The African National Congress and Participatory Democracy

THE THEORIES, CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES OF DEMOCRACY SERIES EDITORS: JEAN-PAUL GAGNON · MARK CHOU

From People’s Power to Public Policy

heidi brooks The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy

Series Editors Jean-Paul Gagnon University of Canberra Canberra, Australia

Mark Chou Australian Catholic University Fitzroy, Australia There are many types of democracies and many types of democrats. Though contemporary Western scholars and practitioners of democracy have tended to repeat a particular set of narratives and discourses, recent research shows us that there are in fact hundreds of different adjec- tives of democracy. What one theorist, political leader or nation invokes as democracy, others may label as something altogether different. Part of this has to do with the political nature of democracy. As a practice and concept, it is always contested. Yet instead of exploring these differences and ambiguities, many democrats today retreat to the well- worn defnitions and practices made popular by Western powers in the twentieth-century. The aim of this book series is to engage and explore democracy’s many articulations. It seeks contributions which critically defne, analyse and organise the many theories, concepts and practices that encompass democracy in all its forms. Both theoretical and empirical treatments of democracy, particularly when told from less conventional or more marginal perspectives, are especially encouraged.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14410 Heidi Brooks The African National Congress and Participatory Democracy

From People’s Power to Public Policy Heidi Brooks Political and International Studies IIE MSA Johannesburg, South Africa Centre for Social Change University of Johannesburg Johannesburg, South Africa

The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy ISBN 978-3-030-25743-9 ISBN 978-3-030-25744-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25744-6

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland For Andrew and Joni Preface

This book emerges from several years of research, much of which informed my doctoral thesis, completed at the University of the Witwatersrand in 2015. In the process of the research, I became increasingly fascinated by the concept of a genealogy of ideas: The notion that our actions—as individuals, collectives, organisations and governments— do not take place in a conceptual vacuum, but are rather born of experience and of ideological and intellectual exposure. Ideas evolve, take shape and reconstitute themselves such that emergent trends in contemporary thinking require an appreciation of their origins. Ideas themselves have an intellectual or theoretical parentage and they give power and purpose to action. Comprehending the successes, failures and limitations of practice requires the exploration and interrogation of its underlying ideas. As a scholar of political studies and South African political history, I wanted to explore what appeared to be a longstanding tradition of popular participation; a frequently stated commitment by the dominant liberation movement that the people are their own liberators. From the mid-1940s the African National Congress, under the emerging leadership of its Youth League, reconstituted itself as a mass movement and over the subsequent decades worked toward the marked expansion of its popular membership. Despite its banning in 1960 and existence as an exiled organisation for three decades, the number of people who considered themselves to fall within the ‘Congress camp’ mushroomed. By the time of its unbanning in 1990 and reorganisation as a political party

vii viii Preface within South Africa, the ANC existed not as a clandestine movement but as a mass democratic one. With this status came not only an extensive popular hegemony but an entanglement of the mass movement identity with the very existence of democracy itself. This organisational evolution took place in a particular historical context—under conditions of repression, underground operation and severe restrictions on open activity. The ANC was also a creature of its intellectual and ideological environment—one which extended from the domestic activity of civic associations and underground cadres, to the bilateral solidarity and alliances of international organisations and regimes. This context—organisationally, geopolitically and ideologically—shaped the very nature of the movement that emerged. Underpinning its mass character was the mantra of active participation. Perhaps most visible in the ANC-aligned movement of the 1980s, mass participation and popular control came to characterize the discourse of the struggle and democracy. Yet what became apparent to me as my own research progressed was how the discourse of ‘people’s power’ in the 1980s had been analysed as a phenomenon of the period; a fragmented and unrepeated experience, often unrelated to its conceptual roots in the wider trajectory of ANC democratic thought. My own project thus sought to investigate this heritage in the hope that challenges to ‘popular participation’ as a democratic ideal in contemporary South Africa might be explained by its theoretical roots. Reading in 2010, at the time that this research commenced, the surge of academic critique and political commentary on the limitations of participatory local government a decade after its legislation, I sought to locate the ANC government’s commitment to a participatory form of democracy to this broader trajectory of ideas. Fortunately, a series of valuable collections of original sources have been compiled by his- torians such as Tom Karis, Gwendolen Carter and Gail Gerhart which made the commencement of this research easier. Jeremy Seekings, Ineke Van Kessel and Tom Lodge, among others, provide excellent accounts of organisational activity which provide solid background to this project. Tremendous work has been done by archivists in South Africa to document and catalogue important works, records and recollections, many of which have been invaluable in the writing of this book. As such, it makes an attempt to tie together what we already know with accounts and discussions about which we know little. It sheds light on a notion PREFACE ix of participation by ‘the people’ which remains central to the ANC’s discourse but about which there is limited conceptual and offcial articulation. Perhaps most importantly, it places in the spotlight the relationship between people and movement that has been the life blood of Africa’s oldest liberation movement. At the time of writing, the ANC is facing perhaps the greatest challenge to its hegemony since 1994. Damage to both its organisational unity and moral legitimacy exists in proportions even greater than that acknowledged at its national policy conference in 2012. Yet the discussion documents of its policy conference in July 2017 were severely wanting in inspiration and innovation. Their lack of promise of anything new suggests a weariness, even complacency, in the so-called ‘battle of ideas’. Any reversal of the damage done by years of mounting factionalism, deepening corruption and rotting of the very fabric of the people’s movement seems to rest on the Presidential leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, in offce since February 2018, as well as on the constitution of the ANC’s National Executive Committee, and most recently on the new executive cabinet following the 2019 national election. Interwoven with the issue of leadership succession is the longstanding connection of movement and people. Both the ANC’s credibility and South Africa’s democracy are infused with this relationship and with the associated identity of the ANC which, despite its growing fragility, has been so effective in sustaining its hegemony until now.

Johannesburg, South Africa Heidi Brooks Acknowledgements

Gratitude is due to a great number of people for assistance and support during the writing of this book. The Leverhulme Trust in the United Kingdom provided generous fnancial support for my research, which was carried out as part of my doctoral studies, without which much of the archival study would not have been possible. My thanks also go to the Department of Political Studies and Humanities Graduate Centre at the University of the Witwatersrand, and to students and colleagues at the Centre for Social Change at the University of Johannesburg who provided a continuously stimulating academic environment for writing and research. I am also fortunate to belong to the collegial environment of MSA where I lecture in political studies. I thank Kate Alexander, the South African Research Chair in Social Change for her mentorship and ongoing support, Anthony Butler for his encouragement, and Daryl Glaser, as my doctoral supervisor, for his advice and sharp mind in guiding me through the feld of democratic theory. I received valuable comments on earlier stages of my work from doctoral examiners, Roger Southall, Saul Dubow and Bettina von Lieres, and from anonymous reviewers in the writing of the fnal manuscript. Ambra Fintello and Anne-Kathrin Birchley-Brun at Palgrave Macmillan have been extremely helpful on the road to publication. The archival staff of the National Heritage and Cultural Studies Centre at the University of Fort Hare, the Mayibuye Centre at the University of the Western Cape, Wits Historical Papers, the South African History Archives and South Africa’s Constitutional Court

xi xii Acknowledgements provided valuable assistance and access to their archive collections during my data gathering. Tremendous gratitude, in particular, goes to the individuals who generously gave their time and made themselves available for interview. Their personal recollections and insights have been invaluable in contributing rich material to inform this book. I thank my brother and sister-in-law, Skip and Helen, and my circle of friends in South Africa and the UK for their friendship and encouragement along the way. The support of my parents, Roger and Chris Brooks, enabled me to go to university, travel to South Africa and continue onto a doctorate. Most of all, I thank my husband and best friend, Andrew and our daughter, Joni who give me the love, support and encouragement every day to enable me to do what I enjoy. Contents

1 Introduction: A Battle of Ideas 1

2 Participation in the History of ANC Democratic Thought 35

3 Discourses of ‘People’s Power’ 63

4 ‘The People Shall Govern’: The Codifcation of Ideas 117

5 Post-1994 Policy and Movement Discourse 165

6 Conclusion: The Power of Ideas 219

Index 241

xiii Abbreviations

AAC Alexandra Action Committee ANC African National Congress CAJ Civic Association of Johannesburg COD Congress of Democrats Cogta Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs COP Congress of the People Cosatu Congress of South African Trade Unions CPF Community Policing Forum CST Colonialism of a Special Type DLCA Department of Legal and Constitutional Affairs (ANC) DLG Developmental Local Government DPE Department of Political Education (ANC) DPLG Department for Provincial and Local Government Gear Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme GTZ German Agency for Technical Cooperation IAP2 International Association for Public Participation IDP Integrated Development Plan LGSETA Local Government Sector Education and Training Authority MDM Mass Democratic Movement MK Umkhonto We Sizwe NDR National Democratic Revolution NEC National Executive Committee (ANC) NGo Non-Governmental Organisation NLGNF National Local Government Negotiating Forum NWC National Working Committee (ANC) NWC-SC National Working Committee Sub-Committee (ANC)

xv xvi Abbreviations

RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme SACP South African Communist Party Sactu South African Congress of Trade Unions Salga South African Local Government Association Sanco South African National Civic Organisation UDF United Democratic Front CHAPTER 1

