SUMMARY OF THE MEETING OF THE

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE

Sunday 13 October 2019

Whittle, Queen Elizabeth II Centre London, United Kingdom

213 STC 19 E | Original: English | 7 November 2019 213 STC 19 E

ATTENDANCE LIST

General Rapporteur Susan DAVIS (United States)

Rapporteur, Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security Matej TONIN ()

NATO PA President Madeleine MOON (United Kingdom)

NATO PA Secretary General David HOBBS

Member delegations Wouter DE VRIENDT Karolien GROSEMANS Leo PIETERS Nikolay TSONKOV Robert KRALICEK Peter JUEL-JENSEN Jean-Christophe LAGARDE Philippe MICHEL-KLEISBAUER Sonia KRIMI Jürgen HARDT Ulrich MÄURER Njall Trausti FRIDBERTSSON Andrea CANGINI Fabrizio ORTIS Ivans KLEMENTJEVS Ausrine ARMONAITE Sven CLEMENT Nancy ARENDT KEMP Lene WESTGAARDE-HALLE Sverre MYRLI Maria Angeles LUNA Fikri ISIK Kamil SINDIR Taner YILDIZ United Kingdom Kevan JONES United States Brendan Francis BOYLE Neal Patrick DUNN Gregory Weldon MEEKS

Associate Delegations Armenia Gevorg GORGISYAN Austria Michael HAMMER Serbia Dejan RADENKOVIC Switzerland Isidor BAUMANN Corina EICHENBERGER Ukraine Mariana BEZUHLA Yehor CHERNIEV Andriy KLOCHKO Ivanna KLYMPUSH-TSYNTSADZE

European Parliament (EP) Eva KAILI Kris PEETERS

213 STC 19 E

Regional Partner and Mediterranean Associate Member Delegations Algeria Mohamed RACHEDI Israel Zvi HAUSER

Speakers Bryan WELLS NATO Chief Scientist, NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO), Brussels Dr Catherine WARNER Director, Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE), STO, La Spezia, Italy James Henry BERGERON Political Advisor, Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), Northwood General (Ret.) Tom MIDDENDORP Chairman, International Military Committee on Climate and Security (IMCCS) and Senior Associate Fellow, Clingendael Institute, The Hague

International Secretariat Henrik BLIDDAL, Director Anne-Laure BLEUSE, Coordinator Giulia MOSCHETTA, Research Assistant

213 STC 19 E

I. Opening remarks by Kevan JONES (United Kingdom), Vice-Chairperson

The Science and Technology Committee (STC) Vice-Chairperson Kevan Jones (UK) welcomed all participants and called the STC meeting at the 65th NATO PA Annual Session to order. He thanked the former STC Chairperson Maria Martens (NL), who did not stand for re-election in the spring elections for the Dutch Senate, for her hard work and dedication to the Committee. Mr Jones explained that the Committee would elect a new Chairperson in the afternoon. In the meantime, he would chair the meeting in the morning and STC Vice-Chairperson Jean-Christophe Lagarde (FR) would chair in the afternoon. Mr Jones also thanked STCTTS Vice-President Bruno Vitorino (PT), who did not run in the recent Portuguese elections and could not attend the Spring Session, for his invaluable contributions as a long- standing Committee officer and wished him all the best for his future career.

Mr Jones announced all candidates for Committee officer positions known to him. He reminded delegates who wished to put their candidacies forward to approach him or the Committee Director and to do so by 12:30 to allow time to prepare ballots, if necessary. In particular, he noted that no one had yet announced a candidacy for the vacant STC alternate member position on the Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council (UNIC).

II. Adoption of the draft Agenda [147 STC 19 E]

The draft Agenda [147 STC 19 E] was adopted.

III. Adoption of the Summary of the meeting of the Science and Technology Committee held in Bratislava, , on Saturday 1 June 2019 [129 STC 19 E]

The Summary of the meeting of the STC held in Bratislava, Slovakia [129 STC 19 E] was adopted.

