Socio-Economic Consequences of Soviet Modernization

JOURNAL OF CRITICAL REVIEWS

ISSN- 2394-5125 VOL 7, ISSUE 13, 2020

UZBEKISTAN IN THE LATE 1980 s AND EARLY 1990 s: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET MODERNIZATION

1RakhmatullaevShavkatjonMuhammadalievich, 2SalimovSherzodYunusovich

1candidate of history, Senior research fellow Of the Institute of history of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan. E-mail: [email protected] 2Doctoral student of the Institute of history of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan. E-mail: sh- [email protected], +998935372706

Received: 22.04.2020 Revised: 24.05.2020 Accepted: 19.06.2020

Summary. The experience of practical implementation of structural changes in the economy and social sphere gradually implemented in modern Uzbekistan shows that the main trends in the development of the previous (Soviet) stage of socio-economic development significantly influenced the development of the strategy of its own model of reforms. The Soviet model of modernization (the so-called conservative model [1]) implemented in Uzbekistan, largely built to please the Russian Center, caused the main contradictions and shortcomings that had accumulated in the Republic by the early 1990s. The proposed article is an attempt to briefly outline the socio-economic problems of Uzbekistan at the turn of the 80-90 - ies of the XX century. It was at this time that the permanent crisis of Soviet society reached its critical point, and the shortcomings of command and administrative management methods were fully revealed at all levels. The arbitrary practice of building a fundamentally new state based on egalitarian principles and utopian ideas, which had no analogues in history, revealed the inability of the Soviet model of development to function effectively at almost all stages of its development. Just as a strategically unjustified leap from one system to a completely different one, experimental (so-called socialism) was carried out, relying on dogmatic beliefs in violation of socio-economic laws developed over thousands of years. At the same time, despite certain achievements in economic development and social development of the population, the country's outskirts, especially Uzbekistan, found themselves in extremely contradictory conditions. By the time Uzbekistan gained state sovereignty, the economy of the Republic had almost lost its ability to overcome acute crisis phenomena in the socio-demographic sphere, including the problems of reducing the standard of living of the population and increasing the level of poverty. This was especially evident in the most problematic region of Uzbekistan-the Ferghana valley. During the study period, socio-economic processes in the Republic, including in the regions of the Ferghana valley, were characterized by inconsistency between the growth of the population, the development of productive forces in General, and in relation to the specific conditions of the region. Ignoring the economic interests of the Republic, damage to the environment, and other economic, political, social, and ideological factors caused the tendency to increase the potential for social tension. Keywords: demography, one-sided development, production, industry, agriculture, socialism, social sphere, Uzbekistan, planned economy.

I.INTRODUCTION The centralized systems of the "planned economy", artificially created and forcibly introduced in the Soviet era, were not worthy of effective activity at most stages of its development. Experiments on the basis of formational coexistence (without negating positive results), that is, the transition from feudalism to socialism without passing the path of capitalist development (jumping from one society to another), ended for thousands of years in the denial of the path and laws of evolution. The experience of the policy of war communism led to the fact that the system of economic behavior, which was solved from year to year, led to the adoption by the Central bodies of unlimited authorities of based methods of non-violent management, under its influence, contradictions accumulated in the national economy and gradually arose crisis situations in a society whose minimum needs were met and socially protected (mainly in the last years of the Soviet Union), was not only devoid of materialism, but also did not realize the deep state of degradation, what was happening in the country's economy. 1698

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In particular, " in the 60s, the conflict in the economy began to manifest itself, the current mechanism of economic behavior began to demonstrate the impossibility of eliminating these contradictions. The pace of economic development has fallen sharply, and spending has increased. The lack of material goods and means became obvious. Economic tools and factors did not work in practice. In the technical development of production and the standard of living of the population began to lag far behind Western countries " [2]. One of the main reasons for this is that during the years of the domination of the socialist economy, a "system of economic protection" for the production of low-quality products was created. It is based on a disproportionate financial policy in the external and internal markets, that is, through administrative measures, unrealistic setting of the exchange rate of the currency, strict setting and holding prices without taking into account the state of the internal market, narrowly bureaucratic interpretation of the monopoly of foreign trade. The above was motivated by the implementation of measures aimed at ensuring that the country's leadership achieves a low level of economic growth, as well as maintaining the external economic balance [3]. At the same time, no matter how much effort was made to organize rational production, the economy, left in the grip of flatness and equal divisions of prints, was deprived of opportunities for self-development. As a result, the country's economy has undergone deep negative changes since the mid-1980s. The leadership of the Union understood that it was necessary to make some changes in order to save the endless spending, inefficient Soviet economy from collapse. Since the second half of the twentieth century, several attempts have been made to reform the economy, in particular, to eliminate voluptuous processes in socio-economic life. However, the fact that the ongoing reforms were incredibly limited, designed for short periods of time and aimed at solving secondary issues, led to a radical improvement in production, creating a stable basis for the relentless growth of its indicators. On the contrary, price action has become one of the most powerful factors that keep the level of monetary issuance on hold, shutting down the economy and prosperity. As a result of the situation that arose in the State price policy, it began to use speculative tools in the sale of industrial goods in the country, especially imported goods to the population. The main goal was to "patch up the holes" that appeared in the State budget. For example, the heads of the Ministry of Finance for such events (especially in the 1970s and 1980s) almost every year from the Council of Ministers for the purchase of consumer goods from abroad allocated 1-1.5 billion rubles. they demanded the allocation of dollars. The establishment of artificial prices for imported goods and their sale on the domestic market at an inflated price amounted to 10-15 billion UAH. rubles of profit in the State budget [4].

