who, tion which would be helpful in resolving holding a couple of strings inside the car- another pressing issue in Armenian politics: riage, thinks he is driving it. But Napoleon the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. fulfilled the cruel, sad, gloomy, and inhuman Soghomian traced the origins of the role predestined for him and therefore took conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the autono- [upon himself] the whole responsibility for mous region within Azerbaijan inhabited what happened.” Referring to the great predominantly by Armenians, to the Arme- tyrants of the twentieth century, Luria nian legacy of World War I and Stalin’s 1923 maintained that Hitler and Stalin bore moral decision to put the region under Azerbaijani responsibility for their personal decisions, but jurisdiction. When Armenia became a that modern history had been moved by far battleground between Turkey and Russia greater factors than these two men. In during the war, related the speaker, large- conclusion, he observed, “The last decade of scale deportations and massacres virtually our history [has proven] the correctness of eliminated the 2.8 million Armenian popula- Tolstoy’s philsophy of history. In spite of the tion of the Ottoman Empire. Following the heroism of our dissidents, they could not war, western Armenia (where the majority of change the situation of the country. It was the her pre-war population resided) was incorpo- crisis of the entire economic and social rated into modern Turkey; the independent system which caused the urge toward republic proclaimed in the formerly Russian- change. The ‘uniform inclinations’ of many occupied area of Armenia was quickly people were then integrated into a mass conquered by the Bolsheviks. Armenians now movement which showed itself to be a real see Nagorno-Karabakh as another land revolution analogous to the February conquered by a Turkish state which could be Revolution of 1917.” lost to Armenia forever, said the speaker, and —by Peggy McInerny will never accept the return of the region to Azerbaijani jurisdiction. He speculated that Vol. IX No. 13 1992 some kind of near independence for the region Politics in Armenia Today which Azerbaijan could accept might serve as The most serious issue in Armenian a compromise resolution of the conflict. politics today remains the perennial dilemma The creation of a diaspora Armenian of Armenia’s relations with Turkey, according population throughout Europe, the Middle to Radio Liberty correspondent Mardo East, Asia, and North and South America Soghomian. Speaking at the Kennan Institute was the second great consequence of World on 14 April 1992, Soghomian described the War I for the Armenian nation, noted ongoing debate in Armenia over whether Soghomian. With one-half of the world’s 19 Armenian population living abroad, he had basically lost control of the republic,” continued, the diaspora and the issue of said the speaker. Armenian-Turkish relations with which it is The Karabakh Committee gradually intimately bound are the primary factors widened its goals to include the political shaping Armenian politics today. “Armenian independence of Armenia and in Fall 1989, politics are never decided in Armenia alone,” nationalist activists held a congress and pointed out Soghomian, explaining that declared the formation of the Armenian political decisions in Armenia represent an National Movement (ANM). Although ex- amalgam of the political thought of the Communists won a huge bloc in the parlia- republic’s citizens and that of the diaspora. mentary elections of Spring 1990, receiving The existence of a large Armenian commu- close to half of the 230 seats in Parliament, nity abroad with well-organized cultural and Soghomian noted that these Communists political organizations greatly influenced were largely nationalist politicians who soon national feeling within Soviet Armenia, formed a coalition with the ANM, which won especially after 1965, observed Soghomian. a similar number of seats. Anti-Turkish activism in the diaspora According to Soghomian, the largest community reached a peak between 1965 and opposition to Ter-Petrossian’s government is 1985, he recounted. The Soviet central non-Communist and centers arond the Arme- government attempted to ward off its nian Revolutionary Federation, and émigré influence by permitting Armenian authors to political group which has returned to Armenia write and publish about the 1915 genocide, and built a large political organization in the he said, albeit within a Marxist-Leninist republic. “I do not believe the opposition will framework. ever use force against President Lev Ter- “Rumblings of Armenian nationalism Petrossian,” said the speaker, “and by force I do could be heard within Soviet Armenia” early not mean simply armed revolt, but the organi- in the perestroika era, noted Soghomian. By zation of mass rallies against the President and 1986–87, intellectuals and students began to the surrounding of Parliament until he is forced form groups around the issues of the envi- to resign.” Economic hardship may prove to be ronment and Nagorno-Karabakh. The latter a greater danger to Ter-Petrossian’s govern- issue galvanized Armenian nationalist ment, noted Soghomian, as it could produce sentiment when demonstrations erupted in spontaneous demonstrations which opposition the disputed autonomous region during Communists would then seek to manipulate to January and February 1988. One million their advantage. Armenians—one-third of the republic’s —by Peggy McInerny population—demonstrated in Yerevan that February for the region’s return to Armenian Vol. IX No. 14 1992 jurisdiction. Nagorno-Karabakh, observed Cultural Restoration in Ukraine Soghomian, was a “good mechanism for Ukrainian culture is undergoing “a getting people out on the streets” at a time recovery, or convelescence, after a prolonged when demonstrations for independence of period of cultural amnesia,” said Oksana the republic were not possible. Zabuzhko, poet and Research Associate at the The Soviet Armenian population Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian became rapidly disillusioned with Gorbachev Academy of Sciences in Kyiv, at a lecture at and the central government in the wake of the Kennan Institute on 16 April 1992. the Soviet Army’s ineffectual response to the Currently a writer-in-residence at Pennsylva- Sumgait riots of February 1988 and the nia State University, Zabuzhko explained that inefficiency of the rebuilding efforts which scores of previously banned works by Ukrai- followed the Armenian earthquake of nian authors, ranging from seventeenth December 1988. Anti-Soviet feeling was so century writers to nineteenth century histori- strong in the republic by the end of 1988, said ans to twentieth century authors, are now Soghomian, that many people were con- being published in Ukraine. Restoration of the vinced the earthquake had been created by authentic continuity of Ukrainian culture and Moscow in order to punish the Armenian literature, however, is overshadowing critical nationalist movement. By early 1989, when reception of contemporary Ukrainian writers Azerbaijan imposed the economic blockade and artists, claimed Zabuzhko. which continues to do damage to the Arme- Now that Ukraine has achieved political nian economy, “the Communist government independence, Zabuzhko asserted that the 20 long traditions of “culture as opposition” as Zabuzhko stressed that the younger generation writer as “savior of the nation” have come to of Ukrainian writers must create new criteria of an end in Ukraine. She reflected that under artistic value. Not only the social, but often the conditions of Russian domination dating from artistic value of the work of previous genera- the late eighteenth century, “literature as- tions was “defined by the hostility of the sumed the role of a substitute homeland for authorities it provoked,” she explained. With Ukrainians,” with the writer assuming the the state removed as a mirror, “a barren, thick burden of defended of the nation. Particularly wall of aloofness separating Ukrainian culture under the Soviet regime, when the Ukrainian from world culture” has become apparent, she language was scheduled to become extinct in said. The “loneliness” of Ukrainian culture two to three generation, she noted that today—long cut off from history and the rest of “writing in Ukrainian turned out to be either a the world—is not unique to Ukraine, main- trauma or overt defiance—overt and quite tained Zabuzhko, and signals a need for conscious opposition to repression.” intercultural dialogue. According to Zabuzhko, writers, and Although her generation will face the more specifically, poets—the fiercest defenders vagaries of the market and the new “censor- of Ukrainian culture—led Ukraine’s national ship” it imposes (i.e., writing what sells), awakening under perestroika. The Ukrainian Zabuzhko asserted that an audience for Writers’ Union 1987 Congress produced a serious literature still existed in Ukraine. She political bombshell, she related, when it confessed to an enormous relief that the discussed the lamentable state of the Ukrainian world of “saving the nation” had passed to language and raised the issue of Ukrainian legitimate political institutions and that national consciousness for the first time since literature could now be de-mythologized. the 1920s. At that time, she observed, over fifty George Mihaychuk, Assistant Profes- percent of Ukrainian schoolchildren were sor of Russian at Georgetown University, enrolled in Russian language schools and served as commentator for the lecture. graduate students were no longer permitted to Mihaychuk concurred with Zabuzhko that write dissertations in Ukrainian. The congress Ukraine was experiencing a cultural recovery, launched a movement for the rehabilitation of not revival. He pointed out that works of the Ukrainian language which soon became previously forbidden authors such as Zerov, associated with the phrase “cultural revival.” Kulish, and Borianin are being reproduced in “Yet,” asserted Zabuzhko, “it was by no means enormous press runs and immediately selling culture as such that was the principal concern out. There is a recapturing of the past in of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, but culture as a Ukraine today, he said, particularly the means of national awakening.” Writers, she history of the 1920s, the post-war years, and pointed out, went on to initiate the mass the Ukrainian diaspora abroad. Mihaychuk democratic movement Rukh in 1989. And argued that the problem of the Ukrainian today, the number of writer-Parliamentarians in language remained an open issue. “In fields Ukraine is greater than perhaps any other that were more or less excluded from country in the world. everyday conversation in Ukrainian,” he The current glorification of Ukrainian noted, “there is a need to come up with writers who defied the Soviet regime is “the equivalent terms and concepts.” Mihaychuk price culture has paid for its immediate defined the real issue in Ukrainian literature participation in national history,” said as the question of poetry versus prose, Zabuzhko. An example of this phenomenon pointing out poetry, with its rhetorical mode is the hero cult which now surrounds the and resonance with Ukrainian folk songs, Ukrainian poet Vassyl’ Stus, who was had in some sense always possessed a imprisoned under Brezhnev and died as the “ready-made signal” for writers and readers result of a hunger strike. Although Stus’ alike. He contended that the future develop- work has been reproduced in great quantity, ment of Ukrainian prose would be of great no single work on his poetics has yet been interest, reflecting that prose had not become published, observed Zabuzhko. “It is no a populat literary form in Ukraine even in the longer the poetry,...but rather the personality nineteenth century. of the poet or cultural activist that interests Questioned about Ukraine’s present the audience today,” she claimed. efforts to differentiate itself from other nations, Now that the state has ceased to be “the Zabuzhko responded, “I am absolutely mirror of external response” of literature, confident that the real problem nowadays is 21 that of resuming our identity in a very broad Using a game analogy, Nodia claimed sense. I think—I hope—that Ukraine has rid the key to democracy is that all the players itself of the different forces which were observe only those rules which everyone imposed on it and did not permit it to be itself. agrees to accept. In order to play a game, That’s my point: being oneself. It concerns not however, a community of players and a only the fate of the nation, but the fate of the playground are needed. The problem with individual as well,” she said. Asked about democracy is that it has no answers to the writing literature during the Soviet regime, problem of how to mold this community Zabuzhko rejected the notion that oppression (citizenship) and playground (the state). One ever was or could be a driving force of culture. could define the community of democracy as “Oppression is not creative,” she insisted, “it is the world, observed Nodia, but history has not encouraging, it is not inspiring.” She only offered the choice of forming democratic contended that oppression had imposed a polities as nations. Although the liberal type of evaluative criteria on writers which principle, which appeals to the notion of the must now be changed autonomous human personality, does not —by Peggy McInerny require nationalism to build a state, it does require a mechanism to implement liberal Vol. IX No. 15 1992 values in human society and protect the Nationalism in Post-Communist States individual’s personal rights. This mechanism “The merging of liberalism with is the state. The liberal choice was in favor of democracy is a natural in well-established, a democratic state, pointed out Nodia, thus it stable democracies of the West as is the is “liberal hypocrisy” to condemn national- interdependence of nationalism and democ- ism as such. Democracy is historically racy in the emerging democracies of Eastern dependent on nationalism—the state has no Europe and the Soviet Union,” contended cohesion without it, he insisted. “Nationalism Ghia Nodia at a lecture at the Kennan should be understood as an ideological Institute on 23 April 1992. Head of the offspring of liberalism,” he said, arguing that Department of Political Philosophy at the together with liberalism and democracy, the Georgian Academy of Sciences in Tbilisi and idea of “nation” is an intergral part of the currently a Research Scholar at the Kennan ideas on which modernity is based. Institute, Nodia called nationalism “the “We must understand the interdepen- major danger and major hope” of post- dence of democracy and nationalism,” said communist states. Nodia, “but we can only do so if we can Nodia spoke in favor of making several forget that these concepts are either ‘good’ or analytical distinctions in examining the rising ‘bad.’ We want to present democracy as problems of nationalism in the former something rational—a rational enterprise communist world. First, he argued that which is codified in laws and constitutions, democracy and liberalism, although often but democracy has both rational and non- interdependent, are separate philosophical rational parts.” Liberal democracy is based concepts with different historical relationships on the claim for human freedom and as- to nationalism. Second, he maintained that a sumes that human beings have absolute real difference existed between the “original” value, noted the speaker, but unless religion democracies of northwestern Europe and is considered rational, this assumption is North America and the “borrowed” democra- irrational. He insisted that the two principal cies which have emerged in other parts of the ideas of the modern paradigm—the central world. Finally, he maintained that the transi- importance of the autonomous individual tion to democracy in post-communist societies and the idea that the modern person is an is a unique historical model. These nations are active, creative person—are relevant to both “returning to history” after an ahistoric the individual and the nation. Whereas isolation imposed by communism; with the ethnicity is an attempt to understand society collapse of totalitarianism, they have experi- through family ties, said Nodia, the concept enced the total collapse of their societies. of nation is an attempt to present people as a Today, they face the daunting challenge of historical personality, an active player in building “something out of nothing,” he world history. explained, and nationalism appears to be a Many of the East European, third world, powerful force with which they can rebuild and now former Soviet states which are themselves as nations. attempting to make a transition for democracy 22 are neither socially nor economically “ripe” crisis situation, one in which the entire face of for liberal democracy. These nations never the governing system [gosudarstvennoe developed from pre-modern societies through ustroistvo] is being transformed,” said Nina scientific revolutions to market economies and Beliaeva at the Kennan Institute on 1 May liberal democracy, said Nodia. Rather, these 1992. Beliaeva is co-founder with Gleb countries turned to democracy out of a sense of Pavlovskii of the Interlegal Research Center, national dignity that impelled them to reject a non-profit research institute in Moscow of totalitarianism and authoritarianism and, by which she is president; she spoke together adopting the Western blueprint of democracy, with Pavlovskii, Director of the Postfactum join the “club of civilized nations.” In order to Information Agency. do so, their Westernizing elites have to “entice A struggle between law and politics people into political activity” by means of dominates the political scene in Russia today, either socialist or nationalist ideologies. Nodia contended Beliaeva, with politics slowly reflected that the nations of Eastern Europe and establishing the basis for a new rule of law. In the former Soviet Union have not mastered the the face of rapid political and social change, West European type of political culture and lawyers are confronted with the predicament thus their nationalism is more ethnic and tribal of trying to change the system of government than the political nationalism which character- without violating the concept of the rule of law. ized the formation of Western democracies. This dilemma first began when Gorbachev “Emergent democracy is a nasty, bloody affair,” introduced the notion of a rule-of-law state. he concluded, “but unfortunately, the process Legal practitioners and political analysts of including and excluding who belongs to a immediately began to challenge the validity of nation is an unavoidable part of national the 1977 USSR constitution, she explained, democratic development in these states.” claiming it was inappropriate for the actual Michael Haltzel, Director of the West political conditions of the country. Despite its European Studies program of the Woodrow deficiencies, however, many lawyers believed Wilson Center, served as commentator for the the only legitimate way to observe the rule fo lecture. Haltzel maintained that nationalism law was to abide by this constitution. has been unfairly criticized as a negative The clearest example of the conflict political force by many political analysts, between law and politics was the attempted especially after World War II and especially coup of August 1991, said Beliaeva. Both the on the Left. For Americans, he said, this kind State Committee on the Extraordinary of criticism of nationalism is somewhat Situation in the Soviet Union (known by its ironic, as American policy towards Eastern Russian acronym, GKChP) and Yeltsin’s Europe during the cold war was influenced Russian Federation government claimed they precisely by considerations of nationalism. were observing the rule of law and issued One must recognize that ethnic and political legislative acts to that effect. “Politically, the elements co-exist in nationalism, he said. As right and the future was in Yeltsin’s hands,” opposed to the “ideal” of democracy, in she continued, “but legally, it was still in the which the ethnic element has been subordi- hands of the coup committee,” as the USSR nated to the political, he called racism and constitution remained the law. “Very often in fascism the “diseases” of nationalisms which dramatic legal developments—as was the have failed to tame their ethnic component. case of Yeltsin during the coup—political Although Haltzel conceded that nationalism forces move forward and establish new law,” could play a positive role in post-communist remarked Beliaeva. “If these forces are strong states, he noted the danger that nationalism enough to keep the new law in force, the can be non-democratic as well as democratic, question then arises: How do you introduce a citing the states of Central Europe between new rule of law? What we are witnessing in the two world wars and autocratic regimes of practice,” she concluded, “is that law is built Southeast Asia as examples. up through politics and not vice-versa.” —by Peggy McInerny The conflict between law and politics continues today in the Yeltsin government’s Vol. IX No. 16 1992 battle with the Russian parliament over Law and Politics in Russia economic reform. The April 1992 session of “Every lawyer in Russia today must the Russian Federation Congress of People’s face the dilemma that law becomes a major Deputies demonstrated that the vast majority obstacle to political development during a of deputies do not represent Russian society, 23 asserted Beliaeva, yet the future of economic has no separatist movement which seeks reform rested in their hands. These circum- independence from the Russian Federation. stances prompt many people to discredit the The tragedy of Russia today, remarked Parliament and seek its dissolution. Beliaeva Pavlovskii, is that conflicting local and regional nevertheless argued against dissolving the interests are beginning to establish a kind of Parliament, pointing out that no legislative balance of power among themselves, but the body would then exist to enact an electoral national government does not reflect this law and mandate new elections. She urged process. Instead, he asserted, the Yeltsin reformers and the government to continue to government operates according to an artifi- work with the current legislative body, cially understood national interest derived moving it forward step by step to adopt two from the international interests of the former pieces of crucial legislaton: a new electoral USSR. Russia can only build a sense of national law and a law on political parties. A new statehood when the conflict of interests Parliament elected on the basis of these laws between different social groups is institutional- could then adopt a new constitution for the ized and regularized on local and regional Russian Federation, she concluded. levels, contended Pavlovskii. Until this occurs, Gleb Pavlovskii claimed that the there is simply no reason for Russian national process of building national statehood has statehood. He claimed the most favorable not yet begun in the Russian Fedeation. conditions for developing a genuine Russian “What is occurring...on the territory of the statehood were continued weak executive Russian Federation is not the building up of a power at the top with increased political and national state, [but] the dismantling of a economic freedoms at the bottom. Greater superpower,” he said. At the moment political and economic freedoms would allow Russian sovereignty was declared and local forces to express and represent them- accepted by the international comunity, selves, promote the formation of local Russia had no clear borders, no Russian structures of governance, and build up a citizenship, no army, and no internal sense of “normal” state based on genuine national itself as a national state, noted Pavlovskii. interests, concluded Pavlovskii. The Russian Federation has achieved legiti- —by Peggy McInerny macy and sovereignty by means of interna- tional recognition, he explained, not by Vol. IV No. 17 1992 means of an internal political process. In Legal Reform in Russia Today addition, Russia’s assumption of the role of Despite recent attempts at reform, successor state to the USSR has endowed the Russia’s legal system still suffers from the Yeltsin government with pretensions to land, inherited vices of Soviet totalitarianism, said people, borders, and property which are Lev Simkin at a lecture at the Kennan ideological in origin. These pretensions are Institute on 2 June 1992. Simkin is Head of both unrealistic and unattainable, he said, the Legal Faculty at the Law Academy of the and further complicate the development of Russian Ministry of Justice and a Short-term national self-consciousness in Russia. Scholar at the Kennan Institute. Problems According to Pavlovskii, different plaguing Russia’s legal system include the regions of the Russian Federation are reacting priority of state over individual interests, differently to the Yeltsin government and interference of officials in the judicial process, economic reform. The institutions of power and lack of checks and balances to restrain which are taking shape on the local level government interference. Legal reform is differ from one another, but local administra- additionally complicated by the fact that tions share one common feature: a resolve to contemporary Russian society is unprepared block interference from Moscow in their for the rule of law. According to Simkin, affairs. Local administrations throughout the neither the population nor politicians take Federation are trying to exert more direct the judiciary seriously or understand the control over natural resources and bargain meaning of justice. with the central government for increased A concrete proposal for judicial reform economic freedoms, explained Pavlovskii. was introduced into the Russian parliament The Krasnodar’ region, for example, bar- seven months ago, said the speaker. The gained for essentially the same degree of reform envisioned the creation of a new kind economic independence granted to of judicial power and structure; improvement Checheno-Ingushetia, although the former of the status of judges; transfer of control over 24 arrests to the courts; and introduction of had recently ruled that the consolidation of adversarial and jury trials. Although many the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Internal judges are politically conservative, they Affairs and KGB would violate the Russian responded favorably to the proposed judicial constitution and threaten citizens’ civil rights. reforms, said Simkin. Simkin named the influence of judges The Supreme Soviet of the Russian over assessors—popularly elected “auxiliary Parliament initially approved the reform judges” whose function, in theory is both to concept, producing “euphoria among monitor the activities of the judge and judges.” This euphoria quickly turned to represent the will of the people—the third disappointment, said Simkin, when judges major problem of judicial reofrm. “It is discovered that the proposed reforms were apparent that the institution of people’s not implemented in fact. Judges’ salaries, for assessors is not successful. Their decisions are example, were increased, but remained lower made under the influence of the judges.” than those of procurators and policemen. argued Simkin. He nevertheless estimated And although the role of the courts in a “rule that the introduction of a jury system could of law” government has been discussed by only be accomplished in a careful, gradual new political leaders in Russia, no new legal manner. “The introduction of a jury system in policies have been implemented. Finally, little a period of extreme social volatility [would attention has been paid to judges’ com- be] dangerous,” he warned. plaints, despite the fact that they have The fourth task faced by judicial organized several strike movements. Simkin reformers is how to define the role of the noted that judges in the Sverdlovsk Procurator in the Russian legal system. The (Ekaterinburg) region demanded a salary Procuracy has a strong legal tradition in increase and declared an intent to strike in Russia and will be difficult to break, ob- Spring 1992. Similar strikes have since spread served Simkin. Characterizing the Russian across Russia from the Tula region to the court procedure as an “inquisition process,” Pacific Ocean. The formation of public he contended that an American who at- organizations such as the recently established tended a Russian trial would mistake the Council of Russian Judges may eventually judge for the Procurator. stabilize this kind of activism among judges, Despite the fact that the Procurator’s remarked the speaker. only obligation is to prosecute criminals, a The judicial reform process needs to newly adopted law on the Procuracy allows address four key problems, contended Simkin. the Procurator the right of “general supervi- First, the independent status of judges needs sion” of the courts, leaving judges without to be recognized. Using Moscow as an control over arrests. Asked to remark on the example, the speaker explained that the city contradiction between the goals of legal government finances the Moscow courts and reform and the new law, Simkin said, “We is thus able to exert a certain degree of have not yet begun reform of the judiciary, influence over judges in the Moscow court but the counter-reform is already gaining system. This influence takes the form of bribes speed.” He explained that the Procuracy for better apartments or more prestigious titles itself had prepared the draft law, which failed (which lead to higher salaries). Simkin cited to pass the Legislative Committee of the the example of former Moscow city mayor, Russian Federation Supreme Soviet until the Gavril Popov, who attempted both to intro- second reading. duce a system in which judges were ap- The problems of the contemporary pointed instead of elected by regional soviets Russian judicial system make it difficult to and to replace district with circuit courts believe that legal reform will succeed, said accountable to a circuit prefect. In Simkin’s Simkin. On a more positive note, he observed opinion, Popov’s attempts to introduce such that the main principles governing a rule of changes reflect the desire of city officials to law state have been defined; draft laws retain their influence over judges. regarding the status of judges, criminal law, Violations of freedom of speech, which and procedures prepared; an international occur with regularity in Russian society, are a committee for the promotion of legal reform second problem of judicial reform. The in Russia established; and an international newly-created Constitutional Court may put conference on legal reform and judicial an end to such violation, suggested Simkin. protection of business activities planned for He pointed out that the Constitutional Court the near future. 25 Although many obstacles stand in the the 1917 revolution into the remote past. He way of legal reform, including politicians’ cited works of historians acribing the revolu- preoccupation with the economy and serious tion to a process which began variously in ethnic conflict, Simkin expressed hope for the 1825, the 1860s, the 1880s, and 1899. “The process of legal reform in Russia. Citing the teleological, ex-post assumption that the ongoing dismantling of the totalitarian revolution was bound to happen led us, first, system, he concluded, “At least we have to imagine a mythical chain of events, and hope that there is no road back to the past.” second, to interpret as revolutionary every —by Amy Smith social tension, political accident, or radical utterance,” he contended. He criticized the Vol. IX No. 18 1992 assumption that the tsarist regime was in a Learning from the Present about the Past? state of permanent crisis for decades prior to The collapse of the Soviet Union has 1917, as well as the notion that late imperial created opportunities for a re-examination of society was characterized by the alienation of certain basic assumptions of Western histori- all social groups from the state and from one ography of Russia, as well as the temptation another. Western historians’ acceptance of the to draw lessons from the present about the inevitability of the Bolshevik Revolution led past, contended Michael Confino at a lecture them to search for elements of division, at the Kennan Institute on 15 June 1992. antagonism, and disintegration in Russian Currently a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson society, and to overlook the degree of social Center, Confino is Samuel Rubin Professor of cohesion, stability, and integration which Russian and East European History at Tel existed in that society in the late nineteenth Aviv University. Martin Miller, Professor of century, argued Confino. Russian History at Duke University, served “Russian imperial society was neither as commentator for the lecture. more nor less fragmented than any other The end of the USSR has supplied final agro-industrial European society at that stage proof of the weaknesses of the 1917 paradigm of development,” he claimed, calling into which has dominated Western and Soviet question the validity of comparisons between historiography of Russia, argued Confino. Russian society and a society of a Western “Many historians adopted, implicitly or normal type. “The normal Western type is explicitly, a deterministic and teleological historically non-existent. No specialist of approach to Russian history, often interpret- France, England, or Germany would recog- ing this history as heading inexorably towards nize the West to which [historians of Russia] the Bolshevik Revolution,” he said. The 1917 refer,” he remarked. Comparisons of this paradigm has lost definitively its authority to type regularly depict Russian development explain the Russian past and construct the as a deviation from the Western model, Russian future, and some scholars now according to which “everything in Russia is question whether 1917 was a revolution at all. awkward and nothing is what it should be.” “But the problem is not whether 1917 was a Regretfully, said Confino, this has led revolution (which it was) or one of the historians to endorse Chaadaev’s vision that periodic upheavals in Russian history,” said Russian history can serve only as a negative the speaker. “The problem is what we histori- example for the family of nations. ans do with the revolution of 1917 in our Confino went on to ask whether, having thinking: in the past we put too much into it; lost the “1917 paradigm,” historians are today, we want to get rid of it!” bound to replace it with a new, “reforms In Confino’s view, the deterministic, paradigm” in order to understand the course teleological approach of the 1917 paradigm of Russian history. Current reforms in Russia, led to three main by-products which deserve from Gorbachev to Yeltsin, have increased close scrutiny: the assumption that a “revolu- interest in the reforms of the past. Can the tionary process” characterized Russia of the ways in which we understand, or misunder- nineteenth century, the idea that the tsarist stand, today’s reforms change our perceptions regime underwent a long-term crisis, and the of what was attempted yesterday?, asked the predominant interpretation of the “awkward” speaker. Confino urged caution. In this case, nature of Russian society. we are not seeking lessons from the present Confino rejected the concept of “revolu- about the past, but rather lessons from the tionary process” as an oxymoron resulting past about the present, he pointed out. He from an obsession with tracing the origins of doubted that today’s reforms, whatever their 26 outcome, could provide better understanding have been handpicked by the military- of the reforms of earlier Russian history. industrial lobby, said Stephen Foye at the Martin Miller claimed that American Kennan Institute on 29 September 1992. Foye historical studies of Russia have been is Senior Research Analyst at the RFE/RL successively influenced by the present, with Research Institute in Munich. two major paradigms dominating the writing The Russian armed forces remain under of Russian history in America in his lifetime: civilian control, but that control is not the hegemonic paradigm derived from the necessarily democratic nor in the hands of cold war and a paradigm of social and labor Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Rather, history which took hold in the late 1960s and claimed Foye, the armed forces in Russia early 1970s. Miller claimed the influence of seem increasingly to answer to nationalist the present on the study of the past was not forces within the Russian government, as the entirely unfortunate, as in America—an case of Moldova seems to illustrate. While the overwhelmingly ahistorical society—the flow of contentious political statements by present spurs people to explore new method- Russian military leaders has abated some- ologies and areas of research. “Historians what since the spring—when it appeared the must realize that they are being influenced armed forces might enter the political fray— by current events, but the influence of the these leaders have crossed a crucial psycho- present may help them to learn things which logical barrier and can now envision them- they previously didn’t care to investigate,” he selves as exercising political power, asserted remarked. “The rule of thumb,” he con- the speaker. cluded, “is that you cannot state what the Foye described the armed forces of evidence does not allow you to state.” Russia and the Commonwealth of Indepen- Historian Terence Emmons of Stanford dent States (CIS) as being in a state of disarray University, present in the audience, remarked after seven years of political liberalization and that the present intrudes upon the past in the rising nationalisms. Draft evasion and anti- way in which people understand the direc- military sentiment remains high in the former tion of history. He contended that modern USSR, brutality within military has taken on a Western historiography is grounded on the more pronounced ethnic tinge, and the officer idea of progress; with Marxism now discred- corps has split between liberal mid-level ited, Russian historians in Rusia are in deep officers and the conservative high command. crisis because they feel in some sense de- Despite the formation of national armies prived of the idea of progress. “Perhaps,” in the newly independent states, draft dodg- answered Confino, “the teleological view of ing and brutality continue to plague their history is not just a methodological approach, militaries, indicating that these problems are but part of certain deep intellectual and not easily resolved, said Foye. Finally, the emotional needs in all of us....We exaggerate distinction between Commonwealth and those features which give us a reassurance Russian armed forces remains blurred, with that there is order in this world, that things confusion over the chain of command of the do not happen perchance. But this is one two forces deliberately sown in order to slow more reason for greater awareness of the down negotiations (e.g., over the removal of impact of current events and intellectual Russian forces from the Baltic states). trends on our thinking. The real task is not to “There are disturbing parallels between learn from the present about the past, but to Soviet security structures of a few years ago learn how the present constantly influences and Russian Federation government security our thinking about the past,” he concluded. structures today,” argued Foye. He pointed —by Peggy McInerny to anecdotal evidence that the Higher Certification Committee of the Defense Ministry and the new Security Council seem 1992–93 PROGRAM YEAR to be appropriating decision making in Vol. X No. 1 1992 security affairs in Russia. The first of these, Russian Army Marches Right formally subordinated to the new Defense Ministry, evaluated candidates who were Political discourse in Russus has moved appointed to senior posts in the ministry; the toward the nationalist right since the spring of second, formed also in May 1992, is an 1992 and the leadership of the new Russian informal advisory board to President Yeltsin Defense Ministry, formed in May, appears to on questions of security. 27 The membership of both bodies is that the Russian government had channelled predominantly conservative. Iurii Skokov, massive amounts of money and armaments whom Foye identifies as “the defense indus- into Moldova in the past year. “The does seem tries’ ‘man’ on the Security Council,” is both to be part of a broader policy that Yeltsin may chairman of the Certification Committee and be opposed to,” he said, “but may either be secretary of the Security Council. Other unable to stop or simply compromised on in members of the Security Council are order to get his agenda in other areas.” Aleksandr Rutskoi, Vice-President of Russia, Foye claimed that resolving the military and Sergei Filatov, first Deputy Chairman of housing shortage was the key to stabilizing the Russian Supreme Soviet. the armed forces in Russia. In the meantime, it “If you realize that Skokov was over- appears that Russian military leaders are seeing military appointments at precisely the using nationalism to rally the forces and create time a new Russian Defense Ministry was cohesion in the military. being formed,” said Foye, “you see that, in Asked if there was potential common effect, the leaders of the military industries ground between the security organs and the picked the new Russian military leadership.” armed forces, Foye commented that events in This leadership is largely made up of conser- both the military and intelligence communi- vative Russian nationalists, many of whom ties appear to parallel each other. The intelli- are veterans of the war in Afghanistan. gence organs were entwined with the defense Only one civilian was named to a high industries, he noted, and a political triumvi- post in the Defense Ministry: Andrei rate of the military, leaders of the defense Kokoshin, a specialist in military-technical factories, and the intelligence community is a policy, and he may only be a token civilian for possibility in Russia. Deteriorating economic Western consumption, said Foye. Liberal conditions, however, may force the Russian military reformers such as Colonel General leadership to choose between military pro- Vladimir Lopatin have been moved com- curement and improving the living condi- pletely out of the picture with surprising tions of the officer corps (i.e., solving the rapidity. It is possible, however, that such housing problem). Either choice could reformers could be moved into high-profile prevent such a coalition, concluded Foye. positions, albeit without substantive duties, in —by Peggy McInerny order to appease Western public opinion. Exactly what role the Security Council Vol. X No. 2 1992 plays in military affairs in Russia remains Public Opinion Polls not the Full Story unknown, but it now appears to be the locus It is difficult to make an accurate of decisions in the security sphere. What is assessment of the public state of mind in clear is that military policy has shifted right. Russia today, said Boris Grushin at a lecture The Russian military leadership has staked at the Kennan Institute on 5 October 1992. out an extremely confrontational position on Grushin is Director of Vox Populi Public the Kurile Islands, said Foye, and may have Opinion Research Service in Moscow. Social influenced Yeltsin to cancel a planned trip to scientists are simply unequipped to gauge Japan. Given the link between the defense present conditions in the country; in order to industries and the new Russian military assess contemporary social consciousness in leadership, as well as the conservative Russia, a social context which embraces a membership of the Security Council, Foye wide variety of different distinctions and argued that the recent decision of the Russian characteristics is required, he argued. government to grant increased credits to According to Grushin, four basic features military-industrial enterprises had most likely characterize mass social consciousness in originated in the Council. He admitted, contemporary Russia. First, extreme agitation however, that he could offer no concrete and emotionalism color contemporary Russian evidence to support this argument. society, but neither is fully articulated in public Regarding the actions of Lt. General opinion polls. Although the concept of the “Big Aleksandr Lebed and the Russian Fourteenth Bang” is often used as literary hyperbole, that Army in support of the self-proclaimed notion accurately describes the social context of “Dniester Republic” in Moldova, Foye Russia today, he said. Referring to the abrupt claimed General Lebed and his actions were end of the Soviet system, he explained that perfectly acceptable to certain forces in the many peoples’ lives, past and present, had Russian government. In addition, he charged suddenly become meaningless to them. 28 Perhaps even more important, a lack of attitude toward the current situation in the understanding of current events in Russia is country and a positive response to Stalin as a widespread among Russian citizens. He symbol (of order), not as a person. claimed that observers in the United States in A second poll which posed the question particular fail to comprehend this phenom- “Should people be allowed to get rich?” also enon. Although Yeltsin must perforce illustrates contradictions in peoples’ views, said pretend to know what is going on, said Grushin. Two years ago, the majority of the Grushin, no one in Russia really understands population categorically disagreed with this what is happening in the country at present: statement. In 1992, 88 percent agreed with the all components of society are moving, but in statement. Such rapid changes in social different directions or no direction. consciousness make it difficult to describe Differentiations among various social accurately peoples’ opinion, remarked Grushin. and political movements in the country make Responding to a question about his up a third feature which characterizes social polling methods, Grushin explained that Vo x consciousness in today’s Russia, said Grushin. Populi research surveys include a widely Russians as a people have never been morally differentiated sample and are divided into or politically unified, he contended. Now, after four main categories. The first type of poll is the “Big Bang,” the entire society is divided by conducted in the Russian republic using 35 wide and widening rifts. Finally, the grand different polling cities, including 18 urban myth of Soviet reality which evolved over the areas, 17 rural aread, and approximately 2,000 past seventy years continues to influence respondents. The Moscow poll involves close social consciousness. Grushin pointed to the to 1,000 respondents and, in Grushin’s view, is difficulty of polling people who are still the best sample taken. However, he claimed captives of this myth, adding that his own the most important survey to be the “leaders’ work has dealt with this theme (“Myth and poll,” which is conducted monthly among ten Realities in Russian Society”). different types of leadership groups such as At the beginning of 1992, Grushin’s people’s deputies, enterprise directors, service conducted public opinion polls on newspaper editors, and the intelligentsia. The peoples’ reaction to the statement: “The fourth type of poll is an inter-regional survey Russian people unanimously vote for that varies according to the client’s interests. democracy.” One third of those polled did Grushin discerned five different social not know what democracy was; another third groups in his research surveys. He defined the of those polled did not understand the first group as socially innovative actors who are meaning of the word democracy itself. “We creating a new fabric of society. He estimated have shown that it is absurd to make an that this group comprises between 3 and 5 assertion like ‘the Russian people unani- percent of the population. The second group, mously support democracy,’ even though accounting for 15 to 20 percent of the popula- Yeltsin and his supporters have advanced this tion, consists of quasi-innovative social actors statement,” proclaimed Grushin. who imitate participation in new social Possibly the most important and least processes while adhering to traditional Soviet understood feature of social consciousness in mentality and social structures. Grushin Russia is that conflicting positions may exist pointed to Prime Minister Gaidar as an within a single social actor. This fact gives us example of the first group and industry leader reason to regard “public opinion” very Arkadii Volsky as a representative of the carefully, suggested Grushin. He cited a survey second. The speaker described the third group conducted first in September 1991 and again in as conservative actors who are best adapted to June–July 1992 regarding the statement: “Stalin any situation and comprise 30 to 40 percent of was a great leader.” In the earlier poll, 20 the population. In his conceptualization, a percent of the population was in complete fourth group is made up of “those who stand agreement with the statement and 8 percent and wait to see what happens,” and a fifth more or less agreed; in the second poll, 27 group is simply “the outsiders.” Grushin noted percent agreed completely and 22 percent more that the fourth and fifth groups account for or less agreed. This poll demonstrated a serious approximately 40 percent of the population change in position, observed Grushin, but it and are often practically impossible to distin- would be a mistake to interpret the change as guish from one another. refering to Stalin personally. In Grushin’s view, The development of a future civil the poll expresses the population’s negative society in Russia depends on changes in the 29 configuration of these various forces within The abstract legal issues at stake in the society, concluded Grushin. Asked to specu- Constitutional Court hearing, together with late on the Russian future, Grushin re- the protracted length of the proceedings, sponded, “After Gorbachev was Yeltsin, after have contributed to the loss of public interest Yeltsin stands no one.” in the case. In Shelley’s opinion, the optimum —by Amy Smith outcome of the proceeding would be a decision which both finds that the Party Vol. X No. 3 1992 possessed a monopoly on power and demon- Soviet System on Trial? strated the damage caused by a one-party Two proceedings—one constitutional, state, thereby establishing the legal basis for a one criminal—dominate the Russian legal multi-party state. scene today, said Louise Shelley at a lecture Turning to the criminal investigation of at the Kennan Institute on 26 October 1992. the perpetrators of the August 1991 coup, Shelley is Professor of Justice, Law, and conducted by the Russian Federation Society at American University. The first Procurator’s office in Moscow, Shelley noted proceeding is a trial on the constitutionality that the venue of the future trial, if it occurs of Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s ban of the at all, remains undecided. The coup investi- Communist Party of the Soviet Union; the gation process is fraught with problems second, a criminal investigation of the primarily because the state against which the perpetrators of the August 1991 coup. coup was initiated no longer exists. Should Criminal trials of leaders have often the coup attempt be considered an act of marked the end of eras in Soviet history, treason, queried Shelly, or an effort to save remarked Shelley, citing as examples the show the Motherland as the conservative forces trials of the 1930s, the trial of Beria at the end claim? The length of the investigative process of the Stalin period, and the organized crime and the fact that the coup perpetrators have trial of Churbanov at the end of the Brezhnev been incarcerated for over fourteen months era. True to form, the constitutional hearing also presents a problem of legal fairness— and the coup investigation appear to mark the some of the public believe these men have end of the Soviet period. suffered enough. Despite its prolonged According to Shelley, the hearing before duration, however, the coup investigation the Russian Constitutional Court is an airing continues to attract public interest. of legal issues pertaining to the nature of the In addition to the length of the investiga- CPSU and the Soviet state. It is not a criminal tion and the uncertainty over whether a trial proceeding. The hearing is to determine will take place, the coup investigation process whether the Party was separate from the suffers from corruption. The investigators are Soviet state or if, in fact, the Party enveloped now selling the testimonies of the accused, the government. Unlike past Soviet trials, said noted the speaker, an action which would be the speaker, this trial was not orchestrated by grounds for dismissing the case in the United the government. Rather, former leading States. According to Shelley, the critical members of the CPSU challenged the constitu- moment for staging the trial is past, as tionality of the ban and the Yeltsin govern- conservative forces have had time to regroup ment chose to exploit the opportunity to and are increasingly active in Russian politics. discredit the Communist Party in its entirety If the trial were to proceed now, she contin- Testimony against the party at the ued, conservative forces would react faster constitutional hearing seeks to prove that: the and more aggressively than they would have Party turned the state into an instrument of its six months ago, possibly causing a backlash power; the Party did not abandon its role as a that would hinder prospects for democracy. “leading and guiding force” of the country It is misleading to view the Soviet after Article 6 of the USSR Constitution was system as being on trial in these two legal abolished; the Party financed foreign commu- proceedings, argued the speaker, as a trial of nist parties and terrorist activities out of the that system would examine both the system state budget; the Party callously attempted to itself and the people who ran it. Notwith- hide the facts about the Stalinist repressions; standing the dissolution of the USSR in and the Party repressed dissidents, committed December 1991 and the fact that the Party no human rights abuses, and violated interna- longer exists and cannot issue orders. Shelley tional treaties which the Soviet government contended that the Soviet system is still in had signed. operation. In her opinion, large sectors of the 30 command economy still exist; the legal system the speaker noted that economic reformers continues to be run by many of the same had been slow to recognize the imperative of people who were in control under the ancien defining the Russian national interest, as well regime; the power of the KGB, although as the need to co-opt groups emerging on the greatly diminished, has not disappeared Russian political scene in support of market altogether; and the military still receives a reform. Nevertheless, Stavrakis claimed, by large share of the budget. Under such condi- choosing and implementing the specific tions, maintained Shelley, it is difficult to make strategy it did, the Yeltsin government the case that the system with which the Party succeeded in shifting the entire discourse on was associated is truly extinct. economic reform in Russia so far in the Together with the coup investigation, direction of a free market that a return to a Western observers view the constitutional command economy is no longer viable. hearing as vital groundwork for establishing Economic reformers in Russia form a a number of critical points: the importance of tightly knit group of individuals who were judicial review; the misconduct of the Party all born in the 1950s, went to school together, and its involvement in criminal activity; the and share—within their context—the same corruption and inefficiency of the Soviet “radical” economic views, explained state, along with its institutional leadership; Stavrakis. He named as members of this and a decision that a society should be based group Acting Prime Minister Egor Gaidar, on the rule of law, no administrative fiat. First Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr However, these issues may elude the Soviet Shokhin, Minister of Economics Andrei public as the length of the proceedings and Nechaev, and Minister of Foreign Economic the detailed nature of the testimony often Relations Pëtr Aven. These men attack the obscure the principal legal points in question. problem of economic reform as an informal Shelley was uncertain whether the two group, making it difficult to distinguish one “trials” would decisively resolve anything in ministry from another. the near future, but expressed hope that both Calling the initial reform process in will work to discredit the notion of a one- Russia “a curious case of the vanishing party state. Seen from the future, she con- national interest,” the speaker contended that cluded, the proceedings may well come to be economic policymakers at first perceived regarded as setting an important precedent their task to be purely economic in character. for a law-based state. “They explicitly factored out political —by Peggy McInerny & Amy Smith questions—politics was seen as divorced from economic reality,” charged Stavrakis. In Vol. X No. 4 1992 his view, the policy of macroeconomic Economic Reform: Politics Won’t Go Away stabilization adopted in January 1992 gave no Russian economic reformers have thought to protecting Russia’s international experienced a remarkable short learning economic interests. Price liberalization of curve, said Peter Stavrakis at the Kennan foreign trade and investment, which, in the Institute on 2 November 1992. In only nine absence of immediate privatization, was months, from January to September of this intended to spur domestic production by year, reformers have changed their course and introducing competition. emphasis dramatically—from a purely In the months that followed, said economic perspective emphasizing macroeco- Stavrakis, large sectors of Russian society nomic stabilization to a mercantilist view became increasingly alienated from the which recognizes the need to define and government’s economic policy, including die- protect the Russian national interest. hard Communists, industrialists of the new Stavrakis, an Associate Professor of Political and old type alike, and an entrepreneurial Science at the University of Vermont and a class increasingly frustrated with tight Research Scholar at the Kennan Institute this monetary controls. Russian economic year, spoke primarily on economic reform in policymakers, however, rapidly came to Russia, although his current research focuses understand the serious risks posed by trade on the transformation of state economic and investment liberalization and recognized administration in Russia, Ukraine, and the need to develop a concept of national Kazakhstan. interest. From roughly April through Sep- Surveying the evolution of economic tember, said the speaker, the reformers policymaking in Russia over the past year, moved toward a mercantilist perspective 31 which emphasized the need to protect the Despite essential differences between Russian economy from outside competition post-Soviet and African states (diferent levels of and saw a legitimate role for the state in the educational, scientific, and industrial develop- economy. Yet they were slow to understand the ment, as well as the fact that the former are need to muster a coalition disposed toward experiencing a collapse in which the imperial market reform, with Gaidar attempting to co- center borders upon the periphery) Stavrakis opt industrial leaders only in October. held that comparisons remain instructive. He Stavrakis noted that the process of drew two essential lessons from the African rationalizing authority in Russia was a monu- experience for economic reform in post-Soviet mental task. In order to create a rational states: the need for political elites to choose a administrative culture, he explained, it is strategy and then successfully co-opt political fundamental to determine the limits of state coalitions in order to survive, and the need for intervention in the economy and have a civil leaders to translate personal authority into bureaucracy which respects those limits. He institutional authority. pointed out that such an administrative culture —by Peggy McInerny has never existed in Russia. In the absence of a system of public procurement, he added, the Vol. X No. 5 development of administrative culture is A Generation of Intentional Outsiders further impeded by the economy’s drift A generation of Russian writers born in backwards toward “centers” or “associations” the 1930s consciously chose to remain which replicate the function of the former outside the official Soviet literary establish- branch ministries of the command economy. ment and remained virtually unknown in Turning to the theoretical basis for both the USSR and the West until quite analyzing economic reform in Russia, the recently, said Peter Rollberg and Josephine Woll at a Kennan Institute lecture on 4 speaker argued for comparative political December 1992. Rollberg is Assistant models to replace the moribund theory of the Professor of Slavic Langauges and Litera- command economy. He noted that many tures at George Washington University; Woll political models today make comparisons is Professor of Russian Literature at Howard between post-Soviet states and the states of University. The work of this group of South America and Asia. In contrast, Stavrakis writers—which included Vladimir Makanin, contended that striking parallels of the post- Ludmilla Petrushevskaia, Anatolii Kim, and communist transition could be found in Africa: Ruslan Kireev—has become associated with both groups of states were part of multi-ethnic the label “proza sorokaletnikh” (prose of the empires, have legacies of imperial collapse, face 40-year-olds) in Russia, as these authors first the awesome task of decolonization in its attracted attention in the 1970s when they were in their forties. After elaborating physical and psychic dimensions, experience characteristics which, in their opinion, cause the problem of former colonial elites in new these writers to form an identifiable group, states no longer controlled by these elites, and Rollberg and Woll focused specifically on the struggle with the role of state administration in writings of Makanin and Petrushevskaia, societies with a weak entrepreneurial base. respectively. “When decolonization occurred in Both speakers conceded that any Africa,” said Stavrakis, “the state was the only generalizations about these highly individu- game in town. In an ironic way, but for very alistic writers were necessarily arbitrary. different reasons, the state is the only game in Nevertheless, Rollberg pointed out that these town in the post-Soviet era.” He drew specific authors had lived through the same forty attention to the phenomenon of the “soft” years of Soviet history: a childhood marked state in Russia. As elaborated by Africanists, a by the trauma of World War II, early disap- pointment over the failure of liberal initia- soft state is one which appears powerful at the tives in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and outset, with strong centralized ministries the long experience of stagnation under charged with the process of economic transfor- Brezhnev. As it turns out, most sorokaletnie mation, but cannot reach into the periphery came to Moscow from the provinces. and implement policy. The potential for Sorokaletnie also exhibited a common conflict between the center and periphery in behavior pattern—they refused to integrate individual Soviet successor states, Russia into the administrative structures of the included, raises the same question which has Soviet literary world and led a precarious plagued African reformist governments: economic existence, often relying on spouses’ whether or not to use force to impose policy. income in order to survive, said Rollberg. 32 Their work was not published in prominent Baranskaia, the second by Petrushevskaia Soviet literary journals such as Novyi mir, and Viktoria Tokareva, and the third by Znamia, or Oktiabr’, and press runs of their Tat’iana Tolstaia, Nina Sadur, and Valeriia books—if published at all—were limited to Narbutova. Petrushevskaia, however, shares twenty or thirty thousand copies, leaving the with the third generation a fascination with authors largely unknown in the USSR. language and penchant for reordering In Rollberg’s view, the works of Makanin, narrative and time, noted Woll. Kim, Petrushevskaia, and Kireev are united by a Rollberg explained that a reordering of metaphysical sense of life—“the feeling that the space and time was a recurring feature of essence of events lies behind the visible and that Vladimir Makanin’s work, one particularly [in order] to understand [this essence], one must apparent in his recent story “Laz” (“The use different modes of approaching reality.” Loophole”). An apocalyptic tale of the end of Their style represented a sharp departure from Soviet society in which outside space and Soviet literary tradition, he continued, with its inside space are portrayed as equally threat- model of an externally defined meaningful life ening, the story upends the conventional and linear depiction of time and events. upstairs/downstairs image of rulers and Rollberg and Woll agreed that Makanin ruled, showing a perplexed ruling elite living and Petrushevskaia in particular share a in a light-filled lower world while chaotic predilection for dividing space into inner and masses inhabit a dark upper world. outer categories. Makanin mixes up space and As in earlier works such as Priamaia liniia time in a fashion that leaves the reader uncer- (The Straight Line) and “Kliucharëv I tain as to the chronology of events; Alymushkin” (“Kliucharëv and Klymushkin”), Petrushevskaia uses the inner/outer division to “Laz” takes up the theme of the outsider reverse the traditional Russian axiom that versus “the swarm” (roi), depicting turbulent public space is hostile and private space is safe. crowds as the greatest threat to the life of the In addition to turning this cultural opposition main hero. The metaphysical essence of of public and private space upside down— events in “Laz,” which ends by implying the showing the private sanctum of the home as a hero has been dreaming while asleep on the place where families tear each other apart, said street, is a theme which has become increas- Woll, Petrushevskaia’s writings also work to ingly pronounced in Makanin’s works over destroy two other deeply-held assumptions of time, said Rollberg. In “Kliucharëv and Russian culture: the idea that maternity is Alymushkin,” for example, a man perceives beneficial to child and mother alike, with that his existence is mysteriously linked to motherhood the most satisfying role for a that of another when he discovers that the woman, and the notion that the intelligentsia is more luck and happiness come his way, the the standard-bearer of moral integrity. more misfortune and unhappiness befall These three cultural icons come under another man. In Rollberg’s opinion, it is relentless attack in Petrushevskaia’s plays and “[this] vague anticipation of the existence of especially in two of her stories. “Svoi krug” something beyond the field of reason” which (“Our Crowd”) and “Vremia noch’” (“The Time unites the work of the sorokaletnie. is Night”), observed Woll. In “Svoi krug,” a The destruction of the conventional terminally ill woman beats her young son in unity of time and space seen in the work of front of a group of her friends, provoking their these writers is characteristic of contemporary pity and thus ensuring that they will take care Russian fiction in general, said Woll, as is a of the boy after her death. Yet the “crowd” of preference for style over content and a intelligentsia in the story is depicted “as a fascination with the physiological aspects of loathsome group of people who trample on sex. Rollberg added that a return to privacy in moral values,” noted Woll, “including their both theme and function appears to be own vaunted love of children.” In “Vremia occurring in Russian literature today, with noch’” a grandmother raising a seven-year-old literature once again primarily serving as a grandson torments the boy and incites the means of personal artistic self-expression. hatred of her two children, despite her repeated —by Peggy McInerny protestations of her great love for all of them. Woll described Petrushevskaia as Vol. X No. 6 belonging to the second of three generations Security Priorities and the Slavic States of women prose writers in Russia—the first Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus today represented by I. Grekova and Natal’ia share critical security concerns of providing 33 social benefits to the military, curbing draft right to participate in the world arms market, evasion and hazing within the ranks, and yet the proliferation of people and organiza- improving poor officer morale, said Susan tions selling arms has rapidly placed the arms Clark at a Kennan Institute lecture on 7 trade beyond government control. Official December 1992. Clark is a research analyst at government institutions, defense factories, and the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) in even individual military personnel are now Alexandria, Virginia; her remarks did not concluding arms deals throughout the former reflect the views of IDA. Soviet Union, she explained. Personnel issues rank among the most Equally disturbing on the arms front is pressing faced by military planners in the Russia’s intent to use weapons sales to finance Slavic states, who are literally grappling with defense conversion. Acting Prime Minister how to pay salaries, build housing, feed the Egor Gaidar recently announced the sale of troops, and retain talented junior officers. two billion dollars of military hardware to Beyond these immediate concerns, however, China, Iran, and India, remarked Clark; other each of the Slavic states confronts a somewhat projected sales form a component of the different set of security imperatives, con- Russian budget for defense conversion. tended Clark. Ukraine’s most urgent security Another complex security issue involv- goals are integration into Europe, the estab- ing all three Slavic states concerns the removal lishment of an independent state-to-state of strategic nuclear missiles from Ukraine and relationship with the Russian Federation, and Belarus for dismantling in Russia. Ukraine retaining a U.S. presence in Europe as a and Belarus appear to be following different counterbalance to Russia. In contrast, the policies on this matter, observed the speaker, principal security concerns of Belarus—where with Belarus seeking to accelerate and the ratio of military to civilians is much higher Ukraine seeking to delay or at least prolong than in any other former Soviet republic and the removal of the missiles. Chairman of the structures of an independent state do no Belarus Parliament Stanislav Shushkevich has yet exist—are to provide for the needs of the already announced that all nuclear weapons in troops stationed on its soil and ensure its Belarus will be removed within two-and-a- survival as a virtual appendage of Russia. half years instead of the seven originally Russia’s highest priority, maintained discussed. Ukraine, on the other hand, is now Clark, is to prevent its own disintegration in demanding both a portionof the monies light of growing demands for economic and derived from the sale of nuclear materials in political independence by various of its the missiles and international security guaran- regions and autonomous republics. Second tees in exchange for their removal. only to this concern are the issues of protect- Ukraine has reacted in similar fashion to ing the Russian diaspora, maintaining stability Russia’s contention that the Russian Ministry of on Russia’s borders, and foiling efforts by Defense, not the CIS high command, should other Soviet successor states to isolate Russia have full control over all nuclear weapons in from the international community. the Commonwealth. Whereas Belarus con- Ukraine and Russia must also make cluded an agreement with Russia placing the basic choices about the future direction of 30,000 Commonwealth troops (mostly strategic their respective foreign policies, said Clark. forces) on its territory under the command of Ukraine must choose either to pursue bilateral the Russian Defense Ministry, Ukraine is relations with the states of Eastern and insisting that the CIS high command have Western Europe, as the speaker recom- control of strategic forces on its soil. Ukraine mended, or continue to concentrate on further seeks to attain administrative control relations with multilateral political and over the selection of these forces in Ukraine. economic institutions. Russia likewise must “Frankly,” remarked Clark, “the Ukrainians see decide whether her foreign policy will have an Russia’s efforts to assert control over these Atlantic, Eurasian, or isolationist orientation. troops as yet another attempt at Russian Specific military issues such as unregu- domination of the former Soviet Union.” The lated arms sales, disputes over nuclear weap- presence of 700,000 former Soviet troops in ons, and the possibility of future peacekeeping Ukraine, she added, make it virtually impos- efforts within the Commonwealth of Indepen- sible for the newly-created Ukrainian armed dent States (CIS) complicate relationships forces to be considered genuinely independent. among the Slavic states. Clark pointed out that A recent CIS agreement on peacekeep- Russia and Ukraine have both asserted their ing efforts has created additional suspicions 34 on Russian imperial ambitions. Signed only by According to Grafova, the refugee Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, problem in the former Soviet Union began in Armenia, and Moldova, the agreement raises 1988 after anti-Armenian pogroms erupted in questions about whom peacekeeping forces Sumgait, Azerbaijan. The phenomenon would protect and the motivations behind became more apparent in January 1989, Russia’s desire to create such a mechanism. when 40,000 Armenians were evacuated to Clark reflected that the Russian military finds Moscow following more violent pogroms in itself in a frustrating dilemma—accused of Baku. Unfortunately, asserted the speaker, imperialism, it is nevertheless asked (as in the the limits on glasnost’ in 1988 and 1989 case of Tajikistan) to engage in peacekeeping prevented adequate press coverage of the operations. Baku riots. As a result, both political leaders Despite the political rhetoric of their and the general public missed an early leaders, interdependence is an escapable fact opportunity to recognize the rising danger of of life for the Slavic states and they are nationalism. increasingly aware of this reality, said Clark. Today, Russian emigrants represent the She cited in support of this argument the fact largest wave of refugees in the former Soviet that Belarus has remained within the ruble Union. “It is a law of history that the collapse zone and the emphasis of new Ukrainian of any empire is accompanied by the exodus Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma on maintain- of the imperial people from the periphery,” ing economic ties with Russia. These states asserted Grafova. “We were long unable to have an overall desperate need to develop perceive this inevitability due to the myth of professional cadres in governance, the the friendship of peoples’ (druzhba narodov) security arena, economics, and the interna- with which we all grew up.” After August tional sphere. Professional training and not 1991, fifteen mini-USSRs sprang up in place humanitarian aid, emphasized Clark, should of the original USSR, each substituting be the focus of Western assistance to these aggressive nationalism for communist nations. ideology, commented Grafova. —by Peggy McInerny Russians are emigrating primarily from Transcaucasia and Central Asia, related Vol. X No. 7 Grafova. In contrast to the Baltics, encourage- Russian Refugees a Blessing in Disguise? ment of Russian out-migration is not official Independent experts estimate that government policy in these countries. approximately two million Russian refugees However, said the speaker, Russians in these have fled to the Russian Federation, said states live in fear for their lives as they expect Lydiia Grafova at the Kennan Institute on 1 anti-Russian pogroms to erupt at any December 1992. She contended that as many moment. In Tajikistan, where a civil war now as five of the twenty-five million ethnic rages, virtually all Russian inhabitants are Rusians now living outside of Russia, fleeing the country. principally those in Transcaucasia and Refugees of any nationality face a bleak Central Asia, could become refugees in 1993. existence in the Russian Federation. The Grafova is a journalist for Literaturnaia gazeta, housing shortage in Russia is already acute and a human rights activist, and Co-Chairman of the Russian government does not have the the Civilian Assistance Committee, a Mos- financial resources to resettle refugees. “For the cow-based private assistance organization for government to address the refugee problem refugees and displaced persons in Russia. now would be like trying to repair a house Despite the tragedy and unhappiness while it is burning down,” observed Grafova. the refugee problem poses for Russia, Beginning with the influx of Armenian Grafova claimed the crisis could become a refugees in 1989, the Civilian Assistance blessing in disguise for the country. “Those Committee has encouraged refugees to help who are returning understand that the state themselves by building their own housing. The cannot help them; they realize they must Committe helps groups of refugees to procure help themselves,” she said. Forced by allotments of land in Russia and obtain expert circumstances to take charge of their own architectural designs for new settlements. With lives, Russian emigrants are building com- the assistance of millionaire Russian entrepre- mercial settler societies for themselves across neurs, the Committee also provides refugees Russia, bringing new vitality and entrepre- with financial support and construction neurial skills to these regions. materials. 35 Communities of Russians in Central the current Russian government, she said. Asia are now working to build settlements in Not all local administrators want the extra Russia before they emigrate, said Grafova. responsibilities which come with refugee After obtaining land and a settlement design, settlements, she continued, and in some these groups raise money from among regions of southern Russia Cossack units themselves, often using the savings elderly have attacked temporary refugee settlements. members had set aside for their funerals. If the urgency of the refugee problem is not Under the pressure of inflation, the groups recognized and given priority, she warned, immediately translate their capital into “this avalanche of unfortunate, homeless building materials and, finally, send a people will become fertile soil for fascism.” construction brigade to build the settlement. —by Peggy McInerny Grafova claimed these refugees were special Russians: descendants of the Vol. X No. 8 wealthier, better-off peasants (the so-called Russian Libraries Hit Hard Times “kulaks”) exiled to these regions, as well as Libraries in Russia are reeling under the descendants of former political prisoners and combined impact of the economic and technical specialists originally sent to these organizational collapse of the Soviet system, areas to raise industrial production. These said Natal’ia Kutovenko and Harold Leich at people possess an entrepreneurial indepen- a Kennan Institute lecture on 8 December dent mentality and bring greatly needed 1992. Kutovenko is Director of the Library technical skills to Russia, insisted Grafova. Information Center of the International “They don’t just build housing,” she empha- Banking Institute in St. Petersburg, Leich is a sized, “they build businesses and factories for Russian/Soviet area specialist librarian at the themselves. And in these settlements, Library of Congress. Hard-pressed financially everything is privately owned: factories, even in the best of times, libraries in Russia homes, and roads.” today are experiencing severe administrative, Whereas Grafova believes the number of funding, technical, personnel, and even Russian refugees in the Russian Federation is physical structural problems. Although close to two million, the newly-established libraries throughout the country are closing Migration Service of the Russian Federation due to lack of funds and the collapse of parent cites a figure of 500,000. “The government institutions, new independent libraries are office only counts those refugeees who are being created at the same time, among them registered,” she explained, “and registration “free public libraries” (nezavisimie only occurs by decision of the government. obshchestvennie biblioteki) as well as church, People were emigrating from Tajikistan for parish, gymnasium, specialized technical, and two years and were never registered, begin- even independent university libraries. And for ning with the 100,000 Russians who left after the first time since 1932, professional associa- the Dushanbe riots of February 1990.” tions of librarians are being formed at local Although the Migration Service was awarded and national levels. three billion rubles for refugee problems in The celebrated Lenin Library in early summer 1992, inflation rapidly rendered Moscow—with a collection exceeding 30 this sum meaningless. million books—was recently renamed the The resources of private organizations Russian National Library, as was the former like Civilian Assistance (including its new Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library. Yet “Return” fund to support refugees), the the two national libraries are now in direct Russian business community, and the competition for funding, acquisitions, and Russian government are simply insufficient collections, noted Kutovenko. Moreover, the to resolve the refugee problem in an expedi- Lenin/National Library is in such poor tious manner, said Grafova. She claimed physical condition that it was almost closed Western assistance for refugee settlement was to the public last year; recent construction of imperative. four metro stations near the library has Russian nationalist organizations like caused cracks in the walls of the building. Pamiat’ as well as Brown-Red coalitions Economic conditions have severely (extremists of the far right and former limited the ability of Russian libraries to Communist Party members) are already acquire new materials, an unfortunate sending representatives to temporary refugee dilemma at a time of growing demand for camps and provoking refugees to overthrow accurate information among all sectors of 36 Russian society. “You need information to source of foreign acquisitions. (The Library of make a market work,” lamented Kutovenko, Congress, for example, has conducted library “without information, it won’t work.” Foreign exchanges with the Library of the Russian currency requirements make the purchase of Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg since foreign materials impossible and even the 1850s.) Inflation is also seriously eroding procurement of books published in Russia has library budgets, lowering already paltry become difficult. Publishing houses in Russia salaries and causing staff attrition. have no tradition of “obligatory depost” of Leich drew attention to the unfortunate books, explained Kutovenko, thus many legacy of the Soviet tracking system for social private printing houses do not provide sciences and humanities collections. The system libraries with free copies of new publications. worked on the basis of three mutually exclusive In addition to the acquisitions crisis, there “tracks” defined by jurisdictional rather than has been a virtual collapse of interlibrary loans logistical considerations: those of the Academy between Russian and foreign libraries. Periodi- of Sciences, the Ministry of Culture, and the cal subscriptions represent a problem of similar Ministry of Education. No contact, communica- magnitude. Prices for Russian newspapers and tion, or resource sharing existed between these journals have risen by a factor of 10 to 100 over tracks, said Leich, which continue to function the past year, noted Kutovenko. Foreign today. Specialty libraries in medicine, agricul- editions are simply unavailable. Many libraries ture, science, and technology were assigned to had unpaid accounts for foreign language still other, separate tracks. “[It was] a very subscriptions they are unable either to repay atomized system with no national vision, no past debts or cover current subscription costs, national network, and no local networks,” often surviving with free subscriptions. Leich concluded. Administrative difficulties also haunt On a more positive note, Leich claimed Russian libraries. Under the Soviet system, that the highly inaccessible “special collec- related Kutovenko, libraries were over- tions” of times past (spetsfondy or centralized, underequipped, and often served spetskhrany), which contained Western as places of exile for people who failed to publications, political materials, and emigré succeed in Party careers or other professions. publications, are now being dismantled and “Specialists often were not running the reintegrated into general library collections. libraries,” she observed, “and today it is very American libraries now enjoy greatly ex- difficult to cope with the mistakes they panded opportunities to acquire previously managed to make.” Today, many qualified restricted materials such as regional and local foreign language specialists are leaving newspapers as well as military and security libraries for better-paid work in private publications. And numerous collaborative businesses. Nevertheless, Kutovenko refused and cooperative programs have sprung up to be pessimistic, claiming, “Our life is very between Russian and American libraries. interesting now.” Both Leich and Kutovenko emphasized Harold Leich, Russian/Soviet area a rapidly growing professionalism among specialist librarian at the Library of Congress, Russian librarians. Whereas Stalin abolished confirmed Kutovenko’s grim evaluation of the last existing Library Council in 1932, economic realities in Russia. “Funding [of professional associations such as unions and libraries] at all levels is a disaster,” he said, councils of librarians began to be re-estab- “Parent bodies are cutting funding drastically lished during the Gorbachev era. Last year a or completely.” Leich claimed that libraries federation of these local councils was created. have been largely left to their own devices to Although technical and budgetary problems raise money, resulting in ill-conceived remain substantial, Leich claimed, “the fundraising schemes and occasional scandals apparatus of fear and repression are gone.” connected with the sale of duplicate rare —by Peggy McInerny books. Educational institutes throughout the country are liquidating their libraries and Vol. X No. 9 1993 sending millions of books, many of a highly Russian-Japanese Relations: A New Foreign ideological character, to the Lenin Library! Policy Ballgame Library exchanges between Russian Russia and Japan were unable to and American libraries have essentially come normalize relations in 1992 largely because to a halt due to inflation in Russia, depriving neither understood the significance of the Russian institutions of another important political changes which had taken place in 37 Russia, contended Semën Verbitskii on 1 dashed popular hopes for Western and February 1993 at a Kennan Institute lecture. Japanese aid, while an increasing number of Verbitskii is an independent scholar and conflicts (linked, for the most part, to territo- former Senior Researcher at the Institute of rial problems) had broken out within the CIS. Oriental Studies in Moscow. Foreign policy- In this context, normalization of Russian- making was highly centralized in the former Japanese relations touched off a heated public USSR, said the speaker, with decisions made debate over the Kurile Islands. Nationalists by the Politburo or, under Gorbachev, within protested Russia’s abdication of its national the USSR presidential administration. In the interests under Western pressure, the Supreme Russian Federation, however, powerful Soviet fought as a body to establish more ministries, presidential advisory teams, the control over foreign policy, and a number of Supreme Soviet, regional political groupings, democratic deputies in the Supreme Soviet the mass media, and public opinion all espoused a “great power” foreign policy influence the foreign policy process, con- orientation that emphasized preservation of tended Verbitskii. Although the reasons Russia’s great power status and rejected behind Russian President Yeltsin’s cancella- following the West’s lead in international tion of a planned trip to Japan in September relations. In addition, the Army and the 1992 were numerous and complicated, regional administrations of the Russian Far Verbitskii insisted that both nations had East and Sakhalin strongly opposed the return misread the dynamics of the contemporary of any of the Kurile Islands to Japan. foreign policy process in Russia. Discussion of Russian-Japanese rela- Russian-Japanese relations in the post- tions in Russia in 1992 became extremely war era basically amounted to Soviet efforts politicized and highly emotional, explained to normalize relations with Japan, said the speaker, with different actors using the Verbitskii. The two nations did not sign a issue to advance personal and/or institutional peace treaty after World War II, but did sign political goals. Newspapers printed articles a joint declaration to renew diplomatic about the Kurile Islands almost daily, the relations in 1956. This declaration obligated subject was debated repeatedly on television, the USSR to return to Japan two of the and Russian specialists on Japan split disputed Kurile Islands—Habomai and between those who supported and those who Shikotan—upon conclusion of a formal peace opposed normalization. treaty. Yet, said the speaker, the joint declara- Finally, said Verbitskii, rumors circu- tion was never published in the Soviet press, lated that Iurii Petrov, head of Yeltsin’s Soviet participants in international confer- presidential administration, returned from an ences were advised not to speak about it, and advance trip to Japan with a letter from Ichiro the Soviet leadership in effect repealed the Ozawa, acting chairman of the Takeshita ninth article by announcing there were no faction of the Liberal Democratic Party of territorial problems between the two nations. Japan. The letter purportedly advised Yeltsin The various problems of the Soviet- that if he refrained from negotiating with Japanese relationship were first discussed Japanese Prime Minister Keiichi Miyazawa openly by the Soviet leadership under and waited until Ozawa became Prime Gorbachev, but favorable conditions for Minister, Japan would provide aid and credits normalization of relations arrived only with the to Russia without making territorial demands Yeltsin-Gaidar government in Russia, claimed in return. Verbitskii stated unequivocally that the speaker. Figuring among these conditions, he had no concrete evidence that the letter he continued, was Gaidar’s interest in securing actually existed, citing the rumor as illustra- Japanese aid and support within the “Group of tive of the highly-charged decisionmaking Seven” industrialized nations; the arrival of a atmosphere in Russia at the time. “If the new generation of Russian specialists on Japan information was circulating,” he remarked, convinced that democratic Russia must base its “someone needed it.” In the end, the decision relations with Japan on the 1956 declaration; to cancel Yeltsin’s trip was made by the and, following Gorbachev’s visit to Japan in Security Council, a new security structure April 1991, the rise of Japan’s prestige among which Verbitskii believes is beginning to exert the Russian populace. great influence on international policy. By late 1992, however, worsening While Russian conditions largely economic conditions had weakened the prevented Yeltsin from normalizing relations position of the Gaidar government and with Japan in 1992, Verbitskii implied the 38 Japanese had some responsibility for this Russia who became an equally renowned negative outcome as well. Not only did Japan conductor, first in Russia and Europe, and try to resolve the territorial dispute directly then in the United States. A student of the with the center, he argued, it never elaborated German conductor Arthur Nikisch, friend and any clear-cut programs—especially an eco- contemporary of Sergei Prokofiev, and mentor nomic program—that would have been to American composer-conductor Leonard attractive to the Russian population. Nor, he Bernstein, Koussevitsky spent 25 years in the added, did Japan perceive the need to conduct service of Russian culture and 25 in the service an informational campaign in Russia in order of American culture, noted Yuzefovich. to explain what Japan and Russia would both Over the course of his long life, the receive as a result of the return of the islands musician-conductor founded orchestras and and an improvement in relations. Japanese musical publishing houses, created philan- diplomats also continued to view the Russian thropic foundations, organized music government and Russian diplomats as adver- festivals, and established a musical academy saries in negotiations, repeating the tactics they in Tanglewood, Massachusetts. Most signifi- had used with their Soviet counterparts. cantly, Koussevitsky was responsible for Finally, he pointed out that Japan did not seem publishing and performing the works of to have a strategic conception of Russia’s role in modern Russian and American composers, Asia on which to base a policy. including Rachmaninoff, Scriabin, Prokofiev, Yeltsin’s aborted trip represents the last Shostakovich, and Stravinsky among the attempt to normalize Japanese-Russian Russians, and Barber, Copeland, Fine, relations on the basis of the joint declaration of Hanson, Diamong, and Carpenter among the 1956, concluded Verbitskii. Russia’s interna- Americans. tional priorities have since shifted toward Born on the upper Volga in Russia in Asian nations and away from the Western the late nineteenth century, Koussevitsky ran democracies, he added, as Yeltsin’s recent away from home at the age of 14 and studied visits to South Korea, China, and India the double bass in Moscow. He soon mas- demonstrate. Verbitskii contended, however, tered the instrument and despite its rarity, that Russia and Japan remain interested in became a famous contrabass soloist in improving relations and that the Japanese Europe. Koussevitsky also played the government appeared to be softening its contrabass in the Bolshoi Theater Orchestra position on the territorial issue. under the direction of Rachmaninoff at the —by Peggy McInerny same time when the famed opera singer Fëdor Shaliapin performed with the orches- Vol. X No. 10 tra. Yuzefovich claimed Koussevitsky’s Russia and America: The Cultural Connection musicality was greatly influenced by The cultures of America and Russia have Shaliapin’s singing, tracing the “singing” been linked throughout the twentieth century by quality the contrabassist brought to conduct- such famous artists as conductor Serge ing not only to his technical virtuosity as a Koussevitsky and director Konstantin string instrumentalist, but to his experience Stanislavskii, claimed speakers Viktor accompanying Shaliapin. Yuzefovich and Anatolii Smelianskii at After studying conducting with such separate Kennan Institute lectures. Both speak- leading German conductors as Nikisch and ers drew attention to the enormous influence Weingartner in Berlin in 1906–07, Russian artists and performers have exerted on Koussevitsky returned to Russia as a conduc- American culture in this century. tor and plunged into an active artistic life “Serge Koussevitsky was a building of there. Yuzefovich observed that Koussevitsky a cultural bridge between Russia and the considered educating the public to be part of United States,” said Viktor Yuzefovich at a his mission as a conductor. With this end in lecture on 11 January 1993. Yuzefovich is an view, he organized concerts intended for independent musicologist and a former “democratic” audiences in Moscow and St. Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Petersburg (to which he invited world-class Mstislav Rostropovich, conductor of the European soloists) as well as three orchestral National Symphony Orchestra, served as boat tours along the Volga River. The latter commentator at the lecture. allowed him to perform symphonic music for Serge Koussevitsky was a celebrated people who had never heard such music double bass soloist of pre-revolutionary before. Koussevitsky and his first wife, a 39 sculptress and daughter of a wealth Russian A biography of Koussevitsky is ex- merchant, became well-known philanthro- tremely important, insisted Rostropovich, pists in Russia; the conductor continued to because a conductor, unlike superb individual generously support artists and composers soloists, not only creates his own interpreta- throughout his life. tions of music, “he creates a community of After leaving Soviet Russia in 1920, musicians and the musical taste of the public.” Koussevitsky spent eight years in Paris before Rostropovich welcomed the addition of becoming the conductor of the Boston Sym- culture to the study of Russia undertaken at phony Orchestra—a position he held until his the Kennan Institute, saying, “I think that the death in 1951. Yuzefovich pointed out that great underground network of relations Koussevitsky brought professional European between countries is in the arts and that these traning and a Russian interpretation of relations are much more significant and solid Russian music to America. The conductor than any political contact between them.” engaged some of the best instrumentalists in The great actor and director Konstantin Europe for his orchestra and made strict Stanislavskii was the focus of another lecture discipline and painstaking work the hallmark on Russian culture at the Kennan Institute of the Boston Symphony Orchestra. given by Anatolii Smelianskii on 3 February As conductor of the Boston Symphony, 1993. Smelianskii is a professor of theater Koussevitsky fought for American music as a history at the Moscow Art Theater Studio legitimate national musical culture, said the School. He described the tour of the Moscow speaker. In many cases, he acquainted both Art Theater in the United States in the years American and European audiences with 1922–24 as a doomed effort of Stanislavskii American symphonic works. Koussevitsky’s and his associate, Nemirovich-Danchenko, to correspondence with American composers of secure the artistic and financial future of the his day—many of whose works premiered at Art Theater in Russia. the Boston symphony Orchestra—could serve By the early 1920s, the Bolshevik Revolu- as the basis for studying American music of tion and Civil War had split the original Moscow the twentieth century, observed Yuzefovich. Art Theater into two parts: the Kachalov group of Yuzefovich pointed out that original Art Theater actors, which toured Europe Koussevitsky, like Eugene Ormandy and for three years, and the studios and younger Fritz Reimer of the Philadelphia and Cleve- actors who had stayed behind in Moscow with land symphony orchestras, respectively, was Stanislavskii and Nemirovich-Danchenko. The a conductor who educated an orchestra over latter found it impossible to pursue the mission of the course of many years. In contrast to the Theater in its original guise, said the speaker. conductors who guest conduct with various orchestras, he noted that this kind of conduc- Nemirovich turned to the idea of an American tor is on the wane. tour as a way to unite the two groups outside of Koussevitsky’s biography is the first Russia, generate income, and wait out the step in a larger study of the Russian contri- national disorder until the Art Theater could bution to American culture of the twentieth again pursue its calling in Russia. century, said Yuzefovich. Pointing to Mae- Stanislavskii headed the American tour stro Rostropovich’s continuation of with two goals in mind: to obtain medical Koussevitsky’s earlier work in America, he treatment for his tubercular son Igor’ and to claimed the Russian contribution to Ameri- either separate out the first group of actors— can culture was a continuing phenomenon. the “old-timers” or original founders of the Mstislav Rostropovich, cellist and Theater—from the younger Moscow group, musical director of the National Symphony or reduce the two groups to a common Orchestra, confessed, “Koussevitsky has denominator. The tour was an artistic and always been a kind of idol for me.” As director financial success in its first year, but failed to of the Moscow Conservatory faculty for the live up to expectations when Stanislavskii cello and double bass, Rostropovich said he extended it for an additional year. came to know Koussevitsky’s work first and The entire tour was a highly demoraliz- foremost through his compositions for the ing experience for Stanislavskii and the actors contrabass. Later he became familiar with alike; they were exhausted from life in Russia Koussevitsky’s conducting by repeatedly during the Revolution and Civil War and/or listening to the Boston Symphony Orchestra’s too long tours in Europe, buffeted by political recording of Prokofiev’s Fifth Symphony in pressures from Moscow throughout their the company of Prokofiev himself. travels, and increasingly anxious about their 40 personal and collective futures in Russia, said with crucial exposure to innovative trends. the speaker. In the end, many of the actors Ironically, the tour and subsequent publica- stayed in America when informed at the end tion of Stanislavskii’s books in the United of the tour that Nemirovich could not assure States created an American understanding of their employ in Moscow. the director’s ideas about acting which differs Stanislavskii was bored with the old significantly from the Russian perception. repertoire and embarrassed by the accolades Stanislavskii first wrote My Life in Art and excitement the troupe’s performances for publication in the United States and gave continued to generate in Europe and America, complete editing rights to his translator there, said Smelianskii. He had hoped to create and who omitted important parts of the book and rehearse new works on the road, but soon made key errors in the translation, said found his actors too worried and emotionally Smelianskii. Upon his return to Russia, depleted to dedicate themselves to artistic Stanislavskii rewrote the book and then twice growth. As early as January 1923, during the enlarged it, finally producing a much longer first month of the troupe’s tour in the United and quite different work. States, Stanislavskii wrote to Nemirovich: “One A similar pattern governed the publica- must get used to the idea that the Moscow Art tion of his other great work, An Actor Pre- Theater no longer exists. Apparently you pares. Written by Stanislavskii in Russia realized this before I did. All these years I have chiefly during the 1930s, the book was first been deluding myself and trying to save its published in America in 1936, then rewritten smouldering remains.” and enlarged by Stanislavskii before its The voluminous correspondence publication in Russia in 1938. Stanislavskii between Nemirovich-Danchenko and was something of an inveterate scribbler Stanislavskii during the trip, unpublished to (grafoman), explained Smelianskii. date, reveals a depressed and discouraged Due to this constant rewriting and Stanislavskii and a Nemirovich intent on revising, as well as the fact that he did not write hammering home to his colleagues the grave An Actor Prepares until the 1930s, he continued, choices facing the Moscow Art Theater under we have something akin to a mythology of the Soviet regime. Only a few days after the Stanislavskii’s ideas about acting. Everyone troupe’s departure, 300 people representing who studied with him at different times—such the cream of the intellectuals of old Russia as Lee Strasberg, Stella Adler, and Michael (including Nikolai Berdiaev, Semën Frank, Chekhov—had different impressions of his and Sergei Bulgakov), were exiled abroad ideas and often taught these ideas as “the” against their will, said Smelianskii. This Stanislavskii method. action was intended as an object lesson to the An accurate understanding of what touring group, with Nemirovich-Danchenko Stanislavskii thought when is the work of and the studios left behind in Moscow as scholars, said Smelianskii. He pointed out hostages to the good behavior of the travel- that an important consideration in this work ling group, he observed. will be to ascertain the relationship between Smelianskii illustrated the acute political Stanislavskii’s writings in the 1930s and the pressures under which the troupe worked in Stalinist regime then in power. the United States by quoting from another Smelianskii noted that a new English unpublished letter by Stanislavskii: “Despite translation of the Russian edition of An Actor all the insults aimed at me in Moscow, I have Prepares would soon be published in London. refused all the profitable offers made to me in Calling this book “a myth of American Europe and America and strived with all my theater,” Smelianskii predicted that the soul for Russia, the very Russia which has Russian edition would create a stir in the now spat on my soul. I don’t know what to American theater community as it presents a do—I don’t have the strength to stay here, but very different picture of Staislavskii’s think- I don’t see any sense in working in Russia ing than that reflected in the original Ameri- under the prevailing conditions.” can edition. Theater as Stanislavskii understood it, —by Peggy McInerny based on ensemble acting, did not exist in the United States in the early 1920s. Given the Vol. X No. 11 1993 embryonic stage of American theater culture Collapse of a Civilization, Not an Economy at the time, he believed the tour would The West is mistaking the collapse of provide American theatergoers and critics civilization in Russia for an economic crisis, 41 declared Alexander Yanov at a lecture at the start that amidst the collapse of its authoritar- Kennan Institute on 8 February 1993. This ian civilization, a nation with an imperial critical misperception blinds Western leaders political culture [would be] unable to come to and societies to the fact that more than an any consensus on a democratic transition.” economic transition is at stake in Russia, that The fact that such a concerted engagement in the future orientation—political and intellec- Russia would not occur under conditions of tual—of the Russian state hangs in the occupation, and that Russian leaders and balance. Yanov is Professor of Political society continue to bear considerable good Science at the Center for European Studies of will toward the West, would make such a the City University of New York. Should pro- course all the more productive in Russia, Western sentiment deteriorate in Russia maintained the speaker. Although a policy along with economic performance and for Russia demands far more sophistication political stability, warned Yanov, an aggres- and subtlety than General MacArthur’s sively anti-Western, fascist regime could mission in post-war Japan, Yanov neverthe- come to power in the country. Such a regime less held up this mission as an example of the would hope to align itself with Islamic kind of extensive political and economic fundamentalist and European neo-Nazi involvement required to assist Russia. forces in an anti-American “Axis.” The West needs to act and act now, “There is no doubt in my mind that, contended Yanov, while a window of oppor- like Weimar Germany or Taisho Japan, tunity is still available to it. He criticized the Russia does not have a chance in the world of American interpretation of the Seventh making the democratic transition on its Congress of People’s Deputies in December own,” remarked the speaker. Like Weimar 1992 as a defeat for President Yeltsin, con- Germany in 1923, Russia is experiencing tending, “The defeatist notion that Russia’s hyperinflation, collapse of government, brief flirtation with democracy is over and disastrous capital flight, and economic chaos. we can do nothing about it seems to be on the Yet, he added, the Nazis did not come to verge of becoming a dangerous cliché in power in Germany for a full ten years after American political discourse.” Rather than 1923. In Russia, anti-Western forces on the far suffering a defeat at the hands of the conser- right of the Russian political spectrum such vative opposition, said Yanov, Yeltsin suc- as the National Patriotic Front and Rossiiskoe ceeded in heading off a budding alliance edinstvo (Russian Unity, a nationalist-Com- between radical nationalists and the large munist bloc in the Parliament) are neither bloc of vacillating, swing votes in the Con- prepared nor sufficiently strong to seize gress. And although he was forced to sacri- power today, said Yanov. In the long run, fice Acting Prime Minister Egor Gaidar in however, the anti-American, Eurasian favor of industrial manager Viktor ideology espoused by the radical Russian Chernomyrdin, Yeltsin nevertheless kept the right could become increasingly appealing to balance of his reformist government intact. the Russian population, leadership, and even Yanov credited Yeltsin’s victory to the fact traditionally Westernizing intelligentsia as that the “Swamp” (borrowing the French economic reform flounders and Western revolutionaries’ term for the parliamentary nations confine their policies to technical majority), having aligned itself with the far economic assistance. right in order to exercise control over the The West must become actively executive government, changed its mind at the engaged in Russia’s reconstruction before the last minute. Shocked by the “outbreak of prevailing pro-Western sentiment in Russian hatred” which erupted among the radical society becomes exhausted, argued Yanov. nationalists in anticipation of their victory over This engagement, he insisted, must be a Yeltsin, the parliamentary middle was then political, intellectual, and economic commit- relieved to support the agreement brokered ment of the magnitude of America’s recon- between President Yeltsin and parliamentary struction efforts in post-war Japan, where chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov by Valerii America set out to establish a democratic Zorkin, head of the Russian Supreme Court. state in order to prevent another Pearl The current Congress is divided into two small Harbor. Instead of leaving Japan to manage wings, said the speaker: the pro-Western its own self-transformation, as the West is Coalition of Reforms and the anti-Western largely doing with respect to Russia, Yanov nationalist Russian Unity bloc, with a largely claimed the United States “assumed from the undifferentiated bloc of votes in the middle. 