H. Bing Siong The Indonesian need of arms after the proclamation of independence In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 157 (2001), no: 4, Leiden, 799-830 This PDF-file was downloaded from http://www.kitlv-journals.nl Downloaded from Brill.com10/05/2021 06:23:46PM via free access HAN BING SIONG The Indonesian Need of Arms after the Proclamation of Independence At the time Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed Indonesia's independence on 17 August 1945, considerable numbers of arms were actually in Indonesian hands (Wagner 1988:119). In 1943 the .Japanese had established the Indo- nesian PETA, in Java comprising 66 battalions.1 Besides, there were the heiho (in my previous articles incorrectly spelled heihö), the Indonesian auxiliary forces, amounting to 25,000 troops.2 In addition there were 24,000 lightly armed Indonesian police with their better equipped Tokubetsu Keisatsutai (special police units), with a total of 15,000 revolvers, 10,000 rifles and 80 machine guns at their disposal (Miyamoto 1973:60, 1986:340; Remmelink 1978:53). This advantageous starting-position of the fledgling republic was not to last long, however. At noon on 17 August, very shortly after Sukarno had made the pro- clamation, the Gunshireikan (Japanese army commander), Lieutenant Gen- eral Nagano, issued Army Operation Order No. 1113, ordering the East, 1 Allen 1976:70; Lebra 1977:109; Notosusanto 1979:99. Miyamoto (1973:17), followed by War History Series (1976:3), Remmelink (1978:50), Groen (1985:94), and L. de Jong (1986:520, aban- doning the correct figure in L. de Jong 1985:972), mentions a figure of 67 battalions, including 3 (according to the editors of Miyamoto 1986:223 this should be 'plus 3') in Bali; however, accord- ing to Miyamoto's notes on a copy of this publication which I was fortunate enough to be per- sonally presented with by him, the number was 69 (including the 3 in Bali). Salim Said (1991:13), referring to Simatupang, says there were 60 battalions in Java. As Miyamoto (1973:25, 27, 1986:231-3) points out, the PETA was under-equipped, however. Initially only 20,490 weapons were made available to around 33,000 PETA members, and this was later even reduced by 6,500. 2 Miyamoto 1973:29,1986:235. Wagner (1988:119) overlooks the heiho. Lebra (1977:97) points out that thousands of heiho were sent to Burma and Thailand and Raben (1999:85) says that the Japanese also deployed heiho troops in the Philippines. According to Army Operation Order No. 1125 of 26 August 1945,1,286 heiho were to arrive at Tanjung Priok harbour in that month (NIOD IC 065459:12, which mentions Jogjakarta as the place where the relevant army orders were issued, although the army headquarters were in Jakarta; the katakana mentioning the place name was incorrectly transliterated by the British intelligence). HAN BING SIONG, a former Associate Professor of the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, is the author of, among other publications, 'The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia and the Administration of Justice Today; Myths and Realities', Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 154-3 (1998):416-56, and 'Sukarno-Hatta versus the Pemuda in the First Months after the Surrender of Japan (August-November 1945)', Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 156-2 (2000):233-73. Mr. Han may be contacted at Ocarinalaan 556, 2287 SJ Rijswijk, the Netherlands. Downloaded from Brill.com10/05/2021 06:23:46PM via free access 800 Han Bing Siong Central and West Java military commanders to disband the PETA on or around 19 August.3 A similar order with respect to the heiho was issued on 20 August, to take effect on 23 August, and with respect to the 48th Division on 25 August (Army Operation Order 1119, NIOD IC 065459:6). The decision to dissolve the PETA and heiho was taken on 16 August (when Sukarno and Hatta were being held captive by some pemuda, or milit- ant youths), at a meeting of the brain trust of the Gunshireibu (army head- quarters) together with the Gunseikanbu (military administration) top. This meeting had been convened on 15 August, after the Japanese had heard the radio broadcast of the Emperor's shattering announcement of Japan's accept- ance of the Potsdam Declaration and a broadcast by the Japanese press agency Domei.4 Then Major General Yamamoto, the chief of staff (Samböchö) and superintendent of the military administration (Gunseikan), had decided, on the advice of the civilian top official Saitö, that the Japanese should main- tain the status quo.5 The formal decision on this and other important policy matters was taken the next day. As the Allies at that time had not yet estab- lished contact with the Japanese army, Allied pressure in this respect, as Alers (1956:107) for instance suggests, was absolutely out of the question. Mean- 3 NIOD IC 065459:3. Peranan