II. Results and Discussion For many years the problems that were hidden in all spheres of the economy and has not found its solution, appeared in the opening, major differences between production and consumption manifested in monetary growth of the population and payment of goods, violation of circulation of money and economic relations, as well as rising inflation," in the complete collapse of the economy has led to tremendous growth of the lack of material and financial resources " [5]. This condition can be seen from the following work [6]. Table 1 Indicators Unit of Years measurement

1969 1970 1980 1985 1988 1989 Population funds in the bank mln. rubl. 38,4 46,6 156,6 228,0 306,7 319,8

Wholesale and retail trade and mln. rubl. 42,3 42,3 67,1 98,0 82,1 80,0 industrial goods reserves

Coefficient of commodity coating percent 90,7 90,7 233,2 232,6 361,4 399,4 of money mass

According to Uzbek expert U. Rashidov, the negative economic principles that began in the 1980s exceeded 1985, and the situation in the domestic consumer market was rapidly deteriorating. The market is increasing the issue of monetary units that are not covered financially. For example, in the first half of 1989, the issue was 8.9 billion rubles. by the end of the year, when the volume of the ruble will increase by 2 times, it is expected to increase by 18 billion. reached the ruble. This was 56 percent more than in 1988. The current increase in prices for consumer goods and paid services is 2 percent compared to 1988. Taking into account the growth of unsatisfactory 1699

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ISSN- 2394-5125 VOL 7, ISSUE 13, 2020 demand (hidden inflation), the scale of inflation in the consumer sector reached 7.5 percent. The situation is such that emissions were predicted in advance. For example, in 1990-10 billion rubles was planned to be issued. Naturally, all these processes and assumptions led to growth and eventually to gross inflation[7]. The socialist economic system, following the plan, came up with a "disease" that can show the achieved indicators of the revolution. The gross product index, which occupied the main place in the bun, did not give real information about the actual cost of the product produced. Because in the process of specialization and cooperation, the same raw materials and semi-finished products were repeatedly recorded in financial accounting documents [8]. This is what led to falsification in the calculations for the produced product, in some statistics, the volume of the product was reflected with different figures. In other words, errors in statistical indicators made it difficult to get information about real production. Indeed, the irrational structural policy pursued over several decades, that is, one approach to the development of industry, allows us to understand the situation that arose primarily as a result of the development of heavy industry [9]. The type of economic growth that is based on the inflow of income and funds found in consumer goods industries to heavy industry sectors has led to a decline in the share of light and food industries from year to year. On the other hand, heavy industry, gaining great strength, material and financial capabilities, was unable to provide the industry producing consumer products with modern technical and technological equipment, which led to an increase in the domestic market of low-quality goods, as well as the import of large volumes of goods from abroad. These and other factors also served as the main factors for the beginning of a deep and prolonged crisis in all areas of the Soviet economy in the 1980s (which was accompanied by a sharp decline in production, the appearance of serious discrepancies between production and consumption, the violation of commodity-money relations, and an increase in inflation). In particular, the crisis worsened by the end of the 1980s, and in 1990 the gross national product-2 percent, national income-4 percent, foreign trade-7 percent decreased, as well as the foreign trade balance of 10 billion dollars. The state budget deficit was us $ 58 billion, and the state budget deficit reached us $ 58 billion. it was equal to the ruble [10]. The country's economic development is disproportionate, and diseases in the economic body have not spared Uzbekistan either. One of the approaches to the economy of Uzbekistan, its excessive specialization eventually led to its focus on products. The above-described situations affected the economy of Uzbekistan in one or more of these aspects and exacerbated the stagnation processes on the eve of independence. If we look from the point of view of today, the "fair" division of labor that prevailed in the Soviet era shows that the policy of deploying productive forces was carried out from the very beginning in the form of Imperial relations. As a result, the economy of Uzbekistan developed extremely one-sided, the country's natural resources were looted, and the Republic was preserved as a market for finished products It can be seen that over-specialization of production also has a destructive effect on the structure of the economy. According to calculations, about 80% of the total production in the industrial sectors of Uzbekistan in 1980 was directly related to agriculture (mainly cotton) [11]. This approach has been maintained in the industry of Uzbekistan for many years, without major changes in it. In addition, the stagnation of innovation processes in the established planned economic system has led to the fact that a significant part of the production assets is outdated in most of the country's existing industrial enterprises. This condition is shown in the table below.