42 Despite factions within this middle, “the Becker, for example, envision a minimal role only division really influencing a voting pattern for the state that ignores the importance of is between parliamentarians of ethnic Russian long-term institutional supply arrangements regions and those of the national republics,” in an industrial economy and relies on said Yanov. The latter consistently vote for private enterprise to take care of investment. Yeltsin’s recommendations, as they seek to Pointing to what he called the ongoing maintain the autonomy of their regions under destruction of the British transport system his presidency. Until the Seventh Congress in resulting from its privatization, he claimed December of last year, the parliamentary these assumptions have proven disastrous for middle regularly voted in favor of reform investment in Western economies as well. measures, he observed, citing the law on The collapse of trade and institutional independent farmers adopted in December structures such as the Council for Mutual 1990, the law on the Presidency adopted in Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the May 1991, and the emergency economic breakdown of trade between republics of the powers granted to Yeltsin in November 1991. former Soviet Union has disrupted the Russian These deputies consider themselves initiators of economy which, in turn, is further impaired by reform, but are uncomfortable with the pace an inherited structural distortion favoring the and privations of shock therapy as well as military-industrial complex. Declining invest- generally confused about the meaning of a ment has further contributed to the catastrophic constitutional division of powers. At the situation in Russia, said Nove. “What is December 1992 Congress, the Russian Unity happening in Russia is certainly unprec- bloc joined these deputies in their battle to edented,” he explained, emphasizing that control the government, hoping thereby to Russia’s transformation is not merely a struc- increase the influence of the radical right by tural economic alteration but the upheaval of parliamentary means. In the end, remarked an entire economic system. Yanov, they were betrayed by Khasbulatov. Measures implemented in Russia under Russian reformers today, claimed the the neo-classical approach have failed to speaker, seek a clear signal from the Clinton address the investment gap, said Nove. The Administration that it supports their democ- freeing of prices, for example, has created racy, as well as a break in the bad news that discrepancies between money incomes and has enveloped them since August 1991. Time retail prices, resulting in a decline in overall is running out in the political war of ideas purchasing power. Uncertainty about the which will determine the nature of the future future, combined with the easing of convert- Russian state, insisted Yanov. ibility, import, and export controls, has —by Peggy McInerny encouraged a drive for instant profits and hard currency earnings among entrepre- Vol. X No. 12 1993 neurs, rather than promote investment in Investment: A Theoretical and Practical Problem productive capacity. The spectacular decline in investment, Free exchange rates and liberal import welfare, gross national product, and the policies in the Russian economy today standard of living in the former Communist disregard the need to sustain long-term countries of Eastern Europe and Russia points supply arrangements and protect and to the need for long-term investment in these channel domestic investment, contended economies, said Alec Nove at a lecture at the Nove. In principle, foreign capital, private Kennan Institute on 16 February 1993. Nove is capital (including the re-investment of Professor Emeritus of Economics at the enterprise profits), and the state are all University of Glasgow. The collapse of capital potential sources of investment capital. Yet in investment in Russia is a practical and a contemporary Russia, said Nove, private theoretical problem, argued Nove. capital is scarce and foreign investment is On the practical level, the dilemma is unlikely to be forthcoming in quantities how to obtain the resources necessary for commensurate with Russia’s size. large-scale investment in the Russian The speaker insisted that administrative economy. On the theoretical level, Nove priorities for economic reconstruction are a contended that neo-classical economics necessity during a period of catastrophe. He overlooks critical investment needs that noted that under the Marshall Plan, the require the participation of the state. Econo- countries of Western Europe implemented mists such as Milton Friedman and Gary restrictions on currency convertibility and 43 imposed import and export controls in order goods with negative value added. On the to dampen immediate consumption and export side, the hard currency earnings made prevent capital flight. “Import duties kept possible by free exchange rates encourages currency spending in sectors where it was the export of goods necessary to the domestic desperately needed,” explained Nove, “such economy. Whether taxi rides in Moscow or oil as reconstruction of energy, transport, and are sold for hard currency, these goods become creation of export capacity.” unavailable on the domestic market, he noted. Nove cited Japan, South Korea, and A concrete investment strategy backed Taiwan as examples of states which have by a solid center would act as a magnet for actively participated in economic develop- investors and give the state sector some ment. These states do not engage in compul- confidence in its future, maintained Nove. sory planning, but work with finance houses The question remains, he observed, whether and producers to create conditions favorable the Russian state can achieve such goals in for investment in key sectors of their econo- the absence of an honest and efficient mies. Politicians, industrial managers, and administration. economists in Russia are increasingly inter- —by Amy Smith ested in the example of China, said Nove, where both investment and living standards Vol. X No. 13 1993 are rising rapidly. In China, the state sector has Regional Economic Development Thwarted not been privatized, he noted, but was left “In the last few years there has been no alone while the non-state sector flourished real legal foundation for regional economic alongside it. With the majority of the non-state policy in Russia,” declared Kirill Yankov at a sector in China comprised of collective, lecture at the Kennan Institute on 6 April cooperative, municipal, and rural enterprises, 1993. Yankov is Chairman of the Economic private ownership does not appear to be Reform Committee of the Moscow Regional crucial as long as enterprises are producing for (Oblastnoi) Council of People’s Deputies and a the market, concluded Nove. Visiting Fellow at the National Forum Foun- Many at the lecture disagreed with both dation of Washington, D.C. If this foundation Nove’s characterization of neo-classical is not created within a short time, said Yankov, economic theory and his prescription for a the debilitating struggle over property and large role for the state in the Russian economy. power between and among different levels of Challenged that he supported the recreation of Russian government will continue unabated. a strong center instead of encouraging Three major tools of economic policy— initiative and entrepreneurship from below, taxation, property laws, and privatization— Nove did not deny the importance of the latter are not available to Russian regional adminis- for a market economy. He repeated, however, trations; as a result, administrators are forced that a vast proportion of the private enterprise to use nonlegal or informal methods to in Russia and Eastern Europe today is devoted influence economic policy. Until economic to distribution and trade, activities which do powers of the regions have a basis in law, not address the problem of large-scale there will be no cooperation between the investment. Members of the audience repeat- provinces and the central government, edly objected to this advocacy of the state, warned the speaker. claiming that the bureaucratic nature of the There are 56 regional administrative Russian economy is one of the chief obstacles units in the Russian Federation—50 oblasti to market reforms. and 6 kraiia. Prior to the collapse of the USSR Nove argued that vital investment and Communist Party in 1991, regions were needs in Russia cannot possibly be tackled administered by dual state and party struc- under laissez-faire, capitalist assumptions. tures, recalled Yankov. On the state side was Unless the investment gap is filled, he an executive committee selected from the warned, net investment in the Russian regional council (sovet) of people’s deputies; economy will become negative. Although he on the party side was the chief instrument of conceded that different exchange rates and power, the regional Communist Party import/export controls often lead to corrup- committee (obkom or kraikom) headed by a tion, he appeared to advocate them in some First Secretary for the region. After the form in Russia. Under free exchange rates in August 1991 coup, both the obkom and the Russia, he said, importing inputs at world executive committee of the regional council market prices results in the production of disappeared, leaving only the regional 44 council, its staff, and a regional head of Regional administrations, reiterated the administration (a position created in 1990). speaker, are unable to determine regional Most present-day councils were elected property and land use taxation rates, acquire in the spring of 1990. New regional heads of the major portion of state property at the administration and personal representatives regional level, or implement regional plans for of the president were later appointed by privatization. Given these obstacles, he claimed Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, the regions had three ways of influencing with the oblast’ councils having the right to economic policy: legal, nonlegal, and informal. confirm the former. Yankov stressed that The legal options, said Yankov, are to unlike West European or American regional demand genuine implementation of the government divisions, Russian regions under March 1992 Federation Treaty or to lobby the the Soviet system and today are governed by central government for individual privileges bodies that simultaneously represent the such as the right to establish free economic regional government and federal power at zones. Blackmail of the central government the regional level. through threats of separatism (seen in the Under the Soviet regime, the All-Union case of Krasnoyarsk krai) and trading on the Ministry of Finance set all federal, regional, popularity of a leader (seen in the case of and local taxes; it also determined the Mayor Nemstov of Nizhi-Novgorod) repre- budgets of their attendant administrative sent nonlegal methods of extracting addi- units by approving projected expenses at tional economic rights from the central every level. Today, as per a December 1991 government. The informal, or, in Yankov’s law of the Russian Federation, there are three words, “traditional Russian method,” is levels of taxation in the country: federal, simply to support federal policy in word regional, and local. while in fact promoting regional goals by Yankov pointed out that the chief other means. Yankov declined to describe federal taxes (value-added, excise, income, these informal methods, but implied that and profit taxes) still represent the lion’s they were similar to those of the Soviet past. share of revenue, while the principal regional Responding to a question concerning taxes (property, land, wood, water, and Oleg Rumiantsev’s draft constitution for the regional transport) produce a smaller Russian Federation, Yankov maintained that revenue stream and are established in the equity of rights between Russian regions advance at the federal level. Moreover, the and national republics in the draft was a fiscal body which collects regional taxes also problem. The national republics will object to collects federal taxes—the regional office of being given the same rights as the regions finance is subordinated to the Russian and the regions will refuse to accept anything Federation Ministry of Finance and the less than that which is awarded to the regional administration at the same time. national republics, he remarked. While Although nominally independent of the conceding that increased regional autonomy regional head of administration, the finance could contribute to dissension in the Russian office depends on the regional government for Federation, Yankov argued that it was office space and living quarters for its staff. impossible to manage a country the size of Further complicating the task of Russia without regional autonomy. regional governance is the current struggle When asked whether U.S. aid should be over the state property among all levels of directed toward the regions of Russia, bypass- government in the Russian Federation. As ing the central government, Yankov replied Yankov described it, “a rather messy process that no aid should be given to any level of of division of state property” has been Russian bureaucracy. “Russian bureaucracy is underway in Russia since 1990, when the bad bureaucracy at all levels,” he said. “Any USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a Law on method [of distributing aid] that deals with Property. After the collapse of the USSR, the the Russian bureaucracy is a bad method.” Russian Federation Supreme Soviet adopted Rather than distribute aid within Russia, he a law (December 1991) specifying the objects recommended that the U.S. government which constitute state property and how they sponsor risk insurance for American business- are to be divided. The central Russian men who seek to invest in Russia. Any risk ministries, explained Yankov, must approve insurance agency, emphasized Yankov, should the acquisition of any state property by be directed from the Unites States. regional governments. —by Peggy McInerny 45 Vol. X No. 14 1993 govern independent states. Political actors on Caucasus: Ethnic Conflict and the contemporary scene often come from Economic Decline outside the political arena altogether and lack Throughout Transcaucasia—in experience in both decision-making and Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, coalition-building. In contrast to European Chechen’ia, and elsewhere—ethnic groups colonial empires, which were disbanded, are seeking political autonomy or outright “there was almost no preparation for inde- independence from the newly independent pendence in the former Soviet Union,” states of the region. Armenia, Azerbaijan, commented Henze. Georgia, and Russia (in the north Caucasus) Although Russia no longer has the are all party to conflicts in which nationality ability to mount sustained military opera- groups aspire to self-determination within tions in the region, Henze maintained that an states that are intent on preserving their incoherent Russian foreign policy itself sovereignty and territorial integrity. created serious problems in the Caucasus “by Ongoing ethnic disputes, together with permitting ineffective military forays.” Long- the collapse of inter-republican economic ties term resolution of conflicts in Transcaucasia of the Soviet system, have hindered economic will depend on how Russia defines its reform in the three countries of the Caucasus, national interest in the area. “The north brought sharp declines in the standard of Caucasus could benefit from a regional living, and created opportunities for outside approach,” he reflected, “yet the classic powers to expand their influence in the Russian approach has always been to play region. The future of these states remain one nationality against the other and, bound to that of Russia, as their ability to unfortunately, this is still going on.” sustain democratic polities and move toward Rouben Adalian, Director of Academic market economies largely depends on the Affairs at the Armenian Assembly of future political orientation of the Russian America, spoke about the impact of the state and the manner in which it defines its economic blockade of Armenia on 8 March national interest. These were the conclusions 1993. He argued that the blockade- in effect of a series of seminars on the Caucasus held since early 1989, when Azerbaijan cut the rail at the Kennan Institute in March 1993. link connecting Russia and Armenia through Paul Henze, speaking at the Kennan the city of Baku—has served to widen the Institute on 1 March 1993, emphasized that conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in conflict mitigation (reducing the intensity of Transcaucasia and increase Turkish influence armed conflict) in the Caucasus was a more in the region. realistic goal than conflict resolution. Henze Under the Soviet system, Nagorno- is a Resident Consultant at the Rand Corpo- Karabakh was an autonomous district ration in Washington, D.C. He described a (oblast’) of Azerbaijan with a majority vicious cycle in which inexperienced politi- Armenian population. In February 1988 the cians, caught up in the immediacy of ethnic Supreme Soviet of the autonomous district conflict, neglect economic concerns and fail adopted a resolution transferring its jurisdic- to institute critical reforms. Given the lack of employment opportunities, armed militias tion from Azerbaijan to Armenia; in January have become a magnet for unemployed 1992, following a referendum and parliamen- young men, said Henze. “Ethnic tension,” he tary elections, it declared the region an observed, “discourages economic reform and independent sovereign state. The Azerbaijani lack of economic reform encourages ethnic Parliament abolished the autonomous status tension.” of the district in Azerbaijan in 1992. Ethnic Henze drew attention to the legacy of conflict and armed hostilities between 270 years of Russian and then Soviet imperi- Armenians and Azeris began in 1988 and alism in the Caucasus region: distorted have occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku, economies designed to serve the needs of an Sumgait, western Azerbaijan, and along the imperial center; economic and environmental Armenia-Azerbaijan border. devastation; territorial and administrative With the collapse of the Soviet Union, boundaries devised for purposes of central “the dispute over Karabakh took on all the control; and deliberately cultivated ethnic characteristics of a military struggle over a and national antipathies. Crowning this piece of territory...with the blockade recast as legacy is a shortage of people with the a weapon of war,” noted Adalian. In his administrative and political skills needed to opinion, the offensive launched by Armenian 46 forces of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992, which Relations with Russia are absolutely central succeeded in opening a corridor between that to Georgia, he argued, as the kind of Russian region and Armenia, changed the strategic state which emerges in the future will nature of the conflict. That offensive determine to a great extent not only the prompted an Azerbaijani counteroffensive future of Georgia, but the future of all former and increased armed hostilities along the Soviet republics. Both speakers indicated that Armenia-Azerbaijan border, making Russian involvement in the Abkhazian Nagorno-Karabakh for the first time strategi- conflict had worsened relations between the cally important to the survival of the Arme- two countries, creating considerable anti- nian state. Russian sentiment among Georgians. Four years after the blockade was Abkhazia is an autonomous republic of imposed, the Armenian economy is devas- Georgia which borders the Black Sea; its tated: energy supplies are extremely scarce population is approximately 17% Abkhazian (eighty percent of Armenia’s energy needs and 46% Georgian. Abkhazia seeks indepen- were imported from Russia by rail); only 10 dence from Georgia and has been engaged in of Armenia’s 400 large industrial enterprises intermittent armed conflict with Georgian are still working; all educational institutes National Guard forces since August 1992. have been closed; public trash collection has Despite a cease-fire negotiated by Eduard ceased; and malnutrition and infant mortality Shevardnadze and Russian Federation rates are rising. Although agriculture in the President Boris Yeltsin in September 1992, country was privatized before Armenia fighting has continued. Georgia has since attained independence in 1991, the blockade accused Russian forces stationed in the and conflict with Azerbaijan has put the republic of taking the side of Abkhazian country on a war footing. Industrial nationalists in the conflict. privatization has been delayed and the “There is no doubt in Georgian minds centralized command economy reinforced by that there is some kind of Russian participa- conditions of scarcity. tion in this conflict,” said Japaridze. “The Turkey’s refusal to open its border to problem for us is whether this participation is Armenia has aggravated the blockade, and coordinated from Moscow or from Tbilisi... Turkish insistence on inspecting humanitar- Russian troops in Georgia are subordinated to ian aid cargo has complicated delivery of the Transcaucasian Military District Com- American aid to Armenia. With repeated mander [in Tbilisi], but the troops in Abkhazia explosions in southern Georgia disrupting are subordinated directly to Moscow.” the natural gas pipeline between Georgia and Japaridze warned that the territorial disinte- Armenia during January 1993, the conflict gration of Georgia could create crises through- has now extended to a third country in out the Caucasus and even prompt the Transcaucasia. disintegration of Russia itself. Adalian held that continued conflict Asked why it had been possible to between Armenia and Azerbaijan only negotiate a cease-fire in South Ossetia but not benefitted outside powers; Russia, for one, in Abkhazia, Charkviani responded that the has a real opportunity to regain a position of two regions were demographically different: influence in the Caucasus if the struggle Abkhazia is a patchwork of different peoples persists. that includes a large Georgian population. In Gela Charkviani, chief advisor to addition, he asserted, Russia has a vested Georgian Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze, interest in Abkhazia because it offers Russia and Tedo Japaridze, National Security Advisor access to the Black Sea. (Paul Henze, on the of the Republic of Georgia, spoke at the Kennan other hand, claimed that Russian nationalists Institute on 19 March 1993. After a hectic 1992, and former communists supported the during which armed conflict claimed over 1,000 Abkhazians out of hatred for Eduard lives, Georgia has attained a certain stabiliza- Shevardnadze.) tion, said Charkviani. Headway has been made “We have the feeling that there are in the economy thanks to more efficient energy several Russias, with several policies; use, and the October 1992 elections produced a depending on the internal situation in Russia new government and a representative parlia- and the power struggle going on in the ment. country, the policy towards Georgia Georgians today are divided over changes,” remarked Charkviani. Although policy towards Russia, said Charkviani. Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze contin- 47 ues to fight in the Georgian Parliament for parliamentary faction supports its indepen- support of Russia and the presence of dence; and armed Armenian units, some Russian troops in Georgia, he faces an uphill representing the armed forces of the state of battle on this policy, observed Japaridze. Armenia, remain on the soil of Azerbaijan. “We understand that Russia, as a major Azerbaijan, said Molla-Zade, supports geopolitical component, [will] have interests resolution of the conflict along two tracks: in the Caucasus,” continued Japaridze. The implementation of a cease-fire and negotia- problem, he concluded, is whether these tions under international supervision to interests are conceived of in military or determine the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. economic and political terms. He described the steps of a cease-fire as Jaihun Molla-Zade, Political Counselor cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of all at the Embassy of Azerbaijan in the United armed units, deployment of observers from States, and Hafiz Peshaev, Ambassador of the Council on Security and Cooperation in the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United Europe (CSCE), rebuilding of all communica- States, spoke at the Institute on 15 March tions between the two countries, and finally, 1993. According to Molla-Zade, Azerbaijan simultaneous lifting of the blockades of found itself at a disadvantage to Armenia Armenia and Nakhichevan. “Following these after the collapse of the Soviet Union. measures,” he said, “control of heavy artillery Azerbaijan, unlike Armenia, did not upon and air power would be established.” independence have a national democratic Azerbaijan views the CSCE and the government, national troops, armaments, or international conference to be convened by it armed militias. Martial law imposed by in Minsk as proper international forums for Soviet troops in 1990 effectively prevented negotiation on the status of Nagorno- the formation of armed militias to defend Karabakh. Molla-Zade stressed that Azeris in Nagorno-Karabakh, contended Azerbaijan’s commitment to negotiations and Molla-Zade, and ensured the election of a deployment of international observers were pro-Moscow communist parliament and concessions, as both measures constitute president. Only in June 1992, when Abulfaz infringements on Azerbaijani sovereignty. Elchibey of the Azerbaijani Popular Front —by Peggy McInerny was elected President, did real democratic forces come to power in Azerbaijan, he said. Vol. X No. 15 1993 The ongoing conflict in Nagorno- Islamic Fundamentalism Not Driving Tajik Karabakh impedes efforts to build a demo- Civil War cratic society and a market economy in The civil war which broke out in Azerbaijan, makingit especially difficult to Tajikistan in May 1992 is generally depicted attract foreign investment, admitted Molla- as a war between communists and Muslim Zade. He characterized the conflict as one in fundamentalists, observed Dust Muhammed which the concepts of territorial integrity and Dust at the Kennan Institute on 6 May 1993. self-determination were at odds. Azerbaijan “In my view, however,” said the speaker, supports the cultural autonomy of Armenians “the hostilities are of a different character: living in Nagorno-Karabakh and has passed before all else, this is a battle between legislation guaranteeing the civil and human supporters and opponents of the idea of rights of all minorities living in Azerbaijan, he reform in Tajikistan.” Dust is a historian at continued. “There is no discrepancy,” stressed the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow Ambassador Peshaev, “between territorial and Chairman of the Democratic Party of integrity and cultural autonomy.” Tajikistan in Exile. To date, he said, the war Only slight differences exist between the has claimed tens of thousands of lives, governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan brought destruction to hundreds of thou- concerning resolution of the conflict, related sands of civilian dwellings (especially in the Molla-Zade: both agree to the principles of a Kurgan-Tyube region), and sent over a cease-fire and no territorial concessions. He hundred thousand refugees into Afghanistan. pointed out, however, that the Armenians of Dust claimed Tajik society split into Nagorno-Karabakh now demand secession pro- and anti-reform wings following the from Azerbaijan; the Armenian parliament November 1991 election of a former Commu- has yet to rescind a 1989 resolution concerning nist Party First Secretary of the Tajik SSR, the annexation of the district; the Armenian Rakhmon Nabiev, as president. According to Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsyutyun) Dust, the societal rift was further exacerbated 48 after mass demonstrations in April 1992 Tajikistan. The overwhelming majority of forced Speaker of the Supreme Soviet of Tajiks are unfamiliar with Islam and have Tajikistan Safarali Kenzhaev to resign and, a been educated in secular schools for over a month later, Nabiev provided arms to generation, said Dust. Only three individuals supporters from the Kulyab region demon- in the republic have been educated in a strating in Dushanbe. “The communist medres, a traditional Islamic school. “The idea government then began to rely on the most of Islamic fundamentalism is thus a rather backward part of the population: those invented issue, one which originated in the completely opposed to reform in the repub- ideology departments of the Communist lic. The greater the poverty,” he remarked, Party of the Soviet Union,” he concluded. “the stronger is the attraction to socialism.” While he did not deny that certain [Mass demonstrations in which all Tajik individuals in Tajikistan advocate the creation opposition movements participated began in of an Islamic regime, Dust maintained they Dushanbe in late March 1992; in May, six were few in number—especially among ministers from various opposition groups democratic leaders. Tajikistan’s relations with were appointed to a new “Government of Iran, he emphasized, are primarily cultural, National Reconciliation.” During the demon- not religious. Although the countries share a strations, President Nabiev received emer- Persian culture, Tajiks are Sunni Muslims gency powers under which he (temporarily) whereas Iranians are Shi’ites. The speaker created and armed a National Guard. Nabiev rejected the possibility of an Iranian-type resigned in September after more demonstra- fundamentalist regime in Tajikistan, declaring: tions in the capital; armed clashes between “The door to another extremist regime in pro- and anti-Nabiev forces, in Dushanbe Central Asia is closed; we have already and much of the southern part of the country, survived such a regime under the red flag.” followed. A new government was installed Dust repeatedly argued that foreign by the Tajik Supreme Soviet in early Decem- states, including Russia and Uzbekistan, have ber 1992.] become progressively more involved in the Tajikistan was one of the least devel- Tajik civil war. The 201st Division of the oped republics of the former USSR, both in Russian Army is posted in Tajikistan; Dust terms of its economic and political life, said estimated that Russian troops in the republic Dust. Eighty-five percent of the population is now number six to seven thousand. Contrary engaged in agriculture and the republic’s few to the belief that the majority of arms in the industries produce no final products, only hands of opposition groups come from inputs for other industries of the former USSR. Afghanistan, Dust claimed the overwhelming Despite accusations of nationalism and majority of these arms had been purchased fundamentalism on the part of Communist from Russian troops stationed in the republic. authorities, strong opposition forces devel- Ample evidence exists of Uzbek involve- oped in Tajikistan prior to the collapse of the ment in every facet of military hostilities, USSR in 1991. The cultural organizations asserted Dust. He cited in particular the Foundation for the Tajik Language and advance of Popular Front troops [a pro- Cultural Foundation of Tajikistan were created Nabiev armed force formed in the Kulyab in 1987; Rastokhez, a nationalist movement region in the summer of 1992] on Dushanbe in modelled on the Sajudis movement in October and December 1992. Casualties of the Lithuania, in 1989; the Democratic Party of October armed clash revealed the majority of Tajikistan and the Islamic Rebirth Party, both these soldiers were regular troops of the in 1990; and the Lali Badakshan public organi- Uzbek army, he related. When the Popular zation, in 1991. After instigating riots in Front , together with the army of the Tajik Dushanbe in February 1990, said Dust, the government, re-entered Dushanbe in Decem- Communist authorities accused the Rastokhez ber, he continued, hundreds of people were movement of responsibility for the disorders. killed in the capital because of their political Soon afterwards, the Communist Party won convictions or ethnic origins. Since that time, ninety-eight percent of the votes in elections he noted sadly, the war has acquired an for a new republican parliament, the same ethnic character which benefits neither Tajiks parliament which continues to function today. nor Uzbeks living in Central Asia. The speaker objected to the widespread Extensive foreign involvement in the assumption that the democratic opposition war has placed its resolution beyond the seeks to establish an Islamic state in capacity of either the Tajik government or the 49 opposition forces, argued Dust, who advo- territory of the Russian Federation by foreign cated United Nations mediation and deploy- powers as well as by the current instability in ment of U.N. peacekeeping troops. He the Transcaucasus and Central Asia; the spurned the idea of Russian or Uzbek troops deleterious effects that collapse would have serving in such a capacity, as he claimed their on economic, transport, and communication respective nations were defending their links between regions; growing rejection of national interests in the war. Russia, he self-determination as a solution to ethnic maintained, seeks to protect the Tajik border problems on the part of Russian leaders of as a point from which to dominate all of public opinion; and the lack of recognition of Central Asia; Uzbekistan, he asserted, hopes the so-called “independent republics” within to prevent the rise of a strong national the international system. Finally, Payin noted government in Tajikistan. that in contrast to the former USSR, the —by Peggy McInerny Russian Federation is largely a one-national- ity state, with ethnic Russians representing Vol. X No. 16 1993 eighty-three percent of the total population. Russian Federation Facing Fate of USSR? The speaker did not dismiss the argu- Despite powerful processes of disinte- ment that the Russian Federation was headed gration at work in the Russian Federation, for collapse. He conceded that a unitary Russia will not follow the former Soviet government was no more appropriate for Union into collapse, declared Emil Payin at Russia than it had been for the USSR and the Kennan Institute on 17 August 1993. claimed the construction of the Federation— Payin heads the Group on Nationality based simultaneously on national formations Problems within the Presidential Council of (republics and okrugi) and territorial units the Russian Federation; he is also Director, (oblasti and kraiia)—was a genuine problem. Center for Ethno-Political Studies, Foreign Resistance to the idea of central authority is Policy Association, Moscow, and Guest growing in the republics, he observed, and, Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center. unfortunately, this tendency has been rein- Payin specified that he spoke as a private forced by the central government’s mistaken citizen, not as a member of the Russian policy of granting concessions in order to government. stave off separatism. Regionalization within the Russian Payin characterized the leaders of the Federation today is a natural process and national republics of the Federation as although the Russian central state is weak, it ideological opponents of the central govern- continues to function, observed Payin. ment and claimed their policies were the “Recruitment into the Army has become biggest barrier to the survival of the Russian very difficult, but is taking place. Trains are state. These leaders oppose reform— occasionally corrupt, but they are function- privatization in particular—because it ing. The degree of dysfunction can be threatens the monopoly on power to which measured,” he insisted, “but so far a central they aspire; their use of nationalist rhetoric is state continues to exist.” Adoption of a new an inevitable political ploy to protect their constitution and the holding of new parlia- own power, he said. Payin was especially mentary elections would, claimed the concerned by a document most of these speaker, strongly inhibit the forces of leaders adopted on 25 May 1993, prior to the disintegration in Russia. Constitutional Assembly. Payin argued that political conditions The document specifies that relations have changed greatly within Russia since the between republics and the center can be collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. With governed either by the constitution or these changes, he contended, various mecha- through bilateral agreements—the latter nisms of self-preservation of the Russian state method virtually granting republics the have arisen. These mechanisms include: the status of foreign states. negative experience of the collapse of the Nevertheless, Payin rejected collapse as USSR shared by all former Soviet citizens; the the probable future of Russia. He argued that resolve of Russian regions, especially the the leading Russian industrial regions were leading industrial regions, to preserve the acting to preserve the integrity of the Russian central state as a hedge against the economic state out of rational economic considerations and political advantages recently acquired by and their negative experience of the collapse the national republics; threats posed to the of the Soviet Union. Moreover, he held that 50 the populations of Russian oblasti and kraiia do 1993–94 PROGRAM YEAR not feel themselves an oppressed majority and are therefore not driven to establish indepen- Vol. XI No. 1 1993 dent national states. Instead, Payin maintained Russia Back in the Great Concert that a feeling of “Russian-ness” was spreading Russia today has returned to the great among the Russian population and would concert of powers, and the goal of the United lead to the formation of a new Russian States and its allies should be to keep her (rossiiskii) state. And despite talk of circum- there without offending or injuring the newly venting the center and distributing aid directly independent states of the region, argued to Russian regions, he noted that western David Goldfrank at a lecture at the Kennan governments continue to recognize the Institute on 4 October 1993. Goldfrank is authority of the central Russian government. Associate Professor of History at Georgetown Several listeners objected to Payin’s University. In attempting to predict the interpretation of political developments in future of Russian foreign policy and most Russia. Vladimir Shlapentokh of Michigan especially, to determine whether Russia, State University claimed decentralization having re-established domestic cohesion, will throughout the former Soviet Union attempt to restore her former empire by force stemmed directly from the weakening of the Goldfrank claimed it was imperative to central state and corresponded to a world- debunk numerous myths held by both the wide trend. Regional elites are simply West and Russia itself concerning the fighting for increased rights for their regions, country’s history and foreign policy. In the said Shlapentokh, regardless of whether they West, these myths depict Russia as a singu- are leaders of ethnic republics or Russian larly messianic, expansionist power aspiring regions. Henry Huttenbach of the City to a universal empire along the lines of College of New York argued that “rust-belt” ancient Persia, essentially uncooperative with industrial regions in need of subsidies, not other great powers. In Russia, such myths powerful industrial regions who can trade sustain the image of Russia as a geographi- raw materials for hard currency, were the cally vulnerable victim of repeated invasions principal supporters of the central state. which have dictated the need for an auto- Elizabeth Teague of Radio Free Europe cratic, militaristic state. claimed that authority of the central state was Paramount among the myths enter- almost non-existent, as the national republics tained by the West is that which attributes to and Russian regions regularly ignore its Russia a peculiar messianism dating back to decrees with impunity. old Muscovy and the doctrine of the Third Asked to comment on events in the Rome. Goldfrank, however, claimed the self-declared Republic of Chechen’ia, Payin Third Rome doctrine was an essentially responded that its experience was beneficial defensive ideology elaborated to protect the (spasitel’no) to the continued territorial rituals and authority of the early Russian integrity of the Russian Federation. The Orthodox Church. “Not messianism,” said consequences of Chechen’ia’s separation the speaker, “but a religiously defensive and from the Federation—non-recognition and politically aggressive pan-Orthodoxy internal political discord now that the influenced Muscovite and Imperial Russian external enemy, Russia, has been removed— foreign policy.” Yet in spite of this pan- demonstrate the real consequences of Orthodoxy, which legitimated absorption of independence to other republics of the Belarus and Ukraine and protection of Northern Caucasus, he remarked. Had Orthodox within the Ottoman empire, said Russia gone to war with Chechen’ia, he Goldfrank, Russia was in fact primarily continued, national consolidation within the interested not in Orthodox lands, but in the republic would no doubt be much stronger economically vital Gulf of Finland and the than it is today. Chechen’ia, continued Baltic coast. As to the claim that Russia is a Payin, is really no longer a part of the peculiarly expansionist power, Goldfrank Russian Federation. “If I were asked to asserted that Russia had expanded and name the number of subjects (ob’ekty) of the contracted over time in the same way as had Russian Federation,” he concluded, “I other nations: “Russian expansion across would say they number eighty-eight and not Siberia was analogous to the European eighty-nine.” expansion across much of North and South —by Peggy McInerny America in the seventeenth to nineteenth 51 centuries. Russia’s rise as a regional great whatever replaces it will also have to conform power in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries to these traditions.” witnessed the simultaneous rise or recrudes- Goldfrank compared the contemporary cence of Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and disarray in Russian domestic politics to Persia....And Russia’s expansion at the expense Muscovy’s Time of Troubles in the early of these four powers in the eighteenth and sixteenth century, “in which foreigners nineteenth centuries was accompanied by intervened and some regions asserted simultaneous gains by Europe’s `big four:’ themselves.” He noted, however, that the Austria, Prussia, France, and Great Britain.” great majority of provincial forces eventually Goldfrank also attacked the notion that overcame these troubles and came together Russia employed uniquely subversive to re-establish a top-down, hierarchical diplomatic and negotiating techniques that Russian state. In the same way in which rendered her unwilling to cooperate with Russian princes reconstituted the empire of other states. Rather, he argued, Russia the Golden Horde albeit with different conducted balance-of-power diplomacy borders after its dissolution and provincial during most of its history. “Like other great cavalries and urban elites reconstituted the powers, Russia found it quite unprofitable to Russian state after the Time of Troubles, flout the Concert of Europe or operate organic ties among the newly independent without a great power ally or two, and did so states of the former USSR may well be very rarely,” he explained. “In this regard, recreated, implied Goldfrank. Far from Russia’s attempts not so long ago to mediate objecting to a type of “Monroe Doctrine” for in ex-Yugoslavia followed the normal Russia in the near abroad, Goldfrank deemed nineteenth and early twentieth century policy it a natural occurrence, arguing that in the of looking after some interests of Balkan long run, imperial restoration depended Slavs within a framework approved by other more on domestic factors within the former interested powers.” Finally, the speaker Soviet republics than on the longings of criticized the idea the Russia sought a Russian minority populations or the Russian universal empire, maintaining that it, like military. other colonial powers, conducted different Western powers should seek to keep policies in the “civilized” realms of the West Russia within the great concert of powers by and the older Asian empires of the East. consistently supporting democracy and the Turning to the Russian perception that rule of law and its development while Russia’s autocratic state and occasional discouraging territorial revision among the militarism are somehow needed in light of newly independent states, said Goldfrank. unique geographic disadvantages and conse- He claimed to prefer slow marketization to quent history of repeated invasions, Goldfrank “shock therapy” in Russia and supported in was dismissive, calling this notion a mere particular the maintenance of inefficient state justification of Russia’s penchant for “bully enterprises for an interim period. Such tactics and armed diplomacy.” An examination enterprises continue to produce goods for the of the last 1,100 years of history, he remarked, domestic market and provide employment reveals Russia as the biggest winner in the for Russian citizens, he said, “which not only regional competition, with no special claim to a gives them wealth, but also a sense that they greater share of the human suffering endured are worth something. by all native peoples of the area. Instead of —by Peggy McInerny attributing Russian foreign policy to geo- graphic realities, Goldfrank made a case for the Vol. XI No. 2 1993 importance of political culture, whose funda- Russkost’ and the Russian Right mental continuities date to the eighth century. “One aspect of the search for native soil He characterized these continuities as “the in Russia today is the attempt to identify and habits and attitudes of the tribute-collecting separate out the sovetskost’ from the russkost’ empire, the tax-farming and tax-skimming in Soviet Russian literature,” said Kathleen middlemen, and the tribute-paying and tribute- Parthé at a lecture at the Kennan Institute on evading plebeians....Russia’s regional great 7 October 1993. “The goal is to reconnect power hegemony system,” he concluded, Russian literature with cultural and spiritual “whatever shape it takes, will thus most surely traditions long out of favor, to restore the conform in part to native, statist, tributary break in Russian literary history and style political traditions...and if Russia breaks up, that came, if not in 1917, then in 1934.” 52 Parthé is Associate Professor in the Depart- elaborate theories about the deaths of famous ment of Foreign Languages, Literatures, and literary figures transforming them into Linguistics at the University of Rochester and symbols of the Russian nation whose suffering a former Research Scholar at the Kennan has earned them the status of sainthood. Institute. Examining the conversation about Parthé interpreted this second phenomenon as “russkost’ (Russian-ness)” which began part of a long historical tradition which first among conservative writers and literary transmuted assassinated Russian rulers and critics in 1985, Parthé explained that the term later, writers who died tragic and violent was used to distinguish ethnically and deaths, into virtual cults based on the Russian spiritually “pure” Russian writers from mere Orthodox belief that the righteous dead can Russian language or “false Russian” writers. intercede with God on Russia’s behalf. Parthé’s presentation was based on a According to Parthé, nationalists close reading of the literature sections of the envision the model Russian writer as: conservative newspapers Den’, Moskovskii “ethnically Russian, at least nominally literator, and Sovetskaia Rossiia, and the Orthodox, inflexibly righteous, politically journals Molodaia gvardiia and Nash conservative favoring a strong national state sovremennik most of which were recently and a strong military, nostalgic for the closed by presidential decree. Noting at the empire, loyal to his Orthodox Slavic brothers outset that she sought to explore the contri- but wary of foreigners in general, and a butions of writers and critics to the ideology proud archaist who in his art adheres to the of the far right in Russia over the past few best traditions of Russian civic and moral years, Parthé claimed their categorization of realism.” This “model literator,” pointed out writers was indicative of the enormous Parthé, bears a striking resemblance to the changes in ethnic and cultural identity now self-image of the derevenshchiki, writers of the occuring in Russia. 1960s and 1970s whose works became The collapse of Soviet Union presents a collectively known as Village Prose. basic problem of typology for literature As for conservative nationalists’ written in Russian after 1917, noted Parthé. theories about the deaths of such writers as Conservative nationalists object to the rubric Pushkin, Lermontov, Blok, Gumilëv, Esenin, “Russian literature of the Soviet period and Mayakovsky, Parthé explained that (russkaia literatura sovetskogo perioda), as “the “various international, masonic, cosmopoli- use of russkaia to designate the entire canon is tan, and other anti-Russian forces are thought seen as an attempt to deny Russians control to have conspired to do away with Russia’s of their own literature and as part of a most talented and patriotic writers in order to broader process they call cultural genocide.” weaken Russia as a whole.” Writers who died These nationalists consider it essential to in duels are depicted as victims of evil plots; separate genuine Russian writers from those who died of illness, of poisoning; those “pretenders” in order to protect Russian who were executed, of betrayal by “cosmo- culture from what they see as its numerous politan Jewish Bolsheviks.” “The rhetoric of enemies. Underneath this concern for russkost’ does not merely defy logic in the protecting Russian culture, however, lies conventional use of the term,” concluded “chauvinism as well as a power play for Parthé, “it defies the very idea of logic, fact, control of what they still feel to be the intellect, rationalism, learning, and objective nation’s voice and soul and its most effective truth. The very use of facts by the opposition ideological tool,” said the speaker. Referring is suspicious somehow unspiritual and to a recent cycle of poems by nationalist unRussian.” writer Stanislav Kunaev entitled “Imperiia, ia “Once a culture is viewed in spiritual tvoi pevets (Oh, Empire, I am Your Bard),” she terms,” warned Parthé, “the division into claimed, “they want to be the imperial bards martyrs and demons is automatic and far- of a Russia that once again classifies its reaching.” Although she said that contempo- writers as pro- or anti-state and rewards or rary rhetoric about russkost’ was largely a punishes them accordingly.” variation on old themes elaborated in the With their sights on “protecting” 1949 anti-cosmopolitan campaign as well as Russian literature, past and present, as well as by such Slavophile writers as Dostoyevsky, cultivating young writers, conservative she noted that the tone of such pseudo- nationalists have developed not only specific philosophical musings had become much criteria for the model russkii pisatel’, but more aggressive than in times past, matching 53 the strident tone of far right nationalist contention that the United States would writings on politics. On a more encouraging never tolerate the kind of sharp economic note, Parthé observed that few talented decline produced by these policies, Nelson writers figured among this group and that argued that America would find ways to many writers of genuine talent considered soften the blow of painful structural reform their theories ridiculous. (Some, like Tat’iana and encouraged the Russian government to Tolstaya, have responded with parodies of do likewise. nationalist theories attributing Jewish The speaker identified Yeltsin’s rela- heritage to Russian writers they consider tions with the Russian parliament as the insufficiently nationalist.) biggest failure of his administration. Yeltsin, Of more interest, perhaps, two writers he argued, had an unprecedented opportu- who were at the forefront of the russkost’ nity to bring about real economic change movement in the 1980s Viktor Astaf’ev and after he was awarded emergency powers by Valentin Rasputin have distanced themselves the legislature at the end of 1991. Yet he from the ultra-nationalist movement to pursue squandered the opportunity by failing to private work: Astaf’ev, his own writing, and work cooperatively with the parliament Rasputin, a recent ethnological study of Siberia. when it still supported him and his economic “Although Rasputin remains an eminence grise reform program in overwhelming numbers. among the nationalists,” said Parthé, “he is not “Yeltsin,” he noted, “operates best in confron- writing the worst of the articles in Den’ or tational situations and creates them for his advocating violence.” She noted that many own benefit...he is not a person who knows Siberian writers appear to have rejected Moscow how to work out relationships among and St. Petersburg as inauthentic Russian cities opposing factions.” and have retreated to Siberia, where they hope When the parliament expressed increas- to create a new Russian national culture. ing doubts about the pace of economic reform —by Peggy McInerny in 1992, Yeltsin reacted by seeking increased presidential powers. “There is persuasive Vol. XI No. 3 1993 evidence,” said Nelson, “that toward the end Shock Therapy the Right Choice for Russia? of 1992, Yeltsin began trying to circumvent “Economics does not float free of and discredit the legislature rather than culture. Economics and culture come together, earnestly attempting to work with Russia’s and economics [in Russia] can’t work if the lawmakers in the propose-and-compromise culture doesn’t support it,” contended Lynn fashion that is integral to political life in Nelson at a lecture at the Kennan Institute on democratically organized nations.” He cited in 19 October 1993. Nelson is Associate Professor particular Yeltsin’s proposal of his own draft of Sociology at Virginia Commonwealth constitution for consideration by the parlia- University. “The shock therapy proposals ment in April 1992, his request for additional that were implemented by the Yeltsin [team] emergency powers in December 1992, his did not grow out of the Russian economic attempt to introduce presidential rule in tradition,” asserted the speaker. “In fact, they March 1993, and the one-sided publicity were argued against very strongly by almost campaign launched by the president prior to all Russian economists.” the April 1993 referendum. Nelson criticized the Yeltsin administra- After his failure to introduce presiden- tion for rigidly adhering to Western economic tial rule in March 1993, Nelson claimed theory in implementing economic reform and Yeltsin launched a well coordinated anti- questioned the wisdom of “shock therapy” in parliamentary campaign that western Russia. Beyond failing to provide financial governments and the western media ac- support to the new entrepreneurial sector, he cepted wholecloth. Depicting parliamentary claimed shock therapy provoked a drastic— deputies as reactionary communist holdovers and unnecessary—decline in production by from the previous regime who constituted a trying to destroy the old command economy barrier to reform, Yeltsin drove the Russian quickly while failing to pay sufficient parliament into an extreme position by the attention to the transformation of existing summer of 1993, the speaker asserted. Many production potential. He described shock of these deputies had supported Yeltsin therapy and privatization as reform from during the attempted coup of August 1991; above that was more political than economic voted to award him emergency powers in in nature. Citing Mikhail Gorbachev’s October 1991; and affirmed their support for 54 his economic plan as late as April 1992, when Vol. XI No. 4 1993 the effects of the January 1992 price liberal- Center Lacks Decentralization Strategy ization were being increasingly felt by the The real danger threatening the integrity population. of the Russian Federation is not the drive of “Even if the Congress had been as the republics and regions to obtain greater uncooperative as Yeltsin said they were [in political and economic rights, but the inability 1992 and 1993], his tactics to circumvent the of the central government to elaborate a viable legislature’s authority were indefensible policy of decentralization, argued Vera Tolz at within a democratic framework,” observed a lecture at the Kennan Institute on 1 Novem- Nelson. He lamented Western support for ber 1993. Tolz is Assistant Director of the Yeltsin’s recent dissolution of the Russian Analytic Research Department of the Radio parliament, asserting that “dictatorial Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute practices are now being promulgated [in in Munich, Germany. Russia] with the complete and full support of The crackdown against the regions that Western governments.” followed the central government’s suppres- Richard Kaufman, General Counsel for sion of the October 1993 violence in Moscow the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. has produced temporary obedience among Congress and currently a Fellow at the regional leaders, said Tolz, but this obedi- Woodrow Wilson Center, served as commen- ence will be short-lived. Curtailment of tator for the lecture. Kaufman concurred with regional rights and reliance on a vertical Nelson’s analysis of the roots of the political power structure will only exacerbate seces- sionist tendencies in the Russian Federation breakdown in Russia and his criticism of the and deprive the federal government of the media coverage of events in Russia, calling broad local support it will need to imple- Western reporting on political developments ment market-oriented economic reform “irresponsible.” Analyzing the Russian successfully, argued the speaker. president’s troubled relations with parlia- Yeltsin early established a pattern of ment, Kaufman maintained the experience of promising the Russian republics additional the developing countries of Asia (especially powers in exchange for political support. He South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and China) first employed this tactic in 1990, Tolz demonstrates that economic reform often explained, when USSR President Mikhail moves forward much faster than political Gorbachev attempted to turn these areas reform. against Yeltsin when he became chairman of Kaufman pointed out that general the now defunct Russian Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin went on to use this tactic repeatedly lack of information about the Russian in the struggle over the constitutional economy and abrupt shifts in policy on the division of power that broke out soon after part of the government were preserving the the Federation Treaty was signed in March unpredictability and unfriendliness of the 1992. commercial environment in Russia. Never- In reality three treaties with three theless, he claimed real economic reform separate members of the Federation—the was taking place. “We must not lose sight republics, the regions (oblasti and kraiia), and of the successes of economic reform so far,” the autonomous okrugi and oblasti—the he said. “One cannot, either in an indi- Federation Treaty represented the Yeltsin vidual industrial plant or in a nation, government’s first and, according to Tolz, simultaneously retool and expand—or even most promising attempt to work out a policy maintain—production.” Although he of decentralization for the country. The treaty agreed that the Russian government should divided power between the center and the act to soften the blow of economic reforms, regions and awarded the republics consider- Kaufman contended that the Soviet cen- able rights of self-government, including the trally-planned economy had been de- right to conduct foreign trade and foreign stroyed and a vast restructuring and policy. The most significant article in the reorientation of priorities begun in Russia. treaty with the republics identified the land Pointing to the sharp drop in military and natural resources of the republics as procurement and production in 1992, he belonging to the people living in them, noted: “Output is falling, but it is falling in although another article specified that their large part for the right reasons.” ownership and use would be governed by —by Peggy McInerny both federal and republican laws

55 The Russian regions were dissatisfied without the federal government until simulta- with their second-class status and inability to neous elections for parliament and the control their own land and natural resources presidency were held. under the Federation Treaty. Both regional and Had violence not occurred in the capital republican elites demanded that the federal on October 3-4, Yeltsin might have been forced government work with them to develop to compromise and hold simultaneous elec- specific legislation to support the Federation tions, held Tolz. Since then, the Russian Treaty, which is general in most respects. president has drastically reduced the powers of These elites sought especially specific legisla- the regions by disbanding local soviets (at the tion regarding the use of natural resources, the city level and lower) and ordering new development of a rational budget system, and elections for smaller regional soviets. By the elaboration of rational conditions for the contrast, he has recommended to the republics allocation of subsidies. The central govern- that they hold new elections and reform their ment was not forthcoming, however, and by legislative organs. More important, the presi- the summer of 1993 some regions were dent has by decree created a vertical power declaring themselves republics in an effort to structure of executive administration in the obtain the same rights as republics. regions. All heads of regional administration The decentralization policy embodied will now be appointed and dismissed only by in the Federation Treaty soon disintegrated the President. These administrators will enjoy into a power struggle between Yeltsin and far greater powers than the elected legislatures the Russian parliament, said Tolz. Yeltsin with which they will work, explained Tolz, wooed the politically vital republics with having the principal right to determine regional large subsidies while Supreme Soviet budgets and approving all legislation passed Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov sought the by regional dumas. support of the leadership of regional and Although she did not foresee actual local soviets. Tolz judged Khasbulatov’s separatism on the part of the regions, Tolz cultivation of regional and local legislatures insisted that some kind of viable decentrali- far more successful than Yeltsin’s attempts to zation was needed to encourage the regions win the support of the republics. As a result and republics to cooperate in implementing of both the Treaty and the battle for political economic reform. “One cannot proceed with power, the regions paid more taxes to the market reforms and general democratization central government while the republics without decentralizing this huge received more subsidies. country,”she concluded. Neither the republics nor the regions —by Peggy McInerny wanted to support Yeltsin in his battle with the parliament, insisted Tolz. In fact, she Vol. XI No. 5 1993 maintained, republican and regional leaders People Outmaneuvered the Planners several times acted together to prevent various The Soviet period can be seen as a drafts of a new constitution from being put to demonstration that people will always carry a referendum and forced Yeltsin to abandon more weight than plans, said Antony French plans for presidential rule in March. Even after at a Kennan Institute lecture on 15 Novem- both subjects of the Federation Treaty ob- ber 1993. Soviet society that most planned of tained additional concessions from the federal all societies is now seen to have failed, and government during the Constitutional this failure represents both a failure of Assembly in summer 1993—the regions economic plans (planirovanie) and physical acquired the same rights as the republics in town plans (planirovka). French is Visiting their dealings with the center and the repub- Professor at the University of Minnesota, lics achieved the definition of “sovereign Minneapolis, and Macalester College, St. states”—neither sought to have the draft Paul; Senior Lecturer in Geography at adopted. Both declined to join Yeltsin’s University College in London; and a former Council of the Federation as an interim body Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center. In an that could adopt the draft constitution prior to overview of the history of urban develop- new elections. After Yeltsin dissolved the ment in the former USSR, French claimed Russian parliament on September 21st, that Soviet town planning consistently continued Tolz, regional and republic leaders neglected the needs and wants of people, twice tried to form a Council of the Members ultimately failing due to the actions of of the Federation intended to govern Russia individuals in large numbers. 56 French described four periods of Soviet Second World War prompted renewed efforts urban development: the 1920s, the Stalin era, to save the heritage of the past the Soviet the Khrushchev/Brezhnev period, and the regime restored or recreated many of the perestroika years. Urban planning in the first summer palaces destroyed by Nazi forces. dozen years of the Soviet regime, he ex- Khrushchev and Brezhnev were left plained, was guided by the conviction that with the problem of housing the people, there was to be a new socialist society. A observed the speaker. Khrushchev in 1957 lively debate took place throughout the 1920s initiated a cycle of building large apartment about the nature of the future “city of blocks that lasted into the perestroika years. In socialist man,” eventually yielding general this third phase of urban development, consensus on the basic principles of the new pressure to provide housing quickly resulted socialist town. The new town would be in the erection of shoddy, pre-fabricated planned (preferably built from scratch on apartment blocks that, according to French, rural territory), of limited size, feature a great were initially designed for a lifespan of only deal of greenery, divide work areas from thirty years. The five-story buildings of the residential areas with “amenity belts,” and Khrushchev era, he explained, are now ensure residents a limited journey to work. universally known in Russia as Khrushchëby, a “Perhaps most important,” said French, “it word which combines the name of was generally agreed that the planned city of Khrushchev with the Russian word for slum socialist man was to be in itself social engi- (trushchëba). Although the housing drive neering. That is to say, [the city] itself would never fulfilled its goal of providing an help create the new desired city and move apartment for every Soviet family, people people into a new form of society.” Stalin continued to stream into the cities in defiance called off the debate in the early 1930s and in of urban plans and the propiska system. “One the end, said the speaker, the Constructivist way or another, people were making cities group exerted more influence abroad than grow and the planners were trying to keep within the USSR. them under control. As a result, plans French described the Stalinist era the consistently underestimated the rate of second phase of Soviet urban development as a growth and therefore became out of date,” period “of no time for people and no time for said French. Overall, this period saw the plans, either.” Very few cities developed urban populations of bigger cities increase while plans before the Second World War and those smaller towns suffered severe shrinkage. plans in existence were consistently overridden French claimed perestroika marked the to serve the goals of industrialization, which beginning of a fourth phase of urban develop- pulled people into cities in large numbers ment in the USSR. This period saw people begin without providing for increased services or to create the urban environment they wanted housing. Powerful industrial ministries (and that urban plans failed to provide). In a occupied land they considered most desirable process that has actually spanned the last twenty in new and industrializing cities; in a city like years, individuals increasingly exchanged Stalingrad (now Volgograd), for example, apartments, trading space for location and residential housing was built downwind developing socially preferred areas within Soviet instead of upwind from industrial factories. cities. “This was certainly not what the plan There was essentially no investment for envisaged,” noted French. Gentrification of older towns during the Stalin era, judged French. houses within city centers, the remodelled New towns were built where there had never apartments of which were often distributed to been towns, but existing towns were left to the nomenklatura, demonstrated a demand for cope with ever increasing populations on their individual dwellings instead of ever-larger own. “As a result, throughout the Stalin period apartment blocks. Street markets, beginning one had increasingly appalling housing with flower and vegetable stands, began to conditions so that by 1953, people were worse appear around break-of-journey points, such as housed than they had been before the revolu- train stations, in response to insufficient retail tion,” he noted. The norm at the end of the outlets. And increased car ownership put Stalin era was an entire family living in one pressure on urban transport systems, particu- room. “All that the people got out of ’Phase larly road networks, and led to the spontaneous Two,’” remarked French, “were the ’people’s creation of car parks. palaces:’ the magnificent stations of the Having lived in the Soviet Union under Moscow subway.” He noted, however, that the a planned economy and in Britain under 57 Margaret Thatcher, French claimed there had regional segmentation of markets initially to be a middle ground between too much produced by the January 1992 price liberaliza- planning and no planning at all. He empha- tion had attenuated; autarkic policy measures sized that urban plans must, first of all, pay adopted by the regions to stabilize their attention to what people want and need (and economic situations were diluted; and many will accept), and second, be flexible, so as to of the disputes over ownership of natural accomodate changing circumstances over resources between the center and the regions time. Although the Western planning tradition had been resolved in deals giving each a share is completely different from the Soviet of newly-created joint stock companies. approach, restrictive rather than prescriptive, Yet in 1993, the revenue sharing system French claimed that planners in the former between the center and the regions particu- USSR would probably adopt more of a larly the unified value-added tax broke down western approach over time. “One must go on into a welter of bargains and exceptions that training planners,” he said, “but one needs to benefitted richer regions at the expense of train them... not to forget the people.” poorer regions. Richer regions generally have —by Peggy McInerny exportable primary commodities, specified Whitlock, whereas many poorer regions have Vol. XI No. 6 1993 economies centered on defense industries. As Regions, Not Center, Will Drive income differentiation between regions Economic Policy increased, it also became apparent that The surprisingly strong showing of regions differed in their capacity to profit extremist groups in the recent parliamentary from market reforms. elections in Russia suggests that relations There was no escaping the fact that in between the Russian president and parlia- 1993, the Russian Federation was held ment will not be harmonious, observed Erik together by concessions from the center to the Whitlock at a Kennan Institute lecture on 13 regions concerning taxation, national resource December 1993. Whitlock is a Research ownership, and foreign trade rights, remarked Analyst at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Whitlock. Such concessions created an Liberty Research Institute in Munich. Such essentially regressive revenue sharing system troubled relations will not allow for the kind between the center and the regions. “Instead of unified central government needed to of a justifiable effort to combat income create a well-functioning federal state in differentiation among regions,” he remarked, Russia, said the speaker. Given the incoher- “it appears that the richer regions are benefit- ence at the center, Whitlock predicted that ting from these favoritism schemes.” economic policy in the near future would be Regions which received net subsidies driven by the regions. from the center last year, which, according to “The day-to-day economic situation, Whitlock, included virtually all the republics as particularly in the provinces, is largely well as the Irkutsk and Kamchatka oblasts, irrelevant to many decisions taken in Mos- enjoy a per capita real income significantly cow,” said the speaker. He argued that above the Russian national average. Foreign Yeltsin’s power to determine the heads of trade rights and export quotas also tend to administration on the local level was now far benefit those regions which are already the more important than the battle among wealthiest in the Russian Federation. Differ- various central government ministers to ences in profitability between domestic and determine national economy policy. “Ulti- international markets, he explained, mean that mately, [economic policy] will depend on export quotas function to transfer additional what happens economically in the regions,” resources to those regions which possess raw maintained Whitlock. “And what is particu- materials, especially in the energy sector. larly relevant to people in the regions is not Whitlock claimed there were several what Moscow does in the next few months, problems inherent in the process of the economic but who is going to remain in the position of transformation of Russia. First, decentralizing a making choices on ownership and price vertically-organized, centrally planned economy controls at the regional level.” threatens the integrity of strong centralized Centrifugal forces that impeded the government. Such decentralization does not, he functioning of the Russian Federation noted, necessarily threaten strong federal throughout 1992 seemed to be abating by the government. Second, market reform in Russia end of that year, noted Whitlock. The sharp entails changing the ownership relations 58 between various levels of government. The in a relatively stable fashion, said Andrei question of which state entity owns what Tsygankov at a Kennan Institute lecture on property, pointed out Whitlock, is crucial to the 20 December 1993. Tsygankov is Assistant privatization process. Third, the economic roles Professor at the Moscow Institute for Interna- of federal and regional authorities must be tional Relations and a Guest Scholar in the redefined, just as the fiscal relationship between Cold War International History Project at the them must be altered. In general, maintained Woodrow Wilson Center. Russia needs to the speaker, the state must abandon direct become a non-imperial state to achieve this management of the economy and move toward transformation, practice a moderate isolation- a role of limited economic intervention. ism with respect to conflicts in the “near” These problems have been resolved to and far abroad, and remain relatively neutral date by means of bargaining and concessions, in its relations with both the East and West. exacerbating income differentiation among “Taken together, these steps imply a strategy regions. According to Whitlock, such differen- of moderate, non-ethnic nationalism,” said tiation will continue to grow and now threat- Tsygankov. He specified that he understood ens the integrity of the Russian Federation. this term to mean a cultural nationalism that Although the Russian state must withdraw encompassed patriotism and pride in one’s from the supply side of the economy and deny native country. itself a wide range of policy-making powers, “Russia needs moderate nationalism he claimed sharp differences in regional today for two reasons: economic and cul- income required a bigger state role in income tural,” asserted Tsygankov. Economically, he redistribution. Such a role may bring the argued, Russia is too weak to become center into increased conflict with the regions, involved in military conflicts abroad. Cultur- however, as income redistribution entails ally, the country is in need of a national idea changing an industrial policy that presently that can unite its population. In fact, he supports successful regions, raising an already continued, a national idea should be incorpo- excessive tax burden on enterprises, and rated into the context of economic reform, an reducing current revenue sharing. opportunity democratic politicians have Whitlock insisted that a functioning, almost missed. decentralized federal state was essential to the Since the declaration of sovereignty of economic transformation of Russia, yet the Russian Federation in 1990, Russia has claimed the distribution of rights and respon- yet to develop a non-imperial Russian sibilities between the center and the regions identity or a coherent foreign policy that can remained unresolved. He pointed out that the provide the Russian people an identity and Gaidar and Chernomyrdin governments, in enable them to survive this difficult period of spite of their stated goal of integrating systemic change, charged Tsygankov. He regional needs into the formulation of national pointed out that Russian foreign policy economic policy (i.e., into industrial, financial, should differ markedly from Soviet foreign social, and foreign trade policy), had acted in policy, as the Soviet regime conducted ways counterproductive to and destructive of foreign policy without consideration of the process of federation building in Russia. national interests or coordination with The problem today, insisted Whitlock, representative bodies. Post-Soviet politicians is how to reverse the detrimental aspects of in Russia, however, pay little attention to the regional federalism that have been estab- Russian people or national interests, while a lished over the past two years by means of genuine civil society with institutionalized concessions and privileges to various regions. political parties has yet to be created in the “Russia,” he concluded, “is still confronting a country. As a result, contemporary Russian series of conflicts about who gets what in foreign policy, like its Soviet predecessor, terms of economic powers across the board largely serves the interests of ruling elites with regard to trade policy, revenue sharing, and not the nation. and tax revenue generation.” Tsygankov claimed national interests —by Peggy McInerny were not simply political or economic, but a complex structure of interests that enable a Vol. XI No. 7 1993 nation first to understand its role in world Russia in Need of Moderate Nationalism politics, and second to do its best to provide The principal interest of Russia today is its people with domestic security, prosperity, to change its economic and political systems and well-being. He argued that national 59 interests could be well-understood and thing a dangerous thing to use military forces articulated only through a democratic secretly in order to strengthen one of two process and predicted that it would require a militant sides.” long time to develop a post-communist Although Foreign Minister Kozyrev identity and nationally-oriented foreign speaks openly of human rights and maintain- policy in Russia. Thus democracy remains ing close relations with the West, Tsygankov one of the most important national interests criticized him for conducting a policy that of Russia today, he concluded. uses military and economic means to return Tsygankov claimed it was not in such states as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine Russia’s national interest to have Poland, the into the Russian sphere of influence. Quoting Czech Republic, and Hungary join the North Zhirinovksy’s contention that Georgia would Atlantic Treaty Organization. He neverthe- crumble and rejoin Russia as a guberniia less found the “Partnership for Peace” plan (province), Tsygankov claimed it was difficult worthy of support as an instrument to keep to distinguish the aims of contemporary Russia open to the outside world and moving Russian foreign policy from the restoration of in the direction of democracy. The suspicions the USSR advocated by Zhirinovsky. He and tensions that have arisen between Russia pointed out that Kozyrev had campaigned for and the states of Eastern Europe as a result of his seat in the State Duma on a platform of the NATO issue and the strong showing of restoring the USSR “by peaceful means.” Such Vladimir Zhirinovsky in Russia’s December a policy, he insisted, is absolutely not in the parliamentary elections are best resolved, interest of Russia and serves only the interests said the speaker, by creating a multilateral of the ruling elite. regional security system that would include Should Russia prove unable to articu- Russia, the East European states, Germany, late a non-imperial identity, he warned, the the United States, and some eastern nations alternative will not be a new totalitarian as members. “Germany,” he stressed, “must regime, nor a democratic government, but be one of the major partners in the future disintegration and civil war. The natural Russian relationship with Europe.” allies of policymakers in developing a new, The main priority of Russian foreign liberal national identity, he said, will be policy in the coming years, however, will found among the growing economic forces in be the “near abroad,” i.e., the states of the Russian society (including some part of the former USSR. Basing Russian foreign policy enterprise director corps as well as new in this region on the rights of ethnic entrepreneurs), certain strata of the intelli- Russians, as Foreign Minister Andrei gentsia, and the current liberal opposition to Kozyrev and Defense Minister Pavel the government. Grachëv appear to favor, would be a —by Peggy McInerny mistake, he argued. Tsygankov recom- mended instead a policy that stressed non- Vol. XI No. 8 1994 ethnic factors such as human rights, Strong Presidency Guarantor of regional stability, and Russian domestic Democracy in Russia? security in order to support the twenty-five “A strong president is, for the next two million diaspora Russians. years, a more important guarantor of democ- Regarding military conflicts within the racy in Russia than a parliament which is Commonwealth of Independent States, the disunited and grasping for power,” main- speaker claimed the real question was tained Alexander Rahr at a Kennan Institute whether Russian involvement in such conflicts lecture on 13 January 1994. Rahr is a Re- served to maintain domestic stability or search Analyst at the Radio Free Europe/ restore an imperial foreign policy. Russian Radio Liberty Research Institute in Munich. involvement in the Abkhazian-Georgian and Following parliamentary elections and the Armenian-Azeri conflicts clearly serves the adoption of a new constitution in December latter, he remarked. “Intermediate efforts to 1993, Russia has become a presidential use military forces on a multi-sided basis in republic. President Boris Yeltsin now pos- order to prevent violence, as was done in sesses sufficient power both to effect real Moldova a year ago, or to coordinate Russian change in the country and guarantee the kind peacekeeping operations with international of stability Russia desperately needs during partners in both the near and far abroad is one the next two years, argued Rahr. At the thing,” he added, “but it is absolutely another outset of 1994, he asserted, the country is 60 more stable than in 1992 or 1993, with Yeltsin Pinochet type or face Zhirinovsky in the 1996 appearing to be the sole guarantor of Russia’s presidential elections, said Rahr. If demo- path to genuine democracy. cratic politicians are to prevent the latter’s Michael Dobbs, former Moscow victory in 1996, he continued, they must bureau chief for The Washington Post and a avoid exhausting battles in the Duma, Research Scholar at the Kennan Institute, concentrate on building regional structures, disagreed with Rahr. If stability depends on a rid themselves of corrupt officials within single leader, observed Dobbs, then the their ranks, and, above all, develop a coher- situation in Russia is decidedly unstable. ent concept of the Russian national interest. Although Yeltsin enjoys greater constitu- Rahr contended that only a candidate who is tional authority than he did prior to the a “khoziastvennik,” a manager of the Soviet suppression of violence in the Russian capital type who can deliver on promises (such as in October 1993, his moral authority has Moscow Mayor Iurii Luzhkov or Prime diminished. Despite greater powers, the Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin), could assure Russian president will probably be cautious a pro-democratic victory in the upcoming in using them to push economic reform presidential elections. forward because he will then bear the Michael Dobbs claimed that it would be political responsibility for such reforms, a mistake to conclude that fascism has tri- commented Dobbs. The two speakers umphed in Russia as a result of Vladimir discussed post-election Russian politics at a Zhirinovsky’s strong showing in the parliamen- special lecture cosponsored with the U.S. tary elections. Yet he warned that it would be Department of State and the RFE/RL Re- an equally severe mistake to underestimate the search Institute. phenomenon he represents. Dobbs attributed Rahr claimed that democratic institutions the vote for Zhirinovsky and the Liberal had the chance to develop under a strong Democratic Party (LDP) to a number of factors: presidency, a struggle over supreme power the personal humiliation of everyday Russian between the president and new parliament was citizens, who have seen their economic situa- unlikely, and the principal political struggle tion worsen while a small group of rich people would now concern candidates for the 1996 profit under economic reform; an enduring presidential elections. Yeltsin’s decision to popular belief in a political savior with a magic firmly quell the violence instigated by support- solution; Zhirinovsky’s superb television ers of former Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan performances during the campaign; and Khasbulatov and Vice President Aleksandr election rules that banned all nationalist parties Rutskoi last October was “a breakthrough to save the LDP. Dobbs suspected that popular save the country from a possible counterrevolu- support for Zhirinovsky may have peaked; tion,” said Rahr. Although he conceded that the now that he is in parliament and people can see creation of a strong presidency indefinitely that he is dangerous, he noted, Zhirinovsky postponed parliamentary government in may be unable to garner as many votes in a Russia, he contended that only a powerful future election. presidency could now guarantee the stability Considerable evidence indicates that needed to move towards democracy and a Zhirinovsky has ties to the KGB, asserted market economy. Dobbs. After getting into trouble with the Given that two-thirds of the deputies to authorities in the 1960s due to his political the State Duma will form an anti-Yeltsin activities at Moscow State University, coalition, Rahr predicted that few laws Zhirinovsky was allowed to travel to Turkey would be passed by the body. Yeltsin, he said, as an interpreter in the 1970s. Soon after the will probably be forced to rule by decree, LDP was formed in 1990, when he was choose to ignore the Duma, and work virtually unknown, Zhirinovsky had a exclusively with the upper chamber of the publicized meeting with then Chairman of the new parliament, the Council of the Federa- Soviet KGB Vladimir Kriuchkov. The LDP has tion. The Council is composed primarily of split several times since and former members regional leaders who, according to Rahr, have accused Zhirinovsky of ties to the KGB. appear disposed to work with the president. It is quite likely that Zhirinovsky has now The strong showing of Zhirinovsky and outgrown his original sponsors in that his Liberal Democratic Party in the December organization, added Dobbs. elections has sent Yeltsin the message either Introducing democracy in Russia while to establish an authoritarian regime of the implementing an economic and social 61 revolution presents a terrible dilemma, posed of 89 articles. Unlike the U.S. Supreme observed Dobbs. “The question is, who can Court, which rules incidentally on constitutional implement this revolution? ...I don’t believe a matters when resolving litigated cases, the parliament responsive to the changing Russian court—like other European constitu- demands of its electorate can implement and tional courts—was specifically designed to lead a revolution which demands a vast interpret and apply the Russian constitution and amount of economic sacrifice and hardship. resolve constitutional questions. There has to be a strong executive of some Upon beginning work in October 1991, kind.” Where he differed with Rahr, said the court immediately received two highly Dobbs, was in his estimation of Yeltsin’s controversial cases for review: one concerned actual power. The constitution grants Yelstin President Boris Yeltsin’s decrees abolishing the power to dissolve the parliament, yet it is both the Communist Party of the Soviet unclear whether he could successfully do so; Union and the Russian Communist Party and likewise, it remains uncertain whether he will confiscating their property; the other con- use his broad presidential powers to push cerned a presidential decree merging the forward economic reforms, given the possible KGB with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. political consequences of the reform agenda. The decision on the latter case was handed Since the living standard of everyday Russian down in January 1993, finding the decree in citizens is bound to worsen further before it violation of the separation of powers man- improves, Dobbs concluded, “I think Russia dated by the constitution. The decision on the is in for two to three very rocky years.” ban of the Communist Party came later in the —by Peggy McInerny year and, in Schwartz’s estimation, enabled both sides to say they had won: the Commu- Vol. XI No. 9 1994 nist Party was allowed to organize at the Ambiguous Record of Russian grassroots level and part of the government’s Constitutional Court confiscation of CPSU property was found to Despite an extremely difficult first two have been within the law. years, the Russian Constitutional Court has By the end of the court’s first year in created a body of jurisprudence which existence, said the speaker, it had made a represents a modest step toward the rule of signal contribution to the institution of the law in Russia, said Herman Schwartz at a judiciary in Russia and was highly respected. Kennan Institute lecture on 3 January 1994. Chief Justice Valerii Zorkin was then one of Schwartz is Professor of Constitutional Law the most popular political figures in Russia. at American University. Created in July 1991, Both Zorkin and the other twelve justices of the court began work in October of that year the court, however, adopted a highly visible and worked continuously until October 1993, and outspoken stance in defense of the when it was disbanded by President Boris constitution at the outset of their work. Zorkin Yeltsin in the wake of his dissolution of the personally spoke out constantly on television, Russian parliament. The court referred to radio, and in print about the need for a strong human rights in almost every decision it constitution and the imperative to abide by it. made during this period and repeatedly The Chief Justice was eventually drawn into stressed the importance of the rule of law. If the protracted power struggle between the the economic situation in Russia can be Russian president and parliament, attempting stabilized, conjectured Schwartz, the work of to mediate disputes between the two several the court may be judged as having moved times in 1992 and 1993. Russia closer to a law-based state. Characterizing Zorkin’s defense of the Given the political circumstances constitution as completely proper for a jurist prevailing in Russia, one could argue that the in his position, Schwartz argued that the Russian Constitutional Court had been prestige of the court eventually suffered more doomed from its creation, said Schwartz. (He from the Chief Justice’s political activism than himself did not ascribe to this view.) In a from its unenviable obligation to defend the country where law has historically emanated inadequate legal standards of the Brezhnev- from the executive and judicial review has not era document. After having brokered an been in force for over seventy years, the court agreement between President Yeltsin and was charged with upholding a Brezhnev-era Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan constitution with some 320 amendments and Khasbulatov in December 1992 to hold a was governed by a constitutional law com- nationwide referendum on the issues dividing 62 the executive and the legislature, Zorkin Vol. XI No. 10 1994 abruptly changed his mind and began to Print Journalism in Post-Soviet Russia campaign with Khasbulatov against the Official censorship died in Russia with referendum—seriously undermining the the collapse of the Soviet Union in August distinguished reputation and goodwill he had 1991, but journalists are poorly paid, newspa- enjoyed among Russian citizens. When Yeltsin pers are scrambling to survive on limited announced his intention to rule by decree in a advertising revenues, and the press as a televised speech in March 1993, Zorkin whole remains highly vulnerable to govern- immediately convened the court which, ment interference, said Iurii Sigov at a without examining the president’s decree on Kennan Institute lecture on 13 January 1994. the matter, ruled it unconstitutional. When the Sigov is a journalist with the Moscow weekly actual document was issued two days later, it Ve k and a Hubert Humphrey Fellow at the contained no mention of rule by decree. University of Maryland. As the conflict between the Supreme According to Sigov, there are four types Soviet and the Russian president deteriorated of press in post-Soviet Russia: the pro- in the summer and fall of 1993, Zorkin began government or government press; opposition to appear allied with Khasbulatov and Vice papers; the commercial press; and the so- President Rutskoi, said Schwartz. When the called “independent” press which, if not President dissolved parliament in September independent financially, is at least so in 1993, the court ruled his action an unconstitu- expression. Pro-government papers are tional act—a ruling Schwartz did not contest. generally those financed directly by various Yet Zorkin’s attempts to broker another branches of the Russian government; these agreement between the president and the include Rossiiskie vesti at present, and Supreme Soviet were unsuccessful and, after Rossisskaia gazeta and Rossiia in the recent right wing nationalist forces attacked the past. Sigov classified Pravda, Sovetskaia Ostankino television station, Yeltsin sus- Rossiia, and Iuridicheskaia gazeta as the pended the Court and Zorkin resigned as principal opposition papers. The last of these Chief Justice under threat of arrest. three is relatively unknown, said Sigov, but Schwartz conceded that the aggressive will soon become less so: its editor-in-chief, public stance of court justices and the political deputy editor, and domestic department activism of Chief Justice Zorkin in particular chief were all recently elected to the State had greatly damaged the movement towards Duma on the party list of Vladimir the rule of law in Russia. Nevertheless, he Zhirinovksii’s Liberal Democratic Party. maintained that such behavior had not Prime examples of the commercial press, necessarily dealt a fatal blow to the Constitu- which covers business and financial affairs, tional Court as an institution in Russia: the are Kommersant and Delovoi mir/Business U.S. Supreme Court overcame the legacy of World. Among leading independent papers, the 1857 Dred Scott decision (denying Con- Sigov named Moskovskie novosti, Nezavisimaia gress the power to prohibit slavery), as well as gazeta, and Segodnia. F.D.R.’s attempt to pack its membership Given their paltry salaries—a good during the New Deal of the 1930s. salary for an ordinary correspondent today is The Russian constitution adopted by 40,000–45,000 rubles per month—Sigov referendum in December 1993 creates a new claimed that most Russian journalists in truth Constitutional Court. Slated to have nineteen work for themselves. Those who earn the members, their nomination by the Russian highest salaries generally write about president must be confirmed by the Federal economic topics (as commercial papers pay Council, the upper body of the new parlia- better than general interest papers) or work ment. Divisions in the new parliament and the part-time for a foreign paper or news agency. requirement that a new constitutional law Many journalists, said Sigov, are leaving governing the court be approved by three- prestigious Russian newspapers and infor- fourths of the State Duma make its immediate mation agencies to work full-time for the future uncertain. Schwartz noted in conclusion Moscow bureaus of foreign media. that Russia appeared to have a new constitu- An exodus of talented journalists into tion, but a constitutional court working under commercial structures, both in Russia and a constitutional law based on the previous, abroad, is also occurring. With most newspa- much-amended Brezhnev constitution. pers largely dependent on their own budgets, —by Peggy McInerny 63 the number of foreign correspondents has directly. The rise of commercial interviews— plunged. Many of those previously posted interviews with leading businessmen or bank abroad for such papers as Pravda and Izvestiia directors that papers are paid to publish—have are becoming commercial representatives of further compromised reporting standards. Russian enterprises and work only part-time Sigov claimed this practice extended to political as journalists. In Russia, where journalism reporting as well, contending that a great deal provides an opportunity to establish a wide of political advertising appeared in Russian network of contacts among government and newspapers prior to the December 1993 business leaders, many writers are quitting elections in the guise of interviews and articles. the field for more lucrative positions in Finally, Sigov argued that neither the public relations or as press secretaries for Law on the Press nor the new Russian political parties. constitution guaranteed the independence of The importance of print media in the press. “In Russia,” he commented, “the comparison with that of television and radio boss is the law.” He recalled the Russian has declined drastically in the past two to proverb, “Zakon—eto dyshlo, kuda povernësh— three years, said Sigov. However, he noted tuda i vyshlo,” meaning that the law in Russia that electronic media remained firmly under follows the direction of the horse—it is the government control, and journalists had far coachman who matters. Until ordinary greater choices of employment in the print citizens and journalists alike see the constitu- market (Moscow alone has 350 newspapers). tion work in practice, he continued, they will Subscriptions have dropped drastically since consider it nothing but a piece of paper. 1991 and all papers, whether or not they Sigov noted that the Russian presidential receive government or commercial support, administration regularly exerted pressure on are increasingly dependent on advertising newspapers and journalists critical of its revenues. “If before newspapers were policies, so much so that chief editors often sign fighting for big circulation, now they are articles prepared by others in order to forestall fighting for more advertising and less a court action against the journalist or the circulation,” said the speaker. paper. A new consultative committee for press The influence of central newspapers matters has now been created within the such as Pravda and Izvestiia has also declined presidential administration in order to, in over the past two years, while that of local Sigov’s words, “once again explain to newspa- and provincial papers has grown signifi- pers what they have to write.” This and the cantly. “Very few people in the provinces limited number of newspaper printing facilities now read the Moscow press,” said Sigov, (Moscow has three; most regions, only one) asserting that provincial papers were very give the government all necessary means to influential on the local level and would assert direct control of the print media should it become more so in the future. Not only has so decide. the readership of central Moscow papers —by Peggy McInerny declined, journalists no longer want to move to Moscow, preferring to remain on the local Vol. XI No. 11 1994 level and cultivate contacts there. According New Round of Russian Constitutional to Sigov, some provincial journalists now Reform Begins travel abroad more often than do their The new Russian constitution adopted Moscow colleagues. And although regional by referendum in December 1993 appears to news agencies have emerged in the Urals and be a transitional document, approved by less southern Russia, most local newspapers can than one-third of all eligible voters of the only afford to subscribe to the ITAR-TASS Russian Federation (32.9 out of 106 million), news agency, which became state-owned in said Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov at a December 1993 by presidential decree. Kennan Institute lecture on 15 February 1994. Sigov lamented a clear lack of profes- Tuzmukhamedov is Head of the Section on sional standards and claimed that the legal Public International Law of the Russian independence of the press in Russia was a Constitutional Court and Assistant Professor fiction. No real responsibility is demanded of International Law at the Diplomatic from either individual journalists or their Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign newspapers, he asserted, pointing out that facts Affairs. He specified that his remarks in no are often not checked and people who were way reflected the opinions of either institu- never interviewed are sometimes quoted tion. As the constitution did not win passage 64 in twelve national republics and ten prov- but does not define. Nor does it define the inces of the Russian Federation, its legal distinction used in its opening statements validity is not altogether certain, implied between the integrity of territory and state Tuzmukhamedov. In his view, the new integrity. Finally, the 1993 constitution is less constitution, together with the new Russian precise than its predecessor concerning the parliament’s intention of introducing an right of the Russian Constitutional Court to entire new set of basic laws including crimi- rule on the constitutionality of international nal, civil, civil procedure, labor, family, and treaties signed by the Russian Federation. land codes marked the beginning of a new The much-amended 1978 version allowed the round of constitutional and legislative reform Court to rule on treaties only prior to their in Russia, the third such wave since President ratification and approval, said Mikhail Gorbachev first initiated constitu- Tuzmukhamedov, whereas the 1993 docu- tional reform in the Soviet Union in 1989. ment merely specifies that the Court may Tuzmukhamedov faulted the new rule prior to the entry into force of such constitution for poor legal craftsmanship that treaties, creating the possibility that a treaty rendered it vague and contradictory, the could be found unconstitutional after it has imbalance of power it created in favor of the been ratified. executive branch, and the haste with which it Robert Sharlet, coordinator of the had been written and adopted. Yet he also Institution Building Rule of Law Program at found the December 1993 document more ARD/Checchi under the auspices of the U.S. “palatable” and noted that it more clearly Agency for International Development, served defined the distribution of authority in the as commentator for the lecture. He specified Russian state than had its predecessor. that his remarks did not reflect the opinions or Although the new document includes the policies of that program. Russian constitu- same set of internationally recognized human tional developments, said Sharlet, are taking rights standards incorporated in the 1978 place within a framework of turbulent constitution by amendment, it differs from political change associated with Russia’s the previous version in several respects. difficult transition away from a communist First, the new constitution makes it system and attempt to build a democracy and possible for the authorities to conduct search a market economy simultaneously. Pointing and seizure under federal law or under a out that many scholars consider the Russian court order; the previous constitution Federation an empire rather than a state, required either a court order or, in the case of Sharlet argued that Russia today was prima- an emergency, a court hearing on the legality rily engaged in the task of state building. This of a search and seizure that had already process, he said, now bears the hallmarks of occurred. Second, the list of conditions under two post-Soviet republics, two constitutions, which the state may derogate the rights and and two Constitutional Courts divided by an freedoms of its citizens has been extended to interregnum during which the previous include protection of the defense and security parliament was dissolved and a new constitu- interests of the state. The amended 1978 tion not yet adopted. “Given the fact that we document, explained Tuzmukhamedov, are dealing with a country going through a permitted such derogation only to the extent rapid transition,” he remarked, “it would not necessary for the protection of the constitu- be surprising if, in the next ten years or so, we tional order and the lawful rights and speak of a third Russian republic, just as in interests of other individuals. Third, the new over two hundred years of history there have constitution names the Russian president as been five French republics, three in rapid the guarantor of human rights and liberties, succession in a small span of time in the yet this role appears to be assigned to the twentieth century.” judiciary in other provisions of the same Calling the new document the “Yeltsin document. “One might interpret this as being Constitution,” Sharlet noted that the powers indicative of the president acquiring certain accorded to the Russian president in several judicial powers,” he noted. articles dispersed throughout the constitution The new constitution, resembled the concentration of powers Tuzmukhamedov continued, fails to distin- accorded to the Communist Party of the guish adequately among three types of Soviet Union in Article 6 of the 1977 USSR categories of laws constitutional federal laws, Constitution. The executive, he asserted, federal laws, and laws per se which it names appears to be moving towards the usurpation 65 of both judicial and legislative power. Despite criticizing the criminal code published in 1923, these deficiencies, Sharlet held out the and died in 1927. prospect that the new constitution might be An ardent supporter of the jury trial in able to provide a framework within which Russia, Koni considered that institution a “workable politics” could be developed in bridge which would bring the Russian masses, Russia, citing Walter Murphy’s argument that the narod, to participate in the larger frame- stable polities eventually developed within work of Russian society, teaching them the the framework of constitutions virtually rudiments of civic behavior and legal con- imposed on other nations in this century, sciousness. Likewise, said Pomar, Koni viewed such as Japan and Ireland. the jury trial as an educational tool for those in Neither Sharlet nor Tuzmukhamedov power, believing the government could use was certain of the status of the Federation the institution to determine and understand Treaty signed in March 1992. Explicitly made popular feelings. When juries were attacked a part of the previous constitution, it was not for a high acquittal rate, said Pomar, Koni incorporated into the version adopted last urged critics to look at the crimes for which December. Although the new constitution defendants were acquitted mostly crimes abrogates the previous version, theoretically against the state involving passport laws and abrogating the Federation Treaty as well, the heed the message that the people did not see interim provisions of section two of the such transgressions as crimes. December 1993 version interpret the treaty as As Koni spent his life immersed in the still being in effect, although inferior to the legal reforms begun under Alexander II, the constitution itself. jurist’s biography sheds considerable light on —by Peggy McInerny the ambiguous nature of the Russian judicial system and the rule of law in Russia of the Vol. XI No. 12 1994 late nineteenth century, argued Pomar. The Anatolii Koni and the Rule of Law in Russia reforms of 1864 introduced an independent A liberal Russian jurist of the nineteenth judiciary and basic rule of law to which all century, Anatolii Koni was a noted advocate of citizens in principle were subject, including the gradual reform of Russian society who, the autocrat, explained the speaker. The tsar, over the course of a lifetime in the Russian legal however, retained the right to rise above the system, became an increasingly outspoken law; this basic ambiguity of authority was opponent of the tsarist regime, related Mark never resolved in the imperial period. Pomar at a Kennan Institute lecture on 1 March Introduced with great fanfare and noble 1994. Pomar is Executive Director of the Board liberal intentions in the 1860s, the judicial for International Broadcasting and a Guest system came under assault for the remainder Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center. In of tsarist rule, said Pomar, and Koni found addition to his life as a jurist, Koni was a himself at the heart of the struggle first to renowned man of letters whose writings establish and then to defend such basic appeared regularly in the journal Vestnik institutions of western legal practice as the Evropi, as well as a biographer, literary critic, jury trial. Although committed to evolution- and occasional editor of Russian writers. ary change, in the face of growing imperial Born in 1844 into an educated middle- intransigence, Russification, and the denial of class family his father was a writer/translator, rights to religious minorities, Koni slowly his mother a famous actress and novelist, Koni became a staunch opponent of the tsarist studied law under Boris Checherin at Moscow regime. Yet Pomar noted that neither Koni University and entered the Russian judiciary nor his liberal jurist colleagues, all imbued as a prosecutor in 1865. He worked to estab- with European culture, questioned the idea lish new court systems in Kharkov and that a powerful state was a necessary instru- Kazan’, settled in St. Petersburg, became a ment of progress and enlightenment. judge in his early thirties, and served as the Marc Raeff, Professor Emeritus of presiding judge at the much-publicized Vera History at Columbia University, served as Zasulich trial of 1878. He later became the commentator for the lecture. Although most Chief Prosecutor of the Criminal Cassation memoirs and information available about the Department of the State Senate in the 1880s, a practice and application of the 1864 reforms Senator, and a Member of the Council of State focus on criminal law, Raeff argued that the under Nicholas II. Koni lived to see the development of civil law in Russia in the late beginnings of the Soviet state, was arrested for nineteenth century was of greater impor- 66 tance. “It would seem to me that civil law to this law and thus preventing its growth would be a paramount element...as it was and development over time. only thanks to a civil law that recognized —by Peggy McInerny aspects of corporate law, contracts, and so on, that Russian society could move in the Vol. XI No. 13 1994 direction of a modern, Western, capitalist Lack of Credit Constrains Business in (whether we like it or not), industrial soci- Russia ety.” He insisted that Russian norms and “My problems in Russia can be reduced practices of civil and family law were crucial to one single fact,” said businessman William for a full understanding the Russian legal McCulloch at a Kennan Institute lecture on tradition and making that tradition relevant 14 March 1994, “there is no credit to do today. almost anything except trade. If you want to The legal reforms of the 1860s, said Raeff, invest and build and produce, where do you introduced a foreign model based on French get the money?” McCulloch is President of and German legal tradition whose sources of the Russian Development Corporation of inspiration differed greatly from those of both Washington, D.C. His business activities in Petrine and pre-Petrine Russian law. He then Russia include work on a U.S.-financed made a tentative case for the argument that the project to build housing for demobilized reforms resulted in two parallel legal systems military officers in Volgograd; a telecommu- which did not interact sufficiently to make the nications project in Ekaterinburg; and some new legal tradition a genuinely living one. small-scale real estate investments. Whether the real Russian legal tradition was “When you ask the Russians what they the bureaucratic practice introduced by the want,” said the speaker, “there is, surpris- Petrine state or popular customary tradition ingly, a lot of cash; and if you structure things and the civil legal practices of peasant com- correctly and provide [the desired goods] on munes and peasant society, he added, was credit, you can accomplish a great deal.” another question, significant in its own right. According to McCulloch, there is high Raeff pointed out that the Russian effective demand in Russia for two essential nineteenth-century debate over the value of goods: housing and telephones. The problem the jury trial, unlike its western European in meeting this demand, he explained, lies in counterpart, took on a moralistic dimension finding an institution that can understand it because the two major sets of actors in the from the supply side and extend the credit judicial system the judges, lawyers, and, required for such projects. prosecutors who implemented the reforms McCulloch first worked in Russia as a and the simple folk who made up the juries consultant in Ekaterinburg on a project funded came from very different backgrounds. Such by the U.S. Agency for International Develop- differences in “legal consciousness” and ment; at present he operates a small company cultural norms dominated the implementa- that employs two American and four Russian tion of the 1860s reforms, continued Raeff, consultants. He emphasized that it was and were perhaps the source of the ambigu- difficult, but possible, to operate effectively at ity of the system they created. Koni himself, low cost in Russia. McCulloch is working with he noted, was ambivalent in his instructions the major bank and telephone company of to juries, providing didactic guidelines, yet Ekaterinburg to raise funds in Russia for a appealing to their sense of transcendent telecommunications system for the city. social-psychological truth. The idea of law as Telephone subscriptions are sold in rubles by a a tool for education, pointed out Raeff, is German firm set up for that purpose, the rubles contrary to, or at least interferes with, the converted into Deutsch marks and invested; the idea of law as a tool for resolving conflicts of hard currency investment is then used in interest among inviduals or groups. negotiations with large telecommunications A clearer picture of Russian legal companies to secure the best price on equip- practice in the nineteenth century, said Raeff, ment and as a guarantee against other sources can only be attained by closer study of of credit. “We’ve figured out how to pay for peasant courts. One must determine, he said, [the project],” said McCulloch, “now we’re whether these courts were developing a trying to get the best price on the equipment.” viable tradition prior to the revolution or The speaker offered two principal whether, by codifying customary law, they thoughts on doing business in Russia: a were actually destroying what was peculiar Western businessman needs the right Russian 67 partner and must personally supervise his and that is to have enough people doing investment in the country. The key, he con- enough things so that some competition tended, is the right partner one with whom a gradually develops to keep them in place,” basis of trust is established over time. “You he concluded. His personal advice to Western cannot bring in an army of New York lawyers businessmen was to avoid Moscow precisely and have an ironclad deal. You have to have a because of organized crime syndicates clear understanding with the right partner operating there. about what you are doing,” he said. Such an In McCulloch’s opinion, assistance understanding, he said, then makes it possible efforts of bilateral and multilateral organiza- to negotiate one’s way through the Russian tions in Russia have been too slow and are political, economic, and banking systems. providing neither the quality nor the quan- Among the obstacles to doing business tity of support needed by the country.”They in Russia, McCulloch cited an extremely are simply not getting the job done,” he harsh environment (in the physical, psycho- remarked. The problem, he specified, lies logical, political, institutional, and macroeco- with the reliance of the advanced industrial nomic senses); corruption; a confiscatory tax nations on international lending agencies system; legal uncertainties; the lack of credit; rather than on bilateral government agree- an atrocious domestic airline; pollution and ments. Only the latter can provide Russia health problems; and finally, rising unemploy- with the volume of funding needed during ment and low incomes that limit effective these very unstable times, he asserted. demand. Nonetheless, the speaker claimed Given the hardships the Russian people that more effective demand existed in Russia have had to endure as a result of economic than most people realized. On the positive reform, McCulloch said he found their will to side, he noted a significant and growing continue with this reform impressive. He private sector; a new Prime Minister who has then turned present wisdom about investing the chance to operate a more effective and in Russia upside down. “You hear people say, stable government; and, in the closing months ’Well, if only the Russians would restore law of 1993, a significant stabilization of the ruble and order and get their macroeconomic act and a serious decline in inflation. together, we could come in and do business.’ Early during his first visit to I think,” he concluded, “that it’s the other Ekaterinburg on business, said McCulloch, an way around: it’s coming in and doing acquaintance advised him to contact the business that will gradually increase the organized crime syndicate in the city, known competition that will slowly return Russia to in Russia as a “mafia.” If one approaches the a more normal way of life.” “mafia” first, went the advice, they will agree —by Peggy McInerny to a reasonable percentage of the profits of a business venture; if such a group finds you, Vol. XI No. 14 1994 the percentage demanded will be much Peasant Culture and Urban Migration in the greater. McCulloch said he understood that 1930s bank clerks sell banking information to “The 1930s in the Soviet Union wit- organized crime groups; the latter then nessed rural-to-urban migration on a scale generally demand ten to twenty percent of the unprecendented in world history,” said money flowing into a businessman’s account. David Hoffman at a Kennan Institute lecture If McCulloch did not wish to deal with on 21 March 1994. Hoffman is Visiting the “mafia,” his acquaintance counseled that Assistant Professor of History at Cornell he should deal with the militia; if not with University and former Short-term Scholar at the militia, then with very important govern- the Kennan Institute. “Twenty-three million ment officials. “The important thing for you peasants moved to Soviet cities in a span of to remember,” said the acquaintance, “is not just ten years...by 1939, nearly half the entire to do business alone.” McCulloch claimed Soviet urban population consisted of former organized crime was a major presence in peasants who had moved to the city within Ekaterinburg, a city which, like Odessa and the decade.” Did the Soviet regime succeed Rostov-na-Donu, has been historically linked in imposing a new identity on these peasant with “mafias.” Only as profit margins decline immigrants to the city or, to the contrary, did are such groups displaced, he remarked, peasant culture imprint itself on the Soviet arguing that competition helped to even out system during these years? Peasants were not the playing field. “I only know one approach, transformed into “new Soviet men,” an- 68 swered Hoffman, but neither did they remain an overwhelmingly peasant country, saw the unchanged by urbanization. Rather, peasant 1930s as a moment of truth, maintained identity in the cities underwent an evolution Hoffman. “These millions of peasants moving in which rural traditions were selectively to the cities and joining the industrial work adapted to the needs of urban life, creating a force,” he noted, “at last offered them the kind of urban peasant subculture. chance to create a large, politically supportive The Soviet state, said the speaker, did proletariat upon which the socialist order could not control the massive wave of urbanization be built.” To take advantage of this opportunity, prompted by the collectivization of agricul- the regime instituted political and cultural ture and rapid industrialization peasants educational programs for peasant immigrants. simply fled collective farms in large numbers Posters, novels, and films broadcast the desired and poured into the cities in search of work. image of clean, efficient, self-denying workers Yet Hoffman claimed this migration was not dedicated to the Soviet regime. The intent of chaotic. “Peasants proceeded along well- these educational efforts was not entirely defined routes to highly specific destina- manipulative, noted Hoffman; the Marxist tions,” he argued, “their movements were convictions of Soviet leaders led them to based on a flow of information from peasants believe that peasants would develop a political already living in the city.” Zemliachestvo, consciousness and transfer their loyalty to the which Hoffman translated as “village Soviet state once their relationship to the means networks,” facilitiated chain migration in of production was changed. which peasants joined relatives or fellow Yet the regime’s attempt to instill a new villagers already living in a city. These identity among peasants failed, largely due to networks then provided the foundation for the false assumption that peasants lacked self-help societies that were established in culture and could be easily molded into the urban peasant communities (usually barracks “new Soviet man.” Clusters of fellow villagers or shantytowns located in isolated areas at in neighborhoods and workplaces allowed the edges of cities) to provide material aid immigrants to preserve a form of peasant and guidance to new immigrants. Artels, culture in the city. Whereas some traditions, groups of peasant laborers who travelled and such as harvest festivals, were discarded, other worked together under the direction of a peasant cultural forms were maintained or village elder, pooling wages and sharing adapted, as in the case of songs that reflected expenses, provided another kind of collective life in the city. In other cases, new cultural security for peasants new to the city. forms were adopted, but imbued with The patterns of migration produced by traditional meanings. Pictures of Lenin, for these traditional peasant mechanisms in turn example, were hung alongside icons not in affected residential housing patterns and the homage to Lenin as the founder of the Soviet shape of the urban workforce in Soviet cities. state, but because peasants attributed a quasi- Clusters of fellow villagers ended up living in religious meaning to these portraits. Urban the same neighborhood and working in the peasants had their own way of understanding same factory or at the same construction site. the world and their place in it, argued “These concentrations of fellow villagers Hoffman, with their own customs surround- tended to undercut managerial authority in ing marriage, family, and kinship. This Soviet industry,” said Hoffman. “As it was, modified form of peasant culture provided managers were unable to train the thousands them an identity which frustrated the regime’s of new workers arriving every year in their efforts to make them into model proletarians. factories or at their construction sites.” Eventually the Soviet regime turned to Newly arrived peasant workers turned to more traditional appeals to build allegiance to fellow villagers to learn how to work and, the state, initiating a major shift in ideology in instead of strict labor discipline and time the late 1930s. A new emphasis was placed on orientation, learned lax work routines and morality, respectability, and strengthening the avoidance of production norms. Artels family unit, and a revival of Russian national- likewise functioned to reduce the authority of ism occurred. This shift dubbed the “Soviet Soviet managers often dependent on artels Thermidor” by Trotsky was the result not only for crucial construction tasks as members of the failure to produce a supportive working took orders only from the artel elder. class, but of the insecurity of peasants and Soviet authorities, conscious of having workers promoted to positions of authority in created a Marxist, working-class revolution in the government bureaucracy during the 69 decade. Uneducated and lacking administrative In 1957, a decree united existing experience, said Hoffman, this group sought to research institutions in Siberia and the Far secure its new status by becoming “respectable.” East in a Siberian Division of the Academy of The great political and social instability of the Sciences (Russian acronym: SO AN SSSR). era, together with the rising danger of fascist The decree simultaneously created a variety Germany, most likely also contributed to the of institutes dedicated to different disciplines ideological shift. Appeals to patriarchal author- in Akademgorodok. Novosibirsk University, ity and Russian nationalism provided the a small, elite institution conceived as a bridge regime with the support it needed in the short- between the worlds of higher education and run, allowing it to emerge victorious from World applied scientific research, was established in War II. In the long-run, however, Hoffman noted 1959. The agglomeration of so many research that such appeals created unresolved contradic- institutes in one place far from the political tions within Soviet ideology and exacerbated capital created a special ethos of pure science relations with ethnic minorities. in Akademgorodok, which Vodichev de- —by Peggy McInerny scribed as an “ivory tower of academic freedoms.” Frustrated elsewhere in the Soviet Vol. XI No. 15 1994 system, many scientists and their students Science in Siberia: In Crisis, But Not Dying found rapid career advancement, material Built with great fanfare in the late advantages, and relative intellectual freedom 1950s, the Siberian branch of the Russian in the science town. (formerly USSR) Academy of Sciences Whereas Akademgorodok symbolized became the most concentrated complex of the great successes of Soviet science in the advanced scientific research institutions in 1960s, said Vodichev, the 1970s saw it begin the world before sharply deteriorating in the to draw criticism for problems that eventu- ally contributed to its decline: the monopoly late 1980s, said Evgenii Vodichev at a atmosphere of its institutes; their isolation Kennan Institute lecture on 21 April 1994. from other research centers; and the elite Vodichev is an Adjunct Professor in the culture of the town. Today, Akademgorodok Russian Area Studies Program at no longer receives the substantial funding Georgetown University and a former Short- formerly provided by the central govern- term Scholar at the Kennan Institute. Cen- ment. Its enormous concentration of highly tered in the town of Akademgorodok near educated, skilled research scientists has Novosibirsk, the Siberian Division of the become a liability in today’s market Russian Academy of Sciences now employs economy. Increasing numbers of scientists, 34,000 people (including 11,000 researchers) primarily those in the 30-49 age bracket, are in 97 research organizations located prima- leaving science altogether or emigrating rily in Akademgorodok, but also in Irkutsk, abroad to live and work on a permanent or long-term contractual basis. This emigration Tomsk, Kemerevo, and Krasnoiarsk. will most likely be a catastrophe for certain According to the speaker, four reasons scientific disciplines as well as for the lay behind the creation of an immense training of a new generation of Russian multidisciplinary, scientific research center in scientists, said Vodichev, although it remains Novosibirsk-Akademgorodok. First, the unclear which disciplines will suffer most policy of accelerating economic growth in the from the attrition. eastern part of the USSR in the 1950s led to a Science in Siberia is in crisis, but not consensus among political leaders and dying, he concluded. Although the system of academicians that scientific research in scientific research and training in Russia must Siberia needed to be reorganized. Second, be drastically reorganized, Vodichev con- Soviet scientists saw in the proposed research tended that such reform would not succeed center an opportunity to advance their own until economic incentives for innovation exist careers and research agendas. Third, con- in the Russian economy as a whole. struction of the center corresponded with the Harley Balzer, Director of the Russian sovnarkhozy reforms of Khrushchev, which Area Studies Program at Georgetown transferred economic management in the University and former Research Scholar at USSR from branch to territorial organization. the Kennan Institute, served as commentator And finally, the growth of the military- for the lecture. Balzer took issue with the industrial complex in Siberia prompted the assumption that the crisis in Siberian science Soviet military to support the creation of a began under Gorbachev, arguing that scientific research center in the region. “islands of excellence” in the Soviet scientific 70 community had been purchased at an power lies at the local level, said Thomas enormous cost to Soviet society as a whole Bradley at a Kennan Institute seminar on 12 and Soviet science in general. He noted that May 1994. They have had better success in the immediate economic crisis tended to building horizontal structures than vertical obscure such long-term processes of decline ones, with national union leaders only as the aging of scientific personnel, interna- beginning to understand the necessity of tional isolation, and the lack of supplies and developing programs for their membership. equipment. Balzer pointed in particular to Bradley is a professional union organizer for the abysmal links between science and the AFL-CIO, for which he recently served as manufacturing in the USSR and the process Russia Country Director in that body’s Free by which the Soviet military, through its hold Trade Union Institute. He maintained that all on the national budget, forced projects on the independent labor unions in Russia today scientific community that not only adversely face the problem of attracting new members. affected funding for all other areas of science, “If the old [Soviet] trade unions are ever to but resulted in horrendous environmental reform,” he emphasized, “they are going to damage. have to feel pressure from new trade Balzer maintained that Vodichev’s unions.” presentation left the question of the identity The enormous Soviet trade union of Akademgorodok unresolved. Whereas apparatus, now renamed the Independent Vodichev made clear that the center was Trade Union Federation of Russia (Russian intended to serve both the military-industrial acronym: FNPR), remains in existence, complex and industrial production, Balzer wields considerable power, and has shown noted that the founders of Akademgorodok perceived it as a bastion of pure science. little inclination toward reform. Under the Three great spurts in the development of Soviet regime, explained the speaker, trade science and the training of scientific research- unions essentially functioned to maintain ers occurred in the USSR (1928–34, the period worker discipline (in a production sense), of World War II, and 1956–62), he said. All sustain ideological purity, and suppress grass three resulted from pressure applied by the roots trade unions that might spring up. Communist Party and the military on the Bradley held that the real power base of these Academy of Sciences. It is perhaps fair to unions was not the workers, but mid-level observe, he remarked, that the Academy used managers of Soviet enterprises, who remain these periods of pressure both to perform as their constituency to this day. “These trade required and to obtain something extra for unions are now independent...of their mem- itself at the same time. bers,” he said. With two or three exceptions, Turning to the present day, Balzer noted that no science lobby exists in the most of the old-style Soviet labor unions still Russian Parliament. “For most of the Soviet have no mechanisms for worker input into period,” he said, “scientists took it for union policy, no genuine elections, and do not granted that what they were doing was see their mission as defending workers’ rights. important and didn’t have to justify it.” He “They are still in the business of distributing predicted that it would take some time for scarce goods,” remarked Bradley, “which Russian scientists to learn to make a case for appears to be their one and only raison d’être.” the funding of pure research. Balzer faulted Although legislation has removed the the present Russian leadership, especially Russian social security fund from the control that of the Academy of Sciences, for avoid- of the FNPR, the same people appear to ing the hard questions involved in reorga- remain in charge of the fund, observed the nizing Russia’s scientific community. Their speaker, which covers workers’ sick leave, reluctance to ask difficult questions may lose them the opportunity to manage this vacation pay, pensions, and the like. Most of reorganization, he concluded, leaving it to the old Communist labor unions are rich in be shaped instead by the forces of raw assets, owning major office buildings in every capitalism. Russian city and over 250 resort properties, —by Peggy McInerny each of which amounts to a small town. According to Bradley, only three unions have Vol. XI No. 16 1994 broken away from the FNPR and reinvented Russian Labor Unions Independent, Not themselves, with varying degrees of success. Necessarily Free The metallurgy workers’ union is attempting Independent labor unions in contempo- to reformulate itself from above, with rary Russia are generally small and their president Boris Miskin working with 71 grassroots factions to replace top-level army, the national government, or local managers and implement a system that government. “They only trust people who permits worker participation. The dock are in their immediate circle, friends and workers’ and seafarers’ unions have also family,” noted Bradley. “Everybody else is a striven to make worker interests their stranger and perhaps even a potential number one priority, said Bradley. Efforts in problem.” He claimed a dangerous political the same direction by oil workers’ and timber vacuum exists among workers that makes workers’ unions, on the other hand, have them potentially susceptible to rightist been less successful. political extremism. Fascism in Russia, as in In addition to these breakaway unions, Weimar Germany, could become increas- Bradley described three kinds of new, inde- ingly attractive to a dispirited, defeated, pendent labor unions in Russia: professional, politically unsophisticated electorate living umbrella, and “commercial.” Professional through an era of hyperinflation and injured unions evolved out of strike committees national pride, he warned. during the perestroika years and strictly limit Despite their record of support for Boris their membership to a certain profession. Yeltsin during times of crisis, independent Bradley considered the three principal labor unions have yet to receive meaningful professional unions the NPG (miners’ union), backing from the Russian president, who the pilots’ union (actually two unions), and continues to extend support to the FNPR. the air traffic controllers’ union the bedrock of Bradley held that two schools of thought on independent labor in Russia today. Umbrella labor unions exist within Yeltsin’s administra- unions, by contrast, function to affiliate tion. One school, apparently led by Chairman independent, enterprise-based unions to the of the Council of the Federation Vladimir center in Moscow, performing social security Shumeiko, advocates retaining the old unions functions in some cases, providing legal because they are capable of controlling the services in others, and generally allowing workers during the painful transition to the them to exist in the east of the country. market. The other school, apparently led by “Commercial” unions are formed by coopera- Sergei Filatov, head of the presidential tives which need unions to provide their administration, argues that the old unions are workers with social security and pension anachronistic and that instead of being benefits. Cooperative owners are generally controlled, workers should be given a voice in members, if not the leaders, of such unions. the debate on reform. Unfortunately, observed Although the interests of these two groups Bradley, the Shumeiko school seems to have will most likely diverge in the future, Bradley the president’s ear at present. observed, “right now, they are in a special —by Peggy McInerny limbo that occurs when a monolithic system tries to unwind itself into a tripartite system.” Vol. XI No. 17 1994 Bradley went on to describe a deep and Russian Legal Reform and the Case of enduring legacy of totalitarian rule that affects Izvestiia contemporary Russian labor relations. Strict The struggle of the newspaper Izvestiia membership rules for professional unions, for to establish its independence first from the example, appear to be a reaction to the Soviet Soviet and then from the Russian national union practice whereby everyone in an legislature illustrates key legal issues at play industry, from the janitor to the minister, was a in Russia’s transition away from a command member of the same union. The fact that economy, said Frances Foster at a Kennan independent union power is strongest at the Institute lecture on 6 June 1994. Foster is an local level and has yet to build powerful Associate Professor at the School of Law of vertical organizations can also be seen as a Washington University in St. Louis. The reaction to decades of centralized power. Izvestiia case primarily concerns questions of Finally, Russian workers have emerged from economic ownership, regulation, and the the Soviet system, in Bradley’s words, “disillu- proper balance between the survival of the sioned, mistrustful, and lonely.” A telephone media and its independence from govern- poll conducted for FTUI by Aleksei Simonov mental authority during a time of transition. and the Glasnost’ Foundation reported that 90- Perhaps the most important function of the 95% of all workers interviewed placed case, however, is the light it casts on the absolutely no trust in old trade unions, new process of law making in Russia today an ad trade unions, the militia, political parties, the hoc, disorganized procedure characterized by 72 a disregard for law and a penchant for publishing complex, one which eventually personal, not institutional, resolutions. saw Supreme Soviet parliament-ary guards According to Foster, Izvestiia clearly dispatched to the publishing house and chafed under the control of the USSR Su- newspaper editorial offices. A plethora of preme Soviet during the final years of the presidential decrees and laws followed. When Gorbachev regime. Seizing the opportunity the Constitutional Court found the Supreme to achieve independence during the failed Soviet resolution unconstitutional in May 1993, coup of August 1991, it published Boris Izvestiia’s legal and political status appeared Yeltsin’s appeal to the citizens of Russia for a secure, but the question of the paper’s eco- general strike. Following the coup’s collapse, nomic ownership remains unresolved. the journalists’ collective threw off the Foster argued that the Izvestiia case held supervision of the Presidium of the USSR several lessons regarding law making and Supreme Soviet the paper’s legal founder law enforcement in Russia. First, the struggle and the body to which it had been subordi- for control of the newspaper reveals the nate and fired the editor-in-chief. The paper difficulty of integrating differing legal then obtained a re-registration certificate regimes from different periods of history, a from the Ministry, elected a new editor-in- problem that continues to plague Russia chief, and appeared as an independent today. In the case of Izvestiia, the legislature newspaper on 24 August. The new Izvestiia and president fought over which law on the announced it would no longer automatically press was in force, that of Russia or the USSR. publish official legislation and began to Today, it is unclear what laws are in effect in publish articles highly critical of political Russia, those passed by the Supreme Soviet leaders at all levels. dissolved by President Yeltsin in September Izvestiia’s critical tone eventually landed 1993 or the decrees issued by the President it in trouble, said Foster. After it published a since that time. Second, the case demon- March 1992 article accusing Russian Supreme strates a consistent disregard of procedural Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov of norms in Russia, where laws are adopted constitutional violations and human rights unsystematically in a process that excludes abuses, a struggle for control of the paper the input of the public and sometimes ensued. The conflict, said Foster, soon legislative parliamentary committees them- became “a parody of the established legisla- selves. Third, the case clearly reveals the tive procedures of the time.” Khasbulatov absence or, at best, indistinct separation of initially attacked the paper at a meeting of powers between the legislature and the the Supreme Soviet Committee on the Mass executive. “Lack of theoretical and practical Media in late March. He then proposed restraints leads to increased rule by law revoking the paper’s independent status and rather than rule of law,” commented Foster, restoring it as the official organ of the “that is, the use of the law by the individual Russian legislature during a session of the lawmaker to further his own agenda.” Congress of People’s Deputies in early April, In addition to highlighting procedural citing concerns about fiscal mismanagement problems of law making, the Izvestiia story and the paper’s purported one-billion-ruble illustrates the statutory, institutional, and debt. Izvestiia responded by filing a court attitudinal obstacles to the enforcement of law action for defamation; Khasbulatov then in Russia. No concrete mechanisms exist for requested the Russian Federation Procuracy enforcing laws in the country, noted Foster, and investigate the newspaper. the judiciary remains institutionally irrelevant A long and convoluted struggle followed when the executive and parliament bypass it to in which the Supreme Soviet attempted to resolve conflicts on their own. Yet Foster revoke the paper’s independence on the basis of pinpointed attitudinal obstacles as the key the USSR Law on the Press in effect in 1991, impediment to the enforcement of law, describ- when the paper declared itself independent. ing a blatant disregard for law and rules in The Russian Ministry of the Press refused to Russia that, in the case of Izvestiia, allowed enforce a Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution personal intervention to decide the fates of each to this effect. Several Supreme Soviet deputies of the parties. Beginning with the struggle over then petitioned the Russian Constitutional Izvestiia, argued Foster, Yeltsin has increasingly Court to review the resolution’s constitutional- and openly supplanted legal institutions and ity. Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a rules, initially with the aim of supporting decree that began a battle for the Izvestiia democracy and, later, in the name of stability. 73 A shift in rhetoric from the constitu- in small-scale retail trade activities that now tional freedom of the press to the citizen’s account for an estimated 40 percent of their right to truthful, objective information seems total income. Approximately 40 percent of to be occurring in Russia today, observed the population, moreover, is employed in the Foster. As a result, the Russian government is private sector an impressive result of only becoming a guardian of the public interest, two and one-half years of reform. Finally, the increasingly acting to regulate the media, speaker argued that “the pace of restrict its access to government meetings and privatization and the number of people documents, and promote a proliferation of already involved in it are perhaps a major new official institutions designed to provide guarantee that the changes are irreversible.” “objective” information to the press. Foster On the negative side, Russia is in the cited the newly created judicial chamber for throes of a deep recession. According to informational disputes within the executive Mikhalev, Russia’s gross domestic product fell branch as one example of non-legal institu- by 19 percent in 1992, 18 percent in 1993, and tions which, together with non-legal sanctions 17 percent in the first quarter of 1994. Gross and conduct, exert a significant impact on domestic investment has also plunged, political behavior in Russia today. declining 200 percent over the two years 1992 —by Peggy McInerny and 1993. Despite its depth, the speaker pointed out that the recession was largely Vol. XI No. 18 1994 structural in nature, with the military- Making Sense of Russian Economic Reform industrial complex particularly hard hit while The outcome of economic reform in the production of certain consumer durables, Russia over the last two and one-half years medical equipment, printing and publishing leads one to be cautiously optimistic, said was growing. Russian manufacturing, Vladimir Mikhalev at a Kennan Institute however, remains uncompetitive on the world lecture on 16 June 1994. Mikhalev is a Senior market and is increasingly protected by high Research Fellow at the Institute of World import duties on the domestic market. Economy and International Relations Although approximately one-third (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sci- (83,000) of state enterprises have been ences in Moscow and an IREX Fellow at the privatized, the controlling share of stock in 80 Harriman Institute of Columbia University. percent of these businesses is now owned by “The end of 1993 and the first quarter of 1994 the workers and management. This process, were marked by the first signs of macroeco- said the speaker, “looks [more] like collectiv- nomic stabilization...after two years of ization than privatization and cannot itself economic chaos,” said the speaker, arguing increase responsibility or efficiency.” Written that Russia would do well simply to sustain off by the Central Bank at the end of 1992, the prevailing economic conditions. payments crisis between industrial enter- Mikhalev’s review of Russian economic prises has again grown severe, as has the performance since the price liberalization of state’s debt to enterprises and state employ- January 1992 revealed a mixed, but decidedly ees; both represent an unresolved inflation- improving, picture. On the plus side, he ary dilemma. Capital flight is also a consider- claimed the foundations of a market infra- able problem, with exporters hiding earnings structure had been established in finance, and transferring them to foreign banks. The trade, and industry. The ruble has become total sum of this drain is estimated at USD 18 freely convertible and, in the second half of billion by the Russian government, USD 60 1993, the exchange rate remained surprisingly billion by western experts. Finally, Mikhalev stable, only to drop albeit relatively slowly in argued that Russia lacked the administrative early 1994. A profound change in Russia’s capacity to implement economic reform gross domestic product has taken place, with policies, as the overwhelming majority of private consumption rising as military Russian bureaucrats remain the highly production declines. Composition of imports unsophisticated administrators of the old has similarly changed in favor of consumer Soviet system. goods to the detriment of military purchases. Mikhalev claimed the social effects of Perhaps most striking is the Russian market reform in Russia were considerable population’s response to market changes. and, in light of the strong showing of Many people are seeking to earn additional Vladimir Zhirinovksii’s Liberal Democratic income by working second jobs or engaging Party and various communist parties in the 74 December 1993 parliamentary elections, had 1994–95 PROGRAM YEAR narrowed the popular base for reform. By far the most psychologically difficult changes Vol. XII No. 1 1994 introduced by economic reform are unem- Status Neighborhoods without a Market ployment and rapidly growing income Under the Soviet system, the state disparity. Open unemployment, which sought to eliminate class differentiation and remains highly troubling for most Russians, create a just society through equitable now numbers approximately 4.5 million distribution of the most important social people; hidden unemployment which goods, namely, food and housing, said Ellen measures people working part-time and Hamilton at a Kennan Institute lecture on 17 workers on leave without pay constitutes October 1994. Hamilton is Program Officer another 4.5 million. for the former Soviet Union at the Free Trade Once bankruptcy laws allow for the Union Institute in Washington, D.C. Accord- closing of inefficient factories and old factories ing to Soviet expectations, equal distribution begin to modernize, the speaker predicted of these goods would remove social inequi- mass unemployment would become a real ties, yet in both Soviet and Western cities, possibility. Current estimates for 1994 range groups with higher social status lived in from 5 to 20 million unemployed. “This is a better-quality housing in more desirable very dangerous prospect,” remarked sections of any given city. Mikhalev, “taking into account the tradition- Intrigued by the issue of who lived ally low mobility of the Russian labor force, where in cities where there was no housing the underdevelopment of retraining systems market, Hamilton said her research on the and the continuing economic recession [which social geography of Moscow in the Soviet is] preventing the creation of new jobs.” period showed that urban residential differ- Added to the threat of mass unemployment is entiation did exist in the Soviet Union in the the sharp drop in the quantity and quality of absence of a market. social services (including health, education The perception that the Soviet state was and housing), a situation that shows no sign of monolithic and highly centralized is somewhat improvement in the near term. misleading regarding social geography, argued Although most Russians experienced a Hamilton, claiming that a mosaic of institutions sharp drop in their standard of living during were involved in the Soviet urban environ- the last two years because wages failed to ment, the most important of which were keep pace with rising prices, the fall in real Gosstroi (the state construction committee) and wages appeared to come to an end in late Gosplan (the state planning committee). On 1993. In fact, said Mikhalev, not only did real one hand, she explained, city plans designed by wages increase on average by 10 percent in Gosstroi focused on the physical infrastructure 1993, individual consumption, including that of a city and projected 20–25 years into the of pensioners the population group that has future. On the other hand, Gosplan created fared the worst under reform increased as five-year plans that focused on short-run well. After peaking in early 1993, the number economic objectives for individual cities. of people living at minimum subsistence as Using Moscow as a case study, well as the number living below the poverty Hamilton noted that the contradictory goals line has declined steadily. Today, the Russian imposed on Moscow by the Soviet state had government faces the task of sustaining the exerted a significant impact on the way in positive trends in economic and social which the city expanded and its neighbor- conditions of early 1994 in the face of a hoods developed. As the capital of the USSR, possible unemployment explosion and the Moscow was intended to be the showplace conflicting demands of radical communists, for socialism, requiring a restructuring of its industrialists, and the International Monetary downtown area. Wide avenues, grand Fund. Mikhalev declined to predict the buildings, and river embankments were course of economic development in Russia constructed. Alternatively, for economic over the next year, saying he remained reasons the state sought to develop industry cautiously optimistic provided that Russian as rapidly as possible and built numerous society continued to find a way to accommo- factories and enterprises in the city, primarily date the most dangerous cataclysms pro- in the eastern districts. duced by reform Industrial expansion required an —by Peggy McInerny increase in the number of workers, which in 75 turn necessitated the building of additional In theory, the Soviet regime distributed low-cost housing in the area. A concentration housing to its citizens according to their of manual workers living in lower-quality needs. Unlike western practice, allocation of housing was thus established in Moscow’s urban housing stock was not based on rent. southeast region. Another, similar neighbor- But in practice, high-quality housing was hood of lower social status existed in the seen as a valuable commodity and was used city’s northern region, where industrial as a reward. “Better” workers were fre- enterprises also predominated. Regions with quently given priority in the supply of more elite social status included the western housing, pointed out the speaker, as were part of the city center, southwest regions near Communist Party officials. Moscow State University, and the northwest Concrete evidence of residential differ- regions that follow Leningradskoe shosse entiation in Moscow existed in the Soviet towards Sheremetevo airport. period, concluded Hamilton. The fact that this Hamilton used several criteria to classify differentiation developed under a socialist the 33 administrative districts of Moscow, state suggests that market mechanisms are not including the amount of living space per the only explanation for residential differentia- capita measured in square meters (a primary tion, she continued. Conflicting economic indicator of housing quality in the USSR), plans and institutional actors contributed to educational attainment, and wealth. Four this phenomenon in the USSR through an indicators from 1989 Soviet data were applied uneven process of housing allocation which to differentiate residential districts. “Number promised to provide housing to all, but of residents age 15 and over who have primarily rewarded those who contributed completed higher education” and “car more to the communist system. ownership rate” were positively associated The post-Soviet state has been unable to with social status; “number of residents age 15 eradicate the Soviet legacy of housing and and over convicted of a crime” and “share of residential patterns in Moscow. Citing just juveniles under 15 years of age” were nega- one example of the continuing influence of tively associated with social status. Analysis of high status neighborhoods of the Soviet era, the data, she said, demonstrated a strong she pointed out that western businesses are positive correlation between regions of elite now renting office space in the regions of social status and the quality of living space. Moscow formerly associated with the Moscow grew tremendously during Communist Party elite. Soviet rule, expanding from a population of —by Julia Smith 1.6 million in 1912 to a population of 9 million today. As the city continued to grow Vol. XII No. 2 1994 rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s, population Democracy and a Functioning Market? Yes, restriction plans were implemented, prima- In Time rily by means of a system of residential Russia can have a democracy and a permits (propiski). Yet Hamilton noted that functioning market economy, but it will take the population restriction plan conflicted time, declared Padma Desai at a Kennan with goals of sequential five-year plans that Institute lecture on 18 October 1994. Desai is sought to encourage the in-migration of Gladys and Roland Harriman Professor of workers so as to boost industrial production. Comparative Economic Systems at Columbia Such “guest workers” (limitchiki) were University. In order to achieve a genuine initially housed in dormitory-style accommo- market economy, Russia must create such dations in a compromise solution, she institutions as a legal system, a financial explained. However, she noted that if such system, and a tax regime. The question is, workers lived in the city long enough, they said Desai, do you wait to implement market eventually could earn the right to permanent reforms until the proper institutions and residency in Moscow. attitudes are in place? Institution building by Five-year plan directives likewise its very nature is a protracted process, she sought to attract needed specialists, who answered; in the meantime you try to change were often enticed to relocate to Moscow the Soviet system as best you can. through the offer of higher-quality housing. Desai identified the introduction of Hamilton observed that both policies contrib- private ownership and markets among the uted to growing patterns of residential genuine and astonishing achievements of differentiation in the capital. economic reform in Russia to date. She was 76 optimistic that the institutional changes state assets, they reject the idea of economic needed to support these successes would “shock” and a fixed exchange rate. Gradual occur, albeit very gradually. The essential reform would seek instead to set moderate firm priority at present is to control inflation, she targets for deficit reduction and inflation said. Reform will stand or fall depending on control, reducing both rates over a period of 3 whether or not inflation is carefully man- to 5 years. aged, thus permitting the government to Other than inducing discipline in maintain a steady course of reform. money creation for 9 months, Desai judged In light of this crucial goal, Desai was the Gaidar government’s shock therapy a encouraged by the Prime Minister Viktor failure. Its goal of reducing the budget deficit Chernomyrdin’s commitment to a strong ruble. (between 17-21 percent of Gross Domestic Chernomyrdin’s thinking about inflation has Product, or GDP, in 1991) to zero in one clearly changed over time. When he assumed quarter was unfeasible, she said, as was the office in January 1993, he claimed production expectation that foreign aid could be raised support was as or more important than or absorbed in quantities as massive as USD inflation control; today he is a firm believer in 30 billion annually. The Gaidar program did the importance of a strong ruble. Asked if the not provide for subsidies to save failing Prime Minister had become a monetarist, factories or support citizens’ standard of Desai noted that given Russia’s financial living, nor revenue mechanisms for state disarray, the money supply is one of the few expenditures passed down to localities. instruments the government can actually Because the transition from militiary- control. She strongly implied, however, that a industrial to market production cannot be reasonable annual rate of inflation for Russia achieved in a short period of time, the would not be in the single digits. Desai expected microeconomic response from specifically referred to the assertion of Russian farms and factories did not occur. Finally, she presidential advisor Evgenii Yasin, made 18 noted, the Gaidar government made no effort months previously, that it was unlikely Russia at consensus building. could achieve a stable annual inflation rate of “They believed that a coterie of a few less than 10 percent before the year 2000. people at the top could bring about radical The speaker held that three aspects of reform and in a democratic kind of system,” economic reform had been essential in Russia at she remarked. Desai viewed the electoral the close of the Soviet era: price liberalization, gains of Zhirinovskii and conservative parties privatization of state assets, and macroeconomic in the December 1993 elections as a natural stabilization. Market prices were needed to political reaction to these policies and a clear identify the costs of resources in the economy, rejection of the Gaidar program. private ownership was needed as an incentive for The Russian economy is today experi- efficient use of assets, and macroeconomic encing a decline, but this decline may have stabilization (i.e., controlling the money supply, reached its trough, said Desai. Russian GDP achieving a stable currency, and reducing the has dropped enormously in real terms over budget deficit) was required to resolve the the last three years (19% in 1992, 12% in 1993, financial mess created by market socialist reform. 17% in the first half of 1994), but since Shock therapy advocates sought to August 1994, industrial production appears acheive these goals by means of rapid deficit to have begun to recover. The budget deficit reduction that would eliminate inflation in has shrunk from 19% of GDP in 1992 to 8.3% the economy. Their program, specified Desai, in the first six months of 1994. And, after was predicated on the assumption of sub- reaching 2,400% in 1992, annual inflation stantial inflows of foreign aid (estimates were dropped to 800% in 1993 and is projected at in the range of USD 30 billion per year) to 180% in 1994. Despite “Black Tuesday” of address the social hardships and industrial October 11th, in which the ruble lost 21% of restructuring needs created by sharp deficit its value over the course of a few hours, the reduction. The program also sought to set a speaker claimed the ruble’s nominal value fixed ruble exchange rate at the outset as a had fallen less rapidly than the rate of way of introducing relative world prices into inflation and had appreciated 200% between the Russian economy from the outside. January 1993 and August 1994. Although advocates of gradual reform, of Desai was optimistic about the future of which she counted herself one, support both market reform, given that inflation is con- price liberalization and the privatization of trolled and the Russian government ad- 77 dresses its severe tax collection problem. The an ideological creed. Notwithstanding its state’s apparent resolve not to rescue in- initial violent introduction in the mid-eighth debted enterprises by again extending credits century, Islam was largely brought to Central is a step in the right direction, she observed. Asia over the course of five hundred years by In light of the cataclysmic events that have merchants who emphasized the culture and occurred in Russia over the past three years daily life of Islam, not Islamic ideology, he the coup of 1991, the disintegration of the said. Haghayeghi noted, however, a di- Soviet empire, the bloody confrontation chotomy in the region between sedentary between the Russian parliament and presi- oasis regions such as Uzbekistan and dent in October 1993, and the election of a Tajikistan, where Islam penetrated society new legislature in December 1993 Desai and changed the structure of social life, and found Russian society remarkably resilient. tribal societies such as those of Turkmenistan, Institutional change will be very slow, she Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, where the concluded, but politics seems to have moved impact of Islam was less profound. Third, the from the streets into the parliament and the speaker asserted that the subdoctrinal government, where bargaining, dialogue, diversity of Islam in Central Asia, which and lobbying are now taking place in earnest. includes Wahhabi and clan-oriented Sufi —by Peggy McInerny sects, among others, has resulted in a frag- mented religious structure that is not condu- Vol. XII No. 3 1994 cive to Islamic fundamentalism. Islam and Politics in Central Asia Finally, Haghayeghi claimed that the A genuine revival of Islam is occurring weak organizational reach and mobilizational in the countries of Central Asia that does not capacity of Islamic forces in Central Asian trace its inspiration to Arab or Middle Eastern nations makes a powerful regional fundamen- nations, said Mehrdad Haghayeghi at a talist movement doubtful. The Islamic Revival Kennan Institute lecture on 24 October 1994. Party (IRP), the backbone of Islamic organiza- Currently a Research Scholar at the Kennan tions in the region, moderated its position Institute, Haghayeghi is Assistant Professor of after branch organizations were established in Political Science at Southwest Missouri State individual Central Asian nations. According University. Despite pockets of extreme to the speaker, the IRP now supports parlia- religiosity, such as the Kara-Kalpak autono- mentary means of achieving power, although mous republic (in northwestern Uzbekistan) militant, Wahhabi, and reformist factions all and the Fergana Valley (which traverses a exist within the party. In keeping with what he swathe of eastern Uzbekistan, northern identified as a stronger proclivity toward Tajikistan, and eastern Kyrgyzstan), Islamic Islam in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, revival in the region is largely religious and Haghayeghi said the IRP had been more cultural in nature, said the speaker. successful in these nations than in other Although external influence, particularly countries of Central Asia. The party has no from the Middle East, could play a crucial role sound organizational structure in in the future development of Islam in Central Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Kazakhstan, he Asia, Haghayeghi judged the internal political said, and its popularity in the latter two dynamics of individual Central Asian nations nations is primarily among Uzbek residents. to be more significant in this regard. He argued Continued government support of the that a large-scale Islamic fundamentalist official Islamic structures created by the Soviet movement that was both anti-Western and regime, together with outright repression of sought to achieve political power in the region Islamic forces in the region could, however, was unlikely for several reasons. First and further politicize Islamic organizations, observed foremost, he said, the Hannafi school of Islamic Haghayeghi. The IRP has gone underground in jurisprudence predominates in Central Asia. Uzbekistan and the Tajik branch is in exile, he Also prevalent in Turkey, the Hannafi school said, making it difficult to assess these parties’ was founded by a non-Arab hence its popular- motivations and modus operandi. ity in Central Asia and is known for its liberal On a more general level, Haghayeghi interpretation and administration of Islamic argued that ethnic issues and the democratic law as well as the distinction it makes between drive of the Central Asian republics worked faith and practice. against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Second, Haghayeghi pointed out that Ethnic orientation precedes religious orienta- Islam in the region is more a way of life than tion in the region, he said, with ethnic separat- 78 ism the most centrifugal force in Central Asia Vol. XII No. 4 1994 today. Noting current tensions between Russian Ruling Elite Redividing Property Uzbeks and Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, Among Itself Kazakhs and Russians, and Uzbeks and The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Russians, Haghayeghi held that the ethnic perestroika in 1985 can be traced to two causes: composition of these nations’ populations the material aspirations of the younger would also affect the development of Islam. In members of the Communist Party Uzbekistan, for example, where Uzbeks make nomenklatura and the coming of age of the up 72% of the population, Islam is likely to Soviet bureaucratic class, declared Sergei become more powerful than in Kazakhstan, Shishkin at a Kennan Institute lecture on 25 where as much as 40% of the population is October 1994. Shishkin is Professor of Law at non-Muslim. Ethnic issues also appear to be Irkutsk State University in Siberia and a inhibiting cooperation between these nations, Visiting Fellow at the Russian Research Center he noted, with several republics wary of what of Harvard University. A well-known constitu- they perceive as Uzbekistan’s hegemonic tional lawyer who participated in the Russian aspirations in Central Asia. Constitutional Assembly during the summer Democracy, asserted Haghayeghi, of 1993, Shishkin claimed to express the view stands a greater chance of succeeding in of the Russian provinces vis-à-vis the Moscow Central Asia than in many developing ruling elite. nations. It offers an alternative ideology to In the late Brezhnev years, argued the both ethnic-based nationalism and Islamic speaker, the younger segment of the Commu- fundamentalism, he explained, and can rely nist ruling class tired of the asceticism of the on sizable intelligentsias created in these Soviet system and became frustrated when nations during the Soviet period they could not legally obtain the perks they (Turkmenistan being a notable exception). He sought to obtain principally, luxury con- claimed a democratic transition was most sumer goods, the ability to travel abroad, and feasible in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the possession of wealth outside of Russia. countries with a weak proclivity towards This generation understood that the perks Islam and a stronger inclination toward offered by the Soviet system were small in democracy. Observing that Central Asia was comparison to the profit they could derive becoming increasingly isolated from the from dividing up the vast Soviet state into other Soviet successor states, the speaker personal property and operating in the world insisted that democratic development in the market. At the same time, the bureaucratic region as a whole could and should be class as a whole matured in the USSR; no encouraged through economic development. longer wanting to serve a leader, the bureau- Asked about U.S. foreign policy in crats now sought to have a leader serve them. Central Asia, Haghayeghi replied, “The “This is the principal leitmotif of the reforms United States has invariably antagonized we see in Russia today,” he concluded, “if we Islam around the world simply by being can call them reforms.” afraid of the intentions of those who have Rather than move toward democracy captured power. We need to rethink the way and a market economy, Shishkin claimed we deal with it. We have made Islam, as that the younger generation of the old Soviet Graham Fuller has said, into a ’bogeyman.’” ruling class was using privatization to Haghayeghi argued that the United States redivide among itself the enormous, mono- should tolerate the participation of Islamic lithic state property of the Soviet system. forces in parliamentary politics in Central Shishkin criticized the privatization program Asia, saying, “I think we need to simply of the Russian government for three reasons: failure to institute private ownership of land allow them to express themselves it is before privatizing state enterprises, failure to difficult not to let them express themselves place meaningful limits on the ability of the when you have societies that are so deeply Soviet nomenklatura to participate in imbued with religious principles....If Islamic privatization, and failure to concentrate on forces are willing to participate in parliamen- the intended use of the property being tary means of competition and power- privatized. sharing, I think they have every right to have “Where there is power and authority in a say in their societies. The problem is,” he Russia today,” said Shishkin, “there is asked, “will they do that?” property.” The average Russian citizen, he —by Peggy McInerny noted, has been pitifully under-informed 79 about the meaning of property, privatization, south; and western Siberia, toward the Baltic and the consequences of different legal states and Scandinavia. decisions regarding property. Citizens, he Although laws on the ownership and insisted, are in need of a concerted educa- use of natural resources and the specific tional campaign to teach them the meaning authority of lower-level subjects of the Russian of property and property ownership. “The Federation (i.e., oblasti, kraiia, and republics) rule of privatization in Russia,” he asserted, are desperately needed, Shishkin claimed one “is that if you do not know, you will be should not overestimate the role of law in punished [for your lack of knowledge].” contemporary Russia. Given that provincial The search for constitutional formulae in elites in Russia are dominated by a triumvi- post-Soviet Russia, he continued, is simply an rate of what he identified as “bureaucrats, attempt to protect the redistribution of former bankers, and industrialists,” the speaker said state property within the ruling elite. Ordinary no political force was now capable of moving Russian citizens have not been a party to genuine economic and political reform ahead constitutional changes in the country, he in the provinces. continued. Rather, everyday people particu- Rather than fight to define the power larly those who inhabit rural areas of the and authority of local governments, Shishkin country have been completely marginalized in recommended that reformers battle to make Russian politics and reduced to day-to-day the budget process in Russia transparent with survival. Shishkin contended that the post- full information on proposed budgets made communist ruling elite in Russia remains available to the public as well as to increase completely unconstrained by law, remarking, the share of the national budget allocated to “We see a continuation of the Russian tradi- the provinces. The government budget is the tion where legal constructs exist in and of principal source of the ruling elite’s wealth themselves without affecting the ruling elite.” and power; exerting more control over this He argued that the only forces influencing the process is the most effective course for behavior of this class were ties of loyalty, increasing public participation in govern- friendship, and trust among its members. As ment at present, he said. in a limited partnership, observed Shishkin, no Evaluating the democratic character of one is responsible for anything in the contem- government in Russia today, Shishkin porary Russian government. concluded sadly, “If one transfers the mental- Behind the fiction of a federation, said the ity of a provincial oblast’ Communist Party speaker, Russia remains a unitary state in which committee to the Kremlin and expects that regional elites are strongly dependent on the democracy and freedom will emerge, one is central governing elite, either because they have either naive or a fool.” bargained for greater political and economic —by Peggy McInerny power from the center or because they are directly subsidized by the central government. Vol. XII No. 5 1994 Yet Shishkin conceded that regional elites Housing Reform in Russia: Slow But enjoyed a certain amount of power in their Certain localities through control of the timing and Despite political and economic instabil- structure of local elections. He judged the most ity in Russia today, housing reform is reaping recent provincial elections to have been a defeat positive results, asserted Raymond Struyk at a for the Yeltsin government, which has re- Kennan Institute lecture on 31 October 1994. sponded by attempting to strengthen the system Struyk is Senior Fellow at the Urban Institute, of executive power in the regions. Washington, D.C., and Resident Director of In Shishkin’s estimation, the Russian the Institute’s Technical Cooperative Program state is disintegrating. First and foremost an in Moscow. According to the speaker, housing economic disintegration, he said, the process reform in Russia has created an impressive nevertheless bears serious political and social record, especially in the rental sector, where consequences. One clear manifestation of the rents are being raised, housing allowance present disintegration of the country, he programs created, and the quality of mainte- explained, is the way in which the Russian nance services improved. provinces are being drawn toward regions Privatization has also made headway: outside of Russia itself. The Russian Far East many Russians have acquired ownership of is being drawn toward Japan, China, and their apartments and are beginning to discuss South Korea; central Siberia, toward the the formation of condominium associations 80 with fellow apartment owners. The rate of the Russian Federation have now raised rents privatization, however, began to decrease in and established housing allowance programs, late 1993 because most high-quality apart- said Struyk a tribute to the popularity and ments had already been bought and potential success of housing reform in the country. owners feared the risk of responsibility for Quality of housing maintenance, a repairs and taxes. continual source of consumer dissatisfaction Under the Soviet command economy, throughout the Soviet period, is slowly being 80% of all urban housing was owned by the addressed in Russia. A pilot program begun in state, centrally funded state firms were Moscow in March 1993 contracted private firms responsible for building and maintaining to maintain municipal housing and has been so housing, and the housing allocation system successful that pilot programs are now popping known for its long waiting lists was adminis- up in other cities. Private firms, noted the tered by the state. By the end of the Soviet speaker, are doing a much better job for the period there was an extreme housing shortage same amount of money. And, while disruptions in which one in three households lived in in maintenance services still occur, compensa- overcrowded conditions despite the priority tion is now available to renters when services status of the housing sector. Lack of govern- such as electricity or water are interrupted. ment funds in the post-Soviet period has Turning to the issue of apartment slowed production and decreased the quality privatization, Struyk said the process was of maintenance services, encouraging the relatively simple: residents fill out a form, private sector to take part in meeting the receive title to their unit, and thereby gain country’s housing needs. ownership. One adverse result of this process, Thorough housing reform, said Struyk, Struyk noted, is that Communist Party involves two separate processes: improving officials given the best apartments under existing housing stock and creating new Soviet rule can now easily obtain ownership of housing. Establishment of a comprehensive these prime accommodations. legislative base and development of market According to the speaker, 8.4% of all services such as brokers and real estate agents eligible units were privatized in Russia in are also necessary elements of reform. Rental December 1992; 26.0% in December 1993; and sector reform includes increasing rental prices, 30.0% in June 1994 the rate of privatization improving maintenance services, and creating peaking in late 1992 and early 1993. The pace subsidies. According to Struyk, raising rents in of privatization has since decreased for three Russia represents a hallmark of housing main reasons, he explained: 1) the inferior reform because it has required breaking the quality of apartments not yet privatized; 2) Soviet social contract of cheap, fixed rents. uncertainty regarding accountability for In 1992, cities assumed greater responsi- maintenance services and property taxes (i.e., bility for social services, providing municipal potential owners are discouraged by the need administrations the incentive to adopt new to assume financial responsibility for these maintenance taxes and increase rents on state- expenses); 3) the risk presented by apartment owned housing. The federal government units in need of rehabilitation. approved a step-by-step increase in rents that Another component of housing reform, will increase renters’ payments over a five-year housing production, has shown its first rise in period, ending in 1998, when operating costs 1994 since decreasing in 1987. Construction will be fully covered. Initial increases will be finance is also moving forward; investors are insignificant as rental rates have been far below now able to contribute equitably to produc- their market value; by the program’s third year tion costs incurred by construction firms. the population will begin to feel the increases. Unfortunately, banks have played a minor role Russia’s recently established housing in financing housing construction to date, said allowance program provides subsidies that Struyk, supporting only 10% of all projects cover the gap between market rent prices and due to high inflation and negative real interest a family’s spending capacity. (Most families rates on mortgage loans. Problems with long- currently spend less than 1% of their income term mortgage lending arise from both on rent.) The program targets 10% of family Russia’s lack of experience with such lending income for rent and is profitable for city and an inadequate legal base. Finally, Struyk governments: 95% of rental increases repre- acknowledged that larger-scale reform was sent net revenue, making subsidies virtually hindered by the infiltration of organized crime self-financing. Two-thirds of all jurisdictions in into the housing sector. 81 To date, said Struyk, the Russian State Ukraine from occupation. Among these Duma has impeded the adoption of more factors were the legacy of Soviet power in extensive housing laws than those passed by Ukraine (i.e, collectivization, famine, and the the now-defunct Congress of People’s great terror); the proliferation of Ukrainian Deputies in 1992. The lack of comprehensive nationalist propaganda with anti-Soviet Nazi laws on housing remains the principal propaganda in Ukrainian territory occupied obstacle to further reform. Struyk’s overall by the German and Romanian armies; and the outlook for housing reform in Russia, existence of a genuine power vacuum in however, was positive, and he predicted that eastern Ukraine during the first half of 1944. pockets of reform would spread as economic The struggle between the Soviet regime incentives encourage city municipalities to and Ukrainian nationalists was decided in a adopt market practices. matter of a few months; the latter were —by Julia Smith completely eradicated in eastern Ukraine in the space of a few years. The ability of the Vol. XII No. 6 1994 Soviet regime to set the parameters of the World War II, Ukraine, and Soviet Power struggle and the nationalists’ misreading of Ukraine’s drastic experience of World social realities in eastern Ukraine were the key War II resulted in a specifically Soviet kind of reasons for their defeat, explained Weiner. On Ukrainian nationalism that linked Ukrainian the one hand, Ukrainian nationalists articu- nationalist sentiment, Soviet power, and the lated a nationalist ethos based on the trau- Red Army in a symbolic triumvirate, said matic experience of collectivization and the Amir Weiner at a Kennan Institute lecture on consequent famine. On the other, the Soviet 12 December 1994. An historian, Weiner is regime promoted the triumph of World War II currently a Research Scholar at the Kennan as the central theme of national pride. Institute. Largely through the conscious use The Soviet regime’s deliberate use of of brutal force, said the speaker, the Soviet force against Ukrainian nationalist bands was regime was successful in conveying the implemented not only by the Red Army and message that it would grant no concessions the NKVD (the Soviet secret police), said to a secessionist nationalist movement in Weiner, but by “extermination battalions” Ukraine during the last year of the war. mobilized from among the citizenry. The The war thus witnessed both the failure resulting campaign of terror brutalized the of ethnocentric and revisionist nationalism in population of the republic, already deeply Ukraine and the simultaneous rise of a traumatized by the Holocaust. Contrary to milder, more effective brand of nationalism their conduct during the terror of the 1930s, based on the war experience of Ukrainian Weiner noted that Soviet officials publicly soldiers and their families. This nationalism bragged of massacres and mass executions of identified Soviet power not with the Bolshe- Ukrainian nationalists in the 1940s. Such viks or the Communist Party, but with the conduct, he explained, convinced the public Red Army, and was linked to a deep sense of at large that the Soviet regime offered them entitlement based on wartime service. their only possible alternative: a Ukrainian “I would not argue that this brand of nationalism that would exist within the nationalism, which emerged mainly in the boundaries of the Soviet empire. eastern Soviet Ukrainian provinces, was At the same time, western Ukrainian universal,” said Weiner. “It was not. For most nationalists misjudged reality and popular western Ukrainians and for Jews, the wartime opinion in eastern Ukraine on several critical experience was quite a resentful experience points. They imagined a rural community Jews in particular were excluded from the that no longer existed, assumed the peasantry ethos of the war,” he said. Nevertheless, he at large preferred free farming over collectiv- maintained this nationalism was the only ized agriculture, and believed the war to be an type possible at the time, allowing for the alien experience for most of the population. expression of mild Ukrainian nationalist Yet, said Weiner, the masses in the countryside sentiment and national pride within the saw matters quite differently. Despite the framework of the Soviet regime. ethnic homogeneity of many eastern Ukrai- Several factors, said Weiner, appeared to nian villages, he argued many peasants did argue for the victory of nationalist forces in not view themselves as “Ukrainians,” but as Ukraine during the critical year of 1944, the peasants. Far from associating the trauma of year in which the Red Army liberated eastern collectivization and famine with Moscow and 82 Russia in general, as did western Ukrainians, tion today, said Cynthia Buckley at a Kennan Weiner held that many peasants in the eastern Institute lecture on 5 December 1994. provinces considered association with Russia Buckley is Assistant Professor of Sociology at and Moscow to be a sign of worldliness. A the University of Texas at Austin. One-third villager who married a Muscovite, he ex- of the total population of the Russian Federa- plained, was not just a muzhik, but had made tion is already above the current retirement an alliance of which he was proud. Such ages of 55 for women and 60 for men. Over peasants, he added, firmly rejected attacks the thirty-year period between 1959 and conducted by nationalist forces against the 1989, the number of older citizens in the Russian population and escaped Russian Russian Federation increased dramatically prisoners of war. and the percentage of the Russian population According to Weiner, the Soviet Ukrai- over retirement age has almost doubled. The nian nationalism that emerged in post-war number of citizens over 80 years of age has Ukraine was composed of three basic compo- also grown nearly twofold since 1959, which nents: unification of all Ukrainian lands and places large demands on Russia’s medical people under the auspices of the Red Army; and social infrastructure. acceptance of the Soviet social-economic order, The elderly, who now occupy a large i.e., collectivized agriculture; and upward portion of the voting population, have the mobility of Ukrainian cadres inside and outside potential to mobilize into an influential the Communist Party after the war. political force if they can be unified by shared The most important of these compo- concerns about health care, pension provi- nents was the latter: the rise of a new Ukrai- sion, and poor-quality infrastructure, con- nian elite formed by the mass of demobilized tended Buckley. Yet older citizens are quite Red Army soldiers and their families. “This diverse in gender, ethnicity, and physical new, so-called constituency brought their mobility, and the concerns of the elderly rural images of the war to the village, making for a population markedly differ from those of the watershed in their world view,” asserted the elderly urban population. speaker. This world view was characterized According to Buckley, the percentage of by patriotic pride in the rodina (Motherland) elderly in the population is much greater in resulting from service in the Red Army, a rural than in urban areas; the highest such sense of entitlement based on this service, concentration is in the central agrarian part of and a deep antagonism towards those such European Russia. Large-scale out-migration as collective farm chairmen who did not of youth from the countryside has played a share the same wartime ordeal. critical role in the proportionate rise of the Curiously, said Weiner, at a time when post-retirement population in rural areas, all expressions of Ukrainian pride and significantly altering the age structure of tradition were being erased in the republic, these areas and changing support networks the Communist Party in Ukraine became for the elderly. This trend has particularly dominated by Ukrainian war veterans who affected rural areas in European Russia and quickly pushed out Soviet Russian Siberia. Reasons for migration from the apparatchiki returning from evacuation in countryside to urban areas, such as low- Central Asia. This “Ukrainianization” of the quality health care, lack of transportation, Communist Party in the republic endured and inferior social services, continue to until the collapse of the USSR, said Weiner, characterize rural Russia as a whole. and was accompanied by a widespread The underdeveloped nature of rural propaganda campaign that linked images of social and economic infrastructure place the a free and united Ukraine with the Red rural elderly in a relatively disadvantaged Army. Conspicuously absent from this position vis-à-vis the urban elderly. There are campaign, he noted, were images of Stalin or fewer active members of the economy for the the Communist Party. elderly to rely upon, just as there are fewer —by Peggy McInerny children residing with or near their parents, making them more reliant upon the state for Vol. XII No. 7 1994 financial and social support. In the western Russia’s Elderly Population Growing Siberian village where she has conducted Rapidly extensive field work, for example, Buckley The elderly are the largest growing said as many as 80% of the elderly residents demographic element in the Russian popula- do not have children living in the same town. 83 In Russia, said the speaker, poor changed. Rural elderly today manage to infrastructure and aged populations are support themselves and sometimes sell extra closely linked: the worse the conditions in a goods to urban areas; in 1990, the older rural given area, the higher the number of elderly population received 44% of their income from who reside in that area. For example, kilome- subsistence farming. Their sale of farm ters of road per resident in a given region are products to the cities is helping to create a indirectly proportional to the percentage of class of middlemen in Russia, as older farmers elderly in the population, she noted. The prefer to hire individuals to sell their goods in number of hospital beds and doctors are also, urban areas. in general, indirectly proportional to the It is a challenge for the Russian govern- percentage of the elderly in a region’s popula- ment to provide social services to its older tion. Given the low standard of living in rural citizens as they differ with respect to geo- areas, the migration of younger rural residents graphic distribution, actual pensions, and the to urban areas is substantial, remarked quality of socio-economic infrastructure Buckley. The combination of poor infrastruc- available to them. Considering the potential ture and dwindling numbers of young voting power of the elderly, Buckley claimed members of society leaves elderly residents the Russian state needed to take their feeling marginalized and looking to the interests into account. She pointed out, for government to meet its needs, she concluded. example, that areas with a high percentage of As a result of an increase in longevity elderly voters are roughly those areas which and a decrease in birth rates in urban areas, voted conservatively in the December 1993 urban populations have aged differently elections. The conservative trend among from rural populations. Urban and rural elderly voters, she implied, can largely be elderly have also experienced different traced to their concern over pensions and, pension histories, causing them to rely on quite literally, survival. In conclusion, she different sources for support. Traditionally, asserted that key interests of both rural and said Buckley, urban elderly have been urban elderly especially health care and supported by official monetary transfers from pensions could politically unite the older the central government, while rural elderly population of Russia. have taken care of each other with the help of —by Julia Smith in-kind transfers from collective farms. The legacy of the Soviet pension system, which Vol. XII No. 8 1994 initially excluded and then provided only Severe Crisis of State Power in Russia partial coverage for collective farmers, has The crisis of state power in present-day contributed to a situation in which rural Russia is more acute and more dangerous elderly are markedly reliant on primary than the political, economic, financial, social, agricultural production. In the 1920s, pen- or spiritual crises confronting the country, sions were provided only to workers; in 1956, said Akhmed Iskenderov at a Kennan an overall pension system was initiated, but Institute lecture on 8 December 1994. “The collective farmers remained excluded, based main trend in the Russian political situation on the reasoning that rural pensioners had today is that the negative, or destructive, larger families to depend on and access to functions of Russian statehood predominate private plots enabling them to survive on over its positive, or constructive, functions,” agricultural production. The pension system continued the speaker. Iskenderov is editor- was amended to include collective farmers in in-chief of Voprosy istorii, a journal published 1974, but they were compensated at only 70– by the Russian Academy of Sciences in 80% of workers’ pensions. Moscow, and chairman of the world history The Russian Federation legislature voted department of the Russian University of in favor of a uniform pension system in 1992. People’s Friendship. Observing that demo- Although a uniform pension system seemed cratic forces in Russia initially sought to to be a good policy move promoting equality, destroy the Communist Party apparatus and Buckley claimed that identical pensions for all the Soviet state to prepare the way for radical would not compensate for the advantages reforms, Iskenderov argued that this destruc- urban elderly enjoy with respect to economic tion has now acquired its own momentum. and social infrastructure. Thus, collective “Its impact on the new structures of power is farms continue to make in-kind transfers to negative, [as] it does not allow them freedom older rural residents even though the law has of action and maneuver,” he noted. In reality, 84 he concluded, there is no government in cease to serve their interests, he insisted. Russia today, nor is there any social basis for “Russia,” he reflected, “is facing a war of governmental power. criminal structures with the state rather than According to the speaker, Russian a civil war, and the state is suffering one democratic forces made a crucial mistake by defeat after another.” Organized criminal staking their strategy on personalities rather organizations are now so preponderant, he than on the creation of a functioning mecha- continued, that no one knows how to use the nism of governance, a mistake he traced to power of the state against them. In fact, he the Russian tradition of confining political asserted, the Russian state is actually moving decision making to a narrow circle of indi- in the direction of criminal elements so as to viduals. In fact, “this tradition is still alive use their substantial wealth to create a new and is capable of surviving for a long time to economy. Given these realities, Iskenderov come,” he declared. Iskenderov further argued that it was imperative to create and faulted the democrats for refusing to publicly test a working mechanism of political admit their mistakes and commit themselves decision making before the next presidential to improving the situation in the country. and legislative elections. The future of Should the economic situation of the majority economic reform and democratic develop- of the Russian population not dramatically ment in Russia, he emphasized, depends on improve, he predicted the democrats would the creation of a mechanism of governance be soundly defeated in the next national and genuine obedience to the law. legislative elections. The consequences of a “When I look at the period between victory by Russian communist parties would, February and October 1917,” he remarked, “I he warned, be adverse for the nation as well discern certain features present today as well: as the world. the political stage was taken by individuals Interpretations of contemporary rather than political parties, classes, or social conditions in Russia vary widely, said the groups. These people passed off their speaker, but all political forces in the country decisions and statements as the will of the seem to agree on the basic phenomena nation, the bulk of which was not even aware apparent in Russia today: increased social of [their actions].” In contrast to the turn of stratification, unprecedented corruption of all the century, business groups have managed structures of state power, a level of crime that to elect a small number of representatives to threatens the security of the state and the the State Duma, an accomplishment the lives of everyday citizens, and a duality of Russian capitalist class did not achieve under power between the newly created presiden- the Provisional Government. Nevertheless, tial system and old Soviet state structures. Iskenderov asserted that the Russian business The Russian government and its supporters class today remains unorganized and lacks blame these problems on the legacy of the political protection. Soviet system and those who are opposing Despite the sharp contradiction between the government. The speaker also noted, the center and the periphery resulting from however, that certain observers believe the proclamations of independence by national present crisis has been created by the people republics and some Russian regions (including now in power, who have encouraged crime the Far East, Siberia, and Sverdlovsk oblast’), the as one of their bases of support. Comparing speaker claimed the state had no tools with the situation in Russia to that of newly which to remedy its current lack of authority. liberated third world countries after World “What shall the government do, send troops War II, Iskenderov noted that leaders of these there? Kill them? As in Chech’nia?” he asked. decolonozing nations initially tended to Speaking prior to the full-scale military assault blame the colonial past for miscalculations against the Chechen capital of Grozny, and failures instead of their own superficial, Iskenderov claimed Chech’nia offered proof and sometimes incompetent, policies. that the Russian state at present possessed no Iskenderov judged the growing power mechanisms for resolving problems of gover- of organized crime and criminal structures, nance. Use of troops to pursue such resolutions, which he claimed were wealthy enough to he insisted, was far from the best method buy the state, the most dangerous trend in available. contemporary Russia. Such criminal groups Ruefully observing that only Vladimir seek to achieve political power for economic Zhirinovsky (leader of the Liberal Demo- ends and will overthrow the state should it cratic Party), the communists, and the 85 agrarians in Russia appear to have a genuine army, Russian businessmen and financiers, political understanding of what they want, and specialists in the military-industrial Iskenderov said he saw no individuals nor complex who seek a non-democratic market in any parties yet capable of or even wanting to which they can maximize arms profits in the rule the country. Although certain elements absence of competition. Both speakers of an authoritarian state are in place in Russia believed such a regime would lead Russia into today, the speaker doubted the ability of the an economic dead end. government to impose an authoritarian Vladimir Boxer argued that Russia had regime on the nation because it lacks an exhausted the possibilities for progress by adequate mechanism for doing so. alternating between periods of economic and —by Peggy McInerny political reform. Although Russia has made genuine progress since 1985 in creating Vol. XII No. 9 1995 democratic institutions of a certain kind and Power Lies in the Streets in Russia moving away from the Soviet economic Russia’s next political order could be an system, Boxer said reform had failed to create authoritarian regime led by an army general the class of private property owners and that will pursue a nationalist, anti-western independent wage laborers required for agenda and a “third” economic path that stable democracy. Nevertheless, he consid- relies on a protected market economy in the ered the course of events in Russia over the absence of democracy, said Vladimir Boxer past decade inevitable. Just as Gorbachev and Leonid Gozman at a Kennan Institute could not have achieved minimal economic lecture on 24 January 1995. Whether such a reforms without having instituted political regime results from a coup d’état based on an reforms that spiralled into an anti-communist agreement between powerful political groups revolution, Boxer held that Egor Gaidar’s or is the product of presidential elections, it economic policies could not have created an will enjoy considerable popular support and interest in economic reform on the part of key will rely on a social base comprised of political forces in the country without destroy- engineers and technical specialists of the ing the Russian state’s ability to govern the military-industrial complex. Boxer is the economy. While privatization and the state’s director of political management for the loss of control over the economy occurred Organizing Committee of the Democratic simultaneously, said Boxer, market economic Choice Party of Russia (Demokraticheskii vybor reform reached a point of no return, which he Rossii); Gozman is a member of the Federal identified as the appointment of Viktor Executive Committee of the same party, an Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister. associate professor of social psychology at Given incomplete economic reform and Moscow State University, and a former political instability in Russia, Boxer claimed Woodrow Wilson Center Guest Scholar and three scenarios were possible in the near Kennan Institute Short-term Scholar. future: a peculiar kind of authoritarian state “Power now lies in the streets. So why akin to Bonapartist France, a fascist regime, hasn’t someone taken it yesterday or the day or an unstable democracy punctuated by before?” asked Gozman, referring to the brief periods of authoritarianism. According current power struggle among influential to Boxer, the fundamental political groupings political groups in Moscow. Only a lack of influencing the Russian political process ideas about how to resolve the country’s today are the “party of power” of Yeltsin’s economic problems has prevented a coup, he immediate entourage, which has no genuine answered. Although the speakers agreed that social base and contains several groupings a nationalist authoritarian military leader was fighting among themselves; the “party of the a distinct possibility in the near future, they Security Council,” comprised of military- disagreed slightly concerning the nature of the industrial and security ministry representa- regime he would head. Gozman predicted tives who are supported by powerful finan- such a regime would be aggressively anti- cial groups, but lack their own financial western and might resort to outright aggres- means; the “party” of Prime Minister sion when it proved unable to promote Chernomyrdin, representing several influen- economic development. Boxer claimed such a tial financial–industrial groups; the “Moscow regime would not seek to re-establish commu- party of power” of mayor Iurii Luzhkov nism or a command economy; rather, it would which, in addition to controlling powerful unite the interests of certain elements in the financial groups, commands a large segment 86 of the national economy and the majority of Center for Political Studies in Moscow and the “independent” mass media in Russia; currently a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson regional bureaucrats, who have yet to choose Center. Reform in Russia has created a gap among the preceding groups; and engineers between society and political institutions, and technical specialists of the military- leaving the country without a viable state industrial complex who have lost status and structure and President Boris Yeltsin with a are being pushed by economic and social decreasing base of social support. These conditions to revitalize arms production under realities influenced Yeltsin’s decision to the rubric of nationalist–patriotic ideology. invade Chechn’ia, said the speaker, who Turning to the war in Chechn’ia, predicted a non-liberal, non-democratic Leonid Gozman claimed the target of the government in the near future. war had not been the Chechen republic, but Shevtsova argued that the experience of Russian democracy. He deemed the war one reform has caused societies in the former of the most terrible events of modern Russian Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to become history, but argued that despite its brutal disenchanted with liberal ideas, making them nature, the war had produced two positive more accepting of nationalist and populist results. First, the Russian regime had been ideologies today. Reform in these countries unable to generate support for the war and was orchestrated from above, based solely on use it as a pretext for instituting a dictator- ideology, not on interests or social forces. ship proof that genuine changes have taken Agreeing with economist Grigorii Yavlinskii, root in Russian society over the last several the speaker asserted that social, political, and years. Second, the Russian media rejected the ideological conditions for market develop- war, leaving President Boris Yeltsin without ment in Russia are very weak at present. the support of a single serious newspaper. Shevtsova claimed that Russia had experi- The government, said Gozman, tried to enced difficulties in its post-communist justify the war with successive claims that it transformation because it faced four simulta- sought to preserve the integrity of the neous challenges: state building, political Russian Federation, defend Russians living in democratization, economic marketization, Chechn’ia, and vanquish the bandit Chechen and the creation of a new multinational state (thereby appealing to racist sentiment identity. (The countries of Eastern Europe, by against Chechens). Yet, Gozman pointed out contrast, generally faced only the imperatives that public opinion polls showed two-thirds of democratization and marketization.) Not of the Russian population did not support the only are state building and political democra- war. He also claimed that Russian prejudice tization particularly difficult processes to against Chechens, although still considerable, undergo simultaneously, she explained, had lessened as a result of the war. Russia must implement market liberalization Gozman and Boxer agreed that the and create a new multinational state at the upcoming parliamentary elections in 1995 and same time. Finally, Shevtsova specified that presidential elections in 1996 were important Russia had begun its transformation under for reasons of stability and the future of several constraints, including an imperial democracy in Russia. Both speakers said the state, a highly militarized economy, and an elections would be dominated by a “party of opposition movement which had emerged protest” and asserted this reality created room from within the Communist Party rather for democratic candidates. Noted Gozman, than, as in Eastern Europe, outside the Party. “Our problem is that our opponents promise Yeltsin was described by Shevtsova as a miracles vote for me and tomorrow every- cautious, clever leader who made a place for thing will be okay. We cannot say that.” the communist nomenklatura in the new —by Peggy McInerny regime, not a destroyer of communism. Yeltsin, she said, is a member of the provin- Vol. XII No. 10 1995 cial nomenklatura that brought about the fall Post-Communist Transition Yields Social of the Soviet system and subsequently Fragmentation assumed power in Moscow. Although they The post-communist transition in have succeeded elevating their political Russia has created an alienated, frustrated status, said Shevtsova, members of this society devoid of ideology, said Lilia subset of the old Soviet nomenklatura lack Shevtsova at a Kennan Institute lecture on 30 competence and professionalism. The current January 1995. Shevtsova is Director of the ruling elite, she added, has no respect for the 87 constitution, nor any desire to compromise disorganized society in which there is no their power. possibility for social action. Although she Yeltsin acted to preserve his power said other options were possible, Shevtsova when he dissolved the parliament in 1993 excluded the possibility of a liberal demo- and subsequently dismissed most liberals cratic government in the short term and and democrats from his government. When predicted that Yeltsin would not hold relative calm prevailed on the Russian presidential elections in 1996 if he had no political scene in 1994, Yeltsin proclaimed chance of winning. If elections do take place that Russia had entered a period of stabiliza- under the current regime, she insisted they tion. According to Shevtsova, however, it was would be organized in such a way as to ensure a peculiar stabilization based on the failure of that the Yeltsin team remained in power. the previous political course and the fear of Although a coup d’etat could occur, new bloodshed, i.e., on elements of political Shevtsova noted that a coup required and economic crisis. In fall 1994, when Yeltsin cooperation among the Russian regions, the returned from a visit to the United States, the army, influential cartels, and society. As no regions and the military were restless, said such cooperation exists, she argued that a Shevtsova, poised for a new struggle for coup would probably produce a non- power. At that time, Yeltsin saw the need to traditional regime either oligarchic rule show the Russian people that he was “alive, consisting of a weak president, a strong sober, and in control.” Chechn’ia served as an government, and a strong prime minister, or ideal pretext for doing so, providing him a an authoritarian regime led by a charismatic way both to consolidate a national, patriotic leader with a military background. Whatever base in Russia and to pacify regional elites. the regime, Shevtsova claimed that in the Today, Russian leaders are repeating in short term Russia would continue to have Chechn’ia what Soviet leaders did in Vil’nius many ties with the west and predicted that a in 1991: using the military to regain control in two-track policy would be pursued: an anti- a non-Russian republic. Given that military western, nationalist domestic policy and a intervention in Vil’nius was the beginning of foreign policy pragmatic in its approach the end of Gorbachev’s career, Shevtsova towards western nations. surmised that the Chechen war could be the —by Julia Smith beginning of the end of Yeltsin’s career. The speaker evaluated the overall consequences Vol. XII No. 11 1995 of the Chechen invasion negatively. Increased Political, Not Ethnic, Identity will Unite inflation and the high financial cost of the Ukraine war have strained an already weak economy. “Ukrainian society today is dispersed, Political life and economic reforms, more- atomized, and unstructured,” said Mykola over, are now taking place within a strange Riabchouk at a Kennan Institute lecture on 9 hybrid of official and unofficial structures, March 1995. Riabchouk is Deputy Editor-in- she continued. There exists an official Chief of Vsesvit, an international political and economy and a shadow economy, official cultural affairs journal published in Kiev, and politics and shadow politics, she said. a Fulbright Scholar at Pennsylvania State Shevtsova then pointed to corporatist groups University. According to the speaker, Ukrai- like the commodity group under nian society lacks a unifying social structure Chernomyrdin’s leadership, the agrarian or political ideas that can integrate the complex, the military-industrial group, interests of different cultural, national, and financial capital, and regional groups that are linguistic groups and allow them to commu- now competing with each other for power. nicate within the same cultural framework. The invasion of Chechn’ia has also Like other post-Soviet republics, demonstrated the continuous fragmentation Ukraine faces the simultaneous challenges of of society and the polarization of politics in decolonization and decommunization. Yet, Russia. While a fragmented society hinders said the speaker, Ukraine is an exceptional the development and consolidation of case because it is composed of two groups of political groups with no strong alternative the same nation who have achieved strik- leader, it makes it possible for Yeltsin to stay ingly different stages of national develop- in power for up to two more years, predicted ment. As part of the Austro-Hungarian Shevtsova. Yeltsin, she specified, can only empire, he argued that western Ukraine survive on the basis of such a fragmented, underwent a process of nation building and 88 succeeded in creating most of the structures perestroika era, when the Ukrainian national of a civil society. By contrast, oppressive movement Rukh elaborated a more demo- conditions of the Russian empire and cratic ideological platform in order to attract unequal economic and political development the support of the eastern Ukrainian popula- under the Soviet regime prevented eastern tion. Democratic nationalists then supported Ukraine from experiencing these processes to the adoption of liberal laws on citizenship the same degree. Riabchouk concluded that and minorities during Kravchuk’s presidency. western Ukraine was thus more modern in Yet a deep-rooted bias in eastern Ukrainian the political and national senses, while society against all things Ukrainian endured eastern Ukraine was more pre-modern. until Leonid Kuchma became president, said The speaker referred to Orest Subtelny’s the speaker. Despite fears that a Kuchma argument that modernization in Ukraine, presidency would split the country between which occurred largely under foreign east and west, if not lead to the absorption of domination, had contributed to an enduring Ukraine by Russia, Riabchouk argued that bipolarity in which Ukrainians (and their Kuchma and his team exhibited Ukrainian language) are associated with the backward political consciousness. village and non-Ukrainians with moderniz- The assumption of power by a non- ing sectors of society. The legacy of the Soviet nationalist elite from the east has disproven regime, which prohibited the use of Ukrai- the idea of Ukraine being permanently nian in official affairs, now makes many divided into, in Riabchouk’s words, “a pro- Ukrainians hesitant to use their own lan- Soviet, pro-Russian, pro-communist east and guage. Although most ethnic Ukrainians an anti-communist, anti-Soviet, ’nationalistic’ know and speak the language in private life, west.” Rather, he argued that Ukrainian explained the speaker, they are accustomed nationalism had become more democratic in to using Russian in public life. Finally, large the west and pragmatic politicians had parts of Ukrainian social life still exist outside challenged the supremacy of the communist, of the Ukrainian language, especially in the pro-Soviet elite in the east. “None of these country’s eastern regions, where Riabchouk forces can integrate Ukrainian society alone, asserted that Ukrainian-speaking citizens but they probably can do it together,” he were a despised minority in the cities and a said. A political coalition of democratic despised majority in the countryside. Ukrainian nationalists and pragmatic The weakness of television program- Russian liberals is essential, he insisted, in ming and publishing also works against the order to minimize inter-ethnic and inter- use of Ukrainian today. The cost of publish- regional conflict in the country and allow for ing has skyrocketed in recent years, sharply post-colonial policies of compromise. reducing the number of books printed in The principal discrepancy between Ukrainian and making them more expensive democratic Ukrainian nationalists and than Russian books imported from Russia. Russian pragmatic liberals, said Riabchouk, Ukrainian television consists of only a few, is their perception of Russia’s colonial legacy poorly equipped regional television stations in Ukraine that is, whether they view the with inadequately trained staffs. Program- colonial legacy as an historical injustice to be ming in Ukrainian is limited to two to three redressed or a reality to be accommodated. hours per day, with most air-time dominated (Although Ukraine’s population is nominally by Russian-language Ostankino television. 76 percent ethnic Ukrainian, 21 percent The varied elements of contemporary Russian, and 3 percent other minorities, the Ukrainian society Ukrainian- and Russian- speaker said these figures only made sense in speaking populations and regions, more and western Ukraine.) Not only do Russians less educated segments of society is not living in Ukraine fear that a Ukrainian evidence of plurality, but of disunity and national revival will result in extreme discontinuity, said Riabchouk. He asserted nationalism, Russians trace their origins to that only a Ukrainian political identity, not a Kievan Rus’ and do not see themselves as linguistic or cultural identity, could success- colonizers in Ukraine. Moreover, Russians fully integrate the Ukrainian nation. A shift have been the ruling elite in many Ukrainian from an ethnic-linguistic to a civic idea of the cities for decades sometimes centuries and Ukrainian nation is, in fact, already under- consider Ukrainian language and cultural way, he said. Movement towards a civic policies in places like Kiev, Kharkiv, and national identity began during the late Odessa to be undemocratic, given that 89 Russian has long been the predominant relationship made it necessary for Kim Il language in these cities. Sung to gain permission from Stalin before Despite the differences that divide orchestrating a military campaign against Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine, South Korea, which he first requested in Riabchouk believed the Russian population March 1949. According to Weathersby, would eventually integrate into Ukrainian archival documents show that Stalin refused political and intellectual life for four reasons: to support such an endeavor, in part because the strength of local patriotism of Russians American troops remained in South Korea living in Ukraine; the insignificant linguistic and China was still engaged in a civil war. barrier between the two groups; the tolerant Rather, Stalin ruled that military action could attitude toward minorities of Ukrainian be undertaken only in the form of a counter- democratic nationalists; and the shift of the attack against a South Korean advance. Kim present-day political center of the country persisted and again raised the issue of from Moscow to Kiev. military action against South Korea on 12 —by Peggy McInerny August and 3 September 1949. By the middle of September 1949, Stalin was more willing to Vol. XII No. 12 1995 consider the idea of a military campaign in Stalin Rejected, then Supported Korean War Korea, given that U.S. troops had withdrawn North Korean leader Kim Il Sung from South Korea. wanted to reunite Korea by military means as A telegram dated 11 September 1949 early as March 1949, said Kathryn from First Deputy USSR Minister of Foreign Weathersby at a Kennan Institute lecture on Affairs Andrei Gromyko to the chargé 13 March 1995. Weathersby, Assistant d’affaires of the Soviet embassy in Professor of History at Florida State Univer- Pyongyang requested detailed information to sity and currently a Research Scholar at the help the Soviet leadership make an accurate Kennan Institute, has reviewed a series of decision about a military offensive. Questions documents concerning the Korean War from regarding the strength of the South Korean the Russian Presidential Archive and the and North Korean armies, the reaction of the Archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry. The population to an attack (i.e., would the documents were presented by Russian southern population aid the North Korean President Boris Yeltsin to South Korea in June army in its advance?), and the possibility of 1994. According to Weathersby, Kim Il Sung the involvement of American troops were was in favor of military action and was addressed to Kim Il Sung. persistent in his request for assistance from According to Weathersby, Kim’s the Soviet Union, knowing that a massive response was unconvincing and the Soviet military advance was impossible without the embassy pointed out that the weak North help of the USSR. Stalin rejected Kim’s Korean army would only be able to launch a requests repeatedly before changing his mind partial assault, creating the risk of a long, and agreeing to support a military campaign. drawn-out civil war. On 24 September 1949, Primarily telegrams covering the period noted Weathersby, the Soviet Politburo from 1949 to 1953, the documents given to ordered Shtykov to respond to Kim’s request; South Korea provide information about high- the North Korean government was advised level decision-making regarding Soviet to support a partisan movement instead of involvement in the Korean War. The collec- launching a direct military attack against tion is somewhat incomplete, however, in South Korea. It seemed that Stalin had again that it represents only a portion of the top- denied Kim’s request for assistance. level documents from that time. Weathersby By January 1950, the civil war in China focused on materials from the period 1949–50 had ended, freeing North Korean troops consisting of correspondence between Kim Il fighting there. At that time, Kim Il Sung Sung, Soviet Ambassador to Korea T. F. again approached Stalin for assistance. In a Shtykov, and Mao Zedong regarding the telegram to Ambassador Shtykov, dated 30 Soviet decision to coordinate a military January 1950, Stalin relayed his response to operation with North Korea. Kim: an offer of military assistance with the The Democratic People’s Republic of attack on South Korea in return for a yearly Korea, also known as North Korea, was supply of 25,000 tons of lead. Plans for a already highly economically dependent on military attack on 25 June 1950 were made the Soviet Union before the Korean War. The under the assumption that the United States 90 would not intervene, especially if military peasant-state war in Ukraine and that of later action was massive and rapidly successful. years. Soviet archival documents from the According to Graziosi, several impor- period 1949–50 show Stalin’s decision- tant circumstances colored events in Ukraine. making style as rudimentary but rational, The very composition of its population, he revealing a careful consideration of gains and said, where the countryside was predomi- losses, said Weathersby. Ironically, she said nantly inhabited by Ukrainian peasants and that Stalin’s decision to reduce the likelihood the cities by non-Ukrainians who controlled of American intervention by increasing the the modern trades, provided grounds for a scale of the assault led precisely to the spontaneous national socialist movement. consequence he hoped to avoid. Because the Those Bolsheviks who were active in Ukraine North Korean attack looked like the kind of were concentrated in these “colonial” cities Soviet offensive the American government so and were generally not Ukrainian, but feared would happen in Western Europe, the Russians, Jews, or Russified Ukrainians. Truman administration decided to intervene Located primarily in Kiev and Donbass, these to protect South Korea. In Weathersby’s Bolsheviks shared deeply anti-Ukrainian and opinion, had Stalin known that the United anti-peasant sentiments. At the same time, States would intervene, he would not have Ukrainian peasant society was booming in supported the war. the countryside in the years prior to the An examination of the recently released revolution growing in numbers, income, and archival materials reveal Kim’s clear depen- productivity. And, as they accumulated dence on the Soviet Union, yet his persistence wealth and acquired land, Graziosi observed seems to have influenced Stalin’s decision that Ukrainian peasants remained firmly regarding involvement in the war. While focused on the idea that land ownership was these documents do not reveal directly why the sole solution to their problems. Stalin changed his mind, Weathersby specu- These circumstances go far toward lated that a combination of factors probably explaining the curious phenomenon by swayed his decision: the withdrawal of U.S. which Ukrainian peasants, in their quest for troops from South Korea, the conclusion of land, brought a strongly anti-peasant and the Chinese civil war, and Stalin’s delicate anti-Ukrainian Bolshevik government to relations with Mao Zedong. Large gaps in the power in Ukraine. Graziosi pointed out that documents, especially for the period between two Bolshevik governments were established April and June 1950, however, make these in Kiev in the chaotic first years after the only initial conclusions. October 1917 revolution: one by Russian —by Julia Smith troops in early 1918 and one by a national liberation Ukrainian peasant movement in Vol. XII No. 13 1995 late 1918. After the fall of the nationalist War in Ukraine, 1918–1921, only a Prelude Rada, the first Bolshevik government lasted The war that broke out in the early only three weeks before German troops months of 1919 between the Bolshevik govern- invaded Ukraine in late February and early ment of Ukraine and the spontaneous, peasant March 1918. When the Bolsheviks began to national liberation movement that brought it to resist the Germans, said Graziosi, Ukrainian power is crucial to understanding subsequent peasants perceived first, that the Bolsheviks Soviet history, said Andrea Graziosi at a were defending their land, and second, Kennan Institute lecture on 24 March 1995. unlike the Rada, that the Bolsheviks were Graziosi is a Researcher at the Department of promising them land. History and Theory of Public Economy at the The partisan peasant resistance move- University of Naples and a former Research ment that arose in May 1918 thus explicitly Scholar at the Kennan Institute. Not only are supported the Bolsheviks and the soviets, the years 1918 and 1919 in Ukraine critical to with all sides involved in the fighting understanding the development of Stalinism, (including the Germans, the peasants said Graziosi, they chronicle the first instance of themselves, and even Lenin) identifying a widespread twentieth-century phenomenon: peasant resistors as “Bolsheviks.” Although the spontaneous peasant liberation movement fragmented ideologically along peasant, with a strong social content led by communists. nationalist, anarchist, and Socialist Revolu- Finally, argued Graziosi, a striking continuity tionary lines to name but a few, Graziosi exists in Soviet history between the 1919 claimed the liberation movement was more 91 or less united by a program that advocated the Soviet regime. Bolsheviks in Ukraine, for free trade (i.e., the right of peasants to sell example, committed such atrocities as shoot- their own produce and not submit to requisi- ing all adult males in certain peasant villages tions) and all land to the peasantry. or killing 100 peasants in return for every After the Germans were defeated in communist killed; peasants responded with fall 1918 and the Ukrainian nationalist leader such atrocities as making communist detach- Petlyura failed to implement the peasants’ ments into statues of ice by soaking them with program, they swung their support behind water. Pogroms were widespread, initiated the Bolsheviks. The second Bolshevik popularly as well as by Whites and Ukrai- government in Ukraine was then formed in nian nationalists. Without understanding the late 1918. Yet by March 1919, a vicious war extreme violence of this early war against the had broken out between the government and peasantry in Ukraine, concluded Graziosi, its peasant supporters due to the Bolsheviks’ one cannot understand Stalinism, just as one attempts to requisition grain and collectivize cannot understand the higher Stalinism of the farmland. Unlike Russia, noted Graziosi, 1930s without understanding the violence of where the Bolshevik government did not the second round of this war in the country- fight for actual farmland until 1929–30, side in 1929–33. Bolsheviks in Ukraine in 1919 fought for both —by Peggy McInerny grain and actual control of the land. Fighting continued until the famine of 1920–21, Vol. XII No. 14 1995 ending only with the institution of the New Anti-Democratic Forces Consolidate Economic Policy in summer 1922. in Russia Graziosi claimed that the Bolshevik- “[The war in] Chechnia reflects a peasant war in Ukraine represented an even consolidation of anti-democratic forces in more extreme form of the paradox of the Russia that goes back to 1992, when the October 1917 revolution. That paradox—in military was able to get its way on issues of which a popular, anti-state, and anti-authori- national security policy by insubordination, tarian revolution based in the countryside specifically with regard to Japan,” asserted clashed with the country’s most extreme Stephen Blank at a Kennan Institute lecture statist political group—ended very quickly in on 27 March 1995. Blank is an Associate Russia proper, he said. In spring 1918, the Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of Soviet government in Russia began to fight the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, against the peasantry and the population at Pennsylvania. He specified that his remarks large as well as against the White opposition. represented his personal views and did not In Ukraine, however, resolution of this reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Defense paradox was complicated by the national Department, or the U.S. government. Far character of the peasant liberation movement from ending Russian democracy, Blank brought to life by the German invasion. The argued that the war in the Chechen Republic war that followed between the Bolsheviks was the culmination of an authoritarian trend and the peasants, argued Graziosi, was that began early in Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. simply the first phase of what he termed the “Democracy, I would argue, never “Great Soviet Peasant War of 1918–33:” a war really came to Russia,” said Blank. “What in two acts separated by the intermission of you had was liberalization and democratiza- the NEP. A primitive war between a super- tion of the broken-down Soviet system, but state and a strong peasant society, it would you did not end up with a new democratic last approximately fifteen years and result in order.” According to the speaker, democrati- the deaths of between thirteen and fifteen zation in Russia gave rise to numerous million people. domestic interest groups that imposed a Noting that World War I began a process check on the ability of the state to move from of brutalization and barbarization in both a Soviet to a more democratic structure. The Europe and Russia, Graziosi observed that the failure of the Yeltsin government to reform war never ended in the Russian empire, but the police and create a coherent state system extended to society in its entirety. In his view, in Russia as it destroyed the Soviet economic the extreme level of brutal violence employed order has, he asserted, resulted in a plethora by all sides in the guerilla war against the of state organizations held together by one Germans and the subsequent peasant-state man’s will and an authoritarian pattern of war in Ukraine greatly affected the nature of personalized relationships. 92 The Chechen war strengthened Yeltsin’s In Blank’s opinion, the most disturbing position by removing any kind of restraint on implication of the presidential report is its the Russian government. At the same time, assumption that Russia can only survive as a argued Blank, in removing all restraints, state if it survives as an empire. Although he Yeltsin destroyed the supports that normally conceded that Russia had legitimate interests in sustain a state. An essential mismatch thus the CIS, Blank argued that Russia could act as exists between the nature of the Russian state the gendarme of Eurasia only by risking the today and that of Russian society, which has destruction of the Russian state. The problem is progressed institutionally beyond the state. not so much that Russia has valid interests in This disequilibrium, said Blank, is mirrored the CIS, said Blank, but that the way in which by the mismatch between the present Russia pursues these interests is profoundly strategic objectives of the Russian state and destabilizing. “To put it in military terms,” he the resources available to it. Until a balance is remarked, “if Russia becomes involved in any achieved in both situations, he contended the more protracted conflicts, Russia itself risks Russian government would continue to be becoming the center of gravity.” tempted to use force to solve its problems at Objecting to the ad hoc nature of home and abroad. Clinton administration policy in the region, Blank compared the kind of decision- Blank contended that it was imperative for making that permeates Russian politics the United States to develop a coherent today, particularly defense policy decision policy towards the CIS as a whole. “Save for making, with that of the late tsarist system. the Ukraine,” he remarked, “we are not As he held was true for the Chechen war, in pressuring these governments to reform and the late tsarist system one civilian the tsar strengthen themselves so that they become controlled the armed forces, no law governed more able to resist [Russian pressure] and, the deployment of Russian troops, and the therefore, Russia will be less tempted and intelligence agencies essentially comprised a less able to intervene in them.” A coherent rogue element out of control. Given that the U.S. policy, he emphasized, should be based political system in Russia now depends on principles of strategic engagement with completely on one individual, it is inherently both Russia and the other members of the unstable, said Blank. He warned that a CIS. While recognizing Russia’s need for complete breakdown of state order could security, the United States should neverthe- occur should Yeltsin or his successor refuse to less deny Russia the right to unilaterally play the role of the “strong tsar” or vozhd’. police the region, he said, as the police role The speaker drew attention to the will prove inimical to both Russian democ- critical importance of a written report racy and overall Eurasian stability. submitted to the Russian parliament by Blank was particularly critical of foreign President Yeltsin in February 1995. In the policy analysts who, out of distaste for the report, Yeltsin linked the war in Chechnia neo-imperial nature of Russian foreign policy with what Blank termed Russia’s neo- in the former Soviet Union, now advocate a imperial policy vis-à-vis the Commonwealth policy of neo-containment of Russia. Such a of Independent States (CIS). The report, he policy will find no support in the United explained, warns that Russia can expect to States or among its allies, he asserted. More- encounter more crises like that in Chechnia over, he warned that any policy that seeks to due to aggressive nationalism and religious break up the Russian state risks provoking an extremism. These crises will be in Russia international conflagration. Just as the itself, along its borders, and on the territory international system could not deal with the of the former USSR. Not only, said Blank, collapse of the Russian state in 1918, when six does the report justify the use of troops in separate states intervened to try to fashion a Chechnia, it claims that Russian security Russia more amenable to their interests, he interests may require stationing troops in concluded, neither can it accommodate such a other member states of the CIS in order to breakdown today. prevent destabilizing developments. “In —by Peggy McInerny other words,” he concluded, “under the pretense of peacemaking, war abroad and Vol. XII No. 15 1995 war at home are explicitly and implicitly Post-Soviet Russia: An Assessment linked in a blueprint for what can only be a Far from signaling a new and aggres- non-democratic state.” sive imperial foreign policy, Russia’s use of 93 force in Chechnia may dissuade it from using Sakha (formerly Yakutia), have driven hard military force elsewhere, said Jack Matlock bargains with the center by avoiding any at a Kennan Institute lecture on 1 May 1995. mention of sovereignty or secession. A former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, The weakness of Russian political Matlock is Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis structures is a critical problem in contempo- Professor in the Practice of International rary Russian politics, argued Matlock, one Diplomacy at the School of International and ultimately responsible for the military Public Affairs of Columbia University. He is invasion of Chechnia in December 1994. The also a member of the Kennan Institute tragedy of Chechnia, he said, lies not only in Academic Council. Matlock pointed out the the methods used to subdue the republic, but essentially rhetorical nature of recent asser- in Russia’s lack of sufficiently strong adminis- tions by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei trative organs to bring the republic under Kozyrev to the effect that Russia has the right control without the use of force. The speaker to use force to protect Russian citizens traced Russia’s institutional dilemma to the abroad. In fact, he said, the Russian govern- failure of democratic politicians to implement ment appears to have chosen not to use direct meaningful reform of the Soviet bureaucracy military force in dealing with its neighbors, in late 1991 and early 1992, when they briefly as demonstrated by its recent conclusion of possessed overwhelming power. At the time, agreements with Kazakhstan and its careful he said, democrats possessed little regard for handling of the Crimean issue with Ukraine the administrative realities of running a state this spring. and failed to reform the police or the army. Matlock conceded that many Russian The Chechen war has demonstrated the need actions in the “near abroad” in recent years to reform both organizations. Not only has the stationing border guards and troops in war revealed the shocking weakness and poor Tajikistan, interference in Abkhazia, leaving leadership of the army, said the speaker, the the Fourteenth Army in Moldova, even security agencies clearly provided the govern- Kozyrev’s current rhetoric about protecting ment poor intelligence prior to the invasion. Russian citizens with force smacked of Lack of administrative reform has imperial behavior. Nevertheless, he dis- allowed President Yeltsin to impose a new missed the possibility that Russia would bureaucracy over and above the old central reabsorb the territory of the former Soviet Soviet bureaucracy, which continues to Union. “Russia can’t afford an empire again function virtually untouched, said Matlock. and the regions will not go along with it,” he Poor pay, poor morale, and poor manage- asserted. Rather than reestablish its empire, ment of this bureaucratic morass mean that Russia is more likely to fragment as a state if administrative positions have become a it initiates military operations against its license for corruption. With organized crime neighbors. Given the nuclear warheads and increasingly entwined with the bureaucracy chemical weapons located on Russian itself, Matlock argued that crime and corrup- territory, he said, the real threat to interna- tion represented one of the most difficult, and tional security today is the potential disinte- intractable, problems of contemporary gration of Russia, not its imperial restoration. Russian politics. Unless the government On the domestic front, Matlock argued addresses this problem in the near future, that any attempt to reinstitute a unitary state warned the speaker, increasingly serious in Russia, particularly by force, also risked political and economic difficulties may ensue. fragmenting the country. Despite Yeltsin’s Although Matlock was pessimistic broad presidential powers and right to about the Russian government’s ability to appoint regional governors, the speaker control crime and corruption, he did not claimed the weakness of the central state had believe that economic reform in Russia had permitted a de facto federalism to take hold stalled in all respects. Privatization has in Russia over the last few years. “Despite achieved considerable gains, he said, even if talk of a unitary state,” he observed, “the fact in many cases, old managers retain control of is, they don’t have one anymore.” Most former state enterprises. More important, he regions currently ignore Moscow if they insisted, is the fact that privatized enterprises disagree with the policies of the central do not function in a competitive system. One government and do not appear to suffer for does not see privatized enterprises facing the their insubordination, he noted. Several market imperatives of reorganization or republics, moreover, such as Tatarstan and bankruptcy, but the preservation of monopo- 94 lies and the creation of oligopolies. Lack of late perestroika era, with many former attention to the institutions needed to make a intelligence officers now working in commer- market economy work, such as tax policies, cial entities. commercial law, and the enforcement of Sadly, said Waller, it is highly unlikely property right has, in addition, led to enor- that civilian control will be established over mous capital flight. Russian security agencies in the near future. The speaker drew particular attention The speaker referred specifically to the to the Russian government’s mismanagement two successor organizations to the KGB, the of socio-economic policies, which has led to Federal Security Service (FSB, formerly the glaring and potentially explosive income Federal Counterintelligence Committee, or disparities. The great majority of people who FSK) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (the voted for the Communist Party, the Liberal SVR), as well as the Russian presidential Democratic Party, and other rightist parties in security service. The FSB, run by Sergei the December 1993 parliamentary elections Stepashin, is comprised primarily of the came from the lowest income brackets of the internal security units of the former KGB; the Russian population, he noted. This voting SVR, directed by Evgenii Primakov, repre- pattern, he argued, is evidence that a political sents the foreign intelligence component of pathology is rooted in the problem of income the former KGB; the presidential security distribution. service, headed by General Aleksandr Given the difficulty of the problems he Korzhakov, oversees the Russian president’s described, Matlock said it was remarkable personal security, security in the Kremlin, that no groundswell of public opinion was and a growing number of analytical and calling for a return to the communist past. information-gathering departments. All of Parliamentary elections scheduled for these organs, specified the speaker, possess December 1995 will probably take place as separate means of earning foreign currency planned, but the results will be inconclusive, that guarantee their continued existence and he predicted. “Unless democratic leaders independent economic power. learn a great deal about coalition building in These organizations remain uncon- a very short period of time, they will prob- strained by legal or public oversight for ably lose,” he commented, “but I’m not sure several reasons, said Waller. First, over the anyone is going to win.” past several years President Boris Yeltsin has —by Peggy McInerny consistently used the security forces as a power base. Contrary to the expectations of Vol. XII No. 16 1995 many, Yeltsin neither reformed nor eliminated Russian Security Agencies Unreformed, the KGB after the collapse of the USSR, but Unmonitored instead attempted unsuccessfully to merge it “The KGB legacy in Russia has left a with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). marked impact that has helped shape the The Russian president has also refused to reform process and the lack of reform process pressure the successor organizations to the in Russia. This legacy has profound implica- KGB to comply with parliamentary investiga- tions for the west, not only in the traditional tions. In 1992, for example, Yeltsin refused intelligence or counterintelligence sense, but requests from both a Supreme Soviet investi- with respect to our entire effort to promote gative commission and the Procurator of the reform there with large-scale economic and Russian Federation to issue a decree requiring small-scale technical assistance,” said J. the SVR to provide crucial data needed to Michael Waller at a Kennan Institute lecture track down billions of dollars of KGB and on 8 May 1995. Waller is Vice President of the Communist Party finances that had been American Foreign Policy Council in Washing- secreted abroad. Second, continued Waller, ton, D.C. According to Waller, the security laws on security and counterintelligence and intelligence services of the Russian successively adopted by the USSR Supreme Federation remain largely unchanged from Soviet, the Russian Federation Supreme their Soviet incarnations and continue to Soviet, and the present-day Russian Duma identify with the Chekist image of the Soviet have without exception been initiated and secret police first directed by Feliks drafted by these agencies themselves. Third, Dzherzhinsky. These organizations are, the self-professed mandate of Russian security moreover, closely linked to the private sector organs to fight crime and maintain law and that began to emerge in Russia during the order strikes a deep chord with Russian 95 citizens. Waller claimed this mission had first organs had greatly diminished in recent been consciously enunciated by USSR KGB years. Many journalists who once wrote on Chairman Vladimir Kriuchkov when it the subject are now living abroad or, in the became clear that the KGB needed a new and worst cases, dead. Significantly, said the legitimate mission in the waning days of speaker, individuals who actively lobby for perestroika and was subsequently later adopted the institution of civilian control over Russian by his Russian Federation successors. security agencies have virtually no recourse “What we are seeing today,” noted to legal protection. Waller reported that one Waller, “really began in the late 1980s when such activist, former political prisoner Sergei Mikhail Gorbachev opened up the economic Grigoryants, has in the past three years lost and political systems of the former Soviet the building in which his foundation was Union.” The gradual opening of the Soviet housed, been severely beaten in his own economy and Soviet politics under controlled apartment, and lost his son in a hit-and-run circumstances, said the speaker, was accompa- car “accident.” nied by a concerted effort of the leadership of —by Peggy McInerny the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the KGB to take every possible Vol. XII No. 17 1995 advantage of the reforms of perestroika for their Obstacles to Economic Reform in Russia own political and economic benefit, assuring What are the causes of Russia’s difficul- top-echelon leaders of both organizations a ties with post-communist reform? Certain place of power in the system that would follow. metaphysical explanations appeal to national Citing a 1992 report of a Supreme Soviet morale and rely on Russia’s historical investigative commission, Waller maintained background, said Leonid Polishchuk, that the Politburo of the CPSU Central Commit- Research Associate at the Center for Institu- tee adopted several secret resolutions aimed at tional Reform and the Informal Sector at the concealing property and monetary resources in University of Maryland. More mundane commercial structures during the final years of explanations, however, offer truer insights. the Gorbachev regime. “Based on [these Polishchuk spoke at a Kennan Institute resolutions],” said Waller, “in 1991 at all levels lecture on 22 May 1995. First, said the of the Party hierarchy there was a mass funding speaker, undeveloped capital and labor of Party banks, joint enterprises, and joint stock markets problems endemic to all countries in companies.” the early stages of reform are slowing the The operational team that oversaw the transition to a market economy in Russia. design and implementation of this strategy Second, emerging markets do not allow for included the First Chief Directorate of the restructuring in the early stages of reform. KGB, said Waller, whose expertise in interna- Countries like Russia, whose economies are tional affairs, particularly foreign exchange in need of significant restructuring due to transactions, proved invaluable. Following distortions caused by Soviet industrialization the collapse of the USSR, many of the Party and centralization, thus have particular leaders and KGB officers who implemented difficulty implementing reform. this scheme remained. Although many went Both the scale of structural economic their separate ways, all had personally distortions and the complication of political benefited from mechanisms that had allowed tensions in Russia have hindered the them to manage the wealth and hard cur- progress of reform, said the speaker. Coun- rency reserves of the USSR during its last tries that do not need as much economic years of existence. The result, said Waller, is a restructuring, such as Poland, Hungary, and network of like-minded people with common the Czech Republic, have had more success, roots in the Communist Party and KGB he noted. For example, private, market- organs who command wealth and power in driven agricultural sectors have always been Russia today. Such people and the commer- present in Poland and Hungary, and the cial organizations they control are now able services sector in both countries was private to fund political candidates, newspapers, and to quasi-private under communism. The business entities throughout Russia. Czech Republic, assigned to produce con- Although liberal newspapers openly sumer goods by the Council for Mutual criticize governmental figures and policies, Economic Assistance, the body that coordi- Waller pointed out that investigative journal- nated trade among the countries of the ism concerning the KGB and its successor Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 96 developed an economic sector vital to a relies on very old equipment, is finding it market economy. difficult to create products in demand. Slovakia, by contrast, was under- Polishchuk emphasized that Russian industrialized and underdeveloped at the politics were not driven by ideology, political end of World