Introduction: A Battle of Ideas

The political landscape of contemporary South Africa is a combination of its past and present. A history of colonialism and apartheid has left deep social and political scarring and a skewing of the nation’s socio-economic trajectory lasting well into the third decade of democracy. Its history of popular political organisation and aspirations for a participatory form of politics have also been carried through to the democratic era. Yet the current political environment is characterised by widespread popular disillusionment with the quality of democracy. Since 2004, South Africa has seen an upsurge in popular protest (Booysen 2007: 24; Alexander 2010), often seemingly triggered by the failures of service delivery but rooted in deeper grievances over lack of representivity, accountability, and disap- pointment with the fruits of democracy. The spread of community and sectoral unrest in black urban townships, the fateful mineworkers’ strike at Marikana in 2011, and the 2015–2016 #FeesMustFall movement on university campuses provide but a few examples. The backdrop to the present picture is a long history of struggle politics which fostered not only popular aspirations for a democratic future, but the idea of a democratic state in which South Africa’s citizens would play a decisive part. At the helm of this struggle was South Africa’s largest liberation movement, and now dominant party, the African National Congress (ANC). In recent years, despite a shift in party leadership and the faded prospect of a ‘new era’ of bottom-up organisation, South Africa has witnessed a ruling party increasingly factionalised. The years

© The Author(s) 2020 1 H. Brooks, The African National Congress and Participatory Democracy, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25744-6_1 2 H. BROOKS from 2007, in particular, have been marked by a crumbling of the ANC’s historic alliance with labour, the breakaway and subsequent formation of new parties posing a challenge to the ANC,1 mounting distrust of the executive, internal leadership challenge, systemic levels of personal aggrandisement in public offce, and popular frustration with the unmet promises of freedom. There has, more positively, been a burgeoning of alternative Left movements. The emergence of a new protest politics has brought with it a revitalisation of civil society organisations and autonomous social movements, not only challenging the status quo, but demanding substantive popular engagement in the governance process. Indeed, it might be suggested that the challenge to centralised power through associational mobilisation from below, represents both a prospering of new spaces for action by an engaged citizenry and the claiming of political rights.2 Yet, as South Africans have increasingly resorted to ‘invented’ spaces to make their voices heard, this has been seen as symp- tomatic not only of a popular desire to infuence policy but of the failure of formal institutional channels for citizen participation in governance (Benit-Gbaffou 2007, 2008; Sinwell 2010).3 During both the transition to democracy and since 1994, the ANC has advocated a role for participatory democracy alongside representative institutions. Local government, in particular, has been the focus of this initiative, with participatory democracy being provided for through both constitutional provision and municipal legislation. Yet, despite the intent to engage citizens in decision-making processes about issues that affect their lives, the participatory democratic project in South Africa is largely considered to have failed and has not fulflled the objectives set out in legislation. Although, on the part of the ruling party, the presence of formal mechanisms for participatory democracy indicates more than a rhetorical commitment, for an organisation whose ‘mass character’ has long been the vehicle of its political programme, the limitations of its approach to institutionalising citizen participation warrants examination. Many on the Left in the historic ANC alliance continue to lament the post- 1994 submergence of the ANC’s participatory traditions in an increasingly ‘thin’ democracy. As a movement, the ANC, as Anthony Butler argues, has “always been constituted in part by how its supporters have conceived of it” (2012: 14). In the context of formal and institutional commitments—and history of the ANC-as-movement, whose very raison d’être lies in its connection with the people—how does one explain the 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 3 inadequacies of democracy’s depth? Those with an interest in the construction and future trajectory of South African democracy might well ask, what went wrong? In order to understand the limitations of South Africa’s participatory democracy, this book interrogates the connection between ideas and practice: how defciencies in the practice of citizen participation might be explained by the ideas that inform it. The defcits of democracy and failures of the democratic promise are witnessed by present day South Africans. Yet the origins and explanations for these defciencies can be found in the history of its democratic trajectory. Valuable scholarly attention has been given to both procedural and substantive weaknesses in the implementation of participatory mechanisms. Yet the ideas that inform commitments to participatory democracy remain inadequately understood: There has been limited examination of their conceptual underpinnings as an explanatory factor of policy failure. There has also been no analysis to date which takes into account the interconnection between the ANC’s very understanding of ‘democracy’ and its own mass movement history.

1.1 the Intertwining of Movement and Democracy Despite the weakening of the ANC alliance, the domestic political landscape of South Africa remains indisputably shaped by its dominance—not only as a political party but as a mass movement historically. The increasing strength of political opposition, and notable (if marginal) decline in the ANC’s share of the vote in the 2019 elections, do not nullify the imprint that its democratic discourse has made on the contemporary landscape. For the movement’s activists and intellectuals, as Butler suggests, “the ANC is more than an organisation: it is also an idea” (2012: 14). An important, yet under-theorised, strand in participatory democratic discourse, is linked to the very identity of the ruling party. The ANC has historically seen itself as engaged in a battle of ideas: an ideological struggle over the vision for the democratic state in which it seeks to mobilise and win hegemony over progressive sectors of society. Although this battle is framed as a national (even global) contestation, between external neo-liberal forces and the objectives of its own ‘national democratic revolution’ (ANC 2013, 2017), there has always been and remains a struggle for ideological dominance within the movement itself. 4 H. BROOKS

This book seeks to show how the contestation of ideas in the ANC about the role for the people is played out in participatory democracy. The focal periods of the book are the 1980s ‘people’s power’ movement and the formulation of post-1994 policy. While there is no cut-off date for the period of analysis, the book is concerned with the period of policy formulation: the roots and development of ideas and their conversion into formal commitments. By examining the ANC, frst as a liberation movement and then a dominant party, it unravels the theory and ideas within the ANC that inform its policy commitments. Importantly, the discussion highlights how the intellectual history and conceptual underpinnings of the post-apartheid framework have played a critical role in the way democracy is understood and practiced.

