INTRODUCTION Scepticism Has Recently Attracted Much Attention

INTRODUCTION

Scepticism has recently attracted much attention from philosophers, and its challenge to knowledge is the object of many discussions. This has also produced a renewed interest in ancient Scepticism. Unfortu- nately, the loss of the writings of all ancient Sceptics but one makes it difficult for us to have a comprehensive picture. The only extant work is that of Sextus Empiricus (late second century AD), who belongs to a late phase of the tradition. Besides Sextus, there are a few minor sources, either opponents or authors of philosophical handbooks. Although these other accounts of Scepticism are most of the time too condensed to be compared with Sextus’, when com- parisons do prove possible Sextus’ formulation of Scepticism appears to be in many respects unrepresentative of the whole tradition.1 The situation is so discouraging that some commentators explicitly state that their discussion will consider Sextus and his Scepticism alone, without covering earlier representatives of this tradition.2 This approach is methodologically sound. The problem is that many Scep- tics lie beneath Sextus’ skin,3 Sextus also being a compiler of earlier material, and that his presentation of Scepticism is not, therefore, a single and coherent whole. Thus, addressing the question of the historical development of ancient Scepticism, so as to isolate different phases and approaches, is not a subordinate job, of a somewhat scholarly flavour, in relation to discussing its conceptual framework, but a condition and an integral part of it.4 Of those very few Sceptics who have eluded anonymity one is the actual founder of the school, Aenesidemus of Cnossus (mid-first century BC). He challenged all philosophical assertions concerning the nature of things, and also countered weaker formulations of scepticism such as the fallibilism of the late Academy, founding a new sceptical school which professed uncompromising doubt. Aenesi- demus named his school after Pyrrho, a maverick wise man who lived

1 See below note 4. 2 Barnes (1983a), p. 8; idem (1990), p. vii. 3 Barnes (1983b), p. 159. 4 Barnes himself investigates Diogenes’ account of Scepticism in Barnes (1992). 2 introduction between 360 and 270 BC, and whose attempt at living a life without beliefs gave rise to a flourishing tradition of extravagant tales. Aenesi- demus’ own work is lost, but his position can be recovered, to a certain extent, from reports of later authors. However, Aenesidemus is a very paradoxical figure. In spite of his well-established Scepticism, there does seem to have been a ‘dogma- tic’ streak in his philosophy, in that he described Scepticism as a ‘path’ towards the philosophy of Heraclitus, a Presocratic philoso- pher who made several claims as to how things are, and professed to be the spokesman of the divine and universal Reason. The precise meaning of the ‘path’ metaphor is uncertain, but it seems at least to imply fondness for Heraclitus, something which Sextus finds incom- patible with genuine Scepticism (PH 1.210-212). In addition to this, there is a body of difficult reports found in Sextus and Tertullian, in which Aenesidemus is associated with Heraclitus as regards his views on the soul, truth, and other issues on which one would have expected a Sceptic to suspend judgement instead. Unfortunately, the relevant material has come down to us in the form of short doxographical reports, and therefore the precise meaning of the doctrines regarding which Aenesidemus is associated with Heraclitus (and which go far beyond anything Heraclitus himself ever thought of) remains controversial, no less than the formula Aijnhsivdhmo" kata; to;n ÔHravkleiton, by which Aenesidemus is coupled with Heraclitus. Hence a problem arises, identified by one eminent scholar as “the most puzzling of all problems raised by ancient Scepticism”,5 the solution of which is bound to affect our evaluation of Aenesidemus’ place in ancient Scepticism, and which has therefore set the scene for a long-term debate. Some commentators have rejected Sextus’ report at PH 1.210-212, that Aenesidemus presented Scepticism as a ‘path’ towards Heraclitus’ philosophy, questioning Sextus’ reliability.6 Others have interpreted this text as evidence for a separate Heracli- tean phase within Aenesidemus’ thought.7 Others have hypothesised that Aenesidemus’ fondness for Heraclitus relates to some common principles shared by Heracliteanism and Scepticism.8 Others have

5 Brochard (1887), p. 227. 6 Diels (1879), pp. 209-212; Zeller (1903), pp. 36-46. 7 Saisset (1840), pp. 188-199; Brochard (1887), pp. 272-289; Capone Braga (1931); Rist (1970); Dal Pra (1989), II pp. 392-411; Tarrant (1981); Hankinson (1995), pp. 129-131. 8 Natorp (1884); von Arnim (1888), pp. 79-85.