Table 2 Depreciation of the main funds of industrial production of Uzbekistan (in percentage terms at the end of the year) [12].

1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Industrial enterprise 30,5 33,8 35,7 36,8 37,2 38,4 39,6 heavy industry 31,4 36,0 38,2 40,5 40,2 41,1 43,1 light industry 27,2 25,4 25,7 26,6 27,5 29,1 28,0 Agro-industry (together with the food 26,6 26,0 27,5 27,4 25,1 28,3 27,7 industry)

The figures shown in the table show that by 1990 almost half of the fixed assets of industrial production were obsolete. If we estimate in civilized countries by the standards of requirements and quality at the end of the XX century, we can assume that this figure will almost double. According to calculations of that period, in the mid- 1980s, more than 900 of the 1.5 thousand industrial enterprises in Uzbekistan needed technical re-equipment and reconstruction [13]. During the subsequent decades of the Soviet period, the priority of developing raw materials industries that produce raw materials and finished products for economic development and are sent abroad, requiring less labor, 1700

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ISSN- 2394-5125 VOL 7, ISSUE 13, 2020 further aggravated the disparity in the national economy of Uzbekistan. In particular, the share of light industry in total production fell from 54 percent to 37 percent in the next 50 years, the share of the food industry from 30 percent to 14 percent, and the share of mechanical engineering increased by only 7 percent to 16 percent [14]. All major types of material and technical production and capital construction were centrally managed and planned, and resources were distributed, which restricted the rights of the republics to solve their internal problems. For example, in the industry of Uzbekistan, 10 percent of production was planned by the Republic, and the remaining 90 percent-by all-Union bodies [15]. On the distribution of products to be produced, with foreign trade, only the Central authorities were involved. Enterprises and organizations in remote areas of the Union were also subordinated to the center, mainly from a departmental point of view. For example, 22 out of 131 large industrial enterprises in the Andijan region were subordinated to the Union, 64 to the Union Republic, and only 45 to Republican departments [16]. There were also a number of shortcomings and shortcomings in the content and development of economic sectors. Includes: - the activities of the national engineering center was limited to the cotton production, cotton picking machines and the necessary equipment for complex household equipment, construction machines, plastic products, food processing equipment, trade and consumer services is almost not made; - the preference of large enterprises in the development of the chemical industry has complicated the environmental situation in the Republic; - large chemical enterprises specialize in the production of primary processed products, such as Nitron, acetate, Caprolactam, and their products are also intended for export mainly from the Republic. The feature of Uzbekistan in the sphere of production is that, on the one hand, it aims at creating a developed heavy industry in the former centre, the creation of the means of production, i.e. manufacture of machinery and equipment, while in the Republic it is directed to the development of mineral resources and agricultural raw materials, for this reason, labor weapons, and machinery are mostly imported from abroad, and the possibility of their updates is not dependent on them. On the other hand, the already established production system was a sign of the weakness of the networks that supply public consumption products. According to 1990 data, the main part of consumer goods that could be grown and prepared in Uzbekistan: 82 percent of grain needed for consumption by the population, 50 percent of potatoes, meat and meat products, and about 60 percent of milk and dairy products were imported from abroad. The share of the country's food products in the impeachment structure was more than 70 percent. Even the inventory in Uzbekistan itself was imported from outside. The following infographic confirms the above. Infographics Balance of consumer (food) goods imported and exiting in the former Union republic ( + , -), 1990 y. mln. on the ruble account(Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Uzbekistan)

This led to the fact that in the early 1990s, Uzbekistan fell to such a level that it could not provide its

population with simple food. As the first President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov noted: "... in the first years of our independence, the supply of grain products to the population of our country, the supply of people with ordinary bread became a big problem. Now, to be honest, it will be, in those difficult days there was not even a risk of starvation... [17]. According to statistical materials published in Soviet times, the standard of living and material security (welfare) of the population of Uzbekistan was significantly lower than in other socio-economic indicators (especially in comparison with the European part of the Union). At this point it is worth noting that despite the fact that the alignment conditions ("flatness") income of the population was not so important, given the characteristics of 1701

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ISSN- 2394-5125 VOL 7, ISSUE 13, 2020 the statistics of the Soviet period and in the conditions of non-public ownership, providing the population with consumer durables was one of the main criteria, comparative data are presented in table 3.