1.2 south Africa’s Landscape of Participatory Traditions Existing research on the 1980s experience of organisational and grassroots struggle ranges from providing a history of the movement itself to case-study-based accounts of popular power in various regions and localities. From the end of the 1970s, with the resurgence of domestic struggle, the growth of organised black labour and advent of a broad civic movement largely aligned to the ANC, a language of mass participation and control became visible in its discourse (Lodge 1999: 5). The period 1985–1986 saw the emergence of township organs of ‘people’s power’, as well as a revival of the 1955 Freedom Charter’s demand for ‘democratic organs of self-government’. The ANC’s call of 1984 to render South Africa ‘ungovernable’ (Mayibuye 1984) shifted toward a discourse of ‘people’s power’ in which the centre of control was transferred from the apartheid state’s Black Local Authorities to local popular organs informally structured outside of the state. Thorough accounts of township struggles in the 1980s are to be found in works by Jeremy Seekings (2000), Ineke Van Kessel (2000), Steven Mufson (1990), Tom Lodge and Bill Nasson (1991), and Glen Adler and Jonny Steinberg (2000). Equally, some of the most well- known case studies of popular and civic organisation in the mid-1980s cover townships in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging region (Seekings 1991, 1992a, b; Marks 2001) and, more specifcally, the West Rand (Seekings 1992a; Van Kessel 2000), Alexandra (Bozzoli 2004; Mayekiso 1996; Carter 1991), Atteridgeville/Sausville (Steinberg 2000) 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 5 and Diepkloof (Marks 2001). Research has also covered areas including Sekhukhuneland (Van Kessel 2000), Port Elizabeth (Cherry 2000a, b) and, to a much lesser extent, Cape Town (Van Kessel 2000; Scharf and Ngcokoto 1990). Seekings (2000) and Van Kessel (2000) have produced the most thorough written histories of the United Democratic Front (UDF)—an umbrella organisation launched in 1983, originally to campaign against the elections for a tricameral parliament, but which later took on a much broader signifcance in linking local community and sectoral struggles to demands for national political change (Seekings 1992b; Sisulu 1986: 101–102; Van Kessel 2000: 28). While these popular structures were widely understood by ANC activists and cadres as contributing to mass mobilisation for the liberation struggle, for some they were also understood as pre-fguring a direct and participatory democracy (Adler and Steinberg 2000). Feeding into the burgeoning civic movement were the traditions and personnel of the independent trade unions. Organised labour, which, from the 1970s, had been implementing democratic shop-foor structures and practices of workplace democracy (Friedman 1985, 1987; Fine and Webster 1989; Adler and Webster 1995, 2000; Erwin 2017), made an imprint on the organisational practices and representative structures taken up by community activists (Friedman 1985: 451–452; Glaser 1991). As a legal front organisation comprised of national and regional leadership but also a range of local affliate organisations, the UDF itself housed a variety of political traditions (Lodge and Nasson 1991: 127). For this reason, the discourse of ‘people’s power’ itself was by no means uniform. Containing traits and infuences of the ANC’s multiple traditions, the shapes it took were not always democratic. Amongst activists, intellectual infuences of nationalist and Marxist thought varied and, while the UDF had aligned itself with the ANC’s ‘national democratic’ project, Lodge and Nasson highlight the dominance of a socialist vision amongst the UDF rank and fle (ibid.: 134). In the offcial literature of the ANC of the time, and in the dominant narrative of its leadership in particular, the imprint of the civics’ and unions’ ethos of grassroots control is interestingly absent. While they each formed part of the MDM, and thus the contestation of ideas, it is not clear that their discourse was dominant in the ANC’s understanding of democracy. In the ANC’s own narrative, as this book seeks to show, trade union infuence remained wanting throughout the 1980s, as did a 6 H. BROOKS real commitment to the idea that people’s power’ was not merely a vehicle for revolution, but a valuable end in itself. Despite the array of literature on mass organisation in the 1980s, missing from existing accounts is an analysis of the ideas about democracy that this popular movement implied—not only as isolated organisations, but as part of a broader trajectory of democratic thought. The way in which both the role and future of people’s power was understood by the ANC helps us to uncover the formation of ideas about the role of popular participation. In addition to the literature on internal activism and organised labour, accounts of the ANC’s period in exile provide important insight into its thinking about the armed and political struggles.4 Howard Barrell’s research (1992, 1993) addresses the relevance of the ANC’s review of revolutionary strategy in 1978–1979 to the direction that the internal liberation struggle took from 1980 onwards. The review acknowledged the severe limitations of the ‘militarist vanguardism’ it had pursued up until this point (Barrell 1992: 85) and instead ‘identifed a political base as a prerequisite for a decisive and forcible ANC contention for state power’ (ibid.: 64). Grassroots political organisation inside South Africa consequently came to take on greater strategic importance. While this may have set a precedent for the anticipated role of civil society organisations as partners in the forging of a democratic state, the ANC’s new focus on internal mobilisation did not, in reality, beget the building of a real grassroots power base nor the inclusion of ordinary people in the construction of a democratic future (Friedman 2012). Although the waning conceptual infuence of civics and labour became most apparent in the political transition, this book seeks to show how its roots can be traced to dominant thinking in the ANC already present by the 1980s. The theoretical debates and discussions in the ANC camp leading up to the democratic transition—the years following the height of people’s power in 1986, and preceding the 1994 formation of the Government of National Unity—also constitute an important period in the history of its democratic thought. As apartheid’s longevity grew increasingly doubtful, the latter part of the 1980s begot a more detailed discussion about its vision of a democratic future. Warranting a particular focus, is the intersec- tion of formal discussions in the ANC which resulted in an offcial position as to the type of state it envisaged, and the debates and democratic discourse of people’s power in the MDM at home. The work of the ANC’s Constitution Committee, established in Lusaka in 1986 to draw up a set 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 7 of constitutional principles, has been somewhat overlooked in this regard (Brooks 2018). Yet two of the most critical shifts which would shape participatory policy took place during this period, including the adoption of some classically ‘liberal’ democratic principles, and the envisaged location of participatory democracy in the local government sphere specifcally. Since the transition, South Africa has embarked on a period of policy formulation with regard to participatory democracy. While it has taken time for the legislative meat to be put on the bones of policy frameworks, the participatory principles for which the ANC has sought institutional form continue today to be linked by policy-makers to 1980s traditions of civic activism and community participation. The later chapters of this book therefore turn to the very ideas informing post-1994 policy. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994 was seen by many on the Left as providing the policy foundation for people-driven, participatory development (Lodge 1999: 9). Through green and white paper processes, and fnally in the passing and implementation of legislation, participatory democracy has been given form and content alongside a commitment to parliamentary representation. The ANC, moreover, has linked the Freedom Charter’s principle, that ‘the people shall govern’, to the structures of local government (ANC 1995) and, more specifcally, to ward committees (ANC 2000). For South Africa’s citizens, the local government ward committee system constitutes the primary mechanism in legislation for the institutionalisa- tion of participatory democracy. Parts of the ANC have gone so far as to refer to participatory governance structures as contemporary ‘organs of people’s power’. On the surface, therefore, both political and legislative commitments are in place. Reports from commentators, academics and participating communities themselves, however, suggest that these mechanisms are not substantively working. The civic movement, previously at the centre of people’s power, has not come to play the infuential role in community representation it had envisaged. The ANC has rather sought to co-opt civics within its own project of national democracy, branding as ‘anti-transformation’ those organisations embarking on protest against government delivery. Joining an alliance with the ANC, Cosatu has also forgone its political autonomy, choosing loyalty to the movement over adherence to its ideological proclamations. With regards to the establishment of institutionalised participation, a range of research has been published detailing its systemic and structural 8 H. BROOKS failures (Buccus et al. 2008; Benit-Gbaffou 2008; Piper and Deacon 2009; Malabela and Ally 2011). Despite clear expectations upon municipalities to engage communities in decision-making, reports indicate that state-invited spaces have been of limited success in providing for local control, accountability and feedback.5 Yet while these accounts highlight issues such as defcits in representivity, the challenge of educating communities, weak accountability of participatory structures, and problems of party-political loyalty, absent from the research to date is an attempt to connect this failure to the underlying theory. As a result, despite a discourse whose trajectory has made reference to popular involvement, we still don’t fully understand how the ANC conceives of ‘participation’.

