Compendium of Policy Documents

COMPENDIUM OF POLICY DOCUMENTS

MAY 2021

Compendium of Policy Documents May 2021 The Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP) is a Tbilisi-based non-proﬁ t, non-partisan, research and analysis organization founded in early 2011. GIP strives to strengthen the organizational backbone of democratic institutions and promote good governance and development through policy research and advocacy in Georgia. It also encourages public participation in civil society-building and developing democratic processes. Since December 2013 GIP is member of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.

*This publication has been produced from the resources provided by the National Endow- ment for Democracy. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessar- ily reﬂ ect the views of the Georgian Institute of Politics and the National Endowment for Democracy.

Editor: Kornely Kakachia Authors: Levan Kakhishvili Salome Minesashvili Bidzina Lebanidze Shota Kakabadze

Printed by: Grifoni ISBN 978-9941-480-91-1

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Levan Kakhishvili is a Doctoral Fellow in political science at the Bamberg Graduate School of Social Sciences (BAGSS), University of Bamberg, in the framework of DAAD Graduate School Support Programme. He is also a Lecturer at the Chair of Comparative Politics at the University of Bamberg, and a Policy Analyst at the Georgian Institute of Politics. He holds two Master’s degrees, in Russian and East European Studies from the St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, and in Transformation in South Caucasus from Tbilisi State Univer- sity. Previously, he worked at International Black Sea University, Caucasian House, East- West Management Institute, and the European Centre for Minority Issues. He has taught various courses at Tbilisi State University, International Black Sea University, and the Geor- gian Institute of Public Affairs. His research has appeared in academic peer-reviewed jour- nals Post-Soviet Affairs and Europe-Asia Studies.

Dr. Salome Minesashvili has been cooperating with GIP since September 2013. Salome holds PhD in Political Science from Freie Universität Berlin, MSc degrees from the University of Ed- inburgh and Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University. Currently, she is a lecturer of politics and international relations at Freie Universität Berlin and ESCP Europe. At the GIP, she has worked in multiple research projects on the topics of foreign policy analysis, identity politics, soft power politics, EU-Eastern Neighbourhood relations, and transformation processes in the former Soviet Union.

Dr. Bidzina Lebanidze is a Senior Analyst at Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP), a Post- doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute of Slavic Languages and Caucasus Studies at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Associate Professor of International Relations at the Ilia State University. He obtained his doctorate in Political Science from the Free University of Berlin, and his Master’s degree in International Relations from Tbilisi State University. Previously, he also held various teaching and research positions at University of Bremen, University of Freiburg, Berlin School for Economics and Law, Free University of Berlin and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Dr. Shota Kakabadze is a Junior Policy Analyst at the Georgian Institute of Politics. He is a Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science from the University of Tartu (Estonia). Shota has obtained his Master’s degree in the European Union – Russia Studies from the same university. During his doctoral studies he has been a Swedish Institute Research Fellow at Uppsala University Institute of Russia and Eurasian Studies, as well as a Junior Researcher of Inter- national Relations at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies at the University of Tartu. His main research interest includes discourses on national identity, foreign policy, Eastern Partnership. He has published several academic articles and a book chapter on Georgian national identity/foreign policy relationship. 4 FOREWORD The Georgian Institute of Politics is delight- President of the European Council and his ed to present Compendium 2021, the latest special envoy, Christian Danielsson, in the of our annual collection of policy documents interparty dialogue has sparked hope that dedicated to Georgia’s political processes, European principles and compromise-based challenges, and prospects. The collection is approaches may eventually fi nd a way into intended to serve as an introduction to the Georgian political discourse. An interparty sixth annual conference #GEODEM2021 agreement may well signal this trend. and a keynote for discussion within the frame of our major event. We hope that the However, this process has once again cor- Compendium will lead to interesting dis- roborated that there is not yet a safeguard cussion. These policy documents and papers in place in Georgia to implement democratic may be used as a resource by representatives processes smoothly. Political elites were not of political circles as well as civil society, ready to independently lead a results-ori- political experts, members of the academic ented dialogue, which is evidence of their community and other stakeholders involved political immaturity. At the same time, the in the country’s democratic transformation. ongoing crisis has challenged Georgia’s prospects for European and democratic de- Aftermath of the 2020 parliamentary elec- velopment with appeals for signifi cant re- tions have brought a breakthrough in the strictions, or termination, of fi nancial sup- domestic political processes and will, pre- port to the country creeping into political sumably, have important long-term con- circles. These appeals still loom over the sequences for Georgia’s democratic de- country.2 It is sad to note that these develop- velopment as well as its future European ments have unfolded against the backdrop perspective. The slamming of the CEC-en- of the ruling party’s intent to prepare an offi - dorsed election results by the major oppo- cial application for EU membership by 2024. sition parties, plus a parliamentary boycott, However, so far, the country has failed to snowballed into a political crisis persisting demonstrate a political culture which would for almost six months. It was only thanks be in line with democratic standards. There- to efforts by the EU and the USA that the fore, it is paramount that Georgian political crisis eventually de-escalated. These efforts parties distance themselves from a zero-sum made by Georgia’s Western friends and mentality and opt for consensus-oriented most important strategic allies for the ben- politics.3 efi t of the country’s political processes is an undeniable sign that the future of Georgia’s It is notable that the fi ndings of various polls democratization remains a priority in both and surveys suggest that the parliamenta- Brussels and Washington.1 At the same time, ry boycott lacks strong support among the the personal engagement of Charles Michel, country’s population. According to the In-

1 Panchulidze, E. & Youngs, Richard. Defusing Georgia’s Political Crisis: An EU Foreign Policy Success? Avail- able at: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/05/10/defusing-georgia-s-political-crisis-eu-foreign-policy-success-pub-84494?fbclid=IwAR3n4VMFgDTsR2Nn1wlR04IeUg8Lmch0iNPsjslYdWCdAAsjZDfvOjTJ3fI 2 The First 100 Days of Georgian Dream Government: Reality and Challenges. Available at: http://gip.ge/ the-fi rst-100-days-of-georgian-dream-government-reality-and-challenges/ 5 ternational Republican Institute, only 26% and frequent questions about the legitimacy of the population back this process.4 At the of elections results raises another question - same time, according to the fi ndings of the why it has been so hard in the state of Geor- CRRC polls, 82% of the population believe gia to conduct fair elections in line with in- that all political parties should cooperate ternational standards. with each other.5 These fi ndings suggest that there is a considerable mismatch between The commitment of the political parties to the ambitions of the political parties and the fulfi lling the conditions of the Charles Michel wishes of their constituencies. Even though agreement, especially those relating to core there has been a growing trend for politi- areas of electoral and judicial reforms, with cal parties to question the credibility of the integrity and honesty, creates an important methodology of public opinion polls,6 the way out of the deadlock in the process of fi ndings nevertheless unequivocally point democratization. Reorganization of the Cen- to the considerable gap between the political tral Election Commission in the runup to the elites and the actual demands of the Geor- upcoming local elections on the one hand, gian society. and the introduction of a fully proportional election system on the other, should lay the As in the previous year, there has been a foundation for diversity within the country’s rollback in Georgia’s democratic freedom party system and fair distribution of powers as demonstrated by international indexes between political parties. In addition, the and reports.7 At the same time, internation- introduction of modern technologies to the al partners have also warned about threats election processes is likely to contribute to of democratic backsliding. Even though the nurturing trust in the organisation of elec- conduct of the 2020 parliamentary elections tions. The respective agencies should put a was generally assessed as transparent and lot of thinking into developing technically fair by international observers, reports high- sound and transparent voting systems fea- light such traditional fl aws as the misuse of turing, especially, those digital mechanisms administrative resources for electoral pur- which can do most to enhance fair and legit- poses, bribery and intimidation of voters, imate election standards in the country. It is polarized media environment and preva- equally important to effectively modernize lence of hate speech in the pre-election dis- the judicial system and reduce the levels of course.8 The multiplicity of such challenges concern about political justice, since a fair

3 Kakachia, Kornely & Lebanidze, Bidzina. 2021. Op-Ed | Time to Push for Consensus-based Politics in Georgia. Available at: https://civil.ge/archives/402624 4 Netgazeti.ge. 2021a. opoziciis boikots 60% ar eTanxmeba – IRI-is kvleva. Available at: https://netgazeti.ge/news/532290/?fbclid=IwAR2l1xjCqnw42kate4MgNEAd9mjCrQ5RnkicY1zwGvPm8xfEFYfotKe8tLs 5 Caucasusbarometer.org. December 2020. Do you agree or disagree – it is important for all political parties to collaborate with each other? Caucasus Research Resource Centre. Available at: https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/ nd2020ge/IMPAPCEO/ 6 Polling Wars in Georgia: Can it undermine public trust? Georgian Institute of Politics. Available at: http:// gip.ge/polling-wars-in-georgia-can-it-undermine-public-trust/ 7 Freedomhouse.org. 2021. Georgia. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia/freedom-world/2021 8 Transperency.ge. 2020. 2020 wlis saparlamento arCevnebis winasaarCevno garemos erToblivi Se- faseba. Available at: https://transparency.ge/ge/post/2020-clis-saparlamento-archevnebis-cinasaarchev- no-garemos-ertoblivi-shepaseba 6 and transparent judicial system constitutes to overcome these challenges. an indisputably fundamental component of state-building.9 This Compendium of policy documents, just like its predecessors, could not be pub- In addition, there are other issues which lished without the support of prominent in- sometimes occur on the political agenda: stitutes, including the National Endowment emergence of new right-wing populist ac- for Democracy. We are also indebted to the tors in party politics, against the backdrop citizens of Georgia, representatives of civil of raucous debate between the mainstream society and media outlets for their contin- parties, and heated intra- and interparty uous support for our work and their civ- discussions. Nationalist and populist narra- ic engagement in the development of civil tives have become increasingly prominent society, as well as the strengthening of the in civic and political life in Georgia. There- organizational backbone of democratic in- fore, both the wider public, as well as the po- stitutions through their contribution to the litical class, must start thinking about ways development of democratic processes.

Dr. KORNELY KAKACHIA

Director, Georgian Institute of Politics

9 Erkvania, Tinatin & Lebanidze, Bidzina. 2021. The Judiciary Reform in Georgia and its Signiﬁ cance for the Idea of European Integration. Georgian Institute of Politics. Available at: http://gip.ge/the-judiciary-reform-in-georgia-and-its-signiﬁ cance-for-the-idea-of-european-integration/ THE EUROPEAN UNION’S NEW ROLE IN GEORGIA: SUCCESSFUL MEDIATION AND A WAY AHEAD

LEVAN KAKHISHVILI

9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Consolidation of democracy is a lengthy and way out of the deadlock. This policy paper turbulent process, in which political crises explores the EU’s successful mediation. The can be a recurrent phenomenon. For Geor- paper ﬁ rst contextualizes the Georgian crisis gia, aiming to apply for the membership in to provide some insights into why solving it the European Union (EU) by 2024, it is polit- was important for the EU and then explores ically costly to let crises become unmanage- determinants of mediation effectiveness. able. However, the current political crisis, The paper argues that three factors were the which started in June 2019, entered a dead- key: high capacity of using leverage, adopt- lock in February 2021 when the leader of the ed mediation strategy, and high degree of largest opposition party, Nika Melia was ar- coherence as a mediator. Based on the ﬁ nd- rested. At this point, the EU took up a role ings, a set of recommendations is provided of a mediator and negotiated a deal between for various domestic actors and the EU. Georgian political parties. This defused the situation and a part of the opposition agreed Keywords: Georgia, EU mediation, democ- to enter the parliament. While the political ratization, political crisis, parliamentary crisis is far from over the EU has found a boycott, conditionality.