IV. Presentation by Bryan WELLS, NATO Chief Scientist, STO, Brussels, on NATO Science and Technology Priorities, followed by a discussion

Bryan Wells, NATO Chief Scientist and Chair of the NATO Science and Technology Board (STB), presented the priorities of the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO). He explained that the NATO STO primary mission was to maintain NATO’s scientific and technological (S&T) advantage by generating, sharing, and utilising advanced scientific knowledge, technological developments, and innovation in support of NATO’s core tasks.

Dr Wells presented a wide-ranging overview on NATO efforts on technology, innovation, and emerging and disruptive technology. NATO’s key priorities included:

- innovation and research and development (R&D); - maintaining the technological edge; - accelerating capability development; and - a commitment for NATO to stay at the forefront of S&T.

Dr Wells outlined the three most relevant elements for NATO S&T contained in the recently released 2019 NATO Political Guidance:

- the commitment to stay at the forefront of S&T in order to maintain the technological edge and accelerate capability development; - the aim to incorporate new technology at the earliest stage possible; and

1 213 STC 19 E

- NATO S&T’s goal to include an enhanced focus on drivers contained in the NATO Defence Planning Process, particularly the medium-term capability targets and the defence planning priorities.

Dr Wells argued that the current NATO S&T strategy position was well suited to respond to these demands. Then, he delineated his overarching priorities as Chief Scientist: to keep the STO fit for purpose in an ever-changing context; to ensure that the STO is a key driver for NATO business; and to take the enterprise to the next stage. He also outlined the key challenges for the STO over the next year, including the need to implement the NATO S&T Strategy; update and review the NATO S&T Priorities; develop a vision for the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE); and cooperation between NATO and the European Union.

He noted how his priorities were closely aligned with the STC Resolution 453 Maintaining the Science & Technology Edge and Enhancing Alliance Agility, adopted at the 2018 NATO PA Annual Session in Halifax. Dr Wells outlined, in detail, the measures the STO was implementing which corresponded to the recommendations included in Resolution 453, covering the following elements:

- increasing R&D expenditure; - adapting to S&T realities; - unleashing the full potential of the NATO S&T community; - nurturing a more diverse community of scientists; - enhancing the agility of NATO S&T; - demonstrating the value of S&T to the military community; - improving strategic engagement and communications; - reinforcing the STO with a focus on baseline funding for the CMRE; - evaluating NATO S&T on mission delivery; and - increasing transparency on defence S&T and R&D investment trends.

After briefly touching upon the NATO S&T Strategy, Dr Wells presented the STO’s horizon scanning efforts, which helped to mitigate the risk of strategic shock to the Alliance and allowed scientists to advise NATO leadership on the emergence of possible disruptive technologies, for example through Von Karman Horizon Scannings. He also outlined the Technology Watch Cards and the Technology Trends report, a publication providing an overview of emerging technologies and assessment on the level of maturity for military applications. In view of the upcoming NATO Leaders’ Summit in London, he concluded by encouraging the members of the STC to reach out to their NATO S&T Board Members.

Following the presentation, Committee members enquired about a range of topics, including:

- the level of dialogue and cooperation with the European Commission and the European Defence Agency (EDA); - the STO approach towards artificial intelligence (AI), autonomy, and autonomous weapons; - NATO and Allied efforts in quantum technology; - the role of new technologies in urban warfare; and - the possibility of more formal interactions between NATO PA and the STO.

Dr Wells emphasised that dialogue between the STO and the EU continued on an upward trend. He then explained that AI and autonomy were high priorities at the strategic level, in particular AI and big data as applied to strategic military decision making. Regarding urban warfare, he said the STO had to maintain the technological edge in the traditional military areas. In addition, the STO had been called upon to do new work to support the Alliance’s hybrid

2 213 STC 19 E warfare efforts. With regard to autonomous weapons, he recognised the need for an interdisciplinary discussion on the ethical boundaries between scientists, lawyers, and policymakers. On quantum technology, he told delegates a Von Karman Horizon Scanning was conducted on the topic in the previous year and that the NATO Military Committee had been briefed on the state of play. He argued that true quantum computing was still far in the future, but some capabilities relevant to the military could be fielded before then. Two applications could already be anticipated: unbreakable cryptography and quantum sensing. With regard to more formal interactions between the Committee and the STO, Dr Wells stressed that a very good level of interaction existed at the strategic level – all three STO executives had presented to the Committee in 2019 – and at the staff level.

V. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security (STCTTS) Artificial Intelligence: Implications for NATO’s Armed Forces [149 STCTTS 19 E] by Matej TONIN (Slovenia), Rapporteur

The STCTTS Rapporteur Matej Tonin (SI) presented the draft Report on the opportunities and challenges AI poses for NATO’s armed forces. Recalling the STC meeting at the Spring Session in Bratislava, Mr Tonin outlined the updates and recommendations incorporated into the report since then.

Mr Tonin explained that AI was revolutionising every segment of society, including the defence and security sector. The report focused on two aspects of AI application in military affairs: information and decision support and robotic autonomous systems. The Rapporteur also emphasised that China’s efforts in military AI were concerning for the Alliance. Mr Tonin urged the Alliance’s main innovators to continue investing in defence-related AI research. He also reiterated that the Allies must not let the defence technology gap grow to the point it would undermine interoperability within the Alliance. Lastly, he asserted that Allied governments must play a critical role in overcoming the challenges of adopting AI. He argued that the incorporation of AI into armed forces raised major legal, moral, and ethical questions. The Alliance’s armed forces were treating this issue very seriously he added. He cited as positive steps both the Pentagon, which was recruiting an “ethicist” to oversee military AI, and France, which had announced the creation of a ministerial ethics committee focused on defence matters.

Following the presentation of the draft report, three amendments were discussed. Mr Tonin presented two amendments he had received from the US delegation, which he was happy to accept. The Committee members concurred. The first amendment proposed to bring the language used in the Report in line with UN language. The second amendment the Rapporteur accepted concerned a passage which could be read as a value judgment when he actually did not mean to make such a judgment. The Turkish delegation proposed an amendment for paragraph 63 to include a reference to more flexible standards for technology sharing. However, Mr Tonin and some other members voiced concerns about the proposed amendment, given the very sensitive nature of technology sharing. The Rapporteur proposed a compromise, which encouraged open architecture standards and regulations, as open architectures lent themselves to more flexible technology diffusion while respecting national sensitivities.

A general discussion followed the discussion of the amendments. The issue of ethics and AI was a central concern. Some members asked about the regulatory provisions for the “rise of machines” and the consequences for civilians. Members enquired about what could be done to prepare citizens and prevent violations of privacy, especially in countries that were not fully democratic. The Rapporteur recalled the discussions during the Spring Session in Bratislava and argued that the human must retain involvement in the decision-making process. Another Committee member raised the issue of adversaries developing fully autonomous weapons. He argued that having a human “in the loop” was a sound principle but stressed that human

3 213 STC 19 E reaction times could pose disadvantages when confronting potential adversaries. The Rapporteur said that Parliamentarians should monitor this issue closely, with a clear focus on ethics, but also track Chinese developments in the field.

The draft Report [149 STCTTS 19 E], as amended, was adopted unanimously.

VI. Consideration of the draft Special Report NATO Anti-Submarine Warfare: Rebuilding Capability, Preparing for the Future [150 STC 19 E] by Leona ALLESLEV (Canada), Special Rapporteur, presented by Njall Trausti FRIDBERTSSON (Iceland), Vice-Chairperson

STC Vice-Chairperson Njall Trausti Fridbertsson (IS) presented the Report on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) by Special Rapporteur Leona Alleslev (CA). The report had three main findings: NATO faced an increased submarine threat from Russia; China and North Korea presented big challenges to the Alliance; and a severe shortfall in ASW capabilities existed within NATO. The report focused on a future where maritime unmanned systems would be integrated tightly with manned assets. At the heart of this future ASW vision would be unmanned surface vessels and underwater vessels. However, he argued that this would take time and investment. Key problems remained in secure communications; collision avoidance; power generation and storage; and many other areas.

