WhateverWh the achievements of Liberaly Democrat did ministers in the coalition, the experiment it ended disastrously g for theo party, with the wroncatastrophic May 2015 general election. Stephen Tall, Nickg Harvey?, John Pugh, Matthew Huntbach and David Howarth offer their opinions of why it all went so badly wrong.

Decline and fall: how coalition killed the Lib Dems (almost) Stephen Tall t 10 pm on 7 May 2015, the accurately the 2010 poll had pre- the loss of our urban English seats Lib Dems experienced our dicted that the Lib Dems were des- where Labour was the challenger. Avery own ‘JFK moment’ tined to lose more seats than at any What was quite stunning – utterly, – we all remember where we were election since 1970. If anything, the compellingly, breathtakingly – when the BBC exit poll was psephologists were over-optimistic unforeseen – was the scale of our released showing the party scythed this time: in forecasting the party defeat at the hands of our Conserv- down from fifty-seven to just ten would reach double figures, they ative coalition partners in the sub- MPs. Some, like our campaign inflated our result by 25 per cent. urbs and rural areas we had thought chair Paddy Ashdown, refused to No one – not even the most pes- were our fortresses. None of us had admit the possibility, famously simistic, coalition-hating, Clegg- seen that coming. promising David Dimbleby that, if allergic, Orange Book-phobic Lib Thinking I could detect some it were accurate, ‘I will publicly eat Dem – had thought it would be kind of 1992-style Tory bounce- my hat on your programme’. Many that bad. The rout of all but one of back in the final few days of the more of us had an instant sinking our Scottish MPs by the SNP was campaign, I got in touch with a top feeling in our guts, recalling how not entirely unexpected. Nor was Lib Dem strategist to ask, ‘Should

32 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 WhateverWh the achievements of Liberaly Democrat did ministers in the coalition, the experiment it ended disastrously g for theo party, with the wroncatastrophic May 2015 general election. Stephen Tall, Nickg Harvey?, John Pugh, Matthew Huntbach and David Howarth offer their opinions of why it all went so badly wrong.

we be worried that Cameron’s It is worth challengers in most of the party’s badly as his predecessor Tory prime schedule is targeting so many Lib- held seats. minister, John Major. Meanwhile Dem-held seats? Do they actually taking a step Then two things happened. Labour, denuded of the instant sniff 300+ seats?’ No, I was assured, First, the global financial cri- unity conferred by its misplaced the Conservatives were ‘wast- back to make sis rocked the domestic political outrage at the ‘ConDem’ coalition, ing their time in Twickenham and scene. Cameron’s flimsy platform might well have descended into Yeovil’. Tell that to Vince Cable another obvi- of compassionate Conservatism Miliband v. Miliband civil war. and David Laws. In one top Lib – that through ‘sharing the pro- It would have been an ideal sce- Dem target, where the party ended ous point, ceeds of future growth’ it was pos- nario for the Lib Dems, the perfect up finishing third, I was told by a sible both to cut taxes and protect launch pad for further gains from highly experienced activist that but one public services – collapsed, and his both parties. ‘our canvassing goes back years. which is now party retreated to its right-wing, This may be just an alternative I thought it was robust. I still do. austerity comfort zone. The pub- reality based on nothing more than There were absolutely no signs of often forgot- lic looked on, nervously, at the idle speculation – but the tantalis- this, not even on the ground today.’ thought of the untested Cameron ing glimpse of what might have So how did it happen? What ten: the Lib and his even younger shadow chan- been is worth bearing in mind, caused the most disastrous elec- cellor, George Osborne, taking the not least because it is what the Lib tion result for the Lib Dems since Dems had helm at this moment of crisis. The Dem leadership had planned for. … well, pretty much since records Tories’ poll lead narrowed. One of Nick Clegg’s first decisions began? not expected Secondly, the first-ever tel- as party leader at the start of 2008 evised leaders’ debate between the was to commission what became ~ to be in gov- three main party leaders took place, known as ‘The Bones Report’ (after with the fresh-faced Clegg best- its author, Professor Chris Bones, a The answer is almost too obvious: ernment in ing both Cameron and Gordon Lib Dem activist and management our decision to enter into a coali- Brown. The Lib Dem poll surge it expert) into ‘how the Liberal Dem- tion government with the Con- 2010. sparked proved to be phosphores- ocrats’ internal organisation could servatives during the most severe cently flashy and brief. But even be built upon to double our number economic downturn in a century. the small ratings boost probably of MPs over the next two general However, it is worth taking a helped deprive the Conservatives of elections’. The implicit assumption step back to make another obvi- the majority they had expected to was that the party would grow, ous point, but one which is now be theirs, as well as saving a clutch rapidly but incrementally, for a fur- often forgotten: the Lib Dems had of Lib Dem seats – eight MPs won ther decade in opposition. not expected to be in government with majorities of less than 5 per in 2010. The widespread assump- cent over their Tory challenger – ~ tion had been (from the moment that might otherwise have been lost. Gordon Brown flunked ‘the elec- It is intriguing to pose the coun- As it was, the party was faced, on 7 tion that never was’ in October terfactual: what if the Conserva- May 2010, with the Hobson’s choice 2007) that David Cameron’s Con- tives had edged a victory in May of doing a deal with the Tories. servatives would triumph. In April 2010 and the coalition had never This was the only option available 2010, the Independent on Sunday been formed? Cameron would for which the numbers added up asked eight pollsters to predict the have had to have tried to keep his to more than the 323 MPs required result: all eight forecast an over- rebellious backbenchers in check for a bare majority and so offered a all Conservative majority. The Lib without the assistance of the hefty period of stable government. The Dems were widely seen to be on majority the Lib Dem bloc of alternative, most of us assumed (I the defensive against this blue tide; MPs afforded him. Chances are he still think correctly), was a minor- after all, the Tories were the nearest would have struggled at least as ity Tory administration forcing a