INTRODUCTION

Political crises in Georgia are not unusual, contexts. Throughout the 1990s and early but understanding and learning from these 2000s, this external actor was Russia; the last crises is the key for Georgia’s success, espe- Russian involvement in a Georgian politi- cially if Tbilisi plans to apply for European cal crisis as was in 2003 and 2004 during the Union (EU) membership by 2024. Therefore, Rose Revolution and the ousting of Aslan this policy paper explores the latest political Abashidze. However, since then Russia be- crisis in Georgia, in which the EU adopted came a source of internal political crises in the new role of mediator. The EU managed Georgia (see Kakachia et al 2017). The cur- to drag the Georgian political elite out of a rent crisis, the origins of which can be traced deadlock. Considering that the Union nor- to June 2019, is a clear illustration (Kakhish- mally hesitates from interfering in domestic vili 2019). political affairs and had never done this before in Georgia, this paper aims to answer a To understand the EU’s new role in Geor- few questions why did the EU adopt a new gia, this paper adopts Bergmann and Nie- role and engage in the internal political cri- mann’s (2015) framework developed to sis in Georgia? How did the EU manage to evaluate the EU’s effectiveness as a media- succeed? What should be the way forward tor in various confl icts, and identifi es what for Georgia? goals the EU aimed to achieve. These are identifi ed based on the content analysis of Although the EU’s interest in the current cri- 59 news articles published by Civil Geor- sis in Georgia is unprecedented, the country gia between 24.02.2021 and 24.04.2021. The is used to external interventions in similar analysis focused on direct quotations from 10 speeches, statements, and letters of various the June 2019 events. This is then followed MEPs and other EU offi cials. This analysis with contextualization of the Georgian crisis also identifi ed what leverage the EU used to in terms of what has been happening in the incentivize or coerce Georgian political elite Eastern Partnership (EaP) region and why to achieve a compromise; what mediation the EU needed to engage. The next section strategy the EU adopted; and how coherent deals with the determinants of the EU’s suc- the EU was across various institutions and cess followed by a section discussing a way member states. ahead for Georgia. The concluding section provides a package of recommendations The paper proceeds with a background sec- for Georgian political parties, the president, tion describing the anatomy of the current CSOs, and the EU. political crisis and how it is connected to

BACKGROUND: THE ANATOMY OF THE CRISIS

Effective crisis management is extremely im- from the resignations of various political ﬁ g- portant, especially in an EU-aspirant coun- ures, one of the main demands was electoral try. However, Georgia has failed to avoid reform – switching to a fully proportional negative consequences from an early stage system for the 2020 elections. of the current crisis (see Kakhishvili and Consequently, the demands for reforming Puslys 2019), which was triggered on June the electoral system became one of the two 20, 2019, when a Russian MP from the Com- pillars of the subsequent political crisis. The munist Party, Sergei Gavrilov, addressed second pillar of the crisis was the politiciza- the delegates of the Inter-Parliamentary As- tion of the judiciary. This was connected to sembly on Orthodoxy (IAO) in Russian from ﬁ gures such as Nika Rurua, Gigi Ugulava the seat of the Speaker of the Georgian par- and Nika Melia. The latter was stripped of liament (see Figure 1). This symbolic viola- the immunity of an MP twice – in June 2019 tion of Georgia’s sovereignty sparked pro- and February 2021. Melia’s imprisonment tests in Tbilisi resulting in clashes between was the peak of the political crisis. This was the police and protesters. Although the pro- the point when it became painfully apparent tests were triggered by an issue related to that Georgian political parties could no lon- Georgia’s foreign affairs, the demands of the ger engage in a meaningful dialogue for the demonstrators quickly shifted to domestic purpose of reaching a compromise-based matters (Kakhishvili and Puslys 2019). Apart consensus. 11

Figure 1. Timeline of the crisis: From the Gavrilov night to the arrest of Nika Melia

Source: Author’s illustration.

This culmination was the reason why six diverging Georgia from the path of reforms MEPs, on the day of Melia’s arrest, sent a let- under the Association Agreement with the ter to the President of the European Council, EU” (Civil Georgia 2021d). Charles Michel, asking him to “encourage Georgian political forces to seek an imme- On February 28, Charles Michel arrived in diate renewal of the cross-party dialogue, Tbilisi. This marked the transition from fa- which must lead to a concrete memoran- cilitation, conducted by the EU Delegation dum of understanding focused on nurturing and U.S. Embassy, to mediation and the a cooperative and inclusive political envi- EU’s new role. The mediation process was ronment” (Civil Georgia 2021d). This letter concluded with an agreement signed on included a warning for the Georgian politi- April 19. cal elite stating that the “political crisis risks

CONTEXTUALIZING THE GEORGIAN CRISIS: WHY DID THE EU ENGAGE?

The EU’s engagement in Georgia’s internal ternational Discussions (Panchulidze 2020). political crisis was unexpected. During the Furthermore, the EU has extensive and suc- August War of 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy – in cessful experience in the Balkans as a media- his capacity as the President of the Euro- tor in international confl icts, peace talks, and pean Council – facilitated communication domestic crises (Bergmann and Niemann between Tbilisi and Moscow and forged a 2015). The Balkan region directly borders EU ceasefi re agreement between the two coun- member states: some of the Balkan countries tries. Subsequently, the EU adopted the role are already members of the EU while the rest of co-chair and mediator in the Geneva In- are on the path to membership. Article 21 of 12 the Treaty on European Union, which de- Russia, with the support of Turkey managed fi nes provisions for European External Ac- to negotiate a peace deal between Armenia tion, sets the following top three goals: “(a) and Azerbaijan (BBC 2020), marking “a deep safeguard its [EU’s] values, fundamental in- retreat in Europe’s ambition to be a regional terests, security, independence and integrity; actor” (Judah 2020). While Europe stood by, (b) consolidate and support democracy, the Russia increased its presence in South Cau- rule of law, human rights and the principles casus by gaining the right to station about of international law; (c) preserve peace, pre- 2,000 peacekeepers in Azerbaijan (BBC vent confl icts and strengthen international 2020), which means that Moscow now has security” (European Union 2012). The Union a military presence in all three South Cauca- has repeatedly made their interest in Geor- sian countries. gia and wider EaP region clear, therefore it is not surprising that the EU has adopted the The third development is related to Ukraine. role of a mediator in Georgia. Considering Even though in 2020 a ceasefi re deal was the context of what has been happening late- achieved between Kyiv and pro-Russian ly in the EaP countries, the EU’s engagement separatists in eastern Ukraine (Reuters becomes even more logical. Three main de- 2020), the agreement soon came under velopments can be identifi ed in the EaP re- strain (BBC 2021a) while in March, Rus- gion to contextualize the Georgian crisis: sia started building up its troops along the unrest in Belarus; renewed war between Ar- Russian-Ukrainian border, alarming NATO menia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Kara- (BBC 2021c). Even though the Russian de- bakh; and intensifi cation of the warfare and fense ministry stated that troops have been subsequent build-up of Russian troops near instructed to return to their permanent bases the eastern borders of Ukraine. (BBC 2021b), this process too showed how limited the EU’s infl uence is when it comes The EU has failed to ensure peace and stabil- to traditional tools of coercion. ity in all these developments, which threat- ens its interests. The elections and the fol- Against this background, Georgian political lowing large-scale protests in Belarus have parties’ unwillingness to compromise seems demonstrated vulnerabilities of the Alexan- to be an easy problem to solve. These and, der Lukashenko regime, as well as the lim- perhaps, other factors, e.g., President Mi- its of the EU infl uence (see Erlanger 2020). chel’s personal background as a Belgian pol- Lukashenko, who enjoys the possibility of itician from a divided society closely famil- external support from Russia, is not willing iar with political standoffs, could incentivize to give up power. the EU to act where it can and strengthen its role in the eastern neighborhood. Therefore, The so-called second Nagorno Karabakh keeping Georgia, a frontrunner of EaP, sta- war, has been another demonstration of the ble in an otherwise turbulent region became EU’s limited infl uence in the region. Only more important for the EU than ever before. 13 DISSECTING THE MEDIATION PROCESS: HOW DID THE EU MANAGE TO SUCCEED?

The EU’s success in concluding the agree- primarily rests on the principle of condition- ment is a fi rst step in a long process of un- ality, the capacity to use positive or negative dertaking reforms to strengthen institutions conditionality is high. The extent to which in Georgia. However, evaluating mediation the EU is willing to use coercive measures is effectiveness is important to understand another matter. When it comes to mediation how the EU managed to deliver concrete strategy, Bergmann and Niemann (2015) dif- results. Bergmann and Niemann (2015) con- ferentiate three types: facilitation, formula- ceptualize “mediation effectiveness” as goal tion, and manipulation. However, the latter attainment, i.e., to what extent the mediator is largely redundant because it is defi ned as was clear about the goals of the mediation the combination of formulation strategy and process beforehand and to what extent these usage of positive and/or negative condition- goals were achieved (Bergmann and Nie- ality. Formulation, in its turn, is defi ned as a mann 2015). Consequently, it is important to strategy during which the mediator not only evaluate what goals the EU had set before makes communication easier for confl ict the mediation process and what factors de- parties – a facilitation strategy – but also for- termined their attainment. mulates a concrete proposal of compromise. Consequently, formulation is viewed to be According to Bergmann and Niemann more effective than facilitation and the most (2015), three factors characteristic to the me- effective if coupled with usage of leverage. diator and mediator’s strategy determine Coherence, on the other hand, refers to the the outcome of mediation: mediator lever- internal unity of the mediator. In this case, age, mediation strategy, and mediator co- whether various EU institutions or member herence. The higher the mediator leverage states send the same signals to the confl ict the more effective the mediation will be. parties. The higher the coherence, the more Considering that the EU’s external relations effective the EU mediation.

Goals of the EU Mediation

The effectiveness of the mediation process and clarity. In Georgia, the EU set an ambi- should be understood as opposed to the tious goal of solving the political crisis and goals set in advance (see Figure 2 for the put forward a range of both clear and vague timeline of the mediation process). There goals. are two aspects to such goals: ambitiousness 14

Figure 2. Timeline of the EU mediation

Source: Author’s illustration.

During his fi rst visit, Charles Michel set a President Michel’s mediation” (Civil Geor- clear goal: “to solve this political crisis” (Civ- gia 2021e). The concrete memorandum was il Georgia 2021a). “Solving the crisis” here signed by mediation participants on April 19. solely refers to the deadlock resulting from There were other ambitious long-term goals the radicalizing rhetoric of Georgian parties. that illuminate how the EU sees the Geor- At the same time, there were other less am- gian political elite’s efforts; these are not to bitious of representatives of the EU: to re- be fi xed by the mediation process. Instead, launch dialogue between the GD and the the primary goals of the mediation process opposition; to stop polarizing rhetoric; and aimed to bring parties together to agree on to sign a concrete memorandum of under- the reforms agenda, but these were accom- standing between the parties. These goals panied by additional, vague objectives. The were all voiced during or before Michel’s clear goals can be grouped into three larger fi rst visit. As a result of this visit, however, categories: electoral reform; judicial reform dialogue was relaunched, and the radical- and the opposition’s role in the parliament. izing behavior stopped from the side of the The vague goals can also be grouped into opposition parties. Illustration of the latter is three categories: protection of Georgian cit- the March 3 announcement of the opposition izens’ interests; protecting constitution and parties about suspending street protests to democratic principles; and fi nding common avoid disruption of “the talks resumed after ground to achieve a consensus (see Table 1). 15

Table 1. Goals of EU mediation

Source: Author’s analysis.