Mr Fridbertsson insisted that much remained to be done. In particular, he argued that the Alliance had to prepare for the future by making the current technologies better and pursuing new ones. He explained how the report emphasised the huge ASW challenges and thus made a pitch for NATO’s CMRE, which had a large focus on these challenges. He also added that the STC remained committed to following Allied progress and ensuring that governments lived up to their promises.

Following the presentation, some Committee members asked about the Rapporteur’s view on the Baltic Sea and the Arctic region as new theatres of anti-submarine warfare. In response, Mr Fridbertsson argued that in the past 12 to 18 months there had been renewed interest in the region. He addressed the risks associated with Chinese investments in the region. He also mentioned the renewed US effort in re-establishing the 2nd fleet in Norfolk. Moreover, he gave the example of the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman during the NATO Trident Juncture exercise, adding that it was the first time in 30 years that such a carrier was deployed to the High North. With regard to the Baltic Sea, he argued that there was a lot of maritime traffic and business which needed to be protected.

Another Committee member mentioned the efforts Norway was undertaking along with Germany to develop a new fleet of modern submarines. Mr Fridbertsson answered that this was a very positive step.

At the end, STC Vice-Chairperson Jones asked the Committee to consider a proposed editorial amendment, introduced by the Turkish Delegation, to clarify the Montreux Convention. The amendment was accepted.

The draft Report [150 STC 19 E], as amended, was adopted unanimously.

4 213 STC 19 E

VII. Panel on Bridging the Gap between S&T and Operators: Maritime Perspective Catherine WARNER, Director, CMRE, STO, La Spezia, Italy and James Henry BERGERON, Political Advisor, MARCOM, Northwood

Catherine Warner gave a presentation on the role and mission of the CMRE. Dr Warner explained that the CMRE was NATO’s only research laboratory and experimentation facility. The CMRE was initially created during the Cold War due to the Russian advance in submarine capabilities. Dr Warner asserted that the threat environment of over 60 years ago was back again, as Committee members had just heard from Mr Fridbertsson. She emphasised the relevance of CMRE: it bridged the gap in technology between the scientists and the operators in the maritime space. At the CMRE, Dr Warner continued, scientists and engineers worked together to bring new technologies to operators in their environment. She explained that the Centre was governed by the NATO STB, primarily equipment oriented, and customer funded. About 75% of funding came from NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT); 25% from member states and national industry; and 5% from the European Commission. She also noted that ACT funding had been reduced in recent years.

CMRE research programmes included: collaborative autonomy; big data analytics and decision support tools; and artificial intelligence and deep learning. Dr Warner explained that the Centre operated two research vessels, the NRV ALLIANCE and the CRV LEONARDO which enabled S&T solutions to be explored and developed at sea. She then explained the wide range of autonomous platforms the Centre operated and equipped with different sensors for specific missions.

Dr Warner outlined how the CMRE conducted ASW as well as operational experimentation. She argued that operational experimentation was a catalyst for transformation, as it exposed the operational community to innovative ideas and technologies and paved the way for industry to deliver the capability. The CMRE also conducted a range of operational experimentation at the low to medium technology readiness level to address NATO capability gaps. She also explained the Centre’s involvement in NATO and national exercises. Overall, she concluded that CMRE was well-positioned to lead and champion interoperability and to provide the framework for industry to demonstrate their solutions.

James Henry Bergeron, Political Advisor at MARCOM, talked about the latest changes in NATO maritime policies, recent developments in MARCOM’s relationship with NATO S&T, and future technological challenges. Mr Bergeron asserted that the need for S&T and the operational community to work together had never been stronger. Due to the return and expansion of the Russian , MARCOM’s roles and size had been expanded and a Joint Force Command in Norfolk had been established.