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 33 why did it go wrong? second cut-and-run election within warrant; it was our actions within who would not point to other poli- months and a resulting vicious the coalition. This debate matters cies – like infant free school meals, squeeze on the Lib Dems. because it has big implications for or same-sex marriage, or more However, few of us were under whether the party should consider apprenticeships – which were suc- any illusions as to quite how dan- coalition again. Is there something cessfully pushed by the Lib Dems gerous a Lib–Con pact might be to intrinsic about being a junior party in office. Or who would not high- the party’s electoral fortunes. As I in a Westminster coalition which light Conservative policies, such as wrote on the Liberal Democrat Voice means you have lost before you hire-and-fire at will or repeal of the website on the Saturday morning have started? Or is your fate in your The big- Human Rights Act or the proposed after the election: own hands – is it possible to make a ‘snoopers’ charter’, which the Lib success of it, if handled well? gest single Dems had vetoed. It is a creditable … many of our members, and The biggest single plummet in plummet litany, especially for a party with even more of our supporters, Lib Dem vote share occurred in just 9 per cent of MPs. would identify themselves as those first six months. Entering in Lib Dem The trouble was that the public ‘progressives’, a vague term which into the coalition with the Con- did not notice. At least they were can be reasonably translated as servatives was a toxic act for many vote share even-handed, ignoring not only ‘anti-Tory’. There is a very real 2010 Lib Dem voters, and our rat- our triumphs but also our disasters risk that by throwing in our ing plunged from 23 per cent in occurred in and treating both those imposters lot with Cameron, or even just May, to 13 per cent by the end of just the same. As the British Elec- appearing to, those progressive the year. The tuition fees U-turn those first tion Study, which has been exam- voters will desert the Lib Dems coincided with this, though did not ining how and why the public vote in favour of Labour, and that may in itself precipitate the collapse. It six months. as they do in every election since threaten many of the fifty-seven did, however, do longer-term repu- 1964, noted: ‘The Lib Dems did Lib Dem seats we now hold. tational damage to the party (and, Entering into not do so badly because they were of course, to Nick Clegg, whose blamed for the failings of the coali- Despite these fears, though, it was a infamous 2010 pledge to oppose any the coalition tion; rather, the majority of voters collective, almost unanimous, deci- increase spectacularly backfired). simply seem to have felt that they sion. No official count was taken What followed was a long- with the Con- were an irrelevant component of at the special Birmingham confer- drawn-out decline. This was the the last government.’ ence on 16 May, 2010, which sealed period in which the party found servatives Two examples suffice. Among the deal, but estimates in the hall, itself outnumbered by the Con- the 44 per cent of voters who where about 1,500 Lib Dem mem- servatives in government, out- was a toxic though the economy was getting bers debated the formation of the oppositioned by Labour on the better, just 19 per cent credited the coalition, suggested only about centre left, and outflanked by anti- act for many Lib Dems compared to 73 per cent fifty conference representatives establishment parties untainted by 2010 Lib who thought it was thanks to the voted against the motion endors- government office with more strik- Conservatives. Meanwhile, of the ing the agreement: the rest of the ingly populist messages (UKIP’s Dem voters, two-thirds of voters who thought hundreds eligible to vote were all anti-immigration dog whistle, the the NHS had got worse under the in favour. SNP’s pro-nationalism placebo, the and our rat- coalition, just 19 per cent held the Initial enthusiasm was under- Greens’ anti-austerity posturing). Lib Dems responsible while 69 standable. The Lib Dems had been Quite simply, we disappeared ing plunged per cent pinned the blame on the out of government for close on a from view, becoming seen as an Tories. century, and the prospect of our irrelevance as our support dwin- from 23 per Unfair? Mostly, yes. But like policies, approved by our confer- dled: a vicious spiral. By the time sailors complaining about the sea, ence, being implemented in gov- of the 2015 general election, and cent in May, it is pointless to wag our finger ernment by our ministers was a our doomed attempt to fight a first- at the voters. Moreover, I do not glistening one. What is perhaps past-the-post election on the basis to 13 per cent think I was the only Lib Dem who, more remarkable is that even with of being everyone’s second favour- as the coalition drew to a close, the benefit of hindsight, it appears ite party, we had been ruthlessly by the end of felt a nagging worry that while most of us would do it again. When squeezed down to just 8 per cent. our party’s successes were things Liberal Democrat Voice asked party the year. The which the Conservatives had lit- members in May 2015, ‘Knowing ~ tle trouble with, the Conservatives’ all you know now, would you have tuition fees successes (too-tight-too-soon aus- still gone in to a coalition with the Was it worth it? Let us look at the terity, over-harsh crackdowns on Conservatives back in 2010?’, 74 per profit-and-loss account, the deb- U-turn coin- social security such as the ‘bedroom cent said yes. its and credits of our record in cided with tax’, Andrew Lansley’s pointlessly government. expensive health reforms) were ~ The Lib Dems were not short this, though things we should have had no truck of achievements. There was not a with. At first glance that enthusiasm senior Lib Dem who was not able did not in Sure, our ministers did their appears odd, given we can date the to rehearse, when challenged ‘But best, and yes, the coalition was Lib Dems’ election catastrophe to what have you done?’, the line that itself pre- markedly less right wing, and in that point-of-no-return decision. three of our top four 2010 priorities some areas even quite liberal, com- For many members, though, it was – tax cuts for low earners, the Pupil cipitate the pared to full-blown Tory rule. not the signing of the coalition Premium, the Green Investment But – let us ask ourselves honestly deal which signed the party’s death Bank – had been delivered. Or collapse. – did we truly succeed in moving

34 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 why did it go wrong? the country in a sufficiently liberal The party’s Labour one’. This kind of split-the- On completing the coalition direction for enough people during difference positioning was unloved negotiations in 2010, William our five years in government given campaign by activists – who labelled it defen- Hague is said to have told his wife, the price we ended up paying? sive and unambitious – yet it was Ffion: ‘I think I’ve just killed the Because it was not just in May itself has the only realistic option avail- Liberal Democrats.’ 2015 that the Lib Dems were wiped able. I call it an option, but it was Well, perhaps. After all, we out. That was simply the culmina- been much not, not really. It was thrust on us were just 24,968 votes – the com- tion of five years of humiliating by the voters when they popped bined majorities of the eight rump defeats at every level of representa- criticised, in the ‘Cleggmania’ balloon in May Lib Dem MPs – away from being tive government. In the European 2010 and then torpedoed electoral wiped out. And, assuming the parliament, eleven of our twelve particular for reform by rejecting the Alternative Tories now move to implement the MEPs were defeated. In Scotland, Nick Clegg’s Vote a year later. long-overdue constituency bound- we lost twelve of the seventeen Those who denounced the strat- ary reforms (blocked by the Lib seats we were defending. (Wales, mantra that egy of liberal centrism were hiding Dems in 2012 in retaliation for the where we lost only one of our pre- from the truth that the party’s only Tories kiboshing of House of Lords vious six AMs, was a relative suc- the purpose route into government was in coali- reform), our notional number of cess.) Our local government base tion with one of the two main par- seats is a mere four. Just because we was hacked down year after year, of the Lib ties, either the right-leaning Tories feel we have hit rock bottom does from 3,944 councillors in 2010 to or left-leaning Labour. That inevita- not automatically guarantee things just 1,801 in 2015. Today we control Dems was to bly meant compromise, pegging the will now get better. six councils, down from twenty- Lib Dems as the party of moderate, But we have 18,000 new party five in 2010. Only in the unelected ‘bring a heart fair-minded pragmatism. We may members and we have a new leader, House of Lords has Lib Dem repre- not have wanted to place ourselves in Tim Farron. Which other politi- sentation grown. to a Conserv- the centre, but that is precisely where cal force in the next five years will For five years of restraining our circumstances put us. We had be making the case for being pro- the Conservatives at Westminster, ative govern- no choice but to make a virtue from immigration and pro-Europe, for plus a handful of policy advances, necessity. An appeal to radical liber- reforming our drugs laws and our the Lib Dems sacrificed decades of ment and alism – land value tax, proportional political system, for championing hard-won gains across the country. representation, a citizen’s income! – civil liberties and the environment, The opportunity cost of lost liberal a brain to a would merely have invited derision and for opposing inheritance-tax influence has been huge. given our necessarily constrained cuts which benefit only the wealth- Labour one’. record in coalition and that we iest and tax-credits cuts which hurt ~ This kind of would have been unable to explain the working poor? how such manifesto promises could For five years the Lib Dems were Was there anything the party could split-the- plausibly be delivered. the opposition to the Conserva- have done to staunch the losses we Ultimately, the 2015 general tives within the coalition. Now suffered in May 2015? I am doubt- difference election simply was not about us. that is done, and with Labour clue- ful. We were, I believe, destined for It was not a change election, but a less about how to respond to their heavy defeat the moment we joined positioning fear election. The spectre of Prime defeat, it looks like the Lib Dems the coalition. Too Tory for our pro- Minister Miliband in hock to the will be the only effective national gressive voters, not Tory enough for was unloved SNP appears to have persuaded opposition to the Conservatives in our small-c conservative voters. The enough voters to put to one side this parliament as well. We are not voters who remained – pragmatic, by activists – their doubts about the Conserva- dead yet. rational liberals (many of whom tives, to hold onto nurse for fear of have since swelled the ranks of the who labelled something worse. Former Lib Dem Stephen Tall was co-editor of the Lib- party as new members) – are too MP Jeremy Browne was surely eral Democrat Voice website from 2007 thinly spread to win us many seats. it defensive right when he said: ‘If the coalition to 2015. He edited the 2013 publica- Maybe it would be different was on the ballot paper, it would tion, Coalition and Beyond: Liberal under proportional representation and unambi- win in May’. But it was not, so the Reforms for the Next Decade and (our 8 per cent of the vote would only logical choice for those voters is a research associate at the think tank yield us around fifty MPs), but tious – yet anxious to avoid a change of gov- Centre Forum. Stephen was a councillor first past the post is what the vot- ernment was to vote Conservative. for eight years in Oxford, 2000–08. ers chose in 2011. And for as long it was the as we have it, a third party looking only realis- to be the moderating force in what seems to be a close election will get tic option flattened by the inevitable pincer From the Rose Garden to the compost heap movement. Even our MPs’ much- available. Nick Harvey vaunted local incumbency is not, it turns out, a magic wand. he Liberal Democrats’ a post-mortem exercise and to let The party’s campaign itself has cataclysm on 7 May 2015 people get things off their chest – been much criticised, in particu- Tdemands analysis and brought roughly half the defeated lar for Nick Clegg’s mantra that reflection, and will be subjected to MPs together for the first time since the purpose of the Lib Dems was both for many years. A ‘gathering the election. There was a unani- to ‘bring a heart to a Conserva- of the fallen’ at the start of July – mous view that we had ‘fought tive government and a brain to a organised by the Whips’ Office as the wrong campaign’ (but fought

