Molnar on Frankel, 'Bismarck's Shadow: the Cult of Leadership and the Transformation of the German Right, 1898-1945'

H-German Molnar on Frankel, 'Bismarck's Shadow: The Cult of Leadership and the Transformation of the German Right, 1898-1945'

Review published on Wednesday, February 1, 2006

Richard E. Frankel. Bismarck's Shadow: The Cult of Leadership and the Transformation of the German Right, 1898-1945. Berg: Oxford University Press, 2005. x + 222 pp. $105.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-84520-033-6; $34.95 (paper), ISBN 978-1-84520-034-3.

Reviewed by Christopher Molnar (Department of History, Purdue University)Published on H- German (February, 2006)

The Bismarck Image and the German Right

In Bismarck's Shadow Richard Frankel describes the development of the Bismarck Cult during the Iron Chancellor's life, and then charts the Cult's impact on German politics, especially on the Right, from Bismarck's death in 1898 until the collapse of Hitler's regime in 1945. By focusing on the impact of Bismarck's image, in its many incarnations, instead of the impact of Bismarck himself, the work is written in a similar vein to Ian Kershaw's well-known book,The Hitler Myth (which the author acknowledges in a footnote).[1] Frankel asserts that, because of his instrumental role in Germany's unification, Bismarck became the dominant symbol of the new Empire. After his fall in 1890, Bismarck became an outspoken critic of the government's policies, and was especially critical of Wilhelm II. Bismarck's opposition to some German policies made him a figure that Germans who were opposed to the government could rally around. After his death, the Bismarck Cult continued to grow among the German Right, where numerous parties and individuals, becoming progressively more radicalized, sought to legitimize themselves and their programs by claiming they were the true carriers of the Bismarckian spirit. In five chronologically ordered chapters (plus an introduction and conclusion), Frankel attempts to describe "the relationship between the Bismarck Cult, the crisis of German leadership, and the transformation of the Right from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth" (p. 13). His primary source base is German newspapers and periodicals, which he supplements with Reichstag records, election data, and published speeches.

In chapter 1 Frankel claims that Bismarck rose to the status of a charismatic figure through his achievement of German unification. He became the national symbol of the German Reich, and devotion to the Iron Chancellor became a cornerstone of German national identity (p. 20). The Bismarck legend developed during his years as chancellor, and the primary features of the legend were the power of his individual genius, his martial character, and his leadership in the process of German national integration. Because Bismarck became the symbol of the nation, German nationalism was a statist nationalism that left little room for the more populist, ethnicity-based nationalism that eventually came to dominate the German Right. After his dismissal in 1890, Bismarck retired to his estate in Friedrichsruh, where he carried on his critique of German policies through important connections in the print media. Bismarck's popularity grew during his retirement. Thousands of Germans made pilgrimages to Friedrichsruh to pay homage to him, and Bismarck used this platform to shape his legacy. Out of power, Bismarck became a rallying point for Germans who

In chapter 2 Frankel describes the growth of the Bismarck Cult after Bismarck's death in 1898. In the author's words, "if life made him a hero, death made him a myth" (p. 49). Bismarck's son did not allow his father to be buried with the Hohenzollerns in the Berlin Cathedral, as Wilhelm II had wished, but rather had him buried at Friedrichsruh. A separate, unofficial service at the Kroll Opera House for Bismarck outshined, and challenged, the "official," imperial memorial, and so even in death Bismarck was a symbol of national opposition. Germans began the process of deifying Bismarck: rituals of devotion were developed, the calendar was filled with dates set aside to honor Bismarck, followers built hundreds of Bismarck monuments and developed a "Bismarckian gospel," in which they saw Bismarck as a savior, "sent to lead his people to the holy land of national unity" (p. 58). Bismarck's followers looked for the return of Bismarck, or at least the rise of a strong leader who would strengthen Germany by ruling in Bismarck's spirit. With Bismarck dead, Bismarckians were free to forge an image of him that fit their programs. Many Bismarckians advocated aWeltpolitik , claiming that, even though Bismarck had declared Germany a satiated power, he would support a German Weltpolitik if he were still alive. In 1903, in an address to the Pan-German League, Heinrich Class argued that German leadership was in crisis, and that, in the absence of a strong leader such as Bismarck, the German people must rise up to lead the nation. The two Moroccan crises, theDaily Telegraph Affair, and the discovery of a homosexual group within Wilhelm II's clique strengthened the sense that Germany suffered from a crisis of leadership. Emboldened by the years of crisis, by 1914 radical populist-nationalist parties and organizations had broken into the mainstream of German politics, and much of their legitimacy and inspiration came from their devotion to the Bismarck Cult.

