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Home , Battle of Oriskany, James Clinton, Sullivan Expedition

Max M. Mintz. Seeds of Empire: The American Revolutionary Conquest of the . and London: New York University Press, 1999. xi + 232 pp. $28.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8147-5622-5.

Reviewed by Charles C. Kolb

Published on H-War (December, 1999)

>From Six Nations to Conquered Provinces: hawk, Susquehanna, and Allegheny broad river The and the Iroquois valleys were a magnet for farmers weary of con‐ This book focuses upon the American military tending with 's stubborn soil. The campaigns against the Loyalist Iroquois and their route westward along the southern shore of Lake Tory allies during the years 1777 through 1779. Erie ofered a pass through the Appalachian The title for my review paraphrases General mountain chain and beyond to the Mississippi" George who considered the lands of (p. 1). the Six Nations to be "conquered provinces" (7 Structurally, Seeds of Empire includes ac‐ September 1783). The title for the book derives knowledgments, a prologue, thirteen chapters, an from a letter from one of General Sullivan's young epilogue, and list of abbreviations, notes, and an lieutenants who wrote that "I index. 23 black-and-white illustrations and six really feel guilty as I applied the torch to huts that maps supplement the narrative. The illustrations were Homes of Content until we ravagers came are, in the main, reproductions of portraits of spreading desolation everywhere.... Our mission some of the important personages who fgure here is ostensibly to destroy but may it not tran‐ prominently in the narrative. There are no sepa‐ spire that we pillagers are carelessly sowing the rate bibliographies or references cited, but a total seeds of Empire?" (p. 186). of 320 endnotes (6 to 34 per chapter) are included, Mintz, professor emeritus of history at South‐ and depend upon a list of 36 abbreviations, most‐ ern Connecticut State University, is the author of ly acronyms. A nine-page double column index is two other books on the American Revolution. He confned to proper nouns and does not incorpo‐ writes that the revolution was "not only a struggle rate topics. for independence, but also for the lands of the In‐ I shall review Mintz's presentation, then pro‐ dians, and the jewel was the do‐ ceed to a critique and comparison of Seeds of Em‐ main of the Iroquois' Six Nations. The fertile Mo‐ pire with Barbara Graymont's classic work, The H-Net Reviews

Iroquois in the American Revolution (1972) [1], counted. In spite of the defeat of the Americans the best account of the Iroquois side of the cam‐ and their retreat at Oriskany, the Loyalists were paigns, and military historian Joseph R. Fischer's unable to capture and they retreat‐ A Well-Executed Failure: The Sullivan Campaign ed. With this important action, the war took a against the Iroquois, July-September 1779 (1997) new turn, for as Mintz notes, "the Indians would [2], which provides an analysis of the Continental no longer serve as auxiliaries in a British force of army's frst expedition against Indians. Seeds of professional soldiers fghting an American force Empire is a synthesis of the military actions be‐ of professional soldiers. They were to direct their tween the Loyalists and Indian allies on one side main ofensive against civilian centers, destroy and the rebel American colonials and their Indian private residences, and take the lives of noncom‐ allies on the other. It is a comprehensive retelling batants of both sexes and all ages" (p. 45). Mintz of the story of the struggle in New York and Penn‐ next documents the backcountry raids by the Iro‐ sylvania between the American colonists and the quois in late 1777 and early 1778 in upstate New American Indians, both native and recent mi‐ York and northern . Notable among grants to that region. Likewise, it documents the the Indian attacks was the Wyoming Valley Mas‐ initial attempt in 1779 by the Continental army in sacre of 3 July 1778. That rampage led the Ameri‐ its frst Indian campaign and assesses its success‐ can Congress, the Board of War, and General es and failures. The confict was not simply be‐ Washington to formulate a major retaliatory of‐ tween the British and the Colonists. Indeed, Euro- fensive and defensive plan of action. The plan‐ Americans, and colonist freemen ning and execution of the Sullivan, Clinton, and and slaves, and American Indians were included Brodhead Campaign of 1779 occupies the subse‐ among the diverse groups drawn into the war. quent eight chapters of Mintz's book (pp. 75-172). The Indians included even more heterogeneous Graymont [1] covers briefy the same period (pp. peoples, in the main among these the Iroquois- 192-241), while Fischer [2] provides 265 pages on speaking tribes of the northeastern . the same topic from a professional military per‐ The Iroquois homeland in upstate New York con‐ spective. trolled important trade routes from the Great New Hampshire lawyer Major-General John Lakes through the Region and Mo‐ Sullivan had military experience at Boston, Que‐ hawk Valley to Albany. bec, and Trenton from 1774-1776, and was select‐ Mintz begins ca. 1773, documenting the ed as commander of the punitive expedition, al‐ schism that developed among the six Iroquois na‐ though known for his "contentiousness" (p. 100). tions, with the Oneida and Tuscarora espousing Brigadier General 's forces joined the rebel "American" cause, while Loyalist Iro‐ with Sullivan near Tioga. At the Battle of New‐ quois, led by the Mohawk , and the town on 29 August 1779, 700 Indians and Loyalist other three tribes allied with the British. Brant rangers under and Brant faced a com‐ (1742-1807) learned English, was an Anglican mis‐ bined force of nearly 5,000 under Clinton and sionary, and fought for the British during the Brigadier General . Although the . He was presented to the Americans failed to close a planned pincer-like court of King George III in 1775 and received a trap and Butler and Brant escaped with some of commission as a captain in 1776, serving as a their men, the battle was an overwhelming victo‐ British ofcer until 1783. The infamous ambush ry for Sullivan's army. Iroquois houses and corn‐ and decimation of General 's felds were burned and the army continued up troops by St Leger's forces and Brandt's Iroquois the into the Iroquois heartland. at the on 6 August 1777 is re‐ Displaced Iroquois warriors and civilians, and