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 35 why did it go wrong? it rather well). But there were as We were far got the T-shirt. Now let’s tell you scenarios. The ‘big offer’ on the Fri- many disparate views of what the about our plans for the next five day lunchtime was far from spon- ‘right campaign’ would have been too keen in years …’ and to have listed four or taneous: it had been well rehearsed as there were people in the room. five distinctive, radical and above and was carefully choreographed. What was striking, however, the early all new ideas. I had no magic recipe, The coalition negotiations in was that despite our appalling elec- but promising five (unspecified) the heady days following the 2010 tion outcome – following disas- days to bills sold our environmentalism election were conducted in three trous rounds of local elections, short; we abandoned our cutting parts. Firstly – and most publicly calamitous European elections, and show that edge on education (Michael Gove – was policy: two teams, led by the loss of a third of our member- had set a shocking agenda – might William Hague and Danny Alex- ship and two-thirds of our popu- the world we not have recovered our initia- ander, assisted by policy gurus Oli- lar support – there also remained a doesn’t end tive, for example in the deplorably ver Letwin and David Laws, spent unanimous view that we had done underdeveloped space of 14–19 hours hammering out a policy pro- the right thing in the crisis condi- if you get a education?); admirable propos- spectus for the coalition, which tions of May 2010 in entering into als on mental health had a narrow was duly presented to the nation coalition with the Conservatives. hung parlia- appeal on the NHS; new economic as the foundation block of the new So where did it all go wrong? thinking and something striking government. On the Lib Dem side Following my involuntary exit ment and to on either civil liberties or interna- there was consultation over its con- from government in September tionalism might have made for a tents and buy-in from parliamen- 2012, I wrote a pamphlet, After the prove that more interesting pitch. And if there tarians, key party committees and Rose Garden, later published by the had been a hung parliament, they even a special party conference. Institute for Government, explor- coalition would have made a good prospec- All this served the party leader- ing from a partisan Lib Dem per- tus for negotiations. ship well when the going later got spective what I perceived had gone could work. Perhaps we kidded ourselves all rocky, because there was a sense of wrong from the ‘inside’ and, draw- along that the advantages of incum- shared ownership of the decision to ing on my experiences, aiming to It was far too bency could overcome awful poll go into coalition. promote a debate about our expec- ratings – after all it hadn’t helped The second part of the negotia- tations if we ever engaged in any cosy and vot- longstanding councillors. Then tion focused on coalition machin- future coalition negotiation. we convinced the media; and then ery – the way disputes, which Before describing my conclu- ers perceived between us, I wonder whether we would inevitably arise, would be sions, let me offer a view of the and the media rattled the pollsters resolved. On our side, Jim Wallace election catastrophe. I filled an that we had into making some allowance for it brought to bear his experiences advisory role on Paddy Ashdown’s sold our souls in their analyses, if only on the gut of two coalitions in Scotland and election ‘wheelhouse’ – represent- instinct that we had bucked head- Andrew Stunell contributed his ing the interests of MPs and candi- to the Tories. line figures before? wisdom gained working for the dates. I felt throughout – and said Looking back over the five Association of Liberal Democrat to Paddy, Ryan Coetzee and Olly By contrast, years, we were far too keen in the Councillors and helping council Grender – that they were seek- early days to show that the world groups to form coalition admin- ing an organisational solution to a in the final doesn’t end if you get a hung par- istrations. The principal idea was political problem. The party’s best liament and to prove that coali- a ‘Coalition Committee’ as the political brains spent hours por- phase, when tion could work. It was far too Star Chamber to resolve disputes. ing over micro-detail of how many cosy and voters perceived that we Interestingly it rarely met. Instead doors had been knocked on in we were had sold our souls to the Tories. By the more informal ‘Quad’ (PM, which seats; baffling, as this could contrast, in the final phase, when DPM, chancellor and chief secre- have been done by good ground belatedly we were belatedly trying to dem- tary to the Treasury) was used for organisers. onstrate ‘clear water’, we looked this purpose. It tangled with some Our problem was our political trying to almost childishly petulant, undo- thorny issues, but appears to have platform, congratulating ourselves ing any advantage which serving been largely harmonious, reflect- on our achievements in coalition demonstrate in government might have done to ing perhaps some similarities in and producing a worthy but dull our fortunes. Like everyone else at outlook between the participants. manifesto whose message seemed ‘clear water’, the July post-mortem, I still believe But backbenchers and the wider to be ‘steady as she goes’ and ‘more that we were right to go into coali- membership of both coalition par- of the same’. My view throughout we looked tion. But much of the political han- ties might question the extent to was that we looked (and indeed almost child- dling – from start to finish – was which it protected wider political were) far too keen to serve in little short of disastrous, and that equities. another coalition which, given the ishly petu- accounts for our current plight. The third part of the negotiation damage to our political position – almost unremarked upon at the that the first had inflicted, seemed lant … time, beyond the fact that the Lib positively kamikaze. But question- Coalition negotiations Dems had some cabinet posts – was ing this starting point seemed to Things started to go wrong from referred to colloquially as ‘bums on be perceived as disloyalty to the before the word ‘go’, not least seats’. For the Lib Dems this meant leadership team, though in truth because the Conservatives were so which – and how many – govern- we had long passed the point of no much better prepared for the hung ment posts would be filled by Lib- return on that. parliament scenario than we were. eral Democrats, and who would fill My suggestion was to say: ‘Coa- They had foreseen the outcome them. This was dealt with entirely lition? Nah: been there, done that, months ahead and war-gamed the on a one-to-one basis between

36 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 why did it go wrong?

