East Asia Strategic Review: China's Rising Strategic Ambitions in Asia

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East Asia Strategic Review: China's Rising Strategic Ambitions in Asia EAST ASIA STRATEGIC REVIEW China’s Rising Strategic Ambitions in Asia EAST ASIA STRATEGIC REVIEW China’s Rising Strategic Ambitions in Asia Editor M.S. Prathibha INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES & ANALYSES NEW DELHI PENTAGON PRESS LLPLLP East Asia Strategic Review: China’s Rising Strategic Ambitions in Asia Editor: M.S. Prathibha First Published in 2018 Copyright © Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi ISBN 978-93-86618-65-8 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without first obtaining written permission of the copyright owner. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, or the Government of India. Published by PENTAGON PRESS LLP 206, Peacock Lane, Shahpur Jat New Delhi-110049 Phones: 011-64706243, 26491568 Telefax: 011-26490600 email: [email protected] website: www.pentagonpress.in In association with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses No. 1, Development Enclave, New Delhi-110010 Phone: +91-11-26717983 Website: www.idsa.in Printed at Avantika Printers Private Limited. Contents Preface vii List of Contributors xi 1. Emerging Foreign Policy Trends Under Xi Jinping 1 Abanti Bhattacharya 2. China’s Japan Challenge: Regional Ambitions and Geopolitics of East Asia 22 Amrita Jash 3. Resurfacing of Divergence in India-China Relations 35 Prashant Kumar Singh 4. The One Belt One Road as a Chinese Vision of Regional Economic Order 73 Saheli Chattaraj 5. South China Sea Conundrum - plus ça change 87 Abhay Kumar Singh 6. Chinese Ambitions in the Indian Ocean Region 113 Adarsha Verma 7. Response of India’s Neighbours to China’s South Asia Policy 129 Smruti S Pattanaik 8. Southeast Asian Views on China: Paradoxes and Prospects 158 Sampa Kundu 9. West Asia in China’s Energy Policy 174 Vrushal T. Ghoble 10. China-Central Asia Relations: Centrality of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 191 Sana Hashmi vi East Asia Strategic Review 11. Chinese Perspectives on the US Alliances in East Asia: A New Type of Great Power Folly? 207 Swati Arun 12. China’s Maritime Goals: Impact on Asia 227 Supriya Sharma 13. China’s Military Modernisation and Consequences for Asia 244 M.V. Rappai Index 256 Preface China has achieved tremendous economic development in the last few decades, and has been leveraging it through its political and diplomatic presence in its neighbourhood to achieve its strategic ambitions in Asia. In fact, the depth of its economic presence in Asia has led it to underscore its cooperation through multilateral and global initiatives. From its role in helping establish new financial institutions to introducing grand initiative of One Belt and One Road (OBOR), Chinese engagement in the region is continuously increasing. As a result, China’s interaction with the region’s political elite has been growing so as to convince the Asian countries the benefits of tying their developmental agendas with the Chinese economic policies, and simultaneously to assure them of the benign nature of its rise. Nowhere it is more conspicuous than in Asia, where China considers itself capable of handling more responsibilities and assuming leadership role. Thus, its relations with major countries in East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia have expanded significantly. After the Chinese President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012, China’s diplomatic engagement has become pro-active that is witnessed in its efforts to implement its OBOR initiatives and regional economic integration. Due to its growing investments, dependence on energy supplies and securing routes, maritime security has become an important component of its policy in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean Region. Although concerns have been raised about China’s sovereignty claims in the SCS, many external powers such as the United States (US) have consistently been performing freedom of navigation patrols in the SCS. Yet, China has been so far successful in keeping ASEAN (Association for Southeast Asian Nations) from forcing the Chinese to concede on island building. Nevertheless, SCS continues to remain a source of anxiety in the Chinese minds due to the perceived threat of US naval deployments in Asia and its impact on Chinese military operations. China’s maritime interests have also impacted the way it is expanding its naval assets and has implications for the major countries in the Indian viii East Asia Strategic Review Ocean region. Apart from the sovereignty and the territorial dispute in the SCS, the ongoing island-building and military installations are clear indications that China intends to protect its interests in SCS even it means to threaten or the actual use of force. The security dilemma in the Malacca Strait means that the Chinese access through OBOR countries into the Indian Ocean region is imperative along with the domestic legal avenues to enforce its sovereignty claims. The foreign policy of China