Decentralization London-Style: the GLA and London Governance

Regional Studies, Vol.36.7, pp. 779–788, 2002

Decentralization London-style: The GLAand London Governance

TONYTRAVERS Greater LondonGroup ,Department of Government, LondonSchool of Economics,HoughtonStreet, LondonWC2A 2AE, UK.Emaila.travers@ lse.ac.uk

(Received February2002; in revised form April2002)

TRAVERS T.(2002) DecentralizationLondon-style: the G LAandLondon governance, Reg.Studies 36, 779–788.The Greater LondonAuthority ,consistingof aMayorand Assembly ,is anoddity: it is botha renewalof Londoncity government and a componentof theLabour government ’sdevolutionreforms whichhave set out some of theparameters for devolutionto the otherEnglish regions. The G LA ’spowers arestrategic and were limited by Whitehallresistance to devolution. Mayor and Assemblyare supported by acommonadministration, which has resulted in some frictions. Policy delivery is inthe hands of ‘functionalbodies ’ and/orthe London boroughs and there is muchscope for interventionby Whitehall.The G LAbudgetis modest,though it does havea limited scalautonomy in the form ofacounciltax precept andcongestion charging. The G LA issignicantly less powerful thandevolved institutionsin Scotland and W ales;the pattern of Whitehallresistance and a complex institutionalenvironment in London hamper the capacity to bringabout even modest change.Further reform isinevitable.

LondonDevolution Elected Mayor City governance

TRAVERS T.(2002) La dećentralisationa` la mode de T RAVERS T.(2002) Dezentralisieungauf Londoner Art: Londres: laG LAetla gouvernance de Londres, Reg.Studies Verwaltungsbeho¨rden vonGroß london und die Artund 36,779–788. La GreaterLondon Authority (l’ autorite ´ Weiseder VerwaltungLondons, Reg.Studies 36, 779–788. municipaleresponsable de l’agglome ´rationde Londres), qui Die auseinem Oberbu ¨rgermeisterund einer V ersammlung consisteen un Maire et une Assemble é,est bizarre: elle bestehende V erwaltungsbeho¨rde vonGroß london (Greater constitue a` lafois unereprise de l’administrationde laville de LondonAuthority GLA)istein Kuriositum: einerseits eine Londres etpartie inte ´grantedes re´formes du gouvernementWiederherstellung der LondonerStadtverwaltung, andrerseits travaillisteen faveur de lare ´gionalisationqui aformule´ aberauch T eilder Dezentralisierungsreformender Labour- quelques-unsdes parame`trespour le transfertdu pouvoiraux regierung, die verschiedene Rahmenbestimmungenfu ¨r die autres re´gionsd’ Angleterre. Les pouvoirsde laG LAsontDezentralisierung der anderenenglischen Regionen aufge- strate´giqueset ilsont e ´te´ limite´spar l’opposition de Whitehallstellt hat. Die Befugnisseder Verwaltungsbeho¨rden vonGro- a` la re´gionalisation.Le Maireet l’ Assembleésontsoutenus ß londonsind strategischerArt; Grenzen wurden ihr durch par uneseule administration, ce qui ae´te´ causede friction.den Widerstandder der Regierungin Whitehall gegen La mise enoeuvre de lapolitique est entre les mains des Dezentralisierunggesetzt. Oberbu ¨rgermeisterund V er- ‘organismesfonctionnels’ et/ oudes municipalite´sde Londres, sammlungwerden voneinem gemeinsamen V erwaltungsap- etle champ d’intervention de Whitehalls’ ave `relarge. Le paratunterstu ¨tzt,was gelegentlich zu Reibereien gefu ¨hrt hat. budgetde laGLAestmodeste, bien que dote´ d’une certaine Die Ausfu¨hrungvon Bestebungen liegt in Ha ¨nden von autonomie scalequant a ` laperception des taxeslocales et ‘ Funktionsko¨rperschaften’und/ oder den LondonerStadt- des frais d’encombrement. Les pouvoirs de laG LAsontbezirken, wasWhitehall reichlich Spielraum fu ¨rIntervention beaucoupmoins importants que nelesontceux des institu-la ¨ßt.Der Etatder GLAistbescheiden, obwohlsie sich tionsre ´gionaliseés enEcosse etaux pays de Galles;l’ organisa- begrenzter nanziellerAutonomie in Form vonErhebung tionde l’oppositiona ` Whitehallet un milieu institutionnel von Stadtsteuern und Gebu ¨hrenzahlunggegen Straß enver- complexe a` Londres empeˆchentaucun changement. D’ autresstopfung erfreut. Die GLAhatdeutlich weniger Macht- re´formes sontine ´vitables. befugnisse alsdezentralisierte Institutionen in Schottland und Wales;das Zusammenspielvon Widerstand seitens Whitehall Londres Re´gionalisationMaire e ´lu undeiner komplexen institutionalisierten Umwelt in London Administrationmunicipale behindertdie Mo¨glichkeiten,auch nur bescheidene A¨ nderungendurchzusetzen. W eitereReformen sind unvermeidlich.

