1 Policy Learning: an Understudied Mechanism of EU Influence On

Policy Learning: An understudied mechanism of EU influence on Turkish Domestic Politics

Alexander Bürgin

Abstract This article argues that EU-induced learning processes in Turkish domestic politics deserve greater attention within the Turkey-related Europeanization literature, which, in view of Tur- key’s increasing distance from the European Union, tends to attribute a continued partial alignment with EU policies to either domestic, or to non-EU-related external factors. Two arguments are put forward. First, also in domestically driven reform processes, the EU may still be able to influence policy choices due to domestic actors’ bounded rationality and conflicting goals. Second, while persuasion and learning at the top political level is rather unlikely, given the currently tense relations, there are much more favourable context conditions for EU-induced learning in the interaction of the Turkish bureaucracy with the EU.

Introduction

The fading credibility of Turkey’s European Union membership perspective and Ankara’s increasing alienation from the EU have undermined the EU’s conditionality strategy; its trans- formative influence has decreased significantly since the opening of accession talks.1 Contin- ued partial alignment with EU standards is often attributed to domestic factors, particularly the domestic agenda of the governing party2, or by Turkey’s modernization strategy.3 In addition, the role of other international actors in Turkish domestic politics, such as the Euro- pean Court of Human Rights and the UN has been highlighted.4

Explanations involving the domestic turn and the focus on global diffusion processes both have merits. However, these accounts neglect EU-induced learning processes as an alternative mechanism of EU influence. Different types of learning can be distinguished, rang- ing from simple strategic learning, where actors merely alter strategies, to complex learning

1 in which fundamental preferences and objectives are scrutinized and revised. Generally, the accession Europeanization literature differentiates between EU-driven social learning processes, and domestically driven lesson-drawing processes in which the EU plays no or only a minimal role.5 Social learning implies a process whereby positions, interests and identities are shaped trough the exchange with other actors.6 As a consequence of such EU-induced learning, domestic actors alter their view regarding policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy programmes, institutions, ideologies ideas and attitudes.7 Harmonization with

EU standards is therefore not the result of strategic cost-benefit calculations, but rather, of learning and persuasion processes. Such learning processes may occur in EU-financed projects or programs, but also in broader policy networks additionally incorporating international actors such as the UN, the World Bank and NGOs. In contrast, domestically-driven lesson drawing implies an instrumental use of the EU for domestically defined interests. Lesson drawing is therefore technical learning regarding policy instruments of actors who are engaged in problem resolution, however without changing their interests or preferences.8

The study of learning processes is relevant because of its focus on the micro-founda- tions of policy-making and international relations. A myriad of micro processes of interacting civil servants and politicians shape the policy making process. Consequently, understanding policy making processes requires a focusing on the micro level of individuals and their social interactions. Over time, “these exchanges generate changes in information, goals, values, behaviours, structures, policies and outcomes.”9 Learning in international networks at the administrative level can have two types of impact on political decisions at higher levels. Bu- reaucratic actors may either persuade further domestic actors at national level, or may climb in the hierarchy and attain more influence. The latter triggers policy changes because of changes in the domestic power constellation; however the positions and preferences of

2 these domestic actors are partly shaped by preceding policy learning processes in international networks.

While political science learning approaches originated from the United States, learning and learning-related theories have gained major significance in the study of EU politics, in particular due to the “European integration dynamics around 2000, including enlargement and the governance turn of exploring new instruments.”10 Internally, the increased use of soft mechanism of governance such as the open method of coordination has increased the interest in applying a learning perspective in the study of EU policy making. The governance turn presumes a tendency that policy making in the EU has moved away from hierarchical legislation towards network governance, assuming that such communicative networks will lead to a deliberative setting, allowing optimum solutions to be found by actors who are open to changing their positions in the light of the stronger arguments.11 As regards the external dimension, a burgeoning literature underlines that “the EU has become increasingly active over the past two decades in seeking to extend or export its internal rules, norms, and standards beyond the Union’s borders to the wider world through a variety of institutional channels.”12 Thereby, learning and persuasion through participation in EU regulatory networks and capacity building programmes have been identified as a relevant mechanism of

EU influence.13 While the accession Europeanization literature has highlighted political conditionality as a key driver for domestic reforms,14 several studies have in addition shown the relevance of EU-induced learning and socialization processes in candidate country’s reform process.15

Despite this broad literature on policy learning in EU studies, Turkey related Europe- anization research has largely neglected this soft mechanism of influence, focussing instead on the EU’s political conditionality or domestic factors as explanations for (non)alignment

3 with EU standards. Rare exceptions include Bolukbasi and Ertugal,16 stressing the relevance of policy learning in the transformation of Turkey’s employment policy, and Bürgin,17 highlighting the learning and socialization effects of projects financed by the EU’s instrument for pre-accession assistance.