War II, only to undergo intense platforms, or beliefs, but by pragmatic consider- communist-style industrialization during the ations. In the absence of a market for human post-war period. The structural imbalances resources, he explained, extra-market activities that resulted in its economy have made such as crime, corruption, lobbying, financial reform a difficult and arduous process in scams, and redistributive activities have Slovakia. Similarly, Stalinist industrialization increased. Due to the depth of structural and centralized political control, in conjunc- imbalances, the focus of economic activity in tion with depressed and underdeveloped Russia today is on redistribution, not produc- capital and labor markets, have left Russia at tion. According to economist Sergei Glazev, a disadvantage in the early stages of reform. success in the Russian redistributive market According to Polishchuk, a market requires strong connections with the govern- economy provides indicators to which labor ment, organized crime groups, and law enforce- and capital respond in a productive manner. ment bodies, as well as an absence of productive While Russia has succeeded in producing assets of genuine market value. Given these indicators (primarily price signals), he requirements, Polishchuk noted that the most pointed out that it has not been successful in effective vehicle for redistribution was the state. responding to them because it lacks a fluid Entrepreneurs who take part in redistributive labor market. For labor to respond to price activities are thus political entrepreneurs, he signals, explained Polishchuk, Russia needs specified, not market entrepreneurs. to have accessible housing, a social safety net In a redistributive system, managers of and public services available regardless of both privatized and state-owned firms seek workplace, an unemployment system, low to preserve their labor teams and output administrative barriers, and a mortgage targets in order to retain the support of large system. At present, increasing stratification numbers of workers and gain political between the rich and poor regions of Russia influence, contradicting the profit-maximiz- and the growth of service sector opportuni- ing strategies of a market economy. In order ties in wealthy areas are further contributing to succeed with economic reform, argued the to the constrained mobility of the labor force. speaker, Russia needs a broad market-driven Russia’s capital market is also very underde- rearrangement of the factors of production, veloped, which Polishchuk attributed to that is, a redistribution of labor and capital. If poorly protected property rights, unenforced not supported by market institutions, contracts, uncertainty and instability in the economic liberalism alone will be insufficient government, high inflation, low liquidity, and to restructure the Russian economy. Laissez uncertain commodities values. faire economic policies cannot be sustained, Polishchuk noted that different sectors he contended, because the state remains the of the Russian economy have responded to prevailing force in the economy. the transition from a command to a market Polishchuk suggested that a market economy in different ways. Russia’s con- economy be put in place by means of a two- sumer goods industry, for instance, was not track policy: the development of market substantially developed in the Soviet period, institutions and adequate protection of thus 80-90% of consumer goods found in property rights. Reflecting on the past, Polishchuk noted that Pyotr Stolypin, often Russia today are imported. On the other referred to as a brutal oppressor of the hand, the publishing and printing industry is Russian revolutionary movement, followed a doing well: orders for books on Lenin have similar policy when he enacted land reforms been easily converted to current orders for in 1906 that sought to transform peasants Stephen King novels. According to into landowners. Polishchuk, the automobile industry has —by Peggy McInerny exhibited a more ambiguous record. The Gaz plant in Nizhnii Novgorod received new, Vol. XII No. 18 1995 versatile equipment in the late 1980s, en- Weak Russian State Expanding abling it to produce new products and to be Exponentially successful during the economic transition. Despite the collapse of the USSR and The Moscow-based Zil plant, however, which the considerably smaller population gov- 97 erned by the Russian state, the Russian “Yeltsin has not created so much a pyramid government is now larger than the Soviet structure of power as a policy wheel.” government was in 1991, said Eugene Two key offices of the presidential Huskey at a Kennan Institute lecture on 12 bureaucracy, the presidential security service June 1995. Huskey is an Associate Professor run by General Aleksandr Korzhakov and the of Political Science and Director of Russian upravlenie delami (office of administrative Studies at Stetson University in Florida and a affairs), belong to the third module of the former Title VIII-Supported Short-term presidential apparatus. This module presiden- Scholar at the Kennan Institute. tial support services also includes the presi- The paradox of a weakening but dential press service, the chancellery, and the expanding state sector is most apparent in protocol office. Together with Iliushin and the presidential apparatus of the Russian Filatov, Korzhakov is one of the central figures Federation, said Huskey. He claimed this in the presidential bureaucracy, said Huskey. apparatus consisted of six basic modules: the The upravlenie delami, which distributes over administratsiia prezidenta, or executive office; one-half of the total budget for the presidential the sluzhba pomoshchnikov, or senior policy apparatus (2.12 out of 5 trillion rubles in fiscal counsellors to the president; the offices of year 1994), also wields considerable power. presidential support services; the small body Chiefly responsible for awarding dachas, cars, of presidential representatives to non- offices, telephones, and other scarce goods to executive bodies; the Security Council; and individuals and government ministries, various presidential commissions and fondy Huskey claimed these goods functioned as (foundations or funds). symbols by which the importance of individu- The administratsiia prezidenta, run by als within the Russian political system were Sergei Filatov, is the largest and most well- measured. known of the modules. Huskey argued that The fourth module of the presidential this body, which possesses fifteen upravleniia apparatus consists of the three presidential and/or otdely (branch departments), was in representatives to non-presidential bodies: many respects a recreation of the Central jurist Aleksandr Yakovlev, presidential Committee of the Communist Party of the representative to the Russian parliament; Soviet Union. Formed by President Boris jurist Valerii Savitskii, presidential represen- Yeltsin as a parallel center of executive tative to the Constitutional Court; and management in late 1991 and early 1992 on General Evgenii Shaposhnikov, presidential the advice of former State Secretary Gennadii representative to the state arms monopoly, Burbulis and then Deputy Prime Minister Rosvoruzhenie. The Security Council, which Sergei Shakrai, it was intended to retain the Huskey termed a modern-day version of the former Communist Party’s role as the key USSR Defense Council, constitutes the fifth administrative player in Russian govern- module of the presidential apparatus. ment. Yet the duplication of bureaucracies, Headed by Oleg Lobov and previously, by said Huskey, has led to a self-destructive Iurii Skokov, the Council was the body in competition between two centers of executive which the decision to use military force in power: the government and its central Chechnia was adopted. ministries, on one hand, and the president Finally, the various presidential and his administration, on the other. commissions and fondy that operate on the Such competition extends to the various periphery of the Russian presidential bureau- components of the presidential apparatus cracy comprise its sixth module. Such bodies itself. The sluzhba pomoshchnikov, for example often possess sizeable budgets, but lack is often in fierce competition with the clearly defined responsibilities. The mission administratsiia prezidenta, with Senior Advisor of the Fund for Presidential Programs, for Viktor Iliushin competing with Filatov for example, is not entirely clear, yet the fund access to the Russian president. The sluzhba commanded a budget of 2.8 trillion rubles in employs such key policy advisors to President 1994 over one-half of the entire budget for Yelstin as legal advisor Mikhail Krasnov, the presidential apparatus. economic advisor Aleksandr Livshits, and “Why did Russian President Boris national security advisor Iurii Baturin. “Just as Yeltsin choose to govern through the presi- Filatov’s executive office overlaps the govern- dency, that is, around the government rather ment, so do the counsellors overlap Filatov’s than through the government?” asked executive office. In effect,” said Huskey, Huskey. In addition to using the presidential 98 apparatus to overcome the resistance of Nevertheless, Armstrong did not view their entrenched Soviet bureaucracies, several independence as being incompatible with cultural and instrumental reasons explain Russia’s essential security needs as a great Yeltsin’s reliance on his personal apparatus to power, which are to avoid isolation and enact reform. First, Yeltsin could not use the remain within the European concert of purge as a tool to remove people who powers. He claimed these needs could be met resisted his policies. Second, the web of provided that: a) independence concerned patron-client relationships that runs through only those nations that genuinely desired governmental bureaucracies made it very independence, b) Moscow abandoned any difficult to target individuals alone for drastic revival of its historical aim of the “in- removal. Third, a cultural block against gathering” of all Slavic lands, and c) a layoffs made it difficult to cut the size and peaceful spirit of cooperation prevailed staffing of government bodies. Fourth, even among eastern Slavs. had employees of post-Soviet ministries been According to Armstrong, the six states fired, said Huskey, it was unlikely that loyal of the western borderlands fall into three and competent replacements could have been basic groups according to ethno-religious found for them. identity, size, population, and geostrategic A lack of a sense of limits to adminis- importance: the Baltic states, Belarus and tration has produced a strange kind of Moldova, and Ukraine, respectively. Cultur- corporatism in the Russian presidency, ally the most distinct from Russia, the Baltic observed Huskey. A state structure that states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are attempts to co-opt rather than co-exist with firmly rooted in European Catholic and other state organizations whose principal Protestant traditions and possess a strong mission is to include everything so as to ethno-religious component of national prevent opposition has resulted in unfettered identity. The flagrant manner with which expansionism, he explained. “The problem they were incorporated into the USSR, said with the presidency is that it is now begin- Armstrong, has led to widespread recogni- ning to take on many of the characteristics of tion, particularly in Scandinavia, that the the entrenched bureaucracy that it was west owes these nations a special debt. Not designed to supersede,” concluded Huskey. only has Scandinavian assistance has been “What we are seeing today is a kind of crucial to their economic success since 1991, institutional imperialism in which one part of he continued, Scandinavian influence the state is attempting to swallow all others.” remains the strongest moral pressure for —by Peggy McInerny keeping them free. Although citizenship requirements for Russian residents of Baltic states remain 1995–96 PROGRAM YEAR controversial, Russia has withdrawn its Vol. XIII No. 1 1995 troops from their territories, the Baltics have Russia Reasserts itself as Great, consolidated control over their external not Super, Power borders, and the European Union has tentatively accepted them as future members. Recent developments in the western Only a military invasion could reincorporate borderlands of the former USSR demonstrate these states into Russia today, said a limited Russian will to remain a great Armstrong, noting that an invasion would power, not a resolve to disrupt the multilat- yield few real gains and provoke a severe eral European balance of power through crisis in Russia’s relations with the west. expansion, argued John Armstrong at a Russia’s position as a Baltic maritime power, Kennan Institute lecture on 25 September he explained, is already assured by its St. 1995. Armstrong is Professor Emeritus of Petersburg coastline, Kaliningrad, the radar Political Science at the University of Wiscon- facilities it has retained in Latvia, and the sin–Madison, and a former member of the transit rights conceded to it by Lithuania. Kennan Institute Academic Council. Turning to Belarus and Moldova, These borderlands (comprised of Armstrong claimed they were culturally Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, closer to Russia, with no major religious and Moldova) are crucial to Russia’s access to differences affecting their relations. “If the the western world, serving as Russia’s problem of Moldova is to maintain indepen- geographic bridge to east-central Europe. dence from an outside power,” he observed, 99 “the problem of Belarus is to figure out how states. Yet the speaker asserted that Ukraine’s [Belarusans] are really different from Rus- inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty sians.” In his opinion, the 1995 agreement Organization would be provocative to between Belarus and Russia on a customs Russia. In the end, he said, both prosperity union and united military control of external (or at least a reasonable standard of living) borders essentially constituted the and the loyalty of citizens of varied back- reincorporation of Belarus into Russia, one grounds will be essential to the viability of that apparently occurred with popular the multi-ethnic Ukrainian state. acquiescence. Given that apart from its Returning to the idea that what we are intercontinental nuclear deterrent access to witnessing in the western borderlands of the Europe represents Russia’s essential weight former USSR was a limited assertion of in the international balance today, Armstrong Russia’s will to remain a great power, judged this reincorporation a substantial gain Armstrong warned against exaggerating the for Russia. nature of Russian expansion. “In recent Armstrong claimed Moldova had not decades, we have learned the danger unless found unification with Romania attractive major totalitarian aggression is involved of after 1991, as the crisis of the Dniester area assuming that dominoes are falling each time inhabited mostly by Slavs basically demon- a rival makes minor gains. For any great strated the inability of post-communist power, incremental gains may, on the Bucharest to protect Romanians. Moldovan contrary, represent normal, tentative adjust- acquiescence in the protracted presence of the ments as the pendulum of international Russian Fourteenth Army on its territory, power slowly oscillates.” together with Ukraine’s concession of the —by Peggy McInerny Sevastopol naval base, he continued, has since allowed Russia to partially regain its Vol. XIII No. 2 position of power on the Black Sea. Challenges to Belarusan Security The significance of developments in The geographic location of Belarus, Ukraine remained unresolved in Armstrong’s situated directly between Berlin and Moscow, analysis. With seventy percent of the popula- puts it in an important yet difficult position tion and over one-half of the territory of the regarding the delicate balance between east six republics of the western borderlands, and west, said Ambassador Syarghei Ukraine is the state of most strategic impor- Martynau of the Embassy of the Republic of tance to Russia. Even less a pure ethnic Belarus at a Kennan Institute lecture on 16 republic than Moldova or Belarus twenty-two October 1995. Mr. Martynau went on to percent of its population is ethnic Russian discuss the effect Belarusan history has had Ukraine’s less distinct ethno-religious identity on the attitude of its citizens toward foreign is offset by a well-defined secular nationalism relations, common Western misperceptions and a popular commitment to independence. about Belarus, and the deficiencies of U.S. Unlike Belarus, observed the speaker, Ukraine assistance to Belarus. historically benefited from dynamic intellec- The history of Belarus has been a tual leadership, whose skillful use of myths tumultuous one, said the speaker. Ruled by about the valiant Zaporozhian Cossack and Kiev in the ninth century, the current terri- the virtuous Ukrainian peasant created the tory of Belarus fell to the Mongols in the basis for a nationalist ethos. Not only could thirteenth century and became part of the the Belarusan peasant never claim any real or Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the fourteenth imagined Cossack heritage, as does the century. The Grand Duchy merged with Ukrainian peasant, said Armstrong, neither Poland in 1569, creating the Polish- could he ever seriously maintain, as could the Lithuanian Commonwealth and subjugating Ukrainian, that he was better off than the Belarus to yet another ruler. As a part of Russian peasant. eighteenth-century Poland, Belarus was Ukraine’s place in the emerging divided during the three partitions of Poland security picture of east-central Europe and was ultimately incorporated into the remains unclear. It has insisted on having an Russian empire. The twentieth century independent military force, refused to join in brought wars, Soviet occupation, and still any external border agreement with Russia, more territorial divisions. According to and, according to Armstrong, is unlikely to Martynau, continuous turmoil and ever- join any military grouping of post-Soviet changing leadership has greatly affected the 100 psyche of the Belarusan people; as a result, when larger neighboring states encroach Belarusans are very cautious and strongly upon small states, international inaction has desire peaceful relations with their neighbors. been the response. In addition, the lack of Having been ruled by other nations for legal and organizational structures that can at least two hundred years, post-Soviet quickly secure the interests of a smaller state independence has finally allowed Belarusan at risk leaves such states without multilateral citizens and their leaders to confront the issue institutional support. of their own national security. Today, Belarus, Current tension between Russia and the the west, and Russia must all consider the west over the expansion of North Atlantic place of Belarus within the framework of Treaty Organization (NATO) poses many global security. Belarus first began contem- problems for Belarus, noted the speaker. plating its policy of national security in 1990, Belarus itself does not consider NATO an said the speaker, when it submitted an aggressive block, however, the possibility of a initiative to the United Nations (UN) for a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) “nuclear-free belt” that would possibly alternative to an expanded NATO would put encompass Belarus, the Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus right in the middle of two great power and other East European countries. While blocks. If an expanded NATO placed nuclear this proposal was not implemented at the weapons in eastern Europe, such a situation time, it later formed the basis for a policy of would also contradict Belarus’s efforts to denuclearization. Belarus concluded that it denuclearize. While economic considerations could not assure its security through military are the driving force behind cooperation with means primarily due to its small population Russia, Belarus retains its customary caution and precarious location; instead, it decided to about becoming a full member of a Russian- promote its national security interests dominated CIS collective security system. through international institutions. Martynau admitted that the return of a cold One of Belarus’s main security objec- war-like security block was not unthinkable, tives is to create and maintain a balanced but noted that it did not fit into current security position, emphasized Martynau. A Belarusan foreign policy objectives. balance between the east (Russia) and the The development of a Belarusan foreign west (Europe and the United States), he policy also concerns internal reforms that can insisted, would insure a secure Belarus. Two improve overall national security. According constitutional provisions have been adopted to Martynau, there is a misperception that by the Belarus government to establish this Belarus is not undertaking reform, yet the balance: neutrality and denuclearization. country was recently approved for an Interna- According to Martynau, the provision on tional Monetary Fund loan, evidence that denuclearization stems from three reasons. Belarus can meet the strict economic criteria First, denuclearization is a reaction to the set by the IMF. In addition, Belarus has nuclear accident at Chernobyl, which did actively pursued private investment with the serious harm to the Belarusan environment United States, organizing an investment and spawned a negative popular attitude mission that brought American business towards anything nuclear. Second, the leaders to Belarus without the assistance of the removal of nuclear weapons is expected to Overseas Private Investment Corporation, reduce the chances that Belarus could which usually facilitates such endeavors. In become a target of nuclear aggression. Third, general, noted Martynau, Belarus has not Belarus believes it can actively contribute to received much assistance from U.S. organiza- the balance of power in Europe by eliminat- tions and more political, strategic, and ing its nuclear weapons. Specifically, added economic attention from the United States Martynau, Belarus intends to encourage close would undoubtedly benefit Belarusan reform. relations with Ukraine and Poland. Martynau pointed out that western Belarus is in a difficult position because preoccupation with Russia, Yugoslavia, and an east–west balance is its only option, said nuclear weapons, as well as the hesitation to the speaker it can achieve balance only if see Belarus as an entity separate from Russia, both sides (Russia and the west) support it prevents Belarus from receiving more and support a framework to maintain peace. attention from the west. It is unclear, he Moreover, the lesson of Yugoslavia rings concluded, what kind of foreign policy other loudly in Belarus: small European states nations would like to see in Belarus. Al- must consider their security carefully because though he surmised that Russia would accept 101 a balanced foreign policy on the part of United States and Russia are cooperating to Belarus, he was unsure of U.S. and European build an international space station. Such reactions to such a policy. achievements, noted Gore, are increasingly —by Julia Smith the norm rather than the exception. “The goal on both sides,” he noted, “is Vol. XIII No. 3 to capitalize on the increasingly normal U.S. Needs New Bipartisan Consensus relationship we now enjoy. Russia, despite all on Russia its current problems, is striving to become a “We Americans made tremendous normal country with a foreign policy rooted in investments and sacrifices to win the cold clearly defined national interests.” Both war. Now we must support the programs countries, he continued, have a common necessary to build a lasting peace,” said Vice commitment to strengthening democracy and President Al Gore at an address at the Four free markets and promoting security in Seasons Hotel on 19 October 1995. The Europe. Gore explained that the U.S. vision of address, cosponsored by the Kennan Institute an integrated Europe included an important for Advanced Russian Studies and the U.S.– role for Russia, including a better defined Russia Business Council of Washington, D.C., relationship between Russia and NATO. was the third in a series of speeches on Russia The Vice President made it clear that the given by the Vice President the same week. Clinton administration understood that NATO “For better or for worse, our nation’s fate is enlargement was a contentious issue for many linked to the destiny of the Russian people,” Russians. “[W]e are making the case to emphasized Gore. Warning that growing Russia’s leaders,” he explained, “that Russia’s isolationist sentiment in the United States own interests and continued integration Congress threatened to damage U.S.–Russian would be best served by remaining open to relations, Gore summoned American broad cooperation with all European institu- policymakers to develop a new bipartisan tions, including NATO and the Partnership for consensus on U.S. policy towards Russia. Peace.” On another security issue, Gore Upon assuming office, said Gore, pledged that the United States and other President Clinton recognized that “America’s signatories of the 1990 Conventional Forces best traditions and vital interests were best Reduction Treaty would work with Russia to served by deepening our engagement with resolve the problem of flank troop limits Russia.” The president accordingly adopted a established before the dissolution of the USSR. policy toward Russia based on three interre- Gore discounted critics who claimed lated goals: 1) support of political and eco- the Clinton administration romanticized its nomic reform throughout the Russian Federa- relationship with the new Russia and insisted tion by means of targeted American assistance; that current U.S. policy was not centered on a 2) integration of Russia into global economic narrow spectrum of individuals in Moscow. and political structures from which the Soviet “We have long recognized that a new Russia Union had been excluded, and 3) diminishing is emerging that is far less centralized,” he the security and environmental threats posed noted. “[O]ur responsibility [is] to work by Soviet-era nuclear warheads, expertise, closely with all of Russia’s democratically reactors, and weapons-grade materials. elected leaders, whoever or wherever they The United States and Russia have may be.” Conceding that institutional established enduring, practical mechanisms infrastructures for economic and political to resolve their differences since the collapse reform could not be willed into place in of the USSR in 1991, said Gore. Through the Russia, he nevertheless claimed Russia had joint commission established by the U.S. Vice made great strides in both areas of reform. President and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Nearly all prices have been freed from state Chernomyrdin, the two countries are work- control, inflation is at its lowest point since ing particularly closely in the strategic the creation of the Federation, and economic spheres of trade and investment, space and growth may be poised to take off next year. science, and health and environment. For Not only has the economy liberalized, but example, the commission is working to “most of the basic building blocks of democ- reform taxes and tariffs that discourage racy a national constitution, political parties, foreign investment in Russia. Conversion independent newspapers and television efforts are helping the Russian defense sector stations, and free and fair elections are now move towards civilian production and the falling into place,” said Gore. 102 Although Russia’s future is far from Kennan, a distant cousin of former U.S. clear, the Vice President argued that its Ambassador to the USSR George F. Kennan, transition away from communism deserved travelled five separate times to Russia in the continuing American support. “[T]o deny second half of the nineteenth and the begin- Russia and the Russian people the possibility ning of the twentieth centuries. After initially of progress,” he reflected, “is to reject the defending the Russian government from its notion that societies can evolve, that free critics, Kennan became a champion of liberal people can choose a new and brighter future revolutionaries working for the cause of for themselves and their children.” Decisions freedom in the tsarist empire. Through his of the current Congress on foreign aid, journalism, books, and public lectures, he did however, may deny the United States the much to promote serious American interest ability to pursue its relationship with Russia in Russia during his lifetime. A journalist for effectively. the popular magazines Century and Outlook, According to Gore, Congress is consid- in between travelling and writing about ering reductions in U.S. foreign assistance to Russia and the Russian revolutionary Russia that would have serious adverse movement, Kennan covered the Spanish– consequences. The Nunn–Lugar program, American War of 1898 in Cuba, the Russo– which provides assistance to Russia for Japanese War of 1904 in Japan, and later dismantling the former Soviet nuclear wrote a biography of financier and railroad arsenal, could be cut by 20 percent. The builder E.H. Harriman. Nuclear Safety Initiative, designed to prevent Kennan first went to Russia in 1865 as future nuclear accidents of the Chernobyl part of the Russian–American Telegraph variety, could be decimated. U.S.–Russian Expedition and explored northeastern Siberia cooperation in assuring the security of for two and a half years. He returned to the weapons-grade nuclear materials would be United States to write Tent Life in Siberia, a endangered. And support for democratic popular book about local life among Siberian institutions, as well as the promotion of natives, and to lecture on Russian topics American trade and investment in Russia, throughout the country. He went back to would be greatly impaired. Russia twenty years later, in 1885, to conduct The Vice President implored Americans research on the political exile system in Siberia. not to allow isolationist sentiment to prevent First published by Century magazine in a them from engaging Russia and continuing widely read series that made him famous, to lead in the post–cold war era. “The point is Kennan’s research was also published in book simply this,” he said, “American assistance is form under the title Siberia and the Exile System. not a hand-out. It is a long-term investment It was this trip, said Travis, that changed in the security and prosperity not only of Kennan’s opinion of the tsarist autocracy and Russia, but of the United States as well.” turned him into a lifelong partisan of the liberal —by Peggy McInerny & Julia Smith Russian revolutionary movement. “Kennan undertook an extensive Vol. XIII No. 4 personal crusade against the Russian autoc- George Kennan and American Experts racy,” said Travis, “He not only wrote Siberia on Russia and the Exile System; he also disseminated his “Long before academe was seriously message through hundreds of public lectures interested, in his era George Kennan stood out delivered during the 1890s; he supported as the most renowned American interpreter of various efforts initiated by others on behalf of Russian life,” said Frederick F. Travis at a Russian political dissidents; he was a leader Kennan Institute lecture on 9 November 1995. of the unsuccessful opposition to the extradi- Travis is Acting President of John Carroll tion treaty between the United States and University in University Heights, Ohio, and Russia in 1893; and he frequently assisted author of a biography of Kennan. Together Russian political émigrés with money, shelter, with Hugh Ragsdale, Professor of History at and moral support.” An enthusiastic sup- the University of Alabama, Travis spoke at a porter of the February 1917 revolution, meeting commemorating the 150th anniver- Kennan’s hopes for Russia were dashed by sary of the birth of George Kennan (1845– the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917, 1924), the American explorer, journalist, which he opposed until he died in 1924. writer, and biographer for whom the Kennan George Kennan, said Travis, was a self- Institute is named. made man steeped in the beliefs of the 103 Enlightenment and the democratic culture of fact both Schiff and Crane were supporters of the United States. As a result, he did not the Provisional Government. provide Americans with a completely accu- Considering the tradition of the study rate picture of Russian reality at the time of Russia in the United States, the two (particularly regarding the diversity of the speakers agreed that American experts are revolutionary opposition and the social liable to confuse the views of the Russian programs of the populists he championed) liberal intelligentsia with those of Russian and was heavily influenced in his views by society as a whole and to use a liberal Russian liberals. Yet Travis refused to severely approach unsuitable for the study of Russia. chastise Kennan for these shortcomings, Liberal democratic expectations of Russian pointing out that his work on Russia was a development today, said Travis, threaten to product of his time and revealed the difficul- result in the same kind of disillusionment ties even intelligent, well-informed people suffered by George Kennan after the Bolshe- confront when trying to understand other vik revolution. Despite genuine recent cultures. progress, obstacles to democratic develop- Turning to examine several of George ment in Russia remain formidable. Ameri- Kennan’s contemporaries in the profession of cans, concluded Travis, would do better to Russia, Hugh Ragsdale provided a broader apply themselves to furthering democratic picture of the world in which he lived and progress in Russia rather than expect rapid worked. Russian experts of that era, he noted, solutions in the liberal tradition. “were certainly a far rarer breed in their day —by Peggy McInerny than we Russia specialists are in our own day.” Several of his peers, contended Vol. XIII No. 5 Ragsdale, were as interesting as Kennan Shock Therapy Produces Political himself. Among these peers was Eugene Capitalism Schuyler (1840–1890) who, after being The Russian democratic movement of educated at Yale and Columbia, went on to 1990–1991 did not represent a broad social join the U.S. Foreign Service, write noted movement from below, but the convergence of studies of Turkestan and Peter the Great, and two pro-democratic elites of the Soviet system. translate and publish novels by Tolstoy and These elites consisted of democratic-leaning Turgenev. “Schuyler,” said Ragsdale, “was members of the Soviet intelligentsia and radical very much the pioneer American expert on reformers within the Communist Party of the Russia in his generation and Kennan was Soviet Union, said Marc Garcelon at a Kennan distinctly his junior.” Institute lecture on 13 November 1995. A second contemporary of George Garcelon is a Post-doctoral Fellow at the Kennan was Jacob Schiff, a German immigrant Department of Sociology, University of to the United States who became head of the California, Berkeley, and a Title VIII-Supported second largest investment bank in the country. Research Scholar at the Kennan Institute. This A dedicated philanthropist of many causes, “specialist rebellion” in urban Russia, said Schiff’s committment to Jewish causes made Garcelon, produced an advocacy of western him an avowed enemy of the Russian autoc- political and economic models on the part of racy. Not only did he work to provide loans to elite groupings and not, as many western Japan in its war against Russia in 1904 while analysts have sought to explain, on the part of a denying such loans to Russia, Schiff also middle class and a reviving civil society. funded Kennan’s efforts to distribute liberal The radical democratic Soviet intelligen- revolutionary propoganda among Russian tsia was itself an artificial social grouping officers held as prisoners of war in Japan created by the Soviet system and dependent during 1904–1905. Another wealthy philan- on it for its redistributive economic function, thropist of the era, Charles Crane, also had an noted Garcelon. By implementing a program abiding interest in Russia, to which he of radical economic reform that decimated travelled more than twenty times. Crane both the social status and economic livelihood funded Paul Miliukov’s lecture tours at the of this intelligentsia (primarily educated University of Chicago in 1903 and 1905 and professionals and highly skilled technical later became acquainted with many leaders of workers), democratic reformers of the first the Provisional Government. Given to virulent Yeltsin administration destroyed their own anti-Semitism, Crane eventually believed social base. The very assumption that radical Jacob Schiff supported Leon Trotsky, when in economic reform had to be implemented 104 quickly to bypass the protest of social groups political and economic actors are intertwined before they could respond, said Garcelon, in a game of political entrepreneurship, meant the design and implementation of democracy has become empty rhetoric in the shock therapy in Russia precluded public eyes of the population, and elite-brokered input into the decision-making process. blocs not political parties have become the The radical democrats’ focus on reform principal form of political organization. from above unfortunately played into Russian Garcelon argued that rent-seeking President Boris Yeltsin’s inclination for behavior had become the predominant form personal rule, observed the speaker. As a of economic activity in Russia, preventing the result, both ignored the important task of emergence of prices as effective carriers of building institutions of democracy, such as a information and shutting out large sectors of civil service, and virtually destroyed the the potential market in Russia. Capital is not ability of the Russian state to govern effec- being invested in production, foodstuffs are tively. The institutional legacies of the Soviet being imported in most cities, and much of the system remained intact while power passed to rural economy is surviving on barter. “Such lower levels in the system. More significantly, realities,” remarked the speaker, “should give said Garcelon, neither the radical democrats pause to those inclined to rely exclusively on nor reformist communists recognized the macro-economic figures in assessing the imperative of state building in Russia after future prospects of the Russian Federation.” 1991. This omission, he noted, cost them the Asked what alternatives to shock ability to shape the debate on Russian national therapy had existed in early 1992, Garcelon identity and shifted the initiative on the responded that many such alternatives “national question” in Russia to nationalists of existed, but were pragmatic and improvisa- the far right. Although such extreme figures as tional in nature, not programmatic. The Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his Liberal Demo- major fault in the debate over monetary cratic Party first seized the issue, Garcelon stabilization policy in Russia, he said, was noted that radical nationalist parties had that it was framed in such a way as to present faltered in the last two years and were not shock therapy as the only possible choice. A expected to do well in the upcoming elections. more evolutionary, pragmatic strategy would Russia, he said, is now entering an have freed some prices while continuing to extremely difficult phase of nation building subsidize others, he explained, and would in which the ideas espoused by former have concentrated on encouraging small- and Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Lebed have medium-sized businesses instead of reform- the greatest chance of success. Whether or ing large state factories. not Lebed succeeds in becoming president, Queried as to whether one could Garcelon claimed that what Lebed stood for compare present-day Russian millionaires would most likely prevail in Russian politics: with the American “robber barons” of the the formation of a center-right “super” bloc turn of the century, Garcelon rejected the among current political elites, rebuilding the analogy. In the United States of that era, he functional capacity of the Russian state, said, dynamic political communities, small reversing the disintegration of the armed businesses, the rule of law, and the culture of forces, and reigning in the most egregious Protestantism constrained rapacious political forms of official corruption. capitalism at the local level. “What changes The system produced by the combina- the equation in Russia,” he remarked, “is the tion of shock therapy and President Yeltsin’s lack of such institutions at the local level.” personalized rule is a distinctive Russian form Garcelon argued that further degenera- of “political capitalism,” said Garcelon. He tion of state capacity in Russia was neither in defined the term as “the utilization of politi- the interest of Russia nor the west. Given the cally appointed or elected positions in order to growing commitment among Russian accumulate wealth and create cartels and politicians to rebuild the Russian state, he syndicates.” Voucher privatization, he pointed warned against a western overreaction to the out, was based on concepts utterly foreign to process. The kind of soft, transitional average Russian citizens, such as stock authoritarianism that may appear, he ownership, and the process of privatization cautioned, would be preferable to the kind of was manipulated by the old Soviet economic protracted, virulent authoritarianism that elite, together with new commerical and could arise in Russia. criminal syndicates. In the current system, —by Peggy McInerny 105 Vol. XIII No. 6 Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Russian Parliamentary Elections: the Congress of Russian Communities, Our Judgment of the Past Home is Russia, Yabloko, and the Liberal The Russian parliamentary elections will Democratic Party. According to Tsipko, the serve as a judgment on the past as well as an democrats will not fare well. He estimated indication of the future of Russian politics, that the leading democratic bloc, Yabloko, said Pilar Bonet at a Kennan Institute lecture will receive only 6-7% of the seats in the on 1 December 1995. In particular, she said, parliament, while approximately 60-70% will they will reveal what can be expected in the go to political blocs running on patriotic 1996 presidential elections. Bonet is Moscow platforms. Bonet noted that 43 political Correspondent for El Pais and a member of the parties and blocs will take part in the elec- Kennan Institute Academic Council. She tions, as opposed to 13 in 1993, reflecting spoke with Alexander Tsipko, Senior Special- increasing dispersion within the Russian ist at the Institute of International Economic political system. and Political Studies of the Russian Academy The Communist Party of the Russian of Sciences and a Fellow at the Woodrow Federation (CPRF) led by Gennadii Wilson Center, about the meaning of the Zyuganov, is expected to win the largest December 17th Duma elections in Russia. number of Duma seats. Bonet described this While these elections are relatively party as the successor to the Communist minor from a legislative standpoint (only one Party of the Soviet Union, given that it of the two chambers of the legislative assem- retained the organization and discipline of bly is being elected and its powers are quite the original structure. Membership of the limited), according to the present Russian CPRF is 500,000 strong, she noted, and constitution, noted Bonet, the president cannot consists primarily of older pensioners and dissolve the parliament during his last six middle-aged citizens who have felt the months in office. Thus, Yeltsin will theoreti- hardships of Russia’s transition to a market cally be unable to dissolve the next Duma, as economy. Tsipko pointed out that the CPRF is his term expires in June 1996. not a true communist party as its central In Bonet’s opinion, the December 1995 platform is not based on communist doctrine, elections are the first “normal” elections in but the idea of the rebirth and protection of Russia since 1991. The December 1993 the Russian nation. Working Russia, noted elections, she explained, were heavily Tsipko, is a true communist party that draws skewed by the October 1993 shelling of the its members from the working class. former Russian parliament building: some Our Home is Russia, otherwise known as potential candidates were in jail, some the “party of power,” is also expected to win a political parties were unable to run in the bloc of seats in the Duma. This group was elections, and the Communist Party was formed in May 1995 by Prime Minister Viktor given a very short time to prepare its cam- Chernomyrdin and other top figures in the paign. The image of the burning Russian current government who appear to be cooper- parliament, or White House, remains etched ating to preserve the status quo. in the minds of Russian citizens, she com- “Chernomyrdin,” said Bonet, “is not a charis- mented, and is being used widely in the matic figure, and the image of the good uncle political advertising of virtually all parties on he attempts to convey is neutralized by the Russian television. image of the godfather who heads the state gas Both Bonet and Tsipko stressed that four monopoly.” The platform of Our Home is events of the recent past will have great bearing Russia is weak and not clearly articulated, and on both the parliamentary and presidential Bonet noted that its electoral campaign had elections in Russia: the dissolution of the USSR; staged showy Moscow performances by the implementation of economic shock therapy; western pop singers and fashion models. the shelling of the Russian parliament in The Congress of Russian Communities October 1993; and the war in Chechnya. (Russian acronym, KRO), led by retired Regarding economic policy, Bonet noted that Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Lebed, former popular attitudes toward privatization in Secretary of the Russian Security Council Iurii particular have been quite negative. Skokov, and economist Sergei Glazev, is Political parties and blocs likely to win expected to do well in the parliamentary seats in the new parliament include the elections. KRO considers itself an alternative to other political blocs and is comprised of a 106 variety of nationalist groups. So far it is unclear hand, has moved from a use-of-force ap- whether Lebed or Skokov will take part in the proach in defense of values to a national presidential elections, said Bonet. Lebed, she security-based use of force. said, is undergoing an intensive political According to the speaker, United States education the results of which remain unclear. foreign policy regarding military use of force Rather than analyze the projected underwent a gradual change from the 1980s composition of the new Duma, Tsipko said it to the 1990s. In the 1980s, Baburkin pro- was more important to examine the possibility posed, American use of force was guided by for genuine democracy in Russia. The revolu- six principles presented by U.S. Secretary of tion of 1991 was unrealistic because it sought Defense Caspar Weinberger: the use of force to undergo a direct transition from commu- must 1) be vitally important to U.S. national nism to a new democratic Russia. People who interests and allies; 2) be a last resort; 3) have supported a democratic Russia in 1991 didn’t the support of the American people; 4) have support the idea of liberty or civil rights, Tsipko the support of the U.S. Congress; 5) have explained, they supported a protest movement defined political and military objectives; and against Communist Party apparatchiki and other 6) be swift and decisive in operation. privileged members of Soviet society. Democ- Weinberger’s principles provided a frame- racy born under such circumstances, he noted, work for U.S. foreign policy from the end of is a very weak democracy. the Vietnam War to the end of the cold war. It is difficult, said Tsipko, for Russia to In the 1990s, according to Baburkin, Joint move towards real democracy because the Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell marked a change preconditions for it do not yet exist in the in U.S. justification for military use of force country. However, he said, the possibility for through his enumeration of the following creating such preconditions does exist it lies points: 1) the use of force must be a last in achieving reconciliation within the current resort; 2) use of force must have clearly Russian political elite. Such reconciliation defined military objectives; 3) clear criteria requires Russian politicians to emulate must be developed in order to define the Zyuganov and advocate a policy of the point at which objectives are reached; and 4) rebirth of a new Russia. Tsipko clarified that force must be used in great magnitude. by national rebirth he did not mean notions Powell’s failure to mention the role of U.S. of nationalism or imperialism, but the national interests in the use of military force healthy patriotism of a powerful state that represents, according to Baburkin, the respected the traditions, culture, and heritage beginning of a shift to value-based action. of its history. Only after achieving reconcilia- It was Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, tion within the elite and the nation as a however, who promoted a new approach to whole, he continued, will the preconditions military action for the United States, Baburkin for genuine democracy exist in Russia. said. His approach, often referred to as the —by Julia Smith “school of limited objectives,” called for a more flexible policy regarding the use of force. Vol. XIII No. 7 1996 Baburkin noted that such flexibility required a The Use of Force by Russia and the change in the justification of the use of force United States from the defense of U.S. national interests to The end of the cold war and the value-based interventions which defend or dissolution of the Soviet Union has caused a further American values, necessitating significant change in both Russian and interference in the internal affairs of other American military policies regarding the use countries. Aspin warned, however, that the of force, said Sergei Baburkin at the Kennan support of value-based interventions would be Institute lecture on 4 December 1995. difficult to predict, considering the extent to Baburkin is a USIA-Supported Regional which media influences public opinion. He Scholar at the Kennan Institute and an also noted that under a value-based policy it assistant professor of international relations would be difficult to decide where to inter- at Yaroslavl State Pedagogical University in vene and where to stay away. According to Russia. He noted that since the end of the Baburkin, two opposing views prevail among cold war, the U.S. and Russia have reversed the American public on this issue: 1) the U.S. trends: the United States has shifted from a doesn’t have to resources to use force every- national security-based use-of-force policy to where; 2) the U.S., as a global leader, has an a value-based use of force. Rusia, on the other obligation to intervene wherever necessary. 107 Baburkin explained that the shift from defense criticism from the political parties including of U.S. national interests to defense of values reformers and former communists. Should was a result of the end of the cold war which the political forces critical of such policies eliminated the Soviet Union as a counterbal- come to power in Russia, predicted Baburkin, ance to the U.S. According to Baburkin, the there will be even more reluctance to cooper- United States now believes that it possesses ate with the United States and the idea of strategic freedom to use force. national security will be interpreted differ- Russia has shifted from a value-based ently by different political figures. justification for military intervention, to a use of —by Julia Smith force in defense of its national interests. Baburkin argued that this change is based on Vol. XIII No. 8 1996 the fact that the Russian government can no Does Palermo Represent the Future longer justify its actions based on communist of Moscow? ideology or Russian orthodoxy, and has not The socioeconomic threat posed by firmly established democracy to promote a organized crime and corruption in Russia has democratic ideology. Hence, another approach, become so acute that it may provoke “mas- based on the defense of national security, has sive retaliation” by a hard-line regime, been adopted. The concept of national security according to Stefan Hedlund, director of the as encompassing social, political, and economic Institute of Russian and East European factors in addition to military factors is new to Studies at Uppsala University, Sweden. Russia, but has already been widely accepted, Hedlund, an economist and professor of East evident by its discussion in newspapers and European studies whose current work journals and support by state institutions. focuses on the Russian economy and institu- Baburkin noted that the Russian Federation tion-building, spoke at a Kennan Institute currently has many threats to its national lecture on 12 December 1995. security and many potential opportunities to Hedlund forecasted that Russia may see use force, particularly in areas in close proxim- a crackdown comparable to Mussolini’s ity to its borders. Internal conflicts, such as the campaign against the Sicilian Mafia in the war in Chechnya, speak to the increased use of 1930s. According to Hedlund, in addition to force within Russia. Baburkin suggested that receiving popular support, such a large-scale the use of force in Chechnya can be seen as a crackdown on organized crime and corruption move to defend Russia’s national security; to could help create a brief economic boom by save the territorial integrity of the Russian reducing capital flight abroad from Russia that Federation; to preserve the region for its has been estimated at $50 billion to $80 billion economic potential; and to lower the level of in 1994 alone. However, due largely to a lack crime thought to be connected with activities of of systemic political and economic reforms, the the notorious Chechen mafia. Limitations on speaker said, the entire effort might amount to Russian use of force include an unpreparedness “a Pyrrhic victory for the Russian govern- for new types of military intervention, political ment—who and whetever it is.” The resulting pluralism, and presence of opposition, and a climate will make life considerably more lack of national consensus on internal and difficult for entrepreneurs and small business. external policies and issues for the Russian Hedlund said the likely outcome will be a Federation. Baburkin further proposed that return to “patron-client, hierarchical, vertical U.S.-Russian military relations have repeated society,” dominated by “huge pyramids” the fate of U.S.-Russian relations in general— under the control of various clan leaders. great hopes, plans, and enthusiasm toward the During the lecture, Hedlund referred potential of the relationship were present at to Robert D. Putnam’s 1993 book, Making first, but are now deteriorating. A growing Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern reluctance toward cooperation with the United Italy, a study of that country’s semi-autono- States is now more visible from the Russian mous regional governments. Although the side with military contacts and exchanges formal structure of the regional governments down significantly from 1992. Disagreements is identical, those in northern Italy have between U.S. and Russian leaders regarding the worked far better than those in the south. use of force in Bosnia have also been evident, Putnam found such differences in perfor- noted Baburkin. mance correlated closely to the degree of The military policy of the Russian civic involvement and cooperation—thus government is currently under extreme there was substantially greater accumulation 108 in the north of the “social capital” needed for Hedlund also said it was probably a functioning democracy. unrealistic to expect that Russia’s controlling The study also concluded that political clan leaders and organized crime lords will problems endemic to the Italian south—too be effectively tamed anytime soon as often producting isolation, suspicion, law- happend with America’s turn-of-the-century lessness, and economic stagnation—may “robber barons.” He contended that “the hold lessons for post-communist states as whole notion of the robber baron parallel— they attempt to move toward self-govern- that Russian gangsters are going to become ment. In that light, Putnam wrote, “Palermo more civilized, and create a good society for may represent the future of Moscow.” their children and such—really rests on the Hedlund argued that for various emergence of a contract between the gang- reasons drawing such a parallel with Sicily sters” to refrain from violence and start may significantly underestimate the likely respecting each other’s property rights. impact of organized crime and corruption in However, Hedlund said, “there are no signs Russia. He contended that “what we see that this is in the making. Rather, we see today in organized—or disorganized—crime stronger tendencies to taking money out of on the Russian scene has very little to do with Russia.” the Sicilian Mafia.” Overall, Hedlund said he is strongly Hedlund noted that the Sicilian Mafia pessimistic about Russia’s prospects for has been a successful parasite on the Italian development over the next several decades. economy in the sense that it has not taken too The country is most likely to develop a “very much from its host, permitting the host to strong authoritarian system,” with an survive and to sustain the parasite.” He added economy heavily based on extraction of that by contrast “organized crime in Russia resources but seriously lagging in civilian today seems to be a rather unsuccesful manufacturing—particularly light industry— parasite, in the sense that it takes too much and with a continuing decline in the effi- from its host—and in the end will perhaps kill ciency of agriculture. Russia has lost about not only its host but then also itself.” Hedlund half of its gross domestic product since 1991 concluded that the future for Moscow might and “it might lose a bit more, but will therefore be worse than Palermo. stabilize on some level [and] remain there for Hedlund noted that key differences 10, 20, 30 years,” Hedlund said. between Russian organized crime and Potentially the most serious damage, he corruption and the prevailing situation in added, will come with adverse demographic Italy and other Western countries include trends, “where we are going to see some substantially higher levels of violence, pretty horrible developments when it comes emphasis on maximizing immediate private to mortality and the spread of disease.” gain at the expense of reinvestment in Hedlund emphasized that “a country which enterprises, and massive capital flight experiences that type of hardship—dramatic abroad. This is exacerbated by the general redistribution of both wealth and incomes, absence of social norms based on trust, coupled with the deterioration in public health contract, and rule of law, and a substantial and demography—cannot be a politically degree of civicness in post-Soviet Russia. stable society without a fair amount of “What’s happened was exactly what authority being exercised by the center.” Douglass North said in his 1993 Nobel —by Barton Reppert lecture—vast disruption and vast destruction that could have been avoided if institutional Vol. XIII No. 9 1996 theorists had had some influence over early Crony Capitalism in Russia post-Soviet Russian policymaking,” Hedlund Capitalism is alive in Russia, but it is asserted. “If we look at the Soviet order as a not well, said Peter Rutland at a Kennan kleptocracy, what we have in Russia today is a Institute lecture on 21 January 1996. Rutland decentralized kleptocracy—an economic is Assistant Director of the Research and system based on no rules and no effective Analysis Department at the Open Media mechanisms of enforcement. It is based on Research Institute in Prague, and Associate privatized, instant justice, where no state Professor of Government at Wesleyan makes and upholds laws, where the rulers of University. Rutland argued that less than five the state do not show any great deal of interest years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in... subordinating themselves to the law.” crony capitalism is causing chaos and 109 hindering, if not blocking, further economic be allowed to create regulations as they progress in Russia. perceive necessary? Rutland noted that According to Rutland, several counter- Russia has neither the chicken nor the egg, it productive relationships are causing the only has interest groups disinclined to Russian economy to veer off course. Rough- establish any rules and a state structure that and-ready capitalism, as Rutland describes it, is unable to establish them. The “collapsed is operating in Russia, but there is a problem- Soviet state is incapable of bridging the gap atic relationship between this nascent between potential common interest of the capitalism and the state institutions. The business elite and their private interest,” said government has yet to provide any rules of Rutland. the game. In addition, new capitalism, Another problem is Russia’s disorga- having developed upon the old Soviet nized economy. Many payments are severely infrastructure, is not well-positioned to take late, including government wages. The advantage of current economic reform. Russian government is finding it difficult to “An interlocking clique of business manage its currency as almost one-half of its elites who use their political connections to cash supply is in U.S. dollars, a daunting shield themselves from domestic and interna- challenge for any government whose cash tional competition” is how Rutland defines supply includes foreign currency, Rutland crony capitalism. While informal relation- noted. Under the Soviet system, the federal ships are a part of business throughout the government controlled 70 to 80 percent of the world, Russia’s extensive set of networks is a Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In the threat to the growth of Russia’s economy. The Russian Federation, that figure has shrunk to use of personal and political connections is less than 15 percent. In Western Europe, by present at the highest level of the govern- contrast, the norm for the GDP controlled by ment. Yeltsin’s cronyism, or playing personal the federal government is 40–50 percent. favorites, fractured the already ideologically “The federal government’s ability to tax and divided Duma. raise revenue is pathetic by international These international business elites, as standards” Rutland said. Russia’s economy is some Russian businessmen have come to be further strained by the legacy of the Soviet known, do not perceive any incentive to economy in which industrial and military invest political and economic power in their sectors were emphasized and the service own country. Since Russia’s economy is now sector was underdeveloped. According to open, they have the opportunity to take their Rutland, “The new Russian capitalism businesses elsewhere. Living in European inherited what was left behind by the Soviet countries where the economy is more state, which of all state structures in history, advanced, education is better, and crime is is probably least inclined toward developing less is far more attractive than trying to affect a capitalist market economy.” change at home. Rutland believes that these Unconvinced of Russia’s ability to new power elites are “looting the economy” become a market economy, Rutland questioned by investing abroad. the prevailing models of economic transition “Some political agent has to create for Russia. He proposed a more effective public order, has to create stable market model—the layer-cake model—which layers institutions. At the moment no such institu- each stratum of society one on top of another tion is visible on the Russian political hori- without any direct connection between them. zon.” Hence, Rutland explained, Russia is Some layers, like the oil and gas industry, are in faced with the problem of how to convince slow decline, while others, like manufacturing, people to subordinate their individual have quickly collapsed. Conversely, financial interest for the good of society-at-large to services have boomed in the last four years, build a strong civic foundation based on low creating 2,500 commercial banks. This erratic inflation, a stable monetary system, and law growth/collapse rate is straining the capacity of and order. As an example of the need for law state institutions to deal with problems. It has and order, last year alone there were 500 created a crisis-driven approach to problem contract killings in Russia. Rutland compared solving where politicians are forced to play Russia’s dilemma with the chicken and egg catchup. For instance, while banks have problem. Should Russia first establish flourished, there was no institution to regulate capitalist rules which the business commu- them. Thus no rules of the game existed and, nity must follow or should business groups tragically, family savings perished. Rutland 110 characterized the current Russian economy as a seen as a threats to neighboring states. “cash on the nail economy that would not work Accepting this concept, it can be argued that in the Stone Age very well, let alone in the neighboring states have an interest in modern world.” promoting resolution. In the search for a Russia now needs to bring order out of resolution to the conflict in Tajikistan, the chaos and create stable market institutions. notion of collective security has been enacted Rutland acknowledged a few positive signs, as pressure from the other Central Asian such as the end of hyper-inflation. But there countries is being applied to both the current is still what Rutland describes as “creative Tajik government and its opposition to come anarchy.” While smaller coutnries might to an agreement. Uzbekistan also seeks to function with a crony capitalist system, unite Central Asia culturally and historically, Russia with its immense networks cannot. through this year’s 660th birthday celebration Rutland’s biggest concern is the real lack of of Tamerlane, a cruel yet successful Central interest of the powerful business elites to Asian ruler. Furthermore, Uzbekistan bring about stability. This should be in their President Karimov promotes the notion of best interest, “so that there are not contract “Turkestan,” a common home for Central killers cruising the streets of Moscow rid- Asia which cooperates toward a common dling bankers with bullets every week.” goal. While other Central Asian states —by Fatimah Balbed advocate cooperation, they do not support the notion of a totally unified region. Vol. XIII No. 10 1996 Turkmenistan, providing the extreme Multi-Lateralism in Central Asia example of this case, has tended to remain The Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, independent and non-cooperative, said Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kangas. Its critical economic situation, Uzbekistan are beginning to realize the however, is causing it to reconsider the benefits of multi-lateral cooperation, stated benefits of multilateral cooperation. Roger Kangas at a Kennan Institute lecture According to Kangas, economic on 29 January 1996. Kangas, Research stabilization has been Central Asia’s most Analyst, Open Media Research Institute, important issue. In an attempt to promote Prague, and Assistant Professor of Political economic growth, Kazakhstan, Kyrgzstan, Science, University of Mississippi, explained Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan that each of these countries is starting to have formed the Central Asian Economic understand that it cannot exist in a vacuum Council, which focuses on regional trade and that relations and ties with neighboring issues. In addition, Kazakhstan and countries must be developed to maintain Kyrgyzstan have joined an economic union stability in the region. with Russia and Belarus. This multi-lateral Upon gaining independence in 1991, association seeks to encourage free trade the Central Asian states of the former Soviet through customs unions. It is also significant Union focused their efforts on resolving because it shows that Russia will remain an domestic issues such as economic stabiliza- important economic partner in the region tion, regime legitimization, and ethnic despite Central Asian reluctance to involve minority concerns. Feeling secure in their Russia. Kangas noted that Russia is a independence, these states are now develop- necessary partner for Central Asia, but one ing regional and foreign policies on the issues that should be kept at a distance. While of economic development, national resource Russia considers Central Asia a resource management, national security and rights for base and a southern border region of ethnic minorities. average importance, Central Asia, still Uzbekistan is perhaps the leader as far unknown to much of the world, needs as regional cooperation is concerned, noted economic interaction with its northern Kangas. It promotes itself as a regional power neighbor. and volunteers to host most multi-lateral Natural resource management is Central Asian conferences and meetings. another area in which Central Asia can According to Kangas, Uzbekistan has a benefit from multi-lateralism, asserted definite interest in becoming the “Germany Kangas. Kazakhstan, for instance, is learning of Central Asia.” In fact, it is Uzbekistan that to negotiate with other countries regarding advocates the concept of collective security in the transportation of oil from the Tengiz oil which internal conflicts in one country are field. Its oil can be transported through 111 Russia, Iran, or the Caucasus, depending on Vol. XIII No. 11 1996 the terms and agreement that are made. The Understanding Nationalist Violence issue of dividing the resources of the Caspian Nationalist violence is best understood Sea is also one requiring negotiations both within a framework of political contention among Central Asian states and with outside rather than as simply a psychological state players. Even tense relations among the among its participants, said Mark Central Asian States can lead to positive Beissinger at a Kennan Institute lecture on 5 outcomes, as in the case with Uzbek oil February 1996. Beissinger is a Woodrow shipments to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, said Wilson Center Fellow and Professor of Kangas. Uzbekistan has cut off oil shipments Political Science at the University of Wiscon- sin, Madison. Nationalist violence is one of to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan due to their several forms for contesting a specific delinquent payments. Each time shipments crystallization of the state’s territorial, have been halted, Kyrgyz and Tajik leaders human, or cultural boundaries, and it is have personally met with Uzbek President important to determine why violent collec- Karimov in order to come to a resolution. The tive action is chosen over other ways of frequency of these shipment cutoffs and their pressing demands. subsequent negotiations have resulted in the Traditional models of nationalist positive benefit of increased communication violence include: 1) a contagion of emotion between the countries involved. whipped up by ethnic entrepreneurs, 2) Military development can also benefit frustration over thwarted goals which find vent from cooperation with other countries, said in aggression, and 3) the notion that there is a Kangas. For instance, Kazakhstan and “culture of violence” which predisposes Uzbekistan have formed joint training units individuals to violent action. Each of these with Russia in order to advance the forma- models is found wanting when one considers tion of their young armies. In addition, patterns of nationalist violence in the former discussion has begun regarding a joint Soviet Union. Of 150 different ethnic conflicts battalion for UN peacekeeping forces that took place from 1988–91, only 20 resulted consisting of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek in human casualties. The speaker argued that it troops. Kangas noted that such cooperation is is impossible to explain why some groups seen as important for peace-keeping in the resort to violence in the name of the nation region, but is not a hinderance to the devel- unless one explains why others do not. Nation- opment of independent military forces for alist violence also needs to be examined as part each Central Asian state. Combined efforts of a larger cycle of mobilizational politics, and are also being discussed to solve certain CIS not merely as a series of discrete acts. border problems, such as unresolved border According to Beissinger, shifts in disputes with Afghanistan and China and authority are critical to triggering national- illegal drug trafficking. ism. Waves of nationalist mobilization are The resolution of rights for ethnic precipitated by events signaling a shift in minorities in Central Asia remains a controver- authority which calls into question the status sial issue for each of the Central Asian states. of the state’s physical, human, or cultural Cooperation and exchange of information can boundaries. Both those seeking to challenge it facilitate the adoption of minorities policies that are capable of using violence. Thus, national- best suits each country’s particular situation. ist violence is not only a way of contesting The use of a titular language versus the Russian domination, but also of institutionalizing language and the question citizenship versus domination. The decision to undertake dual-citizenship for ethnic Russians is of violence is in part strategic, based on the particular importance to those countries with a perceived strength of the target, the per- large Russian diaspora. In addition, each ceived efficacy of non-violent methods, the Central Asian state must address the treatment nature of the issue contended, and most of its other ethnic minorities, regarding official importantly the role played by the state. language use and citizenship. Beissinger examined the roles of Despite struggling economies, ethnic shifting authority, the mistrust embedded conflicts, national resource management through past contestation, and the actions of disputes, and security issues, Central Asia is the state in triggering waves of violence in a in the process of “regionalizing” to bring study of 2,177 mass violent events and 6,663 about stability and prosperity. mass non-violent demonstrations in the —by Julia Smith former Soviet Union from 1987–92. In 112 contrast to the conventional wisdom of the Only in a handful of cases, said Beissinger, has experts at the time, said the speaker, the violence become a self-sustaining strategy of overwhelming majority of violence was not nationalist contention. In each of these cases between supporters and opponents of the active role of the state in sustaining secession from the Soviet Union, but rather violence is the distinguishing characteristic. over the question of republican borders. Non- With the involvement of the state, violence violent demonstrations over borders in 1988– itself becomes institutionalized, and a corre- 89 declined precisely as violent forms of sponding leap in the organization and protest grew in significance. By contrast, the sophistication of the weaponry used ensues. issue of secession from the Soviet Union was “Nationalist violence is largely a tale of almost entirely contested through non- ordinary people doing the most un-ordinary violent demonstrations, even when such things,” declared Beissinger, “and rather than demonstrations in George, Armenia, and simply dismissing this as madness and Azerbaijan were met with violence by the nationalism as irrationality, we need to think state. seriously about how it is such transforma- The reasons had much to do with the tions in people’s thinking occur.” opportunities set by the state for influencing —by Joseph Dresen politics through non-violent means. Under Stalin and Khrushchev the USSR did engage in Vol. XIII No. 12 1996 internal boundary change, making more than Nationalism and Russia’s Republics 30 border changes from 1930–70. But under Nationalism in a multiethnic society Brezhnev a fear of the potential instability that has posed a challenge for democratization in would be unleashed by internal boundary the Russian Federation, said Leokadia change became esconced within the leadership. Drobizheva at a Kennan Institute lecture on A policy of refusing to consider any internal 8 February 1996. Drobizheva and her boundary change was unanimously supported colleagues at the Institute of Ethnology and by the Politburo under Gorbachev. Groups Anthropology of the Russian Academy of initially attempted to influence the Soviet Sciences—Airat Aklaev, Galina Soldatova, government on these issues through non- and Viktoria Koroteyeva—have recently violent means, but found the U.S. government published the results of their extensive unwilling to consider change yet incapable of research on nationalism and democratization defending the status quo. Moreover, the in the Russian Federation. Their analysis, opposing local governments and competing using Tatarstan, Sakha-Yakutia, North ethnic groups were not susceptible to influence Ossetia, and Tuva as case studies, provides a through non-violent demonstrations. By cross-section of the most controversial issues refusing to create a non-violent political process regarding ethno-nationalism in Russia’s on this issue, the Soviet government channeled republics: nationalism and civil society, mobilization over the issue towards violence. interethnic relations in the republics, and the By contrast, the speaker said, the Soviet desire for economic autonomy. government, as the primary target of seces- Drobizheva spoke on the sources for sionist movements, was vulnerable to large ethnic autonomous movements in Russia, non-violent mobilizations over this issue. noting that traditional scholarship has consid- Given this fact, along with the overwhelming ered the ethnic intelligentsia to be instigators of relative coercive power of the Soviet govern- movements threatening the integrity of the ment, violent action was usually rejected as a Russian Federation. But, Drobizheva said, the failing strategy. Beissinger argued that belief majority (60–80%) of the ethnic populations in in the ability to contest issues non-violently Russia have supported movements for more was vital in determining whether nationalism economic autonomy in their respective repub- assumed a violent or non-violent form. lics. The intelligentsia, by contrast, has been Finally, Beissinger noted that the state is primarily concerned with cultural objectives, not an innocent bystander in acts of nationalist such as defending the use of national languages violence—it plays a key role in cuing and even or controlling the local educational system, to organizing such outbreaks. Nationalist ensure that history is taught from the perspec- violence is always organized: from inciting tive of indigenous peoples. crowds, to identifying victims, to transporta- Aklaev discussed the relationship tion of combatants, to supplying weapons. between democratization and ethnic peace, Usually, nationalist violence is short-lived. noting that they are evolving processes, but 113 questioning whether democratization was economic basis for political independence. destined to bring ethnic unrest in Russia. He She explained that Tatarstan and Sakha- asserted that in a weak civil society, ethnicity Yakutia both have a wealth of natural assumes a stronger role, but when the civic resources, giving them a potential advantage and ethnic dimensions of nationhood are in economic development and a desire to balanced, political stability is possible. establish control over these resources. Aklaev concluded that a lack of democratic Tatarstan, for example, strives to sell its oil at institutions and discourse in Russia today has world market prices in foreign markets to resulted in a decline in the civic dimension of generate income for the republic. In 1993–94 nationhood and a corresponding rise in the Tatarstan and Yakutia made strides toward ethnic dimension, catalyzing nationalist economic decentralization in Russia by sentiments. He noted, however, that in refusing to pay federal taxes on income they Tatarstan, where ethnic Tatars and Russians considered to be theirs. Consequently, an are nearly equal in percentage of the popula- agreement reached between the federal tion, there exists political moderation and government and the republics gave the latter trust for the republican government. The what they wanted: increased economic parity (in size) of ethnic communities in autonomy. According to Koroteyeva, eco- Tatarstan is therefore a contributory factor to nomic nationalism is a protective defense moderating claims by leaders of the two against the Russian federal government’s ethnic communities. economic dominance. Alternatively, it is also Soldatova examined the relationship a sign that the republics wish to retain between Russians living in ethnic republics relations with Moscow since politics remains and their titular neighbors, noting that while primarily in the hands of the center. Russian nationalism is on the rise in central Drobizheva noted, however, that the more Russia and in most metropolitan areas, chaos that exists in the center, the higher the Russians who live in republics interact more chance for separation of ethnic republics from constructively with non-Russians compared the Russian Federation. She also mentioned to their counterparts in other areas. Soldatova that while Tatarstan’s ultimate goal is greater contended that Russians in ethnic regions political autonomy, perhaps even secession, have a comprehensive understanding of their Sakha-Yakutia has opted instead for a indigenous neighbors even while differentiat- narrower goal of economic independence ing themselves from them. than political autonomy. She added that While the general tendency for divisive according to public opinion today, only 5– nationalist feelings is less among Russians 10% of the population of ethnic republics living in the republics than for the indigenous want to secede, 40–60% seek more autonomy populations, said Soldatova, there are excep- and treatment as equal partners with the tions. This is especially true when Russians are central government. in the minority, as in the republic of Tuva, for —by Julia Smith example, where Russians comprise 30% of the total population. In such circumstances, Vol. XIII No. 13 1996 Russians develop a “hyper-identity,” charac- Soviet-Era Ecologists: Beginnings of a terized by a low degree of tolerance for others Civil Society? and a feeling of being threatened. Drobizheva Archival research has yielded evidence added that the concept of Russian nationalism that groups of ecologists exhibited characteris- has two very different aspects: the positive tics of a nascent, independent civil society aspect appears in the form of patriotism in under the Soviet system, according to Dou- which Russians feel pride for their country glas Weiner, Associate Professor of History, and want the best for it. The negative aspect University of Arizona, Tucson and former involves “hyper-identity” and refers to those Title VIII-Supported Kennan Institute Re- Russians who consider themselves a higher search Scholar. At a Kennan Institute lecture ethnic group whose rights are above others. on 22 February 1996, Weiner stated that while Drobizheva noted that only 5–10% of the by no means anti-Soviet or a center of opposi- Russian population, mostly those who are tion, the community of Soviet-era ecologists socially disadvantaged, exhibit the negative acted repeatedly to influence Soviet policy on aspect of Russian nationalism. issues of nature protection. Valery Soyfer, The concept of “economic nationalism,” Distinguished University Professor, George said Koroteyeva, is the effort to create an Mason University, cautioned against reading 114 too much into the actions of these ecologists head their nature protection movement. After and stated that the actions of these individuals that, the more ardent ecologists joined the cannot be interpreted as an expression of Moscow Society of Naturalists, where they independence—other explanations for their continued their tradition of independent behavior must exist. thought and supported an environmental Working during the 1920s in the Inter- youth group at Moscow State University. Agency Department for the Protection of From this tradition, Weiner noted, emerged Nature, Soviet ecologists successfully con- important Russian environmental figures like vinced the government to set aside huge tracts Nikolai Vorontsov and Aleksei Yablokov. of land for nature preserves, called zapovedniki. Archival records demonstrate that the actions As the decade drew to a close, the ecologists of ecologists are characteristic of a nascent redirected their nature protection efforts civil society working to defend its interests towards moderating the impact of Soviet within the Soviet system over the course of economic policy on nature. Their efforts decades, Weiner concluded. proved largely unsuccessful, as the first five- Soyfer cautioned against overestimat- year plan saw the end of the ecologists’ direct ing the actual independence of these “archi- influence on Soviet policy with the disbanding pelagoes of freedom.” Citing Weiner’s of their department in 1931. From that time, example of a July 1947 letter from ecologists the ecologists’ struggle would largely center which criticized the KGB for recklessly on preserving the integrity of the zapovedniki. cutting down trees in the Crimea, Soyfer These territories, stated Weiner, were invio- suggested an alternate explanation: rumors lable by charter and thereby exempt from of the declining popularity of Lysenko and Stalin’s “transformation of nature” program, his “scientific” justifications for despoiling making them, and the ecologists who man- the environment were widespread in party aged them, “archipelagoes of freedom.” circles by early 1947. These rumors were Stalin’s rise to power proved to be a proven in March 1948 when Yuri Zhdanov, dangerous time for scientists whose work did Chairman of the Scientific Division of the not support the economic and political Central Committee, delivered a lecture policies of the government. Individuals such criticizing Lysenko to propagandists from all as T.D. Lysenko used political denunciations over the Soviet Union. Soyfer surmised that in the guise of scientific criticism against the ecologists’ criticisms, rather than reflect- colleagues and came to dominate much of ing true independence, merely echoed views Soviet science. While biologists and geneti- supported by the party. As for the youth cists were purged, argued Weiner, field nature protection group at Moscow State ecologists in the remote wilderness were University, Soyfer said, one of their main deemed too unimportant to be targeted for activities was to camp in the woods at destruction. During the height of Lysenko’s Christmas time and make sure nobody cut power in the 1930s, ecologists managed to down Christmas trees. operate quietly to protect the zapovedniki. Weiner and Soyfer agreed that the Soviet ecologists, now organized in the interpretation of records in the newly opened All-Russian Nature Protection Movement, archives of the former Soviet Union will be a shifted from attempting to influence policy at subject of increasing debate in the future. the union level to the republic and oblast level. Weiner commented on the importance of Citing documents from ecologists and local these archives and noted that the Sierra Club officials who supported the continued integrity did not learn the history of the All-Russian of the nature preserves, Weiner postulated that Nature Protection Movement before opening local politicians regarded the zapovedniki as relations with it. Had the Sierra Club done “our property” and as a symbol of their so, it would have discovered that this importance in relations with the center. organization, the largest “nature protection During the 1940s and 1950s the movement” in the world with 38 million zapovedniki grew in significance as the members in the 1970s, was a puppet of the Forestry Ministry began looking for new Soviet government with unwitting factory sources of timber. Although the preserves employees enrolled as “members.” Accord- were successfully defended for a time, the ing to both speakers, such examples demon- Soviet government quashed the modest strate the importance of studying the archival resistance from the ecologists by engineering history of the Soviet Union. the election of a former forestry minister to —by Joseph Dresen 115 Vol. XIII No. 14 1996 and-large pro-Yeltsin and thus suffered no Regional Russian Politics and Yeltsin’s serious divisions. According to Matsuzato, “Administrative Party” Samara oblast was the picture of class The study of regional politics in Russia struggle, its ex-nomenklatura split between is conducive to understanding the Yeltsin Party elites and the rank-and-file. In contrast, regime, asserted Kimitaka Matsuzato at a rural Tver oblast experienced a split consid- Kennan Institute lecture on 19 March 1996. ered by Matsuzato as typical of many Matsuzato, Doctor of Law at Hokkaido Russian oblasts: divisions within the Obkom University and Visiting Scholar at Harvard and the Ispolkom. Cheliabinsk oblast was University’s Kathryn and Shelby Cullom similarly divided, between the Obkom and the Davis Russian Research Center, addressed City Committee (Gorkom) of the oblast the development of local nomenklatura capital. communities since the split of the Commu- Yeltsin created support in the regions nist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1990 and described these communities and their by consolidating “nomenklatura democrats” relationship with Yeltsin’s “administrative into local administrative parties and using his party.” system for the appointment of governors to The breakup of the CPSU began in unite regional pro-Yeltsin factions which 1990 when Gorbachev introduced an anti- emerged after 1990. This structure in the bureaucracy campaign aimed at downsizing regions explains why Yeltsin has not been and reorganizing Oblast Committee depart- interested in creating his own political ments, Matsuzato explained. While Stalin party—he already has one. While Yeltsin led a similar anti-bureaucracy policy with an supporters are often referred to collectively “iron hand,” noted Matsuzato, Gorbachev’s as the “party of power”, Matsuzato preferred plan lacked Stalin’s degree of control and the term “administrative party” to represent exposed itself to the backlash of its victims. The 1990 elections also contributed to the the party’s alliance with local administrative split of the CPSU into local nomenklatura officials. Matsuzato explained that a political communities, subjecting bureaucrats from group, if it has participated in an election, regional governments (Ispolkom), party can be considered a political party. Therefore, organs (Obkom), and the Komsomol to politi- he concluded, the “administrative party,” cal competition. having participated in Russia’s 1993 elections The June 1990 founding convention of (through support of Russia’s Choice) and the Communist Party of the Russian Federa- 1995 elections (through support of Our tion (CPRF) revealed Communist Party House is Russia), is a political party. leaders’ pessimism regarding the future of Matsuzato further asserted that most the Party. Hence, many local CPSU Russian local bureaucracies belong to the nomenklatura feared a loss in their political “administrative party” and are therefore not standing and shifted their alliance to demo- politically neutral. Yeltsin’s positive relations cratic groups. These individuals, who did not with local administrations allow him to give up their Communist Party membership, manipulate the regions to his benefit, using Matsuzato termed “nomenklatura demo- local administrators who have an enormous crats,” demonstrated the overlap between amount of control over local politics and the Russian democrats and former Soviet nomen- election process. The selection of electoral klatura. Hence, as Russia’s democratic candidates, for example, is almost exclusively movement shifted its social base from the under the influence of regional administra- intelligentsia to discontented groups within tions. The collection of signatures (a prerequi- the nomenklatura it further undermined the site for being recognized as a candidate) is Soviet regime. also under regional administrative control. In After the failed coup in August 1991, addition, local administrative officials Yeltsin contributed to the split of local (especially governors) and law enforcement nomenklatura communities by introducing a officials play a large role in electoral cam- system of presidentially-appointed local paigning. Election voting and calculation governors. Matsuzato gave examples of the conducted by local electoral commissions is types of realignment undergone by regional often falsified and fraudulent. Matsuzato ex-nomenklatura communities based on field cited the particular example of the city of research he conducted in four oblasts: Samara in which “at-home” voting took place Ulianovsk, Samara, Tver, and Cheliabinsk. In as early as one week prior to the official Ulianovsk oblast ex-nomenklatura were by- elections. Members of the electoral commis- 116 sion visited homes, bearing gifts which were relations with the Communist Party of the only given after signatures were provided. Russian Federation (CPRF) because they Voters were not informed that the signatures believe it has a good chance of winning the were actually used for ballot entries. upcoming presidential elections. Matsuzato claimed Yeltsin’s chances for Kryshtanovskaya noted that there are success in the upcoming presidential elec- two ways to become a millionaire in Russia: tions were quite promising, due principally through banking and finance; or the sale of to the influence and operation of the presi- raw materials abroad. Natural resources are dential administration. The “administrative under government control and require special party’s” poor performance in the 1995 Duma permission for export, thus demonstrating the elections is not a reliable indicator of the state’s role in giving rise to new commercial presidential elections because those elections elites. Getting rich in Russia is risky, however, were not of major importance to the “admin- as the absence of an effective legal infra- istrative party.” Matsuzato predicted that structure for the commercial sector provides Yeltsin’s party will perform more successfully no protection for the contracts and profits in the 1996 presidential elections due to its made by Russian businessmen. Therefore, regional support: local administrators are Russians turn to one of two options to safe- guaranteed reward and security with a Yeltsin guard their business deals: 1) they create their victory. Matsuzato also expected the results of own security forces; or 2) they pay mafia the presidential elections to be much closer groups for protection. Because it is usually the than those of the Duma elections. less expensive option, many Russian busi- —by Julia Smith nesses are under mafia protection. According to the speaker, the most effective method for Vol. XIII No. 15 1996 debt collection is to hire a group of “enforcers” Wealthy Russians: Privilege and Power who will make threats and/or use force to “To be rich in Russia means that the ensure clients’ debt repayment. Those busi- government has allowed you to be rich,” nesses that choose to create their own security said Olga Kryshtanovskaya at a Kennan forces almost always select a former MVD Institute lecture on 2 April 1996. (Ministry of the Internal Affairs) or KGB Kryshtanovskaya, Head, Department of Elite (Committee on State Security) official to lead Studies, Institute of Sociology, Russian the security division. Former MVD and KGB Academy of Sciences; Director, Institute of officials are characteristically more inclined to Policy Studies, Moscow; and Visiting Scholar, Center for Eurasian, Russian, and support a communist-oriented party than a East European Studies, Georgetown Univ- democratically-oriented party, implying that ersity, emphasized the interrelations between key positions within the commercial struc- the Russian government and the Russian tures are partial to the CPSU, said business community and described the Kryshtanovskaya. characteristics and tendencies of Russia’s The volatility of business in Russia has wealthy in detail. caused rich Russians to keep their capital in According to Kryshtanovskaya, 61 the most liquid of forms: cash. They also buy percent of wealthy Russians come from the diamonds and furs, open bank accounts in nomenklatura of the former Soviet Union, West European banks, or invest in foreign many of them former “economic” managers real estate. The term “New Russians” is often or members of the Komosomol (Communist used in the West to refer to Russians who Youth League). Because initial privatization of spend lots of money, buy expensive cars, and the Russian government was conducted by the stroll the Champs Elysees. These “New state itself, converting ministries to firms and Russians,” stereotyped as being flashy, privatizing the government’s financial and tasteless, impolite, and lacking in education, distribution systems, members of the Soviet are the object of many jokes and anecdotes nomenklatura were some of the first to be among the Russian population. But involved in Russia’s emerging private sector. Kryshtan-ovskaya noted that those who Today, the banking industry is particularly perpetuate the image of the “New Russians” well represented by former government are not the wealthiest in Russia. The truly officials, with 70 percent of the 200 largest rich—far less conspicuous to the Western commercial banks having previously been eye—are those who gained their wealth and government banks. Kryshtanovskaya noted power through preferential access to the that many Russian banks maintain good privatization of government assets. 117 Since most Russian rich became so Russian Federation (CPRF). Speaking at a through government privileges, they are not Kennan Institute lecture on 16 April 1996, supporters of a liberal economy, which would Ayvazyan outlined the platform of the CPRF in theory provide equal opportunity for all for the upcoming Russian presidential citizens. To protect their interests and ensure election in June, contrasting it with what he that their privileges remain shared by only a termed the failed policies of Russian Presi- small and select group, industrial and finan- dent Boris Yeltsin. cial structures make sure to gain the allegiance The Yeltsin administration’s policies of a political “benefactor” within the state have had a terrible impact on the Russian structure. For instance, the oil and gas indus- economy and society, said Ayvazyan. try enjoys Prime Minister Viktor Production has declined by over 50 percent Chernomyrdin as their state supporter; the under Yeltsin’s rule, compared to a figure of metallurgical industry is backed by First 27 percent for the U.S. during the Great Deputy Prime Minister Soskovets. In general, Depression. Income disparity is growing said Kryshtanovskaya, each revenue produc- rapidly as a handful of Russians become ing branch of the Russian economy maintains millionaires while over 60 percent of the a political ally. Given the time and money that population lives in poverty. The economy is is invested in such alliances, Russian business- becoming increasingly criminalized in sectors men prefer to support the political regime that such as consumer goods, banking, energy, promotes the status quo. Liberal democracy and even military industries. Lastly, the war has the potential to bring in new people and in Chechnya has resulted in a greater number new policies and displace current arrange- of casualties than the war in Afghanistan. ments. Businessmen also ensure their These conditions, noted the speaker, have interests are protected by lobbying Duma been accompanied by a psychological loss of members, sponsoring political parties, or pride among the Russians as a nation. paying bribes. Ayvazyan claimed that the ideas In determining which political regime articulated in Zyuganov’s presidential will benefit them most, Russian businessmen platform stand in sharp contrast to Yeltsin’s are divided in their support for Yeltsin and policies. Ayvazyan elaborated on the follow- Zyuganov, said Kryshtanovskaya. Some ing main points of the CPRF presidential support the figure of a “strict Yeltsin” who platform: restore law and order; introduce would promote the cancellation or postpone- social and economic reform to bring about a ment of the presidential elections. Recently, mixed economy with public and private in fact, a group of bankers told Yeltsin that it sectors; improve ethnic relations and end the was not necessary to hold elections as they Chechen war; and revise the constitution to could cause instability. Others back a “lenient make the executive branch more accountable Zyuganov” who does not favor traditional to the parliament. Ayvazyan also emphasized communism, and promises elites stability in that Zyuganov would promote the “volun- the economic system. tary, gradual reintegration” of the former Kryshtanovskaya concluded by noting Soviet republics, adding that the disintegra- the impossibility of forecasting Russian tion of the Soviet Union in 1991 was uncon- economic policy without knowing the shape stitutional and was opposed by 76 percent of of the political system. The upcoming the population at the time. On foreign policy, presidential elections, she maintained, will, Ayvazyan declared that Russia would assert regardless of outcome, have a revolutionary its own national interests first and foremost, effect on business in Russia. while preserving international cooperation —by Julia Smith on global problems. Under Zyuganov, foreign policy priority would be given to Vol. XIII No. 16 1996 relations with the former Soviet republics Zyuganov Aide Outlines Russian and all other neighboring countries, includ- Communist Party Platform ing China, India, Arab countries, Israel, and “Today, Gennady Zyuganov represents the nations of Eastern Europe. a new political force and not a traditional On the question of how Zyuganov communist party,” declared Sergei would end the war in Chechnya, Ayvazyan Ayvazyan, Foreign Policy Advisor to Russian stated that Zyuganov will soon articulate a Presidential Candidate, Gennady Zyuganov, concrete policy on this subject. In general Chairman of the Communist Party of the terms, Chechnya would be granted more 118 autonomy—but not independence—and a pressed doubt that the June election will be limited troop presence would be kept to free or fair. To remain in power, according to maintain stability and to prevent “massa- the speaker, Yeltsin will either cancel, cres” between rival Chechen factions. postpone, or falsify the results of the presi- With an economic team composed of dential election. In support of this view, the former head of Gosplan and representa- Ayvazyan referred to the 9.2 million falsified tives from academia and the private sector, votes (as reported by the U.S. intelligence and Zyuganov will pursue policies designed to the media) in the 1993 constitutional referen- “create an adequate, attractive investment dum, which greatly expanded Yeltsin’s climate,” Ayvazyan said. He further empha- power. The speaker then invoked Stalin’s sized that foreign investment is preferable to maxim that “what matters is not how people credits or loans, and that investments should vote, but how the votes are counted.” be based on the principle of “long-term, —by Joseph Dresen mutually beneficial relationships” rather than deals made for a “quick buck.” Ayvazyan Vol. XIII No. 17 1996 addressed the perception that Zyuganov The Evolution of the Russian presents one face to the West and another to Banking System Russian audiences by stating that Zyuganov Despite significant decentralization and tailors his answers, not his principles, to economic reform efforts, the Russian banking different audiences. system risks a major crisis in the next year, The CPRF, according to the speaker, is said Juliet Johnson at a Kennan Institute the largest political party in Russia with over lecture on 6 May 1996. Johnson, a research 500,000 members, making Zyuganov the fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies “most influential political leader in the Program at the Brookings Institution, country.” The popularity of the party is recently spent seven months in Russia trying reflected in the results of the 1995 Duma to answer the question: why has the Russian elections (Zyuganov’s party captured a banking system failed to reform along plurality of 22.3 percent of the party list market lines? She conducted seventy-five voting and 34.9 percent of the Duma seats) interviews with bankers and policymakers in and by Zyuganov’s status as front-runner in the cities of Moscow, Riazan, and Volgograd. the presidential elections in June. Other Through her research, she found that decen- challengers to Yeltsin for the presidency are tralization alone was not sufficient to achieve not credible, according to Ayvazyan. Ultra- banking reform in Russia. Johnson argued nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky enjoys the that the combination of persistent soviet support of a solid 10 percent of the electorate, institutional legacies and bankers’ adminis- but is only a one-man show and cannot trative independence—the increased au- muster broad support. Ayvazyan also tonomy of bankers that allows them to play dismissed “Third Force” candidates such as the key role in guiding the process of institu- economist Grigorii Yavlinskii, retired Lt. tional change—does not promote the emer- General Aleksandr Lebed’, and wealthy eye gence of a healthy market economy in Russia. surgeon Svyatoslav Fedorov. None of the The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) three are strong enough to win on their own, emerged from the Russian branch of nor are they likely to unite successfully Gosbank (the state bank of the Soviet Union) behind one candidate. after the Soviet Union collapsed. Hence, the Ayvazyan predicted that only Yeltsin Central Bank of Russia inherited a number of and “the party of power” have the potential traits from the Soviet banking industry which to win an election against Zyuganov; al- act as impediments to current reform mea- though, he argued, not by running on sures. Such obstacles to reform include: the Yeltsin’s ideas or accomplishments. Yeltsin’s CBR’s weak monetary policy; the secretive, access to the unlimited resources of the state, centralized nature of the CBR; a nonexistent total control over state media, access to the payments and clearing system; the support of power of the executive branch of the govern- inefficient enterprises to keep production ment, and his control of the Presidential levels up and unemployment down; and the Security Force constitute significant advan- multi-republic structure of the CBR. When tages in his reelection campaign. Ayvazyan Gosbank was taken over by the CBR in 1991, declared his confidence in Zyuganov’s the fourteen other central banks throughout victory in a free and fair election, but ex- the USSR used the ruble as currency and had 119 the capacity to give unlimited loan credits, considered “good, developing banks” by most resulting in hyperinflation. In order to reduce western agencies, although many of them hyperinflation, the Yeltsin government have bad loans and incur losses from currency supported the breakup of the ruble zone. speculation. According to Johnson, the small However, the Central Bank of Russia did not number of “zero banks” holds more power support this breakup because of its desire to than any other sector of the economy. re-centralize the banking system under its Under the current political regime, the own control. The CBR refused to consider a Russian banking system will continue to coordinating monetary authority for the develop and come to represent a market ruble zone, which would have had power banking system, predicted Johnson. Small, over the CBR’s own activities. As a result, regional banks will close as regulations Gosbank and the Central Bank of Russia become more strict (capital requirements are clashed over this issue and undermined each continually being raised and are scheduled to other’s policies whenever possible. reach five million ecu by January 1999). In Although commercial banks in Russia 1994, 600 banks incurred losses and accord- gained their autonomy through an early ing to a European Union study, 1,600 banks liberalization of the financial system, they too will disappear in the next few years. Those remain plagued by remnants of the Soviet remaining will be larger banks, many of system such as an absence of experienced which were created from state banks or banking staff; the spread of organized crime founded in the early stages of reform and had (an offshoot of the Soviet-era black market); the political and economic power to survive. the monopoly of state savings banks over From her research, Johnson concluded individual depositors; and bad loans inher- that most Russian banks continue to refuse to ited from the previous banking system. commit capital to needy businesses with Johnson termed this situation that combines which they do not have long standing ties, independence with disadvantageous institu- thus hampering the development of the tional legacies the “irony of autonomy.” Russian private sector and banking industry. Created in 1987 from Gosbank to boost According to Johnson, executive policy credits to heavy industry, agriculture, and measures were instilled to change the system small business and trade, “specialized banks” without taking into account the existing became a huge banking bureaucracy. In institutional framework. U.S. advisors also 1990–91 “specialized banks” became fully supported macroeconomic stabilization autonomous commercial banks, although initiatives that proved to be unsuccessful as they retained most of their previous power, the CBR continued to print money and give clients, and predilection to favor formerly credits to unprofitable enterprises. Opposing state-owned enterprises. These banks have Steven Krazner’s punctuated equilibrium the highest number of insolvent clients but theory (crisis situations provide a window of are the least worried about going bankrupt. opportunity in which policymakers can as Johnson noted, non-market-oriented restructure institutions to their own liking) institutional legacies cause banks to make and the totalitarian school of thought (once the decisions that do not always promote USSR fell, the unchangeable Soviet organism capitalist development. could be rebuilt from scratch), Johnson “Pocket banks,” another type of Russian maintained that plans for restructuring must commercial bank, developed from take into account tenacious political and Gorbachev’s “law on co-ops” (1988) through institutional factors of the past. Change will be which financial departments of state enter- slow; public expectations should be moder- prises were made into banks. These banks— ated; resources for reeduction are necessary; which were kept inside the pockets of enter- creation of technological infrastructure is prise directors—increased enterprise access to necessary; and there should be a government government credits and gave enterprises the consensus on general goals, advised Johnson. opportunity to embezzle money from the —by Julia Smith state, resulting in undercapitalized, poorly regulated banks. In the past two years many Vol. XIII No. 18 1996 of these banks have begun to fail. “Zero National Linguistic Policy in Tajikistan banks” first appeared in Moscow in 1988, Tajikistan’s newly-gained political primarily for party elite who wanted to secure independence has not led to cultural and their financial future. Today, “zero banks” are linguistic independence for all of its citizens, 120 stated Khusrav Shambezoda at a Kennan various ethnic groups of the country. In Institute lecture on 13 June 1996. Tajikistan, the Tajik language and its ethnic Shambezoda, a lecturer of Russian language group now hold a majority status, which has and literature at Dushanbe Pedagogical alienated minority groups and raised University and a USIA-Supported Regional concerns over the protection of the linguistic Exchange Scholar at the Kennan Institute, and cultural sovereignty of these groups, said explained that the selection of Tajik as the Shambezoda. Segments of the non-Tajik official language of Tajikistan has upset the speaking population, including ethnic delicate cultural-linguistic balance that Russians, were part of a large movement to existed among its Tajik and non-Tajik inhabit- return to their ethnic homelands. ants during Soviet rule. Shambezoda explained that ethnic As the former Soviet republics undergo groups can react to a threat to their linguistic the process of democratization, the question sovereignty in a variety of ways. In particu- of national and linguistic identity is at the lar, he noted that members of Tajikistan’s forefront of a host of current issues. Sweeping Russian speaking population are faced with social changes and questions of national four main choices: they can give up part of sovereignty have not only influenced the their ethnic identity by learning the state political and economic sphere in Tajikistan, language, Tajik; they can withdraw from but have also transformed cultural and society and live and communicate only with linguistic life. According to Shambezoda, the people of their own ethnic group; they can language of an ethnic group not only influ- fully preserve their language and culture by ences the cultural life of its people, but also emigrating to their ethnic homeland; or they affects the shaping of its identity. He argued can attempt to reinstate the Communist Party that very often the life of a language, like the and the Soviet regime to regain their linguis- life of its people, depends on the state’s tic and cultural dominance. Other non- linguistic policy. As a result, ethnic groups, Russian, non-Tajik, speaking populations also especially minority groups, strive to preserve have four similar choices which Shambezoda their national language. denotes as pluralism, integration, assimila- Tajikistan, like many other multina- tion, and segregation. tional states of the former Soviet Union, is A lack of government structure for the home to people of many different ethnic promotion of cohesive cultural and linguistic backgrounds who speak a variety of distinct development has caused the spread of languages. In the Soviet republic of nationalism throughout the Central Asian Tajikistan, the Russian language possessed countries of the former Soviet Union, said the same legal status as the national lan- Shambezoda. He also noted that strong guage, Tajik. However, Shambezoda ex- nationalist tendencies were more likely to plained, priority was always given to Rus- emerge in countries undergoing rapid sian, consequently resulting in the retarda- industrialization, with high levels of literacy, tion of the functional development of the a developed mass media and communica- Tajik language. After declaring indepen- tions network, and the active participation of dence, the majority of the former Soviet an intellectual elite. In addition, said republics, including Tajikistan, declared their Shambezoda, individuals who seek to foster national language the official language of nationalist tendencies are especially aggres- government, business, education, and the sive during transitional periods when a media. In Tajikistan, Shambezoda noted, the struggle to gain political control over the insufficient development of the Tajik lan- newly sovereign nations occurs. After the guage, especially in science, technology, and loss of their externally imposed Soviet industry, is a source of tension among its identity, the newly independent states are multiethnic and multilingual residents. now faced with the task of redefining The Russian language, used as an themselves as sovereign states. This presents official and functional language in Soviet a rare opportunity for rival nationalist groups Tajikistan, lost its status when it was replaced to bolster their presence and compete to fill by the Tajik language. Tajikistan’s new the void created by the current identity crisis. linguistic policy created a vast array of Because language is such an important complex cultural problems in Tajikistan. The attribute of any people, from the smallest ethnic selection of one language as the official state group to the largest nationality, Shambezoda language affected the dynamics between the stressed that addressing important linguistic 121 questions should be a major component of the thrived in Kyiv and Islamic traditions were domestic policy in any multinational and revived in Central Asian architecture. multiethnic country undergoing political, However, with the introduction of the new economic, and social transition. Although Five Year Plan questions of class and genera- recommending a linguistic policy that would tion upstaged those of nationality, and the use of traditional styles was eradicated, fairly represent the needs of all minority groups Castillo said. The new Soviet International is difficult, Shambezoda emphasized that Style, or Constructivism, was therefore further investigation and research of linguistic regarded by non-enthusiasts as a purge of policy is necessary to bring about practical national character and caused fierce debates recommendations to solve Tajikistan’s difficult in the late 1920s. ethnic and linguistic problems. The backlash to this era, Castillo —by Monique Wilson observed, came in 1932 with the definition of the Socialist Realist “working method.” Socialist Realism called on artists to “reclaim 1996–97 PROGRAM YEAR and assimilate critically the full cultural heritage of past centuries.” Attempts to Vol XIV No. 1 1996 translate this definition into architecture led Soviet Architecture and the National to mutant buildings combining modernist Question designs with aspects of past cultural tradi- The techniques used by the Soviet tions. Socialist Realism therefore trans- architectural establishment to mediate formed Western orientalism, making exoti- explosive national tendencies within the cism an anti-imperialist program to rescue Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were cultures debilitated by capitalist exploita- rooted in the nineteenth-century Russian tion, said Castillo. imperial policy of orientalism, said Gregory Castillo argued that a dependable Castillo at a Kennan Institute lecture on 13 recipe for architecture “socialist in content May 1996. Castillo is an Associate at the and national in form” emerged only in 1939 Center for Environmental Design Research at the second great fair in Moscow, the All- at the University of California, Berkeley. Union Agricultural Exhibition. The designers The European discipline of orientalism, of the 1939 exhibition were given the task of said Castillo, promoted exotic images of non- depicting the Soviet people without any Europeans locked in a state of arrested national traditions or architecture. The development. In this way, orientalism sup- pavilions from the periphery won the most ported European claims to dominance. The praise, according to Castillo, for their success Soviet use of exoticism to refer to the nations in reinventing national traditions rather than of the periphery demonstrated continuity simply reflecting them. Designers were with imperial Russian practice while also lauded for their skill in detecting faint conveying new meanings inspired by national features found in vernacular objects Marxism. Castillo traced the “orienting” of and translating them into their work in a the near abroad through exhibitions held in simplified fashion. Moscow between 1923 and 1954. Castillo remarked that the Socialist Castillo noted that the 1923 World Fair Realist resuscitation of regional culture also in Moscow was similar to other European represented a continuation of imperial fairs in that its designers segregated displays Russian policy in its commodification of that depicted modernity from those illustrat- national folk art. He characterized Socialist ing primitiveness or exoticism. In this way, Realist methods as a reversal of the colonial visitors were guided to a standard set of model of exchange. Local traditions were first conclusions about the right to rule. More- transmitted to Moscow from the periphery over, in accordance with Soviet nationalities through local craftsmen. Then the raw policy, the Russian people were equated vernacular material was processed to remove with the Soviet people at the fair, highlight- any extraneous content, the result was ing Russian superiority in the empire. blended with Soviet symbols, and the final Castillo noted that this bifurcation of non- product was shipped back to the periphery Russian exoticism versus Russian progress as the basis for that republic’s official continued to dominate throughout the NEP national architecture. era. The 1939 fair, when remodeled for its According to Castillo, in the 1920s 1954 post-war opening, reflected the new designers in the periphery were able to form of the Soviet empire, said Castillo. The create architectural styles based on their own pavilions at the fair were designed in order to cultural traditions. Thus neo-baroque allow visitors to visualize the new Soviet 122 political space. Thus, although each republic Viktor Ratchenko, and Nina Seliverstova was treated individually, Castillo illustrated from the Institute of Economics of the Russian that taken together they were portrayed as Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk. Kriukov harmonious partners in the Soviet ensemble. stated that Russia is one of the main gas Encoding the Baltic states into the producers in the world with approximately Soviet system signalled a change in Socialist forty-seven trillion cubic meters of gas Realism and brought the architectural reserves. Close to 80 percent of these resources amalgam created at the 1939 fair to its widest are located in Western Siberia. use. Castillo claimed that advisors to recon- Kriukov reported that just before the struction projects across the region had an breakup of the Soviet Union, as part of the opportunity to school designers on how to economic transformation process, all former show their cultural heritage in a “Soviet way.” production amalgamations in industry were Thus, German designers were told that transformed into “Soviet Union Concerns”— Bauhaus Modernism was a result of American for example, Lukoil for the oil industry and Cosmopolitanism, and were strongly encour- Gazprom for the gas industry. This enabled aged to look to the 1939 Moscow pavilions as Gazprom leadership and ambitious Soviet-style models for their own designs. Castillo referred managers to separate Gazprom from the state to this further step west, into the very coun- structure and integrate the structure outside of tries that had initially exported orientalism, as state planning and partly outside state control. the “orienting” of the Eastern Bloc. The next stage in the transformation was to In this journey west Socialist Realism transform Gazprom from a state-concern into a found its antithetical complement in the state-owned joint stock company. This process International Style, or the strain of modern- more or less came to an end in 1995. ism dominant in the West. The elaboration of According to Kriukov, the priorities of Socialist Realism into this other International the state and Gazprom changed during the Style, according to the speaker, was the transformation process. During the transition ultimate development of the orientalist period, Gazprom’s three main priorities (in aspects of Soviet exhibitionary tradition. In descending order) were: 1.) to acquire its new form, Socialist Realism became an substantial autonomy from the state; 2.) to architecture of opposition to capitalist concentrate power in the central body of cultural imperialism. This allowed the Gazprom; and 3.) to make a profit. establishment, Castillo said, to marginalize Gazprom used a number of instru- cultural resistance. ments to acquire its current power and Orientalism, Castillo concluded, has position, stated Kriukov. First, it acquired the been encumbered by its own internal logical rights to be the sole owner and distributor of contradictions. Even so, he lamented that access to the main trunkline. In 1994, the orientalism is conspicuous in its absence in process of privatization was more or less scholarly literature on colonial culture and finished. The Russian Federation government imperialism. Castillo concluded that this is still the main shareholder—with close to absence, caused by current scholars’ abhor- 40% of the stock—management owns 5%; the rence of “vulgar Marxism,” is in effect a national minorities of Western Siberia own marginalizing strategy in its own right. slightly more than 5%; and close to 29% are —by Nancy Popson held by the Siberian population. Privatization is the second instrument Vol. XIV No. 2 1996 which Gazprom used to attain its power. The Economic Development of the Siberian Gas Gazprom board acquired substantial power Industry not only through its control of the distribution The oil and gas industry is one of the of stock shares, but also via the transformation most stable and well-developed industries in of the internal structure of the post-Soviet gas the Siberian economy and the most important industry; the changing of interrelationships of sector of the Russian economy, said Valerii different subunits within Gazprom; and by Kriukov at a Kennan Institute lecture on 5 transforming the former Gas Ministry into a September 1996. Kriukov, Department Head profit center. No problem can be solved or of the Institute of Economics, Russian Acad- decision made without the permission of the emy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, and Associate Gazprom board. The main task under Professor at Novosibirsk State University was privatization was to establish strong protec- joined by his colleagues Sergei Kazantsev, tion against external interests. Gazprom’s 123 charter accomplishes this by stipulating that depend on the transformation of the Russian shares can be freely bought on the open economy as a whole. However, Kriukov market, but the sale of shares requires permis- argued, Gazprom has the potential to survive sion of the Gazprom board, noted Kriukov. and be the main supplier not only of energy The third instrument included the use resources, but also a key supplier of financial of a pricing policy which contributed to resources for the entire Russian economy. financial independence. In the case of —by Jodi Koehn Gazprom, external prices for the Russian internal market outside of Gazprom grow Vol. XIV No. 3 1996 daily in accordance with exchange rates and The Legacy of Russia’s Defense Industrial the rate of inflation. But, Gazprom can only Cities adjust production cost prices approximately Statistically, the extent of demilitariza- every six months. For the Siberian economy, tion of the Russian economy is quite impres- this means that resource-based regions are sive. Defense procurement has plummeted poorer in terms of their sustainable economic and the output of military goods has gone development. Once their main resources are down as far as one-ninth or tenth of what it depleted, these areas have no resources to was during the peak of the 1980s, said transform their economy into something new. Clifford Gaddy at a Kennan Institute lecture Therefore, their budget is not suitable for the on 30 September 1996. Gaddy, Research long-term development of their economy. Associate at the Brookings Institution in When the Gazprom board introduced Washington, D.C., recently completed a this method of pricing, the purpose was to major project on Russia’s demilitarization— transform the technical authority of the main particularly its economic dimension. The board into a profit center. The next step project looked at both the current situation— towards privatization was to change the legal how Russia demilitarized—as well as status of the units within Gazprom. These described and analyzed the historical legacy units were no longer allowed to have their of the problem itself. Gaddy described the own financial sources or to have contact with project as an attempt to go beneath the the regions and companies which purchased surface to look at indirect ways in which their gas. The Gazprom board became the hypermilitarization of the Soviet economy main profit and strategic center responsible affected the broader society instead of merely for the development of the entire company. quantifying the size of Russia’s defense The fourth instrument used by economy in terms of percentage of gross Gazprom to attain its current position was its national product or employment. special relationship with the Federation. It is Gaddy argued that there were three no secret that the Russian Prime Minister is a interrelated characteristics of the Russian former gas industry Minister. Due to overall defense industry that were perhaps even more declining production in Russia, Gazprom is interesting and important than its sheer size— the main financial source for the entire especially when examining the local effects of country. This allows the Gazprom board and the defense industry. First, was the size of the management to establish a strong bargaining individual defense plants. There were at least position with the federation. 