LondonDezentralisierung Gewa ¨hlter Bu¨rgermeister Artund W eiserder Regierungeiner Groß stadt

INTRODUCTION regionalgovernment in Britain. For a start, the Mayor iselected fora singleconstituency of ‘Greater London ’, TheGreater LondonAuthority (G LA),like the capital anarea with 7 ·3millionpeople and over5 million itself, isan oddity inthe contextof e Vortsat devolutionelectors. The Mayor is unique within British politics, withinthe UK. 1 Fora start, the creationof the GLA combiningrepresentative and executive functions.The took place inthe lightof the abolitionof the Greater Mayordeter minespolicies, sets the GLAbudget and LondonCouncil (which had existed from1965 to makes board appointments. The25-member Assembly 1986).The G LCitself was the latest ina longline of scrutinizes the activities ofthe Mayor. eVortsto create e Vective city-wide governmentfor the Themain responsibilities of the GLAaretransport, capital.2 TheLabour Party and the Liberal Democratspolice, economic development, strategic planningand had been consistentlyin favour of recreatingLondon- the rebrigade. Otherfunctions will include the wide governmentever sinceG LCabolition.Moreover, environment, culture, media and sport, publichealth Greater London,unlike all other regions of the UK,is and inwardinvestment. TheG LAalsohas a general almostentirely built-up: the areais as mucha cityas apower to promotethe economicand socialdevelop- ‘region’. London’sregionis the SouthEast. Finally,the ment ofthe capital. newinstitution of governmentset upinthe capital in Thefour key functionalresponsibilities are in the 2000was very muchless powerful than those created handsof boards, most orall of whose members are forScotland and Walesin 1999. appointed by the Mayor.These boards are:T ransport However,the GLAisoften described as anelement forLondon; the MetropolitanPolice Authority; the inthe Labourgover nment ’sdevolutionand constitu-London Fire and EmergencyPlanning Authority; and tionalrefor mpolicies(for example, S COTTISH the LondonDevelopment Agency.Policiesfor these O FFICE,1997,Prime Minister ’sPreface).There is no institutions are deter mined by the Mayor,who has a doubt that by 2002London was the onlyEnglish legalobligation to producea numberof strategies. regionwith anelected government.Inevitably ,the Strategicplanning, research and centraladministration experiencesof the LondonMayor and Assembly would arehandled ina smallcore of G LAsta V. be seenby the rest ofEngland as somekind ofleading TheMayor also sets the budgets foreach service and indicatorof what mightor might not be donein, say , forthe GLAas awhole.This overall budget issubject the NorthEast. Whileit isnot expected that otherto avote by the Assembly,thoughit isonly possible Englishregions will adopt amayoralmodel, the distri- to overturnthe Mayor ’sbudget if the Assembly can butionof powers and nancialfreedom to the GLA producea two-thirds majorityfor an alternative one. willcertainly in uencethe debate about regional Inpractice, the need to securea two-thirds majorityis governmentbeyond the capital. amajorhurdle. However, the 2001 –02budget round TheGreater LondonCouncil was abolishedin did producea two-thirds majorityagainst the Mayor, 1986,leaving London as one of the very few majorresulting in a negotiated reductionin the total.Not- citiesin the worldwithout metropolitan government withstandingits capacityto veto the budget, the Mayor (TRAV ER S et al.,1991,pp .64 –66).Although the isclearly powerful vis-a`-vis the assembly. capital enjoyed relative economicprosperity inthe TheGreater LondonAuthority Act gave the Mayor yearsthereafter, pressureto replacethe GLCremained.the power to appoint directlytwo politicaladvisors Inthe yearsrunning up to 1997,the Labouropposition (withoutcompetition) and up to 10other o Ycials moved froma commitmentmerely to reintroduce(through a selectionprocess led by the Mayor).The London-widegovernment to onewhere the formof politicaladvisors were to be personalappointments, institutionwould be radicallydi Verent fromthose that thoughthe otherMayor-appointed sta V members had previouslyexisted anywherein British gover nment. wouldbe subject to the normalrules of public institu- Asthe newgovernment ’s1997Green Paper made tions(i.e. appointment onmerit). The G LAActalso clear,a directlyelected Mayorwould be the key gave the Mayorresponsibility for appointing all or the feature ofthe capital ’snewgover nancearrangements majority of the board members ofthe fourfunctional (DEPARTMENTOF ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT bodies withinthe GLA ’s ambit: A ND THE REG IONS (DETR),1997,p .2). Transportfor London (T fL) LondonDevelopment Agency(L DA) THEGREATERLONDON MetropolitanPolice Authority (M PA) AUTHORITY LondonFire and EmergencyPlanning Authority (LFEPA). AnewGreater LondonAuthority (G LA),consisting ofaMayorand Assembly,was elected on4 May2000. In the caseof T fLand the LDA,the Mayorappoints KenLivingstone, who had been the nalleader ofthe allboard members. TheT fLboard maynot include Greater LondonCouncil, was elected Mayorafter aAssembly members, whilethe LDAboard membership long and diYcultcontest (D ’ARCY and MACL EAN, must includeup to fourAssembly orborough elected 2000).The G LAisunlike any previous local or members. TheMayor appoints 12of the 23members DecentralizationLondon-style: The G LAandLondon Governance 781 ofthe MPAand all17 members ofLFEPA.All13 of separately-constituted ‘authorities ’ whoseboards, rather the appointees to the MPAand nineof the LFEPA thanthe Mayor,are expected to determinepolicy and appointees must be Assembly members, whoin each make sta V appointments. Tomake matters stillmore casemust be appointed inproportion to the strength complex,the MetropolitanPolice Commissioner ofparty groupswithin the Assembly.Theremaining remains responsible for ‘operational ’ decisions. 