How to Eliminate Corruption in Africa?
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Lobbying and Corruption: Review of the Relevant Literature on The
Methodology of Social Sciences (JPB 150) Lobbying and Corruption: Review of the relevant literature on the correlation between the two concepts and the role of regulation as a preventive measure for lobbying not to become corruption By Anna Shabalina, Barbara Anabalon, Magdalena Montanaro and Nira Arapovic Table of Contents 1.Introduction…….. ………………………………………………………..…….. p.2 2.Overview on the History of Literature on Lobbying …………............................p.3 3. The correlation between lobbying and corruption……… ………..………..…..p.4 3.1. Hypothesis #1- lobbying and bribery as substitutes…..…………..pp. 5-6 3.2. Hypothesis # 2- lobbying and bribery as complements…….…..…....p. 6 4. The concept of transparent lobbying…....……………………….…………......p. 7 4.1. The lobbying regulation in EU…..……..………………………..pp. 8 5.Conclusion …….................................................................................................p. 9 6.Bibliography………………………………………………………………..pp. 10-11 1 1. Introduction The practice of lobbying has been actively applied in politics throughout the second half of the 20th century. As lobbying becomes a more widely used activity, it receives more interest in the field of academic research. Corruption has been associated with political activities for a much longer period of time, and unlike lobbying, is always viewed as an illegal and unethical activity. Nonetheless, over the past few decades there has been a tendency to interrogate the correlation between lobbying and corruption, since both can influence important government decisions. The present literature review looks at two broad areas of studies concerned with lobbying. The first part is related to the two central hypotheses about the correlation of lobbying and corruption: substitution hypothesis and complements hypothesis. The second part focuses on the regulation of lobbying and transparency policies that can ensure legal practices within the lobbying process. -
Corruption-In-Angola.Pdf
Corruption in Angola: An Impediment to Democracy Rafael Marques de Morais * * The author is currently writing a book on corruption in Angola. He has recently published a book on human rights abuses and corruption in the country’s diamond industry ( Diamantes de Sangue: Tortura e Corrupção em Angola . Tinta da China: Lisboa, 2011 ), and is developing the anti-corruption watchdog Maka Ang ola www.makaangola.org . He holds a BA in Anthropology and Media from Goldsmiths College, University of London, and an MSc in African Studies from the University of Oxford. © 2011 by Rafael Marques de Morais. All rights reserved. ii | Corruption in Angola Table of Contents Acknowledgements ................................ ................................................................ ......................... 1 Introduction ................................ ................................................................ ................................ .... 2 I. Consolidation of Presidential Powers: Constitutional and Legal Measures ........................... 4 The Concept of Democracy ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 4 The Consolidation Process ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 4 The Consequences ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 9 II. Tightening the Net: Available Space for Angolan Civil Society ............................... -
Foreignpolicyleopold
Foreign Policy VOICE The 750 Million Dollar Man How a Swiss commodities giant used shell companies to make an Angolan general three-quarters of a billion dollars richer. BY Michael Weiss FEBRUARY 13, 2014 Revolutionary communist regimes have a strange habit of transforming themselves into corrupt crony capitalist ones and Angola -- with its massive oil reserves and budding crop of billionaires -- has proved no exception. In 2010, Trafigura, the world’s third-largest private oil and metals trader based in Switzerland, sold an 18.75-percent stake in one of its major energy subsidiaries to a high-ranking and influential Angolan general, Foreign Policy has discovered. The sale, which amounted to $213 million, appears on the 2012 audit of the annual financial statements of a Singapore-registered company, which is wholly owned by Gen. Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento. Details of the sale and purchaser are also buried within a prospectus document of the sold company which was uploaded to the Luxembourg Stock Exchange within the last week. “General Dino,” as he’s more commonly called in Angola, purchased the 18.75 percent stake not in any minor bauble, but in a $5 billion multinational oil company called Puma Energy International. By 2011, his shares were diluted to 15 percent; but that’s still quite a hefty prize: his stake in the company is today valued at around $750 million. The sale illuminates not only a growing and little-scrutinized relationship between Trafigura, which earned nearly $1 billion in profits in 2012, and the autocratic regime of 71-year-old Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in power since 1979 -- but also the role that Western enterprise continues to play in the Third World. -