100 Russian defense enterprises that had more The final instrument used by Gazprom than 10,000 employees in a single manufactur- is diversification. Gazprom’s current power ing location. These plants employed about one- will not last forever. Thus, it is diversifying third of the entire defense-industrial labor its assets by venturing into the military- force. Today in the U.S., it is difficult to find a industrial complex and acquiring shares of single manufacturing establishment with that these enterprises. Another avenue of diversi- many employees. In Russia, defense enterprises fication is the financial sector. Since 1993, made up a substantial share of the large Gazprom Bank has been one of the main enterprises in the country. The United States, in banks in Russia, remarked Kriukov. contrast, was characterized by a large number Although Gazprom is currently experi- of small firms. encing great economic success, Kriukov The second characteristic was the degree pointed out that there are some disadvantages of geographical concentration of these plants. for the economy as a whole. Gazprom prevents This relatively small number of plants was companies inside it from realizing their full concentrated in a small number of cities in potential. Gazprom’s options for the future Russia. The fifteen largest provincial cities in 124 Russia were basically defense-industrial cities. of people employed and recorded as em- These cities were predominantly in the heart- ployed dropped by about 160–180,000 in four land (Volga valley, Urals, western Siberia). Most years. In manufacturing alone, 100,000 had a population of approximately one million manufacturing jobs have been lost. people and all were provincial capitals. Gaddy stated that the overall size of The third characteristic was the degree Russia’s defense industry is something that is of isolation and control imposed on these very difficult to measure. According to cities due to the defense industry presence. Gaddy, attempting to measure anything that These cities were closed to foreigners and involves pricing—output compared to permanent residence was highly regulated, GNP—is basically impossible. In terms of even for Soviet citizens. This fact does a great employment, a substantially larger percent- deal to help explain the industrial concentra- age of the Russian manufacturing labor force tion. According to Gaddy, one reason—if not was dependent upon the defense industry the main reason—for the degree of concentra- than in the U.S. According to one estimate tion to such a small number of cities was the cited by Gaddy, during the peak of U.S. need for this isolation and control. It was an defense buildup in the mid-1980s, approxi- economy of scale for security reasons, not mately 10 percent of the U.S. manufacturing strictly for economic reasons. It was very labor force was dependent either directly or extensive and costly to close a city and to indirectly on defense contracts. By contrast, restrict and regulate it in such a way. When over 23 percent of the Russian manufacturing military planners built a new facility or labor force was directly employed by enter- expanded the production of an existing prises subordinate administratively to the weapons system, it was much easier to locate military-industrial complex. that new facility in one of the existing closed Gaddy said that the relationship regions, than to pick a new region and have between capital cities like Perm and the rest of to close it off from the outside world. the oblast is strained. One of the biggest Gaddy postulated that these three problems for capital cities, not just defense characteristics justified the selection of one industrial capitals, is that these cities are doing city as an example to examine the extent to all right, but they have to help the rural areas, which a single case study is applicable to the the small towns of the oblast. If the Russian country in general. Perm was one of the top defense industry was parasitic on the rest of defense-industrial cities—in terms of number the economy—which it was—then perhaps of employees and intensity. The ten largest the greatest victims were the rest of the oblast manufacturing plants in the city were all that supplied and supported this big capital defense plants, each having over 10,000 city with labor power and other resources. employees during their peak in the 1980s. It —by Jodi Koehn was a closed city for nearly forty years and had very few western visitors before its Vol XIV No. 4 1996 opening in 1991. Higher Education in Russia What has been the effect on this city Integration with the West requires not and its structure? Today, Perm is the tenth only reform of the Russian political and largest city in Russia. The city government economic system, but also alteration of has to manage a large amount of territory popular attitudes through the reform of dominated by very few industrial facilities higher education, said Olga Safronenko at a not only for employment in general, but for Kennan Institute lecture on 1 October 1996. social services. Much of the land of the city is Safronenko is the Chair of the English controlled and owned by the defense enter- Language Department of Rostov State prises. According to Gaddy, approximately University and a USIA-Supported Regional one half of the city’s population lives on the Exchange Scholar at the Kennan Institute. territory of the defense plants. These people Safronenko explained that a higher are dependent on the defense plants— education system changes over time based on whether they work there or not—for their the cultural experience and the social, housing, social services, etc. economic, and political situation of the Gaddy went on to discuss what has country. According to Safronenko, as these happened to the economic structure of this factors shifted, the Soviet educational system city. In general, the labor force in Perm has underwent three periods of reform. Each of contracted enormously. Officially, the number these reforms altered the educational system 125 to fit the needs of society at the time— authorities and evaluation by the Committee, industrialization, post-WWII reconstruction, a non-state institution can obtain a license to and the Kosygin economic reform plans. operate. Only after three consecutive gradua- Safronenko identified a number of tions judged to be consistent with the drawbacks to the higher education system national standard can the non-state univer- created as a result of these reforms. The sity gain accreditation which must be emphasis on professional training placed reconfirmed every five years. Safronenko priorities on engineering and the sciences over stated that although two hundred non-state the humanities. The system was also geared to schools have licenses, still no more than five massive output of students rather than to have received accreditation. individual development. Central control of Safronenko also outlined the current curricula restricted creative initiative, and the debate over introduction of a new multi-level excessive incorporation of ideology stifled degree system that coincides with world independent thinking. Furthermore, financing practice. Safronenko described the system for the system, which originated entirely with being introduced in many universities, which the federal budget, was never sufficient. includes an incomplete higher education Although the Russian higher education option (two years of general education), a system has remained competitive with Bachelors degree for four years of liberal arts Western Europe, Safronenko pointed to the education, and a Masters degree for two gap that has grown between it and world further years of professional study or research. standards. According to the speaker, this gap Post-graduate study, or independent research was exaggerated by the use of degrees that leading to the defense of a dissertation, retains differed from world practice: Soviet education the dual degrees of Kandidat and Doktor Nauk. conferred two post-graduate degrees (Kandidat Safronenko stressed the enhanced opportuni- and Doktor Nauk), and one graduate (Diploma ties inherent in this system, which makes of Higher Education), with no equivalent to higher education more accessible for students the western Bachelors degree. who have yet to decide on a future career or The present changes in the post-Soviet course of research immediately after high Russian society have led, Safronenko claimed, school. to a new set of reforms which seek to solve The new education reform in Russia, these deficiencies. The current trends in the speaker said, has both advantages and educational reform, she claimed, emphasize a disadvantages. The dual state and non-state broader base of general education, accentuate schools, while creating healthy competition, the moral role of education, focus on teaching have begun to drain the best educators from basic skills and learning habits, introduce an the financially struggling state schools. This interdisciplinary approach, emphasize may lead to a situation, Safronenko warned, computer literacy, and strengthen the role of where the state schools can only provide fundamental knowledge in the curricula. second-rate education. Already many state Safronenko emphasized two main aspects of schools have been forced to fill faculty this reform: the expansion of types of higher positions with under-qualified professors, education institutions and the alteration of the and all professors at state schools must degree system to match world standards. supplement their meager income with other Safronenko claimed that now there is jobs, thus hindering their ability to teach to more independence of administration in their full potential. Since state schools remain higher education. The introduction of non- free of charge, this could mean that less state universities and institutes exemplifies wealthy Russian citizens will be forced to this change. Safronenko explained that the attend state schools and thus will not have 1996 law on education stipulates that non- equal access to quality education. Safronenko state schools can be founded by national or stressed the need for the Russian government foreign institutions, foundations, organiza- to take measures to head off such a situation. tions, or citizens, and can be financed by any In conclusion, Safronenko emphasized number of sources, including tuition fees and that the current reform in Russian higher in some cases partial support from the federal education is actually aimed at renovating its budget. Safronenko remarked that non-state form rather than its essence. The foundation schools must go through an accreditation of the system, she explained, has not process overseen by the National Committee changed: to provide students with a highly of Education. After registration with local qualified professional training, the basic 126 education necessary to meet world standards, wish to rent space and equipment in the and appropriate conditions for the develop- incubator must write a business plan and be ment of each student’s individual personality. approved by a tenant selection committee. —by Nancy Popson Kennan Warnecke noted that the incubator’s current tenants include a bakery, a print shop, Vol. XIV No. 5 1997 and a mushroom growing operation. Small Business in Russia and the In addition to providing space and Role of Women equipment, the incubator has tried to cooperate The incredible growth of small business with local banks to make credit available to small in Russia since 1991 is one of the most businesses. Although the incubator assumes all encouraging developments in the country, financial risk, Kennan Warnecke bemoaned the claimed Grace Kennan Warnecke, President lack of cooperation and understanding on the of SOVUS Business Consultants and Co- part of loan officers. In response to this problem, Project Supervisor of the Volkov Interna- the incubator has set up equipment leasing tional Incubator and Training Center, at a programs. Kennan Warnecke remarked that the Kennan Institute lecture on 28 October 1996. leasing program, in combination with the According to Kennan Warnecke, small minimal fees charged for incubator services, will business in Russia could play an important serve as the basis for the incubator’s sustainability role in economic reform by creating new jobs beyond its USAID grant. and encouraging such character traits as self- In addition, the speaker noted that the reliance and creativity. Unfortunately, the incubator has strived to become part of the new Russian government has not grasped the community and in this way ensure its economic benefits of encouraging small sustainability. Competitions for the incubator’s business, and thus a restrictive tax structure logo and a database of business ideas have and precarious legal position has hindered successfully involved the Volkov population. small business growth. Despite these ob- Moreover, the incubator has served as an stacles, the speaker noted that almost 900,000 outlet for the artistic talents of the city by small businesses currently operate in Russia, making its walls available as exhibition space. employing 9 million persons full time and Kennan Warnecke remarked that the almost 5 million part time. Small businesses most surprising lesson of the incubator project in Russia contribute 12 percent to GDP and was that although 70 percent of people taking make up 20 percent of exports. the Center’s courses were women, they made Kennan Warnecke, in her position as up only 20 percent of those applying to rent Co-Project Supervisor of a USAID-funded space. In order to decrease this drop-off rate, small business incubator in the city of Volkov, the incubator held an eight week women’s is intimately involved with issues of small empowerment seminar, which attempted to business development. The Volkov Interna- break down the psychological barriers to tional Incubator and Training Center was female entrepreneurship. As a measure of its initiated by the Alliance of Russian and success, Kennan Warnecke pointed to the fact American Women at the request of the that some of the incubator’s current tenants female mayor of Volkov. Located in an old are graduates of this seminar. warehouse building, it rents out space to new The need for such empowerment entrepreneurs and provides them with access seminars illustrates the situation of women in to office equipment, consultants, and busi- Russia today, which, according to the speaker, ness training courses. Eventually, the speaker is incredibly complex. She remarked that explained, tenant businesses are expected to women have always been the backbone of “hatch” and move out of the incubator. Based society, the fulcrum of the family, and the on similar programs in American cities, the workhorses of the Soviet economy. Even incubator hopes to diminish the failure rate under communism, their exalted state belied of new small businesses by offering them gross inequalities between the sexes. With the inexpensive rent and leasing rates. collapse of that system, women have borne the The speaker described the business majority of the adverse effects of economic courses offered at the Volkov incubator, which reform. Kennan Warnecke estimated that 80 range from “how to write a business plan” to percent of the newly unemployed are women. financial management and marketing. The Moreover, many of these are highly educated incubator also offers instruction in English and women: some 90 percent of new female computer training courses. Businesses that graduates cannot find work, and those with 127 higher degrees in engineering and physics are legal norms would arise afterwards to protect told to become hairdressers, the speaker said. property that had been privatized. Instead of According to Kennan Warnecke, the emergence of legal norms, however, there women are now beginning to organize and has been an explosion of violence. The recent vocalize the need to enter the political arena bombing of an Afghan War veterans group in order to improve their situation. Para- (whose import tax exemptions attracted phrasing a participant at a Novgorod organized crime groups) in a cemetery and women’s conference, the speaker noted that the shooting of Paul Tatum, an American women are becoming the next wave of partner of the Radisson-Slavyanskaya hotel grassroots social organization in Russia. in Moscow, are but the latest examples of Despite the many changes in the lives how violence is used to resolve disputes. and fates of Russian women over the years, Another aspect of this theft of the the speaker felt it was still germane to quote Russian state, according to the speaker, is the Marquis de Custine’s thoughts in 1839: “In spontaneous privatization of property by the general the Russian women think more than managers of privatized enterprises. Manag- the men because they act less. They are better ers, doubting the ability of their enterprises informed, less servile, and possess more to compete in the global economy, strip the energy of sentiment than the other sex. valuable assets of their firms and export or Heroism itself often appears to them natural invest that wealth abroad. Workers are thus and becomes easy.” This sentiment, Kennan first cheated of their right to own a stake in Warnecke claimed, remains true to this day. the privatized enterprises and are then —by Nancy Popson subsequently robbed of their livelihoods when these enterprises are depleted of the Vol. XIV No. 6 1997 resources necessary to pay wages. Privatization and Organized Illegitimate privatization in Russia has Crime in Russia far-reaching negative implications. Unequal Privatization as it has occurred in Russia wealth and income distribution, lack of is not the same phenomenon of privatization recourse to an effective legal system, and non- that is occurring in the rest of the world, said transparent privatization processes are Louise Shelley at a Kennan Institute lecture detrimental to long-term economic develop- on 18 November 1996. Shelley, Professor at ment in Russia and the evolution of sound the Department of Justice, Law, and Society at business practices in Russian firms. These the American University and former Title VIII- factors have provided instead an economic Supported Research Scholar, Kennan Institute, atmosphere in which organized crime thrives. characterized the Russian privatization The spread of organized crime in the process as the stealing of the Russian state. Russian economy did not arrive with the post- Privatization in Russia was conducted Soviet privatization program, noted Shelley. without the legal safeguards and controls The phenomenon dates back to Gorbachev’s present in other countries, even other anti-alcohol campaign, which began during formerly socialist countries. As a result, the his first month in office in 1985. The Soviet economic wealth of the country became state had previously derived 10 percent of its concentrated in a small number of hands and income from the turnover tax on the sale of the workers of privatized enterprises have alcohol—revenue which in a very short period been cheated of their rights under Russian of time was transferred to a highly profes- law. Shelley gave as an example the sional criminal class that satisfied Russian privatization of a typography firm with a society’s demand for alcohol. This transfer of desirable location in central Moscow. By law, revenue coincided with Gorbachev’s economic the firm was supposed to have gone to the reforms introducing forms of private owner- workers of the firm, but was instead acquired ship in the economy such as joint ventures and by a major bank that coveted its prime cooperatives, providing a window of opportu- location. The workers sued in the courts and nity for organized crime’s entry into the won, but the absence of legal enforcement legitimate economy. mechanisms left the firm in the hands of the If organized crime is like a cancer bank. When the workers showed up to throughout the post-Soviet states, Shelley protest, they were met with tanks. stated, then different areas are suffering from If the privatization process is rife with different types of cancer. Organized crime in illegality, Shelley stated, it was hoped that Russia feeds off the most profitable sector of 128 the economy of the region in which it resides: 1996. This strand was the child of a new civic from real estate and banking in Moscow, to activism nurtured by Gorbachev’s policies of natural resources and military industry in the glasnost’ and best represented by the organi- Urals. Where there is little value in the zation Memorial. legitimate economy such as in the Caucasus, Smith noted that both in the 1960s organized crime resorts to more traditionally under Khrushchev and in the early years of illicit activities such as auto theft, drugs, and Gorbachev’s reform efforts, the establishment arms smuggling. sought to contrast their own present policies Russian privatization and organized with the extremities of Stalinism, and thereby crime have created an environment which is restore public confidence in the Soviet not attractive to foreign investment. Even system. In the latter era de-Stalinization worse, according to the speaker, the climate is initiatives were first promoted by reformers not conducive to maintaining existing capital and intellectuals, who used the opportunities within Russian society. Foreign investment presented by glasnost’ to finish what they felt amounts to a few billion dollars a year, Shelley had been aborted two decades earlier. In this explained, whereas since 1991 at least $50 de-Stalinization drive, Smith stressed that billion of Russian capital have left the country. Gorbachev played only a reactive role, Half of this capital movement was in the form responding positively to the initiatives of of capital flight to more secure investments others while pushing his own priority— abroad, half in the form of money laundering, economic reform. which demonstrates how corrupt Russian However, as perestroika and glasnost’ banks and organized crime are heavily tied progressed, de-Stalinization soon became a into the depletion of the Russian state. catalyst for democratic revolution. Smith Organized crime in Russia is distin- claimed that Gorbachev’s new openness guished by its pervasive involvement in the provided space for civic activism to grow, and legitimate economy, Shelley stated. The groups such as Memorial began to seek more participation of organized crime in Russia’s ambitious goals. Memorial at first used privatization programs facilitated by the petitions circulated in the street in order to absence of legal safeguards and the failure of identify and commemorate the victims of legal norms to emerge have resulted in the Stalin’s purges. By 1988, it had already begun stealing of the Russian state. According to to organize bases of support in the provinces, research by the Russian Ministry of the especially in those areas where a large Interior, over 40,000 privatized enterprises in population of deportees or a prison camp had Russia have ties to organized crime. This been located. In its battle to survive in figure is derived from the number of enter- Gorbachev’s Russia, Memorial faced obstacles prises involved in criminal investigations such as getting press coverage and space to which were halted due to political pressure. hold its conferences. Smith noted that this “It is a pervasive problem,” Shelley con- very struggle with communist authorities cluded, “one which if you attempt to deny served to radicalize the organization. Memorial you are not understanding the political soon changed its goals from the less controver- context in which it is occurring...neither law sial idea of building commemorative statues enforcement nor the judiciary are indepen- to the more radical one of activating the dent actors within the Russian state.” populace to want to build these monuments. —by Joseph Dresen Although Memorial was successful in starting charities, initiating rehabilitation Vol. XIV No. 7 1997 proceedings, and pointing historians to topics Looking Back on Stalin and His Victims reconsidering the Soviet past, Smith said that The anti-Stalinism campaigns of both by 1991 the Soviet people were no longer Khrushchev and Gorbachev were associated interested in anti-Stalinism. In part, she with a political establishment initiating attributed this apathy to Memorial’s very reform within the existing system. However, success. Now that these processes had begun, the revolutionary strand of de-Stalinization activists could move on to other issues. that came to the fore in the late 1980s was Moreover, Memorial was in many ways a unique to the Gorbachev period, said means to bring together democratic-minded Kathleen Smith, Assistant Professor of people in the only manner they could Government at Hamilton College in a organize under the Soviet regime. By 1991 Kennan Institute lecture on 2 December these people were beginning to join newly 129 formed legal political parties. Smith also slogans like “they haven’t changed their pointed to the organization’s failure in many names, and they won’t change their methods.” provinces, where it had less voice in the Smith remarked that it is difficult to say decisions of the authorities and was therefore whether or not this new anti-Stalinism found blocked in its attempts to open archives or resonance with society. It does show that extend social benefits to Stalin’s victims. some politicians, rather than looking for- Finally, Smith remarked that along with the ward, are returning to tried and true histori- regrouping of forces that viewed life under cal themes. Smith concluded that the way in Stalin as one of progress, military victories, which they choose to view Russia’s Stalinist and social mobility, many people were past will be crucial to current politicians who simply overwhelmed by the amount of bad are searching for historical memories upon news they were forced to ingest every day. which to build positive bases of Russian This backlash against bad news added up to pride and patriotism. a backlash against anti-Stalinism. —by Nancy Popson Despite this apathy, Smith noted the strides that have been taken since 1991 in de- Vol. XIV No. 8 1997 Stalinization. She pointed to the destruction The Role of Ideology in Russian of monuments to individuals who led Party Formation purges, the opening of many archives, and “Between 1989 and 1991 there was a the passage of a rehabilitation law covering widespread feeling in the West that not only everyone regardless of class or creed. Yet had Marxism-Leninism as an ideology been when one looks closely at the progress on de- vanquished with the fall of Communism, but Stalinization since 1991, Smith said, the perhaps finally ideology in general had seen results are more ambiguous: the trial of the an end” said Stephen Hanson at a Kennan communist party received poor press Institute lecture on 9 December 1996. coverage and allowed the organization to Hanson, Assistant Professor of Political defend itself based on their activities after Science, University of Washington, and Title 1990; many archives are becoming consoli- VIII-Supported Research Scholar, Kennan dated and closed under Yeltsin; and very few Institute, said that since 1994, however, this civic activists have gained positions of power idea seems to have reversed itself. Yegor in the new government. Gaidar acknowledged that although the The election campaign for president in ideology of Communism collapsed, ideology 1996 illustrated, in Smith’s view, what the did give Communism a kind of power that Stalin era meant for today’s Russian politi- reformers in Russia currently lack. There is cians. She stressed that the nostalgia of the an increasing concern that Russia needs a population that was widely cited as the base new state ideology, that somehow despite the for communist support was based not on collapse of Marxism-Leninism, something is memories of the Stalin era, but of the eco- needed to fill the void that was created. nomic stability of the Brezhnev years. In The general attitude in America is that contrast, Smith remarked that Zyuganov’s “ideology is bad and pragmatism is good.” campaign propaganda conjured up favorable According to this idea, ideological politicians images of the Stalin era. This was because he are irrational and need to be forced into sub- wanted a role model that was associated with mission. Americans see pragmatic politicians strong industry, Russian nationalism, and as similar to themselves, eager to cooperate military victory. and be part of the global liberal order. Hanson Although Yeltsin has avoided using de- argued that instead of simply decreeing Stalinization to build his career, Smith noted ideology as bad and pragmatism as good, we that in the recent campaign he too looked to should try to see the two as complementary. the past for symbols of Russian pride and Without an ideology to define a long-run nationalism. Many of his campaign advertise- political vision, it is often difficult to be ments featured black and white nostalgic politically pragmatic. Pragmatism without a photographs and biographies of older Russian state ideology may be viewed as opportunism. citizens. Anti-Stalinism, however, did not Hanson proposed defining ideology as: surface in the Yeltsin campaign until after the “Any explicit or consistent definition of the first round of balloting, Smith said. It was only membership and boundaries of one’s political then that Yeltsin toughened his anti-Soviet community.” According to the speaker, most stance with anti-Stalinist overtones, utilizing of us have culture, not ideology. Most people 130 know what political community they belong amount of wealth and resources such as to solely in implicit and inconsistent terms. Chernomyrdin’s Our Home is Russia, or Cultural responses to the problem of political ideological to survive. In the 1995 elections, membership are more common, but they fail Chernomyrdin’s party had a great advantage to give concrete answers to questions of in terms of media and financial resources but where the boundaries and membership lie on could barely get over 10% of the vote because the macropolitical level. they were too easily perceived as the party of Hanson argued that in periods of power. Yeltsin’s efforts to create a new party stability—where issues of membership and from above were a lot like his attempts to call boundaries are resolved—ideologists tend to for a new state ideology from above—purely be quickly marginalized. In periods of crisis pragmatic motives cannot create a new when the boundaries of a political community ideology. Parties can stand for elections and are difficult to define, ideologists have power get people to vote for a desired possibility or they would not ordinarily have. However, it is direct connections to the state apparatus but risky to establish boundaries and membership cannot provide party loyalty. of a political community that does not yet The ideologically-based parties of have them. Ordinary people have very little to Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky have achieved gain, and potentially much to lose by standing relative success. Zyuganov’s idea of Soviet up to argue for a particular definition—most Restorationism defines Russia as the Soviet people prefer to be pragmatic. Hanson Union. He has consistently argued that the continued that in turbulent times, pragmatism spiritual traditions of the great derzhava of is often inconsistent. A perfectly pragmatic Russia merged with the Marxist-Leninist state politician will repeatedly change positions. created by Lenin and Stalin. Zyuganov’s The ideologist of the world who consistently relative success as a party-builder in Russia sticks to a definition over time despite the could not have happened without this changing nature of political or geopolitical ideological consistency over time. It was only reality may achieve credibility and acquire during the 1996 campaign when Zyuganov power he otherwise might not have. began to waver that the CPRF fractured. In 1993 when the new Russian Consti- Zhirinovsky’s ideology of Super-Imperialism tution was adopted there was much opti- consistently defines Russia as part of a four- mism for the creation of new political parties part division of the world that he envisions as to compete for votes in the new Russian the permanent future of mankind. To the legislature, create stable representative extent that people were willing to buy into institutions, and transmit social interests at this definition, they would support the regional level. In Russia today, there are Zhirinovsky. so many parties that it is difficult to keep Hanson continued to say that the original track of them. Although parties play an optimism about party formation in Russia was important role in elections and in coordinat- misplaced. It is difficult to build parties before ing the interests of certain Moscow elite, they issues of national identity and boundaries are tend to be Moscow-centric with few links to involved. As long as those issues remain alive the grassroots level. In a 1994 poll only 22% in Russian politics, ideological parties will of the Russian population identified with a continue to play an important role. Only after political party (compared to 87% in the U.S. there is a stable Russia with a stable role in the and 92% in Great Britain). international system, will pragmatic parties According to Hanson, many Russian compete in a left-right system where parties political parties have not yet resolved the move toward the middle and play a role that ideological problem; there cannot be identifi- can consolidate democracy rather than poten- cation with political parties in an environ- tially destroy it. ment where nobody even knows what Russia —by Jodi Koehn is. Instead, political parties often represent the pragmatic interests—or, due to the Vol. XIV No. 9 1997 turbulent environment, opportunistic The Course of Legal Reform in interests—of certain elites. Parties are Independent Ukraine understandably discounted by ordinary The establishment of its constitution in Russian voters. June 1996 was a fitting tribute to the fifth By 1996, it appeared that parties had to anniversary of Ukraine’s independence, said be either pragmatic with an enormous Judge Bohdan Futey of the United States 131 Court of Federal Claims at a Kennan Institute remarked that these reforms are not simple lecture cosponsored by the International and that it is extremely difficult to jump from Foundation for Election Systems on 9 a totalitarian regime to a democracy. January 1997. Judge Futey joined Vitaliy Judge Vitaliy Boyko further clarified Boyko, Chair of the Supreme Court of some of those difficulties that can be traced to Ukraine and three members of parliament the legacy of the communist system. In the serving on the Verkhovna Rada Committee USSR, the court was seen as a branch of the on Law Policy and Legal and Judicial government and judges had no independence. Reform—Volodymyr Stretovych, Committee Because of these legacies, Boyko said, Ukraine Chair; Oleksandr Lavrynovych, Committee had to resolve major problems, such as Deputy Chair; and Viktor Shyshkin, Sub- qualification of judges and prohibition of committee Chair—to discuss recent and entrepreneurship, very quickly in its first years ongoing legal reform in Ukraine. of independence. However, the lack of a Judge Bohdan Futey began the session constitution hindered the development of by remarking that the constitution demon- necessary laws. Boyko remarked that for the strates Ukraine’s move toward a free market first time in Ukraine’s history the new consti- economy and a democratic system based on tution clearly notes that the judiciary is a third the rule of law. Although not everyone is and equal branch of government. Just as pleased with every provision in the constitu- important, in Boyko’s opinion, are the provi- tion, Futey noted that its adoption was sions of the constitution making it superior to historic. However, he cautioned that many all other preexisting laws and establishing key questions remain. Although articles in individual rights. On the basis of the constitu- the constitution provide for basic rights and tion Ukraine has very rapidly begun work on guarantees, they require enactment of those legislative acts necessary to govern the subsequent enabling legislation to make functioning of the judicial system, including them a reality. Moreover, whether the courts the civil and criminal codes, creation of a will emerge as an equal branch of govern- unified court system, and provisions for the ment and whether the constitutional court, right to trial by jury. According to Boyko, which began to take cases on 1 January 1997, knowledge of the experience of other democ- will serve as the final arbiter of disputes racies has been crucial to these reforms, between the executive and legislative especially in the area of appeal procedures. branches is still in question. Oleksandr Lavrynovych commented Volodymyr Stretovych then sketched briefly on his colleague’s presentations, stressing the multitude of achievements and problems that the power-sharing agreement reached by that Ukraine has faced in reforming its legal the parliament and president in 1995 was crucial system. Although Ukraine has a long history, to Ukraine’s constitutional process. He also Stretovych noted that it has been an indepen- cautioned that the adoption of laws is not dent country only since 1991. He remarked enough to create a democratic society; effective that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, public control of the govern-ment is critical to Ukraine attempted to both establish sover- ensure that those laws are implemented. eignty and install a new legal system. As a Viktor Shyshkin shifted the discussion result, several laws were passed that placed to the history of Ukrainian constitutionalism. Ukraine on the path toward democracy and a He claimed that the independence of Ukraine market economy. Of these, Stretovych can actually be dated to October 1990. At that mentioned property and partnership laws, time, Ukraine’s parliament passed changes to election laws, and laws protecting minorities the republic’s 1978 communist constitution. and religious rights. Although adoption of The changed articles revoked the monopoly the constitution was delayed due to strong of the communist party, provided for the left wing opposition, Stretovych noted that independence of Ukraine’s external policy the document finally adopted in 1996 is one and defense, and set precedent for the of the most progressive constitutions in the establishment of an independent constitu- post-Soviet era. He pointed to several laws in tional court and attorney general’s office. In need of alteration to insure their accordance addition, the parliament passed legislation with the constitution, including the new civil making Ukrainian laws superior to those of code, provisions on private property, and the Soviet Union. Shyshkin concluded that reform of the political, administrative, and since all of these measures are characteristics judicial systems. In conclusion, Stretovych of independent countries, one can say that in 132 1990 Ukraine already possessed the legal not paid for delivered goods. Governments say basis for independent development. they are not paying employees or providing The panelists concluded the seminar by allocated subsidies to industry because of low explaining aspects of Ukraine’s current and tax collection and failure to collect projected proposed legal system. According to the revenues. Governments also argue that speakers, the newly operational constitu- corruption or incompetent management is tional court will hear cases on constitutional causing the non-payment. Finally, employees issues that are brought either by branches of say that corruption is the cause. They think that government or by the human rights represen- the money for wages is there, but that it is tative in parliament on behalf of individual stolen by corrupt bureaucrats or managers. citizens. Judges Boyko and Futey noted that All these explanations are correct to one the arbitrage courts will continue to exist as degree or another, which adds to the com- separate courts specifically for disputes plexity. Wage non-payment is part of a larger between economic entities. Regarding the problem: a lack of basic structural reform in reform of election laws, Lavrynovych the way that enterprises are run and a commented that it is proceeding, although “culture of non-payment”—a Soviet legacy slowly. It is expected that a first reading of where the state would take care of your the election law will take place in April 1997, debts. This has created a “debt whirlpool” allowing enough time for it to take effect for that is pulling everything down with it. A Ukraine’s next set of elections in March 1998. brokerage house in Moscow recently esti- —by Nancy Popson mated that by the middle of 1996, overdue payables—including all arrears to suppliers Vol. XIV No. 10 1997 and banks as well as tax and wage arrears— Wage Non-Payment in the former amounted to $90 billion or 21% of Russia’s Soviet Union GDP. At the end of 1996, firms in the fuel and “Wage arrears is the single most energy sector were owed $58 billion by their important issue to ordinary citizens of the customers, which is two-thirds of the total former Soviet Union” stated Daniel annual output of the fuel and energy sector. Rosenblum at a Kennan Institute lecture on Corruption is a cause of some non- 13 January 1997. Rosenblum, Senior Program payment. In 1994 a government commission Coordinator, Free Trade Union Institute, in Russia found that millions of dollars Washington, D.C. said that wage arrears are a earmarked for wages were used by Rosugal— warning that there are fundamental problems the quasi-private entity that runs Russia’s coal in the economic reform process in these industry—to fund commercial ventures countries. Although arrears are a symptom of having nothing to do with coal. In a Kazakh these underlying problems, Rosenblum lead kombinat, it was discovered that while argued that this issue deserves to be ana- workers had not been paid for 9–12 months, lyzed separately, due to the negative political top managers of the kombinat had received six and economic consequences. months salary in advance and had invested According to Rosenblum, wage non- enterprise funds in various other ventures. payment is truly a post-Soviet phenomenon However, Rosenblum argued, in most because it began when the Soviet Union cases the real causes are the larger debt broke up. Under economic liberalization, problem, the overall depression of the prices were freed which resulted in huge economy, and the cycle of non-payment. In price inflation, wage inflation, and a shortage the West, a problem such as this would lead in cash. Despite Yeltsin’s campaign promise to an increase in labor movement or protest. to eliminate wage arrears, they have in- In the former Soviet Union, however, this is creased from $4 billion in February to $9 not so. One reason for the low amount of billion in December. labor movement is the shortage of alternative When looking at the roots of this job opportunities. The option of moving to problem, Rosenblum noted, it is interesting another city or town is often impossible to look at what people believe to be the cause because of a severe housing shortage and because the perception of the problem will continuation of the system of residence often influence what solutions are chosen. permits or propiska. Another reason is the Employers say they cannot pay employees links workers have to enterprises beyond because they cannot find customers to buy their salary such as benefits and social their products, cannot sell their products, or are services that are not available elsewhere. 133 The reasons for a low level of protest Kennan Institute roundtable on 6 December are related to the links of workers to their 1996. The discussants included: Douglass enterprise. There is a paternalistic relation- North, Professor, Department of Economics, ship between enterprise directors and their Washington University, St. Louis; Mancur employees—particularly in one-company Olson, Distinguished University Professor of towns outside large cities—where the general Economics, University of Maryland; Jerry director of the enterprise is a mini-potentate Hough, Professor, Department of Political in his community. In these cases, there is Science, Duke University; Edward often fear that makes protest difficult. There McClennen, Professor, Department of is also the general problem of passivity and Philosophy, Bowling Green State University; cynicism—the assumption that everyone is and Don Rowney, Professor, Department of looking out for their own interests. History, Bowling Green State University. Another factor, Rosenblum pointed out, is The seminar served as a public outlet the failure of trade unions to effectively mobilize for the discussions that took place at the first protest. Except for the coal miners there have in a series of ongoing workshops on “Civil been no sustained and effective protest efforts Society, Social Capital, and Development in against non-payment. A final factor is the Eurasia.” The workshop series is funded by growth of the informal or parallel economy. The the Kennan Institute and the Title VIII growth of informal economic activity serves as a program (The Program for Research and safety valve preventing a bigger social explosion, Training on Eastern Europe and the Indepen- Rosenblum argued. People increasingly rely on dent States of the former Soviet Union) of the home-grown produce, barter, networks of U.S. Department of State, and was organized family and friends, and second and third jobs for by Peter Stavrakis of the Kennan Institute survival. But such activity also impedes progress and Don Rowney and Edward McClennen of toward a market economy. If people used their Bowling Green State University. The series energy to start new businesses or provide seeks to apply theory on civil society and needed services, that would be healthy for the social capital to provide a theoretical frame- development of a market system. work as a guide to policymakers on the According to Rosenblum, there are challenges of development in post-Soviet several negative consequences resulting from states. To accomplish this, it brings together wage non-payment. First, there is the social science theorists and specialists in post- informalization of the economy. A second Soviet societies in an attempt to find a factor is an increase in contempt and disregard common language on critical issues. for rule of law. In most of the former Soviet Edward McClennen began the meeting Union, when someone does not receive their by describing the focus of the first workshop salary it is a clear violation of the labor law and in the series: the differing roles of informal collective bargaining agreements. This violation and formal institutions. He directed the and the lack of accountability reinforces the remarks of the other participants toward two related questions that elicited a sense of the popular perception that there are two sets of discussions that dominated the workshop. rules: one for the elite and another for every- What kinds of factors led to the decline of body else. Thirdly, wage non-payment erodes the Soviet system? What policies should the support for reform even further and provides a West be encouraging now for a successful breeding ground for simplistic solutions that transition to civil society in the region? are potentially more dangerous for the eco- According to Douglass North, in order to nomic future of these countries. Finally, it is a understand economic collapse, one needs to real source of social instability and unrest. So investigate its underlying political and institu- far, the situation has not gotten out of hand, but tional characteristics. North argued that Russia there are signs—such as the increased number lacks an institutional framework and an of hunger strikes and acts resulting in property effective set of rules, norms, and beliefs, damage and injury—that people are getting creating a vacuum that has been filled by a increasingly desperate. variety of ad hoc informal organizations. —by Jodi Koehn Consequently, there is no agreed upon struc- ture for enforcing a contract or rules of the Vol. XIV Nos. 11 & 12 1997 game in Russia, producing relatively chaotic Civil Society in Russia conditions and the evolution of the mafia and Civil Society, Social Capital, and other organizations. North emphasized the Development in Eurasia was the topic of a doubly destructive nature of this development, 134 as ad hoc organizations have emerged out of However, there are also broad tracts of past Soviet practices but are no longer trade that are not self-enforcing that can constrained by the Communist system. occur only with impartial—or reasonably As a result, policies in Russia are being impartial—third-party enforcement. Gener- created outside of stable rules of the game. ally, only in countries with a broad spectrum North maintained that institutions are of markets do you find not only self-enforc- necessary—such as rules of law, effective ing markets but also a vast array of institu- property management, and enforcement tional enforcement mechanisms to sustain mechanisms for contract work—that will economic development. In these countries, create and enforce the rules of the game. production is capital intensive with a great Without these policies, Russia is left with a deal of specialization and gains from trade low level of economic exchange, but no among various actors. Olson maintained that possibility for true economic growth. Unfor- it was the absence of these institutions— tunately, North does not see a policy emerg- particularly those of third-party enforce- ing in the foreseeable future that would ment—that explained why the post-Soviet create these necessary underlying conditions. transition has been so painful. Throughout North maintained further that formal the Third World and the former Communist rules would not function effectively without the world there is virtually no long-term lending support of informal norms that legitimate in the private sector. The types of capital them. The problem, however, is that scholars markets common in the West do not exist in do not yet understand how to successfully the former Soviet Union. Therefore, accord- create these informal norms. Consequently, ing to Olson, the great gains that would have North concluded on a pessimistic note that the come had there been a completely open best that can be done in the post-Soviet economy with free trading, investment, and transition is to create the formal institutions especially third-party enforcement of con- and hope that their development will be tracts, have not arrived. Foreign investors paralleled by the gradual evolution of informal have also been reluctant to aid the transition norms. because they have no assurance that con- The next speaker, Mancur Olson, focused tracts will be fulfilled. on the special problems associated with the Next, Jerry Hough remarked that the transition that are legacies of the Stalinist questions posed are difficult in that there are system. In particular, he outlined one expecta- not only many institutional theories but also tion that was common before the collapse of many different interpretations of those Communism and has since been proven theories. He emphasized the institutional wrong. There was a popular belief that people theory of revolution, because in his view the in Communist countries, particularly the Soviet events of 1990–1991 were indeed a revolution Union, had been without a market economy for on the same scale as the Bolshevik or French so long that the traits needed to take advantage revolutions. Hough observed that the of such an economy were no longer present— essential difference between revolution and that people in these countries would not know evolution is that the former is a consequence how to trade or be entrepreneurs. However, of decisions and non-decisions at the top according to Olson, although the transition has rather than social forces from below. Given been difficult, people of former Communist Gorbachev’s own destructive actions—such countries have proven adept at dealing with as deliberately destroying the Communist the market. This is because although some Party and undermining the union—Hough markets require very special conditions, others concluded that the changes in the Soviet require nothing in the way of institutions. Union in 1990–1991 should rightfully be There are many spontaneous markets that can termed a revolution. emerge anywhere, need no institutions to Hough continued that the whole further them, and can occur even when question of what produces a revolution is best specifically prohibited by the government. For understood in terms of institutional theory, example, the black market existed throughout which rests on the need for a well-structured the cold war in the Soviet Union. Today in the set of laws, incentives, and rules in order to Third World and in countries with difficult create a functioning economy. Economic shock economies, much of the sustenance that people therapy, on the other hand, rests on an entirely receive is through these markets where different premise: that destruction of economic transactions are self-enforced. and social institutions will clear the field for 135 the development of a normally functioning countries like Poland, Hungary, and Czecho- economy in a relatively short period. Hough slovakia ought to be very different from that remarked that the last five years in the post- of Russia. Communist states have undermined the shock —by Peter Stavrakis, Jodi Koehn, & Nancy therapy paradigm. Popson In response to the question of what should be done now, Hough prescribed a Vol. XIV No. 13 1997 return to what Chernomyrdin apparently Achievements and Failures in undertook in 1993; that is, a meaningful Russian Reform economic policy based on legal enforcement Anders Åslund, Senior Associate at the mechanisms and effective state institutions. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Hough concluded by remarking that scholars Washington, D.C., and Timothy McDaniel, should avoid talking in purely theoretical Professor of Sociology at the University of terms and should instead pay close attention California in San Diego, represented very to historical experience—of the West as well divergent views on the achievements and as other regions of the world—that can be failures of the Yeltsin era at a Kennan applied in post-Communist Eurasia. Institute Seminar on 13 February 1997. Don Rowney then focused on an According to Åslund, it is crucial when explanation of how the planning system that judging the transition to democracy and the was introduced by the Soviets in the 1920s, market in Russia to use a broader compara- rather than being a product of Marxism- tive perspective. This perspective shows that Leninism, was instead a consequence of the the decline in output in the former Soviet political and economic past of Russian society Union was much higher than in Central stretching back into the 19th Century. Accord- Europe. In Åslund’s view, this is because in ing to Rowney, there are certain phenomena the former USSR economic distortions were that cannot be explained except by knowing greater, the financial and state structures how they got that way, which is related to collapsed more completely, and civil society historical experience rather than an under- was far less developed. standing of present relationships. Rowney Åslund ascribed the large decline in argued that for a long time there has been an output and income differentials in Russia to enormous amount of institutional disaggrega- the elite’s massive rent-seeking. This rent- tion and destruction in the former Soviet seeking (making money on the state through Union. What presently exists is a society state regulations or subsidies) took three whose customary institutional and organiza- forms: subsidized credits, export rents, and tional frameworks—guided and controlled by import subsidies. Individuals were able to public behavior and laws in the past—no use their connections to buy goods at subsi- longer exist. For Rowney, the absence of these dized prices and sell them at an easy profit. It institutions leads to the necessity for some is this rent-seeking, stressed Åslund, that has form of customary structures and behavior enriched Russia’s elite. Since 1995, however, before it is possible to predict orderly move- the sources of these rent-seeking opportuni- ment in any reformist direction. ties have disappeared and income differen- Rowney pointed out that the process of tials have stagnated. post-Communist reform in Eastern Europe— This evidence shows, in Åslund’s such as Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslova- opinion, that transitions are the periods of kia—is probably very misleading given the greatest danger. Therefore, only radical different experiences vis-à-vis issues like the stabilization, radical liberalization, fast wealth of sophisticated markets. This is privatization, democratization, and conditional because in the case of the initiation of reform foreign assistance could have quickly vaulted movements in Eastern Europe, there are Russia beyond the transition period. Åslund societies where a significant proportion of the emphasized that Yeltsin’s reformers were not population remembers a social organization radical enough in their implementation of in which these types of exchanges occurred economic and democratic reforms. He rated every day. In the case of Russia, however, it is privatization a success, but lamented that difficult to show that a substantial segment of conditional foreign assistance was lacking. the population had any experience with such According to Åslund, Russia is unique activity. Therefore, the expected outcome in some ways, but not to the extent often from initiating institutional change in claimed. It is different in that its elite is 136 particularly vicious, it carries the burden of institutional support. It also alienated the an imperial inheritance, and has large raw population by communicating to them that material resources. However, what should the new system would be based on “survival have been most important upon the collapse of the fittest.” McDaniel concluded that as a of communism was not Russia’s uniqueness, result of these mistakes, Russia is plagued by but rather the implementation of comprehen- an illegitimate elite, an alienated government, sive radical economic reforms checked by and a system whereby arbitrary power has democratic controls and reinforced by public been left in tact without the constraints of the education programs. old Communist political mechanisms. McDaniel, on the other hand, empha- In response, Åslund portrayed a very sized that Russia is unique in certain respects. different picture of present day Russia. In his Throughout the whole modern period, Russia view, Russia is a messy market economy that and then the USSR was a great industrial is predominantly privatized, has achieved power while avoiding social modernization financial stabilization, and enjoys an extraor- and rationalization. This, according to dinary level of pluralism. Russia is demo- McDaniel, has led to a situation where Russia cratic, as it has gone through two democratic lacks many of the facilitators of democracy presidential and parliamentary elections, has and capitalism, such as generalized trust, a adopted a constitution, and has full freedom system of meritocracy, society based on the of speech and association. It is important to logic of competing interests, and formal rules note, Åslund continued, that there has been and laws. In place of modernization, a system little to no labor unrest in Russia, which may has emerged that is based on personal power be proof that the situation is not so dire. The and which sees the state as both protector of basic issue, concluded Åslund, is whether order and promoter of societal change. one favors more or less disruption. The This anti-modernism is what McDaniel negative tendencies that remain today could has termed the “Russian Idea.” Throughout have been resolved had there been more much of the last two centuries, Russia disruption from the start. claimed that this idea was superior to the McDaniel, while not in favor of conti- Western model. McDaniel stated that by nuity with the Soviet regime, argued that accepting this alternative model, Russia there should have been much more thought injected an anti-modern antibody into society about what the sources of growth might have and politics. Thus many of the problems of been. He noted that the sources for the today’s Russia should be ascribed not only to stability and lack of labor unrest visible in the years of Communism, but to this whole Russia are apathy, despair, a lack of connec- pattern of Russian modernization. tion to the government, and a sense of McDaniel contended that an adequate powerlessness. This, he concluded, does not understanding of these distinctive traits leads legitimize either the reform process or the to a deeper understanding of the challenges current state of the economy and society. of reform and a more skeptical evaluation of —by Nancy Popson what has happened since 1991. Had such an understanding been the basis of reform early Vol. XIV No. 14 1997 on, there would have been more concern over The Soviet Turn to Social Conservatism the institutionalization of political power, the in the 1930s emergence of a logical social contract, the “In the Soviet family, both the mother importance of respect for mutual rights in and the father are obliged to prepare for life society, the development of societal trust, and worthwhile Soviet people: manly, hearty, the legitimization of private property and the stoic, morally clean people who will subordi- social hierarchy. Each of these issues should nate their interests to the interests of the have been addressed, McDaniel claimed, so Soviet state” quoted David Hoffmann at a as to overcome the traditional Russian Kennan Institute lecture on 17 March 1997. pattern of a swollen, bureaucratized, and Hoffmann, Assistant Professor of History, unjust state seen as alien to the society. Ohio State University, and Title VIII-Sup- To the contrary, the Yeltsin government ported Research Scholar, Kennan Institute acted in just such a way as to impede these described the shift from revolutionary values deeper social changes. According to McDaniel, to an emphasis on traditional values and this was done through the dictatorial methods social conservatism that occurred in the of introducing reforms without societal or Soviet Union in the 1930s. 137 According to Hoffmann, this shift was the new policies and propaganda were not seen most dramatically in family policy. very successful. For women in the 1930s, the Three areas of family policy—marriage, hardships of everyday life far outweighed motherhood, and patriarchal authority any incentives the Soviet government could within the family—were used in this new offer to have more children. social conservatism. Regarding marriage, the The 1936 decree outlawing abortion also 1918 law making divorce easy was reversed tightened child support regulations, ordering in 1936. The new law made divorce more men living apart from their children to pay a difficult, requiring a court hearing and a percentage of their salary for child support higher fee. At the same time propaganda with an increased prison sentence for nonpay- stressed the importance of marriage and ment. However, the Soviet government lacked family. Articles in the Soviet press argued for the administrative capacity to effectively marriage and criticized free love—the enforce the new child support laws and legal antithesis of marriage—as a bourgeois measures were fairly ineffective at bolstering a invention with “nothing in common with a sense of paternal responsibility. Soviet citizen’s principles of conduct.” Soviet propaganda reinforced tradi- Marriage was promoted not as a personal or tional gender roles by choosing a traditional private commitment but as a social or civic model for the sake of stability, and tried to obligation—to be a good citizen, you needed instill a sense of paternal responsibility. to be a good husband and father. Hoffmann stressed another reason for efforts Soviet leaders’ concern with marriage to buttress patriarchal authority—to teach grew out of certain political questions. obedience to authority figures built on the Family norms set the norms of social organi- idea that people will obey a leader the way zation and sexual behavior that were crucial that children obey their fathers. In the Soviet to the issue of how a society reproduced Union the cult of Stalin was built up which itself. Soviet leaders saw the traditional hailed him as the “Father of all Soviet family as a means to serve their purposes in Peoples.” Patriarchal authority in the family social reproduction. Strong families enabled presented a model for all political authority the increase in discipline of the population within the Soviet system. and maximized the birth rate resulting in a Why did the bourgeois institution of large and controlled population. the family suddenly become such a central Motherhood was seen as another means part of Soviet socialism? Hoffmann disagreed to the Soviet government’s desired end. In with the explanation that strengthening the 1936 a new decree made abortions illegal. family conformed with the social conserva- Politburo discussions stressed that this would tism of the population for two reasons. First, help to maximize the birth rate. Publicly, the the Soviet government only followed popular decree was hailed as a measure to protect opinion when it was within their own women from the alleged harm that abortions interests. Second, it was misleading to call did “to their mental and physical health”— this a return to something that existed before. ignoring the danger caused by the wave of The proposed family model was not the illegal abortions that followed. A propa- traditional peasant patriarchal family— ganda-inspired “cult of motherhood” rooted in village culture and based upon the glorified motherhood. The Soviet govern- father’s control of property—because that ment introduced financial incentives to had been wiped out by collectivization. Nor encourage women to have more children and was this a traditional family in the sense of a paid annual bonuses to women with seven or 19th century Western European bourgeois more children. family because Soviet women remained in These policies were similar to those in the workforce with an emphasis on a other European countries at the time. Accord- woman’s role as both a mother and a worker. ing to Hoffmann, a member of British According to Hoffmann, it was better to Parliament stated “The ideals for which see the family model pushed by the Soviet Britain stands can only prevail as long as they government as a selective re-creation of are backed by sufficient numbers.” Through- elements of the traditional family for specific out Europe, governments increasingly political purposes, primarily social stability intervened in people’s lives through both and population growth. This was part of a incentives and restrictions in an attempt to broader trend in Europe to strengthen increase the population. In the Soviet Union, families and glorify motherhood. Hoffmann 138 called this a new type of “population poli- people by large cultural and educational tics”—a way to view the population as a differences. Finally, Russians in the Baltic resource to be mobilized for the sake of states take on more classical characteristics of economic and military power. diasporas in that they are more concretely Throughout Europe political leaders isolated from their home country. saw the family as a means to increase and Zevelev argued that Russian national mobilize the population. The Soviet Union consciousness is stronger in the diaspora was no exception. The Soviet government communities than in Russia itself, as it has had definite goals that strong families been shaped by interaction with the titular seemed to serve—adding to social stability, population. However, without a central Russia increasing the population, and teaching to link them, these communities could hardly obedience. The revolutionary goals of unite to create a viable political roof on the abolishing the family, liberating women, and basis of a common culture. Therefore, Zevelev eradicating the confines of bourgeois respect- concluded that the “near abroad” policy of the ability were sacrificed to the state’s need for Russian Federation is itself the key factor discipline and control of the population. raising Russian diasporas in the former Soviet —by Jodi Koehn Union to international significance, not their own situation in each country. Vol XIV No. 15 1997 Russia, Zevelev explained, is at a Russian Nation-Building and the crossroads in its national development. On the New Diasporas one hand, the ethnic awakening of Russians in Whether the Russian Federation will try the diaspora could engender a well-articulated to reunite with its twenty-five million-strong common culture that might lead to strong diaspora in the fourteen successor states to the claims for a single ethnic Russia. On the other former Soviet Union is a crucial aspect in hand, the diaspora’s separation from each defining the boundaries and membership of other could cause it to disintegrate into a the future Russia, said Igor Zevelev, Head number of poorly connected communities and Research Associate, Institute of World a core group forming a nation with other Economy and International Relations, Mos- peoples in the Russian Federation. According cow, and Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson to Zevelev, Russia’s choice at these crossroads Center, in a lecture at the Kennan Institute on will depend on two major factors: mass-based 17 April 1997. Karen Dawisha, Professor in Russian nationalism and constructionist the Department of Government and Politics at efforts of the elite. the University of Maryland in College Park, Zevelev noted that Russia emerged joined Zevelev in the role of discussant. from the USSR as an incomplete nation with Zevelev noted that Russian communi- no mass-based national movement. The ties living in the “near abroad” are quite reasons for this are multifold: the existence of different from each other and from their co- the Russian empire prior to a modern nationals in the Russian Federation. These conception of Russian identity has confused differences—caused by such factors as levels the concepts of empire and nation; shared of violence or indigenous national move- history with other Slavic communities has ments in the country, the economic and blurred ethnic boundaries; and Soviet political environment, and the compactness policies, such as creation of a “Soviet of the community’s settlement—may make a people,” the CPSU’s struggle against Russian Russian reunification policy difficult if not nationalism, and the Russian republic’s lack impossible to implement. of separate state structures, have hindered Zevelev identified four types of Russian development of a Russian ethnic movement. communities. Those in Belarus and Ukraine The most important obstacle to its live in an environment where their social development, however, is that the Russian conditions, culture, and political orientation elite have been unable to come up with a are not that different from the indigenous definition of Russia as a distinct nation based population. In areas like Northern on ethnicity. Zevelev explained that for a Kazakhstan, Crimea, and Northeastern century and a half, debates on the Russian Estonia, Russians live in compact regions identity have focused on its relations with the separated from the indigenous population. In West rather than with the neighboring Central Asia and the Caucasus, the commu- peoples of Eurasia. Moreover, traditionally nities are differentiated from the titular Russian intellectuals have identified Russia’s 139 boundaries through the ideal of universalism First, the great incidence of regional subsidies rather than ethnicity. hinders key reforms in the economy. Another Zevelev concluded that Russia has now implication is overall fiscal sustainability. begun to build a new nation entirely from Most of Russia’s regions are heavily depen- scratch. Very little from the past can be dent on fiscal transfers from the federal applied to the present, and intellectual budget. Nearly one-half of the overall history has not provided the modern elite regional budget expenditures are spent on with adequate tools for addressing the new subsidies, so fiscal arrangements between geo-political situation. He warned that federal and regional governments are key attempts to redefine Russia in more concrete items on the policy agenda. ethnic terms—were it even possible to unite Regional subsidies are quite stable— the many different cultures of diaspora having held steady at 5–6 percent of GDP communities in the “near abroad”—could be since 1993. They are concentrated in three the most dangerous undertaking in Russian main sectors: housing, public transportation, history, leading to irredentism and forcible and agriculture, with few subsidies found changes of borders with tragic consequences. outside these main sectors. Subsidies to Dawisha remarked on the importance manufacturers or industry are usually of Zevelev’s conclusions, but noted that the regional specific and not country-wide. one element largely absent in Zevelev’s Freinkman stated that major regional discussion was the role of the Russian state. subsidies are consumer subsidies—for In her opinion, the implementation of housing and public transportation—in which universalist intellectual ideas as policy by the regional governments directly pay a portion state has produced and strengthened the very of the final retail price for consumers. A ethno-nationalism that Russia fears today in smaller share of subsidies are producer the Soviet successor states. subsidies to agriculture and areas like the —by Nancy Popson coal sector where money is directly provided to producers of different goods and services Vol. XIV No. 16 1997 in exchange for price controls, sales within Regional Subsidies in Russia the region, and other explicit or implicit deals Federal transfers or subsidies support with local companies. The fact that in Russia bad policies at the regional level and fail to funds are directly provided to producers for stimulate regions to shift their current policy price controls, makes subsidization inefficient in the right direction said Lev Freinkman at a and does not allow for meaningful income Kennan Institute lecture on 21 April 1997. support policy at the regional level. Freinkman, Consultant, Russia Operations, Freinkman stated there are four reasons The World Bank, Washington, D.C. remarked why regional governments provide different that these policies are not good in an equaliz- subsidies: compensational subsidies for price ing sense and are even worse in terms of control; strategic subsidies for long-term reform-oriented policy. investment in regional development; transi- Subsidies are an indicator of reforms on tional subsidies where regional enterprises the regional level in Russia. The rate of receive money to counteract transitional reform transformation differs across the shocks from radical economic reforms; and country. Subsidies are an easy way to analyze politically motivated subsidies extracted by how great the differences are. local interest groups. Most regional subsidies Regional governments support local are either compensational or politically enterprises and populations through tradi- motivated. Compensation motives are clear tional consolidated budgets, tax exemptions, in the case of housing and public transporta- and extra-budgetary funds created by tion in which subsidies compensate for price regional governments. Federal transfers to controls. Agriculture is an example of a regions are based on regional wealth, so if politically motivated subsidy determined by regional governments can decrease their the strength of the agricultural lobby. regular budgets they are more likely to Housing is a major political and eco- receive more federal support. Extra-budget- nomic problem of regional government, and ary funds are often created by establishing more than one-half of all subsidies are for special local taxes. housing. In 1994, more than 60 percent of total Freinkman argued there are two main housing costs were paid by regional govern- political implications of regional subsidies. ments. Housing subsidies are not equally 140 distributed. Wealthier regions pay more money argued that in market economies there is in housing subsidies than poorer regions and capitalist culture and infrastructure—such as urban populations generally receive more in laws, conventions, and a variety of business housing subsidies than rural. Regions spend practices—that has no important role in a funds on housing subsidies mainly according centrally planned economy. Centrally planned economies had difficulty creating to how much money they have, while factors wealth and rising standards of living. In such as demand or need are less important. theory—and to a large extent in practice— Agricultural subsidies seem to be production and distribution were deter- determined by policy indicators, local power- mined by specific instructions from the sharing, and the strength of local interest central planning agencies to production groups in the agro-industrial complex. establishments. Although Russia is a country with great Without an effective market clearing differences in agriculture, rural subsidies are mechanism, such a system resulted in a everywhere and per capita attempts are more surplus of unwanted goods and a shortage of or less stable. The level of agricultural products wanted by consumers. Planning subsidies for one year is highly dependent on authorities should have been able to adjust to what happened the previous year. these distortions. They were unsuccessful in According to Freinkman, two major part because they did not have access to the policy conclusions emerge from this analysis. immediate signals of price changes that clear First, is the need for fundamental reform of markets in capitalist economies. In addition, intergovernmental fiscal relations in Russia to Greenspan stated, they did not have the make federal transfers to regions more signals of finance to adjust the allocation of equalizing. Second, federal transfers should be physical resources to adapt to shifting conditional, with a portion of federal money consumer tastes. provided in exchange for shifts in regional After the fall of the Berlin Wall black economic policy. Examples of such conditions markets in many former Soviet bloc states are elimination of regional extra-budgetary achieved something similar to a market funds, elimination of illegal taxation as a system. Black markets, however, are not the precondition for receiving federal support, or whole answer since they are not supported increases in cost recovery with the introduc- by the rule of law. There are no rights to own tion of targeted income transfers for poor and dispose of property and no laws of households in the regions. contract or bankruptcy, or judicial review and —by Jodi Koehn determination enforced by the state. In short, black markets offer few of the benefits of Vol. XIV No. 17 1997 legally sanctioned trade. The Embrace of Free Markets In order for free market economies to “On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall function, the belief in property ownership came down, symbolizing the end of an and the legality of its transfer must be experiment in economic and social policy ingrained in the culture of a society. Attitudes that began more than four decades earlier toward property and profit derive from the with the division of the states of Western and deepest values of personal worth so a full Central Europe into market economies and transition from the collective rights of those governed by state central planning” socialist economies to the individual property said Alan Greenspan at a Woodrow Wilson rights of market economies and legal certain- Center dinner on 10 June 1997. Greenspan, ties will take time. There must also be Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal widespread dissemination of timely financial Reserve System continued to say that the and other relevant information so that debate over the virtues of market versus market participants can make informed centrally planned economies is over. One decisions that foster the optimal allocation of surprising result of the forty-year experiment capital. This requires a free press and govern- is what we have learned about the process of ment information systems viewed as free of how and why western economies and hidden political manipulation. Greenspan societies function. claimed that information seen as govern- Contrary to prior belief, dismantling ment-sponsored is regarded by market the central planning function in an economy participants as virtually useless, requiring does not automatically establish a free individuals to rely on rumor and other market entrepreneurial system. Greenspan questionable sources of information. This 141 leads to misjudgments about changing effectiveness, remarked Bob Huber, former patterns of consumer demand and limits the Vice President of IREX, at a Kennan Institute market’s effectiveness in directing the lecture on 16 June 1997. Huber explained optimal use of resources. that the current structure of the Duma The rights of protection against extralegal emerged when there was no general consen- violence or intimidation by the state, arbitrary sus about the rules of the game in Russian confiscation of property without due process, politics. Its instituionalization remains mixed, freedom of speech and of the press, and an full of contradictions, and in a state of flux, absence of discrimination are essential for an making it difficult to draw clear-cut conclu- effective, functioning market system. It is these sions about its role in policy-making. rights that enable the value judgments of The electoral law calls for half of the consumers to be converted through a legally Duma’s seats to be chosen by proportional protected free market into prices of products representation and half through votes for and financial instruments. In addition, such a individual candidates. This process, according to list or bill of rights—enforced by an impartial Huber, has undermined party cohesion in that judiciary—limits government infringement on district candidates are free to associate with any the rights of individuals, so the rational self- faction. Moreover, it has produced mixed interest of the people is always to protect and outcomes in the promulgation of rules. For broaden individual rights. example, members can form factions if more Since centrally planned economies that thirty-five people join and can “borrow” cannot readily accommodate innovation or members from larger factions to meet the new ideas, Greenspan stated that the ideal minimum requirement. Parties are also unable state of affairs for a centrally planned to exercise discipline over the legislative process economy is continuous production of the because the Council of the Duma and Duma same type of goods, of the same quality and committees operate on the basis of consensus in repetitive quantities, with cash wages rather than majoritarian principles. In an backed as necessary by rationing coupons. In attempt to tighten party discipline, the Council contrast, capitalist market economies are has the right to change legislation coming out of driven by “newer ways of doing things, committees and to control the slate of amend- newer products, and novel engineering and ments to any particular bill. architectural insights that induce the continu- Huber also pointed to procedural ous obsolescence and retirement of factories weaknesses in the Duma, including the right and equipment and a reshuffling of workers of each faction to have at least one commit- to new and different activities.” In that sense, tee chair, even if the chair and the majority market economies continuously renew of the committee represent opposite ends of the political spectrum. The legislative themselves, propelling standards of living process itself is quite chaotic, with legislation progressively higher. passed containing contradictory provisions. The experiment in economic and social Committees often try to outflank each other systems did not completely end with the fall for consideration of budgetary items within of the Berlin Wall. Greenspan explained, the their jurisdiction, and the Budget Committee face of the world economy continues to edge itself fails to operate transparently. Proce- toward free-market-oriented societies— dure on the floor, moreover, is arbitrary, and especially as an increasing number of legislation enacted is in many cases left to transition economies prosper and emerging the government to sort out or supersede by market economies tied to free market models decree. Legislative-executive relations, grow. Despite problems and periods of according to Huber, have been improving. backtracking among former centrally The Russian presidency is immensely powerful vis á vis the Duma. The Yeltsin planned nations, claimed Greenspan, “the government has criticized the Duma’s slow experience of the last half century clearly pace, while the Duma Speaker has criticized attests to how far the power of the idea of the government’s inability to collect tax market freedom can carry.” revenues. Despite this, Huber stressed that the duma has avoided serious confrontations with the government. Yeltsin has also slowly Vol. XIV No. 18 1997 come to accept the Duma as a weak but Is the Russian Duma a Real Parliament? potentially useful partner. Many observers of the Russian Duma The Duma, Huber noted, has an have expressed grave doubts about its identifiable track record in such legislative 142 areas as reorganization of the judicial system, rational choice and political institutionaliza- the criminal code, voting rights, elections to tion in a post-communist setting can take the Duma, the Presidency, and the Federation new and, from the perspective of Western Council. Less impressive has been its record social science, counter-intuitive forms. on property rights, privatization, laws —by Nancy Popson regulating and encouraging foreign invest- ment in extractive industries, pension reform, 1997–98 PROGRAM YEAR and any laws limiting the power of the President over the appointment or resigna- Vol. XV No. 1 1997 tion of ministers. The Cuban Missile Crisis and “One Hell In the area of foreign policy, Huber of a Gamble” remarked that the Duma’s power is highly restricted. The responsibility of the Duma to Nikita Khrushchev intended Operation approve treaties, and in particular to fail to Anadyr which placed nuclear missiles in act on them, is the most visible aspect of its Cuba to be a containment plan designed to foreign policy duties. Like his counterparts, scare the Pentagon into leaving Castro alone, the Chair of the International Affairs Com- remarked Aleksandr Fursenko, Chairman, mittee has tried to steer a path of consensus Division of History, Russian Academy of between the communist ruling coalition and Sciences, and former Fellow, Woodrow the government. Those resolutions that cause Wilson Center, and Timothy Naftali, Visiting controversy are generally those that are Assistant Professor, Department of History, considered on the floor, where the Commu- and Olin Fellow, International Security nists and their allies can express their anti- Studies, Yale University, and former Title government position. One of the most VIII-Supported Research Scholar, Kennan controversial of these was the March 1996 Institute at a 19 June 1997 Kennan Institute resolution against the Belovezhskaia Accords. lecture. The two speakers went on to outline According to Huber, the speaker has been the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis. very vocal in assuring the government that On 16 October 1962, Kennedy called the these resolutions are merely statements of first meeting of the Cuban crisis group, known principle and not an effort to convey new as the Executive Committee (Ex Comm). Ex foreign policy powers. Comm discussed four possible military ways Huber concluded that studying the to end the crisis: 1.) an air strike to wipe out all operational structure of the Russian Duma known missile sites; 2.) a general air strike to can have interesting implications for com- include sorties against Soviet fighter jets; 3.) an parative politics. First, the Duma represents invasion of Cuba; and 4.) a blockade to one part of a new hybrid political system that prevent nuclear warheads and more missiles includes a mixed proportional representation from reaching the island. Kennedy gave the and single-member system with a strong principal reason for choosing the blockade Presidency. Furthermore, the principle of option by stating “If we go into Cuba, we have... “minimum winning coalitions” used to taken the chance that these missiles... won’t be evaluate the actions of other parliaments fired... it would be one hell of a gamble.” On 22 October 1962, Kennedy publicly does not apply to the Russian Duma. Rather, announced the crisis and his plan to impose Duma members seek maximum consensus a “strict quarantine” around Cuba followed even on the most controversial issues. by “further action” if work on the missile Finally, Huber warned that the rational sites continued. Furthermore, the U.S. would choice principle of “utility maximization” can view any missile launched from Cuba as an only be useful in understanding Russian attack on the United States, requiring politics when reflected through the prism of retaliation. Khrushchev, however, saw no Russian political experience. The regulations reason to let Kennedy’s speech alter his governing electoral law, presidential power, strategy to complete the missile sites. party cohesiveness, and many other mea- The missile crisis was conducted in the sures of institutionalization were created same back-channel manner common in U.S.- through a process of bargaining between the Soviet relations during the Kennedy adminis- old and new Russian elites. The conservative tration. Georgii Bolshakov, a GRU officer who elements have therefore accepted a regularly transported news from Robert marginalized legislature in exhange for a Kennedy to the Kremlin, received word that stable political identity. This suggests that Robert Kennedy’s office wanted to use him to 143 sound out the Kremlin on a possible diplo- pledge not to invade Cuba. Thinking he had a matic solution to the crisis. Bolshakov re- back-channel proposal from Khrushchev, Scali ported to his superiors that Robert Kennedy rushed the proposal to the State Department. considered the following trade possible: “The On 27 October, Khrushchev sent a new U.S. would liquidate its missile bases in letter to Kennedy stating that the Soviet Turkey and Italy, and the USSR would do the Union would agree to remove weapons from same in Cuba... The conditions of such a trade Cuba which the U.S. saw as offensive if the can be discussed only in a time of quiet and U.S. agreed to remove similar weapons from not when there is the threat of war.” Turkey. In addition, if the Soviet Union The climax of the crisis entailed a series pledged to respect Turkey’s borders and of weak intelligence and eavesdropping sovereignty and not invade, the U.S. would reaching all the way to the Kremlin. On 24 do the same with regard to Cuba. October, Warren Rogers, Washington corre- Robert Kennedy conveyed to Dobrynin spondent for the New York Herald Tribune met that the U.S. would accept the conditions of with fellow journalist, Robert Donovan, at the trade and promise not to invade Cuba, the National Press Club. The two journalists but for NATO reasons could not publicly discussed that Rogers—who was not particu- make a statement about Turkey—however he larly close to the Kennedy administration— “didn’t see any insurmountable difficulties” was scheduled to “cover the operation to in trading the Turkish missiles for those in capture Cuba.” Their conversation was Cuba. Khrushchev then ordered the disman- overheard by the bartender, Johnny Prokov, a tling of the missiles and the crisis ended. Russian emigre who passed this information How close did we come to nuclear war on to Anatoly Gorsky, a TASS correspondent in 1962? On 22 October, the Soviet Union was and KGB officer. This was the first solid contemplating the use of tactical weapons evidence Gorsky received that Kennedy had against a U.S. invasion of Cuba. Khrushchev decided on war and he hurried to report to was committed to using nuclear weapons. the chief KGB officer, Alexander Feklisov. Kennedy went against many of his advisors After “corroborating” Prokov’s story, who thought the United States should invade Feklisov relayed to Moscow that “... the New Cuba. Therefore, Naftali argued, the most York Herald Tribune’s Rogers, said confiden- important decision in the crisis was made by tially that . . . the Kennedy brothers have Kennedy, not Khrushchev. decided to risk all. The attack on Cuba will —by Jodi Koehn start in the next two days.” Rogers also met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin’s chief Vol. XV No. 2 1997 political adviser, Georgi Kornienko. In their Anatomy of a Dinosaur: Russia’s New conversation, Rogers spoke freely— not Regional Elite knowing his comments would set off Russia is like a dinosaur on the verge of alarms—stating that the Kennedy adminis- extinction, with an enormous body and a tration planned for an attack on Cuba which brain too small to function, remarked could begin at any moment. Ambassador Heyward Isham, Vice-President Khrushchev was convinced that the of the Institute for EastWest Studies, at a Soviet Union could not keep ballistic missiles Kennan Institute lecture on 29 September in Cuba without going to war and that the 1997. The Ambassador was joined by Robert U.S. would accept nothing less than complete Orttung, Senior Research Analyst, Institute Soviet capitulation. Khrushchev met with the for EastWest Studies, and Peter Rutland, Presidium and in an effort to defuse the Associate Professor, Department of Govern- crisis, proposed a deal that Washington ment, Wesleyan University in commenting on pledge not to invade Cuba, and, in return, Russia’s new regional elite. Moscow would remove the missiles. Peter Rutland began the session with On 26 October, Feklisov met with John remarks on the stability and interaction Scali, a contact at ABC News, to convey a between elites at the regional and national message to the Kennedy administration. level. In his view, in contemporary Russia Although it is unclear who made the offer, a political stability exists at both the national three-point plan was proposed: 1.) The Soviet and regional level, but there is instability in missile bases would be dismantled; 2.) Castro how the two levels interact. At the national would promise not to accept offensive level, this political stability, which Rutland weapons of any kind; and 3.) The U.S. would terms “messy consolidation,” stems from 144 three factors: 1.) most of the new rulers share and least successful regions, and therefore social origins and values, having been drawn will have far less impact on federal policies. from the old political-economic elite, and are These include what Orttung calls the “failed pragmatic in nature; 2.) the new structures of managers”—governors like Gorbenko in the corporate oligarchy provide a framework Kaliningrad, who came to power on a non- through which the elite can rule; and 3.) there ideological platform but have lost control is a dearth of serious potential counter-elites. over political and economic events and have At the regional level a similar process has since been abandoned by Yeltsin. In addition, taken place. Regional ties have been forged there are the “Zhirinovsky-ites,” such as that are based on new patronage networks, Mikhailov in Pskov, and the Communists, and ideology is even more subordinate to including Chernogorov in Stavropol. power than at the national level. Orttung concluded that the balance of Rutland warned that the creation of power between these groups and the center is linkages between the two levels is the true fairly even. Both have weapons that can be challenge. The mechanisms for linking used in the power struggle—the center still national and regional decision-making have controls much of the subsidies upon which yet to emerge, and have in fact regressed regional budgets rely, while the regions can from those present in the old communist block or implement federal policies on their system. Russia—like all other post-socialist territory. Orttung noted that Yeltsin seems states—has had no constitutional convention recently to be rewarding stable regions over to broker the creation of the necessary those that have achieved economic prosper- federalist institutions. Rutland pointed to the ity. Correspondingly, he has moved away Federation Council as one possible institution from supporting Moscow city by changing which could resolve this problem, but noted the tax laws to require payment of taxes in that it is limited by its ceremonial nature. the region where the company is located The failure to create linking mechanisms, rather than where it is registered (which has Rutland concluded, has led to a strong decen- inevitably been Moscow). tralization of power to the regions, undermin- Ambassador Isham concluded the ing the federal government’s capacity to rule. session, remarking on the dearth of able and This situation, while seemingly stable in the committed people at all levels and in all short term, is dangerous in the long term, regions. He noted the difficulty involved in making it impossible to implement good taking the pulse of Russian politics today—a policy-making. It may therefore threaten the task currently being undertaken by the future viability of the Russian state. weekly publication Russian Regional Report— Robert Orttung shifted the discussion where dysfunctions and healing processes from national-regional linkages to an analysis simultaneously struggle for predominance. of the regional elite itself. He stressed the Conflicts rage within the organs that make diversity of the new elite, categorizing them up the dinosaur that is contemporary Russia; into six groups. The first group are the “Yeltsin contradictions remain between the forward loyalists,” such as Ayatskov from Saratov, who moving elite and those that are retrograde, were Yeltsin appointees in 1991 and have between the relatively honest and the totally continued to be loyal since the Fall 1996 corrupt. Therefore, according to Isham, it is elections. Governors like Starev in Nizhny vital that a constant process of evaluation Novgorod and Luzhkov in Moscow are in the continues, especially if we hope to intelli- group of “strong managers” who support gently assist the forces that are struggling, Yeltsin at crucial times but rule without regard like grass under concrete, to spring forth and to ideology and have their own strong base of create a new Russia. support. Orttung also described “crossover —by Nancy Popson governors” who were formerly in the opposi- tion but have since bought into the existing Vol. XV No. 3 1997 political establishment. Among these are Convergence Theory and the End of Stroev of Orel and Tuleev of Kemerovo. These Socialism three groups are the most likely, according to An analysis of the theories of economic Orttung, to form a successful coalition that can convergence put forth in the past century affect federal policy. shows that in the post-Soviet era economists The remaining three groups of regional have to think in terms of economic develop- elites are for the most part from the poorest ment or economic history rather than 145 comparative economic systems, remarked Finally, Millar presented his own theory, Jim Millar, Director of the Institute for which applies the economic development European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at argument of J. R. Hicks to convergence. Hicks the George Washington University and former claimed that the market gradually evolved Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center at a throughout the world, replacing the previously Kennan Institute lecture on 6 October 1997. dominant custom and command economies. Convergence, or the independent Markets expanded first in the area of interna- development of similarly structured and tional trade and then in domestic economic functioning systems, has been a recurring transactions. Within this evolution theory, theme in the study of the economies of the command economies only exist in pure form in United States and the Soviet Union. The idea the case of emergency or crisis. The Soviet that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. may develop Union, therefore, was a crisis economy ex- independently toward a similar outcome tended indefinitely as part of a historical period arose first in the 1920s during the period of marked by regression away from the market. NEP, then again in the 1960s, and finally According to Millar, when one exam- again under Gorbachev. ines these convergence models in the light of Millar outlined the major players in the the collapse of the Soviet Union, conclusions discourse on convergence. According to can be drawn as to their viability. Millar Millar, there are two main models that explained that the present economic situation theorized unilateral convergence. The first is disproves Karl Marx’s theory, since there is the model of Karl Marx, who hypothesized no sign today that growing conflict in that both systems would converge radically capitalist society will lead to its collapse. toward socialism. This would occur, accord- Tinbergen was also wrong, in Millar’s view, ing to Marx, because the system of distribu- because the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were not tion of wealth in the mature capitalist society equidistant in their extremity from some is irrational and would eventually be over- midpoint—either the U.S. turned out not to thrown by the workers. Millar noted as well be an extreme case or the Soviet case was that Marx’s model is based on the assumption more extreme. Hayek, on the other hand, that scarcity can be overcome. On the other looks far better today, since it did cost far too hand, the opposing unilateral convergence much to run the Soviet economy, and it model—championed by Von Hayek—sees seems that the Russians are trying desper- scarcity as a permanent condition and ately to move toward a free market system. foresees convergence toward capitalism and Millar explained that the Hicksian free markets. This convergence would be model best portrays the situation in that it based on the fact that the number of market starts from a discourse on economic develop- supply and demand equations and the ment. When one looks at the ratio of market immense variety of wants present in a transactions to non-market transactions in developed economy would make a com- various economies since 1850, it is obvious pletely planned system far too costly to run. that there has been constant growth of the There are also a number of economists market as a share of all economic transactions. who discussed mutual convergence. Millar The case of the U.S.S.R. is an anomaly, since noted in particular Tinbergen, who formed there was a deliberate regression away from his theory while considering the implications the market. However, that course has now of the cold war. In Tinbergen’s view, both the been abandoned. Moreover, Millar empha- U.S. and the Soviet system were extreme sized that Hicks’ theory is advantageous in regimes. Since rational actors would move that it portrays economic development as toward an optimal, central regime, both fueled by transaction costs rather than rational systems would gradually approach an decisions of economic actors. That is, the economic system that balances equity and market has continued to grow because its efficiency. This means that the Soviet Union functioning incurs the least amount of cost per would adopt markets and become more transaction, not because actors have made efficient, while the U.S. would develop a decisions based on rationality. Finally, the welfare system. Millar also noted that Hicks model is the only one that allows for the Tinbergen associated economic convergence generation of novelty, of new institutions, and with a kind of political convergence as well, types of economic transaction. leading to a more peaceful world and the end In concluding, Millar suggested that of the cold war. approaching the present economic situation 146 in terms of economic history and its develop- to find a language through which to contest ment based on transaction costs may lead to a the claims of the absolutist imperial state. At better hypothesis than simply stating that the same time, elite notions of where “Rus- capitalism has won at the expense of socialism. sia” lay appear to have shifted from the —by Nancy Popson enlightened and virtuous “sons of the fatherland” found in 1760’s St. Petersburg to Vol. XV No. 4 1997 rural estates like those inhabited by families Provincialism: Eighteenth-Century such as Tatiana Larina’s in Eugene Onegin. Russia’s Gift to the Future The idea of the provinces as glush’ Returning to St. Petersburg for service stemmed from the changes introduced by after spending two years in his native village, Peter the Great to pre-existing Muscovite Andrei Timofei Bolotov visited his sister on cultural and political practice. Peter em- her estate near Pskov. She was shocked at how braced a rhetoric of interventionist raison he had changed. His once-polished conduct, d’etat absolutism, that explicitly broke with manners, dress, and language had become the hieratic and conservative world-view of those of a savage. Bolotov wondered what she its predecessor. The provinces, once the lower expected, since he was returning from two rungs of ladders defined by mestnichestvo, years in the glush’, reported David McDonald, now became objects of state attempts to levy Associate Professor of History, University of conscripts, taxes, information, and noble Wisconsin, Madison, and former Short-term servitors, who seemed to resist the capital’s Scholar, Kennan Institute at a Kennan Institute rising demands. With the development of a lecture on 30 October 1997. quasi-public sphere in St. Petersburg and McDonald cited eighteenth-century Moscow, several forces combined to foster definitions of glush’ as isolated and backward the idea that the provinces were not just locales, an idea conveyed by notions like “the resistant, but vicious. First was the embrace sticks”or “the bush” in English. While the by rulers and elites of the Petrine project as a condescension toward the provinces implied break with the “darkness” that preceded it; by this term still suffuses contemporary this past came increasingly to be associated Russian capital-city culture, McDonald with the noble countryside. Second was the argued that the concept itself evolved during growth in capital-city Russia of an elite the eighteenth century in response to initia- culture that prized enlightenment and tives from St. Petersburg and in provincial identified with the state’s role as enlightener noble culture itself, for the idea of backward- of Russia: the Russia to be transformed was ness attaching to glush’ appears to have the countryside, as became clear with the referred specifically to the rural nobility. frustrations encountered in conducting McDonald suggested that studying the censuses, surveys, and in such moments as emergence of the provinces as backward and the Legislative Commission of the 1760’s. vicious—as depicted in satirical journals, This frustration found reflection in the abuses literary works, and state materials—casts depicted in Novikov’s journals, Fonvizin’s new light on well-known currents in eigh- plays, or Radishchev’s Journey from St. teenth-century Russian history, including Petersburg to Moscow. Likewise, the good “westernization,” the impact of the Petrine citizen limned in these sources was the reforms, and relations between state and product of a culture, education, and sociabil- nobility. From this point of view, the prov- ity only to be found in the city. Thus, the inces emerge as a challenge to the reforming countryside changed over the eighteenth efforts of the post-Petrine state and those century from a site of juniority to one of capital-city servitors that espoused its backwardness and immorality, an implicit civilizing mission. It was this tension be- rejection of the Petrine enterprise and the tween capital center and provincial periphery enlightened values it embodied. that gave force and meaning to European Ironically, the separation between city ideas as they were appropriated in St. and countryside implied in this mid-eigh- Petersburg; similarly the sources of Russian teenth-century vision created the possibility notions of backwardness might well be of an autonomous nobiliary identity by the sought in the encounter between reforming early 1800’s. Lacking western languages of state and recalcitrant countryside, rather than rights or ancient privilege, rural nobles between Russia and Europe. Ultimately, the seemed to invert the prevailing capital-city same challenge permitted the rural nobility view in order to express their own indepen- 147 dence from the state. This process paralleled strong parties in Ukraine—the Communist the emancipation of the nobility, the local Party of Ukraine (KPU) and Rukh. These administrative reforms that followed the parties and their smaller satellites stand at Pugachevshchina in the 1770’s and the Noble polar opposites on most issues, with KPU Charter of 1785. The very distance of the supporting a command economy and close countryside from the city, as depicted in ties with Russia, and Rukh pushing for a capital imagery, gave it an autonomy on the market economy and establishment of ties basis of which rural nobles came to express a with the West. The absence of centrist parties distinct identity, detached from ritual in this equation could stem from the former invocations of service. If the older glush’ electoral law, which discouraged formation continued to resonate in such works as Dead of parties lacking strong mobilizing ideolo- Souls, there arose also a warmer, more gies, suggested Arel. congenial, and more “Russian” gentry- Arel stressed that the development of a inhabitated glush’ in other works, including strong centrist contingent is the largest Onegin: to glimpse this new derevnia and its question in the upcoming elections. The positive national connotations, one need only general orientation of the population, as recall Pushkin’s description of Tatiana’s established in representative surveys, is mother’s rustication. largely centrist, leaving a vast untapped In conclusion, from the eighteenth to reservoir for newly-formed centrist parties. the ninteenth century, attitudes toward the Recent surveys from March 1997 indicate that Russian countryside came full circle. Glush’ a full 55 percent of the electorate do not evolved from having uncivilized connota- identify with any party. This undefined tions to embodying the “the real Russia.” middle, according to Arel, is the potential McDonald emphasized that this fluctuation support for the political center. has been a recurring theme throughout The new electoral law will force this Russian history. In fact, the same pattern has sector of the electorate to choose a party. Arel been repeated during Soviet times and up to predicted three possible developments the present day. arising from this situation: 1) a significant —by David McDonald increase in both leftist and rightist party representation as the undefined middle Vol. XV No. 5 1997 throws weight to either pole; 2) fragmenta- Elections in Ukraine: Consolidation tion of centrist parties, with the centrists or Polarization? failing to pass the 4 percent threshold, The March 1998 parliamentary elec- leaving the right and left over-represented; 3) tions will be about the success or failure of consolidation of the center as a small portion the structuralization of the political center, of the undefined middle goes to the right and said Dominique Arel, Assistant Professor, the left, with the bulk going to centrists. Watson Institute of Brown University, at a In attempting to shed light on which of Kennan Institute lecture on 3 November these three possibilities is most likely, Arel 1997. pointed to survey data illustrating the Arel explained that the electoral law political orientation of the population toward that was finally signed in October provides democratic, socio-economic, and national for a mixed proportional and majoritarian issues. Of these, centrist, leftist, and rightist system much like its Russian counterpart. parties tend to agree on issues of democracy, One half of the parliamentary seats are such as free press and minority rights. It is in chosen through party lists, with parties the areas of national issues—closeness to needing to receive at least 4 percent of the Russia and the status of the Russian lan- vote in order to gain parliamentary seats. guage—and socio-economic issues that the Parties have until 25 December 1997 to polarity of the left and the right is apparent. register for the campaign. The remaining Arel showed that the views of the “undefined seats will be filled through one round of middle” tend to fall either close to centrist elections using the “first past the post” views on these issues or between centrist and method. It differs from Russia’s law in that leftist views. This, Arel concluded, under- there is no minimum participation rate. scores the possible support for centrist parties The new electoral law may be able to and would suggest that if one of the polar help promote party development in Ukraine. parties gets an increase of seats in March Arel contended that there are still only two 1998 it would be more likely to be the KPU. 148 Arel also noted that there are some mist at the Centre for Russian and East worrisome signs that the centrist parties will European Studies, University of Birmingham, fail to consolidate. First, Ukraine does not continued to say that we should look more have a party-of-power equivalent to Russia’s closely at institutional arrangements that are Nash Dom Rossiya, led by Prime Minister supposed to underpin market reform. Chernomyrdin. Ukraine has had three prime Kirkow argued that the question of ministers in the past five years, engendering ownership rights and the culture of corporate three rather than one party. Moreover, reform- governance in Russia is a major issue for minded deputies such as Holovaty, Lanovoi, foreign investors. The ambivalent division and Pynzenyk refuse to run on a single between management and ownership in platform, effectively splitting the reform vote. Russian companies is a real problem. What According to Arel, survey data also usually occurs is “insider privatization” and shows that there is a remarkable gap between an attempt to keep outsiders out of manage- elite and mass orientations, particularly ment and control. relating to national issues. The question of According to Kirkow, foreign investors making Russian an official language was prefer specific sectors of the economy such as hotly debated during the drafting of the the oil sector, metals, and aluminum, partly constitution in parliament. According to a due to the mono-resource specialization of March 1997 survey, a majority of the popula- various regions. This specialization stands in tion agreed that Russian language should stark contrast to the intention by many have either an “official status” (26 percent) or central reformers to diversify the economies the status of a “state language” (28 percent). of Russia’s different regions. However, the parliament chose to deny In looking at foreign direct investment in Russian any official status. Arel pointed to Russian regions, Kirkow devised a classifica- this as an example of the unstable equilib- tion of various regions. According to the rium between elite and mass orientations. speaker, there are four types of Russian regions Another example relates to the question based on their economic geography: commer- of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Arel concluded cial hub regions—both gateway regions and from survey data that the consensus in the big cities like Ekaterinburg and Nizhny electorate is that either Ukraine must be Novgorod—agricultural regions, resource rich independent but remain between NATO and regions, and machine-building regions— the CIS, or Ukraine must be independent but subdivided into high-tech regions like Samara remain close to Russia. This, Arel emphasized, and rust belt regions like Novosibirsk. Statisti- is not the discourse heard among the elite at all, cally, there is a robust core of ten leading who have been emphasizing an away-from- regions in Russia including both Moscow city Russia policy. Thus one sees that a minority and Moscow oblast, St. Petersburg, Nizhny discourse at the mass electoral level happens to Novgorod, Samara, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, be dominating the political elite level. Novosibirsk, and Primorsky krai. Arel concluded that due to this un- From the state’s point of view, Kirkow settled equilibrium, the language question is argued, the Russian state not only initiated the almost certain to reemerge in the 1998 opening of the Russian economy, but also election campaign. Since it divides centrist responded to grassroots pressure from different politicians who otherwise essentially agree firms in various regions. In this aspect, how- on socio-economic and democratic issues, it ever, foreign direct investment was disappoint- may be crucial in determining the success or ing. Official Goskomstat figures show that both failure of the center’s consolidation in the the flow of direct and portfolio investment is new parliament. negligible. However, after monetary —by Nancy Popson privatization, there has been an increasing interest in Russian equities and a number of Vol. XV No. 6 1997 investment companies are trying to buy utilities Foreign Direct Investment in and invest in communication and infrastruc- Russia’s Regions ture in various Russian territories. Progress in The two main pillars of economic Russian stabilization and the end of inflation in reform in Russia are privatization and Russia has shifted away from investment to foreign direct investment, remarked Peter treasury bonds on the way to real equity. Kirkow at a Kennan Institute lecture on 17 Kirkow remarked that in the state’s November 1997. Kirkow, a Political Econo- point of view, the main concern in foreign 149 direct investment was to functionalize infrastructure and communications to make investment as a means to collect taxes, it easier for foreign corporate companies to increase the competitiveness of Russian tap into this particular market. businesses, and create additional employ- —by Jodi Koehn ment. In this role, Russian large cities have increased in importance, gaining from their Vol. XV No. 7 1998 metropolitan regions so that there is a U.S.