11M PAappointments resultfrom a complexset of Theoriginal decisions to constitutethe GLAinthis arrangementsbased onthose for police authorities way were driven inpart by adesire withincentral elsewherein the country.Theother eight L FEPA governmentto develop consensualworking between members aredrawn from the capital ’selected boroughthe Mayorand Assembly and probably (thoughthis is councillors,though their names are subject to the diYcultto substantiate) by aconcernwithin Whitehall Mayor’s approval. notto give the Mayorof Londontoo much unrestricted TheMayor would also appoint the members ofa power.It isclear that the ministersand o Ycials who CulturalStrategy Groupand couldalso set up and worked onthe GLAlegislationwere seeking to create appoint members to anyother groups, task forcesand a ‘strongMayor ’ forLondon, though at the same commissionsdesired. Inaddition to board appoint- time they cameunder pressure from key government ments, the Mayorappoints the chiefo Ycer of Tf L departments to maintainsubstantial powers within (the TransportCommissioner) and the rst ChiefWhitehall to limitMayoral autonomy .Oneway of Executive ofthe LDA.TheMetropolitan Police Com- limitingthe Mayor ’spower was to create the complex missioneris a royalappointment (inreality ,the Homeweb ofboards, board appointments and,in particular, Secretary),while the LFEPAboard appoint the Chief to make the Assembly responsiblefor appointing the Fire OYcer.The Mayor must choosea deputy Mayorsenior G LAsta V. fromamong the 25assembly members. Oneof the most obviouslessons from London for Allof the GLA ’s staV – except the 12mayoral any regional devolution in England is the wayin which appointees – were,as required by the legislation, civilservants (and,presumably ,ministers)in the Home appointed by the Assembly.Thismeans the ChiefO Yceand,to someextent, thoseresponsible for trans- Executive and othero Ycialsof the Authorityare port and foreconomic development choseto limitthe appointments ofthe Assembly ratherthan the Mayor.freedom ofthe newauthority to act independently. TheAssembly appointed acommittee to determinea OYcialsin the ScottishO Yceand WelshO Yce would staYngstructure and employits senioro Ycers.The have had astrongincentive to ensurethe newinstitu- chairof the Appointments Committee (Len Duvall) tionscreated inEdinburgh and Cardi V were as powerful consultedMayor Livingstone about key appointments. as possible because they were to become the administra- Inaddition to the newsenior o Ycialsappointed by torsof the newdevolved government.But in London, the Assembly,the GLAinheritedover 100 sta V from the relevant Whitehalldepartments were to losevirtu- predecessor bodies suchas the LondonPlanning allyall the power the GLAwouldgain. It issmall AdvisoryCommittee and the LondonResearch wonder that somany limits were placed onthe GLA ’s Centre. freedom to operate. Despite e Vortsby the Government TheAssembly was able, inmaking G LAsta V OYceforLondon (which took the legislationthrough appointments, to create its ownpolicy ,scrutinyor Parliament)to make the GLAstrong,their colleagues researchcapacity – eitherfor each member, forparty inkey servicedepartments underminedits autonomy. groupsand/ orfor use by allmembers. Thus,the Assembly appointed the senioro Ycialswho would run the coreG LAadministration,but alsocreated acorps THEFIRSTTWOYEARSOFTHE of staV forthemselves to assist intheir scrutiny and G L A policy-analysisroles. However, the Mayordeter mines Noone could have knownhow the GLAAct would the Assembly ’s budget. workin practice. British government institutions, at TheG LAActrequired the Mayorto producea the national,regional and locallevel, tend to develop numberof strategies and to set annualbudgets for organicallywithin their original legislative framework. the fourfunctional bodies and the coreG LA.These Thenew London ar rangementsare no exception. strategies and otherpolicy directions were to formthe Keyfeatures ofthe post-May2000 administration at basis ofthe operationof T fL,the LDAand anumber RomneyHouse, the GLA ’sheadquarters, areoutlined ofcore G LAfunctionssuch as city-wide planning. below: Theextent to whichthe Mayorcan give policyor operationaldirections to the MPAorL FEPAis TheMayor originally chose not to appoint two heavilycircumscribed by the fact that eachof these politicaladvisors and the additional10 sta V poten- authoritieshad boards consistingeither of politically- tiallyavailable to him.Instead heagreed with the balanced groupsof elected members (with theirown Assembly to appoint aMayor ’s OYcefrom within electorallegitimacy) or of individuals not appointed by the coreG LAsta V. Some Mayor’s OYce staV – the Mayor.Moreover, the MPAand LFEPAare the Mayor’sclosestadvisors – were appointed on 782 TonyT ravers

contractsthat runonly for the four-yearmayoral 2001and 2002in central London, Croydon, East term. Hamand inKensington – attended by both the TheMayor appointed the boards ofT fL,the LDA, Mayorand Assembly members. LFEPAand his12 members ofthe MPAwithin Bythe end ofthe rst two yearsof the GLA ’sexistence, the rst few weeks ofthe Mayelection: T fLand both the Mayorand Assembly had – separately – LDAappointments (i.e.the two boards whereindi- reviewed theirmethods ofoperation. Day-to-day run- viduals were notdrawn from the Assembly orthe ningof the Authorityhas made cleara numberof boroughs)were subject to externaladvertisement and strengthsand weaknesses inthe originallegislation and independent externalassessment. hasalso made it possible to draw conclusionsabout the TheMayor appointed the chiefexecutives ofthe ways inwhich both the Mayor ’s OYce,Assembly LDA,TfLand the board chairsof the LDAand and GLA staV have developed. Theseconclusions are LFEPA.Thechief executive appointments were summarizedbelow . subject to externaladvertisement and independent externalassessment. TheAssembly created anAppointments Committee IMPLICATIONSOFTHEPOST-2000 to determine anoutline G LAsta Yngstructure and ARRANGEMENTSFORLONDON thento make key appointments to the Authority. GOVERNMENT Thiscommittee appointed aChiefExecutive forthe The Mayor andDeputy Mayor GLAduringthe earlyautumn of 2000 and, over a period oftime, made othersenior appointments. Bythe springof 2002, the Mayorhad appointed an TheChief Executive and othersenior posts were oYceof about 35individuals, including his closest subject to independent externalassessment. advisors,administrative o Ycersand secretarialsta V. All TheAssembly created anumberof othercommittees of these staV are GLA oYcials,having been subject to undertake policy-relatedand otherscrutiny work. to the normalappointment proceduresinvolving the TheAssembly alsoheld regular plenary sessions and Assembly’sAppointments Committee. Atthe centreof anumberof one-o V evidence-gatheringmeetings. the