1.3 approaching the Study of Ideas This book is a combination of democratic theory and political and intellectual history. It traces and interrogates the genealogy of ANC democratic thought, exploring the way in which popular participation has been understood by the ANC in the context of both struggle and democracy. In so doing, it assesses how the ANC viewed the role and future of people’s power; examines its ideas about democracy from the late 1980s through the transition; and attempts to draw out the way in which various ideas and themes have been woven into contemporary policy. The contestation of political concepts and ideas, as Laurence Hamilton reminds us, are the crux of politics and political theory (2013: 521). As such, we cannot overlook the signifcance of intellectual histories and the genealogy of political thought. This book cannot profess to be a pure ‘history of ideas’—a endeavour that seeks to understand the development of ideas and theories through examining the historical contexts in which they were formulated—social, political and discursive (Hamilton 2014: 338).6 Yet the book is, nonetheless, premised on the position that politics and democracy cannot be understood without refection on the role of ideas—theories, concepts, and their history, contestation and context. As such, it is a contribution to attempts to reinvigorate the study of ideas. Examination of the development of intellectual trajectories can tell us as much about our present as our past (Hamilton 2014). It is acknowledged that within the ANC there is no well-developed theory of participatory democracy. The banning of the liberation movement and its primary focus on the overthrow of apartheid precluded 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 9 a detailed discussion about the form of a future state. This absence of a singular understanding of participatory democracy is, of course, a refection of the ideological breadth of the ‘Congress movement’.7 The shifting infuence of different intellectual strands and ideological camps—between Marxist-Leninists, workerists, social democrats, and lib- erals—is characteristic of the ANC historically and is no less relevant to its vision of democracy. Coinciding infuences and ideological outlooks, indeed, sometimes characterised individuals—as Butler describes of Cyril Ramaphosa’s lasting affliation to the simultaneous ideas of black consciousness, non-racialism, socialism and, later, business (2013: 219). In light of what Hamilton suggests has been an aversion to, and ideological polarisation of, theoretical positions and debates in the study of politics in South Africa (2013: 524–525), it would seem all the more important to examine such conceptual heritage. Interrogation of the movement’s understanding of democracy thus necessitates familiarity with its ideological roots and traditions. For the ANC, the Freedom Charter and the concept of National Democratic Revolution (NDR) endure as guiding frameworks. Also of relevance are the overlapping identities, ideological roots and personnel within the Congress camp: The South African Communist Party (SACP) from the 1950s, the UDF from 1983 to 1991, and Cosatu from 1985.While the focus of this book is specifcally on ‘the ANC’, it seeks to highlight the ways in which inter-organisational linkages and cross-cutting membership have shaped, promoted or constrained certain ideas. A related issue, of course, is how we defne ‘the ANC’. This is especially pertinent to its period of illegality, its alliance with the SACP, and the concurrent existence of the aligned, but offcially autonomous, UDF. While we can isolate the UDF as a legal front organisation, it was, by its own admission, operating in the absence of the banned ANC and some members of the UDF leadership were involved in the underground ANC. Organisational and communication diffculties triggered by the ANC’s banning, however, saw the development of divergent strategies and tactics between the exiled movement and internal activists. Importantly, different ideas existed across the Congress camp about the role and future of people’s power. Analysis of the 1980s in this book therefore looks at the ideas about popular participation within both the exiled leadership of the ANC and within the UDF, civics, trade unions and other groups who came to comprise the MDM. As John Dunn observes in uncovering intellectual histories, man’s infuence over the 10 H. BROOKS power of ideas is itself held unequally (Hamilton 2014: 340). As such, understanding the triumph of some ideas over others, is part of the value of studying their histories (ibid.). In mapping the history of democratic thought in the ANC, we can certainly identify the emergence of dominant currents and understandings. As a broad church, the contested ideas in the ANC have sometimes remained unresolved—from the race-class debate of the ‘national question’ (Simons and Simons 1969; Wolpe 1972, 1975, 1988; Callinicos 1999; Legassick 2017; Davies and O’Meara 1984), to the role of rights in a national democratic state (Sachs 1988; Friedman 1993) and achievement of political democracy at the expense of economic transformation (Marais 2001, 2011; McKinley 2001, 2006). Thus, while the book examines the coexistence of a variety of infuences on the shaping of democracy, it also identifes those conceptions which have, in effect, ‘won out’. It also seeks to show that the dominant notions of democracy in the contemporary ANC are not necessarily manifestations of the democratic era, nor are they a refection of a post-1994 shift in the ‘character’ of the former liberation movement. Instead, they are a consequence of longstanding conceptual currents in the ANC historically. The dominance of a vanguard conception of democracy and a teleological view of participation in the ANC—explored in Chapter 3—can be traced to a strand in its democratic discourse during the years of struggle. While this was by no means the only conception of popular power in the ANC ‘family’, examination of the historic discourse of the ANC itself suggests a very limited presence of the democratic vision of its partners in the labour and civic movements. Where ideas of popular power have emerged in the ANC, they have joined the battle for infuence. Yet, ultimately, they have served neither the purpose of empowering workers nor providing communities with agency. Limitations in the character of democracy can be traced to the history of underlying ideas. Taking this analysis into the post-1994 era, existing accounts of functional and democratic weaknesses in the system of participatory governance are valuable in their analysis of specifc structures, mechanisms and localities. As such, this book does not seek to retrace existing terrain and is instead concerned with exploration of the ideas informing such policy. In light of this focus, it does not purport to provide a study of non-institutional participatory spaces instigated by civil society. A wealth of literature is already available on the rise of social movement and civil 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 11 society activism.8 What the book does do, however, is take note of the emergence of such invented forms of participation, considering the way in which they are understood by the ANC as a participatory democratic space. Finally, it should be noted that the analysis takes place in the context of formal commitments by the ANC to complementary systems of representative and participatory democracy. It has formally set out its adherence to principles of liberal constitutionalism: the separation of powers, provision and protection of individual rights, political pluralism and open contestation. Political opposition may be discredited—even deemed undesirable—but it nonetheless operates openly on a contested terrain. Therefore, while the book is concerned with participatory democracy, it incorporates analysis of the ANC’s understanding of democracy generally. It is also intended as a contribution to normative democratic debate, discussing participatory democracy by drawing on a range of ideas about its role. This approach is not to submerge the empirical in theory, but is rather used to inform the questions asked of the ANC’s conception of participation. Importantly, it seeks to reveal how the understanding of participatory democracy maintained by the dominant political forces in the ANC infuences the extent to which resulting practices can truly be considered ‘democratic’.

1.4 the Role of Theory in Shaping Democracy To some extent, an exploration of participatory democracy in South Africa must be located in a broader understanding of its theoretical and intellectual origins, as well as an awareness of the debates in democratic theory regarding its normative value. For Left democratic theorists, the participation of citizens is seen as a valuable supplement (and, for some, a superior alternative) to representative democratic institutions. The surfacing of participatory democracy as an alternative to contemporary representative democracy can be located in the rise of radical democratic discourse in the 1960s. By the early 1980s, citizen participation had formed part of a global discourse and practice on the New Left, emanating both from a revived interest in democratic alternatives to orthodox Marxism as well as a desire to address the limitations and political inequality of classic liberalism (Held 1996: 264–265). Despite apartheid South Africa’s global isolation in the 1970s and ’80s, the spread of New Left debate about participation was visible there 12 H. BROOKS at around the same time. Marxist intellectuals and left wing activists engaged in the growth of the independent trade unions and, in support of material struggles in South Africa’s black townships, brought with them discussions about the role of ordinary people in bringing about development and change. During the early 1990s, a not unrelated wave of thinking re-emerged amongst development specialists globally, whose ideas infuenced international organisations, governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) via a broader theory of ‘participatory development’. Debates on the role and impact of participation have since come to incorporate a range of concerns, including goals of popular empowerment; the benefts of decentralised democracy; the realisation of procedural and substantive democracy; and the protection of rights and freedoms. Although radical approaches gained visibility from the late twentieth century, the intellectual lineage of participatory democracy can be traced to Jean Jacques Rousseau’s denunciation of representative democracy as a narrow and limiting form of popular control (1762). While Rousseau’s was a form of direct democracy that drew its inspiration from the city states of Ancient Greece, the value he placed upon participation’s ‘educative’ and ‘self-sustaining’ qualities (Pateman 1970: 24–25) infuenced radical democratic thought. It also restored debate amongst subsequent theorists about the value of ‘classic’ democracy involving the direct participation of citizens (Pateman 1970; Barber 1984; Keane 1988; Walker 1966; Bobbio 1987; Dahl 1985). Although the formation of the modern nation state rendered Rousseauian ideals of republican and direct democracy increasingly untenable, its ideas have caused modern democracy to undergo normative reconsideration. Indeed, in the global South, the push for broader societal participation and a redefning of democracy has been an important characteristic of movements from below (de Sousa Santos 2005). Drawing on the ideas of theorists such as Carole Pateman (1970), Benjamen Barber (1984), John Keane (1988), David Beetham 1993, 2005 and more recently Andrea Cornwall (2008), Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (2004), participatory democracy has largely come to be understood as the participation of individual citizens in decision-making processes about issues that affect their lives. According to Beetham, if ‘the core meaning of democracy is the popular control of collective decision-making by equal citizens [then] the point of participation … is to have some say in, and infuence upon, collective decisions’ (1993: 61). 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 13