has been adjusted to reflect these strategic objectives to support its rising ambitions by ensuring that China maximises the benefits through political and economic involvement. However, there are certain challenges that China is facing in attempting to legitimise its interest in the Asian countries. Deep mistrust in some countries, scepticism in other countries, combined with countries that are seeking to support Chinese initiatives as it provides them opportunities for investment meant that responses to Chinese role are varied and multifaceted. The risks involved in such investment or the concessions given to China has also become problematic. Nevertheless, smaller countries are opting for Chinese investment due to the complications involved in altering their economic policies and developmental models in order to procure loans from international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Thus, China’s strategic ambitions in Asia is as complex as the responses it incurs from countries in the region. However, challenges it faces to its endeavours are often entwined with concerns on the growing Chinese economic and military power in the region. The recent reforms in the Chinese military show that the leadership is keen on transforming the military into a professional force. The organisational and structural restructuring in the military and changes in the leadership were undertaken to increase efficiency and better decision-making system. These reforms have shown that China is increasing its deterrence posture that is required to enforce its strategic interests and counter any external power from challenging Chinese interests. Besides, the Chinese leadership has also been focusing on equally engaging all the armed services, and improve their contribution in the military planning. The primary reason seems to be the realisation that the type of war China is likely to fight in the future would depend on developing its joint operational capability and joint warfare. Thus, a highly integrated force structure and strengthened civil-military integration is designed towards propelling Chinese military into a more professional force. In addition, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign from 2012 has made sure that the Chinese military has been forced to reform and restructure. Preface ix Xi Jinping has been successful to a large extent in reigning the opposing forces to reform as well as his political opponents. This great transformation of China has become a point of scholarly and public debate, because the rising power not only challenges the established power and also the international system, where countries are forced to respond to Chinese rise. Among the Asian countries, India’s role in the region and how it navigates its bilateral relationship has become significant. Other countries also take cue from Indian response to Chinese rise because of India’s geo- political influence. As a result, whether it is conflict or cooperation, the trajectory of the bilateral relationship affects the region and sets the tone for stability of Asia. While bilateral irritants continue to impinge on the relationship, broad consensus exists on the nature of cooperation between the two powers on a range of regional and global issues. The transformation of China and its ambitions are of importance to Asia, and the perspectives from India offer a meaningful contribution to the ongoing debates about it. The recent debates among Indian thinkers show such diversity of thought about the role of China and the way in which it shapes the evolving regional environment. M.S. Prathibha List of Contributors Dr Abanti Bhattacharya is Associate Professor at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi. She teaches courses on Chinese foreign policy, Chinese History, India-China relations, East Asian international relations and Chinese Nationalism. Prior to this, she was Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). She holds a PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. As part of the government exchange programme, she pursued Chinese language course from Fudan University Shanghai. Currently, she is a member of the editorial board of India Quarterly, a flagship publication of the Indian Council of World Affairs. (ICWA). She has published extensively in national and international journals including Issues and Studies, Asia-Pacific Review, East Asia, Journal of East Asian Affairs, Strategic Analysis among others. Dr. Bhattacharya can be reached at: [email protected] Dr Amrita Jash is an Associate Fellow at Centre for land Warfare Studies. She is also the co-founder and Editor-in-Chief at IndraStra Global, New York. Her research has appeared in four edited books, International Journals such as East Asian Policy, Review of Global Politics, Strategic Analysis, Yonsei Journal, China Report and Strategic Vision. She has also published in forums such as CSIS, RSIS, Huffington Post, E-IR, Asia Times, Munk School of Global Affairs, Crawford School, ISDP, China-India Brief, IPP Review, SADF, I-A Forum, Gateway House, China Focus and others.
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