Against this background, this article aims at demonstrating the usefulness of policy learning as a conceptual framework to understand the impact of the EU on Turkish politics and policies. In face of the stalled EU accession talks, policy learning processes outside the framework of official accession negotiations represent an alternative pathway of Europeani- zation in Turkey. The study of policy learning may draw attention to the role of the Turkish bureaucracy, NGOs and policy networks at local and national level. While these actors are often engaged with EU actors and EU projects, they are neglected by the Europeanization literature on Turkey, which rather tends to focus on the behavior of the political elite, in particular the ruling party, in order to explain success and failure of Europeanization processes.Two main arguments are put forward in this article. First, the domestic turn in Turkey- related Europeanization literature18 neglects the potentially significant role of the EU in mainly domestically driven lesson-drawing on the policy choices due to domestic actor’s bounded rationality and conflicting goals. The complexity of topics leads vaguely defined general positions, facilitating learning processes in which domestic actors are ready to fine- tune their positions. Consequently, learning goes beyond the mere strategic or instrumental use of the EU by these actors for domestically defined interests. Second, while it is important to acknowledge that tense EU-Turkey relations at the top political level, characterized by high levels of reciprocal mistrust, are obstacles for EU-induced learning processes, at the administrative level the context conditions for persuasion and learning are much more favoura-

4 ble. This assessment is the result of a series of interviews with civil servants from the Euro- pean Commission and Turkey’s EU Delegation to Brussels between April 2015 and October

2016; and with German officials from the Ministry for Economics and Energy, and the Minis- try for Environment, involved in EU projects in Turkey, in December 2016. Three main con- clusions from these interviews can be drawn. First, a professional EU-oriented expert community in Turkish bureaucracy continues to take an interest in the progress of the accession talks. Second, changes in the political culture have contributed to a generally more transpar- ent policy formulation process, allowing civil society organisations greater access, and facilitating the exchange of arguments. Third, intra- and interministerial administrative coordination has been improved, partially as a result of the EU accession process, contributing to a more deliberative setting, and thus a more conducive context for learning processes within and between ministries, but also in the interaction with civil servants from the EU or the member states. The extent to which these factors are still valid in the post-attempted coup period remains to be seen.

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The first section develops the argument that ill-defined positions and conflicting goals of domestic actors, often explained by the complexity of policy issues, contribute to learning processes in ways which go beyond an exclusively instrumental engagement with the EU, highlighted by the lesson-drawing model.

The second section assesses the context conditions for EU-induced learning processes at administrative level. The third section illustrates some favourable context conditions for EU- induced learning process in the field of environment and energy.

Lesson Drawing Is Not Only Domestically Driven

Research on Europeanization, understood in the narrow sense of alignment of candidate countries with the EU’s body of law and institutions distinguishes between mechanisms driven by the EU, and those by domestic factors. In the first case, the EU itself is the trigger, without which reform would not occur. In the second case, domestic change is spearheaded by domestic actors whose interests coincide with the EU demands, which thus act as an anchor for reform.19 Another distinction is made between two logics of actions: the logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness, originally defined by March and Olsen.20

According to the logic of consequences, governments are open to policy changes if the per- ceived benefits are higher than the costs; according to the logic of appropriateness, actors are motivated by internalized identities, values and norms.21

If these two distinctions are paired, four mechanisms of Europeanization can be identified.22 First, the external incentives model combines EU conditionality and a logic of consequences. Compliance with EU demands is expected if the candidate country considers that membership benefit outweighs adaption costs. In this scenario, a key factor is the credibility of membership, because the candidates need to be certain of receiving the promised re- wards in return for meeting the EU’s demands. The second mechanism, the social learning model assumes a top-down dynamic and logic of appropriateness, and is an alternative to rationalist explanations of conditionality. The EU’s domestic impact results from a process of socialization in which “domestic actors internalize EU norms that they regard as legitimate.”23 Thus, “the participation in the institutional structures of EU may affect the interests and identities of the state agents.”24 Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors are motivated by internalised identities, values and norms. Consequently, actors are more open to learning about principles and normative standards from external sources.