Table 3 The fact that the population is provided with items of long-term use (calculated at the end of the year, PCs) [18] To every 100 families To every 1000 inhabitants

1990 y. 1990 y. Long-term used 1985 y. 1985 y. items Uzbekist Uzbekist USSR USSR Uzbekist an Uzbekist an USSR USSR an an Clock 530 508 565 496 1580 960 1701 907

Radio tools 96 101 96 95 289 188 290 173

TV sets 97 86 107 90 293 159 321 164 Magnitophones 37 33 55 49 110 60 165 89

Cameras 34 23 33 21 102 43 100 38

Refrigerators and 91 80 92 80 275 150 276 150 freezers

Washing machines 70 57 75 67 205 106 226 123

Electric vacuum 31 20 48 29 117 37 143 53 cleaners

Motorcycles and 14 19 20 26 43 34 60 47 motorcycles

Bikes and mopeds 55 100 59 97 165 185 179 168 Sewing machines 65 78 61 76 190 147 179 144

As can be seen from the data given above, when counting the number of families by the end of the Soviet period, the proportion of the population of Uzbekistan was negative, with increased levels of the Union, of almost all durable consumer goods. When calculating the population of each thousand people, the indicators of the middle Union and the middle Republic were completely different, and it was clearly proved that the financial situation of the population of Uzbekistan was low. Analysis of other statistical data also confirms that Uzbekistan is significantly behind in terms of financial status compared to some republics of the USSR. For example, in Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, almost every family refrigerator, Armenia, Estonia, Turkmenistan, Latvia for every 100 families there were 106-112 refrigerators, while in Uzbekistan for every 5 families there was no refrigerator at all [19]. The level of provision of passenger cars in the Union in 1990 was 19 (in the 1980s – 10) per 100 families, and in the 1980s-58 (in the 1980s-30) per 1000 inhabitants [20]. In Uzbekistan, these indicators were 11.9 and 21.9, respectively [21]. Currently, Uzbekistan, with sufficient raw materials and labor resources, is four to five times behind Russia, and 2.5 times behind the Baltic republics in the production of consumer goods per capita [22]. Because the share of finished products in the composition of consumer products produced in the Republic was only 25% [23]. The difficult situation with the material provision of the population was also directly related to the demographic processes taking place in the Republic. At the end of the Soviet period, Uzbekistan fell into the" Malthusian trap " [24]. As a result of high rates of population growth and an increase in the population without an adequate labor force, it has become a factor affecting the well-being of society. In particular, the average birth rate in Uzbekistan in the 19699990's is 34/1000 [25]. This means that the population growth rate is approximately 2.5-3 percent. According to economists, population growth in 1985-1990 would have absorbed 70 percent of the national income of the Republic [26].

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According to world experience, there are several factors that increase the risk of becoming poor. For example, the following factors affect the impoverishment of a household:: 1) children under the age of 16; 2) the presence of unemployed members in the family; 3) living in rural areas; 4) lack of stable income and high share of informal income; 5) slow economic development of the territory (per capita gross regional product (GDP) and its growth rate) [27]. The above factors are clearly visible in the Ferghana valley, the most difficult region of the Republic in terms of demography. Almost 30 per cent of the population of the Republic was concentrated in the valley areas, which occupied only 4 per cent of the total land area of the Republic. As a result, in a region with a relatively small area, the population not only increased, but also increased in density, which had extremely negative forms. Table 4 Population density of Fergana Valley (to 1 km2) [28] 1959 y. 1970 y. 1979 y. 1989 y. 1993 y. 1959/1993 The Republic of Uzbekistan, 18,1 26,3 34,2 44,3 49,6 2,74 times including: Andijan region 183,0 252,1 321,2 409,3 464,6 2,53 times

Namangan region 75,1 107,2 139,2 186,2 215,1 2,86 times

Fergana region 132,3 187,6 238,6 301,7 337,7 2,82 times Fergana valley 119,8 173,4 215,6 299,0 339,1 2,83 times