The clarity of the goals not only helps to changed, and no new goals were added after evaluate the extent of the EU’s effectiveness March 9. This means that the EU was high- as a mediator but also provides an import- ly consistent in its actions and had a clear ant insight into what issues the EU deems target from the earliest stage of its involve- important. All the goals labeled as “clear” ment. Considering that all these issues were in this policy paper were put forward in the included in the ﬁ nal document signed by the period between the arrest of Nika Melia and parties, excluding the UNM, it can be argued Charles Michel’s decision to appoint Chris- that the EU was effective as a mediator. tian Danielsson as Envoy. These goals never

Determinants of Effectiveness: Leverage, Strategy, and Coherence

Based on the adopted analytical framework, The usage of leverage by the EU can be di- the EU’s mediation is the most effective if it vided into two parts. The fi rst covers the formulates a concrete proposal, uses coercive period before the second mediation round measures and/or positive incentives, and led by Christian Danielsson, while the sec- shows overall unity in the mediation pro- ond starts following the failure of the second cess – which the data suggests is what hap- mediation round. In the fi rst period, usage pened in the Georgian political crisis. Based of leverage is dominated by messages that on preliminary preparatory consultations, are both positive and negative, but are rath- the EU did formulate a specifi c agreement er general in their content. The positive in- text and redrafted it after the parties failed centives mostly included voicing the EU’s to reach a consensus. At the same time, this support for Georgia’s “prosperous future” was coupled with a set of positive incentives as well as sovereignty and territorial integ- and coercive measures with a high level of rity. An exception in terms of the generic na- coherence from the side of the EU as a me- ture of positive incentives came on March 9 diator. when Josep Borrell, High Representative of 16 the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security EU-Georgia relations is at stake”, warn- Policy, alluded to the EU’s fi nancial support ing that “Following the refusal from the to Georgia: “We are helping Georgia, we political parties to compromise, Georgia’s are the largest donor in Georgia, we are al- leaders should not expect a return to busi- locating Georgia important support to face ness as usual from the European Union” the coronavirus pandemic” (Civil Georgia (Civil Georgia 2021b). The MEPs addition- 2021c). He went on to express hope that the ally stated that there would be concrete process would result in a political agree- consequences for Georgia “in terms of EU ment, thus tying the fi nancial support with fi nancial assistance, including both a sus- the outcome of mediation. pension of further disbursements of and an Meanwhile, negative messages remained increase in conditionality linked to EU Mac- limited to suggestions on how the political ro-Financial Assistance and budget support crisis “risks diverging Georgia from the path programmes” (Civil Georgia 2021b). This of reforms under the Association Agree- became the fi rst time the EU warned about ment” (Civil Georgia 2021d) and “jeopar- using a specifi c instrument as negative con- dize[s] the country’s stability and aspira- ditionality, which served as a repercussion tions for Euro-Atlantic co-operation” (Civil of the actions of Georgian political leaders Georgia 2021f). An exception was when an and, therefore, as a coercive measure. Estonian MEP from European People’s Par- All these positive and negative measures ty suggested that the “EU must have strong were used in tandem with the formulation leverage over Bidzina Ivanishvili” to pre- mediation strategy, which suggests that the vent him from “leading from behind the mediator should have a high degree of ef- curtains” (Civil Georgia 2021c). fectiveness. Furthermore, the EU was highly Following the failure of Georgian parties to coherent, as demonstrated by the diversity sign the proposed agreement, which was of actors involved in mediation efforts (see publicized on March 31, the EU adopted Table 2). These actors never expressed mes- harsher language and discussed concrete sages that would undermine or oppose any measures. On April 1, seven MEPs from other message from a different actor, which various political groups published a joint was helpful for getting the expectations statement suggesting that “The future of across. 17

Table 2. EU-related actors and their roles throughout mediation

Source: Author’s analysis.

The EU demonstrated a high degree of co- would “slow [Georgia’s] progress toward herence internally, but the USA was also in achieving its aspiration of Euro-Atlantic in- line with the message box the EU used. The tegration (…) and could result in conditions U.S. Embassy adopted a similar role to the placed on U.S. assistance to Georgia” (Civil EU Delegation, while U.S. Senators voiced Georgia 2021g). Therefore the U.S. involve- the possibility of using negative condition- ment was of additional signiﬁ cance, espe- ality in relation to the implementation of the cially considering that the GD unilaterally agreement. Introduced on April 22, a bipar- signed the March 31 agreement on April 16 tisan resolution in the U.S. Senate expressed following the ofﬁ cial visit of the GD Chair- concern that disrupting democratization man, Irakli Kobakhidze, to Washington. 18 WHAT NEXT FOR GEORGIA?

It is a problem for Georgia that the political The UNM’s refusal to sign the agreement actors needed an external mediator for con- is part of the confl ict context. In the politi- ducting a dialogue and achieving a compro- cal stand-off, the GD was one side while the mised-based consensus. Georgian political other included a range of political parties parties should have had suffi cient resourc- with heterogeneous interests and expecta- es for a dialogue or another domestic actor, tions. It is usually more likely that within a e.g., the president, should have been able disunited confl ict party there will be one or to undertake the role of a mediator. Com- more actors who will not agree to the for- mentators of Georgian politics have warned mulated deal. Even in this situation, it does against the challenges related to political not seem that the UNM will be willing or forces seeing politics as a zero-sum game able to remain outside the constructive po- (Georgian Institute of Politics 2021) and ad- litical process. They are expected to enter vocated for consensus-based politics (Kak- Parliament. This can be concluded from two achia and Lebanidze 2021b), but it became facts: Melia has allowed the EU to pay his apparent that domestically there was insuf- bail and be released, and Saakashvili called fi cient resources for a constructive dialogue. on the UNM to sign the April 18 agreement Although the EU managed to relaunch the following Melia’s release (JAMnews 2021). constructive political process through its Consequently, what is the most important mediation, it does not mean that the change for Georgia at this stage is implementing the is either imminent or inevitable. If the GD’s April 18 agreement and developing consen- declared goal to apply for the EU member- sus-based politics. ship by 2024 is feasible, Georgia will have to do its homework. The best indication of The agreement signed by most of the polit- what is expected of Georgia is outlined in the ical parties has fi ve sections: (1) addressing April 18 agreement. Doing this homework is perceptions of politicized justice; (2) ambi- a shared responsibility of all political actors tious electoral reform; (3) rule of law/judi- in Georgia. cial reform; (4) power sharing in the parliament; (5) future elections (European Union One of the key challenges of the April 18 External Action Service 2021). From these agreement is the fact that the UNM has not issues, the most long-lasting and impactful signed it, nor have the European Georgia are the electoral and judicial reforms. These and Labor parties. The latter two are smaller reforms are supposed to create stable insti- parties, while the UNM is the largest oppo- tutions, promote public trust in the judiciary sition party; therefore, the UNM’s actions and elections. However, the agenda of re- are more impactful. However, the docu- forms outlined in the agreement should not ment was signed by individual participants be viewed as an exhaustive list of actions of the mediation process such as Salome Sa- Georgia needs to undertake; electoral re- madashvili and Davit Bakradze, although form is a clear illustration for this argument. Bakradze had already left the European The electoral reform as outlined in the April Georgia, while Samadashvili subsequently 18 agreement only focuses on the electoral voiced her plans to quit the UNM. system, i.e., how elections are conducted. Moving to proportional national elections 19 with a low barrier and decreasing the share recommends to reconsider adoption of the of single-mandate districts in local elections amendments on party fi nancing. Conse- are important steps. In a fully proportional quently, how Georgia manages to level the system, coalition governments will eventual- playing fi eld between the government and ly become a real possibility, which will force the opposition remains to be seen. Georgian political parties to work together. Such developments will make it clear that Apart from the problems the agreement winner-takes-all elections will no longer be aims to solve, it also offers one important a concern of smaller parties. To this end, the opportunity: “parties shall seek to establish agreement is commendable for defi ning the a Jean Monnet Dialogue with the Europe- directions of change of the electoral system. an Parliament” (European Union External At the same time, an equally important as- Action Service 2021). The Jean Monnet Dia- pect to electoral contestation is the pre-elec- logue can become instrumental in building a tion environment. The extent to which all consensual democracy in Georgia. This tool parties have relatively equal capacity is an has already been successfully used in coun- important question. The balance between tries such as Ukraine, North Macedonia, and budgetary funding and private donations, Serbia (Samkharadze 2021, Kakachia and access to media, ruling party’s usage of Lebanidze 2021a). If the Georgian political administrative resources – these are some elite remains divided and shows little capac- of the most pressing issues that legislation ity of constructive dialogue without outside needs to address. However, on these issues, interference, the Jean Monnet Dialogue will the April 18 document suggests following help the practice of responsible politics ce- the joint opinion of the Venice Commis- menting the EU’s new role as a mediator in- sion and OSCE/ODIHR (2021), which only vested in Georgia’s future.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, the April 18 agreement is an import- that implementation of this agreement will ant step in resolving the protracted political not be suffi cient if Georgia plans to apply for problems Georgia faces. The West will close- EU membership by 2024. Secondly, the fu- ly watch how the agreement is implement- ture of the country and how it is seen in the ed. As these actors have demonstrated, they EU or the USA is a shared responsibility of will not hesitate from using negative condi- all parties mandated by Georgian voters to tionality should they see fi t. Therefore, the make decisions infl uencing their daily lives. implementation of the agreement may become a condition for further fi nancial assis- Based on the analysis above, the paper pres- tance from Western partners. Additionally, ents the following recommendations: the Georgian political elite should be aware 20

To all political parties in Georgia

 Ensure that the April 18 agreement is implemented not only to the let-  Refrain from using radicalizing ter but also to the spirit. All parties language, i.e., portraying politics should take their share of responsi- as a zero-sum game or opponents bility to this end. as enemies. This type of language contributes to frustration of voters  Engage in constructive negotiations and moves content-focused policy in the format of a Jean Monnet Di- debates towards the bottom of the alogue in order to nurture consen- agenda of public discourse. sus-based politics.

To the Georgian Dream

 Propose further reforms in two key gitimacy. areas: judiciary and electoral environment. The reforms should aim  Seek consensus among various do- to level the playing fi eld for all po- mestic stakeholders, i.e., opposition litical parties in Georgia in order to parties and CSOs, on systemic re- restore public trust. forms instead of pushing ideas forward through brute force.  Seek and follow the Venice Com- mission and OSCE/ODIHR recom-  Understand that power cannot be mendations when drafting bills re- retained indefi nitely. Therefore, im- lated to changing the political and plementing reforms to ensure level judicial environment in Georgia. playing fi eld for all political parties is a step towards ensuring that when  Consult CSOs while drafting legis- inevitably GD will be in the opposi- lation, make the legislative process tion, it will enjoy the necessary in- inclusive and transparent, and seek stitutional environment to return to approval of CSOs to gain higher le- power through winning elections.

To opposition parties

 Refrain from long-lasting boycotts transparent policy debates. of Parliament and respect the popular mandates received through  Focus on long-term goals such as elections. Boycotts can be effective, changing the system that puts oppo- but quitting parliamentary politics sition parties at a disadvantage, for limits the space for constructive and example, ensuring competitiveness 21

by reforming rules on party ﬁ nances partners by refusing to engage in or access to media, and cementing constructive political processes such judicial neutrality. as parliamentary work. This may lead to use of negative conditional-  Avoid antagonizing international ity.