In contrast, in the lesson drawing model, the focus is on domestic factors (bottom-up dynamics), with domestic actors’ behaviour following either a logic of consequences (third mechanism) or a logic of appropriateness (fourth mechanism). In the former case, policy changes are the result of domestic needs; dissatisfaction with the domestic status quo triggers reforms. Alignment with EU standards thus fulfils particular domestically defined needs.

In the later case, policy changes are inspired by changes in policy paradigms. In either case, considerations of any EU incentives for rule adoption play at best a minor, indirect role.25

The EU incentive is effective only in so far that it changes the opportunity structure of domestic actors; those actors with preferences in line with EU demands are provided with an additional justification for their position; in other words, the EU serves as an “external ally”26 for their domestic agenda. Therefore, the adaptation pressure from the EU may strengthen certain actor’s bargaining power vis-à-vis domestic opponents, by offering political or finan- cial resources required to pursue domestic change. Studies highlighting domestic factors argue that the EU is used strategically for the domestically-defined interests of policy makers, thus excluding significant EU impact.27 According to this view, learning is limited to strategic learning. Dissatisfaction with the status quo in the country triggers domestic reforms, with the EU serving at best as accelerator of facilitator of reforms.

However, it is questionable whether lesson-drawing should be considered as following an exclusively domestically driven logic of consequences. In practise, blurred boundaries exist between domestically driven lesson-drawing and EU-induced social learning. The initial engagement in EU projects or the alignment of certain policies with EU standards can indeed be motivated by domestically defined interests and goals; nevertheless the interaction with

EU actors may subsequently lead to learning processes which reach beyond the initial strate-

7 gic calculation of a domestic actor, thus replacing a logic of consequences with a logic of appropriateness. This can be explained by the fact that policy positions are often not clearly specified. While actors usually hold a generally-defined position, fine-tuning is often shaped in the interaction with other actors. From a communicative theory perspective, actors may change position and preferences if other actors’ arguments are conceived as valid.28 Accord- ing to Béland29 policy actors generally face a certain level of uncertainty that makes learning processes necessary. Dolowitz and Medearis argue that policy makers operate at best within bounded rationality as a result of the lack of resources, often vague and ambiguous goals, and a lack of clear understanding about the nature and content of imported policies.30 Ac- cording to Kingdon,31 policy makers are faced with multiple opportunities and problems as political events unfold in unpredictable ways. Hall argues that the policy making process does not reflect a parallelogram of preferences among public officials, but implies processes of social learning.32Thus, it has to be questioned whether lesson-drawing can be characterized as a linear process from problem definition to finding and adoption of policy solutions, excluding any impact of external actors on the position formation. A more realistic view is that problem at domestic level are ambiguous, and that the preferred policy solutions of a policy maker are often ill defined, inconsistent and may even be contradictory. Such a constellation represents a suitable context for the influence of external actors. As a result of bounded rationality, complex interest constellations and uncertainty, learning processes lead to different degrees of policy transfer. Dolowitz and Marsh distinguish between four approaches: copying, involving direct and complete transfer; emulation, involving transfer of ideas behind the policy program; combinations, involving mixtures of several different policies; and inspiration, in which policy in another jurisdiction may inspire a policy change, but where the final outcome does not actually draw upon the original.33

Therefore, while it analytically makes sense to distinguish between lesson-drawing and social learning, these are not mutually exclusive. The inclusion of the time factor into the analysis of learning processes can contribute to resolving the issue of whether domestically driven strategic learning or EU-induced social learning are the key drivers of Europeaniza- tion. The implication is that while strategic-lesson drawing may prevail in the short term, the