6,75 6,83 Fergana valley /republic 6,6 times 6,6 times 6,2 times -- times times

The table shows that the specific population density "evolution" both in the context of the Republic and in the context of the valley, the population density of the valley in the context of the Republic is almost seven times higher than this indicator. At the Union level, the Ferghana valley was almost the leader in this indicator. For example, in 1990, Andijan region ranked first in the USSR in terms of population density (1 kv.km.at 427.4 people), Ferghana region-the second (313.6 people), Namangan region – the fifth (197.2 people) [29]. The distortion in the deployment and development of production forces, as well as the indifference of the Union leadership to the social needs of the population of Uzbekistan made the problem of employment urgent. According to some data, the number of unemployed in the Republic in 19899990 was about 1 million people. people, or 14-15 percent of the working population [30]. Even in the city of Tashkent, the excess labor resources amounted to almost 200 thousand people in 1985-86 [31]. Given the socio-demographic nature of the Ferghana valley, it can be assumed that unemployment there is more than 20 percent. According to international experts, this figure did not exceed 5.5 percent in other Union republics [32]. In addition, it is worth noting that the mobility of the indigenous population in the territorial and professional sense was sluggish, the migration rate was 2.5 times lower than that of the Russian population [33]. In this regard, we cannot ignore the fact that Soviet statistics aimed at praising the socialist system hide dogmatic imprints, that is, the real state of Affairs in order to activate the prevailing ideology that there can be no unemployment in socialism. As a result of non-disclosure of existing problems, the employment of the working-age population of the Republic was in a regressive state, the employment rate of the working-age population of the Republic for many years did not exceed 75 percent. However, even official statistics at the time show that conflicting principles have deepened in employment, especially among young people. Table 5 The number of non-working and uneducated young people who are graduates of secondary schools in the daytime (1 December per day, per capita) [34] 1981 y. 1985 y. 1986 y. 1987 y. 1989 y. According to the Republic, as well 3406 4295 8221 8621 28551

Andijan region 224 207 521 598 3174

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Namangan region 199 507 426 405 3983

Fergana region 299 775 1495 1747 4291 Fergana valley 722 1489 2442 2750 11448

Contribution to the level of the Republic, 21,2 34,7 29,7 31,9 40,0 in percentage

As can be seen from the table, over the last 10 years of Soviet rule, the number of unemployed and uneducated young people who were graduates of secondary schools in the daytime has increased from year to year both in the Republic and in the valley as a whole. Statistical calculations carried out on the contribution of the unemployed among school graduates of the Ferghana valley (from 21.2% in 1981 to 40% in 1989) indicate that the problem of employment in the region was extremely complex and was also noticeable in relation to other regions of the Republic. The irrational policy pursued in agriculture-due to the monopoly of cotton, limited the possibilities of growing meat and milk in the Republic, the violation of the scientifically based crop rotation caused land erosion, the possibilities of water resources were reduced, which had a devastating impact on agriculture. In particular, as a result of "financing" the development of the extractive industry in agriculture, only in 1971-1985, Uzbekistan received 1.6 million manats. Additional agricultural land included irrigated land. This accelerated the construction of the Aral sea in Central Asia and led to an environmental crisis. At the same time, no matter how much the Republic's economy depended on cotton, its processing and preparation of finished products from it were monopolized by the center. For example, on the eve of independence, only 4-5 percent of cotton Poppies were processed. That is 4.5-5 million. when growing a ton of cotton, the enterprises of the Republic worked at full capacity and processed only 150 thousand tons of cotton [35]. Cotton loneliness has reduced the area of land where most of it is plowed, and has virtually destroyed the country's agricultural diversity. In some years, more than 90 percent of the area of irrigated land was occupied by cotton, and the share of manual labor in it exceeded 85 percent [36]. In this regard, the regions of the Ferghana valley of the Republic were under great pressure. In the second half of the 1980s, three regions, although small in size, would have produced more than 1/4 of agricultural products, more than 30 percent of cotton pulp, 1/3 of fruit, 27 percent of cotton fiber produced, more than 90 percent of silk fabrics (silk), and 31 percent of footwear production. Narrow specialization in cotton cultivation has led to a reduction in production of other agricultural products. In particular, the share of the Ferghana valley in the total grain yield was 15%, in the crop of melons-11%, in the cultivation of grapes-only 5% [37]. In General, in Soviet times, the position of agriculture in the economy of the Republic was high and always maintained its superiority over other areas. As a result, by the end of the Soviet period, many problems had accumulated in the agricultural sector. The lack of effective use of land resources, excessive expenditures on economic activities and water use, ecstatic management method and the predominance of manual labor, low labor productivity-ultimately led to the fact that the industry lags behind developed countries by 2-3 times [38]. The archaic collective farm system of agricultural production has had a particularly negative impact on animal husbandry. In 1990-1992, the production of meat in the country's farms accelerated-on average, it decreased by 17 percent per year. For example, in the regions of the Ferghana valley, this figure is very different from the average for the Republic-43 percent in the Andijan region, 29 percent in the Ferghana region [39]. The transition to new forms of economic activity at the end of the Soviet period did not change the situation. The paradox of the Soviet way of managing was that it did not adapt to the assimilation and wide dissemination of the high results achieved, it "denied" the occasional high results that it encountered from time to time. For example, as a result of increased productivity in the Namangan region, a special method of "getting rid of excess crop" was used: the harvested cabbage crop was simply kicked out. Or another example: for 4 days before leaving the gate of the conserva plant, 60% of the tomato crop grown as a result of waiting in queues will die [40]. The existing production capacity was insufficient for processing the collected agricultural products. In General, it should be noted that along with the shortcomings observed in the socio-economic processes of Uzbekistan, insufficient consideration of national interests and needs led to an increase in the level of social dissatisfaction, sometimes to conflict characteristics. This is evidenced by the tragic events that occurred in 1989 in the Ferghana region, in 1990 in the districts of Boka, Parkent, Tashkent region and in the city of Andijan. The situation in the Republic required rapid measures to prevent economic degradation, mitigate conflicts in the social sphere and, most importantly, eliminate social conflicts. At the same time, preventive measures aimed at preventing the escalation of unrest in the Republic, maintaining law and order, and ensuring the basic and unfounded needs of the population were simultaneously taken.