To the President of Georgia

 Proactively cultivate trust among cation. opposition political parties to establish an image of the President of  Assume the role of mediator in case Georgia as an impartial arbiter. of another deadlock by cultivating President Salome Zourabichvili’s  Act as an unbiased facilitator in case personal capacity as an experienced the ruling party and the opposition diplomat. experience difﬁ culties in communi-

To Civil Society Organizations

 Monitor the implementation of the and/or other EU institutions if the April 18 agreement and report ﬁ nd- implementation process is derailed. ings to the public to ensure accountability of parties.  Continue advocating for systemic reforms to make elections and judi-  Continue advocacy efforts and raise ciary more trustworthy. concerns with the EU Delegation

To the European Union

 Help Georgian political parties  Maintain a high level of coherence practice consensus-based politics across all institutions and mem- through the Jean Monet Dialogue ber states in relation to how Geor- format. gia should advance its democracy though supporting an impartial ju-  Keep acting as a mediator using a diciary and competitive elections. stick-and-carrot approach and formulation strategy of mediation. 22 REFERENCES

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WHY DO GEORGIAN POLITICAL PARTIES STRUGGLE TO NEGOTIATE? STRUCTURAL DISINCENTIVES TO COMPROMISE-BASED POLITICS

SALOME MINESASHVILI

27 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The recent political crisis following the con- Why did Georgian parties struggle to com- tested election results of October 2020 drove promise and negotiate even in a context of both the opposition and the ruling party mutual interest? This brief discusses struc- into a deadlock for several months, with tural disincentives to the confl icting parties, respective displays of drastic demands and which accompanied by personal interests, stiff resistance. The fact that they have gone lead to the failure of consensus-based poli- through several rounds of meetings – albeit tics. Such contextual factors include extreme only with international facilitation – shows political polarization, value underpinning of that both sides considered some type of the confl ict, political culture of personalized agreement, at least ostensibly. However, politics with strong and charismatic leaders, the negotiations have on multiple occasions and historical experience of political perse- run into a dead-end, and only as a result of cution. signifi cant external pressure did the parties eventually sign the agreement, which came Key Words: Georgian political crisis, polit- in the form of a document prepared and pre- ical parties, dialogue, compromise-based sented by a European Union representative. politics.

INTRODUCTION

Street politics has been a common feature of side seemed willing to compromise over the the past three decades in Georgia, and the key demands, including new elections and 2020 political crisis can be considered anoth- freeing those detained over politically-mo- er incident within this trend. A refusal of a tivated charges. Meanwhile, this state of coalition of opposition parties to accept the political turmoil was not only threatening 2020 parliamentary election results threw Georgia’s democratization process, but also the country into yet another series of con- damaging Georgia`s reputation in the West, frontations. Despite international observers and the events became a potential threat to stating that they perceived the elections to the country`s long-sought integration into have been legitimate, including the OSCE Euro-Atlantic structures. Only after warn- (2020), the Georgian opposition boycotted ings that European and American offi cials the parliament and took to the streets to were running out of patience, and when protest the results. The situation further in- the EU decided to introduce the principle tensifi ed in February 2021, when the UNM of conditionality towards Georgia due to its leader Nika Melia was arrested for refusing “high frustration”, did the parties agree to to pay bail over charges related to protests compromise by signing the proposed docu- in 2019. The two rounds of negotiations, fa- ment (Eurasianet 2021b). On April 20, fi rst cilitated by EU mediator Christian Daniels- the Georgian Dream government signed the son, proved unsuccessful. Despite coming document after its offi cial visited Washing- together at the negotiating table, neither ton, followed by several opposition parties. 28

However, this is just the beginning, and the terms of the recent crisis, in December 2020, parties still have to arrive at the agreed form a majority of Georgians (82%) stated that it is of its implementation that has already stum- important for political parties to collaborate bled over several drawbacks (Eurasianet with each other (CRRC 2020c). So why do 2021a). political parties fi nd it so hard to engage in a consensus-based politics and rather strug- Ultimately, it is the Georgian public that is a gle to negotiate? This brief discusses several victim of the continuous instability and con- contextual factors that make the dialogue fl ict in politics; it is they who are left under diffi cult and inhibit compromises among the pressing social and economic problems, political parties. For this purpose, the fol- which have further intensifi ed as a result of lowing sections discuss multiple disincen- the Covid-19 pandemic. Frustration with the tives to consensus-based politics in Georgia, parties is often also refl ected in the public starting from political polarization to the polls, where only 18% of Georgians say that type of political confl ict, political culture, they trust political parties (CRRC 2020b). In and past experiences of power transition.

EXTREME POLITICAL POLARIZATION

Polarization and radicalization have been lic is similarly unifi ed in terms of ideology common characteristics of Georgian political (most are socially conservative), key issues life in the recent past, with a further increase (socio-economic) as well as foreign policy during the 2019 protests (Freedom House direction (Euro-Atlantic integration). In the 2020). Extreme polarization has been iden- lack of issue partisanship, Georgians are not tifi ed as a challenge to Georgia`s democrati- divided over policy or ideology, but rather zation (DRI 2018; Silagadze and Gozalishvili “over partisan political events, politicians 2019), which also creates a signifi cant struc- and the institutions they run” (CRRCa 2020). tural obstacle to the solution of political cri- Instead of specifi c ideologies or policies, poses. litical parties build their legitimacy upon the fl aws of their opponents, and instead of Georgia`s political landscape is mainly di- constructive debates over policy issues, they vided between the ruling Georgian Dream turn politics into personal attacks, while po- (GD) party and the United National Move- litical discourse serves a demonization of ment (UNM), a key opposition faction. A the opposite side. The parties often try to key feature of the political division in Geor- discredit each other referring to its leaders gia is that it revolves around personalities as “oligarch” Ivanishvili from the GD and rather than opposing ideologies, since the the “criminal” Saakashvili from the UNM. parties are identifi ed by their leaders rather As a result of radical positions, the middle than their programs. In fact, party programs ground is shrinking, turning politics into a and foreign policy priorities between the zero-sum-game and thus making any con- two parties are similar, both falling within sensus extremely diffi cult. As there is no the centrist position and prioritizing Eu- middle ground, any attempt to compro- ro-Atlantic integration. The Georgian pub- mise is deemed treason. For instance, after 29 the ‘The Citizens’ party decided to leave the fi fth column” (Interpressnews 2021b), has boycott and join Parliament in the beginning stated that party interests have nothing to of February, the boycotting parties accused do with the crisis, rather “the Georgian na- its leader, Aleko Elisashvili, of acting in ac- tional movement is on the one side and the cordance with the GD agenda (Radio Liber- interests of occupants on the other” (Inter- ty 2021a). pressnews 2021d).

The rhetoric during the post-election politi- In cases of extreme polarization, when an cal crisis has been rich with polarized narra- out-party is considered a threat to the na- tives. Both sides denounced the legitimacy tion, incumbent parties are more inclined to of their opponents with negative image por- violate democratic rules, while opposition trayals, by demonizing and declaring them groups resort to extra-constitutional mea- as threats to the country and its stability, and sures, including boycotts, protests, and qua- blaming each other for acting in the enemy`s si-revolutionary activity (McCoy, Rahman (Russia`s) interests. The GD representatives and Somer 2018). As a result, the latter no framed the crisis as radical attempts by the longer believes in democratic ways for re- opposition to sabotage the state and blamed moving the incumbent party, (ibid) which the UNM for hindering de-occupation ef- has been the case in Georgia. Extreme polit- forts by representing Georgia as a country ical polarization has not only been a facili- without unity (Civil.ge 2021b). GD repre- tating factor in starting the crisis but also a sentatives also called some opposition mem- huge obstacle to solving the confl ict. The bers “criminals” (Civil.ge 2021a) and “so- rivalry is so extreme that dialogue and con- called politicians who are guilty of different sensus almost equals betrayal (DRI 2018). heavy charges” (Radio Liberty 2021b), while When opponents portray each other as a Saakashvili`s involvement in the process has threat to the nation while the rivalry is also been used to instill a fear of destabilization so much about personalities, coming togeth- and potential revolution. Meanwhile, both er for a dialogue over a specifi c issue or a sides blamed each other for playing into policy is extremely challenging. Those in- Russian interests by avoiding any compro- volved found it challenging to compromise, mise (Interpressnews 2021a). On the other constrained by their own discourses as well hand, the opposition has put forward the as personal confrontations with the opposite narrative of themselves as Georgian patriots side. Eventually, it was external pressure fi ghting against a pro-Russian government, rather than their arrival at the agreement and thus against a threat to the nation. Nika that compelled them to sign the document. Melia, calling the government “Russia`s

VALUE CONFLICT

Value confl icts based on people`s beliefs linkage (DRI 2018), Georgian parties refer and identities are more challenging to solve to identities to discredit each other, further in comparison to resource confl icts (Harinck deepening the already existing extreme po- and Druckman 2017). In the context of a lack larization. Blaming their opponents for being of clear ideological profi les and electoral pro-Russian – an accusation frequently used 30 to demonize the other side – is often part of Georgia’s political exhibitionism, drawing This underlying identity-based difference a line between who identifi es as European has also crept into the discourse of the 2020- and who harks back to the Soviet mentali- 21 political crisis. Even before the elections, ty, and who also therefore cooperates with opposition representatives already noted the Georgian enemy. Georgian opposition that a GD victory would mean a victory of and the government have clashed over these the Russian oligarchs in Georgia, abandon- blames since the beginning of the GD`s fi rst ing the EU and NATO integration goals victory. The opposition has complained that and entailing further appeasement of Rus- Georgia under the GD government has tak- sia (Tabula 2020). The opposition and the en a Russia-friendly course and strongly lob- protesters alongside the demands of free- bied for a resolution that established Geor- ing Nika Melia drew parallels between the gia`s pro-Western course as a foreign policy arrest and the Soviet occupation and have priority. The so-called “Gavrilov`s night” in held banners “stop Putin`s dream”, “We June 2019 was one of the most potent triggers don`t want a return to the Soviet Union” for foregrounding identity-based narratives (Jam-News 2021; Politico 2021) and “free- with its consequences spilling over into the dom to Gavrilov`s personal prisoner” (Inter- 2020-21 political crisis. Russian Communist pressnews 2021c). In response, the govern- party member Sergei Gavrilov`s address to ment has not only denied the accusations, the delegates of the Inter-Parliamentary emphasizing that they were the ones driving Assembly of Orthodoxy from the Georgian Georgia close to the EU through achieving Parliamentary Speaker`s chair was followed visa liberalization and the DCFTA, but they by a boycott from the Georgian opposition also tried to play the pro-Russian card back and a rally in front of the parliament build- by blaming the opposition for pouring into ing. This event was very much framed as the Russian interests by sabotaging the election government inviting the Russian occupiers results and holding protests in the streets to take their seat in a prominent government (Interpressnews 2021a). It is not surprising chair, and interpreted as an expression of its that this identity-based framing of the con- pro-Russian sentiments, despite condem- fl ict – divided between pro-Russian and nation of the event by GD members as well backward versus pro-Western and progres- and several resignations (Civil.ge 2019). The sive – makes the crisis even harder to over- government`s decision to violently disperse come. Any compromise from the opposition the rally and arrest the opposition leader might sound like a betrayal to its own iden- Nika Melia for leading the crowd into the tity and cooperation with “Russia-friendly” parliament building has further contribut- authorities, and the idea that government`s ed to the crisis. The latter case and Melia`s complete removal through new elections re- refusal to pay his bail fee has become a key mains the only way to ensure “progressive” factor in the recent political crisis. development of Georgia. 31 POLITICAL CULTURE AND HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