Workshop on Corruption and Human Rights in Third Countries
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION DIRECTORATE B POLICY DEPARTMENT WORKSHOP CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THIRD COUNTRIES Abstract Defined as abuse of public trust for personal gain, corruption is present in all countries. The participants of this workshop discussed various ways that corruption is linked to human rights violations and examined specific challenges in individual countries such as South Africa, Angola and Russia. The recommendations for the EU included supporting civil society activists more effectively, developing international standards for the independence of anti-corruption bodies, establishing a UN Special Rapporteur, setting anti-corruption benchmarks for bilateral cooperation and monitoring the links of corrupt countries with EU Member States. EXPO/B/DROI/2013/03-04-07 March 2013 PE 433.728 EN Policy Department DG External Policies This workshop on 'Corruption and human rights in third countries' was requested by the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights. BASED ON PRESENTATIONS OF: Gareth SWEENEY, Transparency International ‘Linking acts of corruption with specific human rights’ Rafael MARQUES DE MORAIS, Journalist and Angolan anti-corruption campaigner 'Corruption in Africa and the Impact on Human Rights: Angola: A Case Study' Julia PETTENGILL, Research Fellow, Henry Jackson Society, London, Founder and Chair, Russia Studies Centre 'Impact of corruption on human rights in Russia' The exchange of views / hearing / public hearing can be followed online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/homeCom.do?language=EN&body=DROI -
Extractive Sectors and Illicit Financial Flows: What Role for Revenue Governance Initiatives?
U4 ISSUE November 2011 No 13 Extractive sectors and illicit financial flows: What role for revenue governance initiatives? Philippe Le Billon Anti- Corruption Resource Centre www.U4.no U4 is a web-based resource centre for development practitioners who wish to effectively address corruption challenges in their work. U4 is operated by the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) – an independent centre for research on international development and policy – and is funded by AusAID (Australia), BTC (Belgium), CIDA (Canada), DFID (UK), GIZ (Germany), Norad (Norway), Sida (Sweden) and The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All views expressed in this Issue are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the U4 Partner Agencies or CMI/ U4. (Copyright 2011 - CMI/U4) Extractive sectors and illicit financial flows: What role for revenue governance initiatives? By Philippe Le Billon Associate Professor, Department of Geography and Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia U4 Issue October 2011 No 13 Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................................... iv Acronyms ......................................................................................................................................................... v 1. Introduction -
Impact of Economic Freedom on Corruption Revisited in ASEAN Countries: a Bayesian Hierarchical Mixed-Effects Analysis
economies Article Impact of Economic Freedom on Corruption Revisited in ASEAN Countries: A Bayesian Hierarchical Mixed-Effects Analysis Nguyen Ngoc Thach 1,* and Bui Hoang Ngoc 2 1 Institute for Research Science and Banking Technology, Banking University of Ho Chi Minh City, 39 Ham Nghi Street, District 1, Ho Chi Minh City 700000, Vietnam 2 Finance, Economics and Management Research Group, Ho Chi Minh City Open University, 97 Vo Van Tan Street, District 3, Ho Chi Minh City 700000, Vietnam; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] Abstract: Conceptual and applied studies assessing the linkage between economic freedom and corruption expect that economic freedom boosts economic growth, improves income, and reduces levels of corruption. However, most of them have concentrated on developed and developing groups, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries have drawn much less attention. Empirical findings are most often conflicting. Moreover, previous studies performed rather simple frequentist techniques regressing one or some freedom indices on corruption that do not allow for grasping all the aspects of economic freedom as well as capturing variations across countries. The study aims to investigate the effects of ten components of economic freedom index on the level of corruption in ten ASEAN countries from 1999 to 2018. By applying a Bayesian hierarchical mixed-effects regression via a Monte Carlo technique combined with the Gibbs sampler, the obtained results suggest several findings as follows: (i) In view of probability, the predictors property rights, government integrity, tax burden, business freedom, labor freedom, and investment freedom have a strongly positive impact on the response perceived corruption index; (ii) Government Citation: Thach, Nguyen Ngoc, and spending, trade freedom, and financial freedom exert a strongly negative effect, while the influence of Bui Hoang Ngoc. -