Mr Bergeron argued that NATO needed to maintain its technological edge in ASW, underwater warfare, and hold its own in mine warfare. He explained that Allies had enjoyed a substantial capability advantage in ASW throughout the Cold War. However today this edge was eroding because of new weapons and platforms, along with a focus on new Allies vulnerabilities such as electronic warfare, GPS jamming, and undersea cables. He argued that NATO needed technical brilliance and managerial excellence to keep the Alliance ahead of its challengers.

He asserted that a key technology to be exploited was maritime autonomy. In this way, NATO could shift from a posture of a smaller number of high-cost, high-value assets to a posture of a large number of less expensive, autonomous, and networked assets. That shift might compensate for anti-access and area-denial efforts by potential adversaries, since it created a much larger and more distributed field of lower value assets.

5 213 STC 19 E

Mr Bergeron then talked about a potentially new revolution in military affairs, citing quantum technology as one particular area of note. He argued that quantum technology could be only eight to fifteen years away from operationalisation and that it could have profound implications for computing speed, encryption, radar, sonar, and navigation. He also outlined Chinese current quantum developments. He asserted that the implications of this technology were tantalising. For example, stealth aircraft might become much less stealthy in the future, as quantum sensors could more easily detect them. With regard to sonar, ASW, and navigation systems the same principles could allow for much more accuracy.

He then considered the political and strategic implications of the operationalisation of this technology, including high costs, interoperability challenges, and miscalculation between the Alliance and potential adversaries. NATO had to remain apprised of new S&T developments and think them through from the beginning, he concluded.

Following the presentations, some of the members raised the issue of trust in autonomous systems. Dr Warner argued that it was a matter of developing trust over time, and Mr Bergeron explained that were still at the early stages of implementation. The issue of the CMRE’s budget cut was also raised, and Dr Warner explained that this had been done with a five-year notice, allowing CMRE to adapt, while retaining efficiency and quality. Some delegates had questions on the implications of quantum technology. Others asked about the amount of money invested in quantum technology, and how Allied investments compared to Chinese one.

Mr Bergeron answered that a technological breakthrough could occur in 10 to 15 years, but it would take even more time until these technological innovations could be translated into military use. He further explained his thoughts on quantum technology. On quantum competition with China, he argued that some of the political assumptions on rivalry in the scientific field would have to be revisited.

VIII. Summary of the future activities of the Science and Technology Committee and of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security

Chairperson Jean-Christophe Lagarde (FR) presented the activities of the STC and STCTTS. In May 2019, the STC visited Singapore. During the visit, the topics of AI, cybersecurity, maritime security, and the fight against disinformation operations were discussed. The Sub-Committee also visited the UK in June 2019 where they discussed defence S&T; cyber security; AI; machine learning; big data; ASW; and maritime defence and security. For the third visit of the year, the Subcommittee would join the DSCTC for a visit to Norfolk and Washington from 28-31 October. The visit would focus on North Atlantic security and defence; how to maintain NATO's military advantage; Chinese and Russian military modernisation and the challenges of hybrid, information, and cyber operations.

Mr Lagarde also presented the proposed 2020 report topics. The STC General Report would focus on air, missile, and space defence. The STC would also prepare a Special Report as a continuation of its work on maintaining NATO’s S&T edge. The STCTTS would work on a report assessing the future of urban warfare and the role new technologies could play in this area.

The 2020 visits would deal with the report topics and include: a visit to France to discuss its new space defence strategy and the newly created Defence Innovation Agency. The STCTTS was also planning a joint visit with the ESCTD to Turkey, Mr Lagarde explained. The central issues of the visit would be the Turkish defence industry, energy security, and the Iranian nuclear issue. STCTTS had also considered a visit to Japan to understand the changes in the global S&T environment. However, Japan was unable to host the Committee in 2020. The Committee leadership promised to discuss the destination of second STCTTS visit as soon as

6 213 STC 19 E possible. The Chairman also noted the participation of STC and STCTTS Officers in the NATO PA Joint Committee Meetings in February.