In chapter 3 Frankel examines the radicalization of the Right during the "Crisis Decade" from 1914 until 1923. With the outbreak of war many Germans believed that, in defending the Empire, they were also fighting to protect Bismarck's legacy. Most Germans demanded a victory with annexations, suggesting that, despite his moderation during the wars of unification, Bismarck would want German expansion. The Right found Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's wartime leadership was too weak, and when Hollweg was pushed out of power in July 1917, his replacement by the weak Georg Michaelis angered many on the Right. Later that year Wolfgang Kapp founded the radical "Fatherland Party," which was originally to be called the "Bismarck Party" (p. 97). The party was an attempt at right-wing unity, and signaled the further radicalization of the Right. With defeat and revolution, Bismarck's enemies, led by the Social Democrats (SPD), came into power. The SPD wanted to move beyond Bismarck's authoritarian rule. Most of the Right abhorred the democratic principles of the Weimar Republic, and so whereas the "national opposition" had previously challenged certain leaders and policies, the Right now began to question the very legitimacy of the government. After the revolution new parties and organizations on the Right infused the Bismarck Cult with a militant "spirit of the front," and the failed Kapp and Beer Hall putsches of 1920 and 1923 testify to the Right's fierce opposition to the Weimar Republic.

Frankel devotes chapter 4 to the "Years of Stability," from 1923 to 1929, when it appeared that the Weimar Republic had finally found some solid ground to stand on. Gustav Stresemann, the leader of

Citation: H-Net Reviews. Molnar on Frankel, 'Bismarck's Shadow: The Cult of Leadership and the Transformation of the German Right, 1898-1945'. H-German. 09-30-2014. https://networks.h-net.org/node/35008/reviews/44535/molnar-frankel-bismarcks-shadow-cult-leadership-and-transformation Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 2 H-German the nationalist German People's Party (DVP), was appointed chancellor in 1923. He was initially opposed in principle to the Republic, but by 1923 his views had moderated. He was a follower of the Bismarck Cult, but he had an image of a moderate Bismarck that was at odds with the militaristic, authoritarian image of Bismarck held by most of the Right. Stresemann considered himself a realist, and he attacked the emotionalism of the radical Right. Many on the Right, particularly the German National People's Party (DNVP), rejected Stresemann's moderate image of Bismarck, along with his moderate policies, such as his Erfüllungspolitik , the rapprochement with France with the Treaty of Locarno, and Germany's entry into the League of Nations. During the "years of stability," especially during the Depression, the nationalist Right called ever more vigorously for the emergence of a unified right-wing movement capable of toppling the Republic, and Germans hoped for the coming of a strong Bismarckian leader who would lead Germany back to its former greatness. Although the Right was fragmented, it was bound together by the common image it held of Bismarck as a radical opponent of democracy and advocate of authoritarianism. By the end of the decade the survival of the Republic was in question, and while unity eluded the Right, Frankel suggests that "one could be fairly sure that authoritarianism would reign once again in Germany" (p. 148).

In chapter 5 Frankel examines Hitler and the Nazis' use of the Bismarck Cult during their rise to power, and the subsequent decline of the Cult with the growth of the Hitler Myth. From the early days of the Republic, Hitler consciously linked himself and the Nazi movement to Bismarck as a means of acquiring legitimacy. The similarity between the Bismarckian and Nazi rhetoric, both calling for a powerful, authoritarian leader, contributed to the Nazis' electoral breakthrough in 1930. When Hitler was appointed chancellor in 1933, many Germans believed that, by choosing a strong nationalist leader, Germany had finally gone "back to Bismarck." Academics portrayed German history as a continuity running from Bismarck to Hitler. As Hitler's power grew, the Bismarck Cult began to fade, and by 1938, with the annexation of Austria, the Cult of theFührer had eclipsed the Bismarck Cult.

Bismarck's Shadow is a fascinating study of the development of the Bismarck Cult, and the Cult's role in the radicalization of the Right. It offers new insights into the political culture that made possible Hitler's rise to power.Bismarck's Shadow will find a place in graduate seminars, and its chronological narrative, manageable length, and the fact that it deals with the two most important German leaders of the modern era also make it suitable reading for undergraduates. It is particularly good in conveying the extent to which many Germans regarded Bismarck as a quasi-religious figure. Having practically deified one great leader, it is perhaps more understandable that Germans looked to another strong leader to guide them out of the political and economic crises that dominated the last years of the Weimar Republic. While generally a convincing work, at times Frankel almost seems to bring Bismarck back to life himself: he claims the Bismarck image functioned as a "charismatic placeholder" during the crisis of leadership, that his image served as a powerful leader for the Right at a time when they had no strong leader. In the same connection he calls Bismarck "the leader of the national opposition in Weimar" (p. 195). While it is reasonable to believe that the Bismarck image played an important role in the Right's hostility to the Republic, it is going too far to call him the "leader of the national opposition."

Note

[1]. Ian Kershaw, The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1987).

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Citation: Christopher Molnar. Review of Frankel, Richard E.,Bismarck's Shadow: The Cult of Leadership and the Transformation of the German Right, 1898-1945. H-German, H-Net Reviews. February, 2006. URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=11460

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