2 H-Net Reviews their allies streamed toward Niagara, compound‐ lowed the enemy to escape at Newtown and failed ing housing and supply problems at that base. Vil‐ to attack . In the autumn of 1779, Nia‐ lages and croplands on the Seneca River, others at gara had only a garrison of 400 and was over‐ the north ends of Seneca and Cayuga lakes, and whelmed by 5,000 refugees from Iroquoia by Jan‐ Chenussio ("grand capital of the Indian country") uary 1780. The winter of 1779-1780 proved to be were destroyed. On the return trip, Sullivan tar‐ one of the harshest on record, but from February geted the Cayuga villages, croplands, and or‐ to September 1780 Butler sent out 59 war parties chards on the east and west sides of Lake Cayuga, to attack American settlements in the Mohawk, before the army returned to Tioga and then to Delaware, Susquehanna, and Juniata River val‐ Easton. Mintz summarizes that "a draconian tide leys. New York's Governor Clinton estimated 200 of desolation" swept through Iroquoia. dwellings were burned and 150,000 bushels of The third component of Washington's Sulli‐ grain were destroyed (p. 168), but other Tory at‐ van-Clinton-Brodhead strategy involved a success‐ tacks were inefective. With the surrender of ful diversion. Colonel Daniel Brodhead, Comman‐ British General Cornwalis at Yorktown in Novem‐ der of the Western Department and Fourth Penn‐ ber 1781, the reconquest of the Iroquois home‐ sylvania Continental Regiment at led 605 land was not possible, and the Indians were men up the Valley on 11 August. caught between British retrenchment and Ameri‐ There were minor skirmishes with Seneca and can annihilation. These Iroquois felt betrayed by Muncy Delaware, and the force proceeded unop‐ the British and were a subdued people dependent posed to Bucktooth (Salamanca, New York). The upon Canada. A reafrmation of the 1768 Treaty force returned to Fort Pitt on 14 September, hav‐ of Fort Stanwix occurred in October 1784. In the ing destroyed more than 500 acres of crops and book's "Epilogue," Mintz writes "the Iroquois 130 houses in three Seneca villages in the Kinzua found themselves powerless to resist the post-Rev‐ area (Warren, Pennsylvania). None of Brodhead's olutionary takeover and peopling of their heart‐ men were killed or taken prisoner. Graymont (pp. land by the new American nation" (p. 183). He 214-215) and Starkey (pp. 123-127) write briefy then catalogues the attempts by New York State to on this expedition. systematically dispossess the Loyalist Indians of their lands by threat, deception, and guile. The Six Sullivan leveled 32 Indian villages and de‐ Nations Reserve near Brantford, Ontario and stroyed 160,000 bushels of corn, but his overly Seneca land retention and sales are touched upon cautious nature, demands for overwhelming as Mintz brings the reader quickly up to February numbers of troops and extraordinary amounts of 1999 in a few paragraphs. supplies, lack of feld reports, and his braggadocio did not sit well with Washington, who sent Sulli‐ Mintz uses the standard British and Canadian van a one sentence congratulatory letter. Mintz primary sources and a selection of original docu‐ contends that "if Sullivan's assignment was to ments (letters, papers, diaries, journals, order eradicate the villages and sustenance of the Iro‐ books, and minute books). He "mines" these quois, he had succeeded. But if his mission was to sources for useful information and presents his eliminate the Iroquois threat to the European oc‐ detailed, exceedingly well-referenced narrative. cupation of the Six Nations heartland, he had There are fascinating connections revealed -- men achieved only a momentary respite" (p. 154). Sur‐ who were brothers-in-laws; Loyalist Indians who prised by the government's "cool" reception, Sulli‐ were, like some rebel opponents, Freemasons - van retired from military service on 9 November and he comments on the backgrounds of staf and 1779. Washington thought that Sullivan had al‐ rank-and-fle ofcers, some of whom were lawyers or physicians while others were un‐