TNI (1965:28) and B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:100) seem to assume that, in view of the date of the army order, the Japanese took the decision accordingly on 17 August. Nugroho Notosusanto (1979:134) mentions 18 August as the day when the order was issued, whereas Rinzema (1989:31) claims that the PETA was disarmed on the 29th. It is cer- tainly wrong to say, as Dahm does (1971:115), that the Japanese took the decision because of PETA attacks after the proclamation of independence. According to Kahin (1952:137), PETA units throughout wide areas of Java, if they were not too far outnumbered, resisted disarmament and clashed with the Japanese. R. Kadim Prawirodirdjo (1972:8) mentions only two places where the PETA was not disarmed: Sokowidi (Banyuwangi) and Pelabuhan Ratu (Sukabumi). Larson (1970:260) only mentions Salatiga in this connection. Notosusanto (1979:135), on the other hand, says that all PETA units without exception were disarmed by the Japanese. Van Mook (1949:85) erroneously claims that the disbanded PETA were allowed to retain their arms. 4 Sukarno and Hatta, when seeking confirmation of Japan's surrender, did not meet anyone at the Gunseikanbu office (Hatta 1970:30) in the BPM building (Djojoadisuryo 1972:71), on the north-eastern corner of Gambir Square (formerly Koningsplein, and currently Medan Merdeka), at noon on 15 August, as all had been summoned to listen to the Emperor's radio broadcast at the Gunshireibu in the NKPM building, on the opposite south-western corner of the square. See the photo of Army Commander Imamura in front of this building in Ran-In (1967) and Imamura (1986:67), who incorrectly locates this building on the eastern and the palace on the western side of the square. Curiously Meelhuijsen (2000:30, 35), possibly influenced by Shibata (NIOD 006958), mentions 14 August as the date of the Imperial Proclamation. 5 Notosusanto 1979:129. When Sukarno and Hatta approached Major General Nishimura on the evening of 16 August to ask permission to proclaim independence, the latter, mindful of his superior's decision, very cautiously withheld his consent (ARA AS 5205-23:2). To Rear Admiral Maeda, naval liaison officer of the army general staff, Sukarno and Hatta had expressed hopes of Japanese non-interference. As Maeda was not in a position to give them the desired assurance, he requested Major General Nishimura to see the two Indonesians (Han 2000a:240). Maeda's role as described by Van den Doel (2000:77) is therefore not in agreement with the facts. Downloaded from Brill.com10/05/2021 06:23:46PM via free access The Indonesian Need ofArms after the Prodamation of Independence 801 while, Army Operation Order 1110 to préparé for the change in the situation by tightening security measures was issued at 10 p.m. on 15 August. The army was hereby ordered to be prepared to suppress any possible outbreaks of violence (NIOD IC 065459:1-2). In the absence of orders from higher levels of command6, the army brain trust on the 16th stipulated in the first place that the interests of the Japanese army and Japanese citizens, as well as their protection, were the army's main concern. In the second place the greatest sincerity should be observed vis-a- vis the Allied forces. Thirdly, further guidance for the Indonesians on their road towards independence was impossible. All those attending the meeting endorsed the proposal by the sakusen sambö (staff officer in charge of opera- tions), Lieutenant Colonel Miyamoto, to dissolve and disarm the PETA and heiho.7 On the other hand, it was decided to widen the scope for Indonesian participation in the existing government administration.8 Moreover, it was feit that the industry supplying the army's needs should be converted into one supplying the needs of the people and that Indonesian industries should be extended and supported.9 As A.H. Nasution (1977:286) points out, dissolution of the PETA and heiho 6 ARA AS 5205-23:2 (ARA AS 5208:5, suggesting the reverse, is probably ambiguous); Nishijima and Kishi 1963:478-9; Miyamoto 1973:50; War History Series 1976:8; Notosusanto 1979:129. B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:79), followed by, for example, L. de Jong (1985:1037,1986:516) and Van Poelgeest (1999:24), assumes that the orders to maintain the status quo were received from Singapore. 7 Miyamoto 1973:50; War History Series 1976:8; Remmelink 1978:52. Van Delden (as cited by Van Bruggen and Wassing, 1998:72) incorrectly suggests that Miyamoto was the fourth-highest in rank in Java. See, however, the photo in Blussé, Remmelink and Smits (2000:240), showing Colonel Obana on the extreme left sitting next to Major General Nishimura, and Miyamoto with Lieutenant Colonel Nomura and Major Count Yamaguchi, who all three belonged to the fifth echelon, standing behind Obana, Nishimura and Yamamoto (see also Miyamoto 1973:4).