–Ukraine Relations: Past, Present, multiplier effect in the territorial economy and Future and a new function in terms of transporta- One can distinguish two phases in U.S.- tion, distribution, business, and service Ukraine relations, remarked Vladimir activities in general. Dubovik, Associate Professor at Odessa State From the point of view of investors, University and Regional Exchange Scholar, recent developments highlight the problem Kennan Institute at a Kennan Institute lecture of the unprecedented fragmentation of on 2 December 1997. At first, the U.S. shaped Russian economic space and a high volatility the character of the relationship, whereas of the financial sector. The speaker argued now it is up to Ukraine to determine its form that a few oligarchies and “financial em- and nature. pires” in Russia can manipulate the financial Historically, U.S.-Ukraine relations sector in Russia as a whole. have gone through negative and positive Another problem is that of payment periods, noted Dubovik. America’s original arrears, tax collection, and general budgetary position toward Ukraine was made clear by problems because Moscow has retained its George Bush’s “chicken Kyiv” speech on 2 strong distributor function and has tried to August 1991, when he advised Ukraine to remain within the Soviet Union. According functionalize financial and banking sectors in to Dubovik, that policy grew out of Bush’s particular to collect taxes. Additional prob- personal connections with Mikhail lems are the lack of institutional buffers or Gorbachev and the U.S. belief that the constraints to mitigate the impact of financial dissolution of the USSR would destabilize troubles, the problem of collaterals, conversion the region. of shares into equity, and land ownership. By December 1991, it was clear that the Kirkow concluded by discussing the USSR had ceased to exist, and the U.S. was challenges that Russian regions now face. forced to redefine its policy. According to First, is the problem of how to tap a global Dubovik, Bush was advised to link the economy in which there are suddenly eighty- official recognition of Ukraine to the dis- nine territories competing for foreign invest- mantlement of its nuclear weapons, but realized that to do so shortly after the ment. Second, is how to down-scale Russian “chicken Kyiv” speech might create the bureaucracy and come to terms with the impression that America’s policy was anti- hostility toward outsiders. Regions like Ukrainian. America gave official recognition Samara, Nizhny Novgorod, and Novgorod to Ukraine on 25 December 1991, and have gained in this respect and have created diplomatic relations commenced on 2 a positive and “liberal image” of their region. January 1992. Ukraine began to participate A third question is how to ease the in programs such as the Peace Corps, and in licensing and registration procedure and achieve May of 1992 President Kravchuk made his a normal or free sale of equities and land in first official visit to Washington. Russia. This is a problem of conflicting regula- Despite these encouraging signs, tory assistance in Russia and central legislation, Dubovik noted several negative tendencies. particularly the question of land ownership In 1992 and most of 1993, relations were close which the State Duma fiercely opposes. to hostile: sanctions were discussed for A fourth issue is how to move away Ukraine’s non-cooperation on nuclear issues from the redistributory function which the and the diplomatic visit of Vice Prime Russian state claims for itself and, in particu- Minister Kuchma was less than successful. By lar, how to squeeze Russian companies for 1992 the official approach toward Ukraine additional taxes and functionalize foreign was to use any means possible to convince firms for their own tax collection. Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons. A final question—as seen in various Dubovik also pointed to Washington’s Russo- other emerging markets, particularly in centrism as a reason for the change. He Asian markets like in Indonesia, Malaysia, remarked that the U.S. had historically failed and Singapore—is how to set up a modern to see Ukraine as a nation, and the concep- 150 tual vacuum left in the U.S. after the demise and ecological issues vital to its future of the USSR made it only natural to turn to development. known institutions over those newly built in Dubovik recommended continued Ukraine. Moreover, Russia was seen as the military cooperation, noting that it is an leader of the region, and the U.S. tended to effective way to develop international links. portray Yeltsin as a democrat and Kravchuk In the same vein, he pointed to exchange as a nationalist hiding nuclear weapons. programs as a vital form of diplomacy and Things began to shift in a more positive one of the ways the U.S. can influence direction in late 1993. In the U.S., experts through example. He urged the U.S. to began to conclude that an independent support more exchanges at all levels. Ukraine was a crucial counterweight to Dubovik noted that the U.S. could growing Russian power in the region. The coordinate its programs more fully with U.S. Congress also began to feel pressure to other countries involved in assisting Ukraine. pay attention to the non-Russian successor He noted that coordination is lacking even states, and Ukrainian-American organiza- among U.S. governmental branches and tions worked hard to alter Ukraine’s negative agencies. Finally, he recommended that the image. Dubovik noted that the shelling of the U.S. continue its present course of pursuing a Russian parliament in October 1993 illus- Ukraine policy that promotes normalization trated that Russia would not become a of Ukrainian-Russian relations as well as democracy overnight. As Ukraine began to assistance toward Ukraine’s integration into cooperate on nuclear issues, the U.S. started European political and economic structures. to move away from Russo-centric policies. This policy, in Dubovik’s view, is the most With this attitude shift, in 1993 Strobe likely to promote a bright future for Ukraine Talbott, then Ambassador at Large, and and for its relationship with the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher began —by Nancy Popson visiting Kyiv and discussing the notion of “partnership” and de-linking assistance from Vol. XV No. 8 1998 nuclear issues. By 1994 Ukraine ranked third Language Policy and Citizenship in the in the amount of aid received from America. former Soviet Union The tripartite agreement was signed in There is discontent and lingering January 1994, and in November 1994 Ukraine tension among Russia’s neighbors connected ratified the non-proliferation treaty. From that to official language policies which are both a point on, remarked Dubovik, there was a new major pillar of the state-building process and and friendly period of U.S.-Ukraine relations. a source of instability for many newly Now relations are reaching a point independent states, remarked Justin Burke at where it is possible to talk of a strategic a Kennan Institute lecture on 15 December partnership. This is evident, according to 1997. Burke, Associate Director of the Forced Dubovik, by Clinton’s Kyiv visit in 1994, Migration Project at the Open Society Ukraine’s joining the Council of Europe and Institute in New York, stated that the key the Partnership for Peace, and the “distinctive issue is the need for Russian speakers to partnership” with NATO. However, Dubovik adapt and learn the titular languages in these lamented that Ukraine, while activist in its newly independent states. foreign policy, has been lax in implementing Burke focused on three of Russia’s domestic reform. U.S. policy toward Ukraine neighboring states: Latvia, Estonia, and now fluctuates with the progress of Ukrai- Kazakhstan where the issues involved are nian reform, and it is up to Ukrainian most acute because the Russian speaking politicians to pave the way domestically for a population and the titular population are split secure relationship with the U.S. nearly equally. The situation is most noticeable Dubovik concluded with recommenda- in Kazakhstan where Kazakhs comprise a tions as to what the U.S. can do—together plurality but not a majority. In the Baltics, with Ukraine—in order to build on their ethnic Russians make up an overwhelming achievements thus far. First and foremost, majority of the non-titular population. Dubovik stressed the importance of continu- After the Soviet collapse, there was a deep ing to assist Ukraine with its democratic and feeling of victimization in the states neighboring market reform initiatives. He noted that U.S. Russia. Estonians, Latvians, and Kazakhs felt influence on the Ukrainian government could that Soviet russification posed cultural threats to help focus its attention on social, agricultural, their identity, whereas Russian speakers— 151 especially in Estonia and Latvia—were disen- country to rebuild the nation and now are franchised overnight because of language laws being treated poorly by an “ungrateful” revived from the interwar republic that rendered titular population. people non-citizens. There is a danger of this issue— Estonia and Latvia revived and involving citizenship and centering around amended citizenship laws and instituted language—hindering the potential of these naturalization procedures that many Russian states to emerge as fully developed states. In speakers feel are too demanding. In the the Baltics, Economic Union and NATO Baltics, language tests are a prerequisite for membership are at stake. Estonia has been naturalization of disenfranchised non-citizens put on the early list and given clearance by or anyone applying for citizenship. the Organization for Security and Coopera- Kazakhstan’s July 1997 language law seeks to tion in Europe for not having civil rights make Kazakh the state language. However, violations, but still this is a question that not only is the legislation not as well defined could act as a drag on the ability of the state as in the Baltics, but there is less done to to meet EU membership criteria. In promote language learning and training for Kazakhstan, the issue is more about oil. the Russian speaking population. Russian speakers’ discontent serves as a The impact of these language policies has pretext for Moscow to meddle in internal led to an increase in emigration. This is more affairs and keep Kazakhstan in its fold. pronounced in Kazakhstan where hundreds of These problems are difficult to solve, thousands have left since the collapse of the Burke contended, because there is no political Soviet Union, mainly for economic reasons. will on the part of the governments involved. Many Russian speakers in the Baltics realize In the Baltics, coalition politics prevent any that regardless of perceived language discrimi- changes in the existing legislation. Russian nation, the economic situation is better there speakers in the Baltics, especially those who than it would be in Russia. In contrast, many were active in the popular front movements, Russian speakers in Kazakhstan feel that feel deceived. They worked with Baltic Kazakhs have purged them from prime job nationalist groups for independence and were areas and that there is no future there. then cast aside when the empire collapsed. Many Russian speakers feel the motivat- There are some causes for hope, Burke ing factor for such language policies is concluded. Migration flows are stabilizing in revenge for perceived and real abuses commit- both the Baltics and Central Asia. Younger ted during the Soviet era. Burke argued, generations in all these states are more however, that at least in the Baltic case, there is willing to learn the local language and a desire to preserve the national identity and should have no problem passing language statehood because of past history. In the Baltic tests for citizenship. They are also less likely states, there is also genuine concern about than their parents to return to Russia, cultural annihilation and the perception that especially in the Baltic states. The key for the the Soviet era brought the Baltic languages to international community is to promote near extinction. Their size and apprehension stability in the near term so that this emo- about preserving cultural traditions pushes tional stage can pass and more rational them to be adamant about the language issue. decision making can proceed. In Kazakhstan where cultural identity is less —by Jodi Koehn entrenched, Russian speakers see language policies more as a tool used by the titular Vol. XV No. 9 1998 population to reserve certain economic Ukraine: Challenges for 1998 privileges and advantages. The prospects for Ukraine in 1998 are Conversely, the titular populations on the surface less promising than last year, disapprove of Russian speakers’ reluctance to said Carlos Pascual, Director of Russian, learn the titular language. There is still a Ukrainian, and Eurasian Affairs at the perception among titular populations, National Security Council, at a Kennan especially in the Baltic states, that Russian Institute lecture on 12 January 1998. Al- speakers have lingering imperial attitudes though Ukraine now has a greater degree of and are ready to help Moscow reestablish if flexibility in its security relationships, not an actual empire, then a significant domestically it faces a difficult environment sphere of influence. Many Russian speakers for reform fueled by parliamentary elections in the Baltics feel that they came to the in March 1998 and Presidential elections in 152 October 1999. Internationally the climate has gress has linked action on business disputes to also changed in the past year, with sales of the release of some $100 million in assistance treasury bills falling and interest rates funds, and that the Gore-Kuchma Commis- skyrocketing, making 1997’s opportunities for sion is actively engaged in addressing com- “easy money on good terms” obsolete. mercial problems. Ukraine must now demon- In this context, it may be more difficult strate action and give investors the sense that to be optimistic about 1998. However, there is a way to resolve conflicts. Pascual emphasized that Ukraine may end Pascual also underlined the need for up in a stronger political and economic small business development in Ukraine. In position by the end of the year. The crucial this area, Ukraine’s leadership must pay factor will be leadership. In addition to the attention to deregulation and pension reform. challenge of proactive leadership, Pascual The amount of regulation is onerous, making pointed to a number of challenges for it difficult for small businesses to operate. Ukraine in 1998: integration with Europe, Pascual suggested that deregulation can be maintaining macroeconomic stability, positively promoted as a crack-down on building investor confidence, promoting bureaucracy. However, he noted that strong small business development, and reforming political will is necessary to counter en- the energy and agricultural sectors. trenched bureaucrats who make a living off On the security front, Pascual noted the regulations. Secondly, the U.S. and the that Ukraine has an opportunity to use the World Bank have been working with Ukraine space gained through agreements signed to discuss pension reforms—such as increas- with NATO and its neighbors to integrate ing the retirement age or moving toward itself with the European community. private pensions—which would remove a Through mechanisms such as military large portion of the tax burden from small exercises and training programs and imple- businesses. Pascual also remarked on mentation of the Friendship Treaty with America’s robust assistance program, which Russia, Ukraine can normalize its relation- promotes small business development ships in the European community and Russia through business centers and loans. and thus reduce potential tensions between In pointing to necessary sectoral reforms, the East and West. The United States can Pascual mentioned the energy and agricultural assist Ukraine in this challenge through sectors. In order to reduce its dependency on military-to-military programs and practical energy imports, Ukraine needs to move ahead advice and support. on production-sharing legislation for the oil Ukraine’s second challenge will be to and gas sector and act on pricing and collection reinforce macroeconomic stability. Pascual problems in the electricity sector. Since raising admitted that this would not be an easy electricity prices to the level necessary to cover process. Even taking into consideration all costs in the middle of winter is politically possible revenue sources, Ukraine could find difficult, Pascual described a strategy of putting itself one billion dollars short for the first power-generating companies on a “path to quarter of 1998, and election year politics may profitability” which would at first focus on pose an obstacle to economic reform. How- increased collections and then turn to price ever, there are areas where reform can be reform during the summer months. In the implemented without the need for legislative agricultural sphere, Pascual noted that Ukraine action. Moreover, control of the fiscal situation needs to privatize land and revitalize com- through a clear strategy of targeted expendi- modities markets that have been decimated ture cuts and a solid commitment to structural due to regional demands that producers fill the reforms could give the population hope for an state requirements prior to market trading. end to austerity and attract support from These challenges will lead to tough international financial institutions. political battles in the months ahead, and A third challenge is to build up the Ukraine’s success in 1998 will depend confidence of possible investors, countering ultimately on its leadership. According to the conventional wisdom that it is impossible Pascual, the reformers in Ukraine now have to do business in Ukraine. The real problem, an opportunity to pitch to the electorate the according to Pascual, is not just that busi- necessity of extraordinary measures to ensure nesses are encountering difficulties, but that Ukraine’s sovereignty and stability in the face they often cannot see a way to resolve their of tighter international markets. Pascual problems. Pascual noted that the U.S. Con- concluded that if there is a willingness to 153 confront the challenges of 1998 and to unify government. In Nizhny Novgorod and reformers, Ukraine has a chance to create a Tiumen, well-organized enterprise associa- climate that will advance its security, politi- tions formed in each of the dominant eco- cal, and economic agenda. In turn, the U.S. nomic sectors and commanded a fairly large goal should be to work in partnership with block of seats in the newly elected regional Ukraine to make that possible. legislatures. Not only did the concentration —by Nancy Popson of the regional economy encourage economic group formation thereby overcoming one Vol. XV No. 10 1998 collective action dilemma, but it also fostered “Local Heroes” and Political Economy in cooperation between organized economic Russia’s Regions interests in the regional government. Some of Russia’s provinces have In regions with an economy concentrated obviously fared better than others in the within a single sector or among a few large and transition to democracy and a market important enterprises, the structural context economy, said Kathryn Stoner-Weiss at a explained behavior and political outcomes. The Kennan Institute lecture on 22 January 1998. “imbeddedness” of the actions of political and Stoner-Weiss, Assistant Professor of Politics economic interests in such an environment and International Affairs, Princeton Univer- meant a more limited and specialized pool sity, presented the findings of her recently from which to draw regional political actors. published book to explain why higher Economic and political behavior in a concen- performance oblast governments or “local trated economic community also promoted heroes” existed in some regions but not in horizontal networks between political and others. economic actors that, in turn, promoted Stoner-Weiss examined the perfor- credible commitments to one another. mance of four Russian regional govern- According to the speaker, cooperation ments: Yaroslavl, Nizhny Novgorod, between economic and political actors Saratov, and Tiumen. In the study, there was involves the state allowing economic interests a clear and consistent performance ranking to play a more active role in policy formation among the four cases. Nizhny Novgorod and implementation. In return, economic oblast rated highest, Tiumen ranked second, interests deliver indirect political power to Yaroslavl third, and Saratov consistently lagged. When asked, political actors in the the state by guaranteeing consensus and by two highest performance cases—Nizhny drawing on their own resources to ensure the Novgorod and Tiumen—responded that legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficiency of they viewed consensus or stability to be their state action. The result of this was a general most significant accomplishment. consensus on political goals. Stoner-Weiss argued that relative Where cooperative business-govern- stability or political consensus in these regions ment relations were present, regional was a function of the concentration of the government performance was higher. regional economy and the degree to which Concentration of the economy in a particular regional economic interests cooperated with sector narrowed the elite pool both in Nizhny one another and with regional government Novgorod and Tiumen, the two higher actors. Where the economy was concentrated, performance regions, leading to a consensual there was less competition for access to rather than conflictual selection of leaders by political resources and key groups of eco- the oblast legislature. Economic concentra- nomic actors could collectively pursue tion also promoted consensus and limited inclusion in the governing process. Where the factionalization within the legislature. economy was more dispersed, economic Furthermore, consensus on political goals interests conflicted, causing sharp competition meant less time spent on organizational for access to scarce regional resources. The matters than on policy issues. result was lower regional government Policy outputs and implementation in performance. Tiumen and Nizhny Novgorod were more According to Stoner-Weiss, in regions coherent and both had broad economic with concentrated economies, elites overcame development programs. Key organized two collective action or cooperation prob- economic interests participated in policy lems. The first involved cooperation of a formation and used their authority to insure powerful group of economic actors who implementation of economic development pursued systematic access to regional plans. Furthermore, education policy benefitted 154 from the incorporation of economic interests fictitious “official history” for years—is only into policy output and implementation. now being put together. In conclusion, Stoner-Weiss argued, the The falsification of this part of history key variable in explaining performance exists for two reasons, says Ivnitskii. First, variations among regions is collective action Communist ideology dominated the social or cooperative behavior between political sciences, and history was taught only so far and economic elites. The more concentrated as it fell in line with Communist precepts. the regional economy, the more likely Second, historical documents were “forcibly collective action will take place. However, made to comply with the ideological stereo- while a certain amount of consensus or elite types.” It was virtually impossible to find real accommodation is desirable in every success- information. Ivnitskii explained how since the ful and democratic government, too much 1950s he has been engaged in hunting down elite consensus could endanger pluralism in archives that contain actual documents the longer term. It may also jeopardize the relating to collectivization. Even now, many growth of market relations if regional important documents are in closed archives, governments artificially support inefficient such as the Presidential Archives, formerly the enterprises that market forces might other- Archives of the Blue Bureau. wise force into bankruptcy. Therefore, while With the collapse of Communism, regions with concentrated economies may however, many archives have been opened, have achieved more in the early stage of releasing invaluable information, showing transition, if cooperative relations persist in who was involved in the government’s the very long term, there is a risk that decisions relating to “dekulakization,” and democratic responsiveness will be sacrificed how it was managed. According to these in the interest of stability and governmental documents, Ivnitskii noted, a tight coterie of effectiveness. The “local heroes” of today Stalin’s closest Moscow and regional advisors must therefore be careful not to become made drastic changes to an original proposi- impediments to the further growth of tion for collectivization, quickening its tempo, democracy and the market in the future. stripping what meager possessions the —by Jodi Koehn peasants had originally been allowed, and increasing the number of people involved. Vol. XV No. 11 1998 The archives also give a good idea of The “Real Story” of Collectivization and this number, he explained. In 1930–31, over Dekulakization 600,000 families were collectivized. A “In 1930, during collectivization, I was number of families—around 225,000—also eight, so, in fact, I was able to witness how my abandoned their land, seeking a refuge in the neighbors were ‘dekulakized’ and how they cities. The repression of the peasantry were resettled, sent to Solovky and to northern continued on a grand scale—as of 30 January provinces in winter. So I was able to see the 1930, 280,000 people had been arrested. Of tears of children and old people when all this these, 19,000 were shot. happened….In 1950, when I began to study the Ivnitskii remarked that some of the issue of collectivization, I saw that the archival most intriguing information now accessible documents were inaccurate, that they did not relates to peasant protests and uprisings, of reflect the truth,” remembered Nikolai which there were near 13,000 in 1930 alone. Ivnitskii, Professor at the Institute of Russian Terrorist acts were widespread against History at the Russian Academy of Sciences, at Communists and village activists trying to a Kennan Institute lecture on 9 December 1997. enforce the collectivization. Many protests Collectivization of agriculture, one of involved thousands of people, lasting the keystones to Stalin’s revolution from months, and artillery and even aviation was above, forms one of the most painful stories used to combat the rebellions. of Soviet history. By World War II, over four Based on these recently opened archives, million Russian peasants had been deported researchers can draw certain conclusions about from their homes and resettled to work on collectivization and its impact. Ivnitskii pointed collective farms. The consequences in human to three such conclusions. First, despite official terms were great and the benefits, according rhetoric, collectivization was achieved only to Ivnitskii, few or none. The truth about through force. Also, collectivization did not collectivization and “dekulakization” in lead to an upsurge in production, and there is Russia’s countryside—buried under a no evidence of the advantage of collective 155 agriculture over small holders. Moreover, the of Russia from an industrial country to a “dekulakization” of the peasants was not a post-industrial one, remarked D.J. Peterson result of collectivism, it was the means to at a Kennan Institute lecture on 2 February achieving collectivism. Its result was the ruin of 1998. Peterson, resident consultant in the the capable peasant population, and a host of International Studies Group at the RAND problems for the Soviet Union. Corporation, explained that Soviet culture Second, Ivnitskii explained that the was quintessentially a modern culture, one in peasant situation created instability for the which images of industry were glorified. A nation as a whole, forcing Stalin not only to large part of the transition in Russia is how to use troops and weaponry to reassert order, but address the legacy of the industrial past and political gambits, such as releasing various clean up these facilities while trying to resolutions designed to soothe the populace. address the new pressures of the future. Third, the collectivization campaign was Peterson focused on several problems followed by a decided downturn in produc- resulting from Russia’s transition: traffic, tion, and a worsening of the grain problem. trash, and suburbanization. All together, these factors led to the terrible In Moscow, and most other Russian famine of 1932–33, causing the deaths of cities, one of the biggest changes is the huge approximately ten million people. Based on rise in the number of cars. This has large these facts, Ivnitskii concluded that collectiv- implications on many different levels. There ization did not achieve any of its goals, instead are not many paved roads in Russia to functioning as a terrible drain on society. accommodate the increase in traffic. The Ivnitskii ended his talk with an interest- Russian government has funded many ing observation on the lessons of collectiviza- projects to improve existing roads as well as tion and the effect of the peasantry on to build new ones, but this too has an impact Russian history. He lamented that the sad on the environment, namely air pollution and story of collectivization has not made an urban sprawl. As road conditions improve, impact on the reformers of modern Russia. In more small towns and villages near large their zealous ambition to transform Russian cities are becoming suburbanized. society, they do not take into account what Suburbanization brings the problem of they are working with—a society which has how to provide clean water to growing always functioned best when taking the villages that do not have running water or needs of the peasantry into account. sewerage. The infrastructure is not keeping Modern reformers wish to privatize pace with private home building. Obviously, land completely, a move not in the interest of the lack of infrastructure in general could the Russian peasant, who is too poor to farm cause substantial environmental and health the land on his own. If land is privatized on problems down the road. the western scale, speculates Ivnitskii, the In the past, the Soviet government paid peasants will wind up with little. Too poor to for such services and local industries managed farm the land themselves, the peasants will the facilities. Now, these facilities are priva- be forced to sell or lease it, and in the end, tized and such services have been turned over only a few rich persons will have control over to local governments to manage. The popula- Russia’s farmland. tion does not want to pay for services that Warning that reforms will not achieve were once free during the Soviet Union. their goals if they fail to take into account the Another major problem facing Russia desires of the peasantry, Ivnitskii nonetheless today is the problem of trash. In addition to emphasized his belief that the peasantry will the increase in volume, there is the problem survive in the new Russia, in the same way as of types of trash not seen before. Westerniza- they always have, on their own terms. tion brought a great increase in non-biode- —by Maureen Thorson gradable packaging. This raises the question of how to pay for new landfills and waste Vol. XV No. 12 1998 collection systems. Russia’s Transition Brings New These problems can be addressed by Environmental Problems bringing new technologies to Russia, There are two major transitions cur- Peterson argued. One solution lies in eco- rently taking place in Russia: the transition nomic reforms that promote investment in from a centrally planned economy to a general, and the diffusion of clean technolo- market-oriented economy and the transition gies, in specific. However, new technology 156 will only solve part of the problem. The well as its culture in the next ten years and Soviet Union was good at the development certainly within the next generation. The and implementation of technologies. What challenge lies in how to negotiate this rapid Russia lacks is strong management. Poor change without worsening existing problems. management has created many environmen- This change creates a rich opportunity for tal problems and wasted resources. Better improving management and education to organization driven by market incentives to focus on people and get them involved in the increase productivity could help without fate of their communities. expensive technologically-based solutions. Russia wants to be like the United One option is to fix Russia’s notoriously leaky States and to have what we have. For the plumbing to ease pressure on the water environment this is both good news and bad. supply and wastewater treatment systems. Perhaps with time, the idea that nature According to the speaker, environmen- should be valued for itself and that it is not tal managers in Russia are either scientists or just for exploitation, will arise. engineers. They know how to develop the —by Jodi Koehn technology to solve their problems, but not how to develop and implement effective Vol. XV No. 13 1998 strategies for environmental protection. This Regional Development: The View is an area where the United States could from Novgorod provide assistance. The task of bureaucrats in the transition Russia is different from other countries of is to create favorable conditions for entrepre- a similar income level in that Russia already neurship and investment, declared Mikhail has post-modern values in which vacations and Mikhailovich Prusak, Governor of free time are valued. There is a growing Novgorod Oblast’, at the fifth lecture in the population in Russia interested in the “good Kennan Institute’s Russian Governors’ Forum life” that is present in nature. Growing tourism series on 2 March 1998. It is that task to in areas such as Lake Baikal brings a new which the Governor has devoted his team of challenge of how to promote the “love of reformers since his appointment and subse- nature” without trashing it at the same time. quent reelection in 1991 and 1995, respec- This raises the question of how to build the tively. infrastructure to deal with the problem. Governor Prusak explained that Lessons from places like Lake Tahoe may Novgorod Oblast’ currently has a large illustrate what protective measures may be amount of foreign investment—49 percent of appropriate. oblast’ GDP is derived from foreign invest- There have been some attempts to ment. The same figure for Russia as a whole remedy this, Peterson noted. There are efforts is only 2–3 percent. In investment dollars per to get Russia’s children interested in their capita Novgorod is second only to Moscow, community. If the younger generation gets and is rated third for its economic develop- involved, they may influence their parents, ment over the past six years. say to stop littering—such as what has Major foreign investors in the oblast’ happened in the United States. There are also include the English firm Cadbury-Schweppes, attempts to bring once closed natural areas and the Danish company Stimorol. In addi- such as parks to the people and to build up a tion, firms from Germany, Finland, Austria, community of interests. and South Korea are operating in Novgorod. In Russia, there are many opportunities This investment has brought the official for international assistance to help with unemployment rate in the region down to 4.8 nature reserves with global significance. For percent, and has also enabled significant example, there is a species of crane which retraining of the work force. However, the migrates between Japan and Russia. Without Governor lamented that as of yet no American international cooperation to protect its firms have invested in the region. nesting grounds, this particular bird will not The Governor attributes his region’s be able to migrate back to Japan. success in attracting European and Asian Peterson remarked that the transition in investors to bold tax and land policies aimed Russia is proceeding very rapidly with one specifically toward investment. Novgorod year in Russia being equal to roughly thirty did not wait for the federal government to years in the U.S. As a result, we can expect a pass an ideal tax code, but instead worked fundamental change in Russia’s economy as within the framework of the constitution and 157 the authority given to the regional govern- international banks have begun investing in ment to put together its own tax system. Novgorod, including Smolensk Bank, According to Prusak, the basic principle of Avtobank, Promstroi Bank, the World Bank, that system is that private individuals should the European Bank for Reconstruction and carry the bulk of the tax burden. Development, and the Export–Import Bank. Prusak admits that this was a very bold Moreover, the government has created an step, given the poorness of the region. insurance fund for small and mid-sized However, the reformers came to realize two businesses consisting of 100 million new lessons in economics: the poorer the region Russian rubles. the more it must do to attract investment; Although he is certain that all these and individuals receiving regular salaries issues will eventually be resolved at the will be willing and able to pay taxes. There- national level, the Governor explained that it fore, the Novgorod tax code relieves both seemed absurd to wait for federal laws when foreign and national investors from all taxes there was concrete work to be done in the until the company becomes self-sufficient. region. According to Prusak, Novgorod’s This tax break amounts to approximately 50 favorable business climate is due to the work percent of all taxes owed by foreign compa- of the regional legislature and the political nies in the Russian Federation. and social stability brought about by six Regarding land ownership, Prusak years of governance by the same team of remarked that since approval of the federal reformers. He also attributes the lack of land code has been delayed, Novgorod corruption in the region—noted in a 1996 decided to create its own de facto solution Interpol study—to the legal framework set that would keep agricultural land restricted up by the government: he explained that if but allow investors to own land on which the bureaucracy does not attempt to deprive they build production facilities. One such businesses of that which they require, the regulation allows the Russian partner in a criminal element will not follow suit. joint venture to purchase land at very low The Governor concluded his remarks by prices. This in effect gives ownership to the noting that Novgorod’s positive results stem foreign partner as well once the joint venture from the reform team’s conviction that there is becomes a legal entity. Moreover, a com- no such thing as a dead end economic situa- pletely foreign venture is able to lease land tion. Prusak strongly believes that optimal for a period of forty-nine years with the solutions can be found if one respects the option to buy after that time. objective laws of economics and is willing to be Oblast’ regulations also aim to make it proactive in making reform policy decisions. more attractive for foreign companies to —by Nancy Popson invest in failing Russian concerns. For example, they take into account the possibil- Vol. XV No. 14 1998 ity that an investor taking over an existing Russian-Iranian Relations: factory may not need the entire amount of A Tactical Alliance? land set aside for that factory. Therefore, the Russian policy towards the Middle East government allows the firm to only pay taxes is “driven to a large part by the desire for on the land actually used, and the remaining Russia to reassert Russian authority in the land is put in a fund for non-liquid assets and near abroad, over Central Asia, and the distributed to small and mid-sized businesses Transcaucasus,” remarked Robert Freedman in need of facilities. In addition, once a at a Kennan Institute lecture on 9 March foreign company takes over a heavily 1998. Freedman, President of Baltimore indebted Russian firm, oblast’ regulations Hebrew University listed other factors provide for an amnesty on all debt owed by affecting Russian policy towards the Middle the firm up to the date of sale or creation of East as a search for economic gain for a hard the joint venture. pressed Russian economy and a shift in Support for small and mid-sized Middle Eastern regional priorities to focus on businesses is another priority for Governor Iran, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf. Prusak. Currently, Novgorod boasts 7,000 The main point of Russia-Iran policy is small businesses, or one for every 100 that Russia is weak and therefore needs a citizens. Banks that invest in small and mid- good relationship with Iran, Freedman sized businesses are free from taxes on stipulated. In addition, Russia has several profits. As a result, many larger Moscow and important interests in Iran. It is a major 158 market for Russian arms and nuclear technol- percentage of Afghanistan. There has been a ogy and a means for President Yeltsin to recent Russian flirtation with the Taliban and demonstrate to opposition parties his some discussion that Russia would not independence from the United States. Iran is oppose the pipeline going through Afghani- an area in which a diminished and weakened stan. However, such a pipeline would Russia can exercise diplomatic influence. compete with any pipelines going through Finally, Iran is an ally in a number of sensi- Iran which is a serious problem. tive Middle-Eastern, Transcaucasian, and Since the 1980s, Russian-Iranian Central Asian political hot spots such as relations have warmed. The newly elected Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and helps to Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, is check Turkish influence in the Transcaucasus viewed as less likely to push Islamic radical- and Central Asia. ism in the North Caucasus and Central Asia. However, according to Freedman, But on the negative side for Russia was Iran’s Russia has had some problems with Iran. recent tentative rapprochement with the First, is the threat of Iran as an alternative United States. transportation route for Central Asian oil and Freedman suggested that improved gas. The more Central Asian producers use U.S.-Iran relations might weaken U.S. Iran, the less dependent they will be on objections to pipelines through Iran and Russia. Second, is the potential threat of investments in the Iranian oil industry— radical Islam from Iran penetrating Central lessening Central Asian dependence on Asia and the North Caucasus. A third prob- Moscow. In addition, over the next few lem is the inability of Iran to pay its debts to years—although Freedman does not yet see Russia in hard currency. As in Russia, the this as a serious possibility—if Iran not only recent drop in oil prices has hurt Iran. As a improves relations with the U.S. but also result, Iran has been pushing for barter sales continues its new positive policy toward the but Russia has resisted. Fourth is the impact of Arab gulf states, then the U.S. would be less Russian-Iranian relations with its supply of of a strategic threat, making Iran less militar- nuclear reactors and missile technology on ily dependent on Moscow. U.S.-Russian relations. Finally, Iran has been According to Freedman, there are active economically and culturally in the several conclusions to draw from recent North Caucasus. Freedman pointed out, if Russian-Iranian relations. Despite some Russian influence continues to wane there and friction, relations have benefitted both sides. some of Iran’s ideas such as a road around the For Russia, Iran is an excellent arms market, Caspian Sea ever come true, there could be a an area where a newly assertive Russia can redirection of economic and political interest demonstrate its role in world affairs, and a from the North Caucasus toward Iran. tactical ally in curbing Azerbaijan and What are Iran’s interests in Russia? An Turkey, and in confronting the Taliban. At a obvious answer is the opportunity to acquire time when Russia is weak, having an ally in sophisticated weaponry at a time when Iran Iran makes diplomatic sense since Iran can perceives regional threats such as U.S. help diffuse crises such as in Tajikistan and military power in the Gulf, a U.S.-armed prevent the U.S. from dominating the Persian Saudi Arabia, and a possibly revived Iraq. A Gulf—which Moscow considers an important second interest is to acquire diplomatic region for its national interests. For Iran, support against the U.S. to thwart America’s Russia is a secure source of arms, a diplo- dual containment policy. Thirdly, Iran would matic ally at a time when the U.S. seeks to like to help curb the attraction of an indepen- isolate it, and a tactical ally in curbing the dent Azerbaijan on Iran’s Azerbaijani independent hopes of Azerbaijan and the population. Finally, Russia is a market for offensive threat of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Iranian goods. With the U.S. striving for the There are, however, limits to the economic isolation of Iran, Russia is a source relationship. The weakness of the Iranian of industrial equipment and reactors. economy may limit its ability to purchase Iran’s problems with Russia are less military and civilian goods from Russia. serious than the converse. One of the main Second, should Iran ever be able to provide problems is Russia’s unwillingness to accept extensive oil and natural gas pipelines to bartered goods for industrial equipment and Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, Russia’s arms. There is also the problem with the hold over the two regions would weaken. Taliban movement which controls a large Finally, Freedman asserted, as Iran develops 159 trade with Russian regions such as Dagestan, Moscow is “Investors of the world unite centrifugal forces within Russia may be around Moscow and enrich yourselves!” It is reinforced, making Iran a potential danger to for this reason that 55 percent of investment is Moscow. concentrated in the city center, which occupies —by Jodi Koehn only 2 percent of the metropolitan region’s area. Bocharov explained that, in the post- Vol. XV No. 15 1998 Soviet era, decisions on construction in St. Petersburg and Moscow in Transition Moscow are made by the city administration Moscow and St. Petersburg have rather than the federal government. The city arrived at a period of crisis in their urban has begun to rebuild churches destroyed planning and development programs, argued under communism and has built new monu- Vladimir Popov, Chairman of the St. Peters- ments to replace those of communism. A giant burg Union of Architects of Russia, at a Peter the Great, for example, now looks out Kennan Institute lecture on 6 November from the banks of the River Moskva in the 1997, and Iurii Bocharov, Academician in direction of Ukraine and Belarus. Bocharov City Planning and Construction Sciences at noted that some projects have been built at the Russian Academy of Architecture in great cost despite limited demand. For Moscow, at a Kennan Institute lecture on 13 example, in order to keep builders employed, November 1997. the city is considering building a large Under the Soviet Union, both St. Chinese wall around the Kitai-gorod region. Petersburg and Moscow underwent signifi- In St. Petersburg the situation is far cant social, economic, political, and architec- different. The city management has attempted tural changes. Popov explained that the to implement various imported schemes revolutionary waves that took place in the without sufficient analysis of local conditions, beginning of the twentieth century resulted said Popov. Plans were made to turn the city in St. Petersburg’s fall in status from an into a banking capital, but financial resources imperial capital to a regional center specializ- were lacking. Efforts to create an international ing in the defense industry. Despite this business center were hindered by the under- change in status, the city did not lose its development of transportation and communi- architectural uniqueness. This was due to the cations systems, the low qualifications of the fact that both authoritarian and totalitarian local work force, and the unstable social ideologies felt comfortable with regular situation. The low quality of services, high architectural ensembles. Moreover, city prices, and harsh winter climate undermined architects during the post-war period efforts to make the city an international tourist stonewalled attempts to reconstruct the city destination as well. along socialist lines. Popov remarked that the failure of On the other hand, revolutionary fervor these schemes, coupled with the lack of led to Moscow being elevated to a capital financing for large development projects, has city. As such, according to Bocharov, its role led to a situation in which the old functions was to confirm a series of myths associated of St. Petersburg are disappearing and new with the development of communism. Over ones have yet to be identified. However, he the Soviet period, Moscow planning recon- pointed to the new strategic development firmed the legitimacy of the Bolshevik plan as a ray of hope. The plan identifies St. regime, the leading role of the proletariat, Petersburg’s geographical position, port, and communism’s inevitable victory. tourist attractions, and intellectual potential Moscow’s architects were tasked with as its trump cards. Development and con- destroying much of old Moscow to make struction projects have concentrated on way for new socialist construction. In transportation and port infrastructure in keeping with this goal, the capital was order to build a goods corridor between designed to include a public center able to Europe and St. Petersburg through the accommodate huge public demonstrations Scandinavian countries. In addition, projects and surrounded by monumental edifices. to develop a new airport and a high speed Since the fall of the Soviet Union, rail corridor have been launched in the hopes Moscow has promoted a new myth, according of attracting more tourism. to Bocharov—the myth of successful economic Both St. Petersburg and Moscow have reform. A Moscow official was quoted in thus come to another turning point in their Izvestiia as saying that the new slogan for development, although stemming from very 160 different sources. St. Petersburg suffers from exclude any negative values. The CSI is an a deficit of funds needed to implement its average of the specific indexes which helps strategic plan. Although Popov was optimis- analyze individual components of the tic about the planners’ realization that realization of consumer demand. The CSI construction must heed the needs of the simultaneously accounts for the changes in population, this lack of funds combined with all the specific components. slow institutional reform continues to hinder According to Tretyakova-Birman, the most the city’s development. Moscow, on the other valuable property of the CSI is its ability to hand, has plenty of investment capital for forecast changes in the economy. As consumers construction projects. However, Bocharov adapt themselves to conditions and learn from explained that the city is already so densely experience, they alter their behavior in accor- built up that the only room for new construc- dance with the perception of possible future tion is underground. Moreover, Moscow developments. Consumer perceptions often planners still do not understand the impor- prove to be right, particularly in transition tance of market forces; rather their work periods with rapid changes. For example, data continues to exist only for the promotion of shows that consumers predicted not only the Russia’s myth of economic success. decline in production at the end of 1994, but also —by Nancy Popson the deterioration of business conditions in 1996—something which economists failed to do. Vol. XV No. 16 1998 Consumer behavior, Tretyakova-Birman argued, Consumer Sentiment Index in Russia is the most important factor determining Aids Policymakers movement of the economy at the microlevel. It is Russia’s new market economic indica- during such a transition that economic models tor—the Consumer Sentiment Index—can fail to cope with precise forecasts of events assess consumer sentiment and make short- because their successful use is limited by the term forecasts of economic development, absence of reliable appraisal of structural reported Albina Tretyakova-Birman, Resident changes in the underlying interrelationship. U.S. Treasury Advisor to the Russian Finance During radical change, consumer expectations Ministry and Richard Curtin, Director, allow consumer spending and savings decisions Surveys of Consumers, at the Survey Research to be forecasted more accurately. Center, University of Michigan at a Kennan In the transition from a centrally Institute lecture on 26 March 1998. planned economy to a market economy, the The Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) role of consumers has changed. Under a was originally developed by the University of centrally planned economy, the State regu- Michigan’s Survey Research Center. In March lated consumer behavior through the 1996, the Russian Ministry of Finance and the distribution of goods and services and the U.S. Treasury Department established the CSI control of prices. Now, consumers decide for Russian Group to measure the index and themselves how and when they will dispose tailor the University of Michigan’s methodol- of their income. Today in Russia—and more ogy to Russia’s conditions, Tretyakova- so as market relations develop further—the Birman explained. index can be used to analyze economic The CSI draws on the fields of psychol- development and decision making. Accord- ogy, sociology, and economics and reveals ing to Tretyakova-Birman, it is believed that consumers’ intentions and incorporates the recent improvement in Russia’s economy estimations of consumer behavior into market is strongly linked to strong consumer economic analysis. The CSI is calculated from behavior, so that for the first time, the leading respondent’s answers to questions regarding nature of the CSI has manifested itself in perceptions of their current economic situa- Russia. In that sense, the CSI has served as an tion, what they believe their position will be in indicator of the degree of market develop- the next six months, how they perceive ment in a transitional economy. Russia’s economic situation in the short- and According to Curtin, there are some long-term, and whether they believe it is a concerns of using such an approach toward good or bad time to make large purchases. the Russian economy: whether the expecta- For each of the questions, a specific tions of Russian consumers really matter, index is constructed by subtracting the whether it is possible to reliably measure number of unfavorable replies from the them, and once measured whether they will favorable and adding 100 to the difference to help to predict aggregate economic behavior. 161 Regarding the importance of consumer problem. The Soviet Union was reluctant to expectations, Curtin argued, under a cen- let men out of the country because that trally planned economy and constrained meant one less recruit for the army, as well as consumer choice, there was no need to the issue of their access to classified informa- measure expectations. As constraint is tion and military secrets. The Soviet Union lessened—a characteristic of an emerging was also hesitant to have people travel market economy—expectations become more abroad who would reveal Soviet dissatisfac- important. Curtin noted that as constraints tion with the West. A foreigner living in the become lower, expectations will have a Soviet Union was an alien body disseminat- proportionately greater influence in shaping ing too much information about the West. the course of the economy. This did not stop Americans from going The validity of consumer expectations to the Soviet Union and falling in love with relies on consumers’ ability to obtain and use Russians. During the 1920’s, in particular, information. Official information on eco- many Americans went to the Soviet Union for nomic developments is not the sole or even ideological reasons. They went to build the most important source of information on Socialism and they found Russian reality and which consumers base their expectations, romance. During World War II, the image of Curtin argued. Nor does the validity of the the enemy was softened by both sides which measure depend on duplicating the helped create the illusion that it would be easy economist’s definition. It is more important for couples to unite. Many couples thought that the measures accurately reflect the that once the spouse got a visa their problems information that is used by consumers, and were over. However, the question of “Did the match how consumers learn and adapt in the spouse want me or my passport?” continued course of their everyday lives. and led to some real tragedies. Can consumer expectations predict In the 1960’s and 70’s, Americans who macroeconomic trends? Expectations allow went to the Soviet Union were treated as people in the models to explicitly assume that millionaires or Santa Claus by Russians who consumers are forward looking, adaptive, and wanted everything from hard currency have the ability to learn from their experience shops. Russians were as much in love with and anticipate new developments. This is America as with individual Americans. especially important in a transition economy. In the 1960’s when the Soviet Union In conclusion, Curtin stipulated, the began to open up, more Russian women than CSI will provide invaluable information to men took the initiative in these relationships. policymakers. The survey data and the CSI It was easier for women to leave the country have provided reliable information on which because of the problem of military service to base policies. The index has already helped and classified information. By the 1990’s, the Russian government to understand the dating services had begun. According to economic situation and to plan their social Visson, from the Russian point of view dating and economic policy for the future. services are primarily an economic phenom- —by Jodi Koehn enon. These girls—hit hard by unemploy- ment after perestroika—want to make money Vol. XV No. 17 1998 and have a better life. The marriages emerg- Advantages and Challenges of ing from these services are not necessarily Russian-American Marriages ideal, although some of them do work. What do the granddaughter of an What attracts Russians and Americans American president and the assassin of an to one another? Many Americans see Rus- American president (Susan Eisenhower and sians as more emotional, intense, and Lee Harvey Oswald, respectively) have in passionate. American men view Russian common? They both had Russian spouses, women as feminine, interested in being wives remarked Lynn Visson at a Kennan Institute and mothers. Russian women appreciate lecture on 8 June 1998. Visson, Staff Inter- American men because they drink less than preter at the United Nations, interviewed Russian men. The respect with which more than 100 couples in the U.S. and Russia American men treat women is also men- to find out the reasons for Russian-American tioned. In other words, there is a reverse marriages and their inherent problems. situation in which American men are looking During Soviet times, marrying a for unliberated women and Russian women Russian was difficult because of the visa seek more liberated men. 162 Russian men like American women Vol. XV No. 18 1998 because they do not treat them like children. They Soviet Actions during the Munich are friends as well as wives and are independent. Crisis of 1938 American women consider Russian men to be The handling of the Munich crisis in romantic and strong. They do all of the things that 1938 was a blunder that defies description, American men do not do: open doors, pay stated Hugh Ragsdale, Professor Emeritus of compliments, feel they are taking care of a History at the University of Alabama, at a member of the weaker sex. “For American Kennan Institute lecture on 11 June 1998. women used to dealing with men cowed by Ragsdale was joined by Mark Kramer, Director feminist rhetoric, this Russian protectiveness has of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies and great appeal,” Visson remarked. Senior Associate of the Davis Center for Visson found that many mixed couples Russian Studies at Harvard University, in who live in Russia have more successful and discussing the documentary evidence behind solid marriages than those living in America. the Soviet reaction to the crisis. Americans who went to Russia did not do so Ragsdale noted that the Munich crisis because of the passport and were more realistic of 1938 came at a time when Germany’s about what they were getting involved in. They enemies—France, Czechoslovakia, and the generally knew a good deal about Russia and Soviet Union—had at their disposal a were often fluent in the language. military force that was certainly six to seven However, even Russians and Americans times greater than Hitler’s. Moreover, there who know each other’s culture or language was a conspiracy within the German army to can have problems. There is a tendency to assassinate Hitler himself. Despite this, forget that a person is not just a Russian or an France decided not to resist Hitler’s designs American, but a combination of many factors: on Czechoslovak lands. Forty-five Czechoslo- education, class, country, background. vak divisions were handed over to Hitler Another problem is the difficulty in distin- when military assistance from Europe was guishing personal from cultural factors. In not forthcoming, and the Czechoslovaks addition, the spouse sometimes tends to get decided not to resist German annexation. blamed for everything the culture does. Ragsdale acknowledged that the One of the hardest things for Russian Munich crisis has been the subject of many spouses in the U.S. is the lack of friends. The idea studies. However, this literature has focused of living with parents does not go over very well on the Western perspective, relying exclu- with most American spouses nor does the idea sively on Western documentation. Newer that a grown man would call his mother every research coming out of the Czech emigre day and view this as perfectly normal behavior. community has begun to investigate East Visson next discussed the problem of European documents, but according to mind set. One of the big problems found in Ragsdale these studies are “hotly anti-Soviet these marriages is a dogmatism in Russian in their perspective” and tend to rely only on spouses that American spouses complain diplomatic documents. Ragsdale therefore about; an idea that you are either right or sought to remedy these weaknesses by wrong. In America, people are taught not to conducting intensive research on the Soviet be categorical. In Russia, to survive, you had and East European side of the crisis using East to have strength in your convictions. European and military archival materials. Finally, there is the difference between After careful study of Soviet and Polish the individual and the collective. There is much literature on World War II and materials in less of this now in Russia, but the Russian sense archives in Prague, Warsaw, and Moscow, is that in a marriage you are part of a collective Ragsdale found what he considers to be versus the American sense of “me and what is conclusive documentary proof that the Soviet good for my personal development.” Union mobilized forces to the western According to Visson, there are a lot of frontier on a partial but significant scale in changes with perestroika and with young late September 1938. These included 60 people. With younger couples, some of the infantry divisions, 16 cavalry divisions, 3 values are getting closer, but national charac- tank corps, 22 tank brigades, and 17 air ter does not change overnight. The one thing brigades. NKVD reports confirm that the no American married to a Russian has mobilization was accompanied by propa- complained of, Visson concluded, is boredom. ganda for enlisted soldiers, who were aware —by Jodi Koehn 163 that they were expected to assist their the Soviet army would also join the effort Czechoslovak neighbors. Ragsdale pointed should the French lend military assistance. out that there is also evidence of significant However, they were far more ambiguous Soviet mobilization of equipment along the regarding what they would do if the French Soviet-Romanian border. decided to stay out of the crisis. Kramer Ragsdale’s documentary evidence of suggested that knowledge of the mobilization the Soviet mobilization leads to two ques- raised the expectations of the Czechoslovaks tions vital to an understanding of the unfold- despite these ambiguous statements, and ing of the crisis. First, why were the Soviet when aid was not forthcoming, relations actions, which are so well documented in East between the states were affected. European literature and archival material, not Second, Kramer noted that Ragsdale’s reflected in Western sources on the Munich research shows how complicated Romanian- crisis? Ragsdale posited that the intelligence Soviet cooperation was. Despite public agencies of Germany, France, and Britain did diplomacy, which would lead one to believe not know of the mobilization. In his com- that there was little to no cooperation ments, Kramer agreed that this may have been between the Romanians and Soviets, the case, but also noted that the French leaders Ragsdale’s early research into this dimension knew through diplomatic channels that the of the Munich crisis shows that there was Soviet mobilization was underway. much more going on behind the scenes. Second, what was the intent of the —by Nancy Popson mobilization? According to information provided to Ragsdale by Ambassador George 1998–99 PROGRAM YEAR F. Kennan, the German attaché in Prague on the day of the Munich settlement claimed that, Vol. XVI No. 1 1998 given the absence of lines of transportation Media Development in Ukraine and communication between the Soviet border and the bohemian basin, it would have TV today plays an enormous role in the taken at least three months for the Russians to political life of Ukraine, reflecting the move even one division into Bohemia. This struggle between different financial and would suggest that mobilization to come to industrial groups, branches of power, and the aid of Czechoslovakia was unrealistic. regional clans, said Oleksandr Rodnyansky, Ragsdale suggested that documents General Director of the Ukrainian TV showing the Soviet government’s use of broadcasting company 1+1, at a Kennan diplomatic channels in Paris rather than in Institute lecture on 21 September 1998. He Bucharest in order to gain permission to explained that the Ukrainian TV and media move troops through Romanian territory industry has overcome many obstacles, but may point to Bessarabia as the motive for that it still faces severe political pressure. Soviet mobilization. Kramer posited that the Rodnyansky remarked that it became mobilization may have been an attempt to apparent during the 1994 presidential election strengthen the resolve of the Czechoslovaks campaign that media had played a critical and persuade the French to commit forces to role. In response, President Kuchma and his the effort. He explained that Soviet mobiliza- team decided urgent development of media tion began the day after Soviet leaders were was necessary. Rodnyansky described a three- informed that France and Britain would not prong approach adopted by the executive assist Czechoslovakia. Therefore, mobiliza- branch: enactment of legislation to define the tion which took place without hope of TV market; implementation of a plan to find actually being able to provide timely assis- new partners for the old state channel UT-1, tance could have been posturing for the which was only garnering a 7 percent market benefit of the Czechs and French. share nationwide; and creation of a new Kramer pointed to several other implica- channel, UT-2, that would replace Russian tions of Ragsdale’s research in his remarks. Public TV (ORT) programming. First, he posited that the events of the Munich First, the National Council for TV and crisis and in particular the Soviet mobilization Radio Broadcasting was created in order to give may have influenced the cooling of relations out licenses. According to Rodnyansky, today between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet more than 350 licenses have been distributed, Union. Soviet emissaries had repeatedly including local channels and those that share informed the Czechoslovak government that frequencies. He noted that this number is very 164 likely more than in all of Europe. Then in 1995, the audience that before 1994 Ukrainians did international partners were sought for UT-1. not understand what freedom of the press Rodnyansky explained that the government was. Today, although certain newspapers or hoped to find partners to bear financial channels may not present balanced opinions, responsibility and increase audience shares every possible point of view is represented through entertainment programming, while when one looks at the media landscape as a leaving political control over news and whole. Rodnyansky suggested that this was a analytical programs to the state. major step forward. Rodnyansky, with the backing of Rodnyansky also noted that the German firms, answered the call for UT-1 experience gained in covering the March partners. Through sharing time on UT-1, the 1998 parliamentary elections has helped the channel’s audience share went up to 35 field to mature. He attributes the large percent by 1996. When the tender was turnout at the polls in part to the TV shows, announced for licensing on UT-2 in November and in particular to the interest generated by 1996, Rodnyansky and his colleagues created live debates between candidates. the new independent channel 1+1, which Rodnyansky reported that there was im- received backing by an American-British firm mense pressure placed on the media to and began broadcasting in January 1997. support one or another party during the Rodnyansky characterized 1+1 as a campaign, but some outlets, such as 1+1, channel aiming to “build Ukraine’s national were able to remain independent. house.” The channel, which is entirely Rodnyansky remarked that there is an Ukrainian-speaking and produces all of its image of Ukraine as a country with a certain own shows in Ukraine, tries to join people of level of corruption, an underdeveloped level very different religious, ethnic, and regional of political and civil society, and lack of backgrounds into one nation. The fact that economic reform. While he admits that this 1+1 has never attracted less than 30 percent of may be partly true, he also pointed to the the audience share illustrates to Rodnyansky younger generation as a cause for hope. He that their viewers, who are primarily young, noted that it is the twenty-seven year-old identify themselves as citizens of a new businessmen who are now feeding their country. extended families while their parents wait for Rodnyansky demonstrated that the delayed salary payments. These business largest difference between the media situation people are energetic and pragmatic, and in Russia and in Ukraine is that there are no many of the new parliamentary deputies are foreign investors among the Russian national from this group. Rodnyansky also sees the TV channels. Of the four national channels in existence of clan and regional rivalries as an Ukraine, two are joint ventures with American advantage for Ukraine. They create a balance firms and one with a Russian firm. Moreover, in the country that can be credited with the Rodnyansky noted that in Ukraine, oligarchic social stability of the past seven years. He financial powers are unable to exert exclusive concluded that although this situation of control over the media. Rodnyansky stressed regional clans may not be ideal, the stability that this is not because they have no interest in it brings provides breathing room for further influencing the media, but that they lack the political, economic, and social development. financial resources to do so. —by Nancy Popson This does not mean that political pressures are not felt, however. Rodnyansky Vol. XVI No. 2 1998 illustrated this with a personal example: the The Successes and Failures of license for 1+1 has been jeopardized by Capitalism Russian-Style leftists in the parliament who wanted to Capitalism Russian-style is a sharply retract the license to give it to a company that distorted economy directed toward com- would be called “public TV,” but which was modities export—which in the present actually formed by companies close to circumstances is both a source of difficulty Moroz’ financial circles. While 1+1 eventually and a source of stabilization, remarked triumphed, they had to do so in three Thane Gustafson, Director at Cambridge different courts, including the supreme Energy Research Associates at Georgetown arbitrary court of Ukraine. University, at a Kennan Institute lecture on 5 Regarding the level of objectivity October 1998. According to Gustafson, there among media outlets, Rodnyansky reminded are three main approaches to the question 165 of “what is Capitalism Russian-style?” The areas ordinarily handled in other countries first is the composition of output and the by the government. balance among sectors. The old imbalance— Regarding the possibility of continuation the over-emphasis of manufacturing and of Capitalism Russian-style, Gustafson stipu- defense goods production and the atrophy of lated that the present system is the result of a the tertiary and consumer sector—has been halfway revolution, but a revolution nonethe- replaced by an overdeveloped export- less and, therefore, not easily undone. A oriented commodities sector resulting in a return to a centrally planned economy would new tertiary sector of services, particularly in require an institutional structure, a structure the area of finance. for political power, and an ideological struc- Second, it is important to examine the ture that was swept away. A weak govern- degree of penetration into the market ment and complete lack of ideology are economy. In Russia, there has been incom- incapable of rebuilding what it took Lenin and plete penetration of money, western stan- Stalin twenty years to build, Gustafson dards of law, and private property accompa- argued. nied by continued dependence on the state An economic worst case scenario, and an epidemic of non-payments. This has Gustafson stated, would be the continued and led to a “virtual economy” or the portion of chronic inability of the central government to the economy not penetrated by the money collect taxes and balance its budget. The economy. The virtual economy has resulted consequences being continued high inflation in a system of barter exchange as a way to and a growing exit of the private sector into avoid adapting to the market economy and the shadow economy. Serious investment in acts as a defense against a predatory state such an environment is impossible. This will with an impossible tax regime. To some lead to the eventual deterioration of the one extent, every Russian enterprise has one foot remaining strong segment of the economy, the in the virtual economy. commodities export sector. Third, is the degree of Russia’s success Gustafson’s political worst case scenario in building needed private and state institu- follows from the economic worst case. What tions. Russia has failed in both market- has kept Russian democracy alive is the building and state-building, Gustafson willingness of 60 percent of the voting remarked. On the market side, there is a lack population—mainly urban population and of intermediating institutions in capital young voters—to suspend disbelief and markets and institutions to support share- support the government. These are the holders’ rights and corporate governance. people hit particularly hard by the crisis and The state’s failure to protect property are potentially dangerous if they take to the rights and contracts and create a sound streets or support an authoritarian figure. monetary and fiscal system is accompanied There is a best case scenario in Russia, by incomplete privatization and lack of Gustafson concluded. The present crisis is a agricultural reform. The result is a country crisis of the central government, underneath overwhelmingly dependent on imported which are popularly elected regional govern- goods. ments that, politically, are forces of stability. The failure of state-building is more The commodities sector is another major serious, Gustafson argued, and the recent crisis source of stability. Russia must export and so is a good illustration. Recent government short- far can continue to do so. It will be another term borrowing has absorbed private capital five years or so before its export capacity which, in turn, lessened project investment. begins to run seriously downhill. The Russian state also failed to build an According to Gustafson, there are more orderly treasury system, requiring commer- subtle causes for optimism such as a build-up cial banks to manage state revenues by of skills and understanding about the default. When the private banking sector realities of modern economies and little sign collapsed, government financial flows went of radicalization of the population. There are down with it. However, Gustafson remarked, no deep-seated ideologies at war with one the role of banks in the movement of money another, no highly developed political in the Russian economy shows that these movements ready to take advantage of them, were not pseudo-banks and this was not a and no strong personalities with the political pretense market economy. The commercial charisma and organizational talent to take banking system had penetrated, even into advantage of a wave of popular anger. For 166 Gustafson, the greatest source of optimism is change as little as possible, that a fundamen- that “the Russian people still appear to be tal conflict of values was underway. In the willing to wait a little longer.” long run, this conflict would affect the —by Jodi Koehn constitutional basis of the state itself. As the old system was collapsing, the Vol. XVI No. 3 1998 new biznesmen had managed to gain control Building a Relationship with Ukraine of the mines and factories. These new Meeting the challenges of the economic directors were regarded with skepticism and transition is the main requirement for the deep resentment by miners and workers, success of Ukraine’s independence as a demo- who had seen a radical fall in the real value cratic state, declared William Miller, former of their wages, an erosion in the social safety ambassador to Ukraine and Public Policy net, strains on the education and health care Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center, during a systems, and the loss of a promise of lifetime Kennan Institute lecture on 28 September 1998. employment. For most of the population, It is not only a Ukrainian problem, he added, except for the biznesmen, the standard of but also a challenge to those friends of Ukraine living had fallen to one-fourth of the level in the West who believe in the stability and before independence. success of an independent democratic Ukraine Perhaps more importantly, the workers and its critical importance to the security of the had lost their sense of place in society. Miller new Europe. recounted an experience of being given a tour Miller made his first of many trips to the of an anthracite coal mine, the deepest in Donetsk region during 1993–1994 in the hope Europe. One mile beneath the surface—not that his personal encounters would be the far from a chamber that had been rocked by a opening chapter in the creation of a relation- methane gas explosion a year before his ship between Ukraine and the United States. arrival and continues to burn to this day—he The largest region in Ukraine, Donetsk is listened to a miner tell his story. Over his located in the Donbass coal fields and boasts twenty-five years of working in the mine, he many of the industrial and agricultural crown had been awarded numerous citations and jewels inherited from the Soviet era. Control of medals and had enjoyed a decent standard of assets and resources of Ukraine were the prize living with generous benefits. Now, miners in the competition for economic and political had a hard time even supporting their power, and the experiences of the citizens of families. The diminishing social value of Donetsk reflected the experiences and conse- labor combined with the erosion in material quences of this competition. well-being resulted in a loss of dignity and The delegation to the Ukrainian Rada sense of purpose, and was emblematic of the from Donetsk was a mixture at the time of problems of workers in Ukrainian society. communists, socialists, and liberals. The The difficulty of the transition has liberals embraced the new Ukraine as an placed strains on the developing relationship opportunity. They were comprised of entre- between Ukraine and the West. Assistance preneurial people between their 30s and 50s has flowed mainly from the IMF and has who had their roots in Gorbachev’s reforms been conditioned on economic, and espe- of the 1980s, having taken advantage of his cially macroeconomic, reform. Ukraine maxim “that which is not forbidden is viewed with skepticism prescriptions from permitted.” They began to acquire wealth the IMF they perceived as being imposed and companies, and were called at times red without consideration of Ukraine’s particular directors or mafia, but most often biznesmen. circumstances. Miller noted that while the Donetsk was also a major stronghold of IMF’s recipe for monetary policy has worked communist strength, and those pushing for fairly well, the economy is in a catastrophic economic liberalization were opposed at condition. While exports could help Ukraine’s every turn. All political groups in Ukraine economy recover, it has found that access to were aware that control of the assets in Western markets remains restricted for Ukraine, whether under the control of the various reasons. At the same time, Ukraine state or in private hands, would be a key has been obliged to lower its tariff barriers in source of political power and wealth. Miller accordance with WTO standards as part of stated that it was evident from a number of the IMF program. Integration into the world meetings with those supporting the new economy, while a pleasant slogan, is a tough ways, and the communists who wanted to task, Miller commented. 167 The relationship between Ukraine and nuclear engineer, worked with Bellona in the U.S. continued to develop in this context. generating a report on the Russian Northern There were the recurring questions about Fleet’s problems with its nuclear powered bilateral relations and whether the U.S. vessels and with the storage of spent nuclear would continue to support Ukraine after it fuel and other radioactive waste. Nikitin was had surrendered its nuclear weapons to subsequently charged with treason for these Russia. More important, Miller noted, were actions. The charges were based on secret questions about values and what the U.S. decrees, which the court later ordered the thought of the new biznesmen. Their most military to release. Jandl remarked, that fundamental question, however, was would many are encouraged by this decision and independence bring about a better life and believe that this could be a watershed trial. would the economic situation improve? Their Jandl was also optimistic about the response, Miller stated, was “we will work, no current shift taking place in Russia, in which matter what, in the hope that it will get better.” nuclear waste management projects are being —by Joseph Dresen transferred from the military to MINATOM—the Ministry of Atomic Energy Vol. XVI No. 4 1998 of the Russian Federation. This shift mirrors Nuclear Waste Management in Russia the dualistic system in the U.S., in which the The cold war was really a minute battle military produces the weapons and the in the long nuclear war, the question is now are Department of Energy manages the waste, we prepared to win the remainder of the war, and should be completed late this fall. which is the legacy of nuclear waste, remarked However, it is not yet clear how this will Thomas Jandl, Director of Bellona USA in specifically affect nuclear waste policy. Jandl Washington, D.C., at a Kennan Institute lecture remarked that the one option that can on 19 October 1998. The Norwegian environ- challenge the existing culture of defense mental group, Bellona, was established after would be the entry of large corporations into the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear the nuclear waste management process, who plant in Ukraine. Bellona concentrates its efforts would in turn bring large amounts of money on northwestern Russia, where the former into Russia. Soviet Union built and operated a large fleet of Regarding potential industry involve- nuclear powered submarines on the Kola ment, Jandl noted that his organization has peninsula, adjacent to the Norwegian border. discussed with members of U.S. and Euro- The group is primarily concerned with the tail pean industry and the Russian government, end of the nuclear pipeline—nuclear waste means by which industry can increase its management. In his lecture, Jandl explored the participation in clean-up efforts. Large roles played by Russian military culture and corporations and government laboratories international cooperation in nuclear waste that are semi-private and semi-government management in Russia. have already conducted feasibility studies, Russia is a society in which military yet without an agreement on proper policy, culture is very much ingrained, commented corporations are unwillingly to pour large Jandl. At the present time, Russia is under a amounts of money into a potential solution. new system, has a new place in the world, Bellona is currently working on a general and is clearly facing an identity crisis. nuclear waste management strategy with Moreover, with NATO enlargement creating American policymakers to ensure that a clear a defense alliance right at Russia’s borders, policy for U.S. military and civilian agencies to Jandl stated that many in Russia, not just the engage in cooperative programs in Russia nationalists, feel the need to slow down exists. Currently, the U.S. maintains its policy disarmament and justify military secret against funding projects that involve reprocess- decrees and commissions as a necessary ing nuclear waste, due to proliferation consid- measure. However, according to Jandl, erations. This is in opposition, according to groups in the Duma are passing and imple- Jandl, to the solutions proposed by Russia, menting secrecy laws which make it ambigu- which will only be efficient if the end result is ously illegal to do any type of research, the reprocessing of fuel. While Russia acknowl- including nuclear waste research, as he edges that there currently is not a market for evidenced with the Nikitin case. reprocessed fuel, they want to keep their Aleksandr Nikitin, a retired nuclear options open for this possibility in the future. submarine captain in the Russian navy and Although Bellona is against the reprocessing of 168 nuclear waste, Jandl did remark that this is an abolished and production socialized, a classless issue that requires an open debate between the society would result. In a similar vein, Satter opposing viewpoints. commented, the young reformers of the 1990s However, Jandl asserted, there are argued that once state property was put into groups on both sides attempting to move the private hands, a state based on law, as well as a waste management process forward. Jandl democratic and prosperous society, would stated that despite its involvement in the evolve. Satter asserts that it was this lack of Nikitin case, Bellona still has a fair amount of legal and moral rules that prepared the way for support from those in the Duma who want to the creation of a criminal state in Russia. move the process forward. Bellona has Satter divided the transition from formed a working group which brings “criminal communism to criminal capital- together members of the Russian Duma and ism” in Russia into three basic stages: administration, with their European counter- hyperinflation, privatization, and parts, and—at the request of the Russians— criminalization. Hyperinflation began on 2 with representatives of the American govern- January 1992, when the Gaidar government ment and policy community. freed virtually all prices, consequently On another encouraging note, Jandl wiping out the life-savings of millions of commented on the agreement between Russia Russians. According to Satter, this same and Norway. This agreement exempts government also chose to ignore a law Norwegian aid from taxes, duties, and fees passed by the Supreme Soviet that called for and also rules out legal measures against the indexation of savings accounts in the Norway, Norwegian personnel, or suppliers in event of price liberalization, deeming it the the event of an accident. Previously the lack of responsibility of the old regime. Yet while the such an agreement threatened to end crucial majority of population was being driven into and imminent projects. The agreement is now poverty by inflation, a group of well-con- being extended to other specific projects which nected insiders were becoming very rich. include the U.S. Department of Defense. Satter mentioned several ways in which —by Allison Abrams people with access to the state budget and ties to state officials were able to amass wealth Vol. XVI No. 5 1999 including: establishing and fooling the public From “Criminal Communism to into investing in pyramid schemes, speculat- Criminal Capitalism” ing in dollars, obtaining lucrative licenses to “Russia’s problem is not economic and export raw materials, and appropriating and it has never been economic—it is basically a collecting interest on state credits that were moral problem and until that problem is supposed to support industry. Satter asserts solved, no reasonable economic system, no that by the time privatization got underway, market economy...has a chance of taking root the country was already divided into a class of there,” remarked David Satter, Senior people who had no hope of participating in it Fellow, Hudson Institute, and Visiting and a group of people who, as a result of their Scholar, School for Advanced International ability to obtain unearned wealth, were in a Studies, Johns Hopkins University, at a position to appropriate the state’s resources Kennan Institute lecture on 9 November and assets. 1998. According to Satter, when the time The period of hyperinflation was came to create a new democratic society in preceded by “wild privatization,” during Russia, the failure of both the west and which government and party officials began Russia to understand the true nature of to privatize whatever they could get their communism—its denial of universal moral- hands on, noted Satter. Former government ity—led instead to the rise of a criminal state. officials who had once been in charge of state The communist regime systematically resources now became the new owners and abolished normal criteria and promoted the proceeded to sell off these resources. In view that universal values did not exist, only addition, an amendment to the law on class values, noted Satter. He also explained cooperatives allowed factories to create that the need for a legal framework for social cooperatives within the framework of the and political activity—the idea that without factory, which encouraged massive theft as legal and moral rules it is impossible to create a factory directors were now given the means just society—was ignored. The communists to establish cooperatives through which to maintained that once private property was write off and sell factory supplies. 169 However, according to Satter, the real Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Prague, noted theft of the state’s most valuable enterprises that Russia needs good governance, the rule began with money privatization in 1994. At of law, and the values of good citizenship. “public” auctions for state property, the Jensen gave both proximate and larger bidders for the most desirable enterprises causes for the crisis. According to Jensen, the were well-connected to local officials and proximate causes are: financial aspects such often the results of these auctions were as the decline in oil prices and other com- largely determined in advance. The loans-for- modities and continued poor tax collection; shares program, in which the government the confidence problem brought by the Asian exchanged shares of enterprises for loans, financial difficulty and the misuse of the greatly benefitted the banks empowered by IMF’s July 1998 loan installment; and the Yeltsin in 1993 to handle government ac- political results of Yeltsin’s erratic leadership, counts. These banks used government money health problems, and the personality-driven to make short-term loans at extremely high policy making of the past few years. rates of interest. Then, having made a profit One of the broader causes for the current using the government’s money, the banks crisis is the failure to implement sustainable were able to loan it back to the government economic reform policies that had adequate in exchange for valuable enterprises. This is domestic support. The recent policies empha- how the much talked about oligarchy was sizing macroeconomic stabilization and control created and came to dominate the political of inflation have not worked. The stabilization and economic scene, explained Satter. that had been the center of Russian economic Satter then commented on the final stage achievement is now gone. The speed at which of the rise of the criminal state in Russia— the crisis unfolded indicates the broader criminalization. In short, the first cooperatives problem of how Russia was trying to govern were established at a time when all property itself and implement reform. in the Soviet Union belonging to the state was The Russian state has become even completely unprotected. It was also illegal to weaker and is unable to implement many have a private security service. Both these policies or stop capital flow outward. The factors made the first Russian businessmen result, Jensen stipulated, is a fragmentation of attractive targets for criminals. As the number power, from the center to the regions and of independent businessmen grew, the from the so-called official government underworld experienced phenomenal growth. institutions to interest groups and quasi-state With no one to protect them, Russia’s new institutions. This fragmentation—sharpened economic elite, largely composed of corrupt by the impending presidential succession insiders, had no choice but to turn to criminal struggle—is the fundamental problem gangs for protection. Eventually, Russian confronting Prime Minister Yevgeny businessmen found gangsters useful in other Primakov and any future Russian president. aspects of business, including curbing the Jensen then turned to a discussion of growing epidemic of non-payment of debt. Primakov and the role of the oligarches. According to Satter, as these groups According to the speaker, Primakov’s became more interwoven, the entire commer- government, with its representatives from cial and political apparatus in Russia was industrial, regional, financial, and social corrupted. On a final note, Satter reflected groups, constitutes an elite consensus that that the only rule in business and political life seeks to keep Russia away from the political, in Russia continues to be the rule of force and social, and economic abyss and somehow that without law, Russia has no hope of hold out hope for a future government and resurrecting itself. presidential administration by buying —by Allison Abrams domestic stability and managing the decline. Primakov is thus far managing to Vol. XVI No. 6 1999 balance the main interest groups in the Russia’s Economic Crisis and the society, much as Yeltsin did. The problem, Ruling Elite Jensen noted, is that Primakov lacks the The current crisis in Russia is a sys- legitimacy that Yeltsin had as an elected temic collapse not a sign of renewal, re- president. If he begins to act in a more marked Donald Jensen at a Kennan Institute “presidential” manner, he risks losing lecture on 16 November 1998. Jensen, credibility as a neutral arbiter—which is his Associate Director of Broadcasting, Radio appeal right now. 170 The fundamental truth in current Vol. XVI No. 7 1999 Russian politics goes beyond the oligarches, East German Pressure on the Soviets to Jensen noted. Elites govern the country. Build the Berlin Wall Much of politics is informal not formal— The East Germans had much more formally portrayed in constitutions and laws. power over the Soviets than was previously Power is highly personalized and often understood in the Berlin Crisis and the money is the currency of political power. The building of the Wall, remarked Hope distinction between public and private power Harrison, Assistant Professor, Department of is blurred. This, combined with weak Government and Law, Lafayette College, and institutions, creates a system ripe for the Title VIII-Supported Research Scholar, influence of strong interest groups. Kennan Institute at a Kennan Institute lecture The oligarches are rearranging them- on 4 December 1998. Harrison was sup- selves because, Jensen noted, the system is ported by discussant David Murphy, former fundamentally elitist and arguably anti- CIA Station Chief, Berlin, 1954–61, who democratic. There are no intermediating agreed that the “East German tail wagged the government institutions to balance the Soviet dog” in the months leading up to the demands for a civil society as the West construction of the Wall. understands it. Some oligarches such as Contrary to the previous view of the cold natural resource exporters like Gazprom and war, Harrison argued, the East Germans did Lukoil are better positioned economically to exert various forms of power over the Soviets. take advantage of the current situation than Khrushchev was deeply committed to the others. triumph of socialism over capitalism in Ger- What is Russia’s future? Jensen dis- many, remarking that, if socialism did not win in cussed three possible scenarios. One is a slow East Germany, then the Soviets would not win. economic and political recovery focusing on The East Germans learned from this that they the institutionalization of democratic pro- could parlay the weakness of their regime into cesses, repatriation of money from abroad, strength in bargaining with the Soviets. and reform of the tax system. The second is East German motivation to solve the continued degeneration and decline until problem of their citizens fleeing to capitalist Russia somehow reaches equilibrium. Third West Berlin and West Germany and their would be an authoritarian variant under a willingness and capability to act unilaterally leader like Krasnoyarsk oblast’ governor and were very important in the crisis. former National Security Chief, Aleksandr Another source of East German influence Lebed, in an attempt to restore order under was their non-implementation of Soviet authoritarian means. Jensen remarked that policies—in particular, “socialism with a more the second scenario is the most likely. human face.” Finally, the Berlin crisis occurred The upcoming legislative and presi- at the same time as the rift between the Chinese dential elections will be accompanied by a and the Soviets which the East Germans radical rewriting of the constitution in a way learned to use to their advantage, using the that diminishes the power of the presidency “China card” to put pressure on the Soviets. and probably increases the power of the How did the crisis begin which ulti- Duma and the Council of Ministers, Jensen mately led to the building of the Berlin Wall? remarked. This is a systemic crisis of gover- Harrison described Khrushchev’s November nance as well as the exhaustion of the powers 1958 ultimatum to the Western powers which of a particular president. The programs of the set a six month deadline and demanded the three leading presidential candidates— signing of a peace treaty (still not concluded Lebed, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, and since World War II ended), either with a Communist Party head Genadii Zyuganov— united Germany or with the two existing are more assertive, nationalistic, and advo- Germanies, and that West Berlin be trans- cate a greater state role in the economy. formed into a demilitarized free city. If these The regime needs legitimacy, Jensen demands were not met, the Soviets would concluded. Russia has not just undergone sign a separate peace treaty with East economic collapse. Building on a statement by Germany and turn over control over the Alan Greenspan, Jensen noted that culture access routes between West Germany and matters, but so does good leadership and good West Berlin to East Germany. policy. Russia seems to lack all of the above. Khrushchev believed the “free city” —by Jodi Koehn idea was a way to solve East Germany’s 171 refugee problem. If West Berlin was a neutral during the cold war. It is not enough to look city and less capitalist, then East Germans only at U.S.-Soviet relations to understand this would not be so eager to migrate there. East and other important periods of the cold war. A German leader, Walter Ulbricht’s solution to final lesson was the crucial role of economics in the problem was to either take over West the cold war. A month after the construction of Berlin or close the border. Initially, the Wall, Ulbricht wrote to Khrushchev that, Khrushchev refused to allow the East “the experiences of the past years have proven Germans to close the border in Berlin because that it is not possible that a socialist country he felt it would exacerbate the tensions of the such as the GDR can carry out a peaceful cold war and make communism look bad. competition with an imperialist country such as Ulbricht blamed the Soviets for the West Germany with open borders.” refugee problem and East Germany’s economic —by Jodi Koehn problems. In January 1961, he wrote to Khrushchev blaming Soviet post-war repara- Vol. XVI No. 8 1999 tions policy for the current East German crisis. The Legacy of White Foreign Policy He pointed out how much the Soviets took out “Current Russian foreign policy finds of East Germany in the nine years after World itself faced with the very same problems that War II when the U.S. was investing, largely the Whites tried unsuccessfully to solve from through Marshall Plan aid, in West Germany. 1917–20: retaining great power status and Pressure from the East Germans to close imperial ambitions at a time of decline and the border continued in the spring and summer disintegration,” remarked Anatol Shmelev, of 1961. Soviet communications from East Researcher, Russia/CIS Collection, Hoover Germany to Moscow increasingly stressed Institution, Stanford University, and Title Ulbricht’s desire to establish control over the VIII- Supported Research Scholar, at a border, close “the door to the West,” and Kennan Institute lecture on 15 December reduce the problem of East German citizens 1998. Shmelev was joined in his discussion on fleeing to West Berlin. At a Warsaw Pact the White movement’s foreign policy and its meeting in March 1961, Ulbricht asked for parallels with the current situation in Russia permission from Khrushchev to close the by discussant Vladimir Brovkin, NATO border and was told to wait until the June 1961 Research Fellow, Program Coordinator, meeting in Vienna with President Kennedy. United Research Centers on Organized After the meeting, Khrushchev—dissatisfied Crime in Eurasia (UReCOrCE), American with the talks—agreed to close the border. University, and former Title VIII-Supported What did the Berlin Wall accomplish for Research Scholar, Kennan Institute. Khrushchev? It saved the East German The ultimate goal of White foreign regime, eased economic pressure on the Soviet policy was defined in the slogan, “a great Union and other socialist countries to help united Russia.” This policy both defined the East Germany, and kept Ulbricht’s power White movement and united the various anti- limited to East Berlin, thereby taking some Bolshevik factors, and for these reasons was control away from him, Harrison argued. strictly adhered to despite the difficulties it Finally, Khrushchev hoped the Wall would caused. White foreign policy makers, unable show the Chinese and others that he could to see the changes both the revolution and stand up to the “paper tiger” West. Even after the end of the war wrought, sought to the Wall, however, Khrushchev was afraid of preserve imperial Russia and its foreign Ulbricht’s unilateral behavior continuing. He policy despite a weak administration and the wrote to him in September 1961 arguing that lack of a strong military with which to actions which could exacerbate the situation in enforce this policy. This aim of a restored Berlin should be avoided. Russia, primarily motivated by geopolitical Harrison discussed what lessons could considerations, problems of national security, be learned from this. Soviet caution in build- and strategic concerns, eclipsed the basic goal ing the wall on East Berlin territory and of the White movement—the struggle against starting gradually with barbed wire is the Bolsheviks, commented Shmelev. important. Only after it was evident the West Shmelev noted that the Whites began would not resist were concrete bricks used. their struggle not against the Bolsheviks, but The most important lesson, according to against the “Germano-Bolsheviks.” They Harrison, was the importance of alliance viewed the Bolsheviks as German agents politics and the interaction between adversaries who would disappear of their own accord 172 after the war, and therefore did not feel it the White experience. He also remarked that necessary to separate the war against Ger- he is inclined to compare the years 1919 and many from their conflict with the Bolsheviks. 1999, as the same feeling that Russia is in need The Whites’ belief that the Allies thought of a “strong hand,” is present now in Russia, along the same lines proved to be an impor- as it was in 1919. Brovkin noted that the tant misconception, which the Whites came Whites were originally greeted as liberators to realize after the armistice ending World who would save Russia from the chaos and War I was signed and Allied interest in anarchy that came with the beginning of intervention tapered off, remarked Shmelev. Bolshevik rule. However, instead of returning The Allied powers maintained an law and order to Russia, the nation was “split apprehensive attitude toward the Whites in into pieces with only the pretense of a national part because many in the West viewed the government.” Brovkin remarked that he is not Whites as reactionaries, who had shown little predicting that this will occur in 1999, but that sign of democratization or popular support, this cannot be excluded as a possibility. but also partly due to White foreign Brovkin also reflected on the impor- adventurism. Shmelev maintained that in tance of the role that Allied intervention addition to military aid, the White movement played in the Russian civil war. He noted that hoped for moral encouragement from the the White government was in actuality only a Allies, in the form of recognition of their “virtual government”; a government lacking government. In addition to opening lines of any structure or real administration. For this credit and uniting various anti-Bolsheviks reason, Brovkin contended, Allied interven- elements, the Whites expected recognition to tion played a marginal role in the failure of secure treaties that were made with preced- the White movement as a whole, as the ing Russian governments, which could have Whites were unable to take advantage of potentially expanded Russian territory into Allied aid due to corruption and the collapse areas that would threaten Allied interests. of authority in their own government. One example of this was the Whites’ contin- Shmelev agreed that the domestic failures of ued insistence on the annexation of the Whites were certainly the key to their Constantinople and the straits. overall failure, and their foreign policy must Instead of trying to alleviate Allied be considered within this context. fears and ensure support, the Whites contin- —by Allison Abrams ued to be more concerned with Russian territorial unification and expansion, com- Vol. XVI No. 9 1999 mented Shmelev. He remarked that this Relations between Local and mind-set also explains the Whites inability to Regional Governments come to terms with the breaking away of the At a 7 January 1999 lecture at the border regions, including Finland, the Baltics, Kennan Institute, Alfred Evans, Professor, and Ukraine, and the lack of attempts to Department of Political Science, California induce them to intervene in the civil war, State University, Fresno, discussed the which many have speculated could have increasingly confrontational relationship produced a different outcome. The Whites between local and regional governments, and felt that the splintering of “Russia” would its parallels with the relationship between the lead to economic, political, and military national and regional governments. inviability of the border regions, which Evans noted that the presidential would result in their subjugation by hostile administration’s drive toward centralization foreign powers, Shmelev remarked. intensified after Yeltsin’s confrontation with The real legacy of the White movement, the Duma in 1993. In theory, local govern- Shmelev concluded, is that the “great united ments were accorded a great deal of indepen- Russia” concept forms a powerful consider- dence in Russia’s December 1993 Constitu- ation in the formulation of Russian foreign tion and its 1995 law on local self-govern- policy across temporal and ideological ment, but in reality remained highly depen- boundaries. This is especially important to dent. While Yeltsin attempted to centralize bear in mind in viewing current Russian power nationally, regional governments foreign policy. attempted to centralize authority within their In his comments, Brovkin agreed that regions. Thus, there ensued a similar power this “continuing great power ambition of struggle between the national and regional, Russian rulers” is truly one of the legacies of and regional and local governments. 