EU’s influence via social learning evolves over time. In this sense, the domestic actors’ strategic interests in engaging in an exchange with the EU are a necessary condition for the development of subsequent socialization or persuasion processes. The post-accession compliance of Central and Eastern European Countries provides empirical evidence for such a sequential model of strategic and social learning. It has been found that while adjustment to EU norms and practises initially tended to be interest driven, socialisation and learning mechanisms become more prominent over time, provided that EU-imported norms are in line with the actors’ general preferences.34 This process has been facilitated by a Europeanized expert community, emerging within the ministries during the accession process, who, after accession, took on the role of domestic norm entrepreneurs aiming at diffusing EU norms in the domestic policy making process.35

According to a Commission official, this sequence of strategic adaption and social learning has also been shown for the Turkish context, stating that initially, EU demands for a greater civil society participation in the policy formulation process and a better intra- and interministerial administrative coordination were often rather reluctantly implemented, simply to fulfil the precondition for the European Commission’s acceptance of projects financed by the instrument for pre-accession assistance. Subsequently, however, Turkish civil servants became accustomed to this style of policy-making and internalised these EU norms

(interview in Brussels, October 2016).

As regards the theme of this special issue/special section, there is also some evidence that conflicting goals of Turkish actors and the complexity of energy and climate policies contribute to learning processes that exceed the mere facilitation of reforms exclusively driven by domestic factors. On the one hand, Turkey considers an ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction target as a hindering factor for its economic development and was therefore hesi- tating to sign the Kyoto-Protocol.36 A main focus on economic growth, and a postponement of action of environmental concerns, has been framed as the strategy best suited to its national interests. EU demands for a more ambitious climate change policy have been rebuffed by the Turkish side, arguing that is unfair to be requested to forego economic development to resolve environmental problems for which Turkey bears little historical responsibility. On the other, signing the Kyoto Protocol in 2009 was considered as inevitability in the course of its European Union accession process, and as the appropriate behaviour for a state seeking to hold a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council for the 2009-10 term.37 However,

Turkey’s ratification at this stage did not reflect a deeper learning process in the sense of the development of a strong political will for a significant reduction of GHG emissions in the near future. This has been revealed by Turkey’s intended nationally determined contribution sub- mitted shortly before the Paris Climate Conference in 2015. Although pledging to reduce emissions to 21 percent below the projected business-as-usual (BAU) level by 2030, experts and observers state that this target would not mean a reduction since the BAU level was un- realistically high.38 Consequently, Turkey’s climate policy has been characterized as hesitant, viewing mitigations efforts as conflicting with its developmental policies. “Turkey’s position on international negotiations and national actions regarding mitigation and adaptation are disproportionate both to Turkey’s vulnerability and its rising emissions.”39 “With CO2 emis-

10 sion rising between 1990 and 2004 by 72.6 per cent, the world biggest increase, Turkey cannot legitimately downplay its responsibility in the international effort to mitigate climate change.”40 In sum, Turkish actors face a dilemma between development goals and international pressures to increase mitigation efforts. According to interviewees from the German

Environment Ministry, the Turkish side has a strong interest in finding ways to harmonise

Turkey’s development agenda with an ambitious climate and environmental policy, thus offering a favourable motivational setting for social learning processes, even if Turkey’s climate policy is mainly driven by domestic considerations (interviews in Berlin, December 2016).

Favourable Context Conditions for EU-Induced Policy Learning in Turkey given

The dominating focus of the Turkey-related Europeanization research on the motivation and behaviour of the political elite, and in particular on the ruling party, has led to a neglect of the interaction between Turkish bureaucracy and the EU.41 However, as civil servants are crucial to the development of policy,42 I argue that studies on processes of (de)Europeaniza- tion in Turkey could benefit from integrating the role and relevance of bureaucratic actors in the analysis. While high levels of reciprocal mistrust are indeed detrimental for argumentative persuasion processes at the highest political level, the context conditions for social learning are much more favourable at the bureaucratic level. There are four main arguments in this regard.