IX. Election of Committee and Sub-Committee Officers

The following officers were elected by acclamation:

Science and Technology Committee (STC)

Chairperson Kevan JONES (UK) Vice-Chairperson Sven KOOPMANS (NL)

Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security (STCTTS)

Chairperson Matej TONIN (SI) Vice-Chairperson Sven CLEMENT (LU) Kamil SINDIR (TR)

The following officers were re-elected by acclamation:

Science and Technology Committee (STC)

Vice-Chairperson Jean-Christophe LAGARDE (FR) Njall Trausti FRIDBERTSSON (IS) General Rapporteur Susan DAVIS (US) Special Rapporteur Leona ALLESLEV (CA)

Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security (STCTTS)

Vice-Chairperson Karl-Heinz BRUNNER (DE)

Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council (UNIC)

STC Representative Sverre MYRLI (NO) Ivans KLEMENTJEVS (LV) STC Alternate Philippe MICHEL-KLEISBAUER (FR)

No candidate came forward for the STC alternate member position within the UNIC.

X. Consideration of the draft General Report NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defence, Stabilising Deterrence [148 STC 19 E] by Susan DAVIS (United States), General Rapporteur

STC General Rapporteur Susan Davis (US) presented the 2019 draft General Report NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defence, Stabilising Deterrence [148 STC 19 E]. Ms Davis said the report had been updated to reflect the comments and questions raised during the STC meeting at the Spring Session in Bratislava. She also explained that the updated report featured concrete and targeted policy recommendations on cyber security and defence, cyber deterrence, and countering persistent cyber campaigns.

Ms Davis urged the Committee members to fulfil their national cyber commitments under the NATO Defence Planning Process and the NATO Cyber Defence Pledge. The Rapporteur

7 213 STC 19 E stressed that NATO should continue to maintain a cyber deterrence policy of ambiguity. NATO should not disclose the threshold for the level of a cyber attack which would trigger NATO’s collective defence clause – Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO should also not specify how it would react if the opponents were to cross that threshold. Such strategic ambiguity served to strengthen NATO’s cyber deterrence.

Ms Davis also discussed the issue of cyber operations falling below the threshold of Article 5. In this context, she outlined the US strategy of Persistent Engagement to counter persistent cyber campaigns, which consist of a large number of cyber operations to achieve strategic impact over time. The new US strategy did not simply consist of a purely defensive posture, she explained, but shifted to a “defend forward” approach by seeking to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at the source. Ms Davis encouraged active debate at NATO level on this topic. Ms Davis argued the Alliance had to counter such grey zone campaigns with the right mix of security, defence, and deterrence, including increased civil preparedness and resilience. To conclude she encouraged the practice of naming and shaming perpetrators of malicious cyber operations, in a timely manner and preferably in coordination.

Following Ms Davis presentation, one Committee member welcomed the report’s discussion on offensive cyber capabilities and argued that they were the best way to deter. The Ukrainian delegation emphasised the importance of coordination and cooperation between NATO and Ukraine in the cyber domain.

Three amendments put forward by the Ukrainian delegation were then discussed. One was an editorial amendment to rectify a typo. The other two amendments centred on the idea to increase the mention of partner nations in the report. The Rapporteur accepted the first of these and, concerning the second, proposed language capturing the sentiment, but which integrated better with the rest of the text. The Ukrainian delegation accepted the latter language. All amendments were accepted by the Committee.

The draft Report [148 STC 19 E], as amended, was adopted unanimously.

XI. Consideration of the draft Resolution Strengthening NATO Cyber Security, Defence, and Deterrence [167 STC 19 E] by Susan DAVIS (United States), General Rapporteur

Sonia Krimi (FR) presented an amendment on behalf of the Head and Deputy Head of the French Delegation concerning the draft resolution’s wording in relation to responses to cyber attacks. The discussions centred on the role of governments in responding to cyber attacks. Following some discussions in the Committee, a compromise acceptable to all was found. The oral amendment was accepted by the Committee.