173 After 1993, the President appointed ties with the regional governor. Regional regional governors, who then appointed the governors, for their part, were able to use this heads of the local governments within their situation to build strong local support bases region, thereby creating a vertical hierarchy, in within their regions during 1994–95. which regional governors were accountable to The advent of elections at the regional the President and local chief executives were and local levels in 1996–97, brought about accountable to their regional governor. Evans changes in the relationships among the three also remarked that regional governments were levels of government. Regional governors are given much responsibility for the develop- now elected by popular vote and are no ment of local self- government, despite their longer indebted to the President for their obvious interest in centralizing power within positions. Local chief executives are now their own region and suppressing the inde- either directly elected or chosen by the pendence of these governments. locally-elected legislative body. In addition, Another factor encouraging centraliza- though the power base of the regional tion within each region was the lack of governors within their region has been financial independence of the local govern- examined very little, Evans has observed that ments. Evans commented that at the time, most governors who seek reelection seem to most locales in Russia were experiencing an rely not on party organizations, but on local economic decline, accompanied by a decrease officials to mobilize support within a region. in the already small amount of local tax Evans argued that recently many well- revenues. Due to such a lack of income, the publicized battles between local officials and town of Semënov in the Nizhny Novgorod regional governors suggest an increasingly region—an area Evans studied during 1994– adversarial relationship. In addition to the 95—did not even adopt a budget in 1993 or tension arising from shortfalls in subsidies 1994, and was well into 1995 before one was from regional governments, there is the created. perception on the part of some local chief In addition to these financial con- executives that they are being used as a straints, Evans noted that higher levels of buffer between the regional governor and the government and enterprises unloaded more population, with the local officials being responsibility for housing and services on blamed for shortcomings, while the regional local governments. As their tax revenues are governors take credit for successes. More- inadequate to support their responsibilities, over, while a few years ago local executives local governments are forced to appeal to spoke of the need to ask or petition (prosit’) higher levels of government, mainly the for financial assistance from the governor, regional level, for assistance. Meanwhile, in now they describe themselves as trying to many cases, regional governments are dislodge or beat out (vybit’) funds. themselves appealing to the national govern- As in Semënov, local officials often ment for assistance. Evans remarked that due complain that the funds they do receive are to the tremendous decline in the economy, “crumbs”—inadequate to satisfy the pressing basic questions of survival have come to the needs at the local level, which greatly fore as evidenced by Semënov’s appeal for weakens their authority. Evans noted that assistance during the winter months to keep local governments which have been unable to its boiler houses operational, to provide heat obtain needed assistance, have attempted to for homes, schools, hospitals, and other facilitate barter agreements for services and institutions. goods, even trading abroad (mostly with In general, the regional governor has countries of the former Soviet Union). As much discretion in the distribution of vertical relationships have come under financial assistance. By 1994, executive increasing stress, local officials attempt to dominance was seen not only on the regional strengthen various types of horizontal ties level, but also on local and national levels. In —by Allison Abrams the local administration, the chief executive filled the role previously occupied by the first Vol. XVI No. 10 1999 secretary of the local communist party U.S. Policy on Ukraine: Looking organization, who was broadly responsible to the Future for all district matters. To obtain much Many people in the U.S. who have been needed assistance, the local chief executive working on Ukraine over the past several found it necessary to rely on close personal years have felt they were swimming up- 174 stream, remarked John Tedstrom, Research Ukraine. Ukraine increasingly rejects closer Leader for Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian relations with the NIS or CIS. Moreover, Affairs at RAND Corporation in Washington, there is no successful example of reform or D.C. at a Kennan Institute lecture on 11 state-building for Ukraine to follow in the January 1999. He posited that perhaps it is NIS context, nor are there resources that can not that they have been swimming upstream, be mobilized within the NIS that would but swimming in the wrong river. support Ukraine’s reform efforts. Tedstrom suggested that a strategic In addition, keeping U.S. policy toward adjustment is necessary in U.S. policy toward Ukraine within an NIS context sends the wrong Ukraine in order to shift to “the right river.” message to Moscow, Tedstrom explained. It The essence of that adjustment is for the U.S. illustrates that no matter what a former Soviet to stop focusing on Ukraine as a former state does as far as cooperation with NATO Soviet Republic and begin to look at it as an and financial stabilization, it will never be emerging European country. Tedstrom noted considered an emerging European state. that 1999 is the year for this strategic adjust- A strategic adjustment in U.S. policy ment to take place, as both the geopolitical would move Ukraine forward on reform, conditions and the course of Ukraine’s own would address concerns of Central European “European choice strategy” have created countries who will soon be members of ample opportunities for the shift. important European and Transatlantic institu- The geopolitical environment that tions, and sends positive messages to Moscow Ukraine finds itself in today has three parts, about the benefits of transformation, said said Tedstrom. First, there is Western Europe, Tedstrom. Most important, it acknowledges which is characterized by an increasing trends independently underway in the region. openness to enlargement. Second, there is According to Tedstrom, this strategic Central Europe, where one can point to a adjustment would entail several policies. The number of outstanding success stories in first is largely bureaucratic: in order to terms of post-Soviet transformations that change the context that informs U.S. policy may serve as examples for Ukraine. The third making on Ukraine, the Ukraine desks in U.S. dimension, said Tedstrom, is Ukraine itself. agencies should eventually be moved from He explained that over the past several years the NIS to the European department. Sec- Ukraine has distinguished itself internation- ondly, Tedstrom suggested that the U.S. ally through successful regional cooperation heighten engagement with Western and and its relationship with NATO. Central European countries bilaterally and Tedstrom went on to describe the non- multilaterally on Ukraine. security dimension of Ukraine’s present Finally, the U.S. should support high- position. Ukraine has thus far been able to profile projects that have broad support avoid the full financial meltdown that within the Ukrainian government, include a plagued Russia in the second half of 1998. Central European dimension, and encourage While he lamented that Ukraine’s internal Ukraine to undertake reform measures. One reform has gone very slowly, he predicted that the ability of Ukraine to keep a steady example of such a project is the Eurasian hand on the macroeconomic tiller will serve Transportation Corridor from Odessa to the country well. Gdansk, which is highly supported in Ukraine Moreover, the Ukrainian government and would create jobs for Polish refineries and has recently stepped up its commitment to a encourage Ukraine to move forward with “European choice strategy,” said Tedstrom. liberalization of investment laws. In March 1998 Ukraine ratified the partner- Tedstrom warned that there are two ship cooperation agreement with the Euro- near term issues that must be resolved before pean Union. Recently, high-level government adjustment of any U.S. policy can go forward. and parliamentary committees have been The first is Ukraine’s relationship with the formed to deal with issues of European IMF. He noted that IMF disbursements had integration. been cut off in the fall of 1998 and negotiations All of these factors, according to over their resumption are critical. The second Tedstrom, provide the U.S. with a unique issue is certification. On 18 February 1999 opportunity to make a strategic adjustment Secretary of State Albright must certify to in its policy in 1999. Tedstrom claimed that Congress that Ukraine has made significant the NIS context, which is what informs U.S. progress in the areas of economic reform and policy today, does not have much to offer resolution of certain commercial cases raised 175 by U.S. investors. Without certification, further economy. They have not adjusted to the assistance to Ukraine will be curtailed. realities of the new Belarusian society, and in Tedstrom suggested that a favorable IMF fact view the transition as the cause of the agreement would go far to help certify the deterioration of social and economic condi- economic reform issue, but the resolution of tions since 1991. commercial disputes is likely to be difficult. The younger generation, on the other However, Tedstrom concluded that hand, sees themselves in a democratic and should the IMF agreement and the Secretary market-oriented world that does not yet exist of State’s certification be successfully re- in Belarus, said Titarenko. They grew up solved, 1999 presents unique opportunities during a time when criticism of the Soviet for the U.S. in its relationship with Ukraine. regime prevailed, and so from the beginning Taking advantage of those opportunities to of their lives had an anti-communist orienta- adjust U.S. policy, he claimed, will have tion. Titarenko noted that their main problem tremendous payoffs in both the short and is the lack of capital to realize their expecta- medium term. tions. She explained that in Belarus the —by Nancy Popson younger generation is one of the poorest groups of the population—even poorer than Vol. XVI No. 11 1999 pensioners. The younger generation tends to Generations in Belarus live in urban areas, with more than 50 percent A generational approach to analysis of of university students residing in Minsk. the transition process is useful in that it allows The psychological virtual world of the for a long-term perspective necessary to younger generation makes them the most likely understand the institutional, ideological, and to have the potential to bring about future value shifts crucial to the transition, said changes, said Titarenko. It is therefore impor- Larissa Titarenko, Professor of Sociology at tant to look at youth’s assessment of their Belarus State University and Woodrow Wilson current situation in order to analyze their Center Fellow, at a Kennan Institute lecture on potential to support reform over the long term. 25 January 1999. The quality of life of the first The younger generation has a rather post-Soviet generation will be the benchmark negative view of the economic situation in for the success or failure of the transition in Belarus, said Titarenko. After the 1998 Belarus, and therefore analysis of the younger Russian crisis, almost 70 percent of generation today is important in understand- Belarusian youth considered the situation in ing the progress and prospects for reform. their country to be one of “crisis.” However, In order to analyze the development of only 7 percent felt that a return to the the younger generation in Belarus, Titarenko planned economy was necessary, with 68 noted that it is important to understand the percent favoring some pattern of market conditions in which they live. She described reform. Approximately two-thirds worry for Belarus as in an economic crisis situation. Its their financial well-being, with 50 percent refusal to follow IMF orthodoxy alienated it still relying on parental support to survive. from the West and forced its dependence on Titarenko noted that while a majority want to what since August 1998 has been a flailing work in private firms or start their own Russian economy. According to Titarenko, the business, they are hindered by a lack of new union treaty with Russia also poses capital and knowledge. questions as to what type of society Belarusian Politically, the younger generation youth will experience in the near future—a negatively appraises both the Soviet past and sovereign Belarus, a Belarus swallowed by perestroika-era Belarus. Titarenko described Russia, or a Belarusian-Russian union aimed their reaction to the current political situation at reviving the Soviet Union. as split—one-half assess it positively and one- It is in this environment that the first half negatively. Youth are more likely to post-Soviet generation finds itself today. participate in political protests than the rest Titarenko noted that youth development is of the population, especially in Minsk. More also affected by a generation gap exacerbated than 40 percent belong to youth organiza- by the different “psychological virtual tions, although most do not belong to worlds” in which each generation lives. political parties. Titarenko noted that 15–30 According to Titarenko, the older percent of the younger generation support generation lives in the past, in a dream world Lukashenka, 10–15 percent liberal democrats, marked by socialist equality and no market and only 1–2 percent leftist leaders. 176 Titarenko also pointed out that the new was to assess the process and future of post-Soviet generation seems to be the only technology development in Russia. group in Belarus for whom Belarusian Obninsk has managed to attain certain national identity is important. While the autonomy from Moscow in decisions con- older generation identifies with a Soviet cerning state-owned facilities in the city. As a identity, more than two-thirds of the youth result, federal, regional, and local govern- identify themselves with Belarus. ments work together to develop the indus- What is in the future for this post-Soviet trial potential there. generation? Titarenko pointed to three Zarechny, Schweitzer argued, has a developmental paths that will affect chance for success. It only has a small Belarusian youth. The first possible path is population to support. City managers also maintenance of the status quo, which know how to operate in the international Titarenko predicted would cause large-scale market system through their rare gas market. youth emigration, draining Belarus of its base Finally, Zarechny has discovered a gold mine of support for reforms. The second is contin- under the city. ued development as part of Russia. She noted Snezhinsk, on the other hand, is not in that this would make Belarus more suscep- such a good position, remarked Schweitzer. tible to the problems of crime and corruption The city has a larger population and is plaguing Russia—opening criminal opportu- located several hours from any airport. nities for Belarusian youth. The third possi- According to Schweitzer, Russia will need to bility is the independent development of subsidize Snezhinsk for the next several Belarus. Titarenko stressed that this could be decades because it is unlikely the city can positive for the younger generation, but only commercialize its technologies without if Belarus does not become politically and government money. economically isolated from the West. Building on these studies, Schweitzer Titarenko concluded that the positive developed four hypotheses for technology involvement of the younger generation in development. First, that in the foreseeable Belarus’ transition is critical to its success. future, technological developments will have She recommended that a U.S. policy of little effect on what happens in Russia. flexibility and engagement with Belarus Second, the U.S. will need to be engaged in would be the best option. In her view, such a the national security area for a long time. strategy would directly effect democracy Third, given that the Russian government building; give Belarus independence from invests roughly 4 percent of what the U.S. Russia; and improve opportunities for the government does in R&D, federal investment younger generation, enhancing the natural will not make a difference. Finally, a market support-base for a democratic, market- economy may not be the best avenue for oriented society. technology development in Russia. —by Nancy Popson With regard to the legal framework, in most countries of the world, including the Vol. XVI No. 12 1999 U.S., R&D receives certain tax breaks. In The Future of Technology Development Russia, there is discussion of no tax breaks in Russia for anyone. However, a special relationship Some may say that U.S.-Russian between R&D and taxes has been demon- relations are “estranged but leading toward strated for decades in countries that have alienation,” reported Glenn Schweitzer at a done well in technology. In regard to intellec- Kennan Institute lecture on 22 February 1999. tual property rights (IPR), in Russia the However, Schweitzer, Director of the Office for government retains rights to all technology Central Europe and Eurasia, National Re- developed using government funds. In the search Council in Washington, D.C., argued U.S. by law IPR rights automatically pass to that the current situation is just another universities, non-profits, and small busi- “bump in the road that we’ll have to ride out.” nesses. The lack of such a law in Russia does Schweitzer conducted interviews and not provide an incentive for R&D. a structured survey of thirty research and In addition, there is widespread feeling development (R&D) institutes across Russia in Russia that the West has stolen their with teams doing case studies in three technology both physically and metaphori- atomic cities—Obninsk, Zarechny, and cally via the “brain drain.” Although there is Snezhinsk. The purpose of these studies a slow but steady exodus of some bright 177 researchers, remarked Schweitzer, the brain complex demonstrates that Russia is headed drain—going abroad—is not very great. in the right direction. However, the internal brain drain—research- —by Jodi Koehn ers in Russia leaving the sciences— is massive. The number of active researchers in Vol. XVI No. 13 1999 Russia is a fraction of the number reported to Filling in the Blank Spots of the be working in R&D. Prague Spring Recently, schools have seen an increase Recreating the events surrounding the in applications for science and engineering Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia to among Russia’s youth. One possible explana- crush the Prague Spring in 1968, “even with tion for this increase, Schweitzer explained, is existing archives, is very difficult,” declared that students are dissatisfied with the quality Miklos Kun, Professor of History, Eötvös of instruction in the business schools and Loránd University (ELTE), Budapest at a choose instead to follow the route of those bank Kennan Institute lecture on 23 February 1999. presidents who studied physics instead of Two different commissions in Czechoslova- economics and business. This rationale explains kia, separated by twenty years, investigated why there is such a disparity between the the events of 1968. “Amazingly, testimony number of graduates from science programs given by the very same politicians to the two and those who continue to work in the field. commissions was very different. So to rely on Schweitzer remarked that U.S. programs only the archives makes it very difficult to in Russia in the non-proliferation area are establish the truth,” Kun noted. well-conceived but have had problems with To fill in the “blank spots” of 1968, Kun implementation and need to be expanded. used untapped sources in the Hungarian While many people involved have little archives and a recently published collection of knowledge about Russian culture or language, oral history interviews he conducted with key this is slowly improving. U.S. technology participants. Kun’s collection of oral histories commercialization efforts, however, have been is especially valuable, stated Mark Kramer, insignificant. Schweitzer argued that our role Director, Harvard Project on Cold War in that area may be “to cheer on the Russians Studies, and Senior Associate, Davis Center as they look for their domestic customer for Russian Studies, Harvard University. base.” According to Schweitzer, giving money Kramer emphasized that Kun, with his grasp to Russia should not be considered “assis- of the subject, was able to draw his interview tance” as it protects U.S. interests. subjects out and correct them as necessary. There are a few things—none very Kun’s research in the Hungarian popular with U.S. policymakers—which archives revealed explanations of Hungary’s Russia should do to stimulate technological actions during the period. Kun demonstrated development, Schweitzer suggested. One is to that Hungarian leader János Kádár played a develop a good regional customer base. unique role in the crisis, one made possible Another is to adopt a “Buy Russian” law by an extensive network of informants and stating that Russian firms should buy Russian agents of influence in Czechoslovakia. These technology if government money is involved individuals were not Hungarians, but Czech and that technology is reasonably competitive. and Slovak politicians. One such informant Schweitzer concluded with three was Oldrich Švestka, an anti-reform member hopeful signs for Russia. First, due to the of the Czech communist presidium and economic crisis and scarcity of dollars, Russian editor of a prominent newspaper. Švestka companies can penetrate the domestic market passed state and communist party secrets to because foreign imports are too expensive. the Hungarian embassy that were not shared Second, production sharing agreements which with Soviet diplomats. contain some “Buy Russian” clauses are Thanks to his network of agents and moving through the parliament. According to informants, Kun contended, Kádár was even Schweitzer, these agreements may resolve better informed than the Soviet leadership of some concerns of Western companies and may the political balance in Prague. Kádár used attract the West to help Russian technologies this intelligence to his own advantage, move in a more productive way. Finally, keeping some information to himself and Schweitzer argued, the First Deputy Minister passing other items along to the Soviets. Kun of Atomic Energy’s recent announcement of claimed that the Kremlin first learned through Russia’s plans to downsize their nuclear Budapest of the exact attitude of Dubcek’s 178 ruling circle in 1968 regarding the intention of control. Kun quoted a Soviet general who said supporters of “socialism with a human face” that the Soviet Union was going into Czecho- to pursue the Yugoslav model and seek slovakia “even if it means the outbreak of a independence from Soviet influence. third world war.” In contrast, Kramer noted Kun recorded in his book the oral that the Johnson administration had placed an histories of some of the key figures from the emphasis on bilateral relations and was 1968 invasion. These individuals include the distracted by the war in Vietnam. In the end, Soviet Ambassador to Prague, Stepan détente was to continue uninterrupted between Chernovenko; the commander of the occupy- the Soviet Union and the United States. ing forces, Soviet General Aleksandr —by Joseph Dresen Mayorov; and Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee member, Václav Vol. XVI No. 14 1999 Slavík. Oral histories provide a deeper Commemorative Holidays in understanding not only of the events of the Post-Soviet Russia period, but also of the motivations of the “Commemorative holidays are often main actors. For example, Kun stated that his mobilized by governments and interest interviews revealed how Dubcek’s back- groups in attempts to cultivate myths of ground influenced his actions in 1968. His legitimacy and foster solidarity. As these training as a youth in Moscow gave him an needs change in the present, so too do the advantage in working with Soviet form and content of the holidays them- apparatchiks to attain his own ends, but also selves,” remarked Kathleen Smith, Assistant instilled a deep distrust and resentment of Professor, Department of Government, Moscow’s authority. Hamilton College, and Title VIII-Supported Kramer commented on other aspects of Research Scholar, Kennan Institute. Smith the decision to invade Czechoslovakia. He also noted that commemorative holidays are noted that agreements from the early 1960s to particularly attractive at times of political deploy Soviet nuclear weapons on the change because they give authorities a territory of Czechoslovakia were placed in chance to found a symbolic base or establish jeopardy by the Prague Spring. These weapon new rituals with which to create a supportive sites would have given the Soviets their first context for new institutions and practices. In military presence in Czechoslovakia since her lecture at the Kennan Institute on 8 1945, and were a key element in Soviet March 1999, Smith examined the role of military planning against NATO. Kramer holidays in Russia under the newly demo- stated that the Soviet leaders were quite well cratic government by evaluating one old informed about what was going on in the (Soviet) holiday, one newly created holiday, Czechoslovak leadership, and that there was a and one revised holiday. reasonable consensus in 1968 that the reforms The commemoration of the October had gone too far. Within that consensus there Revolution of 1917 on November 7th was the were differences as to how to proceed. Those first major holiday of the old regime to fall who were relatively cautious, like the Soviet after the failed coup of 1991. Despite the fact Politburo’s chief ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, that President Yeltsin banned the communist and Soviet General Secretary, Leonid party on the eve of this anniversary, Novem- Brezhnev, were aware that military interven- ber 7th remained an official holiday, although tion would have costs as well as benefits. More there were no official steps taken to mark this aggressive leaders such as the KGB’s chief, day, Smith noted. Instead “dueling rituals” Yuri Andropov, and First Secretary of the occurred—communist loyalists gathered at Ukrainian Communist Party and Soviet the Lenin monument in Moscow’s Politburo member, Piotr Shelest, were worried Oktyabr’skaya square cheering anti- that if the reforms were allowed to continue, Gorbachev and anti-Yeltsin speeches, while they would lead to unrest not only in other liberals mourned the victims of communism satellite states of Eastern Europe, but even by marching from the Lubyanka to the within Ukraine in the Soviet Union itself. former site of the Church of Christ the Savior. Both Kun and Kramer agreed that the In the following years, remarked Smith, United States was not in a position to prevent while no one denied the significance of this the invasion of Czechoslovakia. From the date, there was also no consensus on the form Soviet point of view, Czechoslovakia was too of its commemoration. In 1996, Yeltsin important to be allowed to escape from Soviet attempted a pluralist approach by renaming 179 the holiday the “Day of Reconciliation and another highly contested holiday with dueling Accord,” recognizing victims (of all political celebrations: the nationalist and communist persuasions) of revolution, civil war, and opposition organized parades for veterans, political repressions in an attempt to create a while liberals gathered in parks and held unifying holiday. This uncritical perspective, various festivities. In 1995 Yeltsin— acknowl- which ignored the contradictions inherent in edging the lack of popular patriotism and celebrating the revolution in this manner, enthusiasm for the current regime—revised was not received well by either the commu- this holiday by recreating a military parade nists or liberals, stated Smith. Thus, commu- similar to those under Soviet times, but at the nists have continued to mark November 7th same time placed the holiday within a new with meetings and marches and the demo- narrative, Smith argued. Yeltsin and the liberal cratic celebrations—without support from the media were careful to promote a new version state—have died off. of the World War II victory from an anti- Smith cited Russian Independence Day, Stalinist perspective—the Russian people won which honors the declaration of state sover- the war in spite of Stalin, not because of him. eignty on June 12, 1990, as an example of a However, Smith noted, it is still unclear as to newly created holiday. However, similar to whether this new view has been embraced. November 7th, June 12th almost immediately Smith concluded that the democratic became a holiday of controversial status as it is government needs a more aggressive stance also marks the first presidential election in toward commemorative holidays to create a Russia—a day of victory for Boris Yeltsin. new genealogy of the regime. The govern- Those who lobbied to make this an official ment has been unable to evoke positive holiday, and not just a non-working day, were feelings of community or collective memory met with considerable opposition from either around old, now partisan holidays or communists and many others who viewed the around new, non-participatory celebrations. day as a personal anniversary for Yeltsin, As for the future, Smith suggested that if the instead of a national holiday. The second current government continues to fail to create problem with Russian Independence Day has unifying commemorative occasions, religious been the Russian public’s unfamiliarity with the holidays and popular secular holidays, such date’s significance—the vote for sovereignty in as Women’s Day, will dominate the calendar. the Supreme Soviet being much more dramatic —by Allison Abrams for the Russian deputies, than for Russian citizens. However, despite these difficulties, in Vol. XVI No. 15 1999 1994 Yeltsin elevated the day to the status of an Rethinking Legal Reform official national holiday of the Russian Federa- Assistance to Russia tion. In 1997, he attempted to assuage continued Thus far, foreign legal advice to Russia public disdain for the holiday by renaming it has not done that country much good, declared “Russia Day” to commemorate the nation’s Stephen Holmes, Professor, School of Law, entire history, thus stripping the date of June New York University; Professor, Department of 12th of its meaning entirely. In addition to the Politics, Princeton University; and Editor-in- date’s lack of significance, Russia Day also lacks Chief, East European Constitutional Review, at a a coherent set of rituals, Smith remarked. Kennan Institute lecture on 15 April 1999. Festivities have not been established on a The failure of Western assistance to national level, allowing Russian citizens little promote the rule of law in Russia can be opportunity for participation. The government attributed to a lack of a “policy science” of itself has admitted that Russia Day will be law and legal development. Holmes pre- nothing more than a day off from work until it is dicted that unless donors develop a common marked by customs and traditions, added Smith. language and take a more scientific approach Victory Day, the anniversary of the May to promoting the rule of law in Russia, their 9th victory in World War II and largely efforts will continually be frustrated. considered to be the most popular holiday in Now that the honeymoon is over Russia, was originally greeted with a laissez between Russia and its Western donors, faire attitude by the Yeltsin administration. Holmes envisions a period of intensive There were no military parades or official state analysis of past experiences as the best way ceremonies, causing veterans and communists forward. If participants in aid programs could to complain that the day was not being given meet to share information, then the aid enough attention. Victory Day became community might be able to develop a 180 common language and set of goals. Holmes recipient alike is pre-trial detention reform. In stressed that the goals at this stage must be Russia, suspects can be held for months ambitious enough to capture the attention and without trial during the investigation of a imagination of donors, but not so ambitious as crime. Given the frequency of tuberculosis to be doomed to failure from the outset. outbreaks in Russia’s overcrowded jails, such There certainly remains ample room for detention can sometimes turn into a death ambitious goals. The Russian state does not sentence. discipline its powerful members in the Thus the donor’s ally in a pre-trial interests of the weak, said Holmes. Public detention reform program is the prison goods that should come from the state (such administration, which has an interest in as the rule of law and environmental con- reducing the population in overcrowded trols) are lacking. Russian society watches prisons and fighting tuberculosis outbreaks. powerlessly as the nation’s assets, from The donor’s enemy is the prosecutor; but even factory equipment to natural resources to here, Holmes insisted, there is common company profits, are siphoned out of the ground. Assistance programs—such as in country through corruption and theft. There investigative training and forensics—can be now exists a kind of cold war between society designed to reduce the prosecutor’s traditional and state, where the state fails to protect reliance on pre-trial detention of suspects. society and society refuses to obey the state. Given scarce donor resources, it is The answer is not to strengthen state necessary to make strategic choices in control, Holmes declared. On the contrary, assistance programs in order to attract the government must be held more account- funding and still have a chance at success. able for its actions. People must be able to The motto for successful reform, said trust that when the state uses its power, it is Holmes, is “strong allies, weak enemies.” for the benefit of society as a whole, not for Holmes noted in closing that the those with connections or even for the amount of funds supporting legal reform is government itself. The way to build trust not an accurate predictor of the program’s between society and government is by ultimate success. In fact, the reverse may be inviting private actors to provide input into true. The less relevant law is to a society (in policy. Likewise, trust must be built within terms of how it is actually enforced), the government, between the various branches. more willing that society will be to accept Ironically, Holmes added, assistance legal reform assistance. If the laws are not programs have been undermining trust- actually enforced against the powerful building. Typically, donor aid has the effect of interests in society, then people will correctly peeling elites away from serving society by perceive legal aid as a “harmless playground pressuring them to act in the interests of the for legal reform consultants.” donor in order to secure future funds. —by Joseph Dresen Holmes advocated that assistance programs change their mission to creating and fostering Vol. XVI No. 16 1999 cooperation between private actors such as State-Building and Intergovernmental indigenous NGOs and the government in Finance in Ukraine order to build trust. Between 1991–97, social expenditure Holmes pointed out that it does not distribution in Ukraine has been remarkably make sense to pursue projects where donor even across regions despite significant high- and recipient are at cross purposes. For level political turnover and economic example, pushing the development of anti- instability, said Lucan Way, World Bank piracy laws protecting computer software Consultant, at a Kennan Institute lecture on will almost certainly backfire when most of 20 April 1999. Way claimed that this illus- your government stakeholders are using trates the Ukrainian state’s ability to imple- pirated software in their offices—the reform ment policies that serve the public good is seen as an effort to redirect funds to rather than cater to powerful political and Western software firms. Intellectual property economic interests. rights are important, but priority should be Way referred to various theories on the given to areas where interests between donor influences over state action in Ukraine, and recipient coincide. including politically powerful clans, wealthy A better example of an aid program groups or individuals, and concerns over that captures the interest of donor and secession of certain regions. However, Way’s 181 analysis of the distribution of tax revenues Third, the budget process still leaves from the center to the regions in Ukraine decisions on expenditure commitments and illustrates that a different force is motivating staffing to the sectoral ministries. Way noted state action in the area of social expenditures. that the motivation of the Education and Social expenditures are largely the Health Ministries is to keep commitments purview of the regional and local govern- high rather than promote efficiency. ments in Ukraine, and in 1998 totaled $4.5 Way also pointed to informal norms— billion. According to Way, were wealth, ways of thinking about financing the social political power, or secession concerns the sector—that motivate preservation of motivating factor determining policy on facilities. Balancing budget revenues and distributing this $4.5 billion, one would expenditures is still considered secondary expect eastern Ukrainian regions to benefit. to fulfilling gross material output in Economic wealth is more concentrated in the Ukraine. Way recalled a Ministry of east, the majority of politicians in powerful Finance official who had responded to posts in Kyiv come from those regions, and questions about the need to cut the budget any perceived threat of secession would by saying, “Our job is to finance things, not originate there. to cut them.” Way suggested that mainte- Way’s data shows, on the contrary, that nance of old ideological norms is not the redistribution process in Ukraine tends to surprising given that the same bureaucracy equalize the amount of resources given to is undertaking the same task it had during regions for social expenditures. Tax revenues the Soviet era. collected by the center from richer, “donor” The trend toward preservation of regions are redistributed so that poorer facilities means that each year the Ministry of regions benefit. The fact that funds are Finance in Ukraine faces roughly the same equitably distributed points to the prece- budgetary requests from each oblast’. dence of institutional norms motivating According to Way, it is at this point in the policy, said Way. process that economic or political power can This equalizing pattern of redistribu- play a role in bargaining with the center. tion in Ukraine can be traced to the fact that However, Way contends that overall it is the the system strongly promotes the preserva- institutional norms that play a much more tion of educational and health care facilities, powerful role. Way explained. Despite the fact that in real Way lamented that these results do not terms revenues have gone down substan- bode well for the success of reform efforts in tially since 1991, local governments have Ukraine. While the Ministry of Finance is retained the same numbers of schools, able to withstand political and economic teachers, doctors, and hospitals. He argued forces in the narrow area of social expendi- that the local governments’ willingness to tures, it has little capacity to change or preserve facilities is reinforced by formal increase efficiency. However, Way noted that budgetary rules left over from the Soviet era. research indicates that in certain key areas First, budget transfers in Ukraine are the Ukrainian state demonstrates a capacity still determined by gap-filling, said Way. to serve a public good rather than simply the Each year, the amount of funds to be trans- narrow interests of powerful political and ferred to a region is determined by subtract- economic groups. While this limited capacity ing expected expenditure commitments from might not bring Ukraine much closer to expected revenues. Way noted that under economic reform, it is far better than no this system, it is disadvantageous to close a capacity at all. school, as closure means the money allocated What is worrisome, said Way, is that in for that school is lost to the region. ten years Western analysts might be looking Second, the Ukrainian system operates back on this period with a certain amount of under cash-based budgeting—expenditure nostalgia for a time when the state was able commitments are not taken into account, only to undertake basic public functions. He expected cash outlays. According to Way, this concluded that the key task for policymakers leads to a situation where a municipality now is to be aware of this existing institu- could receive the amount of cash budgeted for tional capacity and try to design reform in a education but since that line item has no way that preserves this capacity while also relation to the amount of teachers that need to increasing efficiency. be paid, arrears still accumulate. —by Nancy Popson 182 Vol. XVI No. 17 1999 Glad, the stay-at-homes could not help but Russian Communities Abroad resent those who deserted their homeland. “In order to understand what is going With the collapse of the USSR, Rus- on within Russia’s borders, one must be sians abroad now find themselves in a more aware of Russian communities abroad,” or less “normalized” situation, in which stated John Glad, former director of the they can travel freely to and from Russia, Kennan Institute, at a Kennan Institute much as Russians were able to do prior to lecture on 3 May 1999. Glad spoke in detail 1917. Glad compared the status of Russians about his systematic study of this topic, who live abroad today to that of Americans which covers both the tsarist and Soviet who live outside of the United States. They periods. are thought of more as expatriates than as Glad divided the ebbs of Russian emigres or exiles. Exile is no longer an issue, emigration into three distinct waves. The first Glad said, and interest in Russian emigre wave, which was primarily aristocratic in culture is rapidly declining. At the same nature, occurred during the 1920s and 1930s. time, new problems are arising; most This wave consisted largely of members of the importantly the issue of Russians located in Soviet army who believed that they would the former Soviet republics, also known as return to Russia soon after their displacement. the “near abroad.” During the Soviet era, The second wave of emigration fol- the populations of these republics were lowed shortly thereafter, the majority of largely Russified. Now that the republics are whom were less educated peasants. They independent, nationalism has surged. brought along with them pessimism and Russians who never considered themselves disillusionment. Their arrival abroad fol- emigres are now viewed as foreigners in lowed the beginning of the cold war. their own communities. Glad argued that since intellectual and Glad’s study covers Russians all over artistic dialogue was so severely restricted the globe, including those in China who had during the Soviet period, only the Russian first arrived to service the Chinese Far communities abroad could provide a thor- Eastern Railroad. Many more later arrived to ough understanding of the deep undercur- settle in Harbin, which for some time was rents of Russian culture and politics. This virtually a Russian city. When the Japanese became especially apparent during the height occupied Manchuria, the Russians moved on of the cold war, when the third wave of to Shanghai and remained there until the emigration was beginning to take shape. This communists came to power in the late 1940s. emigration, beginning in the 1970s, was At that point the Russians were evacuated to largely an economic emigration—Russians Tubabao, in the Philippines, and later were were leaving their homeland in search of dispersed all over the world. money. The Soviet government attempted to In addition, Glad discussed the Rus- maintain relations with these emigres sians who settled in Yugoslavia. Some 73,000 through publications and broadcasts, but the Russians arrived there via Turkey after the regime’s main interest was to keep track of Crimean evacuations. They were received the emigres’ activities. warmly by the Serbs because of their historic While there has been a continuous ties, but abruptly were forced to flee the presence of Russians abroad for centuries, country at the end of the war since they had there has been a lack of continuity within the largely sided with the Germans during the emigration. Second-generation writers have occupation. been virtually non-existent, and the expatri- Russian settlement in Israel was also ates and emigres of one generation have discussed. Glad described the conservative known very little of their predecessors nature and the identity crisis of the Russian abroad. Russian emigres have quickly emigres there and the large role they now assimilated into the cultures of the countries play in the current Israeli government. Glad of their new residency. also mentioned that a formal request was Glad stated that there has been a presented by the Israeli government to the fluctuating but ever-present hostility between United States in 1987 asking that Soviet Jews the emigres and the dissidents who stayed at be denied political refugee status in the home. Russians have a very communal sort of United States so that they would be forced to philosophy—they want to be physically and emigrate to Israel where the Israeli govern- mentally close to each other and, according to ment contended they belonged. 183 The past decade has witnessed the Smolensk outperformed Moscow and emigration of Russians to every corner of the Ul’ianovsk. In Smolensk, where the govern- globe. Glad pointed out that the experience ment was less intrusive and more pro-market of Russian pilgrims to the Holy Land read as compared with Moscow and Ul’ianovsk, like adventure novels, and that the tsarist public services—including court systems and government would never have been over- police—were provided at a much higher rate. thrown without the intense activities of the In addition, the rate of major capital invest- emigres, who later formed the first Soviet ment in small business was higher. Frye’s government. Today, Russia has a positive research also showed that shops that faced a emigration balance. Despite the current flow high level of regulation (i.e., were inspected of emigres, there are more people entering frequently, or took a long time to register), as Russia—mostly from the former Soviet in Ul’ianovsk, were more likely to have republics—than are leaving. Barring any contact with the private protection racket drastic events in the near future, Glad than shops that were less regulated. Highly predicted a continued normalization of regulated shops also felt that the provision of conditions for Russians abroad. public services was dramatically lower than —by Jennifer Giglio shops that faced regulation. Thus, the research from 1996 suggests that the develop- Vol. XVI No. 18 1999 ment of a market and a state go hand-in- Small Businesses in Russia: hand. Property Rights and Investment In 1998 roughly the same set of ques- In his June 14 lecture at the Kennan tions were asked as in 1996, with consistent Institute, Tim Frye, Assistant Professor, results. Smolensk again performed better Department of Political Science, Ohio State than Moscow or Ul’ianovsk. Importantly, the University, discussed his recent examination research also suggests that market compe- of small business activities in Russia. Frye’s tition was an important catalyst for invest- research takes a micro-level focus on small ment in these cities—the shops that faced an business operations, in an effort to get a intensely competitive economic environment handle on basic questions of governance— tended to invest more and believed the such as does market formation undermine or security of their property rights was greater. assist state formation? In his discussion, Frye In his research, Frye was interested in covered the results of his research and trying to identify factors involved in small analyzed investment trends and the security business investment decisions, thereby identify- of property rights across three Russian ing sources of secure property rights—Frye’s cities—Moscow, Smolensk, and Ul’ianovsk. assumption being that businesses are more In 1996 and 1998, Frye surveyed fifty to likely to invest if they have firm property sixty small businesses in the three Russian rights. Frye noted that property rights in turn cities, as well as in Warsaw and Columbus, are important for overall economic growth and Ohio, for comparison purposes. The businesses arguably for democracy. In an attempt to gauge surveyed were typically retail shops that had their investment decisions, small business from five to fifty employees. Frye noted that operators were asked three questions regarding retail businesses were chosen because they investment in their business—whether they operate in the real economy, as most of their had made a major capital investment in their transactions take place in cash rather than business, the rate of reinvestment of profits, barter trade, and were feasible to survey on a and whether they based their investment small research budget. The business operators decisions on state policy. In Smolensk and were asked a variety of basic questions regard- Warsaw, more small businesses made major ing regulatory practices, investment decisions, capital investments in their operations than in corruption, etc. The form and content of the Moscow or Ul’ianovsk. However, surprisingly, questions themselves were well researched to the rate of reinvestment of profits in Ul’ianovsk elicit the most truthful answers. In addition, was higher than the other cities, although sub-interviews with small businesses known to Smolensk also performed well. In Smolensk it the researchers were conducted and compared was rare not to make an investment due to state with those of the unknown subjects. policy, whereas it was more frequent in Frye first briefly commented on the Moscow and Ul’ianovsk. research results from the 1996 survey. This Frye explained this variation in invest- research showed that small businesses in ment by analyzing the different cities’ results 184 with respect to regulation, corruption, and ing of Russian history, of Russian politics, of public services (here the courts). Frye noted Russian culture, and it plays an extraordinar- that in cities where regulation is high, shops ily critical role in keeping the ties between tend to invest at a lower rate, simply because Russia and the United States strong. it is more costly to invest. The level of The Kennan Institute’s work in deepen- regulation was much higher in Ul’ianovsk ing our understanding of Russia, I think, was than in Smolensk, whose local government invaluable during the cold war, during the was far less intrusive. Regarding the courts, rapid changes of perestroika and glasnost’, and more shops in Ul’ianovsk felt they had come during the final days of the Soviet Union. And I up against a conflict where the courts should think it remains invaluable today, as it helps us have been used but decided not to, which understand the changes taking place as provides evidence of the poor performance of Russia...tries to adjust to post-communist rule... the courts—the business’s legal safeguard. Most of you may not know that the Moreover, in Ul’ianovsk and Moscow, Kennan Institute is actually named after an businesses felt more legally vulnerable, as ancestor of Ambassador Kennan, George compared to Smolensk and Warsaw. Corrup- Kennan the elder. The elder Kennan...became tion was a greater problem and shops were America’s foremost expert on Siberia and the also more likely to have had contact with the exile policies of the czarist government. racket in Ul’ianovsk. Kennan also used his reputation as a leading Through statistical analysis Frye found scholar to become an important figure in the that of these factors—regulation, corruption, foreign policy debates of his day. faith in the courts—one of the most impor- Ambassador Kennan continued and tant influences on a small business operator’s built upon his ancestor’s example of scholar- decision to invest was the extent to which ship in public service. Ambassador Kennan’s they felt legally vulnerable. Frye believed this contribution to our country was recognized sense of legal vulnerability is a sense of how in 1989 when President George Bush vulnerable they are to private protection awarded him a Presidential Medal of Free- rackets. Frye emphasized again that another dom. And the citation that accompanied that important factor was the intensity of market award begins with these words: “Career competition for investment, which implies diplomat, historian, and educator, George that by reducing barriers to entry and Kennan has helped shape American foreign making market competition a bigger priority, policy since 1933.” investment and the security of property Our country would, of course, be very rights would be increased. well served if all of our foreign policy makers —by Allison Abrams approached issues with the thoughtfulness and a long-term perspective of Ambassador George Kennan, especially in our relationship with 1999–2000 PROGRAM YEAR Russia. It is important to keep our eyes trained Vol. XVII Nos. 1 & 2 1999 on the challenges and the opportunities that lie Moving Past “Who Lost Russia?” before us. We need a lot more foresight, and we by James A. Baker, III need a lot less partisanship. Or to use Russian phrasing, we need to ask, “What is to be The following are excerpts from done?” rather than “Who is to blame?” remarks made by former Secretary of State One of the most acrimonious foreign James A. Baker, III at a 4 October 1999 policy debates in America today, of course, is dinner in honor of the Kennan Institute’s the debate over “who lost Russia?” Particu- twenty-fifth anniversary: larly since the major setbacks to Russia’s ...The Kennan Institute, as we’ve reform efforts last year, observers of Russia learned here tonight, is one of the oldest have argued fiercely over who’s to blame for programs of the Center. It is one of the Russia’s continued difficulty in adapting to premiere institutions in the world for Russian capitalism and democracy. Studies. Created in 1974, the Institute has Some in the West charge that the promoted fresh thinking about Russia, and United States lost Russia, first by failing to about U.S.-Russian relations, by bridging the seize on the historic opportunity presented worlds of academia and the worlds of policy by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and then making—the world of ideas and the world of by supporting individual Russian leaders, action. It has strengthened our understand- rather than democratic institutions and 185 ideals. Some in Russia, on the other hand, But I would suggest that we step back just a argue that the reformers, supported by the minute from these perceptions and argu- West, lost Russia by enacting reforms that ments, and focus on where we go from here. turned dozens into millionaires and millions What is the broader context of U.S.-Russian into paupers living below the poverty line. relations today, and what are the challenges Some on both sides claim that Russia was that lie immediately ahead? nobody’s to lose in the first place. According We are emerging from both the eupho- to this view, Russians themselves are to ria of the end of the Soviet era, as well as the blame for their current condition, or their raw tensions of the Kosovo crisis. While there plight is somehow seen as the inevitable is little danger of a return to cold war legacy of their communist past. confrontation, the tremendous reserve of So conflicting perceptions drive this goodwill between the United States and debate, perceptions of what should have Russia that existed just seven years ago, for happened, or what should have been done. instance, has nearly evaporated after troubled These perceptions cloud, rather than shed reform effort and after differences over foreign light on the real problems of Russia’s current policy issues. Both sides are going to need to situation and future. We Americans today are make sustained efforts, and they’re going to frequently frustrated by what is happening in need to make them on many fronts, in order to Russia. We’re upset by the misuse of loans improve relations once again. from international organizations. We’re upset The next few years will present great by stories of massive money laundering. We’re opportunities, as well as great challenges in exasperated by Russian opposition to U.S. U.S.-Russian relations. I think, my friends, that foreign policy initiatives, whether they be in we really are at another crossroads in history, Kosovo, or in Iraq, or somewhere else. We’re one at least as important as the end of the disturbed by the rise of anti-American senti- Soviet era. While the cold war is over, the terms ment in Russia. Most of all, we’re disappointed of this continuing relationship between the that the tremendous efforts and resources that United States and Russia are not yet set. In we devoted to trying to help Russia join the coming years, the relationship between these world community as a stable, prosperous two countries will undergo significant changes. democracy have not yet come to fruition. Those future changes we need to be On the other hand, Russians today are thinking about today, and tomorrow. In the extraordinarily suspicious of America...of our year 2000, Russia will have a new parliament, power. And they are suspicious particularly and for the first time in its history should see a of our intentions. They resent the fact that we constitutional, democratic transfer of power to did not provide the kind of aid that we a new president. In the year 2001, the United extended to Germany and Japan after World States will have a new administration in place, War II. Worse, they feel that we’ve exploited our first administration of the new millen- the collapse of the Soviet Union in order to nium. In the next century, both nations may extend our hegemonic influence. Russians regard each other in a new light, without accuse us of pushing for reforms that have enmity, with more realistic expectations, and resulted in an unprecedented economic with our national interests firmly in hand. depression in Russia. They believe that even Both countries are going to have to now, today, we are holding back their work hard to lay a positive groundwork for development in order to keep them in a role relations in this coming century. We can only of a raw material producer and a market for achieve a stronger relationship if our dis- Western goods. They were enraged by the course and policies are based not on the expansion of NATO, particularly by the way heated debate of the moment, but on careful in which it was accomplished, and they were consideration of the broader importance of equally, if not more so, enraged by our the relationship. intervention in Kosovo. Our efforts to search Here, that relationship is important, for for a way to protect ourselves from missile many, many reasons. Russia’s large nuclear attack by other nations or terrorist groups are arsenal and other advanced military technol- perceived by Russians as a threat to them. ogy could be used to pose a major threat to Now there are some elements of truth us, if it got into the wrong hands. Russia’s in all of these different perceptions, just as economy, though struggling today, I think there is evidence to support the opposing few would argue has great potential. Russia sides in the debate over “Who Lost Russia?” has significant influence in areas of strategic 186 importance to us, such as Central Asia and negative events and developments of recent the Middle East. Russian organized crime years, I think it behooves us all to resolve to networks do stretch throughout the world, help make that potential positive outcome and constitute a major problem to be reck- that I just described a reality. I know one oned with. thing: the Woodrow Wilson Center, and its So given Russia’s importance, it clearly Kennan Institute, can be counted upon for follows, I think, that engagement with Russia sure, to be leaders in that effort. is the only sensible approach to dealing with Vol. XVII No. 3 1999 the problems she faces and the strains in our The State Duma and Russian Politics relationship. A peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Russia is strongly in our national “Everyone’s favorite target of ridicule interest, every bit as much so today as it was among Russia’s beleaguered political institu- in late 1991, upon the collapse of the Soviet tions is the State Duma,” remarked Martha Union. And so we need to continue to work Merritt, Assistant Professor, Department of with Russia to help her reach that goal. Government, University of Notre Dame, and But we ought to have realistic expecta- former Short-term Scholar, Kennan Institute, tions when we do so. We shouldn’t expect at a 4 October 1999 Kennnan Institute Russia to become a thriving market democ- lecture. However, Merritt posed, if the Duma racy that functions just like ours. We must is merely ridiculous, how does the Duma recognize that Russia will develop on her own garner considerable resources and occasional terms, and she’ll develop in her own way. concessions from the executive branch? In an We must understand that major attempt to explore this dynamic of contempo- reforms may not be implemented for years, rary Russian politics, Merritt discussed visible and that reform may not take place exactly as activities of the Duma, which often suggest we would like to see it take place. We should “political theater,” as well as its less visible also recognize that our involvement with activities, which take place “off stage.” Russia will not immediately produce great Merritt began by surveying the overall results. There are going to be bumps in the “power map” of contemporary Russia and the road. There are going to be further setbacks State Duma’s place among political institu- along the way. And we have to be patient. We tions. She commented that a key factor which have to be persistent, and we’ve got to seek Russian analysts refer to is the adoption of the to build bridges where that is possible. We Russian Constitution in December 1993. This should voice our objections with Russia when version of the Constitution, presented by appropriate, but we should always seek to Yeltsin for public referendum, was the most turn those objections, if we can, into a executive-dominant. In addition, by using the constructive dialogue. referendum process (against which there have The challenges facing Russia are been many charges of corruption), the public immense, from security issues, to economic was given only a yes or no option, thereby reform, to political strife. These problems, of eliminating negotiations which might have course, are all badly exacerbated by the fact produced a viable constitution. that Russia does not have an adequately Although the State Duma was constitu- functioning system of laws. Our efforts to help tionally empowered very little, it was given Russia meet her challenges can only have a one key power— approval of the President’s modest impact, really, when you think about choice for Prime Minister. However, if the it, on a country that vast and that complex. Duma does not approve the President’s choice But that impact in and of itself is well worth for prime minister after three presentations, our time, and it’s well worth our resources. the president has the power to dissolve the Ten years from now, I hope, and I Duma. Despite this, Merritt noted, in Septem- believe that the debate over who lost Russia ber 1998 the current Duma was able to force will be ancient history. By then I hope that Yeltsin to abandon Chernomyrdin as his U.S.-Russian relations will be stronger than candidate for Prime Minister and replace him ever, that Russia will be solidly on the road to with Primakov, the Duma’s favored choice. prosperity and integration with the West. Merritt commented that this was less of And such an outcome is going to take a lot of a victory for the Duma and more of a hard work on the part of many people in temporary weakness on the part of the both countries. Let me close by suggesting President. While this is an example of the that rather than continuing to bemoan the occasional checks that the parliament exerts 187 against executive power, Merritt remarked to pass the Duma. Her reading of the situa- that is it a “check without balance.” In other tion is that current members are relying on words, she explained that “these impedi- continued executive dominance and as the ments are often extra-constitutional, arbitrary executive office is currently under contention, in their execution, and rarely yield new they do not want to empower the Duma if a legitimate sources of power for the institu- member of their party becomes President tions that performed the checking.” next year. Merritt noted that this is a reflec- Another public, or “on stage,” activity tion of how deep the commitment may or of the Duma was the impeachment proceed- may not be to change the constitutional ings this summer. Five charges against balance of power. Yeltsin were approved by the Duma for Those who desire a stronger Duma consideration of impeachment, with the express the need for a more constitutionally third—the conduct of the war against empowered institution. Merritt agreed this is Chechnya in 1994–96— thought of as being the only way it could have a more enduring the most justified and likely to be approved. and important role. Returning to the question Merritt remarked that throughout the of why the President feels it worthwhile to proceedings the atmosphere in the Duma compromise with a weak political body, was both somber and angry. The more liberal Merritt remarked that “because the presi- members felt that they were empowering the dency itself faces the threat of illegitimacy as a communist factions if they supported these new institution that has already been strongly charges. Others felt that some of the charges compromised by its current occupant...the were legitimate, while others acknowledged Duma’s ability to extract concessions from the the impossibility of these charges passing executive still relies mostly on the fact that it through the entire impeachment process. In provides a platform for those who are upset addition, on the eve of the impeachment over executive abuse.” hearings, Yeltsin fired Prime Minister —by Allison Abrams Primakov, whose nomination had been an important concession by the executive branch. Vol. XVII No. 4 1999 It was a reminder to the Duma and the rest of The Role of Ideology in the country that the President was in charge. Privatization Programs One of the less visible activities of the “In order to understand the transforma- Duma are deputy inquiries—official channels tion of ownership in post-communist states, through which deputies ask either for ideology must be taken into account,” stated information or redress other governmental Hilary Appel, Assistant Professor of Political institutions. Merritt chose to explore these Science at Claremont McKenna College and a inquires due to their great increase in recent Kennan Institute Title VIII-Supported years. In 1994 there were 37 inquiries, in 1996 Research Scholar at a Kennan Institute there were 597, in 1998 there were 3,025, and lecture on 25 October 1999. as of early May, 1,252 in 1999. Merritt noted Using the experiences of Russia and the that deputy inquiries are sometimes used to Czech Republic for comparison, Appel set out address constituents’ problems, as well as to to answer the question of why some govern- search for an angle in the Duma’s power ments and not others included special privi- struggle with the executive branch. In 1999, leges for industrial and regional groups in thus far, approximately one-third of deputy mass privatization in order to explore more inquiries have been directed at the presiden- broadly the factors determining the design of tial administration. Merritt commented that privatization programs and the evolution of while some would believe the increase in the property rights in post-communist countries. use of inquiries to mean that it is powerful According to Appel, empirical studies of tool, her interpretation considers it as more of post-communist privatization tend to empha- a last resort. Merritt noted that many have size the relative power of various interest tried other means of resolving disputes groups in society to explain the design of before using inquiries, and that about a privatization in specific countries. Given this quarter of the inquiries were repeat inquiries. logic, management and labor should have Merritt also discussed a September 1999 received equal privileges and benefits in package of measures that might have Russia and the Czech Republic since both strengthened the Duma’s position among states emerged from similar property rights political institutions, but interestingly failed systems and industrial structures, in which 188 one could have expected managers and labor privatization and the absence of an ideological having, in principle, equivalent material legitimating idea hindered Russian liberals’ interests and prior claims to property. This attempts to implement and sustain the was not the case, Appel stipulated. privatization program, and ultimately led In the Czech mass privatization program, them to grant certain privileges to certain the government excluded special privileges to groups in order to buy support and ensure employees and regional groups in society. compliance to the new ownership regime. However, in the Russian mass privatization Fourth, Appel argued that a lack of program, the government ultimately provided compatibility between the ideological basis of enormous privileges for various groups, a program and the ideas of elite and mass especially managerial employees. groups increases the cost of political rein- Why did these two cases differ so forcement. The incompatibility becomes radically in the extent of privileges offered to important when leaders lack the political skill certain groups? Appel argued that ideol- to overcome the high costs of political ogy—a coherent set of ideas and beliefs reinforcement and popular support. shared by many—is the key variable needed Appel noted that in the Czech Republic, to answer that question. reformers promoted privatization by portray- Appel offered a four part argument ing it as anti-communist, pro-European, and outlining how ideology determines the thus essentially Czech. Such a strategy would development of privatization programs and have been more complicated in Russia due to shapes property rights systems. First, ideological incompatibilities. Appel noted that ideology shapes the choice by policy-makers since the beginning of market reforms, the to base the new property system on private rejection of the Soviet past in favor of a new ownership. It is intuitive, Appel argued, that Western liberal orientation was often seen as a economic ideas embedded in economic rejection of oneself and demeaning to one’s theory influence economic policy-making. past. So even if reformers had been willing to Second, prevalent ideologies affect the promote such a pro-Western private property economic interests and strength of potential legitimating campaign, rather than relying on opponents to government programs. In the economic incentives, the process would have transformation of property rights in post- been extremely difficult. communist states, the ideological context Appel contended that although in directly shaped the legitimacy and thereby Russia privatization officials refused on the authority of certain groups. In the Czech principle to develop an ideological campaign case, both institutionalized and informal for mass privatization, more commonly, new manifestations of anti-communism served to leaders lacked the political skill to construct discredit labor demands and made manag- effective ideological reinforcing mechanisms. ers reticent, thus preventing these two Consequently, where there is no immediate groups from shaping the design of resonance between the ideas behind privatization. In Russia, however, anti- privatization and the ideas of major groups communism was less prevalent in political in society, and when political entrepreneurs discourse. As a result, the legitimacy and cannot construct effective ideological rein- power of many groups who benefitted from forcing mechanisms, the incompatibility the past communist regime was strength- between the ideas of a program and the ened (or at least not weakened) which ideological context has a generative effect on affected their ability to advance their claims policy content by altering and hindering the to property during the reformulation of the realization of a new property regime. ownership regime. —by Jodi Koehn Third, ideology shapes how leaders go about building support for their programs. Vol. XVII No. 5 2000 Appel argued that Russian property officials, Nation-Building in Ukraine: in contrast to those in the Czech Republic, A Growing Elite Consensus tried to establish a system of property rela- There is an emerging elite consensus in tions without ideological reinforcement. Czech Ukraine on such issues as state-building, reformers linked the creation of the new territorial integrity, federalism, and foreign property regime to the founding of a post- policy, said Taras Kuzio, Honorary Visiting communist national identity. In Russia, a Research Fellow at the Stasiuk Program on strong reliance on material incentives during Contemporary Ukraine of the University of 189 Alberta at a Kennan Institute lecture on 9 followed in the footsteps of the Kravchuk November 1999. administration. It has opposed political and According to Kuzio, there is currently military integration into the CIS and has no debate in Ukraine on the question of state continued to support bilateral economic building. Only the tiny extreme nationalist cooperation. Kuzio also noted that Kravchuk in parties oppose the definition of Ukraine as an 1999 was squarely in the Kuchma re-election inclusive civic state. Across the political camp, illustrating the consensus between two spectrum, the elite see building a Ukrainian politicians who were depicted in 1994 as holding state as a priority. He noted that in the recent polar opposite views on foreign policy. presidential elections, only three of the Another area of growing consensus, thirteen candidates supported a “pro-union” said Kuzio, is state patriotism. He explained position. Even these pro-unionists have that the “national idea” in Ukraine has evolved in their views of the structure of the gradually evolved leftwards, counting ideal union. Kuzio said that unlike in members of socialist parties as adherents. Belarus, one does not hear calls for Ukraine Beginning in 1995, pro-statehood left wing to become a gubernia of Russia—rather they parties began to emerge. The majority of support a confederation of sovereign states. parties on the left fit into this rubric: they are Kuzio also noted that there is broad very critical of the West and in particular the consensus over questions of borders and IMF, who they see as colonizing Ukraine; and territorial integrity. There has always been a their goal is a Ukraine that is independent of constitutional majority in the parliament in both Russia and the West. They call for the support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. need to revive patriotism as a state ideology. Despite many predictions that Ukraine Kuzio pointed to the Kaniv Four electoral would suffer from separatist movements and bloc (including Moroz, Marchuk, Tkachenko, ethnic conflict, this has not been the case. and Oliynyk) in the run-up to the presiden- Kuzio attributes this peace to several tial elections as typifying this new leftward factors. First, there is a large “ethnic buffer” movement of state patriotism. in Ukraine—found in the 30 million Ukraini- Kuzio suggested that nation-building is ans living between the country’s two polar one area where elites have yet to form a consen- extremes of Galicia and the Donbass. More- sus, but in which he feels there has been over, the ethnic Russians in Ukraine have a progress. The concept of nation-building was territorial rather than ethnic identity. This is institutionalized in the 1996 Ukrainian and 1998 exacerbated by the fact that they tend to view Crimean Constitutions; it has been instituted the former USSR rather than the Russian symbolically as well with the invalidation of Federation as their homeland. Soviet passports starting in January 1998. While In Crimea between 1996 and 1998, the this indicates agreement over the larger goal, only separatist movement in Ukraine col- debates remain over the type of nation-building lapsed. According to Kuzio, this was hastened that is right for Ukraine. by the abolishment of the Crimean presidency Here Kuzio placed Ukraine in the in 1995, the shift to all-Ukrainian parties after context of post-colonial societies. The ques- the 1996 Constitution, and the recognition of tions revolve around to what extent and how Ukraine’s borders by Russia in 1998. quickly the colonial legacy can be removed. Kuzio further remarked that there is a Kuzio asserted that the goals of the Kuchma consensus that Ukraine should be a “de- administration in nation-building are the volved unitary state”—that is, neither a same as those of his predecessor—the unitary state (since the elites recognize difference is in the tactics and timing. elements of regional diversity) nor a federal Regarding language, Kuzio claimed that state. Federalism has very few political support for making Russian a second state supporters. Kuzio also claimed that regional- language has declined. However, given the ism in Ukraine, which on the whole has been divided nature of the titular nation, he does far too simplified in many analyses, shows no not foresee complete Ukrainianization of the signs of leading to separatism. country. Interestingly, he showed that Foreign policy issues have also become introduction of Ukrainian historiography and less contentious among Ukrainian elites. There is symbols has not led to counter-mobilization support across the spectrum of parties for of the Russian-speaking population. defending Ukraine’s national interests. Accord- In conclusion, Kuzio emphasized that ing to Kuzio, the Kuchma presidency has largely although Ukraine remains an unconsolidated 190 society, an elite-level consensus has emerged on addition, Russian regions lack the popular most of the critical issues of nation- and state- movements that existed in the former Soviet building. Fundamental questions of the Union—such as the Sajudis in Lithuania or independence of Ukraine, its basic structure, the Rukh in Ukraine—that fueled Soviet borders, and citizenship requirements are no disintegration in the late 1980s. longer contested. Rather, Kuzio noted that Finally, no regional leader in Russia future political debates will revolve around the could play the role that Yeltsin played in the type of nation, political system, and economic breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990–91, stated system that are being built in Ukraine. Alexseev. Other than Chechnya, Russian —by Nancy Popson regions lack a charismatic secessionist leader. For example, the leaders of Dagestan, Vol. XVII No. 6 2000 Alexseev contended, are basically Soviet The North Caucasus Conflict and its apparatchiks who support the Kremlin even in Implications for Russia the current conflict. The leaders of regions Russia is currently facing its worst such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Sakha security crisis since their defeat in Chechnya briefly raised the issue of separatism, but three years ago. Furthermore, the Kremlin quickly withdrew in favor of economic fears it will not be regarded as a great power incentives such as lower taxes and federal if it loses Chechnya and Dagestan, remarked subsidies. Mikhail Alexseev, Assistant Professor of When Chechnya sought independence Political Science at Appalachian State in 1994, the other Russian republics did not University and former Title VIII-Supported join in the movement, Alexseev continued. Research Scholar at the Kennan Institute at a Unlike secessionist leaders in the Soviet 18 November 1999 Kennan Institute lecture. republics who had the support of anti-Soviet However, Alexseev continued, this is a constituencies in the West, separatists in misperception. Russia are on their own. Additionally, Yeltsin At the center of this misperception is a has had better success in negotiating with “domino theory” based on the collapse of the regional leaders than Gorbachev had with Soviet Union, Alexseev stated. According to the Soviet republics. Except for Chechnya, this theory, if one republic leaves the Federa- Yeltsin has established mutually acceptable tion, the Kremlin fears others will also break agreements and ignored sovereignty declara- away—resulting in a Russia consisting of tions as long as they did not undermine nothing more than a group of ethnically Russia’s federal agencies. In 1996, Yeltsin Russian regions surrounding Moscow. allowed the regions to directly elect their According to Alexseev, the “domino theory” own governors. is incorrect and Moscow’s indulgence in the Alexseev then turned to the costs of theory—along with its determination to be Moscow’s determination to be a “great seen as a “great power”—is a more serious power.” In both 1994 and 1999, Moscow threat to Russia than regional separatism. pledged to quash Chechnya’s secessionist Alexseev gave several reasons for his government within a few hours. Both times, argument that the “domino theory” is the Kremlin has overestimated its capabilities. incorrect and why Russia would not breakup Symbolic acts such as sending paratroopers to as the Soviet Union did. According to Kosovo have allowed Moscow to feel like a Alexseev, the eighty-nine regions comprising “great power,” but have diverted “attention Russia have never had the sovereignty held and resources from preventive action in by the fifteen Soviet republics or the at- Dagestan and from peace negotiations with tributes that would help them to be recog- Chechen leaders,” Alexseev argued. nized as independent nations. According to Alexseev, Moscow’s Russia has no state ideology such as illusion of power is pushing the country communism that united the Soviet Union toward “unwinnable military solutions.” The and any breakaway movement would have seemingly imminent massive attack will to draw solely on ethnic anti-Russian senti- trigger another protracted Chechen war. ment, Alexseev argued. However, ethnic Furthermore, the Kremlin’s vow to defeat the Russians comprise more than 80 percent of rebels at all costs will result in Moscow Russia’s population and broad popular having fewer—if any—resources to help support for anti-Russian separatists is Chechnya’s and Dagestan’s struggling unlikely even among non-Russians. In economy. Ironically, this will further the goals 191 of Islamic radicals by creating more instabil- type of change is what has occurred in ity in Dagestan, Alexseev commented. This Russia, Randall commented. In some cases instability will also undermine Moscow’s there have been changes made in the names control of westward routes for Caspian Sea of departments or titles of personnel—such oil. Alexseev pointed out that the pipeline as replacing the economic department with carrying oil from Azerbaijan to the West can the accounting department or the title of bypass Chechnya, but not Dagestan. In director with CEO— but either the “old addition, the conflict’s drain on Russian ways” continue or there is a distortion or monetary resources has caused Moscow to mixture of the old and the new. In either neglect steps to relieve Russians in general instance, what has resulted is different from from years of economic decline. what the reform intended. Alexseev stated that Moscow’s military In order to implement change, Randall campaign in the Caucasus has not demon- argued, all levels need to “buy into” the strated its ability to compromise or wisely reforms and see the benefit of participating or make use of resources. It also encourages supporting it—or at least believe that the cost Russian regional leaders to “fend for them- of not supporting the reform is greater than selves and be wary of the Kremlin.” Some allowing it to happen. However, according to regions have considered strategies such as Randall, Russian managers are reluctant— trade embargoes and regional security forces. and sometimes even resistant—to participate Tatarstan has passed a law which forbids in reforms. Their reluctance can stem from a Moscow to send local residents to the North variety of factors. In many cases managers— Caucasus. Other republics with large non- mostly from former state-owned compa- Russian populations, Alexseev argued, are nies—do not “buy into” the reforms and do likely to adopt similar laws—which could not see how the reforms directly benefit them lead to a broader center-periphery conflict. and the networks of which they are a part. Alexseev concluded that continued Second, managers often did not understand conflict in the Caucasus, will lead to “a that having a market economy would create weaker economy, regional fiefdoms, and “business risk.” A third factor is that incon- social unrest.” This is obviously not the path sistent leadership and action from the top— the majority of Russians would choose for meaning the federal and often the regional themselves. government—has heightened managers’ —by Jodi Koehn reluctance to the proposed changes. As a result of this reluctance, the decisions and Vol. XVII No. 7 2000 actions of managers often distort what was Russian Managers and Business Reform intended by the reforms, Randall stated. Russian managers are critical partici- Randall then described examples of the pants in the transforming of the business reluctance of managers toward the reforms and environment, remarked Linda Randall at a how this reluctance created the distortions in lecture at the Kennan Institute on 29 Novem- business practices and structure: privatization, ber 1999. Randall, Associate Professor, risk averse strategies, and “insider deals.” First, College of Business Administration, and privatization was the “hopeful catalyst to get Chair, Department of Management at the business managers to become participants,” University of Rhode Island; Member, Kennan Randall remarked. However, the managers Institute Advisory Council; and former Title Randall interviewed did not see any benefit to VIII-Supported Research Scholar, Kennan it. They viewed the process as losing control of Institute continued to say that failure to take their companies, even though they received into account all levels of the hierarchy results stock in the enterprise. In order to combat this in confusion and a gap between what was loss of control, Randall cited a case where the intended by the reform and what actually director and several managers of a company happens. joined forces with regional government Randall described the two different officials, a bank, and several friends to purchase types of change within organizational or more shares and gain control over a large block systemic reform. Deep rooted change is when of the company—resulting in a tightly con- every level of a system or organization trolled company. This group treated the reflects the changes. Superficial change, company as a “cash cow,” squeezing the cash Randall continued, occurs when the top of out of the company, diminishing its value, and the hierarchy advocates a reform. This latter leaving the other shareholders without any 192 protection. In Russia, Randall added, there ...In many parts of the world today, are no laws enforced which protect share- people are speaking in defense of their history, holders from actions by company managers of their culture, and of their national sover- which are “detrimental to the value of the eignty. This is a reaction to globalization. stock.” This leaves the company and minor- They’re afraid that globalization will steamroll ity shareholders powerless. everything, will oversimplify the world, [that] Another example is the prevalence of they’ll have a situation when there is one insider deals with networks of people, Randall ...world built according to one standard. continued. In this case, deals are made to keep If we agree that a world built according the network satisfied, with members of the to one model is a utopia, if we agree that network receiving preferential treatment. The [this] cannot be imposed on the world, then result is differential pricing of goods or the question is: what should we do, how services, not based on transportation costs or should we act? And then the question is: whether or not the customer was deemed what kind of new world order? “credit worthy.” According to Randall, the I was asked what I think about the fact network is taken care of and those outside the that the United States is withholding its debt network are left to fend for themselves. This to the United Nations. What is my evalua- type of business activity is not based on the tion? I believe this is a question of rather development of a competitive pricing scheme secondary importance. The most important to expand business, but to maintain close question is this: does the United States want relationships, Randall argued. to preserve the United Nations, the UN A third example is the aversion to Security Council, the European security business risk, which is an accepted factor system and operation system, or...does the when doing business. Randall cited manag- United States dismiss all those organizations? ers in Novgorod who developed “risk My own view, maybe not the view of reducing strategies” which led to the creation the Gorbachev Foundation, but my personal of monopoly-like situations. Another tactic is view is that after the disappearance of the the “carving out of territories” and making Soviet Union from the global arena, many agreements with competitors. Such strategies countries—including, unfortunately, the guarantee a greater potential for the success United States of America—have found of the company by keeping risk at a minimal themselves tempted to play geopolitical level, Randall stipulated. games. Randall concluded that it is necessary And it is obvious now, after Yugoslavia not only to consider what is happening at the and after the military victory of NATO, after top and what is happening with the federal the discrediting of the UN, of the Security government in Russia or the IMF, but to also Council, of the European cooperation system, look at the “ground floor.” One should see after Europe was cut down to size, after Russia how people are responding to reform, what was intercepted [sic], and China and India’s actions are being taken, and what decisions views were rejected, it became quite clear, I are being made. According to Randall, think, to all of us that this is not what we need. looking at the ground level is a critical ...Let me recall for you, when we ended component in determining the future success the cold war, when we united Germany, of any reform that Russia is trying to make. when we were preparing the Vienna agree- —by Jodi Koehn ments on arms control, we said that NATO and the Warsaw Pact would become political Vol. XVII No. 8 1999 rather than military organizations. After the New World Order And there were several important The following are excerpts from a conferences. You remember the London speech given by Mikhail Gorbachev, declaration of NATO. I will not now digest all president of Green Cross International and of that for your benefit, but that process was the International Foundation for Socio- under way, ...initiated by the Soviet Union as Economic and Political Studies, former the summit meeting to end the cold war and General Secretary of the Communist Party of to think about the future of the world and of the Soviet Union, and former President of the Europe. And fifty-four countries, including the Soviet Union, at a Wilson Center Director’s Soviet Union and the United States, signed the Forum cosponsored by Green Cross Interna- Charter of Paris, a political platform for a new tional* on 7 December 1999. Europe and a new world. 193 When the Soviet Union disappeared, create a sustainable future by promoting a what happened? Geopolitical games. And we significant change in human values leading to are now paying the price for that. greater respect and care for Earth’s community of I think it is good that...some people in life in all its diversity. Western countries reacted very sharply to Vol. XVII No. 9 2000 this. For example, Professor Samuel Hunting- Ukrainian National Identity: ton, a leading international scholar from The “Other Ukraine” Harvard University, wrote in April that the United States, having become the sole Ukrainian national identity can best be remaining superpower, without a counter- understood by looking at Ukrainian society part in the world, has been engaged in along a variety of different axes, said Andrew irresponsible politics.... Wilson, Lecturer in Ukrainian Studies at the Anyway, my friends, I think that we are School of Slavonic and East European Studies now in a situation when we must draw of the University College in London, at a conclusions, and I am sure that no G-7, or G- Kennan Institute lecture on 6 December 1999. 8, or G-22, or G-34 can solve the problem of Wilson noted that data from the Soviet global governments, the problem of... censuses that divide Ukrainian citizens into balancing interests. fixed ethnic groups overlook an important We need a reformed United Nations, a segment of Ukrainian national identity. He reformed UN Security Council, and other suggested a more complex model of Ukrai- institutions that support processes in Europe, nian identity—one that includes a substantial Asia, Africa, everywhere, based on equality, middle group between Ukrainians and based on mutual respect, rather then on the Russians. It is this middle group, or “other imposition of the stronger.... Ukraine,” that Wilson feels is the key to any And I’ve been encouraged recently potential majority in Ukrainian society. when I saw initially how the Istanbul summit He noted that the “other Ukraine” was being prepared. The Istanbul summit could be better captured by adjusting the was a very important meeting. census model to include the potential for The initial idea was to record in the dual identities or by adding the element of Istanbul documents some of the points that language to that of ethnicity. According to NATO adopted in Washington, and that is that Wilson, surveys that are sensitive to dual NATO is the leading organization for maintain- identities suggest that some 27 percent of ing security in Europe. Instead, in Istanbul, Ukrainian citizens identify themselves as they agreed that all European nations are both Ukrainian and Russian. Adding lan- responsible for European security, that security guage as an element creates a similar middle systems in Europe will be all European, that the area of 30–35 percent who consider them- institutions will be all European. selves ethnically Ukrainian but whose ...Perhaps I am overemphasizing the language of preference is Russian. importance of the Istanbul document, but it’s Wilson went on to distinguish eight a good sign. It’s something of a sign that we possible identities within this middle group. are coming back to our senses, that after The first is the Soviet identity, to which up to Yugoslavia and some other things we’re 30 percent of the population identifies (at beginning to understand what needs to be least in part). Wilson noted that these people done. Ten years after the Charter of Paris was regret the passing of the USSR and oppose adopted, it is again now mentioned. It was Ukrainian independence. However, he mentioned in the Istanbul declaration instead suggested that “Soviet” may function as of becoming toilet paper, as some people shorthand for other sorts of identities, such as wanted to make it. Eurasianism or pan- (East) Slavism. I think that the attitude taken in Eurasianists see Ukraine as historically part Istanbul toward Russia by the president of of the Eurasian economic and cultural space. the United States of America was a balanced Pan-Slavism goes further, focusing on attitude and I believe that it deserves our Ukraine’s contribution to Russian culture and attention. It means that something is chang- disregarding the west Ukrainian experience. ing for [the] better. Perhaps it is a process of Wilson posited that a form of “Dnieper rethinking that is happening. nationalism” may arise from this position. He *Green Cross International was founded by described this as nationalism that is Ukrainian Mikhail Gorbachev in 1993. Its mission is to help but based on Kyivan rather than Galician 194 traditions. People ascribing to this identity are use showed more moderate views. While 22 able to at once express the idea of a common percent supported a state built on ethnic east Slavic origin and still maintain their principles, 31 percent preferred a civic state, separate existence. This can be distinguished and 37 percent fell between the two extremes. from Kievocentrism, in Wilson’s view, in that The survey did show a widespread belief that the latter emphasizes a pan-Slavism centered Ukrainians continue to speak Russian on Kyiv as the inheritor of Rus’ culture. because they were forced to do so in the past. Wilson said some scholars have argued However, Wilson noted that this was out- that Kievocentrism is countered by the numbered by responses emphasizing “Creole nationalism” of the Russophone voluntary Russian language adoption. population. That is, Russophones as a newly Wilson claimed that according to this post-colonial population are unsympathetic analysis, rapid Ukrainization based on the to Ukrainian culture. Local identities, in narrow traditions of west Ukraine is unlikely Wilson’s view, may also be salient in Ukraine. to occur. He emphasized that this broad In particular, he pointed to the Donbas and middle group could be a swing vote in southern Ukrainian identities as prevalent Ukrainian politics. He concluded by outlin- forces. Finally, Wilson differentiated Galician ing three possible scenarios for Ukraine: a nationalism, which views Western Ukraine as Canada-like state with its own Russophone an agent of national unity and keeper of the or Ukrainophone Quebec; slow Ukrainization true faith of Ukraine. leading to a consolidation around Dnieper Wilson then introduced data from a nationalism; or a continuation and redefini- survey conducted in March 1998 that sheds tion of the overlapping identities that light on issues of national identity and the currently make up the “other Ukraine.” “other Ukraine.” He noted that the surveys —by Nancy Popson revealed little support for an exclusivist model of Ukrainian identity: almost 58 Vol. XVII No. 10 2000 percent of respondents felt that legal citizen- Russian Education and National Security ship or self-identification was sufficient to be Education and human capital are considered Ukrainian. growing national security issues for Russia, Wilson also discussed respondents’ remarked Harley Balzer, Director, Center for views on historical events that are controver- Eurasian, Russian, and East European sial to different nationalist mythologies. He Studies, Georgetown University, and former showed that support for key elements of the Title VIII-Supported Research Scholar, Ukrainian nationalist mythology was nearly Kennan Institute at a 10 January 2000 lecture always lower than the number of ethnic at the Kennan Institute. As a result, the Ukrainians, and often less than the likelihood that Russia will remain a great Ukrainophone Ukrainian segment of the power forty years from now is becoming population. For example, Wilson reported increasingly remote, Balzer continued. that a plurality of respondents fell some- Russia is only beginning to understand where between the Ukrainian and Russian that economic power and scientific and nationalist views of Kyivan Rus’, noting that technical progress are the keys to security in there was no clear division amongst the the future. According to Balzer, even if the Eastern Slavs at that time. Russian government fully appreciated this Pan-Slavist or residual Soviet sentiments concept, it is questionable whether Russia is were evident in answers regarding Ukrainian capable of devoting the resources needed to independence. Wilson illustrated that more address the problems. than 30 percent of respondents considered Balzer noted that what is happening Ukraine’s independence “a great misfortune, with Russian education is not too different in so far as it meant the end of the USSR,” from what is occurring in the rest of the while an additional 20 percent characterized it industrialized world, in that higher education as “an unnatural break in the unity of the east has come to be regarded as a middle class Slavic peoples.” Only slightly less than 9 entitlement, but societies can no longer afford percent agreed that Ukraine “won its indepen- it. Balzer discussed what he calls the “techno- dence in 1991 as a result of centuries of logical gap.” This idea refers to a gap in national-liberation struggle.” knowledge between the first world and the According to Wilson, questions on the third world as well as a potential gap within inclusiveness of the state and on language nations—a difference between people who 195 have access to technology and those who do going to school, the orphans, and those not. Unfortunately, Balzer noted, Russia has children who are too malnourished or hungry both types of problems. to study well. In addition, a growing number According to Balzer, society in the of Russian children are out of the education twenty-first century is going to focus on system by the time they are fifteen years old. information technology and communication. On the positive side, there is a growing Therefore, the definition of what makes an number of private higher education institu- effective education system has changed. The tions—predominately specializing in the key to the future is the ability to think social sciences, law, and economics. This critically, conceptualize, and learn on one’s means there will be interesting developments own—something which is often lacking in in education in these fields, but the question post-communist educational systems, Balzer remains as to whether these developments argued. Students from former communist will promote the technical base of society, countries receive high scores on tests of Balzer stated. factual knowledge, but perform poorly on According to Balzer, the result of the tests measuring problem-solving and the education stratification is that Russia is ability to learn on the job. becoming a “20–80” society. The education Balzer stated that there have been system serves the top 20 percent of the striking positive developments in Russian population, the affluent rather than the rest. education which have produced unprec- Or, Balzer postulated, education could be a edented opportunities for a limited number “20–60–20” situation in which 10 percent are of people—along with serious problems and illiterate—although this percentage could be disturbing tendencies for the majority of the closer to 20 percent in Russia, Balzer ar- population. There are a number of innovative gued—10–20 percent (the elite) are very well- teachers and pedagogical thinkers in the educated, and the rest are sorely lacking in country, but the application of this new the skills which would give Russia a modern thinking is not widespread. The majority of economic system. the population does not share the benefits. This does not mean immediate collapse, This stratification, Balzer argued, threatens but it does indicate a development trajectory the country’s long-term development. which would prevent Russia from re- In Russia, higher education enrollments occupying what many people suggest is its are growing, which is both a positive and a natural geostrategic space in the center of negative development. On the negative side, Eurasia, Balzer argued. This is a problem, higher education tends to be the most Balzer concluded, which both Russians and expensive and the most regressive type of Americans have only begun to contemplate. publicly financed education, Balzer ex- —by Jodi Koehn plained, as public spending on higher education tends to help those who are Vol. XVII No. 11 2000 already well-off. Enterprise Development for Women Another problem with higher educa- in Russia and Ukraine tion in Russia is that the “serious economic Women in Russia and Ukraine have dislocation” prevalent in Russian society has been disproportionately affected—through not been used to replace old methods of high unemployment, underemployment, and education with structures better suited to a a lack of mobility and opportunity—by the modern economy. According to Balzer, now overall transformation in their societies, that the focus is on stability, it will be even remarked Karen Sherman at a Kennan more difficult to make these changes. Institute lecture on 24 January 2000. The quality of the education system in Sherman, Vice President for Programs, Russia is a growing concern. Balzer remarked Counterpart International, Washington, D.C. that Russia currently spends less—as a added that in addition to those economic percentage of GDP—on education than any constraints, women suffer from a number of major industrialized country. Balzer cited gender constraints such as the need to find statistics stating that between 50–80 percent of daycare and support their family, a feeling of Russian school age children are classified as inadequacy in necessary technical skills, and having some kind of physical or mental defect. gender discrimination. This problem is compounded when you add Many of the limitations women the number of street children who are not entrepreneurs face are the same constraints 196 affecting entrepreneurs more generally in because of the networking and collaboration Russia and Ukraine. These constraints are during these programs, some of the women associated with the lack of an enabling formed business associations which have environment for small business develop- gone on to be sustainable organizations ment—lack of access to financing, heavy providing services to women entrepreneurs, taxation on businesses, non-supportive Sherman argued. legislation, and inconsistent enforcement of In Ukraine, similar results were laws relating to small businesses. Sherman reported. Of the women participants in stated that a majority of women in both training and technical assistance programs, Russia and Ukraine reported that the macro- Sherman remarked that 55 percent were able economic constraints were much more to create a small business after the training, daunting than the gender constraints. 65 percent noted changes in the operation of According to Sherman, a three-compo- their business, 60 percent reported an nent strategy must be pursued to combat the increase in sales, income, and profit, and 500– problems faced by women in enterprise 700 new jobs were created. development. In the sphere of business According to Sherman, the most training and technical assistance, business startling statistic is that 96 percent of the training programs help women with business women—who often feel isolated and con- planning and instruct them on the various fused about how to get started, manage their aspects of managing a business. business, and access technical assistance— The second component must be to reported an increase in self-confidence after provide access to credit. Sherman com- the training. These training programs mented that women entrepreneurs have provide a forum and support mechanism for difficulty accessing the formal financial women to get the kinds of tools and re- sector. In response, there is a need for both sources needed to succeed in their busi- individual and group lending programs. nesses, Sherman commented. The final necessary component is the Sherman argued that young women development of organizations to provide need to be targeted with training and support services to women entrepreneurs technical assistance programs, and mentoring over the long-term. Sherman noted that such programs to “make them see the possibilities organizations have already developed as a both for enterprise development and eco- result of the technical assistance programs in nomic opportunities more broadly.” Accord- the region and are part of the overall efforts ing to Sherman, women’s enterprise develop- to build such local institutions. ment provides options for women to support This general strategy treats women as their family, overcome poverty, and gain clients, not as beneficiaries. According to economic independence. Sherman, the goal of such programs is mainly One important result of these types of to introduce women to the formal financial programs, Sherman concluded, is the self- sector and make sure they are confidence and self-respect that women gain “mainstreamed” with other entrepreneurs. and the feeling that they can be successful in Sherman stressed the importance of including society and in the economic transformation of women with other entrepreneurs at their level their country. Such programs also give so they can “graduate up” into the sector. women hope and a stake in the future of their Sherman and her colleagues at Coun- countries. Women have been active and terpart International conducted interviews successful as entrepreneurs, Sherman argued, with women entrepreneurs to assess the and should continue to be supported. impact of such programs over the short-term. —by Jodi Koehn Of the women in Russia who had partici- pated in business training and technical Vol. XVII No. 12 2000 assistance programs, two-thirds stated that Who Killed Kirov? “The Crime they had changed their way of doing busi- of the Century” ness as a result of the training, one-third had The murder of Sergei Kirov—as the increased the sales and employment in their event that set off the purges in the Soviet business, nearly one-half had obtained Union—set the stage for Stalin’s dictatorship external finances as a result of the training, and had a tremendous impact on the entire and two women’s business associations were twentieth century, said Amy Knight, Visiting created, reported Sherman. In addition, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, 197 Carleton University, and former Fellow, Knight’s research focused on the circum- Woodrow Wilson Center, at a Kennan stances surrounding the murder and the Institute lecture on 24 February 2000. relationship between Stalin and Kirov. At the time of his death, Sergei Kirov Knight offered several examples of was the Leningrad Party Chief, a full member inconsistencies surrounding the murder. of the Politburo, and Secretary of the Central Although it was commonly assumed that Committee. According to Knight, he was Kirov had arrived unexpectedly at the enormously popular within the party and a Smolny Institute, in fact one of his body- charismatic and talented orator. He was one guards had called at least one-half hour of the closest Politburo members to Stalin, before his arrival, leaving (limited) time for and their friendship was widely accepted. the plan to be set in motion. Strangely, the After he was murdered by a “crazed assas- assassin was found unconscious at the scene. sin” on the third floor of the Smolny Institute Witnesses in the hallway provided conflicting in December 1934, he became a saint and was stories that were never investigated by the mourned for weeks by the leadership and the NKVD; moreover, the police did not close off people. the building immediately after the murder. Knight noted that the murder is a Archival evidence also lends credence critical event in Soviet history in that it set to Stalin’s motive. There was considerable into motion the purges that swept the tension between the two comrades. Knight country in 1936-8, leading to the death of showed how, upon his transfer (at the order millions of Soviet citizens. Knight remarked of Stalin) from Azerbaijan to Leningrad, that on the very day of the murder Stalin Kirov bitterly complained about the situation signed two new laws authorizing the NKVD in letters to his wife. Kirov’s letters show that (secret police) to arrest people suspected of he was very unhappy to have been called to planning terrorist acts, sentence them vacation with Stalin in Sochi in the summer without a court or lawyers, and execute them of 1934. Knight’s research also led to a typed within twenty-four hours. Thousands in archival transcript of a previously unpub- Leningrad and Moscow would be implicated lished speech Kirov gave around the time of in the “conspiracy.” Stalin’s fiftieth birthday. At that time, party Knight went on to explain that the leaders were revering Stalin in their orations. murder, although it occurred over sixty-five According to Knight, Kirov not only damned years ago, continues to be a subject of contro- his boss with faint praise, but went so far as versy and debate by historians. Some histori- to bring up Lenin’s Testament, in which ans have put forth the theory that Stalin Stalin was described as rude and unfit to himself was involved in the assassination by rule. Although he did so in order to illustrate ordering the NKVD chief to arrange for the Lenin’s mistake, the very mention of the murder. Knight explained that the suspicions testament was considered heresy. arose from the unusual circumstances of the Based on archival work and an investi- crime: the floor on which he was killed had gation of Kirov as a man and politician, restricted access; Kirov’s bodyguard was too Knight concluded that there is a “fairly far behind him to be of assistance, and was convincing circumstantial case” linking Stalin killed the next day in a mysterious truck to the crime. Not only was there tension accident; and the shooter had been caught by between the two, but the circumstances the NKVD at least once prior to the assassina- surrounding the crime and its investigation tion in possession of a handgun and released. point to NKVD involvement. Knight is sure The theory posits that Stalin’s motive was to that the NKVD would not have acted do away with a “moderate” politician and without the consent of Stalin, which means possible rival (there are rumors that Kirov that Stalin punished thousands of innocent received more support than Stalin at the 17th people for a crime committed because of his Party Congress). own lust for power. According to Knight, Stalin’s complicity Stalin’s role in the murder is, therefore, has been rejected by revisionist historians critical to an understanding of the founda- who concentrated on societal themes and the tions of the Stalinist system. Knight remarked deeds of the ordinary citizen rather than elite that the murder has important contemporary politics. It has also been rejected by Soviet implications as well. In Knight’s opinion, the and some Russian historians. In order to Russian population still seems incapable of determine the validity of the allegations, looking squarely at their Soviet past. Knight 198 observed that the Russians have not gone post-communist Russia, especially as they back to ask what the KGB was doing during view further democratization and social the Soviet era. Instead, former KGB elite now empowerment as crucial to their agendas. hold top positions in the Russian political Christensen also discussed the role of system and, in 1998, only 37 percent of national and regional movements in contem- Russians disapproved of Stalin. Knight porary Russia. The goal of these movements warned that in the long-run this lack of is to devolve political authority from the unbiased review of Soviet history will hinder central state apparatus to the localities in the country’s fundamental transition to order to gain regional control of economic democracy. resources. Greater decision-making power in —by Nancy Popson the regions could serve to strengthen local forces by bringing them closer to the institu- Vol. XVII No. 13 2000 tional structures to which they might ad- Left Politics in Russia Today vance their agendas. However, these move- Left politics, as defined by Paul ments are generally not viewed as progres- Christensen, Assistant Professor of Political sive. National identity in Russia must be Science, Syracuse University, at a Kennan constructed beyond the anti-communist Institute lecture on 28 February 2000, are sentiment of the recent post-Soviet period. those which place a high value on democracy, Russian society as a whole retains a economic egalitarianism, and an expansive “socialist value culture” derived from its role for the state and interest groups in the Communist past and reinforced by its post- operation of society. communist present. The provision of social Christensen discussed three burgeoning guarantees was one of the bedrock principles leftist movements in Russia. The first, the of the Soviet state and many Russian citizens contemporary labor movement, was initially continue to support this practice due to the developed during Gorbachev’s perestroika. current poor living conditions. A new Once Gorbachev’s reforms became paralyzed, economic phenomenon, deprivatization— Christensen argued, workers turned their embracing both the renationalization of the support to Yeltsin who openly advocated a economy and the more radical notion of capitalist strategy. Recently, many established collective social ownership—is becoming labor unions have been demanding the direct increasingly popular. Many Russians seem involvement of labor in economic decision- unconvinced by the political arguments, making. There is also growing pressure to re- which have been made since 1992, in favor of nationalize property in order to keep enter- capitalism as the condition of democracy. prises in operation. Another current trend Christensen offered several scenarios for involves a shift among workers and local Russia’s future. First, the model which serves labor organizations away from nationally- as the basis of U.S. policy and is the goal of the based initiatives to more regionally-focused current Russian leadership, holds that Russia strategies. would continue along its current path of neo- Women’s rights organizations in Russia liberal reform. In addition, the economy also have found politics at the national level would stabilize and gradually grow, the unavailing. In addition to facing the same existing “socialist value culture” would erode, structural biases as other socially progressive democratic political institutions would groups, women’s groups must overcome a become embedded, creating the foundation system in which gender has not been ac- for a capitalist and democratic Russia. cepted as a legitimate means of organizing Christensen argued that this scenario would political demands. Institutionally, the formal involve continued suffering by the Russian rights of women to equal participation in the people and a commitment to democracy that system are guaranteed. These rights do not might strain some people’s credulity. always translate into reality, however. In the second model, Russia would Christensen described how some organiza- adopt a form of societal corporatism. In the tions fill the resulting gaps by providing economic realm, this would combine feminist education to young girls, establish- deprivatization with a system based on ing crisis centers for victims of abuse, and consultation between the state, managers, joining forces with other organizations on the and labor. Political relationships would be left. Women’s organizations are an important revamped, and resources would be redi- progressive force in an increasingly sexist rected toward social welfare and societal 199 organizations to encourage development of a first years of their rule placing their own civil society. Christensen argued that this supporters in positions of power and influ- scenario would provide Russia with the ence. Yeltsin, however, was an exception to opportunity to become a stable, prosperous, this rule and followed the Western model of and democratic state because it would allow beginning his term at his strongest with a the government to garner social support in “honeymoon” period. what undoubtedly would be a difficult When it comes to Putin, we do not period. Unfortunately, Christensen contends, know if the Western or Soviet model will this scenario is unlikely given the power of apply, declared Solnick. Many commentators those who have done well under the most believe that he will start with his own recent transition and what they would stand honeymoon period, but that assumes that to lose. Russian democracy will continue to follow The third model is for Russia to adopt an the Western model. Some observers note that increasingly authoritarian form of state Putin could not have come to power without corporatism. This would involve more state the support of certain oligarchs and regional control over the economy, enough social leaders, and therefore suspect that he may be welfare and cooptation of societal groups to a puppet. The recent consolidation of Russia’s contain discontent, and an aggressive official aluminum industry into the hands of nationalist posture such that Russians would Berezovsky and his allies is cited as evidence rally to support the state but Russia’s relations of Putin’s lack of independence. The truth is with the West would not be breached. This that it is still too soon to tell, Solnick con- scenario is the most likely, claimed cluded. Even if Putin is able to put his own Christensen, based on the status of today’s team into the government, there are still Russian elites and current dismal economic structural constraints on what he will be able conditions. The admiration of most ordinary to attempt or accomplish. Russians for a strong hand is based largely on Putin’s relationship with the Duma will Russia’s desperation for normalcy rather than be one such constraint. The January power- conviction. If the current U.S. administration’s sharing agreement in the Duma between reaction to the situation in Chechnya is any Putin’s Edinstvo Party and the Communist indication, Russia’s leader need not worry that Party split committee chairs between the two authoritarianism at home will materially affect giving the post of Speaker to the Communists. their relations with the West. This allocation of positions is locked in for the —by Jennifer Giglio four-year duration of this Duma. Solnick predicted that this situation could pose a Vol. XVII No. 14 2000 problem for Putin, tying him in the future to Predictions for the Putin Presidency the compromises he had to make in the past in It is commonplace to refer to the order to get elected. Putin may be faced with a Russian presidency as one with sweeping Duma bearing a “nasty resemblance” to the powers, commented Steven Solnick, Associ- sort of legislature that Yeltsin had to deal with ate Professor of Political Science, Columbia in 1992–93, which was formed in part because University, and former Title VIII-Supported of the compromises Yeltsin had to make to rise Research Scholar, Kennan Institute at a to power in 1990–91. Kennan Institute lecture on 27 March 2000. In The fragmentation of power between reality, the Russian presidency is much the federal and regional levels will impose weaker than it appears on paper. The newly another important constraint on Putin. The elected Russian President, Vladimir Putin, erosion of power from the federal center to will confront certain constraints regardless of the regions is unlikely to be arrested easily, what he chooses to do as president of Russia. remarked Solnick. Regional governors have In examining the nature of the Russian tremendous power within their own regions. presidency, Solnick compared the characteris- Regional administrations are increasingly tics of executive succession in the Soviet era taking roles as large shareholders in regional to succession in a Western democracy. Soviet enterprises, giving the governors economic leaders, Solnick stated, were at their weakest power and resources for independent action. at the start of their term, and they consoli- Putin is unlikely to try to challenge the dated power over time. Soviet-era leaders governors directly. Solnick noted that Putin, were selected by political elites put into place from his experience in running the unsuc- by their predecessors and had to spend the cessful reelection campaign for St. Petersburg 200 governor Anatoly Sobchak, understands the tion of time,” stated Catherine Wanner, power of elections to bring about incremental Senior Lecturer, Department of Anthropol- change better than other politicians do. ogy, Pennsylvania State University, at a 20 Thus, Solnick predicted, we are un- March 2000 Kennan Institute lecture. The likely to see Putin attempt to return to a revision of its calendar can be viewed as part system of appointing governors or undertake of the state’s efforts at nation- building. By any action which affects all governors attempting to foster cultural change the state simultaneously. Instead, Putin will engineer is actively shaping the daily lives of its policy shifts to foster dissention among the citizens. In the lecture, Wanner discussed governors. One example is Putin’s suggestion October Revolution Day, May Day, Indepen- to establish appointed officials, “Governors dence Day, the reintroduction of religious General,” who will have supervisory respon- holidays, and the impact of these commemo- sibility over groups of regions. This would rations on the dynamics of nation-building in force governors within these macro regions Ukraine. to compete against each other for influence. Despite being the cornerstone celebra- At the same time, Putin will present his tion under the Soviet regime, October approach not as an attempt to take power for Revolution Day (7 November) remained a the center, but to restore equality among national holiday in post-independence regions. Given the unequal powers and Ukraine. However, 7–8 November were not privileges enjoyed by different regions, this is considered official holidays, but only official something that most governors can support, rest days. Eventually, ambivalence regarding declared Solnick. the holiday prompted a vote in the Solnick concluded with observations Verkhovna Rada to determine its continued based on Putin’s published campaign commemoration. Wanner explained that the biography and recent press quotes. It is clear, holidays survived because legislators were emphasized Solnick, that Putin remains hesitant to eliminate any holiday during a incredibly respectful of and loyal to the KGB period in which there was already a dramatic and its successor, the FSB. Putin originally decline in the standard of living, as well as studied law not because of an interest in law, many other economic hardships. but to be recruited by the KGB. He believes Wanner noted that October Revolution that the KGB was and is an organization of Day in post-independence Ukraine was consummate professionals, and anything the celebrated differently by various factions who KGB did in Soviet times that was “unfortu- engaged in what Kathleen Smith has dubbed nate” was the fault of the Communist Party. “dueling rituals.” For example, in Kharkiv in Putin believes that the needs of the 1998 two key demonstrations took place, one State trump the rights of the individual. of which was organized by a committee of the Solnick cited one response from Putin Communist party. At the demonstration, regarding Andrei Babitsky—the Radio Free “several thousand people listened to speakers Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent who condemning the ‘bourgeois-nationalist was arrested while reporting on the war in dictatorship’ in power.” At approximately the Chechnya—as particularly troubling. Asked same time, a commemoration was held by the whether Russia’s trading Babitsky to Chechen national democrats to call attention to the fighters in exchange for Russian soldiers victims of communist terror. violated Babitsky’s rights as a Russian citizen, Wanner commented that similar Putin stated “he