Identification with EU

First, the identification of domestic actors with the EU has been identified by constructivist approaches as an important precondition for social learning, highlighting that argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader is a member of the in-group to

11 which the persuadee belongs or wants to belong.43 Actors seek to fulfil the obligations en- capsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions.44 The accession Europeanization literature has shown that the identification with the EU has generated diffuse support capable of trumping cost-benefit calculations as explaining factors for the harmonization of domestic legislation with EU acquis.45 As regards Turkey, interviews with Turkish officials suggest that the accession process has not yet completely lost its relevance. A standard argument was that that the accession process has merits independently of an eventual membership, as it enables a reform process which would otherwise be extremely slow at least (interview in

Brussels, April 2015). In turn, Commission officials stated that, “officials on the Turkish side, in particular at the lower levels of hierarchy, are pro-European and strongly interested in a positive judgement in the progress report” (interview in Brussels, April 2015). Other studies similarly identified a continued existence of interest in EU alignment.46 However, it has also been reported that the higher echelons of Turkish ministerial bureaucracy are now less in- clined than previously to support cooperation projects, whereas civil servants at the lower and middle level of the ministerial bureaucracy try to keep these projects ongoing (interviews in Brussels, April 2015 and October 2016).

Political Culture

A further factor influencing the likelihood of social learning is the political culture. The political culture provides the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in a political system, and thus the tendency of policy-makers to learn from external actors. Dolowitz and Medearis have shown that the isolationalist political culture in the US has negatively affected cross-national policy transfers of urban and environmental planning policies, “in

12 which all information is filtered through a “we know best” attitude.”47 Jaenicke considers a political culture for consensus seeking and openness of the political system for the input of civil society actors as crucial factors for successful policies.48 Collins and Ison argue that citizens’ participation is a key element to tackle climate change effectively at international, Eu- ropean Union, national and local levels.49

A key feature of the political culture in Turkey is the dominance of a strong state tradition. Since Ottoman times, the attitude of Turkish bureaucracy towards civil society has been characterized by distrust.50 The 1982 constitution, drawn up under the tutelage of the military, was designed to reduce citizens’ political participation. Until today, there remain se- rious barriers to the development of pluralistic policy-making structures through the inclusion and participation of civil societal elements.51 The European Commission’s 2016 Turkey report notes deficiencies with respect to public participation.52 Such a political culture hin- ders the affinity of the Turkish bureaucracy and political leaders to learn from stakeholders, and contributes to the implementation of policies without adequate public consultation.

However, the EU accession process contributed to changing the adversarial relations between state and civil society actors in Turkey in two regards. First, learning processes were enabled by EU-funded training programmes and the participation in networks with European

NGO’s, leading to more professionalised Turkish civil society actors.53 Second, EU project funding was used as an instrument to develop partnership between state institutions and civil society actors. This is illustrated by the selection and implementation process of projects financed by the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). After the agreement of the budget for each component and sector of the IPA programme, Turkish ministries and agen- cies are requested to submit project proposals. The selection process is jointly coordinated by the Ministry for EU Affairs and the European Commission, but it is the latter which makes

13 a final decision. Thus, the European Commission has significant discretion in accepting, blocking and prioritizing projects. It can exploit the competition for projects among departments in the line ministries to ensure the inclusion of stakeholder participation by the re- spective ministries. Consequently, the consultation of civil society actors in the policy formulation phase has become increasingly institutionalized. According to several Commission officials, this represents a significant change in the political culture, even though the extent of the change in attitude varies across the ministries (interviews in Brussels, April 2015).

Administrative Capacity

The administrative capacity is another context factor for learning processes; its impact is, however, ambiguous. While a limited administrative capacity may contribute to the readiness to learn from abroad,54 the implementation of the results of these learning processes may be hindered by capacity constraints. Limited administrative capacities make it less likely that EU-induced diffusion processes leads to sustainable institutional change and a transformation of domestic practices.55 In turn, high administrative capacity can reduce the propen- sity to learn due to the self-esteem to be in no need for external advice.56 However, once learning has taken place, it is easier to the implement the results.57

In general, Turkey’s administrative capacity provides good context conditions for social learning processes. Turkey’s strong state tradition, reflected in a strong centralised bureaucracy, is favourable for the implementation of policy transfers, if the government has the political will for reform. The World Bank government effectiveness indicators suggest that in Turkey the degree of state capacity rose significantly from 1998 to 2002, with no significant change until 2009, situating it slightly below Croatia.58 The EU accession process contributed to these improvements. In order to manage the EU accession process and the IPA

14 process, the Turkish ministries were required to establish growing EU departments consist- ing of staff with IPA-financed training. As a consequence, according to a Turkish official,

“while in the past, only few, rather isolated, international relations experts were involved in