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In particular, one of the first steps of the new leadership of the Republic, headed by Karimov, was to resolve the issue of granting farmers 350 thousand hectares of land as farmland (Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the Communist party of Uzbekistan No. 258 of August 15, 1989 "on further development of agriculture"). In this historical document, it was planned to allocate an average of 25 acres of land to each resident of the village and multiply the farmland by the aging population. For example, in 1989-1990, only one Andijan region allocated 198.9 thousand families (despite the limited land area) 17.2 thousand hectares of land. Of these, 8.6 thousand hectares were allocated for the construction of individual housing and 8.6 thousand hectares for personal subsidiary farming (sheh) [42]. In General, in 1989-1990, more than one and a half million families in Uzbekistan received additional land plots, and 700 thousand families were granted new land plots. In addition, hundreds of thousands of hectares of irrigated land were removed from technical plantations, and the plan for growing cotton was reduced to 700 thousand tons. This was the first, but extremely important, practical step towards the elimination of the cotton monopoly. As a result of this socio-economic and political event, there are more than 2 million families in the country, or an average of 10 million partially solved the socio-economic problem of more than one rural population. This socially and economically significant event was legalized as an independent element of the country's economy, which in the crisis years was considered as a type of private production, and provided employment for its employees with socially useful work. This event was also one of the important steps taken to develop the economic base of the Republic, aimed at meeting the basic needs of the population in goods and food. It is known that in different periods of existence in the" Land of Soviets" personal subsidiary farming was considered an addition to the public economy, but it was always administratively limited due to its inexhaustible private-property nature. Although some researchers try to prove that this is a "dying", "transitional" form [43], in practice, personal subsidiary farming was not only a" Supplement", but also a significant contribution to the replenishment of the consumer basket of Soviet-era society. According to calculations in 1988, in the year before the farms were given, these farms in Uzbekistan produced up to 25 percent of the gross product and up to 33 percent of the national income created in agriculture, 50 percent of meat, 64 percent of milk, 44 percent of vegetables, and so on.the example of the valley shows that the land use efficiency of personal subsidiary farms is several times higher than that of collective farms and councils. For example, if in the Andijan region in 1988 from 1 hectare of state land received 2227 rubles of gross product, the product from 1 hectare of land given for farmland was equal to 12095 rubles (5.5 times more efficient) [45]. Indeed, on the eve of independence and in the first years of its existence-in difficult socio-economic realities-these farms became one of the leading sources of replenishment of the food base of the Republic, which, in turn, proved their high role in solving acute social problems. The consequences of unilateral development were evident in the first years of independence, and the position of agriculture, in particular, in the economy of the Republic was preserved. In the early 1990s, a quarter of the country's gross domestic product came from the same sector of the economy, and more than half of the country's production and agricultural potential were interconnected. During this period, 50-60 percent of all currency received by the state was exported from agricultural products. From a social point of view, the majority of the Republic's population (more than 60%) were rural residents, and their standard of living, material and spiritual well-being remained directly linked to this network. At the same time, the problems that have accumulated over the years in this important network economy and are waiting to be solved, required a radical change in government policy in relation to agriculture. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite an example that was recorded in a newspaper published in the early 1990s.it is Noted that in the Netherlands, one farmer was able to grow agricultural products that would reach 80 people. That is, the farmers of this country not only fed the people of their country, but also exported food to many countries in Europe. Uzbekistan produces products for 2-3 people, with more than one farmer working on state and collective farms [46]. Consequently, as in all spheres of the national economy, labor productivity in the agricultural sector of the Republic lags behind. To solve the problem and get out of the crisis, it was necessary to switch and form new economic relations.