Mayor’s OYceis a smallcore of key individuals TheMayor appointed anAdvisory Cabinet consist- whoact as the policyar mforthe executive part ofthe ingof a numberof senior policy advisors, board GLA,thoughsome of their activities have included chairs,Assembly members, the ChiefExecutive of moreexecutive-style functions.These o Ycers are the the GLAand othersfrom outside the Authority.Mayor ’smost trusted advisors.They have immediate However,it isimportant to notethat thisbody had accessto the Mayorand canbe relied uponby those noexecutive functionand, as aresult,its perceived outside the centralcore of the Mayor ’s OYceaccurately importancehas been severely limited as compared, to re ect the Mayor ’spoliciesand aspirations. say,to the Mayor ’s OYce. Sucha coreof key ,trusted advisors isan inevitable TheMayor has published anumberof policy docu- part ofa mayoralsystem ofgovernment. A single ments, startingwith oneon congestion charging. A individualcannot realistically undertake allthe tasks draft transportstrategy ,adraft economicdevelop- that ina parliamentaryor traditional British local ment strategy and two ofthe environment-relatedgovernment system wouldbe undertaken by aCabinet strategies have alsobeen released. TheMayor orcollective leadership .Experience ofdirectly-elected appointed (as the lawrequired) aCulturalStrategy o Ycialsin other countries, notably the US,suggests Group.Healsoset upanumberof othercommissions individualselected as Mayors,governors or presidents and initiatives (e.g.on housing and onhealth). tend to accumulatearound themselves agroupof TheAssembly undertookinvestigations and pub- paid (thoughoccasionally unpaid) o Ycialswho can be lishedreports oncongestion charging, a Vordable trusted to provide loyaladvice and to give policy housing,the aborted celebrationsplanned for directionsto the chiefo Ycersof the key servicesfor 31December 2000,buses, greenspaces and anumberwhich the elected o Ycialis responsible. Indeed, the ofother issues. Other inquiries and investigationsare oYceofBritish Prime Minister has developed inrecent under way. yearsin such a wayas to includepresidential elements TheMayor published hisbudget for2001 –02 and, such as ‘kitchencabinets ’,politicalpress o Ycers,policy followingamendments, the Assembly chosenot to unitsand the like.A numberof commentators have seek atwo-thirds majorityfor an alternative. The concludedthe PrimeMinister needs aseparate depart- budget set required anincrease in precept of22% ment ofstate to operate e Vectively. overthe 2000 –01level,largely to nanceadditional The rst Mayorof London has understandably expenditure by the MetropolitanPolice. A similarevolved aMayor ’s oYcewith asmallnumber of close debate took place overthe 2002 –03budget because and trusted advisors.However, it ishard for those ofdemands foradditional cash for police and outside the GLA(oreven thoseinside it) fullyto transport. understand the roleof these advisors.For the sake of People’sQuestionTimes were heldduring 2000, transparency and accountability,the identities and roles DecentralizationLondon-style: The G LAandLondon Governance 783 ofthe crucialindividuals who give policydirections bodies – iftheirnumbers were somewhatincreased and on the Mayor’sbehalf willneed, inthe longerter m, the existingindividuals were morewidely recognizedas to be made clear.It wouldalso be better forthe beingof ‘deputy mayor ’ or ‘assistant mayor ’ status. individualsconcerned if theirimportance to the Londongovernment system (and,in particular, that Settingup the GLA they speak with the Mayor ’sauthority)were more widely understood. TheMayor and Assembly faced ademandingand It was thusto be expected that the Mayorof London uniquejob inthe 18months after May2000. For the woulddevelop acore ‘Mayor’s OYce’ soas to be able Mayor,Assembly and GLAasawholeit was necessary to address the complexand varied problems ofa city to set up – fromscratch – anewadministration for ofseven and ahalfmillion people. Thesystem ofLondon. Unlike the newgover nmentsin Scotland and governmentcreated by the GLAActrequired aDeputy Wales,there was nopredecessor department ofstate to Mayor – appointed by the Mayor – whohad to be aprovide anestablished administrative back-up forthe member ofthe Assembly.It seems certainthat those GLA.Asmalltransition team had been created before whodrafted the legislationimagined the Mayorwould May 2000 to provide basicadministrative support for select anAssembly member ofthe same party to be the Mayorand Assembly members onceelected. But, Deputy Mayor.In the event, an ‘independent ’ Mayorunderstandably ,the transitionteam did notmake any had to select adeputy fromone of fourpolitical parties permanent seniorappointments to the GLA.Nor that were nothis own. was it possible before the 2000election to determine Regardlessof the politicala Yliationof the Mayor appropriate structuresfor mayoral or assembly member and the variousparties onthe Assembly,it was inevit- needs. able that the appointment ofanother elected individual Agreat deal oftime had to be spent during2000 as Deputy Mayorwould create di Verent dynamicsto and 2001simply to put inplace newo Ycerstructures the kind ofdeputies (e.g.those within the New York and newappointments. Evidence fromT oronto(where system ofgovernment) who were notthemselves anewmayoral government system was introducedin elected members. Even wherea mayoralcandidate 1996)suggests it cantake overtwo yearsto make decided to namea particularassembly candidate ashisall the newappointments demanded by anewcity orher running mate inadvance ofan election, the government.Most senior posts were lled by the uncertaintiesof the candidate selectionprocess would summer of 2001,within one year of the GLAhaving make it diYcultto be surethat aMayorwas able to been created. However,some of the lower-levelposts chooseexactly the rightperson to deliver the kind ofwithin the GLAand its functionalbodies were still executive support anelected Mayorrequires. being lled earlyin 2002. Although all elected mayor Theroles assumed by Deputy Mayorsin city govern- systems arelikely to requirea signi cantturnover of ment systems analogousto the post-2000 London senior staV whena newMayor is elected, the position arrangements – notablyNew York – have made it inLondon is complicated by at least two distinct