EU affairs, today, a community of EU experts exists, contributing to an improved intra- and inter-ministerial exchange in EU-related matters” (interview in Brussels, April 2015). There was a consensus among the Turkish officials that these new coordination structures within and between the ministries have contributed to social learning processes, leading to an increased willingness to cooperate and engage in an exchange of views. Furthermore, it has been highlighted that the EU experts in Turkish ministries are important agents of change,

“as recommendations from colleagues are often more acceptable than those from the EU

Delegation.” In addition, Turkish officials stressed the positive effect of an increase in staff with advanced English, leading to a more effective dialogue with the EU (interviews in Brus- sels, 2015). This positive assessment of the Turkish side has also been confirmed by a Com- mission official, arguing that “the degree of professionalization and coordination at the Turk- ish side has significantly increased” (interview in Brussels, April 2015). In this regard, the Eu- ropean Commission has in particular emphasised the role of the Ministry for EU Affairs, stating that its institutional capacity has been improved by intensive training measures on IPA principles regarding programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.59

However, despite these improvements, the Commission’s 2016 Turkey Report states that a stronger administrative capacity is still required.60 Furthermore, according to a Com- mission official, these positive developments in the recent years are now jeopardized by a high level of staff turnover after the attempted coup of July 2016, to which the government reacted inter alia with a significant replacement of civil servants (interview in Brussels, Octo- ber 2016).

Frequent Interaction in depoliticised setting

Finally, another conducive context condition for social learning is a deliberative setting, im- plying low levels of politicisation, frequent exchanges, and a relation in partnership, in which the persuader neither lectures nor demands. 61Twinning projects are designed to offer such a deliberative setting. They last up to two years, with the possibility of targeted follow-up, thus supporting long-term relationships in a less politicized setting. Each twinning project in- cludes at least one Resident Twinning Adviser and a Project Leader from an administration or another approved body of a member state. These officials work full time for a minimum of twelve months in the corresponding ministry of the partner country during the implementation of the project. The projects envisage a relationship in partnership with joint responsibility to achieve the agreed outcomes.

The few existing studies on twinning projects in Central and Eastern European countries show mixed results regarding the success rate of EU-induced learning processes.62 De- spite favourable context conditions, it is open to question how far the values, norms and procedures which exist within the EU will actually be internalized and become embedded in domestic administration and political cultures.63 In particular, the lack of an open-minded discursive setting has been highlighted as an obstacle for learning processes. Some officials in the candidate countries complained about the patronising behaviour of their counter- parts; who, in turn, complain that the representatives of the beneficiary country try to limit their role to service providers, minimizing interaction and exchange.64

In the Turkish context, only few studies have explicitly dealt with learning processes in twinning projects.65 In correspondence with the experience in CEEC, the findings reveal an

16 ambivalent picture regarding the deliberative character of the project work.66 However, in- stances of social learning processes in twinning projects have been traced.67 There is also discrepancy in the accounts of the interviewed officials from the European Commission and

Germany as to the impact of the most recent deterioration of EU-Turkey relations on the work in IPA financed projects or in the institutionalised dialogues in the framework of the positive agenda implemented in 2012. While some EU officials stated that the project work at technical level, characterized by high levels of professionalism and mutual respect, has not been affected by the worsening political relationship, others highlighted that projects at administrative level cannot easily escape from the influence of broader political context, arguing that with these developments the level of mutual mistrust also increased at technical level (interviews in Brussels, October 2016 and Berlin, December 2016). The latter state- ments accord with findings of other studies. Young and Küçükkeleş argue that as “Turkish sensitivities over hosting EU or member state officials within state bodies have become stronger” after the attempted coup “cooperation with EU bodies has slowed down.”68 This is also illustrated by the decreasing number of twinning projects, suggested by Turkey, and a faltering readiness among the member states to engage further in twinning projects with

Turkey. According to a German official, member states are less engaged in further cooperation projects with Turkey, as their long term impacts are much uncertain than in the past (interview in Berlin, December 2016).