3 H-Net Reviews schooled, skilled frontiersmen. Black Loyalist and therefore, his book is diferent from Mintz's vol‐ rebel soldiers, slaves, free blacks among the Iro‐ ume. Fischer writes (p. 190) that "in a broad sense quois, and a black physician also served during Sullivan's expedition turned up problems in the the struggle. The military strategies, tactics, and relationship among the government, its people, logistics are also documented briefy and the per‐ and the military that would plague the nation for sonnel strengths of military units and atrocities decades." Government assumptions about the on both sides are recounted. Curiously, there is a virtue and altruism of its citizens had been redundant story about American compassion for proven false, while the citizens expected more an old Cayuga woman with slight variations (pp. help than they received from the Continental 128-129, 134-135). In some instances the reader Army. However, the neonate federal government must be careful to discern correctly the person lacked the ability of coercion in the face of strong about whom Mintz refers because there are multi‐ political systems in New York and Pennsylvania. ple Butlers (John, Richard, Walter, William, and Fischer contends that the "well-executed failure" Zebulon), Clintons (George, Sir Henry, and James), was the responsibility of Washington rather than and Johnsons (Francis, Guy, Sir John, Sir William, Sullivan. While the former hoped that Niagara and William). Some fought on opposite sides and would be taken, he did not provide the means for even against one another in the same battle, so Sullivan to accomplish this goal. Sullivan's that the reader must pay careful attention. Mintz scorched-earth ofensive in Iroquoia served as a often includes present-day community names and catalyst to rally the Iroquois to the British cause, highway routes where Indian trails or expedition particularly because the British were able to roads once existed, helping to orient the reader to maintain their Indian allies during the harsh win‐ the current cultural geography. He writes (p. 4) ter. An advantage of Fischer's book is that there that more soldiers' diaries survive for this cam‐ are plans of military formations and a separate paign than for any other in the American Revolu‐ selected bibliography with individual sections on tion, and he made extensive use of these primary manuscript sources, printed primary sources, and documents. secondary sources. Graymont's Iroquois in the American Revolu‐ Fischer's evaluation of Washington's ofensive tion (published in 1972 and still in print), is the and defensive strategy concludes that the Conti‐ most comprehensive assessment of the topic of In‐ nental Army grew in sophistication with respect dians and the War for Independence.[1] She be‐ to operational planning. The frm decision was gins ca. 1710 by providing information on the six made that the initial priority was to destroy the tribes and the context for the confict, and con‐ Seneca because they were the most populous of tains a more detailed background on Iroquois at‐ the Iroquois and provided almost half of the na‐ tempt to maintain neutrality. Likewise, there is tive warriors. Washington's intelligence-gathering important material on the immediate results and network formed the foundation for the opera‐ long-term efects of the American Revolution on tional scheme, while the British sufered intelli‐ the native populations. Graymont discusses the gence failures and failed to recognize the veracity Sullivan-Clinton-Brodhead expeditions in some of the Iroquois about American strength (p. 42, detail (pp. 192-241) in her more broadly con‐ 60). Tactically, Sullivan's force was a "typical Euro‐ ceived volume, while Starkey [3] provides only an pean-style army in its confguration for battle in overview (pp.118-125). Fischer's A Well-Executed the wilderness" (p. 61 [2]). Fischer contends that Failure (1997) is a brilliant military analysis of the "the Iroquois focused their attention on fghting in Continental Army's frst expedition against Indi‐ 1778, and their farming had sufered as a result" ans.[2] He focuses upon army feld operations; (p. 84). I fnd this an invalid assumption for sever‐