Here a Causal Relationship? Contemporary Economics, 9(1), 45–60
Bibliography on Corruption and Anticorruption Professor Matthew C. Stephenson Harvard Law School http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/ March 2021 Aaken, A., & Voigt, S. (2011). Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness? Economics of Governance, 12(4), 301–324. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-011-0100-8 Aaronson, S. A. (2011a). Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up? Available at SSRN 1922190. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1922190 Aaronson, S. A. (2011b). Limited partnership: Business, government, civil society, and the public in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Public Administration and Development, 31(1), 50–63. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.588 Aaronson, S. A., & Abouharb, M. R. (2014). Corruption, Conflicts of Interest and the WTO. In J.-B. Auby, E. Breen, & T. Perroud (Eds.), Corruption and conflicts of interest: A comparative law approach (pp. 183–197). Edward Elgar PubLtd. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.GEN_batch:ELGAR01620140507 Abbas Drebee, H., & Azam Abdul-Razak, N. (2020). The Impact of Corruption on Agriculture Sector in Iraq: Econometrics Approach. IOP Conference Series. Earth and Environmental Science, 553(1), 12019-. https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/553/1/012019 Abbink, K., Dasgupta, U., Gangadharan, L., & Jain, T. (2014). Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 111(Journal Article), 17–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012 Abbink, Klaus. (2004). Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: An experimental study. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(4), 887–906. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.008 Abbink, Klaus. -
Corruption in Context: Social, Economic and Political Dimensions
CHAPTER 1 CORRUPTION IN CONTEXT: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS GLOBAL CORRUPTION: LAW, THEORY & PRACTICE CONTENTS 1. WHY CORRUPTION MATTERS: THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION 2. THE MANY FACES OF CORRUPTION 3. DRIVERS OF CORRUPTION 4. PERCEPTIONS AND MEASUREMENTS OF CORRUPTION 5. MORE ISSUES ON MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION 6. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION LAWS 7. DIVERGENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS ON CORRUPTION 8. A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 9. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CORRUPTION 10. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF CORRUPTION: GOOD GOVERNANCE 11. ANOTHER CASE STUDY: BAE ENGAGES IN LARGE-SCALE CORRUPTION IN SAUDI ARABIA 1. WHY CORRUPTION MATTERS: THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION 1.1 A Case Illustration of the Impact of Corruption The TV report noted below investigates the cancellation of World Bank funding ($1.2 billion loan) for a major bridge proposal (worth nearly $3 billion) in Bangladesh. The bridge is critical to both the economic growth of the country and the safety of hundreds of thousands of poor Bangladesh citizens who cross the Padma River daily in crowded, unsafe boats.1 The World Bank cancelled funding for the bridge project because very senior politicians and officials in the Bangladesh government allegedly solicited bribes from bidding companies. SNC-Lavalin allegedly agreed to pay those bribes in order to get the engineering contract (worth $50 million) to supervise the bridge construction. SNC-Lavalin is one of the five 1 “SNC and a Bridge for Bangladesh” CBC, the National, Investigative Report (15 minutes), aired May 15, 2013, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/TV+Shows/The+National/ID/2385492220/>. -
Dark Deals and Dampened Destinies: Corruption and Economic Performance Shang-Jin Wei, Richard Zeckhauser* John F
Japan and the World Economy 11 (1999) 443±454 Dark deals and dampened destinies: corruption and economic performance Shang-Jin Wei, Richard Zeckhauser* John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA ``If you look under most banking crises, there's always a degree of fraud and abuse, and there's often a large amount of criminal activity. Corruption threatens growth and stability in many other ways as well: by discouraging business, undermining legal notions of property rights and perpetuating vested interests.'' Lawrence Summers, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Speech to Summit of the Eight, Denver, June 10, 1997 The Asian crisis, and the crises that followed in Russia and Brazil elicited strong prescriptions for therapy from international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, and forceful recommendations from US Treasury Department of®cials and many of the world's leading economists. The principal area identi®ed for reform was ®scal fundamentals. Surprisingly, disagreements among the organizations and experts about what should be done were signi®cant, and often sharply worded and loudly voiced.1 `Control corruption' was a second prescription for the nations in crisis. Here there was widespread agreement among the leading commentators and actors, almost all of whom were Americans, and shared the American anathema ± some would say prissiness ± to corrupt practices. Corruption and cronyism were frequently identi®ed as underlying causes of the crisis in the troubled economies. A number of the same sorts of ®rm-government, ®rm-bank, or ®rm-®rm relationships that were previously described as critical ingredients of social capital, or were portrayed metaphorically as the engine of the East Asian growth, * Corresponding author. -