possible forthe Mayorto increasethe power ofthe features: executive. Deputies, whoare appointed by the Mayor Assembly (ratherthan mayoral) appointment of (thoughnot from the citycouncil) take onportfolios senior GLA oYcers ofresponsibilities and thenget onwith achievingthe post-Nolanprocedures for ensuring probity inpublic Mayor’spolicyobjectives (K IRTZMAN,2000).In the appointments. existingLondon Mayor ’s OYce,a smallnumber of key advisors – probably nomore than three orfour The fact that the Assembly isresponsible for the individuals – ful l such ‘deputy mayor ’ roles.They are appointment ofall G LAo Ycialsresponsible for far lessvisible thantheir importance might suggest. deliveringthe Mayor ’spolicyand budget decisions Oneway of extending the capacityof the Mayor ’s created the need fornegotiations between the Mayor OYcewould be forthe Mayorto usesome or all of and Assembly about the administrative structureto be the 12political advisor and mayoralappointment posts adopted. Individualshort-lists of potential o Ycers and originallyenvisaged inthe GLAAct.In fact, Living-appointments had (and have) to be the subject of stonedid usea numberof these appointments during informalnegotiations between the two parts ofthe 2001.Such posts couldin future be used to create Authority.Thisprocess has taken placeduring 2000, specialpositions for leading advisors, possibly with new 2001and 2002,generally involving bilateral discussions titles and job descriptions.They might also strengthen between the Chairof the Appointments Committee of the Mayor’steam with individualswho combined the Assembly and the Mayor.Inevitably ,aprocessof politicaland executive experience.The considerable this kind willbe slowerthan if – as the logicof the demands (see below) onthe smallnumber of o Ycials ‘strongmayor ’ modelsuggested – the Mayoralone at the coreof the existingMayor ’s OYcecould then appointed the seniorG LAsta V. be spread moree Vectively – with the possibility that the Asecondissue facing the Mayorand Assembly has Mayorcould assume greater controlover the functionalbeen the requirementthat manysenior positions within 784 TonyT ravers the GLAshouldbe subject to fullpublic employment Thedecision to give the Assembly the duty to procedures,including oversight by anindependent appoint GLAo Ycialswithin a governmentsystem externalassessor. There are, of course,good reasons for wherethe Mayorwas the soleexecutive had anumber processesof thissort that areintended to avoid anyrisk ofconsequences. First and most obviously,the Mayor ofcorruption and/ ornepotism. In the yearssince the does notmake anyof the appointments ofthe GLA establishment and rst report ofthe C OMMIT TEE staV whoare intended to write hisstrategies, prepare his ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC L IFE,1995(the Nolan budgets and oversee the performanceof the functional Committee), nationaland regionalgover nmentinstitu- bodies. Buildinga relationshipof trust between GLA tionshave increasinglybeen expected to make senior senior staV and the Mayor ’s OYce proved diYcult. appointments usingthe fullrange of protectionsagainst Thereis clearly a di Verenceof approach between, on improper in uenceson theirdecision making. the onehand, the coreof the Mayor ’s OYce (i.e. the However,the introductionof directly-elected Mayor’skey advisors) whofeel time-limited pressure Mayorsinto the Britishpolitical system creates apoten- to get thingsdone for London and, on the otherhand, tialinconsistency with the post-Nolanprocedures. The GLA oYcialsfor whom there areimperatives to work Mayorof Londonand otherelected o Ycialswho may onparticularstrategies and the day-do-day administra- be adopted elsewherein the countryare part ofthe tionof the GLA. government’s eVorts to ‘modernize’ localauthority Thecurrent arrangements require the executive (the practices.The key idea behind the move to directly- Mayor)to be heldto accountby representative mem- elected Mayorswas to make it clearto the local bers (the Assembly).There are some parallels with electorate who,precisely ,isresponsible for local public the respective positionsof the UKgovernmentand services.In a system with suchtransparent personal Parliament,where the Houseof Commons and the accountability,the useof lengthy appointment proce- Houseof Lords (eitherthe wholehouse or in commit- duresmight be thoughtto be lessrelevant. tees) subject the executive ’s(i.e.the government ’s) If the Mayorhas been elected – as isthe casefor the activities to scrutinyand voting.Analogous arrange- Mayorof London – to be the visible politicalexecutive, ments have been set up withinthe ScottishParliament there wouldbe alogicto allowingthe o Yce-holderto and WelshAssembly .However,under the GLA make appointments ofindividuals who directly arrangements,the government(i.e. the Mayor) nds re ected theirneeds and/orwho represent particular that the scrutinyelement ofthe system (the Assembly) constituenciesof interest. Thisis certainly how ,for makes allthe key civilservice appointments. Sucha example, state Governorsand cityMayors in the US system isunlikelyto secureharmonious working rela- appoint theiradministrations. If Governorsand Mayors tionsbetween the parties involved. were to make appointments subject to the Britishpost- Second,relationships between the Mayorand GLA Nolanprocedures, it wouldtake far longerthan at oYcialsare mirrored to aconsiderableextent by those present to eVect achangeof government.In short,the between the Assembly and thosesame senioro Ycials. post-Nolanrequirements of senior o Ycialappoint- Becausesenior o Ycerswithin the GLAlargelyexist ments maybe inconsistentwith the notionof direct personalresponsibility implied by the o Yce of Mayor. to deliver the Mayor ’spolicies,budgets and services,it was – at least at rst – hardfor the Assembly to see such oYcersas beingin a positionto provide loyal The GLAstaff,the Mayor andthe Assembly and water-tight advice to Assembly committees and TheG LAwas set up inadi Verent formfrom all other members. Thisproblem was particularlyacute where elected governmentalinstitutions in Britain. Not only the Assembly and Mayorhave widely divergent views does it have adirectly-elected chiefexecutive gure, ona subject. During2000 and early2001, matters but alsoit must administer majorpublic services at were made worseby