Kyrgyzstan by Erica Marat Capital: Bishkek Population: 5.3 million GNI/capita: US$2,150 Source: The data above was provided by The World Bank, World Bank Indicators 2010. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Electoral Process 5.75 5.75 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 6.00 6.00 6.25 Civil Society 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.75 5.00 Independent Media 5.00 5.75 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 6.00 6.25 6.50 Governance* 5.25 5.50 6.00 6.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a National Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a n/a 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.75 Local Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.50 6.50 6.50 Judicial Framework and Independence 5.25 5.25 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 6.00 6.00 6.00 Corruption 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.25 6.50 Democracy Score 5.29 5.46 5.67 5.67 5.64 5.68 5.68 5.93 6.04 6.21 * Starting with the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national democratic governance and local democratic governance to provide readers with more detailed and nuanced analysis of these two important subjects. NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. 290 Nations in Transit 2010 Executive Summary n March 2005, President Askar Akayev was forced from office by opposition supporters protesting alleged electoral fraud and large-scale corruption. IOpposition leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev became president after Akayev’s ousting, but he failed to meet public expectations, quickly succumbing to corruption himself and increasingly resorting to authoritarian suppression of competing political forces. A new constitution adopted in 2007 lacked checks and balances, enabling President Bakiyev to appoint the government and judges and to secure a majority for his Ak Zhol party in the parliament. The violent dispersal of opposition demonstrations in April of that year, and the ongoing persecution of independent journalists further marred public perceptions of the Bakiyev regime, as did the president’s apparent unwillingness or inability to curb corruption in government and the business sector. These developments were strongly reminiscent of the crucial mistakes that had led to Akayev’s downfall. Driven by short-term goals to centralize his power, and failing to design viable economic and political policies, President Bakiyev showed signs of becoming an even more authoritarian and corrupt leader than his predecessor. President Bakiyev scheduled a presidential election for July 2009, months before the constitutionally defined election date. According to official results, he won 76 percent of the vote, while his main opponent, Almazbek Atambayev, earned a mere 8 percent. Following his reelection, President Bakiyev continued to sideline political opponents and silence critical media outlets. He also increased his personal control over the country’s military and security structures. The country saw a wave of violence against journalists and opposition leaders, as well as regional interethnic tensions, yet central and local authorities did little to address the unrest. National Democratic Governance. Governance in Kyrgyzstan became more authoritarian in 2009. After his reelection in July, President Bakiyev decreased the number of ministries and state agencies in order to centralize his own control over the government. The president also extended personal control over military structures and allowed the army to intervene in domestic affairs. A number of political assassinations and assaults on journalists demonstrated regime supporters’ willingness to use violence to quiet their opponents. In light of President Bakiyev’s efforts to consolidate control over the government and security structures, as well as his suppression of the opposition and civil society, Kyrgyzstan’s national democratic governance rating worsens from 6.50 to 6.75. Electoral Process. The July presidential election revealed the president’s readiness to manipulate the electoral system to enhance his own power. He was credited Kyrgyzstan 291 with 76 percent of the vote and immediately sought to suppress any opposition protests challenging the official results.Because of the president’s move to hold elections earlier than allowed by the constitution, and the widespread falsification of the vote, Kyrgyzstan’s rating for electoral process worsens from 6.00 to 6.25. Civil Society. Far fewer nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were willing to participate in public life in 2009 compared with 2008, and local mass media often refused to publish statements by civil society activists. Following the presidential election in July, virtually no NGO has openly attempted to contest the results. Indeed, several opposition leaders and civil society activists fled Kyrgyzstan prior to the elections. The Bakiyev government also strengthened state control over religious institutions during the year. With Kyrgyz NGO leaders unable to engage in policy debates, Kyrgyzstan’s civil society rating worsens from 4.75 to 5.00. Independent Media. A series of violent attacks against journalists created an atmosphere of fear among local reporters in 2009. Most online and print media published fewer articles featuring criticism of government policy, effectively reducing opportunities for NGOs to speak out. In addition, the government introduced a bill during the summer that would categorize the Internet as a form of mass media, extending existing controls on traditional media to online outlets. Due to the wave of attacks on journalists and the government’s moves to impose greater restrictions on the Internet, Kyrgyzstan’s independent media rating worsens from 6.25 to 6.50. Local Democratic Governance. Ak Zhol, the ruling party, dominated local governmental structures, allowing central authorities to exert extensive control over all levels of government. Local officials proved unable to resolve interethnic conflicts during the year without the intervention of the central government. Kyrgyzstan’s rating for local democratic governance remains at 6.50. Judicial Framework and Independence. In 2009 the government considered a number of legal changes that would limit civic freedoms. For example, officials proposed legalizing capital punishment, arguing that it would demonstrate the “Kyrgyz” way of dealing with criminals and religious extremist groups. Because of this proposal and an array of existing harsh practices, Kyrgyzstan’s rating for judicial framework and independence remains at 6.00. Corruption. Corruption continued to plague all state institutions in 2009. The president created a new agency that would control all foreign financial inflows and national strategic enterprises, including foreign aid and credits. Maksim Bakiyev, the president’s son, was named to head the agency. Given this indication of unchecked nepotism and increasing opportunities for graft, Kyrgyzstan’s corruption rating worsens from 6.25 to 6.50. Outlook for 2010. In 2009, President Bakiyev demonstrated that he had gathered enough power to unilaterally implement substantial changes to the state structure 292 Nations in Transit 2010 and political system. He altered the cabinet and ministerial organization and called for an early presidential election. He also showed little desire to collaborate with civil society groups or opposition representatives in the parliament. The opposition in turn was unable to challenge the regime, as was clear when Atambayev lost the presidential race to President Bakiyev by a wide margin that went largely uncontested. However, it is unclear how long the president’s grip on power will hold, as his increasingly personalized rule has likely narrowed his institutional and political base of support. By the end of the year, Kyrgyzstan’s human rights and democracy situation had worsened, coming to resemble the grave situations in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Nearly all prominent opposition leaders have been effectively silenced through arrests or public shaming. Following an unprecedented number of physical attacks against journalists in 2009, local mass media and civil society are likely to be less critical of the government. Acts of violence have apparently become the president’s chosen method of dealing with opponents, creating a volatile atmosphere. Several NGO leaders, journalists, and politicians who have fled President Bakiyev’s Kyrgyzstan remain unable to return to the country. Given developments over the past year, prospects for an improvement in the country’s governance are dismal. Kyrgyzstan 293 Main Report National Democratic Governance 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 n/a n/a n/a n/a 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.75 Kyrgyzstan’s government became more authoritarian in 2009. After winning the early presidential election in July, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev promised to reform the government to eliminate corruption and promote more efficient decision- making. As part of this effort, he brought the National Security Service (SNB) as well as the Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs Ministries under his control. After dismissing the cabinet in October, President Bakiyev appointed Daniyar Usenov, who previously served as chief of his presidential staff and in several other high posts, as the new prime minister. The president’s son, Maksim Bakiyev was promoted to lead a new Central Agency on Development, Investment, and Innovation, which would control all foreign financial inflows, including aid and credits.