III. CONCLUSION Thus, the analysis of economic policy conducted during the Union period did not allow us to effectively organize the economic and social life of society, the domination of a centrally planned economic system. The economic factor played an important role in the failure of the Communist party's experience of building a new society over several decades. As a result, since the 1980's, the worsening socio-economic crisis led to a sharp decline in production, the collapse of all sectors of the economy, the deepening of the symptoms of the crisis and ultimately to a drastic reduction in standard of living of the population, and the aggravation of social contradictions. The decentralized economic system has led to an unfair distribution of resources and investment, that is, on the basis of "Union specialization", which does not take into account the capabilities of remote countries, including Uzbekistan, their orientation of the national economy to the production of raw materials, has caused the accumulation of socio-economic problems from year to year and, ultimately, aggravation. 1705

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In the mid-1980s, political restructuring aimed at finding a way out of the crisis led to the emergence of economic and social contradictions that lay only in the bowels of society. Because the authoritarian system that was defined until the mid-twentieth century, and the consequences of "fast policy" under its influence, as well as the impasse, which began to emerge under the influence of "apologetic Economics" in the period of stagnation, was not able to eliminate evils such as juvena economic relations, protectionism, apathy, immortality, – not changing the status quo.

References: 1. Vishnevsky A. G. The Sickle and the ruble: conservative modernization in the USSR. Moscow, 1998. 2. Karimov I. Uzbekistan: national independence, economy, politics, ideology., Vol. 1. - T., 1996. –P. 279. 3. Latsis O. R Fracture: the Experience of interpretation of unclassified documents. - M., 1990. –p.p.226. 4. Valovoy D. V. Secrets of the Kremlin's Oval hall. - Moscow: "Truth", 1991. –P. 12-13. 5. Karimov I. Uzbekistan: national independence, economy, politics, ideology., Vol. 1. - T., 1996. –p. 280. 6. Rashidov U. On the role of cooperation in the stabilization of the domestic consumer ring / / domestic science in Uzbekistan. - 1990. - № 11. –p. 18. 7. Rashidov U. On the role of cooperation in stabilizing the internal consumer ring ... P. 18. 8. When calculating the gross output of any economic Association of any network of all industries or industries in which there is an indissoluble economic connection with each other, it was possible to avoid the real situation when determining the amount of output produced by them when adding their products. More precisely, aganda causes an increase in these indicators. For example, if the fabric produced was counted as a product of the textile industry, then its further recalculation when calculating the product of the clothing industry was made with wax. This process was also observed at later stages. 9. Since the time of Joseph Stalin in the industry of the USSR, the share of heavy industry has always been dominant. By 1986, the share of Group a (production of means of production) in the total volume of industrial production was 75,3 percent, Group B (production of consumer products) – only 24,7 percent. In the same period in the US, this figure is equal to 53.8 percent and 46.2 percent, respectively. Also, by 1987 year, compared to 1917 year, the products of Group B in the Union grew 103 times, and Group A-705 marotaba. A similar unity is evident in the industrial development of Uzbekistan. Sources: National economy of the USSR for 70 years. Jubilee statistical journal. - M.: "Finance and statistics", 1987. –P. 128.; Economic issue / / 1991, № 8, P. 4 Maslovskiy L. lagging the USSR from the USSR in the 1970-1980-s. / / http://zavtra.ru/blogs/otstavanie-ssha-ot-sssr-v-1970-1980-h-godah 10. The economy of the USSR v 1990 - Moscow, 1991. –p. 3. 11. Ziyadullaev S. K. Economy of the Uzbek SSR in the conditions of re-construction. - T., 1988. –P. 16. 12. National economy of the Uzbek SSR in 1990. Statistical yearbook. - T., 1991. –p. 194. 13. Pravda Vostoka (Truth of the East). - 1986. - Four July. 14. Narinsky K. M., Soliev A. S., Iminov T. K., Mamadaliev T. I. MyAndijan (Andijan region will be dedicated to the 50th anniversary of its establishment). Andijan, 1991. P.46. 15. Ziyadullaev S. K. Forecasting the economic development of Uzbekistan in the transition to a market economy. T., 1993. S. 59. 16. Narinsky K. M., Soliev A. S., Iminov T. K., Mamadaliev T. I. My Andijan (Andijan region will be dedicated to the 50th anniversary of its establishment). Andijan, 1991. P.26. 17. Karimov I. A free and prosperous homeland is the ultimate goal of a free and prosperous life. Vol. 8. - T., 2000. - 171 rate. 18. Rakhmatullaev Sh. Economic transformation processes in Fergana Valley (1991-1996 years). - Tashkent: "Nishonnoshir", 2017. P.19. 19. Gurev V. I. Fundamentals of social statistics: method, system of indicators, analysis. Moscow, 1991. P. 84. 20. USSR in numbers in 1990, Moscow, 1991. P. 149. 21. Main trends and indicators of economic and social development of the Republic of Uzbekistan during the years of independence (1990-2010) based on the forecast 2011-2015. Statistical compendium. T., 2011. P. 86. 22. Uzbekistan in the world economy. - T., 1993. –p. 53. 23. Ziyadullaev S. K. Economy of the Uzbek SSR under restructurings. - T., 1988. –p. 22. 24. Class Economics education theoretically captain bulligan - Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) sterilize "Humanising" Anikonov the law on longevity called " the librarians of old silgan theory 25. AlikhanAman. Population migration in Uzbekistan (1989-1998). UNHCR. – Tashkent, 2000. – P. 70. (Experts of the country explain the rapid growth of the population in Uzbekistan that the policy of encouraging birth in the Soviet period was carried out primarily for the defense capability of the country, taking into account the interests of the former Union. In this situation, conscripts from the republics of Central Asia, including Uzbekistan (for military service) formed an increasingly large part of the Armed

