Practical Aspects of Tender Offers and Acquisitions
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Chambers Global Practice Guides Corporate M&A Japan 2017
CHAMBERS Global Practice Guides JAPAN Corporate M&A LAW & PRACTICE: p.3 ContributedContributed by Mori Hamada by & Matsumoto MoriThe Hamada‘Law & Practice’ & Matsumoto sections provide easily accessible information on navigating the legal system when conducting business in the jurisdic- tion. Leading lawyers explain local law and practice at key transactional stages and for crucial aspects of doing business. DOING 2017BUSINESS IN JAPAN: p.283 Chambers & Partners employ a large team of full-time researchers (over 140) in their London office who interview thousands of clients each year. This section is based on these interviews. The advice in this section is based on the views of clients with in-depth international experience. JAPAN LAW & PRACTICE: p.3 Contributed by Mori Hamada & Matsumoto The ‘Law & Practice’ sections provide easily accessible information on navigating the legal system when conducting business in the jurisdic- tion. Leading lawyers explain local law and practice at key transactional stages and for crucial aspects of doing business. LAW & PRACTICE JAPAN Contributed by Mori Hamada & Matsumoto Authors: Hajime Tanahashi, Takayuki Kihira, Kenichi Sekiguchi, Akira Matsushita Law & Practice Contributed by Mori Hamada & Matsumoto CONTENTS 1. Trends p.5 6.6 Additional Governance Rights p.12 1.1 M&A Market p.5 6.7 Voting by Proxy p.12 1.2 Key Trends p.5 6.8 Squeeze-Out Mechanisms p.12 1.3 Key Industries p.5 6.9 Irrevocable Commitments p.12 2. Overview of Regulatory Field p.5 7. Disclosure p.13 2.1 Acquiring a Company p.5 7.1 Making a Bid Public p.13 2.2 Primary Regulators p.5 7.2 Types of Disclosure p.13 2.3 Restrictions on Foreign Investment p.5 7.3 Requirement for Financial Statements p.13 2.4 Antitrust Regulations p.6 7.4 Disclosure of the Transaction Documents p.13 2.5 Labour Law Regulations p.6 8. -
The Use of Contingent Value Rights in M&A
Norwegian School of Economics Bergen, Autumn 2017 The use of Contingent Value Rights in M&A An empirical review Eivind K. Fosheim & Niklas Olufsen Langerød Supervisor: Associate Professor Francisco Santos Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration, Finance NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are responsible − through the approval of this thesis − for the theories and methods used, or results and conclusions drawn in this work. 2 Abstract This paper contributes to the literature on payment methods in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A). It seeks to establish how the use of Contingent Value Rights (CVRs) in M&A affect the probability of deal completion following a bid announcement. Further, the paper provides answers on how the stock market reacts to bidders’ issuing CVRs as part of their deal consideration package by estimating the bidders’ cumulative abnormal returns (BCAR). It also presents a general definition of a CVR that acknowledges that there exist two main categories of the instrument. Namely, event-driven CVRs and performance CVRs. By utilizing more than 1,800 U.S. transactions, including 41 observed CVRs, we find robust evidence in favour of that CVRs have a significant positive impact on the probability of deal completion in M&A. More precisely, we run Probit regressions on matched sub-samples and estimate that the marginal probability increase on deal completion when using CVRs are 13.9% to 22.1%. BCAR is estimated using a market model. -
Initial Public Offerings
November 2017 Initial Public Offerings An Issuer’s Guide (US Edition) Contents INTRODUCTION 1 What Are the Potential Benefits of Conducting an IPO? 1 What Are the Potential Costs and Other Potential Downsides of Conducting an IPO? 1 Is Your Company Ready for an IPO? 2 GETTING READY 3 Are Changes Needed in the Company’s Capital Structure or Relationships with Its Key Stockholders or Other Related Parties? 3 What Is the Right Corporate Governance Structure for the Company Post-IPO? 5 Are the Company’s Existing Financial Statements Suitable? 6 Are the Company’s Pre-IPO Equity Awards Problematic? 6 How Should Investor Relations Be Handled? 7 Which Securities Exchange to List On? 8 OFFER STRUCTURE 9 Offer Size 9 Primary vs. Secondary Shares 9 Allocation—Institutional vs. Retail 9 KEY DOCUMENTS 11 Registration Statement 11 Form 8-A – Exchange Act Registration Statement 19 Underwriting Agreement 20 Lock-Up Agreements 21 Legal Opinions and Negative Assurance Letters 22 Comfort Letters 22 Engagement Letter with the Underwriters 23 KEY PARTIES 24 Issuer 24 Selling Stockholders 24 Management of the Issuer 24 Auditors 24 Underwriters 24 Legal Advisers 25 Other Parties 25 i Initial Public Offerings THE IPO PROCESS 26 Organizational or “Kick-Off” Meeting 26 The Due Diligence Review 26 Drafting Responsibility and Drafting Sessions 27 Filing with the SEC, FINRA, a Securities Exchange and the State Securities Commissions 27 SEC Review 29 Book-Building and Roadshow 30 Price Determination 30 Allocation and Settlement or Closing 31 Publicity Considerations -