Participatory democracy’s success must therefore be judged by the extent to which popular infuence is indeed realised. On this note, a distinction can be made between participation and mobilisation: ‘Participation’, as argued by Giovanni Sartori, ‘is self-motion and thus the exact reverse of being put into motion (by another will) … [It is] the opposite of mobilisation’ (1987: 113). There is thus an important distinction between bottom-up processes of participation and the mobilisation of popular groups from above. Equally, mobilisation from below might generate the articulation of important popular claims and agency able to push for democratic change (Coelho and von Lieres 2010), while processes conceived as ‘participation’ may merely be articulations from above. Space must therefore be made for the recognition of differing views as to the normative means and ends of ‘participatory’ processes. If participation is understood as the involvement of citizens in decision-making processes beyond those of electing representatives, it’s correct counterpart is logically the exclusion of citizens from this activity. In the latter, participation is the preserve of political ‘elites’: Citizen participation would involve merely ‘participation in the choice of decision makers’ (Pateman 1970: 14). Elitist democracy is associated with the view that those interested in preserving the stability and effciency of democracy should fear the participation of the populace—a presumption which emanates from a belief in the autocratic and irresponsible tendencies of the average citizen (Pateman 1970; Walker 1966: 287, 289). For proponents of participatory democracy, elitist approaches go against the view of the masses as ‘citizens’: Responsible and reasoned subjects and ‘participants in public life’ (Held 1993: 323, 324). Indeed, the elitist presumption most troublesome for participatory democrats is the idea that ‘mass political quiescence is essential to the stability and health of democracy’ (Bachrach and Botwinick 1992: 32). This narrow conception of citizenship is buttressed by the notion of political activity as a restricted arena. Pertinent to South Africa’s case is the contention that elitist democrats tend to view social movements as playing an ‘antagonistic’ (Walker 1966: 294) or ‘disruptive’ role (Young 2000: 46–51; Cornwall 2008: 282). Infrequently are they seen as enriching the content of debate in the public sphere—or as initiators of ‘reviews and innovations in policy’ (Walker 1966: 294). Yet recent research shows that the substantive outcomes of participation are not only benefts to participants themselves, but to the democratic state and broader construction of citizenship, including increased state responsiveness and 14 H. BROOKS accountability; and greater societal cohesion and inclusion (Gaventa and Barrett 2012). At the same time, participation is often confated with direct democracy—a corollary to the tendency to view participation as in confict with representation. Participatory democracy, in and of itself, is not direct. It does not necessarily imply the direct decision-making of citizens in political matters, and thereby the removal of all representatives in the exe- cution of those decisions. Participatory democracy may involve both of those features, thus constituting a form of direct and participatory democracy. Indeed, the structures of people’s power which emerged in South Africa carried some direct features. On its own, however, participatory democracy constitutes the participation of citizens in the decision-making process, whether or not this also involves the use of representatives. The committees of people’s power and the shop foor committees of the independent trade unions in South Africa also involved the election of representatives, often through a tiered pyramid system of councils or committees. Most forms of participatory democracy in general involve representation, either within participatory structures themselves or through the external complement of representative institutions (such as an elected council or national parliament). Simultaneously, representative systems often involve participatory decision-making (such as neighbourhood forums or assemblies) alongside elected bodies. In contemporary South Africa this is the case: The system of municipal participatory governance is a complement to the system of representative democracy, ‘through which citizens are actively involved in the decision-making processes of government’ (Parliament of South Africa 2001). Every decision is not subject to referenda but nor is decision-making completely relinquished to representatives. Rather, it seeks to deepen and extend the relationship of citizens with their elected institutions (ibid.). The expectations of participation and the measure of its success must therefore be judged by the extent to which it fulfls certain criteria or objectives. Not only should participatory democracy involve citizen input in decision-making processes, but it should take place in such a way that this input infuences the decisions reached (Beetham 1993: 61). Either way, participation must involve some form of discussion and exchange of ideas, not merely the casting of a vote. Some advocates of participatory democracy see the representative model as inadequate; that the very act of representation makes it a 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 15 contradiction in terms. Others do not seek the complete replacement of representation. Pateman and Barber, for example, argue not for the abolition of national representative institutions but for their democratisation through participation (Pateman 1970: 42, 105–106; Barber 1984: 264, 308). Representative and participatory democracy can in this sense be mutually reinforcing (Pateman 1970: 20, 109–110), the presence of ‘competing leaders at national level’ being complemented by the simultaneous existence of a participatory society (ibid.: 42–43). Debates about the pairing of radical democracy with some of the values of political liberalism are picked up again below. It is worth stating here, however, that this book proceeds from that basis that participatory democracy can and should supplement representative democracy as a way of increasing political equality, democratic control and accountability, providing a much-needed voice in decision-making to more marginalized citizens. Shireen Hassim (2003) highlights how the increased presence of women in representative politics in South Africa, for example, has not substantively increased their infuence on policy, pointing to the need to deepen the democratic system beyond its representative form. In states such as South Africa, which continues to suffer from vast inequality, high levels of unemployment and popular marginalisation, the incorporation of all its citizens into the active space of policy development is perhaps all the more important.

1.5 currents of Participation and Their Intellectual Origins An important theme in the coming chapters is the impact of ideas in shaping policies and practice. This emerges from the premise that ideas matter and that challenges and weaknesses in participatory processes can be explained by the theories that inform them. For this reason, while not detracting from our focus on the South African case, we need an appreciation of the genealogy of participation in democratic theory, as well as some allowance for the existence of competing conceptions. Normative debate in democratic theory has itself been a battle of ideas over the reach of democratic control: The value to citizen and state of greater levels of popular participation versus concerns of effciency and stability. It has brought to the fore the fundamental tension in democracy between equality and liberty: Balancing the need for wider and 16 H. BROOKS deeper forms of democracy with the protection of individual freedoms that liberalism defends. Amongst radical democratic themselves, as the preceding section suggests, there also exists variation as to how far popular rule should extend, as well as the forms it should take. Importantly, participatory democracy itself emerges from a variety of traditions on the political left, not all of which have reached the same conception of ‘participation’. Understanding this landscape of debates enables us to situate and critique the ANC’s own ideas.

Marxism, Marxism-Leninism and Mass Participation One of the dominant ideological currents in the ANC historically, particularly from the 1960s, is the infuence of Marxism-Leninism. As a doctrine, Marxism-Leninism was characteristic of a broader geopolitical era and, for South Africa, its infuence arose through the strengthening of the ANC’s relationship with the SACP. Marxism-Leninism became an intellectual current which, in addition to African nationalism, shaped the ANC’s strategy and vision. An early inspiration for ideas of popular participation can be traced to Karl Marx’s own writings on the 1871 Paris Commune which overthrew and temporarily replaced the government in Paris with a radical, working-class government of the people. For Marx, the Commune was not necessarily the fnal ends of a new participatory system, but a stage in a longer struggle (Levin 1989: 120; see also Lenin 1932: 32). It was, what Michael Levin describes as, ‘an instrument of decentralised popular participatory expression’ (1989: 117). For Vladimir Lenin, too, the Commune held the potential for the popular seizure of power and erection of a working body with both legislative and executive functions (1932: 40–41). The focus of Lenin’s ideas about the masses related to the need for a vanguard party of revolutionaries. His key contributions to democratic thought included both the rejection of parliamentary institutions and the belief that class political consciousness needed to be brought to the workers from without (Liebman 1975: 30–31). Although, in Russia, Lenin came to understand the Soviets (workers’ councils) as ‘embryos’ of a revolutionary government (ibid.: 88–90), the Marxist notion of local, decentralised ‘communes’ or councils stood in tension with the simultaneous defence of a centrally planned economy (Schecter 1994: 9–10). Under Lenin, this contradiction ‘was solved at the expense of the organs of grassroots democracy’ as the Soviets were eventually shed of their autonomy and 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 17 subsumed in the Communist Party (ibid.). The establishment of Party- connected mass organisations akin to those which characterised many Marxist-inspired regimes, provides evidence of popular participation as a cloak for centralised control (Femia 1993: 75–78, 133; Glaser 2007). The experience of state socialism has justifably led participatory democracy’s critics to highlight its propensity for authoritarianism. In the African Marxist regimes of the mid-1970s—found in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia—participatory organs were often established to make up for ‘the absence of representative-democratic institutions’ (Glaser 2007: 133). Participatory bodies were generally used for co-op- tation of civic groupings or to quell unwanted dissent. Glaser describes these regimes as conceiving of participation as the ‘mobilisation of the population to realise collective ends defned by the ruling party’ (ibid.: 113–114). Although this brand of Marxist regime is distinct from the earlier generation of African socialism found during the 1950s and ’60s in Tanzania, Senegal and Guinea, the latter were also averse to ‘bourgeois’ representative democracy. In creating their own forms of participatory or direct democracy, their character soon equated to a censuring of individual rights and freedoms in the name of a greater collective good. Linked to Marxism-Leninism’s superfcial application of citizen participation is what Joseph Femia refers to as its ‘schizophrenic attitude towards the popular will’ (1993: 93). On the one hand, communist discourse emphasised popular power and control. Yet, at the same time, it implied ‘an agreed socialist culture to which the people needed to be enlightened’. The Party either ‘interpreted’ the authentic popular will or acted as ‘an enlightened vanguard’ (ibid.). Yet what appeared as an elaborate facade was, within communist ideology, merely an alternative conception of participation. The vanguard party’s historic role was to interpret the popular will; a will that was predestined, scientifc and in the popular interest, whether or not the people themselves were yet conscious of it. ‘The typical communist regime’, as Femia argues, ‘was not merely an authoritarian government, a small elite group … Instead it was a dynamic totalitarian system, which set as its idea the active involvement of all citizens’ (ibid.: 133). The ideas underpinning this conception of participation necessarily informed its practice. The infuence on the ANC of Marxist-Leninist thought, introduced through its alliance with the SACP and the cross-fertilisation of their personnel, is taken up in the subsequent chapters. The people’s committees erected in South Africa’s townships in the 1980s provide an example of 18 H. BROOKS the celebration and replication of soviet-style councils. They also, however, bore similarity to alternative structures of popular control. The latter were often inspired by Marxism but, importantly, broke away from the orthodox approaches of Lenin and the SACP, for whom the vanguard party/movement was the engine of revolutionary power. In South Africa, alternative approaches represented other Left and social democratic debates about the popular role and nature of democracy taking place within the ANC family.