should behave according to “dueling rituals” occurred, but on a different the laws of his own country if he expects level, in L’viv. There was an attempt to these laws to be observed with regard to replace 7 November with a 1 November him.” commemoration of the founding of the —by Joseph Dresen Western Ukrainian National Republic. “By replacing the original Soviet symbolism with Vol. XVII No. 15 2000 an event centered on Ukrainian statehood Holidays and Nation-Building in Ukraine and the Ukrainian historical experience, they “By analyzing how the post-Soviet transformed a ‘red anniversary’ into a black Ukrainian state has revised the calendar of one.” In addition, employees were given the holidays and commemorations, we see how option of working on public holidays and the state restructures cyclical practice, the being compensated with an additional day details of historical memory, and the percep- off. Many in Western Ukraine chose to work 201 on 7–8 November, in an effort to diminish the also discussed that by using commemoration importance of these two days. as a “fractured lens,” one can see that the key Eventually, in February 2000, President fractures in society are not linguistically or Kuchma eliminated October Revolution Day nationally-based, but rather based on diver- from the state calendar. Wanner noted that gent interpretations of Soviet experience. after defeating the communists in the recent —by Allison Abrams election, Kuchma wished to publicly reject the past and appeal to the West. Vol. XVII No. 16 2000 Another key Soviet holiday, May Day, Social Status and Ethnicity in is still celebrated in Ukraine. While grandiose Russian Republics displays of military power on this day have What divides people in Russia at the ceased, the common traditions of working at moment is not so much ethnic or cultural the dacha, or simply taking a day off on this differences but deeper issues lying in the date, have not. Wanner noted that while the sphere of politics, remarked Leokadia holiday itself has become meaningless, the Drobizheva, Chair, Institute of Ethnography individual practices associated with it are not and Anthropology, Russian Academy of and therefore the state continues to grant rest Sciences, Moscow. Drobizheva was joined by day status to May Day. Viktoria Koroteyeva, Senior Researcher, The Ukrainian state has instituted two Institute of Ethnography and Anthropology, secular public holidays: Constitution Day (28 Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, at a June) and Independence Day (24 August). The Kennan Institute lecture on 3 April 2000. actual dates themselves are uncontroversial as Drobizheva and Koroteyeva conducted they relate specifically to the formation of the surveys in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and new Ukrainian state, however the manner in Sakha (Yakutia) to analyze the participation which Independence Day has been com- of various ethnic groups in the transforma- memorated has come under criticism in the tion process; how new social divisions past several years. In 1998 and 1999, the resulting from the transition period influence festivities included a parade which featured inter-ethnic relations; and how new solidari- an impressive showing of military hardware, ties appear. soldiers from all branches of the armed forces, According to Drobizheva, ethnic and marching athletes. Military might and diversity impacts social diversity and social athletic prowess, once a Soviet source of pride, differentiation. After the August 1998 are now included in celebrations of the financial crisis, Russia’s overall social struc- Ukrainian state. ture changed. There is now a small upper With regard to the Ukraine state’s class, a decline in the proportion of the reintroduction of religious holidays and their middle class, and a dramatic increase in the impact on nation-building, Wanner com- number of people placing themselves in the mented that, “while religion is clearly an lower class. In the national republics, how- important element in reviving traditions and ever, there is a different situation, Drobizheva fashioning a national culture—and during commented. In Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and the early years of independence the state Sakha, a large proportion of people still tried vigorously to establish a national identify themselves as part of the middle church to mirror the new nation-state—the class. Furthermore, the proportion of those role of the church in the process of nation- placing themselves in the lower class is building thus far has been mixed.” She noted higher among Russians than among native that religious festivities are not celebrated in groups. Drobizheva cited statistics showing the same collective way in the public realm that the real position of ethnic groups did not and only by those who adhere to a particular change as much as their perceptions. faith, thereby lessening their impact on There are differences among regions nation-building. Additionally, the reintroduc- over what it means to be middle class. This is tion of religious holidays increases the where, Drobizheva stipulated, ethno-cultural difficulties in attempting to incorporate features come into play and influence the multiple calendars and therefore inadvert- self-perceptions of people. When asked what ently creating holiday marathons. it meant to be rich, respondents in Tatarstan In reviewing the holidays discussed, answered that it meant to have your own Wanner noted that one is surprised by the business. For Russians, to be rich meant to continued presence of the Soviet past. Wanner have money and to be free to spend it as you 202 wish. For the Yakut, in addition to money, it loyalty to the Russian state, which may cause was important to have a good job. some conflict. According to Drobizheva, since the Drobizheva offered two conclusions. notions of what it means to be successful First, in reality, ethnicity does not have much vary, people of different ethnic origins cannot influence on the transformation process and the always understand what are the cultural proportion of the middle class among native expectations of others. Often, the basis of ethnic groups in the republics is rather strong. ethnic tensions are due more to the subjective Second, Russians are resentful of this fact and perception of one’s position in society than have responded with increased ethnic aware- real objective status, Drobizheva stated. ness. This sentiment contributed to massive Viktoria Koroteyeva then described the support of the pro-government party “Unity” ethnic and social structures in the surveyed and Vladimir Putin in the most recent elections. republics. There is territorial and occupa- —by Jodi Koehn tional segregation among communities in Sakha, unlike in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Vol. XVII No. 17 2000 The Sakha people live mainly in rural areas Human Rights in Russia and work predominantly in agriculture and “Many current Russian problems and certain intellectual occupations like teaching. opportunities are linked to the concept of Conversely, Russians in Sakha are urban Russian independence and the struggle for dwellers and are employed in industry. In all free Russia,” remarked Sergei Baburkin, the republics surveyed, however, the titular Professor, Department of History, Yaroslavl nationalities held a disproportionate number State Pedagogical University, and Galina of positions in both the government and the Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and economic sphere. This marks a new cultural Conflict Resolution, Kennan Institute, at a 12 division of labor, Koroteyeva argued. June 2000 lecture at the Kennan Institute. Following from these ideas, Koroteyeva One of these problems is that of human rights continued, access to power and the status of and national security. culture and language are further indicators of Baburkin described the major develop- the status of ethnic groups. In the case of ments in human rights over the last few Tatarstan during the Soviet period, the inferior years. Under the Soviet system, limitations status of Tatar culture and language among and violations of human rights and political urban Tatars contributed to the push for liberties were mainly caused by policies of political changes and the reversal of the status the state. These violations were committed by of Tatar and Russian cultures. According to state security organs in the course of imple- Koroteyeva, now, in the post-Soviet era, menting security policy, as well as in the political status is a crucial dimension to overall name of the security of the socialist state, social status. For many Russian respondents, Baburkin stated. there was a belief that titular groups had a In contemporary Russia, first, there better chance for promotion in the government have been changes in the ideology of security. and better access to jobs—so their political The concept of national security now is not status declined in their eyes. This decline has only the security of the state, but the security influenced their perception of overall social of individuals, society, and the state. Second, status and led many Russians in the republics the legal framework of security policy is to place themselves at the bottom of the social more liberalized to include laws regulating ladder, Koroteyeva remarked. activities of the security apparatus with Drobizheva discussed how new special articles demanding respect for human identities and solidarities are formed. rights. Next, the structure, personnel, and According to Drobizheva, the major identities tasks of the security system have changed. of survey respondents in the republics and The KGB has been divided into several parts other regions are social and professional. Two such as the service of foreign intelligence, the other identities—ethnic and state—are seen service for counterintelligence (FSB), and the by some as competing. Drobizheva argued, agency for state communications. There is no however, that these identities are comple- longer a monopoly of one agency in the mentary. People can identify themselves as security arena. Finally, and most importantly, belonging to a particular ethnic group as well argued Baburkin, there are now a number of as being a citizen of the Russian Federation. governmental and non-governmental human Often, loyalty to the republic is higher than rights organizations specializing in the social 203 and political environment which issue again facing a security threat from the region— precise reports on the state of human rights in due to what Baburkin referred to as the open Russia. aggression against Dagestan—Russia again According to Baburkin, the reports responded militarily. Unfortunately, this action produced by these organizations indicate has led to a new wave of human rights viola- changes in the structure of human rights tions in the region—now including the partici- violations in Russia. The magnitude of pation of Russian troops. political rights and civil liberties violations in According to Baburkin, although the the country has diminished, argued Baburkin. reasons for human rights violations related to However, there has been an increase in Chechnya may differ from those of other violations of basic rights of Russian citizens— areas, there are some common aspects. such as the right to life and the right to one’s Baburkin noted the security culture of Russia security. There has also been an emergence of which is characterized by a low level of new forms of human rights violations, such as respect for the lives of people, including its kidnaping and slave trade. Furthermore, own troops. There have been some changes in Baburkin reported, the bulk of human rights this aspect, Baburkin argued. Russian military violations are linked not to counterintelligence command now pays more attention to the or intelligence services, but to law enforce- lives of its soldiers. Baburkin expressed hope ment agencies such at the police, penitentiary that this is the first step in changing the nature system, and armed forces. of Russia’s security culture. According to Baburkin stated that some of the Baburkin, it is necessary to continue changing human rights violations in Russia now are the security culture of the nation in a demo- not viewed as state organ activities, but as cratic and positive manner which would the results of insufficient activity of the state respect human rights and the lives of the apparatus responsible for maintaining people. security and enforcing law and order. In There have been some positive devel- addition, Baburkin argued, there is increased opments in the area of national security and discussion about the “counter-offensive” of human rights in Russia, Baburkin concluded. the security apparatus, the secret services, According to Baburkin, to ignore these and, particularly, the FSB. However, this changes would be politically counter- increased activity does not represent a drastic productive and unfair to those in Russia and threat to human rights, Baburkin argued. abroad who have dedicated themselves to The situation of human rights and the changing the situation in Russia. activities of secret services is different in —by Jodi Koehn various regions of Russia. Chechnya differs drastically from the rest of the country. Vol. XVII No. 18 2000 Human rights issues and security are Russia and a Post-Divided Europe intrinsically intertwined. In the 1990s, The following are excerpts pertaining to Chechnya was an internal source of multiple Russia from a lecture on post-divided Europe threats to Russia’s national security, Baburkin and its implications for American foreign remarked. Its movements toward separation policy given by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former from the Russian Federation threatened National Security Advisor, at a Woodrow Russia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty Wilson Center Director’s Forum on 19 July over the country as a whole. The situation in 2000. The remarks were delivered without a Chechnya also jeopardized the security of prepared text. Russian society and individuals through its ...We tend to define the post-communist attempts to introduce different laws and decade of the 1990s in a very undifferentiated norms. According to Baburkin, Chechnya fashion, failing to note fundamental differ- became a “bandit enclave” in Russia. From a ences between what happened in Central security standpoint, it was evident that Europe and what transpired in the former Russian authorities had to take action. Soviet Union. In Central Europe, the post- Baburkin went on to describe the communist decade involved the rejection of response of Russian authorities. In 1994, Russia communism, the organic rejection of some- attempted to resolve the problem militarily— thing alien; the rejection of something action for which they were poorly prepared. In imposed from the outside. This transforma- 1996, there was an unsuccessful attempt at a tion was spearheaded by spontaneous resolution based on negotiations. In 1999, once national movements that were able to 204 consolidate a critical mass of new political government is now fostering through its leaders capable of undertaking the process of policies in Chechnya. democratization and reform. In conclusion, ...an undivided Europe is In Russia, we are not dealing with an really unfinished business, and there are organic rejection of communism. Rather, we are certain areas where a persistent strategically dealing with the collapse, from exhaustion, of minded sense of direction is needed.... It is an inefficient totalitarian state that overreached almost obvious, and many of the strategic in its global competition with the United States. issues are very clear-cut. First, if we want That competition precipitated the Soviet post-divided Europe to be stable and eventu- Union’s collapse. It was not produced by a ally to be whole and free, then there must be democratic movement; it was not the conse- a sustained expansion of both the EU and quence of popular unrest. Indeed, the implo- NATO. The absence of the expansion of sion of the Soviet Empire was a collapse of will, either institution leaves a large portion of imagination, and of power stemming literally Europe in a state of ambiguity. The expansion from physical exhaustion. That collapse left of the two together helps to reinforce the behind a political elite that, while realizing the transatlantic relationship by deepening the need for change, is still very much a product of scope of the security while widening the span the preceding system. This is especially true of of post-divided Europe. the current leadership. Just think of this: there is Second, ...we should help consolidate not a member of President Vladimir Putin’s the independent states in the former Soviet government who was ever associated with any space, primarily because their very existence helps to consolidate positive change in dissident activity. What is more, there is not a Russia. If the new independent states in the member of Putin’s government, including Putin former Soviet space are stable, then Russia is himself, who could not be in the Soviet encouraged to redefine itself in a more basic government today if the Soviet Union still and fundamental way... existed. Finally, we have to keep the European ...That brings me to my third point: option open for Russia.... That option must be namely, how the Russians perceive them- held open if Russia is at some point to selves, and how we treat them. Putin recently exercise a choice—a choice in favor of reality said that “we are not seeking to make Russia a rather than nostalgia for a status and for a great world power because Russia is already a capability that is not within Russia’s reach. great world power.” This point was reiterated The notion of Russia as a center of the modern world is unrealistic unless Russia in the statement on Russian foreign policy just becomes more like Europe...a more advanced, issued a week or so ago, which explicitly more developed modern democratic state. It stated that Russia is “a great power; one of the cannot do that by exercising a domineering most influential centers of the modern world.” role in the former Soviet space, or by blocking It is worth noting that Russia’s GDP of Central European membership in Europe and today is one-tenth of America’s, one-half of NATO as it is currently seeking to do vis-à-vis India’s, and less than that of Brazil.... The UN the Baltic states. This strategy has a broader recently ranked Russia’s health system 131th, purpose. The option for Russia must be held just ahead of Sudan’s. Finally, Russian open while the external geopolitical condi- population in the last decade has decreased tions become so stable and consolidated that from 151 million to 146 million, with deaths integration with the transatlantic community exceeding births by slightly more than 50 is Russia’s only logical choice. percent. So much for Russia being one of the These are the challenges in our rela- most influential centers of the modern world. tionship with Europe that we will face in the On top of that social and demographic course of the next administration. During the crisis, Russia is not in a very favorable past decade we spoke of a Europe whole and geopolitical position. To the east is a country free. That is still our objective and there are with a population eight times that of Russia clear ways of reaching it. and an economy five times larger—and economy that is growing far more dynami- cally.... To the west is an increasingly inte- 2000–2001 PROGRAM YEAR grated Europe with a GDP ten times larger that Russia’s—a Europe Central European Vol. XVIII No. 1 2000 countries wish to join. And finally, to the Leadership in a Changing World South of Russia, there are three-hundred The following are excerpts from a million Muslims whose goodwill the Putin lecture given by Condoleezza Rice, Chief 205 Foreign Policy Advisor to George W. Bush at transparent. You also have a lot of countries a Wilson Center Director’s Forum on 27 April that have kind of one foot on the train, 2000. because they know that it is the only train ...I want to talk a little bit about leader- running. One could talk about, to a certain ship and American leadership in particular in extent, the Russians or perhaps the Chinese this volatile world... What does it mean to who know in their heart of hearts that this is lead? What does one have to do in order to the only train and they are trying to find a be able to lead? Clearly the United States way on it. You have another host of them that leads simply by virtue of its overwhelming don’t have particularly good assets for power and influence in the world today... The getting on the train but are trying to find United States also finds itself, along with its their ways. Then you have... the Iraqs the allies, in a position of leadership in the world North Koreas of the world that have no because the other great paradigm for the useful place on the train so they are intend- organization of human history—that is, the ing to blow it up instead. Soviet Union and the notion of communism ...If you use that image and you say our and central planning—has collapsed. best interest...is to keep that train running, to ...But it is one thing to say that you find get others onto that train—what then must yourself in a position of leadership and quite we do in order to seize the opportunity that another to lead... Leadership requires, first and we find when the rules of the game are foremost, diagnosing the challenge before you increasingly clear to everyone?...One is you and diagnosing it properly... What is the have to keep the peace. And to keep the challenge before us? The word that is most out peace, you have to be aware that there are big there is the concept of “globalization.”...I like challenges and small challenges. The big to think of [globalization] ...as a train that is challenges are to deter war in places that moving down a track, and that track is pretty matter to the global balance. clear ahead for those whose values and ...Secondly, you have to try to spread institutions, governmental structures, and the benefits of prosperity... because I can economic structures are more or less aligned assure you if this period of globalization with the demands of this new environment. creates circumstances in which you have big ...When that other [Soviet] alternative winners and big losers—which will hap- collapsed, the game became to find your pen— if some of those big losers are also place in this single international economy in important countries, the Chinas, the Russias which your economy has to be transparent, of the world, then you have a potential for your banking systems have to be strong, you 1930s-like instability. have to have rules of law and rules of the ...Russia [is] a declining power, trying to game in which private capital can play on an find its identity, and a country that has man- even playing field. You have to have some- aged to take concepts of the market, private thing that attracts it, because...private capital capital, and privatization and mutate them into can go anywhere, and it has no strategic something else. We in the United States, sense. It doesn’t go to a country because it is unfortunately, certified that there were reform- important in strategic terms, it goes to a ers doing some of this when in fact it turns out country because it can make money. That that some of these “reformers” were actually means that the demands, the draconian stealing the country blind. This is a problem for demands, to get your house in order, to be a us. You have to tell the truth about these places part of this system is causing earthquakes because capital will sniff it out, capital will around the world, particularly for those know. And right now investment in Russia countries that are not aligned with the shows that capital understands the true picture demands of private capital. And as much as in Russia. It is up to the Russians to figure out we talk about IMF funding or as much as we how to get a tax code that does not tax small talk about the World Bank, it is a drop in the business at 120 percent of income if you pay all bucket compared with the size and scale and of their overlapping taxes. We can’t fix that scope of private capital. problem, the Russians can... So if you think of this train, you have Finally I would suggest that we have a bit the United States sort of out there conduct- of a challenge as Americans in figuring out ing. You have a whole host of capitalist how we intend to press the case for democracy economies already on board, in varying in the world.... Individual liberty, individual degrees capable of being that open, that responsibility, freedom of press, freedom of 206 religion, the need for electoral systems that based on legitimate differences in points of allow people to chose those who will rule them view. But much of it...reflected an attitude clearly [are] very important. But we have other about Russia on the part of some that values in the United States that also need to be bordered on a kind of historical fatalism, on pressed: ...our ability and propensity to take the view that at some level Russia was risk, our willingness to allow failure, and immutably antithetical to democracy.... around that a set of communitarian values that ...Overall, as we look back on the result of say there is a civil society that cares about those our Russia policy, what we see is an extensive who can’t quite make it on their own. [Another] record of accomplishment: Americans are reason the United States will always lead is it measurably safer today than they were eight can tolerate difference better than anyplace in years ago.... Democracy is now the accustomed the world. That, in a time when difference is a norm in Russia.... Tens of thousands of state- license to kill in much of the world, is an owned enterprises have been privatized and important message. more than 900,000 small businesses have been established, contributing to Russia’s recent Vol. XVIII No. 2 2000 economic rebound.... All mainstream parties Russia’s Future and U.S. Policy now espouse democracy and free market The following are excerpts from a reform.... Russia is increasingly enmeshed in lecture given by Leon Fuerth, National the international community.... Security Advisor to Vice President Al Gore, ...Turning to the future, the path at a Woodrow Wilson Center Director’s President Putin is leading his country still in Forum on 25 July 2000. many ways yet to be clarified....President Both the United States and Russia are at Putin strives for a strong Russia, but he has a a pivotal moment as we both undergo a contradictory...concept of what constitutes period of transition in our national leadership. strength. He has demonstrated an instinct to After successfully conducting the first demo- restrict the free media; and his policies in cratic transfer of executive power in its history, Chechnya...have antagonized the Chechen Russia and its new government are in the people and have created obstacles to Russia’s early stages of charting a new course... It is integration with the international commu- therefore a particularly important moment to nity. We have been blunt with Putin on all survey the past, the present, and the future... points, making clear that we are prepared to ...With the fall of Soviet Communism, work with Moscow where our interests Russia was forced to undergo a wrenching coincide, and to hold firm where they transformation encompassing three revolu- diverge. tions at once: a political revolution, from But at the same time, it is important to Communism to democracy; an economic note that President Putin’s own program...is a revolution, from a command economy to a program of vigorous economic reform along market-based system; and a geopolitical lines that we ourselves would have advo- revolution, from an imperial state to a cated and in fact did advocate at the begin- federation surrounded by newly-indepen- ning of our close association with the Russian dent nations. government. His program, if carried out, ...We decided that in these circum- offers the single greatest hope for the rebirth stances, we had three primary objectives: To of the Russian economy on conditions that protect ourselves and the world against a are compatible with political freedom. breakdown of Russian control over the Let me end where I began. As we assess inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal; to help those U.S.-Russia relations during this critical period who had come to power in Russia make sure of transition, let us not lose sight of what we that there was no return to the Communist have achieved and the means by which we past.... We realized that we would need to successfully achieved them. Because we chose find some unprecedented way to convert our to engage Russia...we have succeeded in general intentions into specifics and facts on locking in important, practically irreversible the ground. The Bi-National Commission... progress that serves U.S. national interests. became the joint American and Russian Engagement has brought us this far—and is response to the sense that an entirely new the only means of bringing us farther. technique of cooperation was needed. We recognize that Russia’s historic From the outset, this strategy...was transformation is incomplete—all the more controversial. Some of that controversy was reason we must continue to engage Russia. 207 We recognize that Russian democracy is phy. Each article of the constitution should challenged by corruption that deeply pen- enjoy the full scope of judicial protection. The etrates her society—all the more reason to primary task of the Constitutional Court is to engage Russia on behalf of reform. We disclose and develop the constitution’s recognize that Russia has her own self- democratic potential. Bondar claimed that the interest and concerns that can and do run constitution must be adjusted according to contrary to ours—all the more reason to the development of the state. search for constructive forms of cooperation. Legal and constitutional nihilism has We deeply disagree with what Russia is been a constant feature of recent Russian doing in Chechnya and remain concerned history. A total of four constitutions were about signs of Russian efforts to intimidate adopted during the period of Soviet rule. In the press—all the more reason to step up our spite of their number, they failed to establish discussions with them on those issues. the rule of law in the country and the nihilist This evening...the major components of attitude has not been overcome. During the the Russian and American contributions of Soviet period, the constitution was widely the international space station will dock. If perceived as a political document which this complicated maneuver succeeds, the affirmed the victory of one class over another. international space station will have become A constitution which pits one segment of a reality. It is in many ways a perfect meta- society over another cannot successfully phor for the risks and gains of Russia policy dictate the main law of the land. during the Clinton-Gore administration.... According to Bondar, the political and ...The space station, like our entire legal potential of revolution have been relationship with Russia, was born in travail, exhausted in Russia. All of the recent stages and like that partnership, it has proceeded in the constitutional development of Russia under continuous criticism.... But we have were marked by radical revolutionary managed to maneuver over fifty tons of transformations. Experience shows that such equipment into the same orbital plane, and if transformations rarely promote the rule of all of our planning pays off, we will succeed law—more often, they disrupt it. Justice in inching these massive objects together Bondar is of the belief that constitutional until they click into place. And when that transformations should be evolutionary happens, all eyes must turn to the future to rather than revolutionary. ask that if we can come this far, and accom- In addition, Bondar claimed that Russia plish this much, what else is possible? cannot develop constitutionally in isolation from the rest of the world. It must utilize the best of Vol. XVIII No. 3 2000 the world’s constitutional experience. However, Constitutional Development in even the best of the constitutional experience of Present-Day Russia other countries cannot successfully be put into The issue of constitutional development practice in Russia unless the national experience is at the center of modern Russian history, and the peculiarities of the Russian state and stated Nikolai Bondar, Justice, Constitutional history are taken into account. Court of the Russian Federation, at a 26 One of the many issues which needs to September 2000 lecture at the Kennan be addressed by the Constitutional Court is Institute. that of federative relationships. Federalism in The Russian constitution of 1993 has Russia revolves around the relationship allowed for basic democratic achievements between the federal center and the regions. during the last decade, argued Bondar. Russia Bondar argued that President Putin’s attempts today finds itself at a constitutional cross- at re-centralization must be balanced with the roads. Ten years ago, Russia opted for democ- provision of regional autonomy. The negotia- racy and freedom. Now transformation must tion of recent agreements between the central be adjusted to current conditions and set administration and regional authorities has within a contemporary constitutional frame- reinforced the legal asymmetry of the various work. This does not necessarily mean that a members of the Russian Federation. It has also new constitution must be adopted; rather, the enfeebled the central government and pre- potential which is inherent in the 1993 vented it from providing for a single legal and constitution must be realized. constitutional space within the borders of the The 1993 constitution was based on Russian Federation. According to Bondar, legal positivism and a natural law philoso- legal separatism has emerged—with many 208 regions adopting constitutions and laws much of what is supposedly—according to which directly contradict the Russian national Article 41 of the Russian Constitution—free constitution. This can be viewed as a latent or, health care. There are also problems at the in some cases, even an open form of political provider level with doctors and nurses not irredentism and must be resolved within the being paid their wages for months at a time existing constitutional framework. and the fact that those wages are alarmingly Bondar remarked that the development low when they are paid, Twigg remarked. of the judiciary is the most important form of Twigg examined health care system constitutional development in Russia. Russia reform at the regional level in order to answer has witnessed enormous changes over the three questions. First, what is happening in past few years. The 1993 constitution pro- health care reform. Second, why is it happening claimed the judiciary to be equal to the or not and more precisely, why it has progressed legislative and executive branches of govern- more successfully in some regions and virtually ment. One of the hallmarks of the constitu- not all in other regions. Third, and perhaps most tion was the creation of the Constitutional importantly, what has been the impact of reform Court of the Russian Federation. The Consti- of the Russian health care structure and the tutional Court evaluates laws, presidential impact of those structural reforms on health decrees, and other edicts for their conformity status throughout the country. to constitutional standards. The decisions of In order to determine what is happen- the Constitutional Court are mandatory and ing with health care system reform in Russia, cannot be appealed. The Court has the Twigg focused on a sample of forty-one responsibility to mediate arguments between regions according to fourteen variables. various bodies of state power; to interpret the Those variables were: the degree of payment articles of the constitution; and to hear of health insurance taxes; provider reim- appeals from citizens whose rights were bursement mechanisms; the degree to which violated, based on the unconstitutionality of the region has moved from inpatient to a law. The Court provides for the constitu- outpatient care; the move toward using tional integrity of the state, but at the same general practitioners instead of specialists; time ensures the protection of the human global budgeting; co-pays and voluntary rights of private citizens. medical insurance; the move toward elimi- Bondar concluded by stating that nating excess capacity; salary variation; constitutional development should proceed quality reviews; comprehensive insurance along the path of difficult and profound benefits; subsidies to the poor; geographic political, economic, and social transforma- coverage; and whether insurance companies tions which will lead to the constitutional and international intervention are present. resurgence of Russia. According to Twigg, the analysis showed —by Jennifer Giglio that the regions which were more progressive in the reforms were the ones most mentioned in Vol. XVIII No. 4 2000 the West: Karelia, Novgorod, Moscow city, Russian Health Care in Crisis Tver, Tula, Penza, Samara, and Kemerovo. The There has been wide variation among average regions were the bulk of the forty-one, Russia’s eighty-nine regions in terms of the with twenty of the forty-one falling into that severity and dynamics of the health and category. The non-reformers were: Ryazan, demographic crisis, remarked Judyth Twigg Kursk, Tambov, Kalmykia, Astrakhan, at a Kennan Institute lecture on 2 October Karachai-Cherkess, Krasnodar, Stavropol, 2000. Twigg, Assistant Professor, Department Udmurt, Orenburg, Chelyabinsk, and Amur. of Political Science and Public Administration According to the study, Twigg found at Virginia Commonwealth University went that wealth enables health care system on to say that the Russian government’s reform. The regions with more money to response to this crisis has been to try to reform work with achieve greater success in imple- the structure of the health care system, in the menting these health care system reforms— hope of providing better health care to the as one would expect. Another finding was Russian people. That effort, too, has experi- that urban areas seem to be a bit more enced wide regional variation, Twigg stated. reformist than rural areas, Twigg stated. According to Twigg, one of the recent The last question Twigg discussed was problems with the Russian health care whether the reforms mattered for health system is that the State is not paying for outcomes; whether the changes made a 209 difference in the health of the Russian people. countries in 1939, declared Joseph Berliner, According to Twigg, in terms of several of the Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, most important indicators—life expectancy, Brandeis University during a 19 October 2000 maternal mortality, and infant mortality—the lecture at the Kennan Institute, you would answer is no. For life expectancy, this is not have concluded that the USSR was a very surprising as many determining factors— minor player on the world scene, with very such as behavior and environmental fac- little impact on the lives of Americans. By the tors—are not directly related to the structure 1950s, according to Robert Tucker, Professor of the health care system. But infant and Emeritus, Department of Politics, Princeton maternal mortality are thought to be corre- University, there was an intense, well-in- lated with the quality of the health care formed debate about the nature of the Soviet system, Twigg argued. Twigg posited that if political order. Both speakers and the lecture’s similar research were conducted a few years discussant, Abbott Gleason, Professor, from now, there might be different results. Department of History, Brown University, and Perhaps it is too early in the process of former Director, Kennan Institute, stressed the implementing these health care structure importance of newly accessible Soviet archives reforms for them to have had a significant in evaluating the predictions of the early impact on health outcomes, Twigg argued. Soviet studies specialists. According to Twigg, there is a more To address the lack of expertise on their positive interpretation of the findings. In new wartime ally, the U.S. government response to those who fear these health care established an intelligence gathering unit in structural reform efforts actually harm health the newly created Office for Strategic Services care status, Twigg stated that there was no such (OSS) in 1941. After the war, veterans from evidence. If it is true that these structural this unit went on to work in U.S. universities, reforms produce monetary savings or en- educating the first post-war generation of hanced efficiency opportunities for the Russian scholars who took up a specialization on the health care system, so far they do not seem to Soviet Union within their disciplines. The be a detriment to the health outcomes that are rapid expansion of Soviet studies, a product of related to the quality of the health care system. the cold war rather than an expression of It would be dangerous to infer causality purely scholarly interest in Soviet society, was in any of these relationships at this point, funded by government and foundation grants, Twigg added. In terms of correlation, this and took the form of research centers, gradu- study has confirmed that there is wide ate programs, research grants, and journals. variation among the regions, not only in By 1950, the first wave of new scholars were terms of health status, but in terms of health completing their doctorates and launching system quality and structure. The data their careers, and by 1960 the field of scholar- showed that money does make a difference. ship (soon dubbed by the then-disparaging If it is true that wealthier regions have the term sovietology) was in full swing. material ability to get farther in health system Because of the secretive nature of the structure reform, Twigg concluded, we can Soviet order, this new field of study did not begin to speculate that the health insurance lend itself to direct examination. Instead, system might be doing some good; that the scholars were forced to find alternate meth- regions that are the farthest along in imple- ods of interpreting this system. Tucker noted menting the insurance mechanism have that a particularly formative experience for progressed further in restructuring their him, while serving in the U.S. embassy in health care systems. In terms of the impact of Moscow in the 1940s, was going to the Lenin health care structure reform on health Library to research changes in Russian policy status—in either a positive or negative toward Poland after the victory over Napo- direction—Twigg argued that it is still too leon in the war of 1812. He learned that the soon to make that judgement. Soviet Union had to be interpreted in the —by Jodi Koehn context of Russian history. It was this experi- ence, and such writings as George Kennan’s Vol. XVIII No. 5 2001 comparing Stalin’s rule to the evolution of the Looking Back at the Origins of tsarist autocracy, that led Tucker to conclude, Soviet Studies “the one-party system had given way to a If you had surveyed the scope of one-person system; the ruling party to a American scholarly research on foreign ruling personage.” 210 During the 1940s and 1950s, theories on have correctly identified the fault lines where the the nature of totalitarianism were developed earthquake might occur, but lacked the means to and debated. Tucker stated that according to forecast when and how it would occur. the writings of Hannah Arendt and Zbigniew Commenting on the presentations, Brzezinski, the Soviet Union, as a totalitarian Gleason added that new information from power, was driven by ideology rather than the opened archives has provided valuable Stalin as an individual. This model did not fit insights, especially on the conduct of Soviet well with what we now know actually hap- foreign policy. He emphasized, however, the pened in the Soviet Union, Tucker declared. early critical work of the two speakers in In early 1953, for example, Soviet shaping our understanding the Soviet Union Russia was paralyzed with fear over official with only the scarcest of data available to rely pronouncements signaling the start of a new upon. round of purges. Stalin’s death in March 1953 —by Joseph Dresen not only forestalled this new round of purges, but led to a subsiding of internal Vol. XVIII No. 6 2001 terror. On the day after Stalin’s funeral, Women’s NGOs in Ukraine: Georgi Malenkov, then the head of the Soviet A Tale of Two Publics government, stated in a meeting of party The objective of western civil society leaders that “much happened in connection programs should be to foster groupings of with [Stalin’s] personality cult, we consider it individuals joined by mutual understanding obligatory to bring to an end the policies of of common problems for which they propose the personality cult.” This statement was first common solutions, said Alexandra Hrycak, published in 1991, Tucker noted. Assistant Professor of Sociology at Reed In the social sciences demanding College, at a Kennan Institute lecture on 30 concrete data, such as economics, the lack of October 2000. access to data presented obvious challenges Hrycak explained that these groupings, to early Soviet specialists. Other obstacles or “publics,” are important in western were less obvious but equally challenging, countries in a variety of policy domains. stated Berliner. One example is that political However, in Ukraine, policy-making is constraints on Soviet economists curtailed disconnected from government accountabil- any kind of balance in Soviet writings on ity, and groups have been unable to cooper- their own economy. Berliner recounted ate or form coalitions around common meeting as a young scholar with a senior agendas. Western programs can encourage economist at the Institute of Economics of the regular interaction among groups and Russian Academy of Sciences, and how he thereby help build effective community brashly lectured on price theory and the organizations through which citizens might importance of using interest rates to properly better influence politics. measure the cost of capital. “You know,” Hrycak suggested that the western replied the Soviet economist, “I wrote a community to date has focused more on number of articles on that subject before I providing assistance and training from the was arrested.” outside. She noted that it is difficult to The offset to this lack of openness, determine the extent to which these pro- according to Berliner, was the Soviet practice grams have been able to foster networks of of “self-criticism.” Intended to shield society cooperation in Ukraine, since evaluations from corruption, the accounts in the Soviet tend to focus on quantitative measures, such press never implicated top officials. These as the amount of groups created or individu- stories did describe all sorts of schemes at the als trained. This focus has led, Hrycak enterprise level and became an invaluable contended, to ephemeral organizations that source of information on how the Soviet focus on self-perpetuation and on creating economy actually worked. the possibilities for future grants. In order to Perhaps the biggest criticism against do so, they tend to focus on publishing Soviet specialists, noted Berliner, is their failure activities, and are not able to create a public to predict the collapse of the USSR. But, for themselves or their issues. Their audience Berliner pointed out, they had correctly becomes the foreign donor rather than the identified the sources of inefficiency and domestic community. retardation. If Soviet specialists were geologists A possible alternative perspective is to instead of social scientists, they could be said to focus on the political process. Hrycak 211 explained that this approach encourages The other public is made up of women’s greater face-to-face activity and deliberation. groups that grew out of more maternalist Only in this way will individuals become organizations, and who are already engaged committed to finding solutions to common in domestic politics. Their main issues and problems. Unfortunately, according to mode of activity, according to Hrycak, may be Hrycak, western grantmakers encourage more appealing to the women of Ukraine than groups to remain small, diversified, and those rooted in the feminist frame of mobiliza- specialized, making it difficult to create a tion. However, Hrycak noted that these public for the groups. groups have also learned to present their Hrycak then illustrated the effect of issues in ways that can attract western funds, western civil society programs on Ukrainian and over time have become more committed women’s organizations. In Ukraine, like in to questions of women’s rights. Russia, there was a large peak in the number In conclusion, Hrycak remarked that of organizations founded in 1994–1995. In western civil society programs have been theory, such a peak should coincide with effective in quantitative terms. However, increased domestic political opportunities. many of the newly founded organizations However, Hrycak claimed that the peak in have meager membership numbers. She also Ukraine corresponded instead to a western noted that women’s issues have been effec- catalyst—the funneling of western assistance tively put on the agenda in Ukraine, and this into the country in preparation for the Fourth may be attributable to the work of western World Conference on Women in Beijing in programs. Her greatest criticism of the September 1995. The new groups founded at programs was their tendency to provide that time were interested primarily in disincentives for cooperation, leading to women’s rights. Quite a number of these factionalization of the community. organizations have no ties to each other, Finally, Hrycak recommended that subsist only on their own narrowly defined western civil society programs could be more issues, and do not engage in coalition build- effective were they to create incentives for ing. Often they do not want to cooperate for activists to attend conferences and events at fear of having their issues become neglected in which rival groups could deliberate. In this the larger network of associations. way they could form a public around agendas Other groups play a more central role that are domestic rather than foreign. and do have significant networks of coopera- —by Nancy Popson tion. These grew out of the national indepen- dence movement and the organizations of Vol. XVIII No. 7 2001 soldier’s mothers, and their focus is very Globalization and the Russian Transition different than the western-oriented groups. Insufficient attention has been paid to the For example, originally Soyuz Ukrainok and fact that Russia has been going through a Zhinochna Hromada were interested in the state process of economic transformation in a time of the Ukrainian language, culture, and characterized by increasing globalization both environment rather than the rights of women. of economic and political processes, remarked They therefore advocated a more maternalist Michael Bradshaw, Professor of Human than feminist style of politics. These groups Geography, University of Leicester at a Kennan have sustained networks that meet on a Institute lecture on 6 November 2000. In order regular basis. Their activities revolve around to understand why Russia’s transformation has service, bringing them into contact with their been so troubled, Bradshaw continued, it is public and fostering longer-term commitment. necessary to look at questions of globalization Hrycak concluded that there are two which have great implications for the creation publics, or two ways of understanding the of a functioning state, a coherent federal role of women’s groups, that have developed system, and a market economy. in the past decade. One is the feminist bloc, The process of globalization impacts the which is oriented more on centers outside of processes of change on the local and regional Ukraine. These activists spend a good portion scale. According to Bradshaw, globalization of their time participating in training ex- implies a stretching of social, political, and changes with western countries. Hrycak economic activities across frontiers such that noted that these groups are more appealing events, decisions, and activities in one region to western funders, as they share a concern of the world can impact individuals and over issues of women’s rights in the region. societies elsewhere, as well as an increased 212 interconnectedness which transcends indi- old order. These actions have in turn ham- vidual states. In many ways, the state is no pered the emergence of a new economic longer the key scale of action as the bound- geography. The result is a partially restruc- aries between domestic matters and global tured economic map. There have been many affairs are blurred. In the case of the Russian changes, but most of them have been destruc- Federation and other post-Soviet states, tive—a consequence of collapse. One of the Bradshaw remarked, we see societies that key indicators of whether or not Russia is were previously closed off from global becoming a market economy will be if its influence are now open to all these forces. geography begins to reflect the logic of the Globalization processes have a great market, Bradshaw argued. impact on the progress of economic transfor- It is at the regional level where the mation in the post-Socialist world. The struggle between the old and the new is most “transition economies” have been encouraged obvious, Bradshaw stipulated. According to to open their crisis-ridden economies to Bradshaw, there are regions in Russia which international trade and attract foreign invest- could benefit directly from greater interaction ment. The governments of these states have with international actors without dealing been powerless to combat the changing with Moscow. Globalization could free these fortunes of the global economy. According to regions from overdependence on Moscow. Bradshaw, Russia’s 1998 financial crisis was in In Russia, Bradshaw pointed out, large part caused by the changing sentiments statistics on import/export activity, foreign of international financial markets. Equally, investment, and bilateral and multilateral Russia’s current economic recovery is partly technical assistance programs reveal that driven by high world oil prices. In addition, very few regions have been incorporated into the devaluation of the ruble has actually been the global economy. Moscow is a difficult and beneficial for Russia as import substitution expensive place to operate, so companies revived domestic producers and encouraged developing a Russia policy must get beyond foreign investors to produce locally. Moscow, Bradshaw argued. Patterns of The Russian government faces a foreign investment reflect a strong natural dilemma—as do most transition economies— resource orientation in sparsely populated Bradshaw noted. Opening the economy to regions of Russia such as the north and far global, competitive forces may promise new east. Conversely, statistics on “enterprises wealth while ending state subsidies and with foreign involvement” show a concentra- protective measures as required by the World tion in “gateway” and “hub” regions. In Trade Organization could unleash further addition, Moscow oblast is becoming an destruction upon the Russian economy. obvious solution to the problem of expensive According to Bradshaw, it is unclear Moscow city, Bradshaw pointed out. what role Russia will play in the global To make sense of any one region, one economy. It is necessary to consider the must look at the relationship between relationship between globalization and transition and regional change as well as the economic transformation as well as to look at relationship between globalization and those the relationship between economic transfor- two processes. Regions can use the links mation and regional change. The regional between the global and the local to increase dimension is a key factor explaining why their independence from Moscow—which Russia’s economic transformation has been so will increase dependence on the global troubled, Bradshaw remarked. Russia inher- market. However, Bradshaw argued, that ited economic activity and geography that vulnerability may be preferable to being made some sense in a centrally planned dependent on Moscow. command economy, but which is ill-suited to —by Jodi Koehn the demands of emerging market economies. Consequently, Bradshaw noted, economic Vol. XVIII No. 8 2001 transformation has brought a spatial restruc- Evolution of Center-Periphery Relations turing, as the economic geography of Russia In examining Yeltsin’s and Putin’s has started to reflect the market economy. differing responses to ethnic conflicts along According to Bradshaw, however, the Russia’s periphery, Emil Payin, Director, actions of the central and regional state have Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional slowed down the process of spatial restruc- Studies, INDEM Foundation, Moscow and turing in order to protect the interests of the Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights 213 and Conflict Resolution at the Kennan republics or, more seriously, the collapse of Institute proposed that we might glean a the country entailing the formation of one or deeper understanding of the varying direc- two new countries in the heart of Russia. In tions that Russia has embarked upon in the order to curtail such a collapse, Payin recent past. Payin was joined by Michael advocated a multi-cultural doctrine, wherein Thumann, journalist, Die Ziet, Moscow the leaders would recognize the threat to the Bureau, and Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow country and open representation in the Wilson Center at a 1 December 2000 lecture central government to non-Russians. This at the Kennan Institute. tactic, Payin noted, is unlikely to bode well Connecting Putin to Yeltsin’s late rule with the current leadership. allowed Payin to deconstruct the myths of Payin concluded with murky optimism, Putin as a representative of pragmatic liberal that there is still time to overcome the present reform. Payin responded to the myth that course of Putin’s administration, in the Putin brought order and stabilization to process making way for new political powers relations between Moscow and the regions, of the liberal democratic sense. finding that the second Chechen War particu- In response, Thumann agreed that larly demonstrates a trend towards disinte- Russia’s multi-ethnic character has always been gration. While Yeltsin managed to squelch a fundamental, yet often underestimated, factor growing discontent at the expense of conces- in Russian politics. Using the Sakha region as a sions to the republics, under Putin the case study, Thumann explored Yeltsin’s use of situation has worsened. The pressure Putin concessions to stabilize rebellious republics places on the leaders of the republics revives and contrasted this to Putin’s more aggres- their nationalist separatist strength. sive strategy of centralization. As in any drawn out conflict in occu- Thumann credited Yeltsin with devel- pied territory, the demoralization of the oping a “prudent though economically Russian army and dissatisfaction of the inefficient mode to prevent regions and people is at hand, as both economic and republics from leaving the nation.” Though social losses are being felt. Another conse- critical of Moscow’s motives in launching the quence is that Moscow’s response to two offenses into Chechnya, Thumann Chechnya has exacerbated developing otherwise found that Yeltsin held the Russian Russian policy towards non-Russians. Putin’s Federation together by peaceful means rather strategy is aggressive, contributing to the rise than by war. Yeltsin, for example, granted the of separatist sentiment among the republics. wealthy, yet far from independent, Sakha This strategy fosters the growth of secret region a commitment that “whatever they nationalistic movements, rather than re- wish to give they may give; whatever they sponding directly to Putin’s policies. wish to retain they may.” As the Chechen war drags on, the Using subsidies and tax breaks to rebels cease to fear the army, and the per- accommodate the regions most inclined to ceived weakness may inspire other nationali- protest, argued Thumann, the central ties to accelerate the breakup of Russia. These government managed to diffuse a crisis strategies can lead to solidarity amongst all before it could spread. This policy of ap- offended nationalities, threatening the notion peasement inhibited the formation of a of a unified Russia. If the Russian Federation national ideology against which separatist had allowed Chechnya to succeed, Payin movements could have rallied. stated, it might have prevented the ensuing In contrast to Yeltsin’s strategy of “domino effect.” Instead, solidarity has concessions, Putin has embarked upon the formed among non-Russian nationalists reverse strategy, naming Russia as a great along religious and cultural lines. The power to strengthen support from the people potential for such uprisings increases as the for his reform policy. Thumann stated that population changes along ethnic lines. many Russians were receptive to this policy Russians are becoming the minority group, after the 1998 crisis, as centralization enhances particularly in much of the North Caucuses. efficiency. Thumann credited the inception of It is estimated that Russians could become this plan to Yeltsin’s second term. Thus far, minorities in the biggest republics of the Putin has reduced the role of the Federal Povolzh region, Siberia and in the Far East. Council and eliminated the regions’ leaders Possible outcomes of the situation, from this council while adopting Yeltsin’s noted Payin, are secession along the border abandoned plan to divide Russia into districts 214 with individual presidential representatives. cooperation and political concession the U.S. With the established policy of concession- One of the themes emerging from the recent making, Putin may find resistance as he Putin policies is that cooperation, debt relief, moves towards centralization. and further resources from Western countries Thumann concluded by pointing to and institutions, like the IMF, are desirable, Putin’s predicament of addressing the restruc- but not necessary. turing of the state as a whole, for doing so Putin’s assessment of national security ignores ethnic identities. Instead, he found interests is markedly different from Yeltsin’s. that discussions must be considered in terms Wallander identified two reasons for this of ethnicity in order to conceive of a broad difference. First, the composition of Putin’s sense of accurate citizenship. Should Putin’s domestic, political, and economic coalition is centralization efforts fail, substantial conces- unlike that of Yeltsin’s, and, secondly, Putin is sions to the republics will become inevitable. dealing with an economy driven by rising —by Lauren Crabtree energy prices. Putin is now in a position to defy the oligarches’ control over the country. Vol. XVIII No. 9 2001 The strength of the economy lies in capitaliz- National Security and Foreign Policy ing on advanced technologies and exporting under Putin competitive sectors of the defense industries. Russian foreign policy under Vladimir These interests are determined by Russia’s Putin has undergone a substantial evolution, national and foreign policy, a factor, remarked Celeste Wallander at a 27 Novem- Wallander argued, that the West often over- ber 2000 lecture at the Kennan Institute. looks in criticizing Russia’s international role. Wallander, Senior Fellow, European Studies, Putin’s overall objective, Wallander Council on Foreign Affairs, addressed both suggested, is to create conditions for the the differing style and substance of the potential success of the market economy, and Yeltsin and the Putin administration’s to further the success of industries on the approaches to the world outside of Russia. international horizon. While Yeltsin concen- Downplaying changes in style, Wallander trated his efforts on achieving low inflation found Putin a reasonable policymaker, whose and international credit-worthiness, Wallander goal is to bolster Russia’s status as a world reasoned that Putin “is unwilling to sacrifice player rather than simply accept a supplicat- the core economic and political sectors in ing role in international negotiations. order to achieve these broad objectives.” To understand these differences, This stand is a prime indication of Putin’s Wallander began by challenging the criticism strength as a leader, Wallander stated. Putin of Putin as being primarily motivated by refuses to be strong-armed by the U.S. for anti-Americanism. Yeltsin and Putin do not concessions based upon U.S. foreign interests. vary significantly in their primary objects of Wallander called upon the recent example of economic prosperity and international IMF negotiations, in which Russia walked away stability, she argued. Their differences lie in from the unfavorable conditions stipulated by the means they are willing to deploy in order the U.S., and referred to the Russian denounce- to achieve such stability. Wallander sees ment of the “unreasonable” compromise Putin’s policies as practical approaches to programs. “By declaring [U.S. terms] desirable, position Russian national security interests. but not essential, [Russian leadership] has Yeltsin believed it best to approach the removed the single most important lever of West “as subordinate, if necessary, because influence that the West, and the United States in [Russia] was a weak supplicant ready to particular, had and wielded over Russian trade cooperation in political and military foreign and security policy in the 1990s.” affairs for economic support and assistance,” Russia’s alternative is to diversify its stated Wallander. In characterizing his position, reaching out to countries such as relations with neighboring and weaker states, China, India, Libya, and Iraq. In addition, Wallander found Yeltsin’s approach to be trade with these countries has the added forceful, attempting “to bully and assert appeal of coinciding with the current Russia’s rightful place as a country more leadership’s own domestic priorities, such as powerful than the others.” military modernization and support for As Putin defines his role on the interna- defense industries. tional front, Russia veers away from a In changing the means by which perceived tradeoff between economic economic prosperity is reached, Putin has 215 begun to take advantage of Russia’s geopo- symbolism of “money” inherited negative litical location, seeking a multi-polar world in connotations during the Soviet period. which Russia is a great Eurasian power. This Within the ideology of socialism, the desire strategy is not a primary goal, as in the days for money and endeavors to generate it was of Primakov, argued Wallander, for it seeks seen as a sin of the capitalist enemy. Owning mutual benefits for a variety of countries. dollars was a criminal offense in Soviet times, Cooperation with the U.S., therefore, is and dollars still bear this sort of underworld not necessary for Putin to achieve his long- association, Paxson argued. term goals. Rather than responding to anti- Paxson stated that another reason for American motivations, as he has been the negative connotation of money is deeper accused, Putin is attempting a realistic and has to do with certain fundamental assessment of the domestic, political, and principles of exchange. Money is used in economic state. Instead, Wallander found the exchange where debts are precisely calcu- U.S. has viewed Putin’s foreign policy to date lated and promptly erased. Money is com- as motivated by anti-anti-Americanism, a fortable where debt and the social connec- position which reflects U.S. slow-footedness tions it implies are uncomfortable. However, to adapt to the new international stage. within the village, there are intricate webs of In conclusion, Wallander advocated social connection. Money can quantify debt that the U.S. “selectively focus [its] interests and erase social connection, which is appro- into areas where Russian interests really do priate if there is social distance between the conflict” with U.S. policy, and encouraged the traders. The closer the relationship between U.S. to “welcome Russia’s foreign policy people, the more uncomfortable and socially diversification where it is in keeping with inappropriate the use of money becomes. [U.S.] interests, such as in accelerating Russia’s Exchange of goods and services is something integration and cooperation in Europe, and to that is done with categories of svoi—one’s seek to address its causes where it is not, such own people. Money is more appropriate to as in the economic profit incentives fueling dealings with chuzhie (outsiders). Russian-Iranian, Russian-Chinese and The preferred system of exchange is an Russian-Indian arms sales.” If the U.S. instead informal one, where accounts are kept, but chooses to adapt to the new arena, and focus where there is a principle of returning more on economic cooperation and profit, it stands than what you received. In this system, in a much better position to profit from Putin’s Paxson remarked, villagers are connected by approach to Russian foreign policy. the dynamic of debts they owe each other. —by Lauren Crabtree According to Paxson, such exchange is viewed as a positive feature of social life. For Vol. XVIII No. 10 2001 example, when there is social distance Social Organization and Exchange between families, exchange is avoided. in Rural Russia Furthermore, when outsiders are involved, Russian villagers operate primarily the social distance makes monetarized outside the market economy, making the exchange more accepted. Russian village the safest place in the country For these reasons, there is a reluctance in for economic survival, remarked Margaret the village to formalize economic exchange with Paxson at a 29 January 2001 lecture at the money. When villagers occasionally sell each Kennan Institute. Paxson, a Title VIII- other produce, they are careful to name prices. Sponsored Research Scholar at the Kennan Conversely, in terms of one’s reputation and Institute, continued to say that villagers are status in the village, it is absolutely necessary to able to either grow or obtain much of what is reimburse people for their services. needed for survival. This lack of dependency Exchange is closely kept track of. An on the market, Paxson stated, reinforces the outsider to the village first sees countless self-sufficiency of the village. examples of generosity. According to Paxson, One of the most popular ways of in head-to-head social confrontations, to obtaining what one needs is through ex- “win,” it is necessary to be the one who gives change, which comes in several forms. Goods more. Paxson referred to this as “one and services are often offered in exchange for downsmanship”—by spreading out one’s goods and services. Money is useful, but can surplus one wins status in the community. The be an uncomfortable form of capital, particu- “circle” of exchange groups appears to include larly in certain contexts, Paxson noted. The an aspect of verticality. In short, vertical 216 extremes (of wealth) are avoided in the village Vol. XVIII No. 11 2001 economic system in favor of relative social Russia’s Demographic Crisis “evenness.” Status is won by being an agent of Demographic trends in Russia limit its redistribution, not of individual accumulation. economic potential and social well-being, As time passes, it is clear that accounts remarked Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt are carefully kept in the village, even without Chair in Political Economy, American formalizing them through money, Paxson Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. at a 5 noted. Giving someone a basket of produce February 2001 lecture at the Kennan Insti- does not imply a similar item in return, but it tute. These trends, Eberstadt continued, also does create a debt which must be “paid” limit the potential for improved productivity eventually. The debt is not meant to be and Russia’s ability to have influence on the quantified and then erased, but will instead international stage. continue to encourage future interdepen- Since the end of Communist rule, dence on a local level. Eberstadt noted, Russia has experienced a Furthermore, the unspoken rule that drop in overall population due to a conjunc- one should return more than what was ture of birth decline and mortality increase. received is the hallmark of a broader system Eberstadt argued that barring an unantici- of exchange that encourages economic pated influx of foreign nationals, Russia’s homogeneity in the village community. In population will continue to decline. this system, generosity is good and in terms According to Eberstadt, there is nothing of one’s social status, generosity must be met inherently worrisome in the short-term about with equal or greater generosity. In the a situation in which the number of deaths Russian village, Paxson added, an inequality exceeds the number of births. In Russia today, of means can become a social liability. fertility levels are extremely low: less than 1.2 What does this system say about the births per woman per lifetime, if current prospects for reform in rural Russia? Accord- trends continued indefinitely. Yet it is not the ing to Paxson, there are two main issues. low levels of fertility, Eberstadt argued, that First, there is the question of how rural makes for Russia’s demographic crisis. communities interact with non-rural commu- The crisis, Eberstadt stated, is due to nities. As was noted earlier, the closer the the great increase in mortality in Russia over relationship between two parties, the less the past decade—and the prolonged period comfortable exchange involving money of stagnation in life expectancy during the becomes. At the same time, Paxson noted, the late Soviet era. Over the past forty years, closer the relationship, the deeper the Eberstadt remarked, the Russian Federation interdependence. When considering rural has suffered a retrogression in health levels reform, this is a problem since villagers that is unprecedented for any urbanized should more actively engage with the literate society during times of peace. market. Exchanges do occur involving Certain industrialized countries—such money, but the question becomes how to as Japan and West Germany—have experi- continue to exchange through their comfort- enced sharp declines in life expectancy, only able “barter” system, Paxson argued. to have health levels quickly restored and Second, Paxson stated, in rural Russia, economic progress revitalized by those health there is a dynamic of social interaction in improvements, Eberstadt stated. Yet those which an individual gains status from their very cases highlight the differences in Russia, generosity and risks various forms of social Eberstadt argued. In Japan and Germany, “danger” by private acts of accumulation. reversals in life expectancy were a result of This does not mean, however, that villagers war. When the war ended, prosperity will never accumulate wealth or lord it over returned and health levels rebounded. In one another, but that there is an unspoken, Russia today, there is no war to end. More- powerful mechanism for eliminating the over, the maladies and afflictions ex- extremes of wealth. Paxson concluded that perienced by the Russian population are this is part of an overall dynamic which tries inherently more difficult to deal with than to maintain a certain level of group cohesion. the earlier health problems of other Western This dynamic, Paxson argued, can discourage countries subject to mortality crisis. the development of rural capitalism in its To illustrate this point, Eberstadt gave most extreme forms. the example of Japan in the early 1950s, in —by Jodi Koehn which the mortality level was slightly higher 217 than Russia’s mortality level in the mid-1990s. to health constraints, registers positive growth, The causes of death, however, were quite but grows more slowly than other regions of different. In Japan, respiratory diseases and the world. Over the next twenty-five years, tuberculosis killed a larger proportion of the Russia’s working age population will almost population than is the case in Russia today. surely decline, Eberstadt stated. That decrease, Those diseases responded to relatively combined with the implications of constrained inexpensive public health measures that could per capita worker productivity, suggests the suppress infectious communicable mortality. possibility that the Russian Federation’s In Russia today, Eberstadt noted, the ranking among world economies might drop greatest killer of men and women is cardiovas- further in the decades ahead. cular deaths, such as heart disease and stroke. Eberstadt concluded that Russia Cardiovascular disease represents the “accumu- currently seems to be in a period of histori- lation of a lifetime of insults”—often having to cally unnatural weakness. The demographic do with behavioral factors. The second greatest trends suggest the possibility that today’s cause of death in Russia is due to injury and weakness for Russia may only foreshadow poisoning—many of which are alcohol-related. continued relative decline. According to Eberstadt, there is a great —by Jodi Koehn deal of “negative momentum” in Russian health patterns. To judge by mortality levels, Vol. XVIII No. 12 2001 contemporary adult Russian men and Ukraine’s Regional Politics: women are not as healthy as their parents The Case of GUUAM were a generation ago. From the beginning of Ukraine’s indepen- Eberstadt offered a further comparison dence, it was obvious that Ukraine is a me- with Japan—which, despite disastrous losses dium-sized state whose foreign policy interests in World War II, currently has the healthiest are largely that of a regional nature, remarked population in the world. According to Oleksandr Pavliuk, Kolasky Exchange Fellow, Eberstadt, each successive birth cohort in Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies; contemporary Japan has had a dramatically Visiting Scholar, Centre for Russian and East lower death rate than birth cohorts 5–10 European Studies, University of Toronto; years earlier would have had at the same age. Director, Kyiv Centre of the EastWest Institute; In contrast, in Russia, for people in their late and Advisory Council Member, Kennan 20’s, the highest death rates experienced are Institute, at a Kennan Institute lecture on 12 for the generation that is now in their late February 2001. Nowhere are those interests 20’s; for people in their late 30’s, the highest more important or more challenging than with death rates in the recent past are for people GUUAM, the regional constellation of five who are now in their late 30’s. What this countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, means, Eberstadt elaborated, is that it will Azerbaijan, and Moldova) formed in 1997 to take a great improvement of the existing explore mutual goals and needs in the post- “health stock” in the Russian Federation to Soviet space. simply re-attain their parents’ level of health. According to Pavliuk, prior to The health situation in Russia is a GUUAM, Ukraine’s regional ambition human tragedy, but there are economic centered mostly on the development of closer implications as well. Eberstadt argued that in ties with the countries of Central and Eastern the 21st century, the wealth of a nation lies Europe, and to positioning Ukraine in primarily in its human resources. When Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, due to the human resources are degraded, the economic difficulties of Ukraine’s domestic transforma- potential of the country is constrained. tion, not to mention Ukraine’s cultural and According to Eberstadt, there is a strong psychological characteristics that differ correlation between a country’s level of health dramatically from many other states in this and its productivity—wealth brings health region (i.e., Poland and the Czech Republic), and vice versa. On the international level, Ukraine has so far failed to become an Eberstadt added, there is a strong correlation integral part of Central Europe. between life expectancy and per capita GNP. Later on, in 1997, the southern or Black Russia is not destined to continuing Sea dimension was added to Ukraine’s priori- economic decline, Eberstadt observed. Yet ties in regional politics. Ukraine’s strategic Russia may suffer relative economic decline in interests in the Black Sea region stemmed from the decades ahead, if its economy, due partly this region’s geographic location, its 218 geostrategic importance, its economic and energy transportation, notably the location of trade potential, as well as from the vital need an oil pipeline, that is likely to be a major to get access to the Caspian Sea’s energy determinant of GUUAM’s future. This is the resources to diversify its energy supplies. issue that could either enhance or decrease the This new dimension of Ukraine’s commonality of interests of GUUAM members. regional politics, Pavliuk underscored, was Another important question is to what manifested in the country’s leading role in extent Ukraine is able and would stay the creation and development of GUAM committed to GUUAM cooperation. At initially, and then GUUAM, with the addition present GUUAM becomes a barometer of of Uzbekistan. Ukraine’s interest in GUUAM Ukraine’s further development and a kind of was twofold: first, for Ukraine, especially in barometer of Ukraine’s foreign policy in 1997–98, GUUAM became a kind of impor- process. Given Ukraine’s current domestic tant political means of asserting itself as a situation and its international standing and regional leader, something that Ukraine image, GUUAM remains perhaps the only failed to achieve in Central and Eastern foreign policy area where Ukraine can stay Europe. In fact, since independence, Ukraine proactive, display initiative, and ultimately has played a critical role in sustaining play an international role corresponding to geopolitical pluralism in the post-Soviet the country’s potential. space, leading a group of counties that Pavliuk concluded by pointing to the objected to the transformation of the CIS need for support by the West of GUUAM, from a loose grouping to a supranational and and in particular by the new U.S. administra- closely integrated military alliance. tion. Only last year did the U.S. government Secondly, and over time, increasingly start to show more attention to GUUAM, important for Ukraine, GUUAM was seen as recognizing that it (GUUAM) has already an institution that could become an instru- contributed, and potentially can contribute, ment to deepen economic and energy both to strengthening each of GUUAM’s cooperation, with priority given to gaining members internally and to bolstering re- access to Caspian oil and gas. Heavily gional security and stability in a region dependent on energy supplies from Russia, stretching from Central Europe, with Ukraine Ukraine put great hopes on being chosen as a and Moldova, to Central Asia, with transit country for the export of Caspian oil Uzbekistan. From this point of view, the to Europe, Pavliuk noted. support of the west and of the U.S. towards Unfortunately, over the past two years GUUAM would affect not only the fate of Kyiv’s capacities to help GUUAM withstand GUUAM, but also would help define the Russian pressure have decreased. Ukraine’s direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy and, in persistent economic difficulties as well as its the widest sense, Ukraine’s development. political weakness and vulnerability to —by William Gleason Russian pressure have all affected Kyiv’s ability and maybe its willingness to play its Vol. XVIII No. 13 2001 political role, Pavliuk said. A Pollster’s Perspective on the These challenges led to discussions Putin Phenomenon within and among member states about “Different social strata see Russian GUUAM’s priorities and its future develop- President Vladimir Putin differently,” ment. Should it develop primarily into an declared Aleksandr Oslon, Director, Public energy-economic grouping or remain a Opinion Foundation, Moscow, at a 9 March framework for political cooperation and 2001 lecture at the Kennan Institute, “but all consultation? Should it be institutionalized or strata see him as addressing their concerns. remain a loose consultative framework? Young people see him as healthy and Should it reach out to new members or focus vigorous, and as providing an environment on internal strengthening, Pavliuk asked. in which they can achieve. The elderly and ill Pavliuk argued that it is necessary and see him as a guarantor of social benefits. important that GUUAM retains its regional Workers and professionals see him as a political and security dimension. At the same guarantor of stability. All these strata see in time, the value and importance of foreign Putin, if not a guarantee, at least a hope that policy coordination might decline over time if they will be provided with what they need.” GUUAM fails to compliment this cooperation Faith in Putin as a leader has tracked consis- with the practical energy component. It is tently over 60 percent in polls, Oslon noted. 219 Oslon’s Public Opinion Foundation, an Putin sustained his rising popularity independent, non-profit research organiza- with concrete policy actions. As prime tion in operation since 1992, has branches in minister, Putin addressed the issue perceived almost all territories of the Russian Federa- by the Russian people as the most important tion. The main source of funding is the problem facing Russia—the non-payment of presidential administration, which is supple- pensions by the government. According to mented by subscriptions from media outlets, polling data from 1996 onwards as many as major organizations, and business. The 50 percent of pensioners had not received Public Opinion Foundation chooses the payments on time. The government cleared topics of its polls independently and pub- the backlog in 1997, but only as a one-time lishes the results of these polls free of charge solution by borrowing money and by fall the on its web site (www.fom.ru). In the years the problem returned. This was an example of Foundation has been in operation, the rapid the “virtual politics” that frustrated Russians. rise of Vladimir Putin in the polls has been an The pension arrears were eliminated in unprecedented phenomenon, as has his November 1999, which played a huge role continued high approval rating. insolidifying Putin’s popularity. Not only When Putin was appointed acting have pensions continued to be paid on time, prime minister in the summer of 1999, his Oslon added, but they have also been popularity stood at 1 to 2 percent and increased. Putin’s popularity immediately remained at that level for about six weeks. paid off in political terms. After announcing Putin was not alone in his unpopularity. that he would vote for the newly-created Russian society was exhausted from the Unity party in the December parliamentary tumultuous 1990s and completely disillu- elections, Unity captured the second largest sioned with politicians. Oslon noted that bloc of deputies in the election. when asked in a poll to identify the key Putin has taken other steps after his oligarches in Russian society, people identi- election to confirm the public’s perception of fied prominent politicians such as Anatoly him as a leader who does not engage in Chubais and Boris Nemtsov right along with virtual politics, Oslon stated. He limited the businessmen Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir power of regional governors. He took action Gusinsky. Putin’s appointment as prime to limit the influence of the oligarches over minister coincided with an intense media government. He has pledged judicial and campaign between leading politicians in the land reforms, but has avoided launching run-up to the December parliamentary sweeping initiatives on the scale of the elections. Russians felt that their leaders were economic reforms of the early 1990s. As engaging in “virtual politics” rather than president, he has maintained a constructive governing the nation, according to Oslon. relationship with the Russian Duma. One event changed this dynamic. In At the same time, Oslon added, Putin September 1999 a series of bombs destroyed worked to find issues that resonate with apartment buildings in Moscow and other popular opinion. His decision to reintroduce Russian cities, killing hundreds. “This led to the Soviet anthem and continue to pursue a very rare thing in Russian public life,” unification with Belarus may have elicited noted Oslon, “at the same time, tens of negative opinion from abroad and even from millions of Russians experienced the feeling elites at home, but it reflected the desire of of fear in their own homes. No other event the majority of Russians as documented in in the 1990s approached the effect of these national polls. Putin’s statement that “only a explosions.” Putin, the unknown politician stupid person believes that the Soviet Union with a 2 percent approval rating, reacted can be reconstructed, and only a malicious with swift, unexpected announcements person can object to nostalgia for the Soviet promising action. “Our research,” Oslon Union” captured the public mood, according declared, “shows that the attitude of the to Oslon. Russian public towards Putin changed to One frequent criticism of Putin is that one simple phrase: He is like us.” Putin’s he is not using his immense popularity to popularity started climbing at a rate of decisively address deep-rooted problems or about 5 percent per week, until by the end introduce market institutions in Russia. Such of the year it stood at about 49 percent criticism is unrealistic, argued Oslon: “It is where it remained until his election for naive to think that by signing a decree, the president the following March. president can get results. There are issues out 220 there that will be very difficult to resolve, but ing the war in Chechnya in December no one can guarantee that he will fail.” 1994. —by Joseph Dresen Another strand of this strategy was the development of “slush funds” for Yeltsin. He Vol. XVIII No. 14 2001 gave tax breaks to favored organizations on Market Bolshevism against Democracy the understanding they would support him Yeltsin’s desire to remain in power at politically and financially in return. Also, any cost after the events of 1993 compro- Yeltsin’s second volume of memoirs—financed mised the growth of a successful democracy by Boris Berezovsky and his associates—was in post-Soviet Russia, argued Peter used to corrupt him and his family. The three Reddaway, Professor of Political Science and million dollars raised by this group were International Affairs, George Washington placed in one of Yeltsin’s accounts, with the University, and former Director, Kennan monthly interest deposited in a safe in Institute at a 19 March 2001 lecture at the Yeltsin’s office. Though Yeltsin was told that Kennan Institute. Reddaway stated that these deposits were advances, they were in Yeltsin’s method of imposing market reforms fact a bribe, and he was inextricably linked from above required the undermining of thenceforth to the interests of the oligarches. democracy. Reddaway labeled this approach While Reddaway highlighted the of imposing quasi-market institutions on dependency created by these events, he Russia “market bolshevism,” a phrase used acknowledged that some degree of corrup- in the title of his and Dmitri Glinski’s recently tion would have occurred during these years published book, The Tragedy of Russia’s regardless of the personal corruption of Reforms: Market Bolshevism against Democracy. Yeltsin. An interesting consequence of To control the crisis of 1991, Yeltsin and Yeltsin’s dependency was that “Berezovsky’s his advisors advocated shock therapy, freeing corruption of Yeltsin personally did reduce many prices from government control, Yeltsin’s personal power... thus reducing any reducing government spending, courting possible danger of a strongly personal financial backing from western institutions, authoritarianism under Yeltsin.” as well as trying to create the institutional Yeltsin’s focus on preserving his and legal infrastructure to support a market personal power was particularly clear in the economy. Reddaway argued that accomplish- events on March 1996, three months before ing these goals was both culturally and the scheduled date for the presidential politically impossible. elections. While most writers and commenta- Since successive Russian parliaments tors have praised Russia for holding these opposed this economic strategy, Yeltsin had to elections, Reddaway pointed out that it later undermine the very foundation of his demo- became clear that Yeltsin had decided to cratic policy, often ruling by decree. Citing dissolve the parliament and postponed the manipulated elections, plans of 1996 to presidential elections. Yeltsin consulted with dissolve parliament, and his relationship with his relevant colleagues and systematically the oligarches, Reddaway noted that “by 1998, lied to each of them, stating that everyone Yeltsin’s regime and the Russian state had had agreed to the operation. It was only become not just dangerously weak and when the Interior Minister, Anatoly Kulikov, corrupt, but also... financially dependent on consulted them individually that Yeltsin’s Russia’s wealthy elite and also on the West.” trickery was discovered. When confronted, In 1993, Yeltsin both dissolved the Yeltsin refused to back down at first, though parliament and used armed force. It was he did change his mind by the next morning. during the time following these events that These events, stated Reddaway, demon- Yeltsin’s dependency on the oligarches was strate that “Yeltsin had no firm commitment to firmly ensconced in his political operations, his own constitution and the institutions that thereby exacerbating “the loss of legitimacy it purported to legitimate. Faced with the on the part of the state and its institutions.” possibility of losing by far the most powerful Yeltsin’s advisors, Aleksandr Korzhakov in office in the political system, he didn’t hesitate particular, were interested in limiting the to hang onto this office by crudely violating drop in Yeltsin’s popular support, and one of the constitution’s most important embarked on several strategies to regain his provisions.” If not for Kulikov, Reddaway popularity, including an attempt to link noted that Yeltsin may well have succeeded in popular support to nationalism by launch- subverting the political process. 221 A particularly harrowing aspect is that ideology. Soviet leaders from Lenin to Yeltsin was acting in response to pressures Gorbachev spoke of a revolutionary transfor- from the oligarches to postpone the elections mation in the country, although the general and rid the system of the communists. public became increasingly cynical about Following the failure of this tactic, Yeltsin, such phraseology. Anatoly Chubais, and the oligarches, in With the collapse of the Soviet Union and effect, rigged the election by spending leadership of Boris Yeltsin, however, revolu- hundreds of times more than the amount tionary rhetoric disappeared. According to allowable for campaigns. Hanson, Yeltsin—the “quintessential anti- Putin, as Yeltsin’s successor, has the revolutionary revolutionary”— promised a pivotal role of determining whether the return to “normal” life and to Europe, which market bolshevism policy will continue. was viewed in the Soviet Union as the antith- Reddaway sees Putin as a product of the esis of revolution. Such a plan was seen as Yeltsin system, who, “if he does try to change Russia’s natural fate, a return to something that the system... will find himself a prisoner of had once existed but had been derailed by the the system.” Though his style differs, his Soviet experience. This strategy, Hanson strategy is fundamentally a continuation of argued, was likely the only way for the market bolshevism, leaving Russia in the democratic movement in Russia to gain mass lurch until new reform movements emerge. support. —by Lauren Crabtree Hanson stipulated that the problem with such a strategy is that the level of social Vol. XVIII No. 15 2001 transformation needed to attain the goal of The Anti-Revolutionary Revolution liberal capitalism is inconsistent with the in Russia rhetoric of a return to “normal life,” evolu- Is the Russian experience over the last tion, and gradualism. This inconsistency, ten years so different from the great revolu- Hanson stated, led to a disconnect between tions of the past?, asked Stephen Hanson, the aspirations of Yeltsin’s supporters and the Associate Professor, Department of Political reality of fundamental social changes which Science, University of Washington, and would be both costly and disruptive. The former Title VIII-Supported Research Scholar, result was a split between formal ideology Kennan Institute at a 2 April 2001 lecture at and the mass base in the democratic Russian the Kennan Institute. There are many movement, Hanson remarked. definitions of revolution that apply quite Even Yeltsin’s opposition would not use easily to the Russian case, yet Western the terminology of revolution, Hanson noted. analysts have rarely used the concept. It would be logical for Yeltsin’s “inability to The Russian revolution of 1991 and the sustain social support for revolutionary revolutionary decade since have had a transformation under the guise of a return to distinctive feature that sets it apart from normal life” to produce ideologues to lead other revolutions in history, Hanson stated. the revolution in an anti-liberal, anti-demo- This is the first revolution in human history cratic direction. Yet, political figures like to be organized and directed against an Gennady Zyuganov and Vladimir officially revolutionary regime, Hanson Zhirinovski consistently claimed to be argued. According to Hanson, “a revolution upholding tradition or centrism, not revolu- that was organized, directed, and consciously tion. Meanwhile, genuinely revolutionary focused on rejecting a revolutionary regime is fascists and communists found little support. a revolution that cannot speak its own name. According to Hanson, the legacy of a “society The moment that you say ‘this is a revolu- that was forced into revolutionary rhetoric tion,’ you are associating yourself with a and to some degree revolutionary action...has discredited ideology of the past to which actually undercut the social base for revolu- nobody wants to return.” Furthermore, a tionary movements of all types.” revolution that cannot call itself revolution- Vladimir Putin’s strategy of “pragma- ary generates specific problems of legitima- tism and patriotism” continues Yeltsin’s tion, Hanson remarked. approach. The one difference is that Putin According to Hanson, for the Soviet includes “radical liberalism” as another type leadership up until 1991, the term “revolu- of extremism to be avoided. However, such a tion” had positive connotations and was policy makes it difficult for Putin to recruit considered a source of legitimacy in official genuinely committed supporters and estab- 222 lish lasting institutions. Thus, Hanson added, Montana at a 11 April 2001 panel discussion Putin’s policy fails to overcome the uncer- at the Kennan Institute cosponsored by the tainty and unprincipled politics that have Wilson Center’s Asia Program. The panel also plagued Russia since 1991. included Aleksei Voskressenski, Professor The irony is that the attempt to create and Head, Department of Asian Studies, legitimacy without the rhetoric of revolution- MGIMO-University, Moscow, and former ary ideology has sustained uncertainty longer Regional Exchange Scholar, Kennan Institute; than was seen in previous revolutionary Jeanne Wilson, Associate Professor, Depart- periods. Revolutions usually end within a ment of Political Science, Wheaton College; decade with the decisive establishment of an and discussant Alexander Lukin, Visiting alternative ideological regime, Hanson stated. Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Russia is attempting to live with the Studies (CNAPS), Foreign Policy Studies, legacy of its revolution but lacks a clear focus Brookings Institution. Rather than a relic of or national identity. However, Hanson noted, the cold war, the panel agreed, the strength- the current regime cannot be easily over- ening relationship between China and Russia thrown because any figures with the desire to is driven by a complex set of shared interests do so are immediately discredited by Russian and different priorities. public opinion. Most Russians do not want to China and Russia share a mutual return to any type of extremism. Unfortu- interest in a stable border. By the late 1990s, nately, Hanson added, even liberalism is now Moscow and Beijing had resolved a long- associated with revolution. standing border conflict that had once According to Hanson, the possibility threatened to engulf the Soviet Union and that the current non-ideological regime might China in outright war. Both Russia and China sustain itself for several more years is are also interested in limiting U.S. influence potentially a positive thing. Without a in Central Asia, as well as maintaining revolutionary figure taking charge, Russia political stability in these new states. can avoid the revolutionary outcomes of the The economic forces unleashed by past that were most disturbing for world globalization also work to reinforce this stability and democracy. cooperative relationship, according to American politicians, Hanson con- Voskressenski. While benefiting from cluded, should therefore strive to take a long- international trade, Russia and China are also term perspective. Russia might end up with concerned about lagging behind Western an authoritarian regime, Hanson argued, but nations more fully integrated into the global if so its lack of ideology and loyal supporters economy. Both nations seek to mitigate the would limit its ability to sustain itself. The negative consequences for globalization by best case is one in which Putin does not promoting increased cross-border trade. China fundamentally establish an authoritarian benefits from increased access to Russian regime that the West cannot tolerate. If this energy supplies and Russia benefits through happens, Hanson stated, it makes sense to greater integration of the Russian Far East into think about a long-term process of transfor- the Pacific economy. Another aspect of the mation in which “the fact that ideology is economic relationship between Russia and gone represents an opportunity for global China is one that strongly concerns the United compromise and the spread of liberal States—Russian arms sales to China. Wilson democratic institutions.” noted that 70 percent of Russia’s arms sales —by Jodi Koehn went to China in 2000. For Russia, these sales represent a very important source of export Vol. XVIII No. 16 2001 earnings that also keep several enterprises in The Prospects for a Sino-Russian Russia’s defense industry afloat. China, in Strategic Partnership turn, relies on Russia for sophisticated arms “The idea of a Russian-Chinese strategic and military technology, as it is cut off from partnership that Russian President Boris arms sales from the West. Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin It is international politics, however, that first proclaimed five years ago, in April 1996, throws Russia and China together with the evokes memories of the Sino-Soviet alliance of greatest urgency and public fanfare. Both half a century ago, but it is actually nothing of Moscow and Beijing view with alarm the the sort,” stated Steven Levine, Mansfield economic, political, and military dominance Professor of Asia Pacific Studies, University of of the United States in global affairs. In their 223 eyes, Lukin stated, they are defending an military alliance and will be based upon international order rooted in the United independently derived assessments of their Nations, where each holds veto power in the convergent mutual interests. A strong rela- Security Council, from a United States bent tionship between these states is a positive on changing that order to its own advantage. trend, as it promotes stability in the region NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia over Kosovo and economic development. An element of was particularly important in convincing that relationship will be to challenge the Moscow and Beijing of the need to strengthen United States, but that challenge will be security ties. Both China and Russia are mitigated by each nation’s interest in main- multinational countries, Lukin noted, and taining positive relations with the United they wonder why the U.S. felt it could bomb States. Yugoslavia and not China and Russia, or —by Joseph Dresen even Turkey, for the same crime. If the United States provides China and Vol. XVIII No. 17 2001 Russia with the strongest reason to unite, it is Contemporary Ukrainian Theater as also the greatest source of contradiction in Baroque Carnival the relationship. Both China and Russia view The experience of Ukrainian theater is their own bilateral relations with the United one of trying to balance classical heritage and States as more important than their develop- a tragic history with innovation, according to ing strategic partnership, the panelists Pavlo Bosy, Producer, Little Globe Theater, agreed. Each also suspects the other of being Kirovohrad, and OSI Research Fellow, New willing to cut separate deals over vital School University, New York. Speaking at a security matters. Russia values China’s Kennan Institute lecture on 1 May 2001, Bosy cooperation in voicing opposition to U.S. explained that theater is important for hegemony, but it knows that China would understanding Ukrainian culture because it is not endanger its economic ties with the West “that kind of art which is the most alive, over another round of NATO expansion. metaphoric and capable of reacting to life Bilateral trade between Russia and China issues.” Theater, he declared is a “model of may have reached a record $8 billion in 2000, society.” but this figure is only 1.7 percent of China’s In the 19th century, Ukrainian theater trade volume and is dwarfed by China’s $75 developed in three centers—Poltava, Lviv, billion trade with the United States. China, and what is now Kirovohrad. The main on the other hand, is very concerned over any genres, according to Bosy, were comedy, form of missile defense, given its limited tragedy, operetta, and musical drama. The nuclear deterrent and its desire to intimidate musical drama, which he portrayed as a Taiwan with missiles based across the strait. Ukrainian invention, helped to make theater China suspects that Russia may be willing to accessible to the lower class, but had stag- cut a deal with the West on missile defense nated by the 1920s and was no longer that would negate China’s deterrent without considered an art form. damaging Russia’s. Further experiments in theatrical art in Another challenge in the relationship is Ukraine came to a halt under Stalin. During the reversal in relative power since the cold the 1920s and 30s, Soviet power brutally war. This change is evident in the demo- repressed all forms of artistic expression that graphic situation developing in the Russian was not in line with political preferences Far East. Sparsely populated to begin with, from Moscow. Ukrainian actors and play- the Russian population of the region is in wrights were arrested and frequently decline. Over the border lies China, with the executed. world’s largest population and memories of By the 1940s and 50s, theater as an art territories annexed by the Russian Empire form had become completely unified and through a series of unequal treaties. If the identical throughout the Soviet Union. security relationship between Russia and Special regulations dictated that every new China is to endure as more than a reaction to theater should be built on the model of the United States, they will need to come to Moscow theaters. Actors were to be trained terms with the shift in power and manage in the Stanislavsky method, and the reperto- such vexing issues as the Russian Far East. ries of new and classical material were In short, the panelists agreed, the Sino- restricted. Musical dramas were favored, as Russian relationship will fall far short of a they were simple and easily regulated. 224 Theatrical productions became limited to different regional approaches to this task. For classical productions that were technically example, he explained that, by staging perfect, but stagnant. The only forum for productions in English, the theater company innovation at that time was in stage design, that he heads in a provincial Ukrainian city is and that form of artistic expression grew to able to present more explicit and absurdist be very important for Ukrainian theater, material than would be possible in Ukrainian declared Bosy. or Russian. Fusing stylistic, cultural, and During the 1970s, theatrical experi- linguistic traditions is a challenge that the ments became more permissible in the artists in Ukrainian theater are ready to meet, provincial capitals of the Soviet republics. according to Bosy: “One of the translations of Playwrights from the provinces explored Ukraine is borderland—something between new issues for theater, and were eventually two worlds. It is like this for theater life as accepted on the stages of Moscow. In time, well.” Moscow grew thirsty for material from the Theater companies, regardless of their provinces. “The forced artistic unity of individual style or strategy, are an important previous decades had vanished,” argued element in the rebirth of Ukrainian culture. Bosy, “Some theatrical centers became “Culture and art play an important regula- optimistic, while others, such as in Armenia tive role in industrialized urban society,” or Lithuania, became openly tragic.” Bosy argued, “They help to adapt and The 1980s and, especially, 1990s integrate values of a multi-ethnic society.” witnessed additional political liberalization. —by Joseph Dresen Directors, who in the past were forced to express their views in the symbolism of Vol. XVIII No. 18 2001 fables and parables, became freer to say what Caspian Energy: Issues and Prospects they wanted, but discovered that they had “The United States needs to support the difficulty finding what to say with the independence of the Caspian states not only erosion and disappearance of Soviet control. as a moral priority, but because their vulner- In response, Ukrainian directors turned to ability will undermine our own security and post-modern expression, and innovation was energy interests.” stated Jan Kalicki, Public expressed in form rather than content. Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center “The result,” stated Bosy, “was a at a Kennan Institute lecture on 14 May 2001. baroque carnival in Ukrainian theater.” A central element to ensuring the continued Directors and playwrights started to reach independence and stability of the Caspian back to draw upon images and themes from states is the development of an east-west history in order to reinterpret them and place transportation infrastructure that would new forms on history. In this way, old classics provide a route for Caspian energy to the and theatrical clichés were reinterpreted in world market independent from Russia and absurdist approaches, with an emphasis on Iran. improvisation. For example, one production The Caspian region is situated on the of Chekhov’s Three Sisters was staged during crossroads between Western Europe, East World War II, with a KGB official playing the Asia, and the Middle East. The region holds villain and accompanied by Elvis Presley gas and oil reserves that will become as music. Bosy described how another produc- important as the North Sea in assuring the tion staged a Chekhov play as if they were future energy security of the West. Kalicki British actors with no knowledge of Russian argued that it is vital to U.S. interests to life—for example, serving vodka from a promote the unfettered development and samovar. Yet another company staged the transportation to market of Caspian energy Eagles’ pop song “Hotel California” as a play. supplies. Doing so would not only promote Bosy also described one director’s technique the independence of the Caspian states, but of having actors trade roles mid-way through also decrease the potential for the region to a play, and how another director became part become a bridge to the flow of weapons of of the performance by joining his actors on mass destruction, terrorists, and narcotics. stage with a video camera. Kalicki, former NIS Ombudsman in the In addition to a complicated historical Clinton administration, argued that to defend and stylistic legacy, Ukrainian theater must these interests, disengagement from the also operate in a nation divided by ethnicity region is not a serious option for the United and language. Bosy noted that there are States. Yet under President Bush, the position 225 of Caspian Coordinator has been down- cost an estimated $2.4-2.7 billion to construct. graded to that of a senior advisor in the State Politically, it is necessary to maintain a Department, while the corresponding official framework conducive to the commercial in Russia holds the rank of Deputy Foreign development of the BTC. Minister and is a former Minister of Energy. If the strategy is to succeed, it is U.S. policy under Clinton had been to necessary to prepare against two contingen- advance commercial and foreign policy cies, according to Kalicki. The first contin- interests in the region by involving U.S. gency, cost overruns, can be insured against, businesses, promoting the role of Turkey, for example through a special facility under curtailing the influence of Iran, and counter- the Overseas Private Investment Corporation balancing Russian influence. The centerpiece (OPIC), with deductibles and premiums set of this policy was both support for the in advance to determine the shares to be Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline borne by government and by participating across Russia and the plan for the Baku- businesses. Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline—an east-west The second contingency is the threat pipeline that would bring Caspian energy to that Russia and/or Iran may try to undercut the world market through the Turkish the BTC through subsidized tariffs to ensure Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The BTC that Caspian oil and gas transit through their pipeline would not only establish a route territories rather than through the Caucasus independent of Russia or Iran, it would also and Turkey. To defend against this second help solve the most sensitive problem contingency, Kalicki argued, Turkey should currently facing the transportation of Caspian make clear that any tariff war would have oil, which is Turkish opposition to ever- commensurate commercial consequences increasing oil shipments through the narrow against future energy sales by Russia or Iran 17-mile long Bosporus straits. to the Turkish market. Russia and Iran are actively developing Kalicki concluded by calling for a their own alternatives to the BTC for trans- renewed focus on the region at the govern- porting Caspian energy. Kalicki noted that mental level, as well as a reinvigoration of Russia’s Caspian negotiator, Deputy Foreign private-public sector consultations to achieve Minister Viktor Kaluzhny, has stated that the goal of an east-west transportation while Russia no longer objects to the BTC in infrastructure for Caspian energy. On the principle, it will move to create highly international front, Kalicki recommended favorable tariff conditions to attract Caspian that the U.S. consolidate a consensus with oil to its Transneft system. Iran has also been our Turkish and Caspian partners, and also increasingly active in developing its ability to with our European partners, on the impor- benefit from Caspian energy. “From a tance of an east-west pipeline. Both Russia pipeline to the Turkish border to increased and Iran should be offered incentives not to processing facilities,” declared Kalicki, “from oppose an east-west project, but we should purchasing gas from Turkmenistan to be prepared to go forward without their pursuing oil swaps with Kazakhstan, Iran is approval. Kalicki stressed that the U.S. becoming a player.” Kalicki pointed out that should oppose the transit of Caspian energy European firms are actively investing in through Iran until there is an operating east- Iranian energy projects and Chinese enter- west pipeline. prises are assisting Iran to develop transpor- “While it would be far more preferable tation infrastructure that can be used for to base pipeline development on purely Caspian energy. commercial terms,” declared Kalicki, “I Kalicki argued that it is important for would argue that the strategic importance of our Caspian energy strategy to have strong the east-west energy transportation infra- commercial and political components in structure is large enough to justify consider- developing an east-west transportation ation of political intervention as a final resort infrastructure. Commercially, there must be if this should make the difference for ulti- clear economic incentives to participate in mate success.” building and operating the BTC, which will —by Joseph Dresen

226 F Speakers’ Index Foster, Frances 72 A Foye, Stephen 27 Adalian, Rouben 46 Freedman, Robert 158 Aklaev, Airat 113 Freinkman, Lev 140 Alexseev, Mikhail 191 French, Antony 56 Appel, Hilary 188 Frye, Tim 184 Arel, Dominique 148 Fuerth, Leon 207 Armstrong, John 99 Fursenko, Aleksandr 143 Aslund, Anders 136 Futey, Judge Bohdan 131 Ayvazyan, Sergei 118 G B Gaddy, Clifford 124 Baburkin, Sergei 107, 203 Garcelon, Marc 104 Baker, James A., III 185 Glad, John 183 Balzer, Harley 70, 195 Gleason, Abbott 210 Beissinger, Mark 112 Goldfrank, David 51 Beliaeva, Nina 23 Gorbachev, Mikhail 193 Berliner, Joseph 210 Gore, Vice President Al 102 Blank, Stephen 92 Gozman, Leonid 86 Bocharov, Iurii 160 Grafova, Lydiia 35 Bondar, Nikolai 208 Graziosi, Andrea 91 Bonet, Pilar 8, 106 Greenspan, Alan 141 Bonner, Elena 12 Grushin, Boris 28 Bosy, Pavlo 224 Gustafson, Thane 165 Boxer, Vladimir 86 H Boyko, Vitaliy 132 Haghayeghi, Mehrdad 78 Bradley, Thomas 71 Haltzel, Michael 23 Bradshaw, Michael 212 Hamilton, Ellen 75 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 16, 204 Hanson, Stephen 130, 222 Buckley, Cynthia 83 Harrison, Hope 171 Burke, Justin 151 Hedlund, Stefan 108 Burlatskii, Fedor 5 Henze, Paul 46 C Herspring, Dale 14 Castillo, Gregory 122 Hoffmann, David 68, 137 Charkviani, Gela 47 Holmes, Stephen 180 Christensen, Paul 199 Hough, Jerry 134 Clark, Susan 34 Hrycak, Alexandra 211 Confino, Michael 26 Huber, Robert 142 Curtin, Richard 161 Huskey, Eugene 98 Huttenbach, Henry 51 D I Dawisha, Karen 139 Desai, Padma 76 Isham, Ambassador Heyward 144 Dobbs, Michael 61 Iskenderov, Akhmed 84 Drobizheva, Leokadia 113, 202 Ivnitskii, Nikolai 155 Dubovik, Vladimir 150 J Dust, Dust Muhammed 48 Jandl, Thomas 168 E Jensen, Donald 170 Eberstadt, Nicholas 217 Johnson, Juliet 119 Emmons, Terence 27 K Evans, Alfred 173 Kalicki, Jan 225

227 Kangas, Roger 111 Pavliuk, Oleksandr 218 Kaufman, Richard 55 Pavlovskii, Gleb 23 Kazantsev, Sergei 123 Paxson, Margaret 216 Kirkow, Peter 149 Payin, Emil 50, 213 Knight, Amy 197 Peterson, D.J. 156 Koroteyeva, Viktoria 113, 202 Polishchuk, Leonid 96 Kramer, Mark 163, 178 Pomar, Mark 66 Kriukov, Valerii 123 Popov, Vladimir 160 Kryshtanovskaya, Olga 117 Popovsky, Mark 18 Kun, Miklos 178 Pravda, Alex 9 Kutovenko, Natal'ia 36 Prusak, Mikhail Mikhailovich 157 Kuzio, Taras 189 R L Radyshevskii, Dmitrii 11 Lavrynovych, Oleksandr 132 Raeff, Marc 66 Leich, Harold 36 Ragsdale, Hugh 103, 163 Levine, Steven 223 Rahr, Alexander 60 Ligachev, Egor Kuz'mich 7 Randall, Linda 192 Lukin, Alexander 223 Ratchenko, Viktor 123 Luria, Jakov 18 Reddaway, Peter 221 Riabchouk, Mykola 88 M Rice, Condoleezza 205 Martynau, Ambassador Syarghei 100 Rodnyansky, Oleksandr 164 Matlock, Ambassador Jack 94 Rollberg, Peter 32 Matsuzato, Kimitaka 116 Rosenblum, Daniel 133 McClennen, Edward 134 Rowney, Don 134 McCulloch, William 67 Rutland, Peter 109, 144 McDaniel, Timothy 136 McDonald, David 147 S Merritt, Martha 187 Safronenko, Olga 125 Mihaychuk, George 21 Satter, David 169 Mikhalev, Vladimir 74 Schwartz, Herman 62 Millar, James 146 Schweitzer, Glenn 177 Miller, Martin 26 Seliverstova, Nina 123 Miller, William 167 Shambezoda, Khusrav 121 Molla-Zade, Jaihun 48 Sharlet, Robert 65 Murphy, David 171 Shelley, Louise 30, 128 Sherman, Karen 196 N Shevtsova, Lilia 87 Naftali, Timothy 143 Shishkin, Sergei 79 Nelson, Lynn 54 Shlapentokh, Vladimir 51 Nitze, Ambassador Paul H. 4 Shmelev, Anatol 172 Nodia, Ghia 22 Shyshkin, Viktor 132 North, Douglass 134 Sigov, Iurii 63 Nove, Alec 43 Simkin, Lev 24 O Smelianskii, Anatolii 39 Olcott, Martha Brill 15 Smith, Gordon 10 Olson, Mancur 134 Smith, Kathleen 129, 179 Orttung, Robert 144 Soghomian, Mardo 19 Oslon, Aleksandr 219 Soldatova, Galina 113 Solnick, Steven 200 P Soyfer, Valery 114 Parthe, Kathleen 52 Stavrakis, Peter J. 31 Pascual, Carlos 152 Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn 154

228 Stretovych, Volodymyr 132 Struyk, Raymond 80 Suleimenov, Olzhas 3 T Tedstrom, John 175 Teeter, Mark 1 Thumann, Michael 214 Titarenko, Larissa 176 Tolz, Vera 55 Travis, Frederick F. 103 Tretyakova-Birman, Albina 161 Tsipko, Alexander 106 Tsygankov, Andrei 59 Tucker, Robert 210 Tuzmukhamedov, Bakhtiyar 64 Twigg, Judyth 209 V Verbitskii, Semen 38 Visson, Lynn 162 Vodichev, Evgenii 70 Voskressenski, Aleksei 223 W Wallander, Celeste 215 Waller, J. Michael 95 Wanner, Catherine 201 Warnecke, Grace Kennan 127 Way, Lucan 183 Weathersby, Kathryn 90 Weiner, Amir 82 Weiner, Douglas 114 Whitlock, Erik 58 Wilson, Andrew 194 Wilson, Jeanne 223 Woll, Josephine 32 Y Yankov, Kirill 44 Yanov, Alexander 42 Yuzefovich, Viktor 39 Z Zabuzhko, Oksana 20 Zevelev, Igor 139

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