David Cameron and Nick Clegg. strengthen our position and save my personal cost two years later. But, as was clear from the moment valuable time. In short, in a two-party coalition of Cameron’s ‘big offer’ to the Lib where we essential to its viability, Dems at lunchtime the day after we must have roughly a quarter of polling, the Tories knew what they Governing with the the posts. wanted from this part of the nego- Conservatives As we lick our wounds and sur- tiation far more clearly than did the Many Lib Dems greeted the 2010 vey the wreckage of our fortunes Lib Dems. negotiation as a triumph – rejoic- from the political wilderness, the Compounding this difficulty, in ing that key Lib Dem policies were [The Con- excitement of forming Britain’s contrast to the policy agenda, we to be enacted in government, and first peacetime coalition in almost Lib Dems had no internal discus- by Lib Dem ministers, for the first servatives] a century seems a distant memory sion about what we wanted here. time in eighty years. For myself, now. We are all older and wiser. We This struck me as rather odd. In the I was more sceptical. When our drove a hard can take some quiet satisfaction in British political culture party lead- negotiators reported back, my political the progress made in stabilising the ers choose who holds what post, but immediate thought was that agree- economy, reforming aspects of wel- it was surely a matter of collective ing to Lib Dem MPs abstaining on agenda and fare, improving the lot of pension- interest what number and nature of student fees and nuclear energy ers and sustaining overseas aid. We posts we expected. But it seemed was a hostage to fortune. It was too often can point to our signature achieve- to be thought either unseemly or – in practical impact – capitula- ment of raising the threshold and tempting providence to dare discuss tion, giving to the Conservatives we hadn’t taking millions out of income tax; ‘bums on seats’ and instead we sent a majority on these issues which stimulating the creation of two Nick Clegg – who had served only they had not won. I also looked at enough million apprenticeships; guaran- one term in the Commons and had the policy prospectus drawn up teeing a healthy annual rise in state very limited familiarity with the and could only see enough to fill political fire- pensions; the pupil premium pay- Lords – into battle entirely alone, the early part of the parliament, ing extra money to help children with no support, and no indication and I wondered whether as five power in the from disadvantaged backgrounds; from his colleagues as to what we years rolled out we would ever saving the post office network; cre- wanted. I was astonished that we again be in so strong a position to right places ating the Green Investment Bank had not deployed a heavyweight bargain. And I looked at the ‘bums and the Business Bank and other team to haggle over posts, numbers on seats’ in astonishment and dis- to stop them. hobby horses. and operational questions. may. I simply couldn’t believe how But being in government with Once these mechanical issues few posts we had secured: seven- Some of the the Conservatives was not the had been agreed – at breakneck teen ministers (one unpaid), three sweetness and harmony suggested speed and with inadequate collec- whips in the Commons, and three time they by the rose-garden scenes of May tive forethought – there was really whips in the Lords (two unpaid). truly set out 2010. They drove a hard politi- no way of unpicking them. We had We held just 23 posts out of 122 in cal agenda and too often we hadn’t waited eighty years for a peacetime the government. to ‘shaft’ us enough political firepower in the coalition but, in a matter of hours My assumption was that the right places to stop them. Some or at most days, on critical points Conservative starting point would and took rel- of the time they truly set out to the pass had been sold. There was be a divvy-up pro rata to Com- ‘shaft’ us and took relish in doing no political incentive for David mons seat numbers (Lib Dems ish in doing so (and throughout they were plan- Cameron to agree later to revisit getting roughly one-sixth of the ning a ‘stealth’ election strategy to any of these issues and concede posts), whereas the Lib Dem start- so … At destroy us). At other times they just more than we had agreed at the ing point would be a divvy-up pro conducted government as though outset. The window of opportunity rata to votes (Lib Dems getting other times we weren’t there and assumed we for fundamental renegotiation had roughly one-third of the posts), would go along with it. Too often, gone for five years. We could only and we would haggle to a midway they just we did. learn from experience and form a point – Lib Dems getting roughly much more detailed shopping list one-quarter of the posts. But the conducted for any future negotiation. Conservatives cannily recognised Recommendations for any With fifty years of political pro- that over five years, giving a bit government future coalition gress reversed in one parliamen- of initial ground on policy was Framing my recommendations in tary cycle, it looks a daunting task a price worth paying for getting as though my Institute for Government pam- to rebuild our lost political capital plenty of their best bums onto the phlet, I was hugely encouraged by to the point that we would be rel- key seats. Bitter experience proved we weren’t the degree of colleagues’ support evant to a hung parliament follow- them right. We must never make there and for them: such as each department ing any future general election. But this mistake again! In any future having a Lib Dem deputy secretary if that proves overly pessimistic, negotiation we must demand abso- assumed we of state armed with a veto – akin to then inevitably much of the hag- lutely that we appoint at least one the one Nick Clegg cleverly secured gling in the days after the elec- minister in every department (if the would go for himself as deputy prime minis- tion would again focus on policy. talent pool in the Commons were ter. Indeed the big wins of the 2010 So, establishing well in advance small, we are blessed with talented along with it. coalition must be consolidated – in our clear ‘demand’ over govern- peers) and three paid whips in each particular that ‘DPM veto’ (receiv- ment machinery and positions, House. Those seven or eight extra Too often, we ing contemporaneously, and hav- then making this demand clearly posts would have made a huge dif- ing to approve, prime ministerial understood from the outset, would ference, as I was to discover to did. papers); the balanced ‘Quad’; the

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 37 why did it go wrong? deputy prime minister’s chairing of is needed: perhaps backbench They need our votes to get any- the Home [domestic] Affairs cabi- funds for all parties, and front- thing through parliament. With net committee; and a Lib Dem chief bench funds only for those in proper working arrangements, secretary to the Treasury. opposition. they also need our assent to all sig- Secondly, we must have a min- • We must move beyond the nificant executive actions. ister at every department (twenty- nonsense of one party’s press Of course, deals have to be two in the current structure of team trying to gag the other struck which will sometimes result government, though we favour party: the solution is for Lib in one or other party going through merging departments), plus three Dem ministers to answer to the lobbies holding their noses. government whips in each House. the DPM press team and not to The larger party will inevitably get Add a couple of junior ministers Number Ten’s. its way more; its greater numbers to support Lib Dem secretaries of • The Coalition Committee mean it will set the agenda more state, and we would still only total should actually meet regularly of the time. Lib Dems must accept thirty: roughly a quarter of the and handle routine tensions that, and the underlying demo- government. This is entirely rea- inevitable in any partnership – cratic legitimacy derived from sonable in a two-party coalition if only referring up to the ‘Quad’ winning more votes. our participation makes the whole intractable problems they are Willingness to serve in any coa- thing viable, and peers can always Politically, unable to resolve. lition entails willingness to com- fill posts if Commons numbers are • The smaller party in a coali- promise in the national interest, and limited. the greatest tion must not be silenced in an acceptance that we will not get We shouldn’t accept backwa- parliament on the basis that the our own way all of the time. But we ter cabinet posts. We can reason- lesson Lib- larger partner ‘speaks for’ it. must ensure that we have reliable ably demand one great office of If ministers from the smaller machinery to provide an effective state (Foreign & Commonwealth eral Demo- party wish to make a separate veto on all occasions. We must be Office, Treasury or Home Office); front-bench statement, trans- ready to use it on a daily basis. And one of the politically sexy ‘hot crats must parency demands that they we must have greater collective potato’ departments (Education, must always be able to do so. ownership of that veto. Health, or Work & Pensions), and learn is to • Any future coalition should And all Lib Dem MPs and peers, fight to the death to get it; one focus on running the country prominent frontbencher or loyal ‘hard-edged’ department (Busi- …‘just say well, implementing policy, foot soldier, must be able to look ness, Innovation & Skills; Defence; dialogue with parliament and themselves in the mirror as they Energy; Communities & Local no’. It is dif- nation, devolving power, and brush their teeth before bed, con- Government); and one ‘softer’ ser- so reducing the flow of new fident that the sound sleep of the vice department (Environment, ficult for the legislation. righteous awaits them because Food & Rural Affairs; Transport; smaller party nothing they have been asked to do Culture, Media & Sport; Justice; that day has been an abandonment International Development). The in a coalition Conclusion of the liberal and democratic values final Lib Dem cabinet minister Politically, the greatest lesson Lib- that drew them into public service pretty much has to be chief secre- to make the eral Democrats must learn is to in the first place. tary to the Treasury. heed the words of Nancy Reagan The coalition party not head- larger one and ‘just say no’. It is difficult for Nick Harvey was Liberal Democrat ing any department must get first the smaller party in a coalition to MP for North Devon from 1992 to 2015 choice of the next portfolio in it. do things make the larger one do things it and Minister of State for Defence from And in every department, which- doesn’t want to. But the reverse 2010 to 2012. He served as party defence ever party does not have the sec- it doesn’t should not be true: it should be rel- spokesman from 2006, having previously retary of state should provide the atively simple to stop them doing covered Transport, Trade & Industry, deputy secretary of state – Lib want to. But things we don’t want them to do. Health, and Culture Media & Sport. Dems should make this a deal- breaker in any future negotiation. the reverse Further recommendations include: should not • Every Lib Dem minister must Coalition history – our follies and our fortune be true: it have a special adviser to sup- John Pugh port them, and cabinet minis- ters at least two. should be rel- • The Lib Dem minister in every atively sim- here is a scene in The God- inheritor of Danny Alexander’s job department must be able to: father where Michael Cor- at the Treasury, compared David serve on the department’s ple to stop Tleone, calm and collected Cameron awaiting the results to board; bring in chosen outsid- at the christening of his nephew, Michael Corleone, as one by one his ers to conduct reviews and fill them doing waits to hear the news that his plans former coalition allies were wiped appointments; and commis- have worked. Across the country off the electoral map. sion work from officials on things we in various places, rivals and erst- Shortly after the election, at their own policy initiatives while colleagues are being gunned Lib Dem HQ, I attended a post- across the department’s work. don’t want down and eliminated on his orders. mortem to hear from defeated col- • A completely new approach to At a gathering of Conservatives leagues about what went wrong. Short and Cranborne funding them to do. after the 2015 election, Greg Hands, Good points were made about the