The political culture of personalized politics agreement document. with a strong and charismatic leader stems from Georgia’s Soviet heritage, and is indi- In addition, Georgia’s past experience of ut- cated as one of the driving factors of politi- terly annihilating the defeated political side cal polarization in Georgia (DRI 2018) that in the context of the country’s weak institu- also inhibits a compromise-based approach. tions has created a perception of “a politi- Georgian society`s inclination for charismat- cal witch-hunt” (DRI 2018), which particu- ic leaders who also fi t within the “father of larly leads the incumbents to fi ercely resist the nation” idea (Chedia 2014) incremental- any change that could lead to losing power. ly include the idea of a strong leader. 50% of The UNM started its abrupt economic re- Georgians think that the government should forms and modernization process alongside be like a parent, in comparison to 41% who the detaining and charging of former gov- state that a government is like an employ- ernment offi cials with accusations of abus- ee (CRRC 2020b). The effect of Soviet-style ing power and illegally amassing fortunes. leadership is perhaps also responsible, and Some businessmen and former politicians this striving for a leader with a strong hand who were affi liated with the Shevardnadze also stands behind the fact that 45% of Geor- government were singled out for retribu- gians have a positive attitude towards Sta- tion (Rimple 2012). Similarly, the Georgian lin (DW 2013). Within such a culture, every Dream government was accused of selective party perceives themselves as the exclusive justice after the transition of power from the owners of the truth. There is always diffi - UNM in the 2012 elections. GD has institut- culty in recognizing defeat and victory and ed criminal proceedings against a number of governing factions rarely shy away from former UNM ministers, as well as the former using strong responses towards the opposi- mayor of Tbilisi, and President Saakashvili tion, not to mention avoiding compromise. after the end of his term in the name of “the In fact, there are rarely any cases when restoration of justice”. This movement has Georgian authorities gave in to the protes- been criticized by Georgia’s international tors’ demands, with the exception of Eduard partners as indulging in-politically motivat- Shevardnadze during the Rose Revolution. ed acts (Council of Europe 2014). Weak state Even in the latter case, a complete loss of institutions and a tight grip over the justice legitimacy and extreme external pressure system usually allows an incumbent gov- were probably stronger drivers of the de- ernment to have an uninhabited free rein cision. Thus, in the context where the 2020 in attacking their opponents. Such an expe- election results are recognized as being le- rience turns any crisis in Georgia into a ze- gitimate by Georgia`s partners, the govern- ro-sum game where in any defeat, especial- ment not only considered compromise as a ly if a compromise is seen as such, loser not sign of a weakness but also used suppres- only loses their power but might also faces sive methods, such as the imprisonment of persecution. Therefore, every side will try opposition members. Only strong external their best to hold onto power or fi ght more pressure for a dialogue drove the govern- fi ercely to obtain it. This could also explain ment and the opposition to fi nally sign the why the opposition insisted on new elec- 32 tions and a chance for a complete removal of categorically prevented the possibility of the incumbents, while the government has hosting new elections.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Multiple contextual factors inhibit Geor- from politics, since they have had enough of gian political parties from forming consen- political crises and turmoil. It should not be sus-based politics, which is also intensifi ed surprising that only one in fi ve Georgians with mutual personal animosity between trust political parties (CRRC 2020b) and they the ruling and opposition parties and their might lose interest in elections as a means of founders. Extreme polarization, wherein power transition considering how rare such parties pursue personalized rather than is- cases are in Georgia. The Georgian public sue-based politics, and further deepening of are rather more concerned about issues such the political confl ict over identity lines, cou- as unemployment and poverty, while po- pled with a political culture of authoritative litical parties continue to wrestle over their leaders and a fear of persecution after losing personal interests. Unless the latter manage power, all act as disincentives to compromise to overcome the constraining factors to a di- and establish cooperation-based politics in alogue and start acting in the public’s inter- Georgia. Such frequent clashes also lead the est, Georgia`s democratic development will Georgian public to become further detached remain a mere hope.

For the ruling party:

 Take a more rigorous focus on the  Rethink the value of compromise content of its activities, rather than in Georgian politics and continue continue accenting the “criminal working on further compromises to past” of the UNM; be fulﬁ lled as promised;

 Avoid negative language oriented  Ensure the fair power sharing while on personalities – insulting or blam- working on crucial reforms – Judi- ing speciﬁ c party members; ciary as well as electoral reforms - in the Parliament;  Evaluate the post-parliamentary election crisis thoroughly and pre-  Initiate and Implement reforms to pare for the upcoming 2021 elec- strengthen independent institutions accordingly in order to avoid tions, e.g. judiciary. another political turmoil; 33

For the opposition:

 Show a sign of will to cooperate ment; while working on the reforms in the Parliament;  Avoid an uncompromised de-legit- imization of the political processes  Avoid negative language oriented advanced by the ruling party in the on personalities – insulting or blam- name of “fraud elections”; ing speciﬁ c party members;  Prepare a strong strategy to at-  Pursue issue-oriented policies while tract the electorate prior to the 2021 working on reforms in the context self-government elections based on of sharing the balance in the Parlia- the issue-based campaign.

For the European Union and the USA:

 Continue observing the inter-party proactively both against the govern- relations, cooperation and fair pow- ment and the opposition; er-sharing in the Parliament;  Publicly discourage personalization  Measure further perspectives of of Georgian political discourse and building the consensus-based polit- negative language directed at indi- ical culture in Georgia and plan and vidual representatives of parties; follow the next activities accordingly;  Publicly encourage issue-based campaigns and politics in both the  Use political conditionality more government and the opposition. 34 REFERENCES

1. Chedia, B. 2014. The Paradigm of Post-Soviet Political Leadership in Georgia. Central Asia and the Cau- casus, 15, 3: 135-144. 2. Civil.ge. 2019. Ruling party on the defensive over Russian MP in the parliament speaker seat. 20 June. Avail- able at: https://civil.ge/archives/309180 3. Civil.ge. 2021a. After UNM Raid PM Garibashvili Talks National Unity, Dialogue. 23 February. Available at: https://civil.ge/archives/400500 4. Civil.ge. 2021b. PM-Designate Garibashvili Prioritizes “Order”, State Intervention in Economy. 22 February. Available at: https://civil.ge/archives/399785 5. Council of Europe. 2014. The functioning of democratic institutions in Georgia. 5 September. Available at: https://pace.coe.int/en/fi les/21275 6. CRRC. 2020a. Are Georgian Voters Polarized? Policy Bulletin. Available at: https://civil.ge/wp-content/ uploads/2020/10/Polarization-brief-6Oct2020.pdf 7. CRRC. 2020b. Caucasus Barometer. December 2020. Available at: https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/ cb2020ge/TRUPPS/ 8. CRRC. 2020c. NDI: Public Attitudes in Georgia. December 2020. Available at: https://caucasusbarometer. org/en/nd2020ge/IMPAPCEO/ 9. DRI Democracy Reporting International. 2018. The High Price of Extreme Political Polarization in Georgia. 15 August. Available at: https://bit.ly/3cSaCxL 10. DW Deutsche Welle. 2013. Georgia`s Struggle with the Stalin Myth. 8 August. Available at: https://www. dw.com/en/georgias-struggle-with-the-stalin-myth/a-16992871 11. Eurasianet. 2021a. Landmark Georgian political agreement already hitting snags. 23 April. Available at: https://eurasianet.org/landmark-georgian-political-agreement-already-hitting-snags 15. Eurasianet. 2021b. U.S., Europe start to play hardball with Georgia. 19 April. Available at: https://eurasianet.org/us-europe-start-to-play-hardball-with-georgia 16. Freedom House. 2020. Nations in Transit. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia/ nations-transit/2020 17. Harinck, F. and Druckman, D. 2017. Do Negotiation Interventions Matter? Resolving Confl ict Interests and Values. PS: Political Science and Politics, 38, 2: 201-209. 18. Jam-News. 2021. Georgian Opposition Leader Arrested During Special Op, Tear Gas Used. 23 February. Avail- able at: https://jam-news.net/georgian-opposition-leader-arrested-during-special-op-tear-gas-used/ 19. McCoy, J., Rahman, T. and Somer, M. 2018. Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Politics. American Behavioral Scientist, 61, 1: 16-42. 20. OSCE. 2020. Georgia – Parliamentary Elections, 31 October 2020. Preliminary Conclusions. Available at: https://www.osce.org/fi les/f/documents/a/d/469005.pdf 21. Politico. 2021. Georgia Crisis Tests Western Push to Check Russian Infl uence. 24 February. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-political-crisis-nika-melia-opposition-west-us-europe-response-russia-infl uence/ 22. Rimple, P. 2012. Who Owned Georgia 2003-2012. Transparency International Georgia. Available at: https://www.transparency.ge/en/content/stub-366 23. Silagadze, G. and Gozalishvili, N. 2019. Extreme Political Polarization as a Threat to Democratization. Avail- able at: https://medium.com/strengthening-political-pluralism-in-georgia/extreme-political-polarisa- tion-as-a-threat-to-democratisation-d331d7f6592b 24. Interpressnews. 2021a. gia volski - sxvadasxva saerTaSoriso doneze ukve Riad miuTiTeben, rom sabotaJi ruseTis strategiul interesebs emTxveva. 28 March. Available at: https://www. interpressnews.ge/ka/article/648654-gia-volski-sxvadasxva-saertashoriso-doneze-ukve-giad-miutiteben-rom-sabotazhi-rusetis-strategiul-interesebs-emtxveva/ 25. Interpressnews. 2021b. nika melia - gavrilovis davaleba Sesrulebulia _ morCilebaSi myof- ma 88 adamianma gaamarTla Tavisuflebis da Rirsebis idea. 16 February. Available at: https:// www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/642364-nika-melia-gavrilovis-davaleba-shesrulebulia-morchile- bashi-mqopma-88-adamianma-gaasamartla-tavisuplebisa-da-girsebis-idea 26. Interpressnews. 2021c. “Tavisufleba gavrilovis pirad patimars”. 4 March. Available at: https:// www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/644988-tavisupleba-gavrilovis-pirad-patimars-am-sloganit-nacio- naluri-mozraobis-carmomadgenlebi-rustavis-penitenciur-dacesebulebastan-nika-melias-mxardamch- er-akcias-martaven 27. Interpressnews. 2021c. nika melia _ erT mxares qarTuli erovnuli moZraoba dgas, meore mx- 35

ares ki okupantebis interesi _ axla Cveni arCevania vin, sad dadgeba. 17 February. Available at: https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/642557-nika-melia-ert-mxares-kartuli-erovnuli-mozraoba-dgas-meore-mxares-ki-okupantebis-interesi-axla-chveni-archevania-vin-sad-dadgeba 28. Publika. 2021. vadamdeli arCevnebi aris wiTeli xazi. es sakiTxi ar ganixileba - RaribaSvili. 2 March. Available at: https://publika.ge/vadamdeli-archevnebi-aris-witeli-khazi-es-sakitkhi-ar-gan- ikhileba-gharibashvili/ 29. Radio Liberty. 2021a. “moqalaqeebis” liderebi pirvelad daeswrebian parlamentis sxdomas. 2 February. Available at: https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/31081468.html 30. Radio Liberty. 2021b. naklebi dasavleTi da meti ruseTi _ ra mohyveba Sedegad krizisis gaRr- mavebas? 23 February. Available at: https://bit.ly/31NRQB6 31. Tabula. 2020. ra moxdeba Tu qarTuli ocneba mesame vadiT darCeba? 27 October. Available at: https://tabula.ge/ge/news/655801-ra-mokhdeba-tu-kartuli-otsneba-mesame-vadit