KL Event Driven UCITS Fund
The Directors of KL UCITS ICAV (the "ICAV") whose names appear in the section of the Prospectus entitled "THE ICAV" are the persons responsible for the information contained in this Supplement and the Prospectus. To the best of the knowledge and belief of the Directors (who have taken all reasonable care to ensure that such is the case) the information contained in this Supplement and the Prospectus is in accordance with the facts and does not omit any material information likely to affect the import of such information. The Directors accept responsibility accordingly. If you are in any doubt about the contents of this Supplement or the Prospectus you should consult your stockbroker, bank manager, solicitor, accountant or other financial adviser. KL EVENT DRIVEN UCITS FUND (A sub-fund of KL UCITS ICAV an Irish collective asset-management vehicle with variable capital constituted as an umbrella fund with segregated liability between sub-funds pursuant to the European Communities (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) Regulations 2011 (as amended)) SUPPLEMENT DATED: 29 MARCH 2018 INVESTMENT MANAGER Kite Lake Capital Management (UK) LLP This Supplement forms part of, and should be read in the context of and together with, the Prospectus dated 29 March 2018 as may be amended or updated from time to time (the "Prospectus") in relation to the ICAV and contains information relating to the KL Event Driven UCITS Fund (the "Fund") which is a separate portfolio of the ICAV. The Fund may be exclusively invested in financial derivative instruments ("FDI"), therefore prospective investors should ensure that, before investing, they understand the relevant risks and are satisfied that an investment is suitable. -
Overview of Public Merger & Acquisition Regulations of The
FIRST ISSUED FEB 2018, UPDATED AUGUST 2019 Overview of Public Merger & Acquisition Regulations of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia IN THIS ISSUE: Introduction Introduction Since the introduction by the Capital Market Authority (the “CMA”) of the Key Legislation Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the “Kingdom”) of the amended Merger and Scope of Application of M&A Acquisition Regulations1 (the “M&A Regulations”) there has been a distinct Regulations increase in market activity2, indicating that public M&A transactions will Appointment of Advisers continue to drive deal flow in the Kingdom. Competition Law Considerations This note, updated in August 2019, provides a high-level overview of the Private Transactions current regulatory regime of the Kingdom governing public M&A Rules of Tender Offers transactions, and how certain of the M&A Regulations are tending to be applied in practice No Squeeze-Out Right Merger Transactions Key Legislation The principal legislative acts which regulate public M&A transactions in the Kingdom are: the Companies Law (the “Companies Law”) issued by Royal Decree No. M/3 dated 28/01/1437H (corresponding to 10 November 2015); the Capital Market Law (the “CML”) issued by Royal Decree No. M/30 dated 02/06/1426H (corresponding to 31 July 2003); the M&A Regulations; 1 As issued by the CMA pursuant to its Board Resolution No. 2-94-2017 dated 25/01/1439H (corresponding to 15 October 2017), which became effective as of 19 October 2017, as further amended pursuant to its Resolution No. 3-45-2018 dated 7/8/1439H (corresponding to 23 -
'' Criticizing the Mandatory Bid Rule of the Takeover Bid Directive ''
School of Economics and Business Administration LLM in Transnational and European Commercial Law & Alternative Dispute Resolution DISSERTATION ‘’ Criticizing the mandatory bid rule of the takeover bid Directive ‘’ IOANNA BALTA Stud. ID: 1104120054 Under the supervision of Dr. Thomas Papadopoulos Thessaloniki, 29 November 2013 International Hellenic University Criticizing the mandatory bid rule of the Takeover Bid Directive S Acknowledgements The writing of this dissertation has been one of the most significant academic challenges I have ever had to face. Without the support, patience and guidance of the following people, this study would not have been completed. I owe my gratitude to Dr. Thomas Papadopoulos, who undertook to act as my supervisor despite his many other academic and professional commitments. His wisdom, kindness and knowledge to the highest standards inspired and motivated me. I will always be grateful to my family, that have supported, encouraged and believed in me, and in all my endeavours who so lovingly and unselfishly cared for me. This dissertation is dedicated to my family. 1 International Hellenic University Criticizing the mandatory bid rule of the Takeover Bid Directive ABSTRACT This paper analyses the efficiency of the mandatory bid rule under the framework of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids. The rule requires that anyone acquiring control of a listed company is obliged to make an offer to be addressed to all the shareholders of the target company for all their holdings at an equitable price. In the efforts of the EU to promote more efficient capital structures in Europe, the rule is mainly regarded as a protection mechanism for the minority shareholders. -