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JOURNAL OF CRITICAL REVIEWS

ISSN- 2394-5125 VOL 7, ISSUE 13, 2020

Forces of the USSR.. See: National report on human development, 2005. Decentralization and human development. Uzbekistan 2005. UNDP/CER. С. 40.) 26. Yusupov Yu. V. Formation and development of economic science. A course of lectures on the history of economic doubling from ancient times to the end of the 80's. XX century. - T., 1999. –P. 64. 27. Impact of economic growth on reducing the share of the low-income population of Uzbekistan. (IFMR, UNDP, Uzbekistan). - T., 2012. –P. 23. 28. Rakhmatullaev Sh. Economic transformation processes in Fergana Valley (1991-1996 years). - Tashkent: "Nishonnoshir", 2017. P.15. 29. Abdullaev R. Why are the political and economic dogmas of the Uzbek "opposition" wrong? // http://inosmi.ru/middle_asia/20110630/171425773.html#ixzz3bo4PFLgp 30. Tuхliev N. An exhausting way to move to a market economy. T., 1999. P.32.; Khadzhimirzaev M. Working class of Uzbekistan: problems of development // Man and politics. 1991. no. 9. P.20.; Uzbekistan: General assessment of the country. UN. 2003. P. 12. 31. Bobodjonova D. Experience in training national workers in Uzbekistan / / social Sciences in Uzbekistan. 1997. № 3-4. P.37. 32. Uzbekistan: General assessment of the country. UN. 2003. P. 12. 33. Bedrintsev A. K. Regional factors of transition of the Uzbek SSR to a market economy // Social Sciences in Uzbekistan. 1991. No. 1. P. 4. 34. Rakhmatullaev Sh. Economic transformation processes in Fergana Valley (1991-1996 years). - Tashkent: "Nishonnoshir", 2017. P.21. 35. Pravda Vostoka (Truth of the East). - 1989. - September 30. 36. Labor in the USSR. Goskomstat of the USSR, Moscow, 1988, P. 235. 37. Aliakberova N. M., Goldfarb B. eat, Ergashev A. Placement of the population of the Ferghana valley (demographic aspect). T., 1990.P. 3-4. 38. Archive of the Ministry of agriculture of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In. 1., storage unit. 101., p.p. 34. 39. Archive of the Ministry of agriculture of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In. 1., storage unit. 101., p.p. 44. 40. Klinova A. Long-suffering vegetable // Pravda vostoka(Truth of the East). 1989. September 10. 41. The State archive of the Andijan region. F. 608. In. 2., storage unit. 2043., p.p. 243. 42. Narinsky K. M., Soliev A. S., Iminov T. K., Mamadaliev T. I. My Andijan (Andijan region will be dedicated to the 50th anniversary of its establishment). Andijan, 1991. P.33. 43. Belyanov V. A. Personal subsidiary farming under socialism. Moscow, 1970. 44. Pravda Vostoka (Truth of the East). - 1988. - November 19. 45. State archive of Andijan region F. 608., In. 2., storage unit. 2043., p.p. 243. 46. "Voice Of Uzbekistan". - 1993. - June 22.

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