RADICALIZATION OF GEORGIAN PARTY POLITICS: IN SEARCH OF LONG-TERM STABILITY

BIDZINA LEBANIDZE

39 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The recent post-election crisis highlighted policy brief argues that there are two broad the role of political radicalization as a major long-term solutions to the radicalization of challenge for Georgia’s fragile democracy. Georgian politics: institutional and societal. Political radicalization in Georgia under- Institutionally, key actors who have a major mines the process of democratic consolida- role to play in political deescalation – courts tion and weakens state institutions in the and the CEC – should be institutionally re- country by contributing to mistrust among formed and have all of their inherent polit- political actors, political disengagement of ical bias removed. For the public, the im- the electorate, polarization of political trust, age of these and other key state institutions and a general lack of political legitimacy. The should also be improved, as the perceptions polarization of political trust and a lack of of the country’s society are equally import- political legitimacy of key state institutions – ant for the integrity of the electoral process ﬁ rst of all, the judiciary and central election and for overcoming political radicalization commission (CEC) leave the country within Georgia. out effective crisis mediating institutions which cannot be fully replaced by external Keywords: political radicalization, political mediation attempts leaving the country trust, parties, consensus-based politics, de- open for a permanent political crisis. This mocracy

INTRODUCTION

Political radicalizationi has always been a this will be crucial for Georgia’s democratic part of Georgian politics, yet it acquired a consolidation and overall institutional efﬁ - new dimension and moved to the fore since ciency. It will also be a litmus test for Georgia the 2012 power change from the United Na- to improve its tarnished image and requalify tional Movement (UNM) to the Georgian as a pioneer country of the Eastern Partner- Dream party (GD). It peaked during the re- ship (EaP) in the eyes of the European Union cent post-election crisis when opposing po- (EU) and international community. litical parties failed to agree on 2020’s election results, and it took six months of active The remainder of this policy brief explores international mediation to break the stale- the key features of political radicalization in mate. Georgia, identiﬁ es its negative implications, establishes a connection between political Next to causing an institutional gridlock, radicalization and the polarization of politi- political radicalization also leads to the po- cal trust, and suggests ways to overcome the larization of political trust, resulting in the curent political crisis. The brief concludes decreased legitimacy of public institutions with recommendations for the Georgian and disenchantment of the electorate from government, the opposition, and interna- the political process. Therefore, overcoming tional community. 40 MAIN FEATURES OF POLITICAL RADICALIZATION IN GEORGIA

Conceptually, the post-2012 political radi- formidable opposition parties, and Western calization in Georgia can be placed between pressure provide enough hedging to pre- the two extreme types of hybrid regimes vent authoritarian consolidation. suggested by Thomas Carrothers: a ‘dominant-power system’ and ‘feckless pluralism’ The defi ning feature of Georgia’s political (Carothers 2002). Dominant-power systems system since 2012, however, has been the are characterized by ‘the blurring of the line political radicalization driven by two rival between the state and the ruling party’ (Ibid, political groupings and their proxies: the 12) and are ‘ruled by political forces that ap- ruling GD faction and the UNM, the elector- pear to have a long-term hold on power […] ally-largest opposition party, as well as the and it is hard to imagine any of the exist- latter’s splinter groups. The two opposing ing opposition parties coming to power for camps have been embroiled in a spiral of many years to come’ (Ibid, 13). Under feck- mutual hatred and demonization since the less pluralism power rotates among ‘genu- 2012 power change. Georgia’s political rad- inely different political groupings’ by means icalization has also spilled over to the me- of democratic elections but political elites are dia landscape and resulted in severe media perceived as ‘corrupt’, ‘self-interested,’ ‘in- polarization. The partisan editorial policies effective’ and detached from the electorate of key media outlets on both sidesii create (Ibid, 10). Both types feature weak, under- parallel notions of truth, and build fertile perfoming state institutions, tenuous social ground for societal polarization. It is part of and political reforms, and a disillusioned a strategy of the rivaling groupings to reach and politically-alienated electorate (Ibid). out to their supporters and the broader elec- Georgia’s political system was sometimes torate through radical and non-compromis- considered to be a dominant-power system ing message-boxes (Kakabadze and Leb- (Berglund 2014), but since the 2012 power anidze 2021). transfer, the country moved more towards feckless pluralism, and since then represents To summarize, the key features of political a mix of both regime types. The ruling GD radicalizationiii in Georgia include, among party commands signifi cant state resources, others, permanent demonization and hate but instead of coercion it mostly relies on speech against political rivals, partisan and co-optation, which still makes it less threat- polarising editorial policies by mainstream ening compared to its predecessor. The po- media sources, negative election campaign- litical playing fi eld is also skewed in favour ing, and decreased and polarized political of the ruling party, yet elections are compet- trust. Political radicalization is shaped by itive enough for the opposition to defeat the the dominant position of the ruling party, incumbent. All branches of power – includ- and has resulted in politicized public insti- ing the judiciary – are at least partially politi- tutions with a salient opposition and civil cized and dominated by the GD, yet a strong society. civil society, various grassroots movements, 41 FROM POLITICAL RADICALIZATION TO POLARIZATION OF POLITICAL TRUST

Since 2012, Georgia’s political radicalization often considered as a social glue that holds has further excarbarated the problems of the the public together in a democratic setting, country’s democratization and overall de- and gives legitimacy to political institutions velopment. Firstly, political radicalization to fullfi l their functions. However, polarized makes playing by democratic rules harder, trust ‘inhibits the formation of public con- since it is always a matter of being ‘all in’ sensus on public policy because it reduces (Minesashvili 2021). Losing elections often the willingness of citizens to sacrifi ce their amounts to political actors disappearing ideological proclivities for the com¬mon from the political scene entirely or even end- good’ (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015, ing up behind the bars. In Georgia‘s post-So- 580). Political radicalization can further un- viet context, wherein governments general- dermine positive expectations among cit- ly tend to overstay their welcome in power, izens about procedural fairness in public this gives incumbents additional incentive institutions (Tyler 1997), honest and trans- to avoid power change at any cost. As a re- parent governments (Rothstein and Uslan- sult, the democratic institutional design of er 2005), and equitable distribution of re- the country suffers, as the incumbent regime sources (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) – all attempts to retain its grip on key state insti- of which are important ingredients of a high tutions – most notably the courts and the level of social and political trust. In the case electoral system – to prevent the victory of of Georgia, the political legitimacy of state its competitors. Opposition parties, on the institutions has always been quite low due other hand, tend to reject the legitimacy of to various reasons, varying from their polit- established political institutions by dismiss- ical bias to disfunctionality. However, po- ing them as helping hands of the ruling par- litical radicalization contributed to a more ty. partisan reasoning among the electorate. For instance, recent public opinion polls indicate Secondly, political radicalization leads to signifi cant gaps between the supporters of the polarization of political trust along par- the ruling party and the opposition in their tisan lines (Hetherington and Rudolph 2018) assessments about performance of public and the diminished legitimacy of public in- institutions and other important political stitutions and political actors, including the questions (Figure 1). political parties themselves. Political trust is 42

Figure 1: Do you agree or disagree that the Central Election Commission (CESKO) performs its work in a trustworthy manner? (Disaggregated by party preference)iv

Source: IRI. 2021. “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Georgia. February 2021.” Accessed 05.05.2021. https://www.iri.org/sites/default/ﬁ les/iri_poll_presentation-georgia_febru- ary_2021_1.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1mE0WyKgHFk9gYuohb9D4bCr8YcS7Dyl0QjtnvKvojQ_dH- 84W9ok6fztg. P. 43.

Thirdly, political radicalization also re- ernments and consensus-based governance sulted in the detachment of political par- in Georgian politics (NDI 2020, 55-56), po- ties from their electorate’s preferences and litical parties are still driven by a zero-sum the supply-demand gap between parties game mentality and mutual demonization and electorate has only increased over the policies. Considering these mismatches, it years. For instance, according to the Febru- is not overly surprising that the population ary 2021 polls, while the top fi ve concerns distrusts political parties. According to one of the Georgian population were comprised survey, political parties are the least favor- of socio-economic issues (IRI 2021, 10), the able institution except trade unions (fugure political agendas of Georgian parties were 2). Several surveys also indicate Georgia to dominated by political infi ghting and per- have one of the highest percentage of unde- sonal enmities which did not interest the cided/protest-minded electorates in both majority of the country’s population.v There the region and wider Europe (NDI 2020; IRI is also a high mismatch in the preferences of 2021). Interestingly, however, unlike many the electorate in terms of politics and gov- EU countries the protest voters have not yet ernance and what political parties actually gone in signifi cant numbers to populist far- deliver. While a majority of the population right or far-left parties. is supportive of the idea of coalition gov- 43

Figure 2: Please tell me your opinion about the work of each of these institutions:

Overall, the negative implications of politi- tutional reforms, demotivates the incum- cal radicalization for Georgia’s democratic bent regime to play by democratic rules, development are manyfold: it undermines and even leads to the rejection of established and polarizes political trust in public insti- political and social orders by some political tutions, makes the electorate disenchanted stakeholders. from political processes, undermines insti-

FROM POLITICAL RADICALIZATION TO CONSENSUS-BASED POLITICS

While the recent EU mediation provided for political radicalization to be replaced by a workable solution in the short term by cooperative and consensus-based politics somewhat defusing the political radical- (Kakachia and Lebanidze 2021). Broadly ization (Samkharadze 2021), international- speaking, there are two long-term solutions ly-mediated crisis-management with a focus to this problem, one of which is institutional, on short-term outcomes will be unsustain- the other societal. Institutionally, key actors able. Instead, the international community who have a major role to play in political and local stakeholders should work together deescalation – such as the courts and CEC to create conditions for a long-term strategy – should be adequately reformed and erase 44 political bias by increasing their transparency, inclusiveness and accountability. The problem of enforcing reforms can be solved by the EU claiming the role of guard- Doing so will also contribute to the depolar- ian of the reform process. Having signifi cant ization of political trust and increasing the leverage over Georgia, the EU, together with legitimacy of publc institutions, which is as the US, is well-positioned to push the Geor- important as any institutional reforms them- gian authorities by using a mix of positive selves. Building confi dence in elections, and and negative reinforcements into a genuine in the political process more generally, ‘is reform process, and to simultanously force about more than ensuring compliance with the opposition parties into more cooperative legal obligations, or the effective perfor- behavior. Despite the EU’s aversion to con- mance of the electoral management body, ditionality-based approaches, the Union re- or the absence of electoral malpractice’ (Kofi cently started moving in this direction (Ka- Annan Foundation 2012, 5). The social ac- khishvili forthcoming) but more needs to ceptance of public institutions among the be done to turn the current political break- governed population ‘leads to voluntary through in Georgia into a genuine process of compliance and cooperation’ from the side democratic consolidation (Panchulidze and of the population (Risse and Stollenwerk Youngs 2021). For this to happen, the EU 2018). For this to happen, both government and the US are advised to institutionalize and opposition parties should take action. the conditionality-based approach in their The government should depoliticize key broader strategy and to more clearly delin- public institutions and, in response, the op- eate parameters of reform benchmarks in position should display more cooperative their documents and progress reports. behavior. 45 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, while Georgia’s democratic consol- ization of political trust. Overcoming these idation was stuck in limbo for a long time, challenges will be of paramount importance political radicalization added another nega- for Georgia’s overall development, but also tive layer and derailed Georgia’s progress, for its Euro-Atlantic prospects. Below, this which was expected to accelerate after the brief provides a number of policy recom- 2012 electoral power change. Political radi- mendations on how different stakeholders, calization also undermines institutional ef- including the parties themselves, can con- fectiveness in the country and leads to polar- tribute to this task.