2019 Annual Information Form
MOUNT LOGAN CAPITAL INC. _____________________________________________ ANNUAL INFORMATION FORM For the Financial Year Ended December 31, 2019 _____________________________________________ March 25, 2020 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXPLANATORY NOTES ............................................................................................................................................ 1 General ..................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Forward-Looking Information .................................................................................................................................. 1 CORPORATE INFORMATION .................................................................................................................................. 2 Name and Organization ............................................................................................................................................ 2 Structure of the Corporation ..................................................................................................................................... 3 GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS ................................................................................................... 3 Description of the Business ...................................................................................................................................... 5 DESCRIPTION OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE ............................................................................................................ -
The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers
Washington University Law Review Volume 62 Issue 3 1984 The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers Marc I. Steinberg University of Maryland Evalyn N. Lindahl Emory University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Marc I. Steinberg and Evalyn N. Lindahl, The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62 WASH. U. L. Q. 351 (1984). Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Washington University Law Quarterly VOLUME 62 NUMBER 3 FALL 1984 THE NEW LAW OF SQUEEZE-OUT MERGERS MARC I. STEINBERG* & EVALYN N. LINDAHL** CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 352 II. PRIOR DELAWARE CASE LAW ............................ 355 A. Singer and Its Progeny.............................. 357 B. Reaction of Other States ............................ 360 III. WEINBERGER V UOP, INc.-AN OVERVIEW ............ 361 4. Background ......................................... 362 B. The Delaware Supreme Court's Decision ............. 364 IV. FAIR DEALING UNDER WEINBERGER .................... 366 A. Presence of Independent Negotiating Committee ..... 367 B. Use of Majority of Minority Vote .................... 371 C Relation of Procedural Safeguards to Substantive Fairness ............................................. 373 V. FAIR VALUE UNDER THE APPRAISAL STATUTE .......... 376 A. Elements of Future Value ............................ 379 B. Availability of Injunctive Relief ...................... 381 C. Two-Tier Offers ..................................... 384 © 1984 by Marc I. Steinberg and Evalyn N. Lindahl. All rights reserved. -
Mergers & Acquisitions 2021
Mergers & Acquisitions 2021 A practical cross-border insight into mergers and acquisitions 15th Edition Featuring contributions from: Aabø-Evensen & Co Advokatfirma Dittmar & Indrenius Oppenheim Law Firm Advokatsko druzhestvo Stoyanov & Tsekova in E&G Economides LLC Philip Lee cooperation with Schoenherr GDA Advogados Roca Junyent SLP APM & Co. GSK Stockmann Rokas ASP Advogados Hogan Lovells Schoenherr Atanaskovic Hartnell Houthoff Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co Bär & Karrer Ltd Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP Lee and Li, Attorneys-At-Law BBA//Fjeldco URBAN STEINECKER GAŠPEREC BOŠANSKÝ LEGIS and Partners Ltd Bech-Bruun Vieira de Almeida Lexel Juridique & Fiscal Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Maples Group Bowman Gilfillan Inc. Walalangi & Partners (in association with Nishimura MJM Limited & Asahi) Cektir Law Firm Moravčević Vojnović and Partners in Walkers de Bedin & Lee LLP cooperation with Schoenherr WBW Weremczuk Bobeł & Partners Attorneys at Law DealHQ Partners Nishimura & Asahi Wolf Theiss DF Advocates NUNZIANTE MAGRONE Table of Contents Expert Chapters Global M&A Trends in 2020 1 Scott C. Hopkins, Adam Howard & Craig Kelly, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP M&A Lessons from the COVID Crisis 4 Adam O. Emmerich & Trevor S. Norwitz, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Q&A Chapters Angola Indonesia 9 Vieira de Almeida / ASP Advogados: Susana Almeida 143 Walalangi & Partners (in association with Nishimura Brandão & Hugo Sipitali & Asahi): Miriam Andreta & Siti Kemala Nuraida Australia Ireland -
Fairness Opinion Regarding Announced Mandatory Offer from Canica AS