Alternative Socialist Projects and Workplace Democracy Participatory models which emerged as socialist alternatives to orthodox Marxism are of particular interest as experiments in popular control. Despite Marxism’s very foundation in the struggle against working class oppression, Femia notes that Marx actually said very little about mechanisms for worker participation and self-management (1993: 79). Through the erection of community or workplace councils, several popular movements internationally took up this issue. Revolutionary—or anarcho-syndicalism, council communism and guild socialism came to represent Left alternatives to the centralized authoritarianism of state socialism and the elitist power structures of liberal democracy (Schecter 1994). These traditions each built forms of participatory workplace democracy, while the guild socialists sought to extend this beyond the industrial sphere. Both councils and workers guilds incorporated a belief that participation carried an educative function through ‘learning’ self-government (Schecter 1994: 75; Pateman 1970: 38). Anarcho- syndicalism, for its part, took on a broad role in educational services, labour support and information dissemination to members. In slight contrast, collective anarchism rejected state authority but was not based exclusively in the industrial sphere (Heywood 1992: 205). Given its rejection of permanent authority structures and the unoffcial nature of localised organisation, we might challenge collectivist anarchism’s defnition as a form of democracy. Yet its import on direct and participatory democratic ideas lies in its belief in local, communal rule and what Heywood terms ‘the human capacity for social solidarity’ (ibid.). Although the Soviets became victims on the altar of state socialism, council democracy as a model has been criticised for its own democratic defcits. While creating their own internal representative structures, both council communism and revolutionary syndicalism branded universal 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 19 suffrage as benefcial only to the ruling bureaucracy (Schecter 1994: 28). They also failed to allow for political pluralism and contestation (Glaser 1994). Carmen Sirianni’s analysis of the experience of ‘dual power’ where councils or committees exist in parallel to a national parliament also notes the risk to democracy of the proliferation of council structures which lack institutional arrangements for mediation and democratic discussion (1983: 107). Given the comparisons drawn by the ANC in the 1980s between the concept of ‘dual power’ and the establishment of ‘people’s power’, then the council model is of signifcance to the South African case. Within the ANC itself, the Leninist variant of Marxism seems to have been prevalent during its years in exile: accounts and documents of this period, interrogated in the coming chapters, support the argument that it was ideologically dominant. The analysis, however, seeks to establish the extent to which ideas were also infuenced by experiments established as alternatives. Ideas associated with forms of ‘workerism’ (or ‘ultra-leftism’), in ANC discourse, were shunned in favour of a broader alliance politics. In the independent trade unions, however, features and practices of these workplace experiments can indeed be identifed. People’s power, not dissimilarly, although seen by some workerists as part of an opposing ‘populist’ tradition, brought with it elements of community education, self-empowerment and service provision refective of these workplace experiments.

Democratic Debate Since the 1960s With the establishment of authoritarian communist regimes following the two world wars and the subsequent resurgence of liberal democratic doctrine, the late 1960s–1990s brought about a revival of normative democratic debate on the issue of citizen participation. One of the earliest proponents of this movement was the American, Arnold Kaufman. His work in The Radical Liberal signifed rising dissatisfaction on the American democratic Left with the paradoxical rhetoric and reality of democracy.9 Kaufman’s fundamental argument was that the very need to ‘deepen and enrich the quality of the democratic process, to make it both more deliberative and more participatory, fows directly from the central doctrines of liberalism’ (1968: 7). By denying liberalism the possibility of cultivating human potential, and thus producing good citizens, he argued that liberalism itself had become ‘self-defeating’ (ibid.: 45). 20 H. BROOKS

Kaufman’s solution to the ailments of American democracy was essentially the radicalisation of liberalism: ‘an attempt to build a society which is free because its citizens are thoughtful and informed’ (Mattson 2000). Representative institutions and individual rights would remain but participatory democracy would be ‘a necessary component’ (ibid.). Kaufman was thus one of a number of radical democrats who emphasised their desire to reinforce, not remove, liberal democracy’s underpinning values. That participation produces better citizens is a case argued by subsequent theorists. Barber advocates the reversal of apathy and popular powerlessness induced by citizens’ distance from decision-making by encouraging something between liberal and unitary democracy: He refers to this as ‘strong democracy’ which focuses on civic engagement and deliberation but aspires to ‘a form of community that is not collectivist’ (1984: 150–151). Barber proposes participatory spaces such as neighbourhood assemblies to create the ‘conditions’ for participation and the capacity and ‘civil competence’ for the local exercise of power (ibid.: 268–269). Through participation, it is possible to rid democracy of the threat envisaged by elitist democrats of the ‘irresponsible dema- gogue’ (Walker 1966). The defence of a more participatory form of democracy that would still secure individual rights and popular choice is reminiscent of the critique of Leninist strategy by Karl Kautsky and, later, Nicos Poulantzas and Geoff Hodgson (Sirianni 1983: 85). Parliamentary institutions and universal suffrage, they argued, should not be displaced but supplemented and ‘enriched’ by ‘grassroots democratic organisation’ (Hodgson 1977 in Sirianni 1983: 85–86). Norberto Bobbio’s liberal socialist approach also addresses the need to extend principles of representative democratic control to other areas of society (1987: 54–56) while still protecting pluralism (ibid.: 62) and the rights of citizens (ibid.: 25–26). Contemporary literature has tackled the question of participation’s normative value more directly, not only as a method of reaching collective decisions, but in terms of its positive outcomes. John Gaventa and Gregory Barrett (2012) show the various positive democratic and development outcomes realised through citizen participation, including the construction of citizenship, strengthened practices of participation, more responsive and accountable states, and the development of more inclusive and cohesive societies. Their fndings in defence of citizen engagement provide food for thought as to whether South Africa’s policies and processes foster similar outcomes. 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 21

At the same time, the criteria for participation’s democratic possibilities remain at the fore, necessitating an examination of the ideas underpinning its practice. Jane Mansbridge, for example, warns of the potential for democratic defcit in a context where consensus amongst participants is not guaranteed. Assessing forms of participation that sprung up in 1960s America, she argues that what many participatory democrats sought was not ‘equality or liberty’ but rather ‘solidarity’ and ‘community’ (1983: viii). The suppression of difference amongst communities by the nationalist movement in South Africa sometimes engendered such a false unity (Lodge 1983: 107–108, 160). In some cases, other struggles demanded deference to the greater cause (Hassim 2004), or took the form of outright political intolerance (Cherry 2000b) and coercion in popular campaigns (Mufson 1990: 119, 129–130; Van Kessel 2000: 188–191; Bozzoli 2004: 134–135). Mansbridge’s is not an elitist democrat’s account, but rather a word of warning that what participatory democrats seek in some cases is essentially democracy in a ‘unitary’ form (1983: xi). While this may be appropriate and benefcial in cases where there is common agreement amongst participants, in contexts in which this is not the case, unitary democracy may fail to recognise diverse interests, hiding or suppressing differences between groups in the name of a false unity (ibid.: 4, 34–45). In South Africa, we must ask whether the forms of popular participation that have inspired participatory democrats make provision for the existence of difference. Do they allow for the natural occurrence of confict and the unpredictability of outcomes which constitute democracy’s rationale? At the same time, ‘adversary’ democracy—a mechanism that assumes confict between individuals—runs the risk of failing to build social unity or citizen solidarity. Not only can such a sense of community help to foster a ‘participatory society’ and publicly minded ‘good citizen[s]’, it is also, Mansbridge argues, a human need (ibid.: 4). In a move to specify a method or process for more democratic decision- making, some theorists have advocated ‘deliberative democracy’. While not synonymous with participatory democracy, deliberation is a method by which it can be practiced. In contrast to a simple aggregation of votes, deliberation involves a process of discussion, argument and exchange of views. There is emphasis on accountability and justifcation of decisions taken (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 7). Not unlike participatory democracy, deliberative democracy’s critics have equated its emphasis on consensus with attempts to eradicate pluralism (Mouffe 2000). Others 22 H. BROOKS argue, however, that it need not necessarily seek to erase difference: In what Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson refer to as ‘deliberative pluralism’, value is placed on achieving ‘as much agreement as possible’ but also seeking ‘ways of living well with those disagreements that cannot or should not be eliminated’ (2004: 28).