To the Georgian government and political parties:

 Georgian political parties should the judiciary undergoes a fundamen- pay more attention to the widening tal reform and erases clan corporat- gap between their agendas and the ism, according to the recommenda- electorate’s preferences, and engage tions of the Venice Commission and more in issue-based discussions in other international stakeholders; order to avoid alienation from the voters;  Next to judicial reform, political parties should work in close coordi-  In close coordination with the broad- nation with international and local er public and civil society, political- stakeholders on additional legisla- ly neutral public ﬁ gures should be tive mechanisms to avoid political- appointed in key positions in the ly-motivated personnel procure- CEC and other institutions which ment policies in public services and are supposed to refrain from polit- to avoid the unjust persecution of ical bias; representatives of former governments.  The government should ensure that

To the EU, the US and the international community:

 In coordination with and based on fullﬁ llment; assessments by the Venice Com- mission and other international  Threaten political parties to reduce stakeholders, Europe and America high-level contacts and to cut the should propose a long-term reform associate membership to European package in the areas of the judicia- party families if they continue with ry and elections with clear bench- radical political agendas and do marks, and make further progress not engage in cooperative, consen- in EU-Georgia relations on their sus-based politics; 46

 Reward consensus-ready, construc- consensus-seeking, including the tive parties with intensiﬁ ed linkag- Jean-Monnet format,vi but introduce es, high-level contacts and, possibly, also a broader format of societal dia- an invitation to associate member- logue with participation of non-par- ship in EU party families; ty actors (NGOs, CSOs, unions);

 Propose new formats of political

i According to McCauley and Moskalenko, “[p]olitical radicalisation of individuals, groups and mass publics occurs in a trajectory of action and reaction, and the end of the trajectory can seldom be controlled by either side alone. Radicalisation emerges in a relationship, in the friction of intergroup competition and conﬂ ict that heats both sides”(2011, 223). ii The most notable examples of partisan media coverage deliver TV Mtavari (close to UNM) and TV Imedi (close to GD). iii According to some authors, political radicalization needs to be distinguished from societal polarization since the former mostly refers to extreme political partisanship and does not neccessarily include deep divisions within a society. See the comment by Lincoln Mitchell in: GIP. 2021. Extreme Political Polarization: Implica- tions for Georgian Democracy. http://gip.ge/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GIP-Expert-comment-16-1.pdf. P. 4. iv *”Other parties” includes parties selected by fewer than 3 percent of respondents: Citizens, United Georgia, For Justice, Republican. v For instance, according to the recent IRI survey, only 26% of surveyed population „deﬁ nitely“ or „somewhat“ supported „the opposition’s decision to boycott entering the Parliament“ (IRI 2021, 34) which was the main political event in the country for the last six month. vi On Jean-Monnet dialogue format see: Samkharadze, Nino. 2021. “Jean Monnet European Dialogue – Next Step towards Consensus-Oriented Politics.” Georgian Institute of Politics. http://gip.ge/jean-monnet-european-dialogue-next-step-towards-consensus-oriented-politics/. 47 REFERENCES

1. Berglund, Christofer. 2014. “Georgia between dominant-power politics, feckless pluralism, and democracy.” Demokratizatsiya 22 (3). 2. Carothers, Thomas. 2002. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy 13 (1): 5–21. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0003. 3. Hetherington, Marc J, and Thomas J Rudolph. 2015. Why Washington won’t work: Polarization, political trust, and the governing crisis. Vol. 104. University of Chicago Press. 4. ---. 2018. “Political trust and polarization.” In The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, 579-597. Oxford University Press. 5. IRI. 2021. “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Georgia. February 2021.” Accessed 05.05.2021. https:// www.iri.org/sites/default/files/iri_poll_presentation-georgia_february_2021_1.pdf?fbclid=I- wAR1mE0WyKgHFk9gYuohb9D4bCr8YcS7Dyl0QjtnvKvojQ_dH84W9ok6fztg. 6. Kakabadze, Shota, and Bidzina Lebanidze. 2021. Stakeholders of (De-) Radicalisation in Georgia. https:// dradproject.com/?publications=stakeholders-of-de-radicalisation-in-georgia. 7. Kakachia, Kornely, and Bidzina Lebanidze. 2021. “Time to Push for Consensus-based Politics in Geor- gia.” Civil Georgia. Accessed 05.05.2021. https://civil.ge/archives/402624. 8. Kakhishvili, Levan. The European Union’s New Role in Georgia: Successful Mediation and a Way Ahead. Georgian Institute of Politics. http://gip.ge/the-european-unions-new-role-in-georgia-successful-mediation-and-a-way-ahead/ 9. Kofi Annan Foundation. 2012. Confi dence in elections and the acceptance of results. A policy brief of the Elec- toral Integrity Initiative. 10. McCauley, Clark, and Sophia Moskalenko. 2011. Friction: How radicalization happens to them and us. Ox- ford University Press. 11. Minesashvili, Salome. 2021. Why do Georgian Political Parties Struggle to Negotiate? Structural Disin- centives to Compromise-Based Politics. Georgian Institute of Politics. http://gip.ge/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Policy-Brief-33.pdf. 12. NDI. 2020. “Public Attitudes in Georgia. Results of December 2020 telephone survey.” Accessed 05.05.2021. https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/fi les/NDI%20Georgia_December%202020%20Poll_ ENG_FINAL.pdf. 13. Panchulidze, Elene, and Richard Youngs. 2021. “Defusing Georgia’s Political Crisis: An EU Foreign Policy Success?”. Carnegie Europe. Accessed 14.05.2021. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/05/10/ defusing-georgia-s-political-crisis-eu-foreign-policy-success-pub-84494?fbclid=IwAR1STGg- 28pgs6t8XJ-yLYQkdP9p6WHR4P-T8OWGEqzbHloiFdLp_7zafNNM. 14. Risse, Thomas, and Eric Stollenwerk. 2018. “Legitimacy in areas of limited statehood.” Annual Review of Political Science 21: 403-418. 15. Rothstein, Bo, and Eric M Uslaner. 2005. “All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust.” World Pol. 58: 41. 16. Samkharadze, Nino. 2021. “Jean Monnet European Dialogue – Next Step towards Consensus-Orient- ed Politics.” Georgian Institute of Politics. http://gip.ge/jean-monnet-european-dialogue-next-step-towards-consensus-oriented-politics/. 17. Tyler, Tom R. 1997. “Citizen discontent with legal procedures: A social science perspective on civil procedure reform.” The American Journal of Comparative Law 45 (4): 871-904.

QUEST FOR CREDIBLE ELECTIONS IN GEORGIA: IS “E” THE ANSWER?

SHOTA KAKABADZE

51 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This policy paper discusses the idea of em- tion line) the authorities need to start work- ploying internet voting in elections in Geor- ing in this direction as its implementation in gia and all the advantages and disadvantages Georgia may ﬁ x many key issues. Howev- this offers. It engages with detailed analysis er, before E-voting is introduced, there are of the Estonian case as the only country that several major challenges that need to be ad- has been using E-voting nationwide for ﬁ f- dressed: internet penetration and computer teen years, and then discusses its application literacy remain quite low in the rural areas in the Georgian context. Considering all the of the country. Furthermore, substantial advantages internet voting offers (boosting work needs to be done to increase trust in non-resident voter turnout, increasing par- the system. ticipation of multiple socio-demographic groups, as well as making it easier for citi- Key words: Georgia, Estonia, E-Voting, zens living on the other side of the occupa- Elections, Trust, Voter Turnout.

INTRODUCTION

Internet voting is being partially used in quent political crisis, was no exception to this some countries (Australia, Norway, Swit- rule. This policy paper aims to suggest one zerland, Canada), while Estonia has been way to address this long-standing challenge allowing nationwide application of this by limiting the human factor and introduc- method for last fi fteen years. The case of ing electronic voting (E-voting). This work the latter is the focus of this paper and is engages in cost-benefi t analysis of the ap- discussed in detail as the Baltic states have plication of internet voting in the Georgian always been a role model, and in many in- context. It is examining pros and cons of the stances have actually assisted Georgia with introduction of E-voting, potential challeng- economic reforms (Radio Free Europe 2007) es Georgia could face, and how to address or with responses to Russian cyber warfare those obstacles, as well as the overall bene- (Kirk 2008). Internet voting could be another fi ts of internet voting for further strengthen- project to be successfully implemented fol- ing the fragile Georgian democracy. lowing the example set by this Baltic state.

Implementation of modern technology in In the ﬁ rst part, this paper examines how the election process is especially import- Estonia has beneﬁ ted from E-voting and the ant for emerging democracies like Georgia, advantages it has offered. Next, it moves to where elections have been haunted by con- the mechanisms of internet voting - i.e. how stant distrust from the losing side for last 30 it work in practice - then discusses the case years since its independence. The latest par- of Georgia and ends with recommendations liamentary election, in 2020, and the subse- for the actors involved. 52 WHY ESTONIAN EXPERIENCE OF E-VOTING MATTERS FOR GEORGIA?

Estonia is known for its advanced digital (Valimised “Statistics about…” n.d.). Inter- society. Already in 1996 E-banking services estingly, the share of E-voters in the turn- were developed, which contributed to the out in the latest parliamentary elections was embrace of E-solutions and the later use of 43,8% (ibid) highlighting the attractiveness IDs (e-estonia n.d.). By the year 2000 the of internet voting. On the other hand, what country had online government E-cabinet needs to be noted is that although the intro- meetings and online tax declarations. Cur- duction of this internet voting option has not rently, 99% of residents of Estonia (including affected the overall turnout, it had a signiﬁ - foreigners) hold ID cards with microchips cant impact on Estonians voting from abroad and 70% use them regularly to get various (Valimised n.d.). As will be discussed in the services online (ibid). Internet voting was next section, this trend makes it quite attrac- ﬁ rst introduced in Estonia in 2005 and the tive in the Georgian context - easing voting share of voters opting for this option was for thousands of Georgians living abroad or only 2 percent. However, in the latest par- students residing in Tbilisi, but registered in liamentary elections (2019) it grew to 27% other towns and villages.