Arcus ASA Destilleriveien 11 1481 Hagan Norway Attention: The Board of Directors Oslo, 9 July 2018 Fairness Opinion regarding announced mandatory offer from Canica AS 1. BACKGROUND Carnegie AS (“Carnegie”) has been retained by the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Arcus ASA, a company incorporated under the laws of Norway (“Arcus” or the “Company”), in connection with the mandatory offer by Canica AS (“Canica” or the “Offeror”) to acquire all outstanding shares in Arcus for a cash consideration of NOK 45.00 per share (the “Offer Price”), as announced 4 July 2018 (the “Offer”). The Offer was formally set forth in the offer document (the “Offer Document”) published 4 July 2018, and values Arcus shares to approximately NOK 3,061 million (market capitalization). Under § 6-16 (1) of the Norwegian Securities Trading Act, the Board has a duty to issue a statement in relation to the Offer. The statement shall include an assessment of the impact of a potential completion of the Offer on the Company’s interests, including the effect, if any, of strategic plans by the Offeror as noted in the Offer Document on the employees and the location of the Company’s business, as well as other factors of significance for assessing if the Offer should be accepted by the Company’s shareholders. The Board has retained Carnegie to provide a Fairness Opinion of the Offer in accordance with the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance – NUES. The opinions expressed in this Fairness Opinion are prepared for the Board in order for the Board to evaluate if the Offer is fair from a financial point of view. -
Tender Offers in Italy
May 2007 JONES DAY COMMENTARY Tender Offers iN ItalY Italy has not yet implemented the Directive on target company’s shareholders—hence the provi- Takeover Bids (Directive 2004/25/EC, the “Directive”) sion, in addition to the rules governing voluntary ten- in its internal legal system.1 However, Italian tender der offers, of a set of rules governing the so-called offer rules currently in force, as set forth in Legislative “mandatory tender offers.” Decree no. 58 of February 24, 1998, and CONSOB2 Regulation no. 11971 of May 14, 1999, already provide for In a nutshell, the concept of a mandatory tender offer many of the concepts set forth in the Directive, since is such that whoever comes to hold a controlling the Italian legislation, when enacted, was based on a stake in an Italian listed company shall be required to previous draft of the Directive. We will provide here an launch a tender offer for all of the remaining shares of overview of the main concepts and rules that apply to such company at an equitable price to be determined tender offers in Italy, noting where they differ from the in accordance with Italian law, thus allowing the minor- principles set forth in the Directive. ity shareholders to tender their shares to the bidder at a price that is the same as or comparable to that paid by the bidder to acquire the controlling stake in the ThE ConcepT Of Mandatory Tender target company. Offers Italian law provides for three main types of mandatory Both the Directive and Italian law aim to ensure equal tender offers: treatment of, and prevent discrimination against, the _______________ 1. -
A New Era in Private Equity Deal Making
Implications Of The Amended Best Price Rule: A New Era In Private Equity Deal Making Summary After many years of lobbying, the SEC has finally amended its Best Price Rule to revive the functionality of tender offers as a practical structural alternative to the conventional merger for the acquisition of public companies. While many will see the SEC rule revision as a modest, but long needed, correction of a dysfunctional misuse of the old rule by the plaintiffs’ bar, the consequences of the amended rule have the potential to be farther reaching. • Ironically, revitalization of the tender offer should not have much impact on hostile deal making, notwithstanding that hostile bids are often thought to be the principal function of tender offers. • Rather, the rule revision’s greatest impact will be on consensual deal making because the tender offer provides speed of execution which reduces exposure of buyers to topping bids and sellers to material adverse change and similar risks. • Speed of execution will be most telling in deals lacking regulatory issues, such as corporate diversifications and, more important in today’s market, leveraged buy-outs. • For corporate buyers, the practical availability of the tender offer structure will allow for the first real test of the SEC’s early commencement rule for offers involving the issuance of securities. If the implicit commitment of the SEC to process exchange offers on a 20 business day timetable is honored, the exchange offer will become competitive with the cash tender offer and will provide public company buyers greater structuring flexibility. • The critical issue for cash buyers, particularly private equity sponsors, will be financing the tender offer in compliance with the Federal Reserve Board’s Margin Rules.