Participation and Municipal Governance Crucially, participation has not been the preserve of theorists alone but has extended to an international shift in the role of local government. States have come to extend their focus beyond local government’s role as a service-provider towards its concern with ‘community leadership’ and local democratic input beyond elections (Stoker 2002: 31). In the 1960s and 1970s, various attempts at practising participation in local government took place in Britain and America, and were picked up again in the 1980s–1990s. This latter period also saw a number of participatory governance initiatives in municipalities of lower and middle income countries, including Brazil, South Africa and India. In analysing experiments in participatory governance in the global South, some authors have drawn on ideas of deliberation (Abers 1998; Baiocchi 2003; Fung and Wright 2001). Examining the experience of two such models—Porto Alegre in Brazil and Kerala in India—Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright refer to the strategy of ‘empowered deliberative democracy’ which aspires to ‘deepen the ways in which ordinary people can effectively participate in and infuence policies that directly affect their lives’ (2001: 7). In Porto Alegre, local government reforms restructured democratic decision-making by introducing a participatory budgeting system involving local residents and associations through elected neighbourhood assemblies (ibid.: 7–8). The municipality itself invested in the up-skilling of citizens to be involved in such processes (Abers 1998; Wainwright 2003). In Kerala, a similar system of self-governing assemblies has facilitated a downward shift in the ‘locus’ of decision-making and an increase in the range of grassroots groups participating in policy formulation (Heller 2001: 142). While both of these examples appear to have enhanced citizen incen- tive to engage in issues of local government (Heller 2001; Abers 1998; Fung and Wright 2001), participation does not always necessarily produce such outcomes. Participatory experiments may fail to address social inequalities and unequal power relations, for example, nor do they always 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 23 account for local political contexts (Baiocchi 2003; Cornwall 2008; see also Theron and Ceasar 2008). The strength of local democratic institutions is also critical: Where such institutions are weak, ‘it is possible for decentralisation to result in decentralized authoritarianism or elite control’ (Beard et al. 2008: 6). In the case of South Africa, research on local government has shown the ward committee to be an institution lacking any real power (Benit-Gbaffou 2007), often subject to a top-down culture of government (Heller 2001), party political loyalty and a lack of accountability to communities themselves (Benit-Gbaffou 2007; Piper and Deacon 2009). A useful analytical tool in this respect is Sherry Arnstein’s ladder of participation (1969). Alerting us to the existence of different degrees (or conceptions) of participation, her categorisations range on a spectrum from ‘manipulation’ to ‘citizen control’. It shows the ways in which ‘consultation’, ‘informing’ and ‘placation’ can be construed as forms of participation, yet differ signifcantly in their empowering potential to methods such as ‘partnership’, ‘delegated power’ and ‘citizen control’ (ibid.). Not dissimilarly, the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) has produced a Spectrum of Public Participation which depicts an increasing scale of public impact, including: inform, consult, involve, collaborate, and empower (IAP2 2007, 2014). The public participation strategies used by the South African government in the application of its municipal Integrated Development Planning (IDP), managed through the ward committee system, are based on IAP2’s core values (Theron and Ceasar 2008: 112–113).

Participatory Development Development theorists have also sought to pursue and evaluate a number of experiments in participatory development and planning. Further to the development experiments in participation during the 1960s, ideas about the positive potential of ‘participation’ were renewed in the 1980s–1990s amongst international development organisations, NGOs, and donors. Development discourse in South Africa, too, has absorbed these international trends. The World Bank defnes participation as ‘the process through which stakeholders infuence and share control over priority setting, policy-making, resource allocations and access to public goods and services’ (World Bank, n.d.). 24 H. BROOKS

However, while participatory development is premised upon the need to empower participants as well as achieve sustainable and effective outcomes, not unlike participatory governance initiatives, Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari have critiqued its failure to fundamentally challenge deeper issues of power and power relations (2001: 6, 14). Citizen engagement may thus not always lead to positive outcomes (Gaventa and Barrett 2012). Others have highlighted how the notion of ‘participation’, having been co-opted as a ‘buzzword’ by mainstream international development organisations, has lost its ‘radical transformative edge’ (Cleaver 2001: 37). These concerns warrant a range of questions regarding whose voice is heard in deliberative processes: is participation dominated by those who are more educated, more confdent, or whose work and family circumstances give them greater fexibility to participate? ‘Who is excluded and who excludes themselves?’ (Cornwall 2008: 275). Are those who act as ‘community representatives’ indeed representative of those they claim to speak for? Do participants shape the agenda, as ‘social actors’ and not ‘passive subjects’? (Theron and Ceasar 2008: 105). And have priorities already been agreed in advance by local leaders, external experts or government offcials? These concerns have accordingly led to concerns about the ‘tyranny of participation’ (Cooke and Kothari 2001) and the extent to which it makes provision for the type of politics where participants cannot be characterised by a collective interest.

1.6 anc’s Theory of Participatory Democracy The theoretical landscape of democracy and development illuminates the ideas that have come to bear on practices of participation, making possible an appreciation of potential infuences on South Africa. Given the ANC’s lack of ideological homogeneity and assorted historical traditions, it is perhaps more appropriate to talk about ‘theory’ or ‘ideas’, as opposed to ideology per se. The movement has most certainly been shaped by ideological traditions, but not exclusively so. Practices have also been infuenced by other organisations, intellectuals, revolutionary experiences and bodies of theory that are not refective of a singular worldview. The notion of ideas therefore allows for the infuence of these multiple currents. The fragmented nature of the evidence about the ANC’s understanding of democracy necessitates somewhat of a reconstruction exercise. Central to this approach, is analysis of the movement’s discourse during 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 25 particular periods. What is attempted in the subsequent chapters is a decoding of its writings, interrogating the meaning and ideas implied in texts, commentary and statements. Interviews with former activists, policy makers, ANC members and leadership are also drawn upon. A blend of chronological examination and thematic analysis is utilised to enable the identifcation of conceptual continuities, shifts and distinctions, without reproducing a simple policy history. Formed in 1912, the ANC’s conceptual heritage of course extends far beyond the 1980s. As such, while the latter is a period in which popular power took on organised forms in the ANC camp, the frst of the following chapters examines its prior location in the movement’s history. Focused on ideas about participation and the role for the people, Chapter 2 traces the evolution of ANC democratic thought, concentrating on its shift away from political liberalism from the mid-1940s, towards mass movement politics. Importantly, it introduces the notion of vanguardism as an important conceptual current which would come to infuence both the shaping of democracy and the role for the people. The analysis of ‘people’s power’, contained in Chapter 3, forms a study of the ANC as an opposition movement in the 1980s. Although it was the years from 1990 that incorporated the codifcation of principles that would shape the democratic system, popular aspirations and expectations of a post-apartheid democracy were formed prior to this—in the course of popular struggle and in the praxis of the domestic resistance movement. With the banning of the ANC and its political exile after 1960, the broad vision of a democratic future held by its support base was shaped considerably by emergent structures at home. The chapter also interrogates how people’s power was conceptualised by the external movement and examines the debates taking place in the ANC about the desired form of a future state. These fndings fow into Chapter 4, examining the constitutional discussions and publications of the ANC between 1986 and 1991 in which there was a merging of radical and liberal traditions. In particular, it examines the work of the ANC’s Constitution Committee, established in exile in 1986 to formulate constitutional principles for a future South Africa. It looks at the conceptual shifts which took place during this period—and their signifcance for the legislation that followed—and at the work of local negotiating forums inside South Africa who sought to shape the structure of a future democratic local government. 26 H. BROOKS

The transitional period from 1990 to 1994, covered in Chapters 4 and 5, is examined as a period in which a clearer articulation of the future democracy took shape. Through analysis of discussion and policy documents, speeches and other publications, these chapters identify whether the democratic and ideological traditions of the 1980s have infuenced post-1994 policy, as well as the extent to which new ideas have emerged. Against this backdrop, Chapter 5 separates out the ideas of participation informing public policy from those informing the ANC’s own discourse. It seeks to show the way in which the ANC’s identity as a mass movement remains intertwined with its very conception of democracy. The framing approach of the book is that the power of ideas lies in their capacity to affect practice. It posits that defciencies in the realisation of South Africa’s participatory democracy lie not in a lack of translation from paper into practice but in the way that the ANC understands participatory democracy. In arguing this, the book challenges two prevalent views. Firstly, it contests those voices who view the current system of parliamentary, representative democracy as both unrelated and inferior to the democracy pre-fgured by people’s power (Neocosmos 1998; Legassick 2007; Sinwell 2011). For this contingent, people’s power constituted a deeper, more ‘real’ form of democracy. This author argues, however, that the discourse and practice of popular power during times of struggle can tell us something about the ideas and objectives of popular power that later take shape under democracy. The suggestion that people’s power held, in entirety, the promise of a transformative and democratic form of popular participation (Sinwell 2011) ignores the presence of other important infuences and traditions that also constituted the phenomenon, some of which continue to inform the theory and practice of participatory democracy today. Secondly, it challenges the notion that the ANC has shifted from being a deeply democratic and popularly-driven movement to one displaying new authoritarian tendencies. Instead, I argue that top-down processes of development, centralised policy direction and an instrumental understanding of participation can be traced to the ANC’s ideological roots and traditions. Rather than constituting a post-1994 shift associated with the advent of liberal democracy, these traits were visible prior to the 1990s. While the book interrogates a particular form of democracy, it also traces a genealogy of democratic thought. Its structure is therefore a 1 INTRODUCTION: A BATTLE OF IDEAS 27 refection of the ANC as a movement in transition, from the status of illegal opposition to a ruling party in government. A reconstruction of its theory of participatory democracy thus requires analysis of past and present. Moreover, while emphasising the need to acknowledge competing conceptions, the analysis also proceeds from a normative view of participatory democracy based on existing theoretical literature. This normative position informs the questions asked, considering both the ideas underlying the role of ‘the people’ in ANC discourse, and the intellectual heritage of its model of participatory democracy.