ashortterm lackof capacity arm’slength.The Mayor ’spowers overthe functional withinthe GLAto provide Assembly committees with bodies, asset outin the GLAAct,involve a mixture the advice and expertise needed to undertake particular ofgeneralized oversight and direct control.T ransport, inquiries.However, the creationof a formalposition economicdevelopment, the police,and re and emer- ofHead ofScrutiny,plusa dedicated team ofo Ycers, genciesare Mayoral responsibilities, though in each ensuredthat thisproblem was largelyremoved during casethe servicemust be runindirectly through an 2001and 2002. appointed board. Anumberof the di Ycultiesinherent Third,the earlydi Ycultiesfaced by the GLAwere inthe relationshipbetween the Mayorand the func- nothelped by the need to absorb sta V froma number tionalbodies areconsidered in the next section. ofpredecessor bodies. Thiswas apoint made strongly Anotheroddity inthe GLAarrangementsis the fact by KPMG,2001, (commissioned by the Mayor ’s (described inan earlier section) that the Mayordoes OYce)in their report Deliveringthe Mayor’s Policies . notappoint the key GLAsta V whomonitor the Despite theirbest e Vorts,these inheritedsta V – with performanceof the functionalbodies. Instead, the theirparticular skills and backgrounds – were not Assembly make GLAsta V appointments. alwaysseen as havingthe aptitudes orinclinations DecentralizationLondon-style: The G LAandLondon Governance 785 required to runthe country ’s rst mayoralgover nmentregional development agencies,the HigherEducation system. FundingCouncil for England and Learningand Skills Perhapsthe most obviousconsequence of the Councilsare examples ofservicedelivery by appointed diYcultiesoutlined above was the relianceof both the boards. Butin all cases, central, regional and local Assembly and the Mayoron externalconsultants during authorities have maintainedpowerful bureaucracies to 2000and 2001.A numberof Assembly inquirieswere ensurecontrol over service provision. undertaken with externalconsultancy assistance. The TheMayor of Londonwas designed to operate ina Mayor’s OYcealso used consultantsand/ orexpertise very diVerent way.It was envisaged there wouldbe a withinthe functionalbodies to producedraft strategies smallcore of o Ycialswithin the GLA(expected to be and otherpieces ofwork. As the Assembly ’s Head of nomore than 450 in total – thoughby 2002their Scrutinydeveloped acapability to undertake morenumber had grownclose to 600),but with virtuallyall scrutinyin-house, the amountof workcontracted out ofthe servicedelivery undertaken by the functional declined somewhat. bodies. Thelatter wouldhave boards partly orwholly It isclear that anumberof parties, includingthe appointed by the Mayorand wouldenjoy some auto- Mayor,the Chairof the Appointments Committee and nomy.Asoutlined above, the precise formofboard the ChiefExecutive ofthe GLAmade considerable appointments, chiefexecutive appointments and eVorts in the rst two yearsof the GLAto nd ways accountabilityvaries fromfunctional body to func- ofaccommodating the needs ofthe Mayor ’s OYce tionalbody . and,separately ,ofthe Assembly,withinthe terms of Thear rangementsfor each functional body are the GLAAct.As the systemicdi Ycultiesof the Act diVerent.While the desire foradministrative tidiness is have become clear,e Vortshave been made to create – doubtless misconceivedand fruitless,the system created as far as ispossible – water-tight, con dential, oYcerat the GLAhasa numberof consequences: sectionsfor the Mayorand, separately ,forthe Assembly. Onlytime willtell how e Vective suchar rangements Twoof the functionalbodies (TfLand the LDA) willbe. However,under the existinglaw it willnever aresubject to reasonablydirect mayoralcontrol and be possible to get awayfrom the legislative requirement assembly scrutiny that the Assembly,notthe Mayor,must appoint allthe TheM PAand LFEPAaresubject to moreindirect senior GLA oYcials.In such circumstances, it islikely control.Accountability for them isconfused because to continueto be di Ycultfor the Mayor ’s OYce to theirboards arelargely or wholly composed of workas closelywith these o Ycialsas would be desir- elected Assembly orborough members. Moreover, able. Inevitably,the Mayor ’s OYcewill work directly theirchief o Ycersand (inthe caseof the MPA,the with the functionalbodies and theirboards, to some chair)are not, as isthe casefor T fLand LDA, extent cuttingout G LAsta V involvement. appointed by the Mayor Theonly way to avoid the di Ycultiesdescribed in Becausea majorityof M PAand LFEPAboard thissection would be to changethe legislationso asto members aredrawn from the Assembly,noscrutiny allowthe Mayorto appoint the GLAsta V responsible committees have been set up by the Assembly to fordelivering mayoral strategies, budgets and services. monitorM PAorL FEPA TheAssembly ,equally,wouldhave to be giventhe Inthe caseof the MPA,accountabilityis split four rightto set its ownbudget and make sta V appointments ways:between the Mayor(who determines the police needed to ful lits legalobligations. There is nodoubt budget); the Assembly (whichprovides overhalf the that – as compared to the existingposition – such MPA’smembership,includingthe Chair,and which changeswould tip the balanceof power withinthe isresponsible for budgetary scrutiny);the Home GLAtowards the Mayor,requiring a re-balancingof Secretary(who, in reality,appoints the Commissioner the relationshipbetween the Mayorand Assembly.For and whocontinues to assumesome national policing example, the Assembly wouldprobably need to be responsibilities);and the Commissionerhimself, who givengreater powers to a Vect the budget and/orpolicy, remainsresponsible for police service operational possiblyby anextension of theirveto powers. matters TfLand the LDAaresubject to strategies deter- mined by the Mayor,though in the caseof the LDA, The Mayor andthe functionalbodies the fact that otherregional development agencies Withinthe UKgovernment,the Scottishand Welsh inEngland are government-appointed bodies has devolved administrationsand localgover nmentin produced, ine Vect, two accountabilitylines for the Britain,services are delivered – withinpolitically-set LDA – oneto Whitehalland oneto the Mayor policies – by departments sta Ved by oYcials.In some Thelegislation does notrequire mayoral strategies cases,such as the NationalHealth Service or the forpolice or re,though the MPA,incommonwith PrisonsService, there maybe an ‘executive’ body to otherpolice authorities, must producea PolicePlan provide day-to-day control.Other services are delivered Thearrangements for control and oversightof the throughsemi-autonomous boards. Healthauthorities, functionalbodies arealmost certainly su Yciently 786 TonyT ravers