38 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 why did it go wrong? nightmare scenario we had faced had anything to do with the major The coalition Knowing the strength of support – the polls showing a stalemate achievements or goals of the coali- we had off the back of our resolute between Miliband and Cameron, tion. The blunders we made were government defence of public services, they the fear of Scottish leverage, the utterly de trop and born of political immediately brought forward resource and intelligence of the inexperience and hubris. was not a legislation on educational and Tory ground and air war, the weak- This was manifest from the health services that was designed ness of ours, etc. Any change in very beginning, when people with bad govern- to antagonise many of those who any of those variables and the result previous experience of coalitions worked within them and possibly would not have been so bad. and pacts within a British context ment and alarm those who used them. They However, one thing the defeated (Steel, Williams, etc.), whether very consciously acted, as Oliver MPs omitted to mention was that at parliamentary level, regional was, in its Letwin put it, before their political we had not just started to lose in level or council level, were either own terms, capital was used up. In luring us 2015. We had lost badly – very ignored or kept on the margins and into the health and social care bill badly – and consistently through- advice sought instead from selected successful; (never in the coalition agreement) out the coalition years. Without the continental sources and special and creating misconceived havoc Scottish factor, an appalling night advisors. but practi- in our most cherished British insti- might perhaps just have been a very Insufficient challenge was built tution, they successfully cemented bad night. But with our poll ratings into the new system. Had it been cally none of an image of the Lib Dems as Tory- at their worst level for decades, it there, it might have been pointed lite. We let them, and initially, to was perhaps odd that MPs thought out that, given the tribalism of the strategic some sections of the party, associ- they might somehow be immune British politics, the choreography ating the party with pro-market from the decline in support that had of coalition had to look right. It blunders we health ‘reforms’ did not seem to be affected our MEPs, our councillors, had to look like a business arrange- a problem. our by-election candidates – the ment not a rose garden ‘love in’. made that so Forcing an early response to the rest of the party. It might have been noticed that Browne review of university fund- Perhaps, trapped in the West- encumbering so many of our small badly dam- ing – a move which in the end made minster bubble, we could not see parliamentary party with junior a negligible contribution to defi- the tsunami coming, consoled ministerial positions is a great way aged the cit reduction – Osborne, through by the trappings of power, errant of tying up some of our best tal- pressure on Alexander and others, party polling and irrational opti- ent in the minutiae of government party had invited us to trash our own repu- mism. Lured in by the courtesies of – while ensuring good behaviour tation. We took up the invitation. the House, many did not see their from those hoping for ministerial anything Much has been made of the ‘fool- ‘honourable friends’ (for so we were preferment. to do with ishness’ of our tuition fees pledge taught to refer to our Tory coali- The Tories, in offering us so but, having made it and had our tion colleagues) as their mortal ene- many baubles of office, made our the major leader iconically filmed on West- mies – parts of the most successful party more manageable and poten- minster Bridge berating previous political killing machine the coun- tially acquiescent. It suited the achieve- politicians for broken promises, it try has seen. The Corleone analogy Tories to inveigle us into the tribal is hard to find a better instance of works here. politics of Westminster, to embrace ments or kamikaze politics. Post-2009 and It is said that, after the coalition us, to school us in the old ways of the expenses saga, where trust was negotiations were concluded, Wil- government – and before long, goals of the simply the major political issue, we liam Hague went home and told colleagues were jumping up and chose to appear faithless rather than his wife he had just killed off the down in the chamber asking on- coalition. stand up to Osborne. Liberals. I do not know if he did say message whips’ questions, ignoring That the AV referendum shortly that, but I do not think he was cor- sane amendments from opposition The blunders after became a plebiscite on Clegg rect. The coalition per se was not sources, and churning out centrally and coalition fell nicely for the the cause of the electoral disaster drafted press releases of depressing we made Tories, as did the sheer ineptitude that overtook us. That resulted for vacuity. of the Yes campaign and the people the greater part because the parlia- In a nutshell we needed to show were utterly chosen to run it. mentary party made a succession from the word go that coalition was By that time, too, we had agreed of strategic blunders which, look- a new way of doing politics and we de trop and to prioritise oddly the inevitable ing back now, still appear stagger- did not. We failed. It was as though cuts in spending, by reducing capi- ingly naïve – almost reckless – in traditional Westminster politics born of polit- tal expenditure and foolishly mak- their disregard of mature political was temporarily being led by a new ical inexpe- ing sure that local government calculation. political-amalgam party. Politics working over-rigidly on an annual It is often said that heroically in Westminster was still tribal; we rience and financial cycle bore the major brunt we sacrificed party interest in order had just gone off and aligned with of the first tranche of cuts. With to secure the good of the coun- the Tory side. It suited the Tories. hubris. some sleight-of-hand redistribution try – and that is how the coalition It suited Labour. It did not suit us, to largely Tory areas mixed in, we parliamentary party would like however, but we guilelessly let it allowed a narrative of unfairness to be remembered. The coalition happen. to blossom and ensured our rapid government was not a bad govern- Having got the ground rules in demise in many cities. ment and was, in its own terms, place, the Tories’ next move was Casually we dismissed the successful; but practically none to undermine elements of our core resulting wipeouts in Liverpool of the strategic blunders we made vote and our biggest asset, which and Manchester – the undoing that so badly damaged the party at that stage was Nick Clegg. of decades of graft – as mid-term

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 39 why did it go wrong? blues and moved on, unfazed. Our Much has reform – but for the intervention conclude by telling us that it was relative failure in council elections of the Lords – nearly went into the electorate that got it all wrong are compared even with the Tories was been made election with our only constitu- more likely to be delusionary. deemed inevitable. After all, every- tional gains being individual voter thing was as normal in Westminster of the ‘fool- registration and boundary changes John Pugh was leader of the Lib Dem – save that a party once routinely that helped the Tories. group on the hung Sefton Council before graced with by-election victors was ishness’ of History is supposed to be writ- entering parliament in 2001. He led that instead shored up with knighthoods ten by the victors but there are group through successive elections, turn- and privy counsellors. As the Lib our tuition not many victors left in the party ing them from the smallest group to the Dem benches came more and more to contest the narrative. I cannot largest. He was elected to parliament to to resemble Camelot, hard politi- fees pledge prove that, but for the follies of the join the largest post-war cohort of Lib- cal realities receded. Belatedly we but, hav- early coalition years, outcomes in eral Democrat MPs and now survives as recognised our potential clout and 2015 would have been different. a member of the smallest group. He was embraced differentiation as some- ing made it What I can do is to defy anyone backbench co-chair on health during the thing more than the odd spat in to explain how such blindingly coalition, but resigned as result of dif- cabinet, but by then people inside and had our obvious errors could possibly have ferences over policy. He is currently the and outside the party had a very helped and to gently point out party’s education spokesman. unclear sense of what the party was leader iconi- that the alternative accounts that about. Given this, our campaign pose as cally filmed the honest broker for the next gov- ernment looked doomed and even on Westmin- risible as a campaign strategy. Ryan Coalition: a difficult situation made worse Coetzee, whose gifts turned out to ster Bridge be sub-Napoleonic, had schooled Matthew Huntbach us to ram home our mantra of ‘a berating stronger economy – fairer society’. he February 1974 general would demand. The impression There is, however, scarcely a politi- previous election marks the point at was given that, if a general election cal party in the world that claims politicians Twhich it could no longer ever did leave the Liberal Demo- to campaign for the opposite. We be assumed that British politics was crats holding the balance of power, could not get people to ‘get’ any- purely Labour versus Conservative. they would have effectively ‘won’ more who we were. for broken Although the electoral system sav- the election. They may when they see Tory promises, agely discriminated against the Lib- This is counter to the experience rule untrammelled. They may eral Party, its huge growth in votes both of Liberal Democrats in local when they count and begin to it is hard to meant it could not be written off as government in the UK and third appreciate some of the blessings of a historical relic and established it parties in other countries. Holding coalition government. They may find a bet- as the main opposition to the Con- the balance of power often turns when we rediscover our voice. servatives in a significant propor- out to be a miserable experience, in From a historian’s point of view ter instance tion of the country. It was also the which you get the blame for any- it would be only fair to say that I election where the Ulster Unionists thing unpleasant but none of the struggle to be dispassionate. As a of kamikaze formally broke their links with the credit for anything that works well. philosopher, I have concerns any- Conservative Party and the SNP A good example is the Green Party way about the objectivity of his- politics … and Plaid Cymru won enough seats in Ireland which formed a coalition tory; perhaps there are only ever that they could no longer be dis- with Fianna Fáil in 2007 and was ‘histories’. Whenever I look back I we chose missed as fringe elements. almost wiped out in the 2009 local feel again the anger and bewilder- Ever since then the possibility of elections and 2011 general elec- ment I felt over some of the crass to appear a ‘hung parliament’ has been a topic tion. The collapse in support for decision-making in the first two for discussion in general elections. the New Zealand First party in the years – the decisions that wounded faithless It was usually discussed as if the 1999 New Zealand general election the party without improving the Liberal Party, or Liberal Democrats was similar. economy. Damage was inflicted rather than as it became, would have a power- Small parties which are able to do which was wholly and utterly ful position as ‘kingmaker’, free well in balance-of-power situations unnecessary. stand up to to choose with which of the two tend to be those with committed In my more charitable moments Osborne. main parties it would form a coali- supporters who have a narrow inter- I tend to see such errors as stem- tion (often vulgarly put as ‘jump est in certain issues. They do well ming from inexperience, too trust- into bed with’), and able to dictate because their supporters are unlikely ing a nature, overconfidence in the the terms of that coalition. So the to desert them and are easily satisfied rationality and fairness of the great Liberal Democrat leader would so long as their particular interests British public. In darker moods I be subject to questions on which are dealt with. The classic example see hubris, the influence of ‘class’, party he preferred and what con- was the National Religious Party in a clumsy misguided attempt by ditions he would ask for, but that Israel. The UK Liberal Democrats the party leadership to remould was almost never balanced by the are the opposite of that sort of party, a party they could not love and Labour and Conservative leaders with much transient support and barely understood. But I still gasp being asked about their willingness very few voting for it on strict ideo- at the thought that, after five years to form a coalition with the Lib- logical grounds or because of sup- in government, we as a party of eral Democrats and the terms they port for a particular policy issue.