Process of E-voting

In order to use the internet voting option, a voter must have an ID card issued together with pin codes, the ID program in the computer and a card reader. They are similar to the one currently being issued in Georgia and used for getting various services from the state. For instance, to get a free parking permit near your residence in Tbilisi you need to log in with your ID and pin codes. Afterwards, the voter will need to download the voter application. There are guidelines available on how to verify the authenticity of the page as well as the application which is being downloaded. Once the voter application is downloaded, the voter logs in with the pin code 1 and proceeds to the list of the parties to vote for. The application also offers options to see the names of party candi- dates or to use search option to fi nd specifi c names in the list. Once the voter makes a choice, she/he will need to confi rm it with a digital signature i.e. pin code 2. After the process is complete, a QR code appears on the computer screen that allows the voter to check whether the vote was delivered to the server and the choice recorded correctly. There are several mechanisms in the system that ensure that the voters express their will freely and are not being coerced. Not only that the voter can choose a suitable time or date to vote, but also he/she has an option to change the vote later. Furthermore, the voter could go to a polling station and cast a paper vote, which will automatically annul the earlier internet vote. Additional privacy measures include encryption of internet votes in such a way that it is not possible to see for whom the voter voted, as the system separates between personal data and the votes given. The votes cast via the internet are opened only during counting with a secret key, access to which is given to the members of the election committee, and more than half of them have to be present in order to open the votes (Valimised n.d.b). 53 APPLICATION OF E-VOTING IN GEORGIA: POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES

At the 5th Annual Democracy Conference or- to allow internet voting, yet some legislative ganized by the Georgian Institute of Politics, measures - popularization of ID cards and the head of the Central Election Commission increasing penetration of the internet - were of Georgia, Tamar Zhvania, remarked that, still needed (IPN 2015; Khatchapuridze based on other countries’ experiences, there 2016). If this is indeed the case, that techno- were no plans to fundamentally change any- logically Georgia is ready to include E-vot- thing in the methods of voting. Online plat- ing as an option for voters, the authorities forms were developed only for technical is- need to start working in this direction as sues, be it either double-checking voter lists soon as possible considering the following or registering observer missions and other advantages it could offer: boosting turnout commissions (5th Annual Democracy Con- of citizens of Georgia living abroad, and in ference 2020, 4-5). However, at the moment the occupied territories or students living in Georgia, ID card technology is used for far from their place of registration, as well various government services. The Minister as facilitating the more active participation of Justice has mentioned on several occa- of ethnic minorities. sions that technologically Georgia is ready

Effects on voter turnout and participation

As was mentioned in the introduction, in- was 56,11% (CESKO “Elections 2020” 2020). ternet voting was fi rst introduced in Estonia However, the turnout of the voters abroad in 2005 and has been becoming increasingly was only 18,5% - that is about three times popular ever since. Turnout in the parlia- less (ibid). There are two ways specifi c to mentary elections in Estonia has been con- the Georgian context in which the E-voting sistently just above 60%, however, the num- could possibly increase voter turnout. ber that has been growing is the portion of the votes cast via the internet. In 2007, the First of all, it could positively affect partici- fi rst parliamentary elections since the intro- pation of young people and students. Most duction of E-voting, the share was 3,4% out university goers in Georgia live in Tbilisi but of all the eligible voters. This number grew are registered in different municipalities all to 27,9% in the latest parliamentary elections across the country. Thus, in order to vote, (2019). When calculated percentages from they need to travel to their place of registra- the turnout the number is 5,5% and 43,8% tion, which they might not be able to do due for 2007 and 2019 respectively (Valimised, to work commitments, distances being too n.d.c). long to travel for one day, or simply being lazy. As studies have shown, costs related For Georgia, turnout for the parliamentary to reaching the polling station play a bigger elections is not that low either. Despite the role in whether a person is going to vote or COVID-19 crisis, in the fi rst round of the last not, in comparison to the costs related to ac- parliamentary elections (2020) the turnout quiring necessary information for making 54 an informed choice (Blais et al. 2019). Vot- able to afford a day off to travel and vote or ing via the internet from one’s own personal do not feel passionate enough about any po- computer, on the other hand, eliminates an litical party or any issue to go to the trouble. obstacle to voting as there will be no need to Introduction of internet voting on the other travel just for one day. hand, has the potential to considerably increase access to voting for Georgian citizens Similarly, participation in the elections and living abroad. thus the exercise of their fundamental democratic right is considerably limited for Geor- Last but not least, the Coronavirus pan- gians living abroad. In order to vote, they demic further tilted the balance in favor of need to travel to the cities where the embas- distant voting. The spread of the virus is in- sies or consulates are located, which could deed an obstacle to voters showing up at the explain such a big difference between the polling station - internet voting can be done voter turnout in Georgia and abroad (~56% even in the middle of full nationwide lock- and ~18% respectively). Either they are not down or by the patient from a hospital bed.

Boosting political participation of ethnic minorities and those living in the occupied territories

The case of Estonia illustrated one interest- decrease the constant controversies around ing trend that could be very beneﬁ cial in polling stations in the regions populated by the case of Georgia. Studies suggest that the Azerbaijani and Armenian minorities. technology enables increased political participation. Internet voting bridges societal Additionally, what is especially relevant divisions and eases political participation, for Georgia is the possibility of voting from even of those with fewer resources (less con- home for Georgian citizens living on the nected to modern technology) or those who other side of the occupation line. In other are simply not voting because of the incon- words, people living in Abkhazia and South veniences of paper voting (Vassil et al. 2016, Ossetia do not need to put themselves in 458). Furthermore, studies indicate that af- danger trying to cross the dividing line to ter several cycles of elections when internet exercise their fundamental human right. voting was used, the disparity between eth- One more implication, if this practice is es- nic and non-ethnic Estonians voting online tablished, is the increased popularity and has totally disappeared (ibid, 456). Thus, trust in E-services. Thus, by broadening E-voting could be an important step in ad- state services, citizens of Georgia living on dressing the issue of ethnic minorities in the other side of the occupation line will be Georgia being disfranchised from political able to vote without leaving their homes. life. As well it could, to a certain degree, 55

Lack of trust and its implications

Despite all the advantages and benefi ts inter- strategies to convey as much detailed infor- net voting has to offer, there are several major mation about the mechanisms of internet challenges and cons that policymakers and voting to the wider public as possible could the Election Administration of Georgia (CEC) be the way to considerably mitigate this will need to overcome in order to successfully problem. Furthermore, it needs to be noted apply E-voting in the Georgian context. One that while trust is an important factor at the of the fi rst issues that need to be addressed is beginning, after several elections where in- the lack of trust not only in the system but ternet voting was enabled, the need for its also in state institutions. Another obstacle to powers diminished. (Vassil et al. 2016, 456). the full implementation of the internet voting option is the lack of internet penetration and The mode of internet voting that is analyzed computer illiteracy. This section of the paper in this policy paper is also known in the lit- discusses these challenges in detail and, in erature as REV (remote electronic voting). the concluding part, provides certain recom- It permits voters to cast their vote from an mendation to address them. unsupervised environment (from any place outside the polling station). This implies that Studies show that one of the key factors fa- there is a high risk of voter coercion as the cilitating internet voting is trust in the sys- vote is cast in an uncontrolled environment tem (Trechsel and Vassil 2011 cited in Vassil (Gibson et al. 2016). However, the possibili- et al. 2016). Study of a case of Finland, which ty of changing your vote cast online at any allowed postal voting for its non-resident time prior to the election day, as well as an voters, illustrated that while voters extreme- option of casting a paper ballot at the polling ly distrustful of this mode of casting the bal- station and thus annulling the internet vote lot were unaffected, medium-trusting voters cast before, are some ways of ensuring vot- living abroad began using postal voting if ers’ choice is expressed freely and protected the nearest polling station was more than against external infl uence. Additional mech- 100 km. away, while high-trust voters ad- anisms that include separation of the vote opted this method even if the polling station cast and personal information, as well as a was within a range of 10-30 km. (Nemčok possibility of checking if votes were deliv- and Peltoniemi 2021). ered and registered correctly on the server facilitates, increase trust in the system. Considering the general low level of trust in state institutions in Georgia (trust in the However, privacy in this system still largely executive government in 2019 stood at 21%, depends on the level of trust in the device for the parliament at 15%, while for the po- from which the vote is cast(ibid). Whether litical parties just 8% (Caucasus Barometer there is malware on the primary device used time-series dataset 2019)) as well as the con- for voting, or whether the internet connec- testing of offi cial election results by the option is secure, remain some of the many po- position parties every time, this just might tential problems internet voting faces. and prove to be the greatest challenge for the au- relates to another challenge connected with thorities. Transparency and communication computer literacy and access to the internet. 56

Computer literacy and access to the internet as a major stumbling block

Another major challenge that the Georgian Those numbers point to the challenge that authorities will need to overcome is increas- needs to be addressed before all the bene- ing computer literacy and access to the in- ﬁ ts of E-voting can be materialized. What ternet. According to a report published by the study of the case of Estonia suggests is the Institute of Development of Freedom of that the potential enabling effect of internet Information (IDFI) in 2020, in 2018 Georgia voting - i.e. considerably increasing par- with 63%, along with Ukraine, scored the ticipation of multiple socio-demographic worst among the Eastern Partnership coun- groups - takes at least three elections to take tries in terms of internet accessibility (IDFI place (Vassil et al. 2016, 459). However, the “internet usage and accessibility…” 2020). same authors also note that, considering that Internet penetration, according to the same internet voting in Estonia was introduced study, is really high in Tbilisi (125%) and Ad- in 2005, and since then the level of inter- jara (124%), while in other regions it remains net penetration, the use of social media and quite low. In Guria it is 33%, while in Ra- technology has increased so dramatically cha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti internet that widespread acceptance of E-voting may penetration is no more than 15%. Interest- take considerably less time than three elec- ingly, regions which are populated by eth- tions (ibid). nic minorities are better connected – Kvemo Kartli scores 76% and Samtskhe-Javakheti Last but not least, scepticism towards new 59%. In comparison, internet penetration in ID cards and their application, especially Samegrelo - Zemo Svaneti is around 41%, from conservative religious groups (Net- Shida Kartli around 51% etc. Similarly, na- gazeti 2013) needs attention from the poli- tional computer ownership is at 62%, 74% cymakers. Special campaigns and programs of which is in the urban population (ibid, 5). need to be developed in order to better com- The IDFI report also includes Geostat data municate the mechanisms behind the new from 2019, according to which 46% of pop- identiﬁ cation cards and to address fears ulation has no basic knowledge of the com- among this sector of the population. puter (ibid, 6).

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For several years, the Georgian political rectly recorded in the server, could posi- scene has been haunted by constant distrust tively affect the level of trust in the election and challenges to the election outcomes, results. Furthermore, E-voting facilitates with the latest parliamentary election being participation of non-resident voters i.e. citi- no exception to this rule. Removal of human zens living abroad or far from their places of factor and allowing citizens to cast their registration. Internet voting can also consid- vote online from their personal computer, as erably ease the process for Georgians living well as giving them an opportunity to check in the occupied territories. Another positive whether their votes were delivered and cor- side-effect of this move could be increasing 57 trust in E-services in general and mitigating all, trust in the system of internet voting and distrust in new IDs among religious conser- application for connecting ID card to the vative groups in Georgia. computer needs to be high. Furthermore, internet penetration in the rural areas remains However, the introduction of internet vot- extremely low and the state has to start in- ing still faces several major challenges and vesting more in this infrastructure. stumbling blocks. In order to take full advan- tage of the beneﬁ ts that are being offered by This policy paper proposes the following the implementation of E-voting, they need recommendations to facilitate the applica- to be addressed as soon as possible. First of tion of internet voting in Georgia.

To the government of Georgia and the CEC

 Start conducting studies to assess it works, as well as distributing vid- the readiness of the E-infrastructure eo instructions and ads via media and software for the introduction channels on how to cast one’s vote E-voting online

 Initiate special campaigns to speed  Government should invest more up the process of replacing old in building E-infrastructure in the identity cards with new ones. Fur- regions, and most importantly, in- thermore, conduct information crease internet penetration in the ru- campaigns to address the issues of ral areas. distrust in the new ID cards among conservative groups of the popula-  Work closely with political parties tion. to explain the beneﬁ ts and security of E-voting systems. Explain how  Promote Computer literacy, i.e. how the votes cast through them are to use the ID card reader, pin codes, protected and how anonymity is b what is a digital signature and how guaranteed.

To the international community and countries with the experience of E-voting

 Assist, by bringing in foreign ex- against possible hacking and works perts and involving Estonia, in or- properly. der to share knowledge and skills.  Organize special training and work-  Cooperate closely with the CEC and shops to inform the third sector other institutions responsible for the about possible loopholes and how administration of elections to ensure to check on actors who could abuse an E-voting infrastructure is secure the system. 58

To international and local non-governmental organizations as well as to the local media

 Actively cooperate with the gov- election day when paper votes could ernment of Georgia on information invalidate the online ones already campaigns and popularization of in- cast, as well as when the E-votes are ternet voting. opened for counting.

 Make sure an online voting process  Work more closely with ethnic mi- is free from government / local au- norities in order to make internet thority intervention by closely mon- voting more accessible to them and itoring the process, especially on boost their participation. 59 REFERENCES

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