diVerent and complexto inhibitpublic understand- that matter to the previousmethod ofsetting the ing;it wouldbe di Ycultfor a member ofthe public policeand transport budgets forthe capital).Indeed, fullyto grasp the di Verencebetween, say,the Mayor ’scompared with parliamentarydebates about the Chan- responsibilitiesfor transport and thosefor policing. cellor’sBudget and the annual nancebill, the GLA budget processwas far moretransparent and subject to Theparticular arrangements for each functional body opendebate. derive fromthe di Verent views taken withinWhitehall Asimilarprocess occur red inthe springof 2002 about the newLondon gover nmentat the pointthe duringwhich the 2002 –03budget was the object of GLAlegislationwas beingdrafted. TheHome O Yce Assembly review.Inthe secondyear ’sbudget debates, evidently demanded – and got – afar lesserdegree of the fundingof transport(the Mayorof London ’s main mayoralcontrol for the MPAand LFEPAthanthe serviceresponsibility) was consideredin detail. The DETRconcededfor transport. There can be little Mayor’sproposalsto buyin tra Ycpolicingservices doubt that the Mayorof London will nd itharderto fromthe MetropolitanPolice, in particular, were sub- implement radicalchange to eitherthe policeor re ject to rigorousconsideration. The Mayor ’sproposalto servicesunder the existinglegislative arrangements. pay foradditional police numbers – as in 2001–02 – TheMayor could realistically only use the controlover was moreeasily accepted by the Assembly. the budget to bringabout policychanges in these In both 2001–02 and 2002–03,the boroughs, services.By contrast, transport could(subject to the throughthe Associationof London Government, nalconclusion of negotiations about controlof the pressed the Assembly and Mayorto minimizethe Underground)be very directlychanged by Mayoral budget riseand thusto reducethe impact onthe city- demand. wide counciltax precept. Unlikein Scotland and If the Mayorof London is to be heldto accountfor Wales,where no regionaltax was set (indeed, inW ales the performanceof the capital ’s police and reservices, noneis available), the GLAdoes set anannual tax. In changeswould have to be made to existinglegislation. 2002–03,the precept islikely to exceed £500million. Indeed, to give the Mayoranything like the kind of However,the fact the GLAprecept represents only controlenjoyed by,forexample, the Mayorof New around 15–20%of gross income has the e Vect of Yorkit wouldbe necessaryto changethe traditional causingsmall percentage changesin expenditure to approachto policeaccountability enshrined in the have a magni ed percentage impact onthe overall relationshipbetween the MPA,the Commissionerand precept. Thise Vect isknown as ‘gearing’.Inaddition, the policeservice. althoughthe Mayorhas access to atax source,it is harderfor the Mayorto move resourcesfrom one budget head to another(e.g. from T fLto the MPA, The Budgetprocess orvice versa) thanit wouldbe forthe government, TheG LAbudget for2000 –01was set by central the Scottishor W elshadministrations and forlocal governmentin advance ofthe May2000 election. authorities. Thus, the rst mayoralbudget proposalsfor the GLA and the functionalbodies related to the nancialyear The Assembly 2001–02.As envisaged inthe legislation,the Mayor put forwarda draft budget documentcovering the coreThe above sectionshave consideredsome of the roles GLA,TfL,the LDA,the MPAand LFEPA.This and activities ofthe 25G LAassembly members. There draft was thenthe subject ofnegotiations between the islittle doubt thispart ofthe GLAfoundit di Ycult to Mayorand Assembly,resultingin a reductionto the determine aprecise roleduring the rst two yearsof budget and precept guresoriginally envisaged. Thethe newAuthority .Fourfactors above allothers a Vected Assembly did not,in the event, seek to pass analter na- the Assembly ’scapacityto worke Vectively: tive budget (whichwould, by law,have required atwo- the fact that the Mayorwas notaligned to oneof thirds majority). the fourparties represented inthe Assembly Thereis no doubt that discussionsbetween the the smallnumber of members Mayorand Assembly about the 2001 –02budget were the electoralmethod used (aform of proportional heated and,at times, highlycombative. Sucha public representation),which produced nomajorityparty debate about the Authority ’sbudget (which,in gross members did notneed to forma ‘leadership’ to set terms,exceeded £4billion)was undoubtedly asign budgets and runservices. that the originalintentions of those who drafted the legislationhad been achieved. Discussionswere widely Thecomplex story of how Ken Livingstone became reported inthe media. The nalbudget meetingwas the rst Mayorof London has been told elsewhere wellattended by the publicand press. Farmore public (D ’ARCY and MACLEAN,2000).He was notselected attention was givento the Mayor ’sbudget and alterna- as the oYcialLabour party candidate, stood as an tive propositionsthan would normally have been the Independent and won.The Assembly consistedof nine casewith aconventionallocal authority budget (or,for Conservative,nine Labour, four Liberal Democratand DecentralizationLondon-style: The G LAandLondon Governance 787 three Greenmembers, whichmeant that noneof them Londonhas existed ina broadlysimilar for msince were members ofthe Mayor ’s ‘party’.Althoughsome before the year1000. Local, often parochial,interests assembly members, notablythe Greens,had areason-are very important to boroughcouncillors. There are ably close aYnityto MayorLivingstone, there was noserious proposals to reformthe boroughs,though absolutelyno sense inwhich the Mayorwas part ofthe Cityof London ’sancientfranchise (which has anyof the politicalgroupings within the GLA. continuedto allowvoting by businesses)was inthe Thesmall total ofassembly members, coupledwith processof reformduring 2002. the formof proportional representation used, ensured Ever sincethe GLCwas abolishedin 1986 there