The Political Economy of Corruption
The Political Economy of Corruption ‘Grand’ corruption, generally used to define corruption amongst the top polit- ical elite, has drawn increasing attention from academics and policy-makers during recent years. Current understanding of the causes and mechanisms of this type of corruption, however, falls short of a full awareness of its importance and consequences. In this volume, leading academics and practitioners analyse the economic and political conditions that allow ‘grand’ corruption to survive. Contributions include: • Case studies of countries that have witnessed flagrant misuse of political powers. • Theoretical papers which present models of corruption and project their possible effects. • Empirical studies which raise research questions and test the theoretical models using insightful methodologies. The studies in this work not only indicate the importance of the economic implications of ‘grand’ corruption, but also provide a framework for under- standing its processes. Academics and policy-makers working in the fields of economics, political science and sociology will find this an illuminating and valuable work. Arvind K. Jain is Associate Professor at Concordia University, Montreal. His current research focuses on corruption and on international financial crises. His past research papers have dealt with corruption, agency theory and the debt crisis, capital flight, international lending decisions of banks, oligopolistic behaviour in banking, foreign debt and foreign trade in devel- oping countries, impact of culture on saving behaviour and commodity futures markets. He has previously written two books and edited a volume entitled Economics of Corruption. Routledge Contemporary Economic Policy Issues Series editor: Kanhaya Gupta This series is dedicated to new works that focus directly on contemporary economic policy issues. -
A Crude Awakening
Dedicated to the inspiration of Jeffrey Reynolds ISBN 0 9527593 9 X Published by Global Witness Ltd P O Box 6042, London N19 5WP,UK Telephone:+ 44 (0)20 7272 6731 Fax: + 44 (0)20 7272 9425 e-mail: [email protected] a crude awakening The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/ 1 a crude awakening The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets “Most observers, in and out of Angola, would agree that “There should be full transparency.The oil companies who corruption, and the perception of corruption, has been a work in Angola, like BP—Amoco, Elf,Total and Exxon and the critical impediment to economic development in Angola.The diamond traders like de Beers, should be open with the full extent of corruption is unknown, but the combination of international community and the international financial high military expenditures, economic mismanagement, and institutions so that it is clear these revenues are not syphoned corruption have ensured that spending on social services and A CRUDE AWAKENING A CRUDE development is far less than is required to pull the people of off but are invested in the country. I want the oil companies Angola out of widespread poverty... and the governments of Britain, the USA and France to co- operate together, not seek a competitive advantage: full Our best hope to ensure the efficient and transparent use of oil revenues is for the government to embrace a comprehensive transparency is in our joint interests because it will help to program of economic reform.We have and will continue to create a more peaceful, stable Angola and a more peaceful, encourage the Angolan Government to move in this stable Africa too.” direction....” SPEECH BY FCO MINISTER OF STATE, PETER HAIN,TO THE ACTION FOR SECRETARY OF STATE, MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN SOUTHERN AFRICA (ACTSA) ANNUAL CONFERENCE, SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL OPERATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, JUNE 16 1998. -
The Organization of Anticorruption: Getting Incentives Right!
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Graf Lambsdorff, Johann Working Paper The organization of anticorruption: Getting incentives right! Passauer Diskussionspapiere - Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, No. V-57-08 Provided in Cooperation with: University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics Suggested Citation: Graf Lambsdorff, Johann (2008) : The organization of anticorruption: Getting incentives right!, Passauer Diskussionspapiere - Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, No. V-57-08, Universität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Passau This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55006 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von