As concerns the environment and energy sector, frequent institutionalised dialogues in a rather depoliticised setting represent actually conducive context conditions for EU-induced learning processes. While the energy chapter is yet to be opened due to the re- sistance of some member states, a dialogue on energy matters is one of the priority areas

17 identified in the framework of the positive agenda, launched by enlargement commissioner

Füle in May 2012, in order to revive the accession process.69 To this end, working groups were established, dealing with issue such as energy scenarios and energy mix, market integration and development of infrastructures of common interest, global and regional energy cooperation, the promotion of renewable energy, energy efficiency and clean energy tech- nologies, as well as nuclear safety and radiation protection. Furthermore, a High Level En- ergy Dialogue was launched in March 2015, reflecting the European Commission’s commit- ment to establish strategic energy partnerships with increasingly important energy produc- ing and transit countries.70 Moreover, energy and environmental policy represent priority areas in the pre-accession programme. Between 2002 and 2013, six billion Euros of pre-accession assistance was allocated to Turkey, of which 15 per cent (about one billion Euros) was for the environment sector. A further sum of almost 650 million Euros in assistance has been approved through the 2014-2020 Environment and Climate Action programme. This new programme aims to improve environmental protection by addressing the challenges of climate change, environmental management for sustainable development and disaster management, as well as building capacity to manage water, waste, chemicals, air quality and natural resources.71

Conclusion

This contribution has shown that the EU still has the potential to be a relevant actor in Turk- ish domestic politics despite the fading effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality strategy.

There are two main reasons for continued EU influence in Turkey. First, also in domestically driven reform processes, the EU is still able to influence policy choices due to domestic actors’ bounded rationality and conflicting goals. Those scholars, who consider lesson-drawing

18 as a purely domestic driven reform process, neglect that domestic reform agents usually indeed hold a generally-defined position, but are ready for external input for the fine-tuning of their policy goals and instruments. Consequently, while the EU is not the trigger for reform in domestically driven lesson-drawing, it is more than just a facilitator of reform. Second, while persuasion and learning at the top political level is rather unlikely, given the currently tense relations, there are much more favourable context conditions for EU-induced learning in the interaction of the Turkish bureaucracy with the EU. Evidence from the interviews sug- gests that EU-Turkey relations at administrative level work much better than could be expected from the overall negative political context.

Interviews 1. 27-30 April 2015: with three officials of the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the EU, one Commission official from DG Enlargement, one Commission official from DG Energy and one Commission official from DG Migration and Home Affairs, Brussels. 2. 19 October 2016: with two Commission officials from DG Enlargement, Brussels. 3. 15-16 December 2016: with three officials from the National Contact Point for EU Twinning and TAIEX at the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy; and three officials from the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Berlin.

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Notes

1 Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber, “Encounters with Europe”, 1; Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva, “Lost in Europeaniza- tion”, 68; Kubicek, “Political Conditionality”; 910; Yilmaz, “Domestic Drivers of Turkey’s Europeanization”, 303. 2 Avci, “The Justice and Development Party and the EU”, 410; Öniş and Yilmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism”, 7;Yilmaz and Soyaltin, “Zooming into the Domestic”, 11; Yilmaz, “Domestic Drivers of Turkey’s Europeanization”, 303. 3 Kaliber, “Reassessing Europeanization in the Case of Turkey,” 58. 4 Kirişci, “Turkey’s New Draft Law on Asylum”, 64; Tolay, “Turkey’s Critical Europeanization”, 43. 5 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe,” 8. 6 Checkel, “International Institutions and Europeanization”, 802; Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning”, 275, Heclo, “Modern Social Politics”, 305-06; Sabatier, “Policy Change over a Decade or More”, 13. 7 Dolowitz and Marsh, “Learning from Abroad,” 12. 8 Kemp and Weehuizen, “Policy Learning,” 8. 9 Zito and Schout, “Learning theory reconsidered,” 1103. 10 Ibid., 1104. 11 Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, „Governance turn in EU studies“, 40. 12 Zeitlein, “Extending Experimentalist Governance,” 4. 13 Lavenex, “The Power of Functionalist Extension”, 890 and 899; Falkner and Müller, EU Policies in a Global Perpective”; Börzel and Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion.” 14 Cengiz and Hoffmann, „Rethinking Conditionality”; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe.” 15 Andonova, “Europeanization of Environmental Policy in Central and Eastern Europe”; Braun, “Europeaniza- tion of Environmental Policy in the New Europe”; Dabrowski, Shallow or Deep Europeanization.” 16 Bolukbasi and Ertugal, “Europeanisation of Employment Policy.” 17 Bürgin, “Why the EU still matters.” 18 Yilmaz and Soyaltin, “Zooming into the Domestic”; Yilmaz, “Domestic Drivers of Turkey’s Europeanization.” 19 Tocci, “Europeanization in Turkey”, 74. 20 March and Olsen, “The Logic of Appropriateness.” 21 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe”, 9. 22 Ibid., 8. 23 Sedelmeier, “Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States”, 11. 24 Checkel, “International Institutions and Europeanization”, 802. 25 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe”, 10. 26 Tocci, “Europeanization in Turkey”, 81. 27 Yilmaz and Soyaltin, “Zooming into the Domestic”; Yilmaz, “Domestic Drivers of Turkey’s Europeanization.” 28 Thompson, “Deliberative Democratic Theory.” 29 Béland, “The Politics of Social Learning”, 562. 30 Dolowitz and Medearis, “Cross-national Policy Transfer”, 686. 31 Kingdon, “Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.” 32 Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning”, 275. 33 Dolowitz and Marsh, “Learning from Abroad”, 13. 34 Dabrowski, “Shallow or Deep Europeanization”, 730. 35 Braun, “Europeanization of Environmental Policy in the New Europe”, chapter two. 36 Adaman and Arsel, “Environmental Policy in Turkey”, 320. 37 Alkan-Olsson and Alkan-Olsson, “Turkey’s signature of the Kyoto Protocol”, 20. 38 Şahin, “Warming a Frozen Policy”, 123. 39 Ibid., 120. 40 Alkan-Olsson and Alkan-Olsson, “Turkey’s signature of the Kyoto Protocol”, 17-18. 41 Bürgin, “Why the EU matters”, 115. 42 Heclo, “Modern Social Politics”, 303.