that noparty wonmore than nine seats inthe Assembly.were proposalsto create anewform of city-wide Given recenttrends inLondon politics, even ina year elected government.In 2000, yet anothernew form of whena particularparty did exceptionallywell, it wouldLondon-wide authority was introduced – the fourth be surprisingif it gaineda majorityof seats undersuch system in35years. The G LA,ashas been stated above, anelectoral system (see T RAVER S,1998,pp .xi –xvi). isa part both oflocal and regionalgovernment in Thus,party groupswill always be small.Whipping and Britain. the normalmechanisms of party groupswill inevitably Anumberof lessons of relevance to the rest of have diVerent dynamicswith suchsmall numbers. Englandemerge from the rst two yearsof the GLA: Labourand Conservativeparty groupson the Greater TheG LA,despite havinga Mayorwho is strong LondonCouncil generally had between 30and 50 withinthe system as itoperates, isa weak authority members. interms ofits servicepowers and nancialcapacity . Moreover,the groupson the GLAarenot required Moreovermany of the powers it hasare circum- to form an ‘administration ’ inthe waythat wouldbe scribed. If regionalgovernment were created for required inother major local authorities, or in the otherparts ofEngland with fewer functionsor less Scottishor W elshgovernments. The Mayor is the power thanthe GLA,there isa risk sucha reform executive part ofthe authority.Thus,while the Assem- wouldunder minethe credibilityof the new bly must performscrutiny and policyoversight func- institutions. tions,they arenot under pressure to deliver budgets, ‘Consultative ’ and ‘coordination ’ powers arenot executive controlor policies. This lack of pressure to suYcientto ensurea regionalauthority can have controlthe authorityremoves the need fora managed authority.Onlypolitical institutions with legitimacy, politicalleadership . powers and accessto resourcesare likely to achieve Asa resultof the above factors,the Assembly found very much. ithardto develop acoherentrole for themselves during Thereis a realpossibility ofintensepolitical disagree- their rst two years.A smallnumber of blockbuster ment between the regionaland localgovernment reports were published, notablyone on the Mayor ’s tier(s) over,for example, planningpolicy .Whilesome proposed congestioncharging scheme. But generally politicaldebate ishealthy ,there isa risk ofserious there appeared to be areluctanceto pursuethe detail of and damagingintra-regional dispute. Mayoralpolicy implementation. Question time sessions Whitehallrarely pulls back entirelyfrom its various with the Mayorproduced short,combative, sessions regionalroles. In London,very few governmentinsti- (notunlike Prime Minister ’sQuestionTime in the tutions(e.g. the GovernmentRegional O Yce, Houseof Commons) rather than deep probingof EnglishPartnerships, Learning and SkillsCouncils) particularmayoral policy .Inthe longerterm, the ceased to operate followingthe creationof the GLA Assembly willhave to establish afar morevisible role inMay2000. There is a risk ofgovernmentaloverload. for itself. Centralgovernment is unlikelyto give regionalgov- ernmentmuch nancialfreedom. Waleshas none CONCLUSIONS and Scotlandvirtually none. The G LA,curiously,is moreautonomous, having access to asmallcouncil Thesystem ofgovernment in London is complex. tax precept and,in future, a congestioncharge. Thereare, in e Vect, four diVerent kinds ofgover n- Regionsin England, if created infollow up to mentalinstitution: central government departments; the May2002 White Paper,will enjoy G LA-style government-appointed boards; the Greater London nancialfreedom at least oncounciltax. Authority;and the boroughsthemselves. Thepublic nds the system di Ycultto understand.Accountability There can be little doubt that London ’s Mayor and forservices such as the police,transport and strategic assembly have democraticlegitimacy .Turnoutat the planningwere, until the electionof the Mayorand 2000election was just under35% which, though hardly Assembly,buried withincentral government evidence ofa surgein democratic involvement, was departments. reasonablein the contextof many local government Boroughgovernment, on the otherhand, is deeply electionsin recent years. Services such as transport, entrenched.The boroughs have theirorigins in earlier, economic regeneration and strategic planning(and smallerunits of civic administration. The City of to alesserextent policeand re)were made more 788 TonyT ravers democraticallyaccountable than had previouslybeen private-sector institutionsmust allwork together to the case.But putative regionalgovernments in other achieveeven modest changewithin London. Securing parts ofEngland need to be awareof the resistance the powers and fundingfor a majorproject suchas a withinWhitehall to morethan token devolution.The newrailway line or a key sports event willoften Home OYce,in particular, was carefulto ensurethat stillbe beyond the capacityof this multiplicity of the arrangementsfor police accountability in London organizationsand individuals.The creation of the left the HomeSecretary with animportant role. Greater LondonAuthority can really only be seenas a It istoo early to make ade nitive judgement about start onalongerprocess of bringinge Vective, autono- the successor failure of the Londongovernment refor m mous,government to the Britishcapital. Further ofMay 2000. But what isalready clear is that the reformisinevitable. Greater LondonAuthority (through the Mayorof London,as its executive) isa signi cantlyless powerful NOTES regionalgovernment than those for Scotland and Wales. Indeed, the 32London boroughs and the Cityof 1.This paper is largelybased oninterviews conducted as Londonhave easilybeen able to demonstrate both a partof anE SRC-fundedproject. Partsof itare abstracted from areportproduced for theMayor ’s OYce during collectiveand anindividual capacity to ensurethe 2001.Parts will also form thebasis of sectionsof a Mayorcan be made to lookrelatively powerless. book onthe Greater London Authority to be published Thereare still many players involved inthe capital ’s during2002. government:Whitehall departments, government- 2.For an earlier example of thestruggle to runLondon, see appointed quangos,the boroughsand manylarger ROBSON, 1948.

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