4 H-Net Reviews al reasons. Traditionally, Iroquois women were Seeds of Empire is an engaging synthesis and responsible for the horticulture while men hunt‐ assessment of a component of one of the most sig‐ ed and conducted warfare. During 1778, the nifcant episodes in American cultural and mili‐ Americans did not molest Indian villages or crops, tary history. It is compelling history and compre‐ but the rich harvest of 1779 destroyed by the hensive in outlook, considering the struggle in American expeditions indicates that much land New York and Pennsylvania between American was under cultivation and substantial quantities colonists and American Indians native to that re‐ of corn were harvested. Logistically, seven of ten gion - the Iroquois. This is excellent scholarship, British supply ships arrived in Quebec in August superior in some ways to other accounts in that it 1779, so that sufcient supplies were available in details the confict of the Tories and their Indian Montreal, Niagara, and . Sullivan and Clin‐ allies against the American settlers, the Continen‐ ton's forces were obliged to forage for food in tal Army, and their native allies. No other volume Seneca and Cayuga country because of spoiled treats all of the major battles and expeditions for and inadequate food and transportation prob‐ the decade 1773-1783. Fischer's meticulous evalu‐ lems, but Clinton had less of a problem because ation of the Sullivan-Clinton campaign is essential supplies had been stockpiled at Lake Otsego dur‐ reading in order to understand the strategy, tac‐ ing the previous year in preparation for the attack tics, logistics, leadership, and civilian-military in‐ on Canada that had been called of (p. 186 [2]). teractions. Therefore, Mintz's book may be read Washington, Fischer contends, never understood alone or in conjunction with other syntheses and the scope of the food supply problem and the fail‐ is useful for scholars and students of the Colonial ure to inform the Commissary Department of Sul‐ era, the American Revolution, and military histo‐ livan's needs; "from the standpoint of logistics, it ry. failed at the strategic level" wrote Fischer (pp. REFERENCES CITED 115-119, 125 [2]). Therefore, he concludes that Sul‐ [1]. Barbara Graymont. The Iroquois in the livan was not to blame and stresses that the fail‐ American Revolution. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Uni‐ ure to take Niagara was the fault of the ultimate versity Press, 1972. commander, . [2]. Joseph R. Fischer. A Well-Executed Fail‐ Your reviewer was particularly struck by par‐ ure: The Sullivan Campaign against the Iroquois, allels to British and American political and mili‐ July-September 1779. Columbia: University of tary strategies elsewhere in the world. For exam‐ South Carolina Press, 1997. ple, "The Great Game," the politico-economic pow‐ er struggle between Russia and Britain for control [3]. Armstrong Starkey. European and Native of Afghanistan. In this confict Britain sought to American Warfare, 1675-1815. Norman: Universi‐ prevent a Russian presence in the Gulf of Arabia, ty of Oklahoma Press, 1999. the Indian Ocean, and the Indian Subcontinent by Copyright (c) 1999 by H-Net, all rights re‐ enlisting local allies. The Iroquois found that their served. This work may be copied for non-proft faith in the British was misplaced and that they, educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ too, were pawns to be manipulated for the beneft thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ of the Crown (Fischer, p. 88). The British "Great tact [email protected]. Game" strategy of divide and conquer was applied Charles W. Sanders, Jr. Book Review Editor, H- in the Colonial wars in North America, India, and War Kansas State University

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Citation: Charles C. Kolb. Review of Mintz, Max M. Seeds of Empire: The American Revolutionary Conquest of the Iroquois. H-War, H-Net Reviews. December, 1999.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=3672

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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