WhateverWh the achievements of LiberalY Democrat did ministers in the coalition, the experiment IT ended disastrously G for theO party, with the WRONcatastrophic May 2015 general election. Stephen Tall, NickG Harvey?, John Pugh, Matthew Huntbach and David Howarth offer their opinions of why it all went so badly wrong. Decline and fall: how coalition killed the Lib Dems (almost) Stephen Tall t 10 pm on 7 May 2015, the accurately the 2010 poll had pre- the loss of our urban English seats Lib Dems experienced our dicted that the Lib Dems were des- where Labour was the challenger. Avery own ‘JFK moment’ tined to lose more seats than at any What was quite stunning – utterly, – we all remember where we were election since 1970. If anything, the compellingly, breathtakingly – when the BBC exit poll was psephologists were over-optimistic unforeseen – was the scale of our released showing the party scythed this time: in forecasting the party defeat at the hands of our Conserv- down from fifty-seven to just ten would reach double figures, they ative coalition partners in the sub- MPs. Some, like our campaign inflated our result by 25 per cent. urbs and rural areas we had thought chair Paddy Ashdown, refused to No one – not even the most pes- were our fortresses. None of us had admit the possibility, famously simistic, coalition-hating, Clegg- seen that coming. promising David Dimbleby that, if allergic, Orange Book-phobic Lib Thinking I could detect some it were accurate, ‘I will publicly eat Dem – had thought it would be kind of 1992-style Tory bounce- my hat on your programme’. Many that bad. The rout of all but one of back in the final few days of the more of us had an instant sinking our Scottish MPs by the SNP was campaign, I got in touch with a top feeling in our guts, recalling how not entirely unexpected. Nor was Lib Dem strategist to ask, ‘Should 32 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 WhateverWh the achievements of LiberalY Democrat did ministers in the coalition, the experiment IT ended disastrously G for theO party, with the WRONcatastrophic May 2015 general election. Stephen Tall, NickG Harvey?, John Pugh, Matthew Huntbach and David Howarth offer their opinions of why it all went so badly wrong. we be worried that Cameron’s It is worth challengers in most of the party’s badly as his predecessor Tory prime schedule is targeting so many Lib- held seats. minister, John Major. Meanwhile Dem-held seats? Do they actually taking a step Then two things happened. Labour, denuded of the instant sniff 300+ seats?’ No, I was assured, First, the global financial cri- unity conferred by its misplaced the Conservatives were ‘wast- back to make sis rocked the domestic political outrage at the ‘ConDem’ coalition, ing their time in Twickenham and scene. Cameron’s flimsy platform might well have descended into Yeovil’. Tell that to Vince Cable another obvi- of compassionate Conservatism Miliband v. Miliband civil war. and David Laws. In one top Lib – that through ‘sharing the pro- It would have been an ideal sce- Dem target, where the party ended ous point, ceeds of future growth’ it was pos- nario for the Lib Dems, the perfect up finishing third, I was told by a sible both to cut taxes and protect launch pad for further gains from highly experienced activist that but one public services – collapsed, and his both parties. ‘our canvassing goes back years. which is now party retreated to its right-wing, This may be just an alternative I thought it was robust. I still do. austerity comfort zone. The pub- reality based on nothing more than There were absolutely no signs of often forgot- lic looked on, nervously, at the idle speculation – but the tantalis- this, not even on the ground today.’ thought of the untested Cameron ing glimpse of what might have So how did it happen? What ten: the Lib and his even younger shadow chan- been is worth bearing in mind, caused the most disastrous elec- cellor, George Osborne, taking the not least because it is what the Lib tion result for the Lib Dems since Dems had helm at this moment of crisis. The Dem leadership had planned for. … well, pretty much since records Tories’ poll lead narrowed. One of Nick Clegg’s first decisions began? not expected Secondly, the first-ever tel- as party leader at the start of 2008 evised leaders’ debate between the was to commission what became ~ to be in gov- three main party leaders took place, known as ‘The Bones Report’ (after with the fresh-faced Clegg best- its author, Professor Chris Bones, a The answer is almost too obvious: ernment in ing both Cameron and Gordon