43 Checkel, “International Institutions and Europeanization”, 813; Sedelmeier, “Europeanisation in New Mem- ber and Candidate States”, 13. 44March and Olson, “The Logic of Appropriateness”, 2. 45 Börzel et al., “Same or Different?”, 271. 46 Pierini and Ülgen, “A moment of opportunity”, 13. 47 Dolowitz and Medearis, “Cross-national Policy Transfer”, 689. 48 Jaenicke, “Conditions for Environmental Policy Success”, 54. 49 Collins and Ison, “Social Learning as a New Policy Paradigm”, 358. 50 Begüm, “Turkish Political Culture”, 60. 51 Sozen and Shaw, “Turkey and the European Union”, 111. 52 European Commission, “Turkey Report”, 87. 53 Kubicek, “Grassroot Democratization”, 368; Paker et al., “Environmental Organisations in Turkey”, 762; Ru- meli and Boşnak, “Europeanization of Civil Society Actors”, Şirin and Ege, “Turkey’ renewable energy policy,” 4926. 54 Bolukbasi and Ertugal, “Europeanisation of Employment Policy in Turkey”, 249. 55 Börzel and Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion”, 12. 56 Dolowitz and Medearis, “Cross-national Policy Transfer”, 689. 57 Bachtler et al., “From Conditionality to Europeanization”, 747; Milio, “Can Administrative Capacity Explain Differences”, 439. 58 Aydın-Düzgit and Noucheva, “Lost in Europeanization”, 68-69. 59 European Commission, “Positive EU-Turkey agenda.” 60 European Commission, “Turkey Report”, 37. 61 Checkel, “International Institutions and Europeanization”, 813. 62 Bailey and de Propris, “EU Pre-Accession Aid”; Grabbe, “How does Europeanization affect CEE governance”, 1014; Papadimitrou and Phinemore, “Exporting Europeanization”; Tulmets, “Institutional Twinning.” 63 Papadimitrou and Phinemore, “Exporting Europeanization”, 19. 64 Tulmets, “Institutional Twinning”, 670-71. 65 Bürgin, “Strategic Learning”, Bürgin, “Why the EU still matters.” 66 Ibid., 469. 67 Bürgin, “Why the EU still matters”, 113. 68 Young and Küçükkeleş, “New Dircetions for European Assistance”, 11. 69 European Commission, “Positive EU-Turkey agenda.” 70 European Commission, “High Level Energy Dialogue.” 71 Young and Küçükkeleş, “New Dircetions for European Assistance”, 11