40 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 why did it go wrong?

A junior coalition partner in one, which it could not. The assurance that the coalition gov- always faces the problem that when economic situation meant it would ernment would be stable; but pub- it agrees with the senior partner its be denounced as irresponsible if it lically acknowledging that their contribution is ignored. When it had not allowed a stable govern- weakness meant it would be a gov- disagrees and tries to force through ment to be formed, and Labour ernment mostly Conservative in its own ideas, there are two pos- and Conservative would have policy would have done this just as sibilities. If it alone supports an joined forces in the election, as well, if not better. idea, it faces being denounced for they did in the 2011 Alternative As with many things, what hap- playing politics – causing dam- Vote referendum, urging voters to pened at the start dominated how age to force through something denounce the Liberal Democrats people saw it for ever afterwards. which has little popular support. If for the crime of existing and so The ‘Rose Garden’ image of David the idea is supported by the oppo- denying the country a stable two- Clegg and Nick Cameron hold- sition, it needs to look for moral party system. ing hands was what stuck in peo- support from the opposition to Most of all, the presence of ple’s minds. For a while, the Liberal prove it is not acting irresponsibly MPs from other small parties and Democrats appeared to push the or selfishly. However, the opposi- the distortion of the electoral sys- By overem- idea that the coalition was not just tion is more likely to want to draw tem meant a coalition with the half but actually three-quarters supporters of that policy to itself Conservatives was the only viable phasising Liberal Democrat. The inaccuracies and profit from the small party option, a Labour–Lib Dem coali- here are deliberate; the point is that being unable to succeed, and so to tion would not have had a major- and exag- human memory often constructs denounce it rather than offer sup- ity. From Labour’s point of view, false images to fit in with conclu- port. The obvious example is the allowing the Conservative–Lib gerating the sions it has already drawn. The ‘75 Liberal Democrats’ position on Dem coalition to happen and then per cent of our manifesto imple- tuition fees. There was no way the benefitting from the inevitable power the mented’ message was well meant, Conservatives would have agreed collapse of Liberal Democrat sup- but few saw that it did not mean the to the tax increases necessary to pay port was a far better option than party had in same as ‘75 per cent of the govern- for the Liberal Democrats’ origi- attempting to form an unstable ment’s policies are ours’. People saw nal policy, yet the Liberal Demo- coalition with the Liberal Demo- the coalition, it as the Liberal Democrats support- crats were denounced for ‘breaking crats, especially as they knew the ing the coalition not out of neces- their pledge’ on it. Here, as with economic situation meant that any its leadership sity but out of direct support for most issues they received no out- incoming government would have its mostly Conservative policies. It side support or acknowledgement to make unpopular decisions. The and national was damaging also to trumpet the for the compromise they reached, distortions of the electoral system, 75 per cent figure, which arose from which saved universities from the which gave the Conservatives over image-mak- one brief analysis, when another large-scale cuts endured by further five times as many MPs as the Lib- ers caused it analysis gave 40 per cent. education colleges with a system eral Democrats even though they Given that having a coalition which, in terms of money passing had barely one and a half times as huge dam- was a novelty, and the coalition through hands, was little different many votes, meant that the result- existed only because of the Liberal from a graduate tax. ing government was bound to be age. The real- Democrats, and only the Liberal Following the 2010 general Conservative in its main thrust. Democrats talked about it posi- election the Liberal Democrats The Liberal Democrats had no ity is that tively (Conservatives, of course, were in just about the worst situ- effective power they could use to resenting it for denying them a ation a small party could be in. get their way. Under these circum- the Liberal majority), it was hardly surpris- After a big rise in the opinion stances, they needed to take an ing that people identified the word polls attributed to ‘Cleggma- extremely defensive position. The Democrats’ ‘coalition’ primarily with the Lib- nia’, the party did unexpectedly party’s national leadership made eral Democrats, so assumed that badly in its actual vote share. The sure it did the opposite. influence in what came out of the coalition situation seen in previous gen- By overemphasising and exag- government was essentially what eral elections, where its support gerating the power the party had the coalition the Liberal Democrats were about. had steadily risen as the campaign in the coalition, its leadership and Opponents of the government progressed, had not happened. national image-makers caused it would be no assiduously used the word ‘coali- Instead its support peaked early huge damage. The reality is that tion’ where previously they would then declined, with (as seen again the Liberal Democrats’ influence more than a have used ‘government’ and took in 2015) an embarrassing ‘I’ll eat in the coalition would be no more delight in using the phrase ‘coa- my hat if that’s true’ response from than a swinging of the balance swinging of lition policies’ to describe poli- senior figures when the first exit towards the more moderate wing the balance cies which the Liberal Democrats polls came out. If the party had of the Conservatives. And that was would have fought against inter- done unexpectedly well, it could relative given that in many ways towards the nally and accepted only reluctantly have used the threat of doing bet- the Conservatives had become far as part of the general compromise. ter in an ensuing early general more right wing than when they more moder- The emphasis that the Liberal Dem- election to force its way. It was were last in government, with the ocrat leadership put on boasting clear, however, that it had failed extinction of the old Tory ‘wets’. ate wing of about being ‘in government’ helped to meet expectations and would Yet the image that was put out support this notion. most likely be the biggest loser in was that the coalition was almost the Conserv- By exaggerating and boasting an early general election, even if it an equal partnership. The Lib- about the power and influence they could afford to campaign properly eral Democrats needed to provide atives. had in a government whose policies