Lib Dem activist and management our decision to enter into a coali- Brown. The Lib Dem poll surge it expert) into ‘how the Liberal Dem- tion government with the Con- 2010. sparked proved to be phosphores- ocrats’ internal organisation could servatives during the most severe cently flashy and brief. But even be built upon to double our number economic downturn in a century. the small ratings boost probably of MPs over the next two general However, it is worth taking a helped deprive the Conservatives of elections’. The implicit assumption step back to make another obvi- the majority they had expected to was that the party would grow, ous point, but one which is now be theirs, as well as saving a clutch rapidly but incrementally, for a fur- often forgotten: the Lib Dems had of Lib Dem seats – eight MPs won ther decade in opposition. not expected to be in government with majorities of less than 5 per in 2010. The widespread assump- cent over their Tory challenger – ~ tion had been (from the moment that might otherwise have been lost. Gordon Brown flunked ‘the elec- It is intriguing to pose the coun- As it was, the party was faced, on 7 tion that never was’ in October terfactual: what if the Conserva- May 2010, with the Hobson’s choice 2007) that David Cameron’s Con- tives had edged a victory in May of doing a deal with the Tories. servatives would triumph. In April 2010 and the coalition had never This was the only option available 2010, the Independent on Sunday been formed? Cameron would for which the numbers added up asked eight pollsters to predict the have had to have tried to keep his to more than the 323 MPs required result: all eight forecast an over- rebellious backbenchers in check for a bare majority and so offered a all Conservative majority. The Lib without the assistance of the hefty period of stable government. The Dems were widely seen to be on majority the Lib Dem bloc of alternative, most of us assumed (I the defensive against this blue tide; MPs afforded him. Chances are he still think correctly), was a minor- after all, the Tories were the nearest would have struggled at least as ity Tory administration forcing a Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 33 WHY did IT GO WRONG? second cut-and-run election within warrant; it was our actions within who would not point to other poli- months and a resulting vicious the coalition. This debate matters cies – like infant free school meals, squeeze on the Lib Dems. because it has big implications for or same-sex marriage, or more However, few of us were under whether the party should consider apprenticeships – which were suc- any illusions as to quite how dan- coalition again. Is there something cessfully pushed by the Lib Dems gerous a Lib–Con pact might be to intrinsic about being a junior party in office. Or who would not high- the party’s electoral fortunes. As I in a Westminster coalition which light Conservative policies, such as wrote on the Liberal Democrat Voice means you have lost before you hire-and-fire at will or repeal of the website on the Saturday morning have started? Or is your fate in your The big- Human Rights Act or the proposed after the election: own hands – is it possible to make a ‘snoopers’ charter’, which the Lib success of it, if handled well? gest single Dems had vetoed. It is a creditable … many of our members, and The biggest single plummet in plummet litany, especially for a party with even more of our supporters, Lib Dem vote share occurred in just 9 per cent of MPs. would identify themselves as those first six months. Entering in Lib Dem The trouble was that the public ‘progressives’, a vague term which into the coalition with the Con- did not notice. At least they were can be reasonably translated as servatives was a toxic act for many vote share even-handed, ignoring not only ‘anti-Tory’. There is a very real 2010 Lib Dem voters, and our rat- our triumphs but also our disasters risk that by throwing in our ing plunged from 23 per cent in occurred in and treating both those imposters lot with Cameron, or even just May, to 13 per cent by the end of just the same. As the British Elec- appearing to, those progressive the year. The tuition fees U-turn those first tion Study, which has been exam- voters will desert the Lib Dems coincided with this, though did not ining how and why the public vote in favour of Labour, and that may in itself precipitate the collapse. It six months. as they do in every election since threaten many of the fifty-seven did, however, do longer-term repu- 1964, noted: ‘The Lib Dems did Lib Dem seats we now hold.