Ms Krimi also presented another amendment on behalf of the Head and Deputy Head of the French Delegation centring on the “sovereignty of states”. After in-depth discussions between the Rapporteur, Ms Krimi, Mr Lagarde, and other Committee members, compromise language acceptable to all was found. The oral amendment was accepted by the Committee.

A Ukrainian delegate presented an amendment by the Ukrainian delegation to strengthen the partnership dimension of the resolution. The Rapporteur accepted the amendment and so did the Committee.

The draft Resolution Strengthening NATO Cyber Security, Defence, and Deterrence [167 STC 19 E] was adopted, as amended.

8 213 STC 19 E

XII. Presentation by General (Ret.) Tom MIDDENDORP, Chairman, International Military Committee on Climate and Security (IMCCS) and Senior Associate Fellow, Clingendael Institute, The Hague on Climate Change and Security, followed by a discussion.

General (ret.) Middendorp gave a presentation on the security impact of climate change. He explained that most risks worldwide were climate related. He argued that NATO should be concerned about climate change because it presented a direct threat to military critical infrastructure. Sea level rise, storm surges, and wildfires compromised critical economic hubs as well as military installations and operations. For example, he noted how NATO ACT in Norfolk, the biggest naval base in the world, was threatened by sea level rise. Climate change also presented geostrategic risks, he added. Melting ice in the Artic opened up new lines of communication in the north which may lead to international geopolitical tensions and competition for resources. Moreover, General (ret.) Middendorp asserted that climate change was a threat multiplier. Climate stress on water, food, and energy resources increased the likelihood of mass displacement, instability, and conflict, which also provided breeding grounds for extremism.

General (ret.) Middendorp stressed that NATO should care because climate change provided some opportunities for the Alliance to become more self-sustained, for example looking at the new technologies associated with energy transition, which would allow NATO to reduce vulnerabilities and the logistical burdens of the operations. General (ret.) Middendorp emphasised that climate change was a problem involving the entire world thus requiring a response from society as a whole. Climate change, he argued, was also a matter of national security. Many wars had been fought over access to resources thus the Alliance had an important role to play, as part of the global response to this problem. NATO should adapt and transform taking this change into consideration, he concluded.

Some members argued that climate should have been taken into account in political, military, and geostrategic thinking from the very beginning. General (ret.) Middendorp agreed with the point raised, adding that intelligence services had warned about the threat for decades and now the military had to confront the issue and adapt. Some members asked how conflict accelerated climate change and others raised the issue of water resources. General (ret.) Middendorp answered that conflict had also a significant impact on climate change both directly and indirectly, for example by causing larger CO2 emissions. He also argued that technology can provide the answer with regards to freshwater supplies. Other members asked how close the world was to a point of no return and what could be done to reverse it. The General asserted that climate was in constant change and we could only adapt and make sure it did not deteriorate.

Technology was a big part of the solution, he asserted. The defence community could be a platform for innovation on a variety of technologies that could help mitigate this problem, by helping the military to reduce their own footprint and being at the forefront of energy transition. The military could also play a bigger role in answering humanitarian and natural disasters, General (ret.) Middendorp argued. NATO could do more with regards to early-warning mechanisms, looking at risk areas and fragile countries, preventing the emergence of conflict by addressing climate change as the root of conflict. The military should also prepare in order to protect military infrastructure and cities in coastal areas. Moreover, he continued, climate change could lead to new geopolitical tensions, for example in the Arctic region. The energy transition would also affect countries which are highly dependent on oil and gas, such as Russia, requiring NATO to adapt strategically, he concluded.

9 213 STC 19 E

XIII. Any other business

No other business was raised.

XIV. Date and place of next meeting

The STC would hold its next meeting in Kyiv, Ukraine, where the Spring Session would take place from 22 to 25 May 2020, Mr Lagarde announced.

XV. Closing remarks

The Vice-Chairperson concluded the meeting of the STC and thanked the guest speakers, observers, interpreters, the NATO PA Secretariat, and hosts from the UK Parliament.

______

www.-pa.int

10