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 41 why did it go wrong? very much reflected its five-to-one becoming a ‘party of government’, revival was to be a voice for the Conservative–LibDem balance, with this meaning a shift to the voiceless. Starting with its histori- the Liberal Democrats gave the Given that economic right. The most eloquent cal survival in remote parts of the impression that either they were case for this was an article in the UK whose population felt neither much more right wing than their having a coa- New Statesman written by Richard the Conservative Party nor the supporters supposed, or that they Reeves on the eve of the 2012 party Labour Party knew or cared about were rather pathetic, overawed and lition was a conference.1 He dismissed many their particular issues, it built sup- so too easily satisfied by the minor of those who had voted previously port among the less-well-off in concessions they were given by the novelty, and for the Liberal Democrats as ‘bor- southern, small-town and rural Conservatives. rowed from Labour’ and suggested England who might once have People who had voted Lib- the coalition that the party should abandon them been Labour voters but felt alien- eral Democrat because they were and seek new voters. Reeves had ated from a Labour Party which against what the Conservatives existed only worked as ‘director of strategy’ for seemed completely urban based. stood for, and saw the Liberal because of Nick Clegg for two years prior to It then achieved success in urban Democrats as the main opposition writing the article. Clegg made no areas, where Labour had been to the Conservatives where they the Liberal effort to disassociate himself from dominant, among people who felt lived, felt betrayed. People who its sentiments, and made disparag- Labour had taken their support voted Liberal Democrat because Democrats, ing remarks about those unhappy for granted. This bedrock of sup- they were against what the Con- with this direction in an interview port for the Liberal Democrats was servatives stood for, but lived in and only in The Independent newspaper at that thrown away during the time of a Labour-dominated area and felt time. Reeves’ remarks were deeply the coalition in the belief that there that Labour had become tired and the Liberal insulting to those who had spent was an untapped source of support complacent and the Liberal Demo- decades building up support for the from people who liked the eco- crats offered a fresh way forward, Democrats party, with many of those votes nomics of the Conservative Party, felt betrayed. ‘borrowed from Labour’ deriv- but wanted something with a little A common line among some talked about ing from activity as long ago as the more of a liberal attitude on social who had gained influence in the 1970s Liberal revival and remaining issues, and had hitherto disregarded Liberal Democrats was that this it positively there since, not won over in 2010 as the Liberal Democrats as ‘not seri- did not matter. Was it not bad that he claimed. ous’. However, if there was such a the Liberal Democrats were over- … it was Activists who might have been source, joining the coalition and reliant on those voting for it as a willing to defend as necessary promoting the image of the Liberal ‘protest party’, and would it not be hardly sur- compromises the positions taken Democrats as this sort of party did better if the Liberal Democrats had by the party in government that not tap it. more voting for it because they sup- prising that were upsetting long-term support- The underlying theme in the ported its ideology? Those pushing people iden- ers were undermined by a lead- 2015 general election was dissatis- this line tended to have an ideology ership unwilling to join in with faction with British politics. The they thought the Liberal Demo- tified the that defence. The notion that they SNP was successful in tapping this crats should adopt, or that it was were what those leading the party in Scotland; the obvious inadequa- always the underlying ideology word ‘coa- secretly wanted in the first place cies of UKIP and the Green Party (hence they liked to call it some- was allowed to grow. Again, the meant they were not so successful thing like ‘classical liberalism’ or lition’ pri- tuition fees policy is an example. in England. Most parties of protest ‘nineteenth-century liberalism’) of Instead of putting out the message are not liberal in instinct – that is the Liberal Democrats and needed to marily with that the compromise reached was often why they fail, and it is why be enforced to make the party more because the Conservatives would it is best that they do. A liberal distinctive. It was a ‘small state’ ide- the Liberal not agree to the Liberal Democrats’ party of protest is a rare thing. Pro- ology, incorporating much of what ideal, the leadership suggested it test means challenging established the previous generation of Liberal Democrats, was a ‘mistake’ to have adopted power, which in the twenty-first Democrats called ‘Thatcherism’. our original policy and hinted century has moved from the state This was a turnaround from times in so assumed that it was all the fault of naïve to big corporate business. The sur- the past when it tended to be those party members for pushing it. This vival of the Liberal Party as a relic on the left of the Liberal Party who that what boosted the party’s attackers who of the old pre-socialist left revived argued for a more distinctive ideo- argued that the Liberal Democrats by local enthusiasts meant it was logical approach, and those on the came out of were untrustworthy because they well placed to take on this chal- right who argued for pragmatism. had campaigned on a policy they lenge. Yet the Liberal Democrats The coalition was not the time the coalition never really believed in. Attempt- during the time of the coalition to engage in factional argument in government ing to put the blame on party mem- seemed determined to throw away the party. Activists who tended to bers ignored the fact that it was a that role as well. the left would be the most discom- was essen- decision of the party’s leadership Much of the rhetoric coming fited by the fact of the coalition and to highlight this policy in the elec- from the top of the party during the policies that were emerging tially what tion campaign, and it was this high- the time of the coalition put across from it, and so needed reassurance lighting with a ‘pledge’ to vote the idea that it was ashamed of its that there was still a place for them the Liberal against tuition fee rises which made old role of being a party of protest. in the party. The message from the it particularly difficult when the It ignored the fact that the elec- top was often the opposite. The Democrats party had to compromise on it. toral system meant that local activ- idea was put across that the party An important role of the Lib- ists had passed through a brutal had fundamentally changed in were about. eral Party in its twentieth-century ‘survival of the fittest’ process. Far

42 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 why did it go wrong? from being unrealistic dreamers party’s public relations at the top. Finn sug- the result of which presumably sur- as was sometimes suggested, those The coalition was always going to prised them as much as it surprised who had survived and prospered be a difficult situation for the Lib- gests that its victors. were those who had a good feel for eral Democrats, but this made it The book is divided into three what works to win votes. Temper- much worse. … Liberal parts. The first examines the con- ing feelings of protest and detach- (Note, it has been suggested that stitutional and institutional aspects ment from conventional politics the author of this article is mak- Democrat of the coalition; the second looks into support for a party which was ing these points in ‘hindsight’. In thematically at a number of policy pragmatic on policy and humble fact these are points he was mak- secretaries of areas; and the third encompasses its in accepting that it had no right to ing throughout the time of the political effects, principally on the anyone’s vote (a big distinguishing coalition in comments on Liberal state could main parties but also on the media factor from Labour) was their job Democrat Voice. See, for example, have been and includes a very useful contribu- and they were good at it. http://www.libdemvoice.org/ tion from John Curtice on elections This pragmatism meant that opinion-agreeing-with-nick-25352. deployed in and referendums. most active members could under- html#comment-184883 where the For students of Liberal history, stand the argument for forming the main point made here was made at departments the central chapters will be two by coalition in 2010, so there was lit- the time of the 2011 Liberal Demo- Mike Finn himself, on the coali- tle outright opposition to it within crat party conference.) better suited tion agreement in the institutional the party. However, the overselling part of the book and, especially, of the coalition, the attempt to use Matthew Huntbach joined the Lib- to promoting on the consequences for the Lib- it to push a permanent shift to the eral Party as a university student in the eral Democrats in the political part. economic right by some who had 1970s. He was an active campaigner in the distinc- Some of the other contributions plenty of funding but little practi- various parts of the country, standing for are distinctly less useful, since they cal political experience, and the local elections first in his home county of tiveness of seem to forget that the government domination of the party’s national Sussex, and later in the London Bor- was indeed a coalition rather than a image and strategy by a leadership ough of Lewisham where he was a Lib- the party … Conservative administration. One which was disconnected from the eral Democrat councillor 1994–2006, can, however, gain much from, party’s activist base led to many and leader of the council opposition The problem for example, Howard Glennerst- serious mistakes being made in 1998–2004. He is an academic in com- er’s clear account of the coalition’s party tactics and presentation. Fail- puter science at Queen Mary University with that health reforms and Nicholas Tim- ing to understand how some of the of London and at Beijing University of mins’ admirable chapter on social lines used would be misinterpreted, Posts and Telecommunications. suggestion, security and pensions policy. Peter and failing to learn the lessons from however, Riddell’s chapter on ‘The coali- Ireland and New Zealand on how 1 Richard Reeves, ‘The Case for a tion and the executive’ is notably small parties are often damaged by Truly Liberal Party’, New Statesman, was not just well informed (and notably positive coalitions, suggested a considerable 19 Sept. 2012. about how the coalition functioned naivety among those directing the that Clegg within Whitehall). Much is also to be learned, in a was too little different way, from Martin Lough- lin and Cal Viney’s chapter on ‘The interested in coalition and the constitution’. It The Liberal Democrats in coalition: owners gives an account of unremitting distinctive- hostility to the Liberal Democrats’ of all and nothing attempts at constitutional reform, ness, but also which the authors characterise as Anthony Seldon and Mike Finn (eds.), The Coalition Effect an illegitimate attempt by a minor- 2010–2015 (Cambridge University Press, 2015) that he was ity party to impose its agenda on an Review by David Howarth unwilling nation. Admittedly, the uninterested AV referendum and House of Lords reform were total failures, but nly when a historical existence of ‘Britain’ itself, are still in civil liber- their assessment of the one Liberal period is over can we very much in train. One perhaps ties and con- Democrat success, the Fixed Term Otruly understand it. The paradoxical merit, however, of The Parliaments Act, is based on a mis- Owl of Minerva, as Hegel said, Coalition Effect 2010–2015, a collec- stitutional understanding. They adopt Vernon takes flight only at dusk. And so tion of essays organised and edited Bogdanor’s criticism that, contrary any attempt to understand recent by Anthony Seldon and Mike Finn, issues … to the populist spirit of the age, political events, events whose con- is that it was completed and pub- the Act introduces a system under sequences are still being worked lished just before the end of events which parliaments make new gov- through, is inevitably not so much it describes, which means that its ernments rather than the electorate an exercise in history as an inter- assessments are free from any of in general elections. But that fails to vention in the politics it describes. the dubious benefits of hindsight. understand both the arrangements That applies without qualification It stands as a document of what a before the Act and those under it. to the Conservative–Liberal Dem- group of eminent scholars and com- During the twentieth century, the ocrat coalition of 2010–2015, whose mentators thought were the impor- political composition of the British effects on every party in British tant features of the coalition era just government changed several times politics, and indeed on the political before the general election of 2015, in the course of a parliamentary

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 43 why did it go wrong?

the party in the end kept, such as the party’s liberalism would have the pupil premium and raising the emerged much more clearly had it income tax threshold, the party had taken the Home Office or the Min- let the public down on what its own istry of Justice. The problem with voters regarded as its unique sell- that suggestion, however, was not ing points, in particular abolishing just that Clegg was too little inter- tuition fees. ested in distinctiveness, but also One might question, however, that he was uninterested in civil whether Finn is right on a related liberties and constitutional issues, point. He identifies as crucial the habitually referring in this review- U-turn on nuclear power. It seems er’s hearing to the former as ‘tra- unlikely that nuclear power was ditional’ – as if preserving them anywhere near as significant for was similar to supporting Morris the Liberal Democrat electorate as Dancing – and to the latter as ‘legal fees. At the time Chris Huhne, the niceties’. Secretary of State for Energy and Finn also identifies as a seri- Climate Change, expressed sur- ous problem the growing distance prise at how just little resistance or between the party in government, objection it had generated. One can particularly Clegg, and the party make a case instead, looking at the in the country. Finn explains the detail of the party’s opinion poll process by which, as he puts it, rating decline in 2010, for saying Clegg came to despise his own that the issue that almost rivalled party. Of course, for much of the tuition fees in its negative effect was party that feeling was mutual, economic fairness, from the point with serious consequences for the at which Nick Clegg was seen to party’s capacity to campaign. The slap George Osborne on the back biggest puzzle, however, is how after a budget that reduced income Clegg survived as leader. His fail- tax for the wealthy and cut benefits ure was complete at the point the for the poor. AV referendum was lost in 2011, More generally Finn argues but no challenge to his leadership term. Whether the new govern- that Nick Clegg’s central mistake occurred until 2014, at which point ment called an election was not was to give very low priority in the failure of the parliamentary automatic but entirely a matter the early years to maintaining the party to act doomed the attempt for them. In 1940, for obvious rea- party’s distinctiveness, prefer- almost as soon as it started. Finn’s sons, no election ensued, but even ring instead to show that ‘coalition explanation for the failure of the in 1931 an internal debate raged works’ by ‘owning’ every coalition 2014 coup was lack of a convinc- about whether to call an election – a policy. Once the public had fixed ing new leader – Vince Cable was debate that caused the first of that in its mind that the Liberal Demo- implicated in the fees debacle and decade’s many Liberal splits. The crats were merely an appendage to Tim Farron was unwilling at that difference under the Fixed Term the Conservatives, later attempts stage to move – together with a Parliaments Act is that the decision at differentiation looked insincere prevailing mood of fatalism both whether to call a new election lies or contrived. Consequently, even in the parliamentary party and not with the government but with policies that really were distinc- in the party at large. Finn is right parliament. tively Liberal Democrat, such as the that both factors were important. The failures over AV and the increase in the income tax thresh- The parliamentary party failed to House of Lords also feature in Mike old, could not be convincingly act because no one would lead it Finn’s chapter on the coalition and claimed for the party. By ‘owning’ into action and those who might the Liberal Democrats. He makes it everything it ended up ‘owning’ have led it feared that if they tried the centrepiece of what he calls the nothing. no one would follow them; and government’s second phase, from Finn suggests, as others have, the degree of fatalism was so great 2011 to 2013. He pays more atten- that the party might have done that in some quarters it amounted tion, however, to the catastrophic better had it chosen to dominate to a feeling that the party needed first phase, 2010 to 2011, concentrat- specific ministries rather than dot- to do penance for its sins. But one ing in particular on the tuition fees ting single ministers around many wonders what new information debacle. Finn points out that the departments. But he adds that, will come to light in the coming party never recovered from the loss even within that strategy, Liberal years about other possible factors of support it suffered in 2010–11 and Democrat secretaries of state could affecting the parliamentary party, that subsequent policy successes in have been deployed in depart- including the power of patronage, taxation, schools policy and even ments better suited to promoting especially promises of peerages, economic policy failed to offset the distinctiveness of the party. and gullibility, particularly about the loss of trust and credibility that That might be unfair in the case private polling arranged to make happened early on. He argues con- of the Department of Energy and the position of sitting MPs look far vincingly that although the party Climate Change, where Liberal better than it really was. hierarchy might claim that the par- Democrats USPs were at stake, but Finn’s conclusion (for which ty’s manifesto had stressed promises it is certainly a plausible idea that he relies on a recent article in this

44 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 why did it go wrong? journal by the current reviewer) of itself as a party built above It looks even more right now. David Howarth is Professor of Law is that Clegg’s desire to present all on values. He describes the Whether it will still look right and Public Policy at the University the Liberal Democrats as a relia- ‘coalition effect’ on the Lib- when the Owl of Minerva at of Cambridge and served as Liberal ble coalition partner and thus as eral Democrats as ‘devastat- last takes off remains to be seen, Democrat MP for Cambridge from a ‘party of government’ under- ing’. That looked right in April but the old bird’s wings are 2005 to 2010. mined the party’s definition 2015 when this book came out. already twitching.

Which Way Back? The Liberal Democrats and the 2015 election in its historical context One-day conference, Birmingham, Saturday 28 November

10.00am – 4.00pm University of Birmingham Campus B15 2TT (accessible from the University train station) The Liberal Democrat–Conservative coalition government of 2010–15 was the first peacetime British coalition since the 1930s. Whatever the Liberal Democrats may have achieved in government, their electoral reward was the most catastrophic in the history of the party or its predecessors.

This one-day conference, organised by the Journal of Liberal History and the University of Birmingham, will examine the key issues the Liberal Democrats faced as partners in the coalition government and the party’s performance during the 2015 general election.

The conference will feature opening and concluding addresses and three panel sessions, looking at: • Campaigning – what messages were the Liberal Democrats trying to communicate during their period in office and during the general election; how was this done and how effectively? • Policy and ideological direction – getting Liberal Democrat policy implemented in government, the relationship with the Conservatives and how this played during the election. • Parliamentary strategy – keeping the parliamentary party together, 2010–15; how the Liberal Democrat presence at Westminster was used to reinforce the wider messages the party was seeking to promote to the public and inside the government. Confirmed speakers include Martin Horwood (MP for Cheltenham, 2005–15), Peter Sloman (author of The Liberal Party and the Economy 1929–64) and Andy Denham.

Registration £20 (students and unwaged £15). Payment will be taken on the day, but please register in advance – send your details to: Matt Cole 134 Haunch Lane, Birmingham B13 0PY [email protected]; 07762 176 035

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 45