Notes 1. The Congress of the People (COPE) was formed in 2008 by a group of ANC members and leaders loyal to the former President, Thabo Mbeki following his ousting by Jacob Zuma in December 2007. In 2013, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) was formed by former ANC Youth League President and frebrand, Julius Malema. In the national elections of 2014, the EFF became the third largest party in parliament. 2. For an analysis of the ways in which mobilization from below can lead to forms of democratic deepening and strengthened citizenship, see Coelho and von Lieres (2010). 3. Institutional forms refer to formal, state-invited forums for citizen engagement with government (i.e. mechanisms for participatory governance). Non-institutional (or ‘invented’) forms refer to the ‘bottom-up’ spaces for participation, created by civil society. 4. See, for example, Ellis and Sechaba (1992), Ellis (2012), and Shubin (1999). 5. Buccus et al. (2008) and Benit-Gbaffou (2008) provide accounts of the limitations of participatory governance at the local level. See also Friedman and McKaiser (2010) on the diffculties faced by community organisations formally engaging with government; and Piper and Deacon (2009) on problems befalling the ward committee system in Msunduzi municipality in KwaZulu Natal province. 6. on the role and import of intellectual history (‘the history of ideas’), see the work of John Dunn (1968) and Quentin Skinner (2002). 7. The term ‘Congress movement’ refers to all of those organisations aligned to the ANC. 8. On social movements, see, for example, Ballard et al. (2006), Sinwell (2009), Dwyer (2004), and Robins (2008). 9. Related ideas are also found amongst America’s Students for a Democratic Society, 1962. 28 H. BROOKS

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Sinwell, L. (2010). Conceptualising direct action as a form of participation in development: A South African case. Politikon, 37(1), 67–83. Sinwell, L. (2011). Rethinking South Africa’s transition: From transformative to mainstream approaches to participatory development. African Studies, 70(3), 359–375. Sirianni, C. (1983). Councils and parliaments: The problems of dual power and democracy in comparative perspective. Politics and Society, 12(3), 83–123. Sisulu, Z. (1986, March 29). People’s education for people’s power. Keynote address: National Education Crisis Committee (NECC).Transformation, 1, 96–117. Skinner, Q. (2002). Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas. In Q. Skinner (Ed.), Visions of politics: Regarding method (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Steinberg, J. (2000). A place for civics in a liberal democratic polity? In G. Adler & J. Steinberg (Eds.), From comrades to citizens: The South African civics movement and the transition to democracy. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Stoker, G. (2002). International trends in local government transformation. In S. Parnell, E. Pieterse, M. Swilling, & D. Wooldridge (Eds.), Democratising local government: The South African experiment. Cape Town: UCT Press. Theron, F., & Ceasar, N. (2008). Participation—A grassroots strategy for development management. In F. Theron (Ed.), The development change agent: A micro-level approach to development. Pretoria: Van Schaik. Van Kessel, I. (2000). Beyond our wildest dreams: The United Democratic Front and the transformation of South Africa. Charlottesville: University of Virgina Press. Wainwright, H. (2003). Reclaim the state: Experiments in popular democracy. New York and London: Verso. Walker, J. (1966). A critique of the elitist theory of democracy. The American Political Science Review, 60(2), 285–295. Wolpe, H. (1972). Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: From segregation to apartheid. Economy and Society, 1(4), 425–456. Wolpe, H. (1975). The theory of internal colonialism: The South African case. In I. Oxaal, T. Barnett, & D. Booth (Eds.), Beyond the sociology of development (pp. 229–250). London: Routledge. Wolpe, H. (1988). Race, class and the apartheid state. London: James Currey. Young, I. M. (2000). Inclusion and democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. CHAPTER 2

Participation in the History of ANC Democratic Thought

The traditions and practices of popular participation which became visible after the 1970s did not appear in an historical vacuum but from a period of organisational history in the African National Congress (ANC) in which it transformed into a mass organisation. The years from 1940, in particular, were formative in this regard, both organisationally and ideologically. From the mid-1940s, the ANC moved away from its previous approach of seeking concessions via constitutional means toward the use of mass participation through passive resistance. Woven into this organisational shift was a self-perception of having built the credentials and experience to occupy the position of the people’s representative. While later decades, and the 1980s in particular, were signifcant for the advent of popular organisation under a liberation banner, the historic and intellectual context for mass movement politics can be traced to preceding decades. As such they warrant discussion in tracing the history and role of ideas. The ANC’s account of the bulk of its history is characterised by the direct involvement of the oppressed in their own liberation, a narrative which remains infuential in the ANC today. This chapter therefore provides a prelude to those that follow. Examining the ANC’s intellectual and ideological roots, it traces the existence of popular participatory discourse in the movement prior to 1980. The chapter is divided into conceptual stages in the movement’s history. It argues that up until 1960 the ANC retained an understanding of democracy as primarily representative in character. Ideas of popular

© The Author(s) 2020 35 H. Brooks, The African National Congress and Participatory Democracy, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25744-6_2 36 H. BROOKS participation arose only with its transition to mass movement politics after 1949 and are best described as being characterised by the notion of mobilisation. It also identifes that the representative and liberal-inclined view of democracy held by the ANC in its early decades, was shaped by a notion of its own trusteeship. In the years from 1950, radical African nationalism and Marxism-Leninism emerged within the ANC, with the latter becoming most infuential during the movement’s years in exile from 1960. Nationalist discourse sustained a paternalist notion of representation and the movement continued to view itself as the trustee of African interests. It is also argued, however, that the framework of African nationalism provided a vehicle for the ANC’s role as the leading representative to break loose from its democratic bounds. With the co-existence of Marxist-Leninist doctrine after 1960, trusteeship became more clearly visible as vanguardism.

2.1 from Conservative Liberalism to African Nationalism Prior to the formation of the Congress Youth League in 1944, the dominant understanding of democracy in what was then the South African Native National Congress (SANNC)—changing its name to the ANC only in 1925—was characterised by an essentially reformist conservatism. Aspirations for political change were oriented not toward the unrestricted extension of democratic rights, but to the ideal of a non-racial but qualifed Cape franchise.1 Appeals to the government took the form of deputations and delegations of educated, middle class men, appealing to the goodwill and Christian morals of public opinion, government and Crown (Walshe 1987: 3–4, 24; Jordan and Radebe 2010: 47–48; McKinley 1997: 6–8; see also Gerhart 1978: 77). Drawing on dominant European views of the time, Congress’ early ideological heritage was infuenced by Christian liberalism, parliamentary liberalism, paternalism and trusteeship. These ideas remained visible in the movement’s programmes of the 1940s and 1950s and were perhaps most visibly embodied in the leadership of Dr. A. B. Xuma and, later, Chief Albert Luthuli. Throughout his life, Nelson Mandela would also continue to hold in high regard the institutions of western democracy and representative government.2 As early as the mid-1930s, however, growing African disillusionment with persistent government repression and the removal of Cape Africans from 2 PARTICIPATION IN THE HISTORY … 37 the common voters’ roll triggered discussion within Congress about the use of extra-constitutional means to challenge the state (Walshe 1987). The infuence of competing global discourses also took root within Congress at this time, including the racial independence and assertion of American Garveyism (Edgar and ka Msumza 1996), which played a role in shaping Africanist and nationalist discourses, and the working-class solidarity of international communism (Walshe 1987: 170–171, 176). After 1944, these conficting strands would fnd voice in the radicals of the Congress Youth League. During the 1930s, the (then) Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) played a fairly marginal role in African circles. Nonetheless, individuals within Congress came to be infuenced by Marxist thought as a result of contact with a small number of white radicals (Gerhart 1978: 9). By the 1940s, both the new blood infusing Congress and its growing disillusionment with reformism culminated in the birth of a new radicalism. The Youth Leaguers essentially ‘redefned’ the ANC as an African nationalist movement (O’Malley 2007: 62), marking a step away from the qualifed franchise and recognising the need to create a mass membership (Walshe 1987: 264). At this stage, however, the ANC’s democratic ideals did not substantially change from its vision of representative institutions for Africans. The view of itself as a mass movement also continued to refect its self-identifcation as sole representative of the people. The cultivation of a mass membership would serve to consolidate and validate this position. What became increasingly contested, however, were the means of challenging the white state (ibid.: 278; Edgar and ka Msumza 2018: 31). Debates about the movement’s role and strategy were rooted simultaneously in the development of African nationalism and surfacing of Marxist infuence.

Representation as Trusteeship The idea of trusteeship in the ANC emerged from the mission-educated, middle class African leadership of the 1910s and 1920s. Trusteeship, in the South African context, originated from the early Cape liberal provision of the franchise to educated and propertied Africans only, resting on the ideal of their assimilation and the purportedly temporary system of European guardianship. Speaking of the African elite of this period, Gail Gerhart argues that ‘a belief in the superiority of European culture was basic to its world view, and its goals were unabashedly assimilationist’ 38 H. BROOKS

(1978: 34). ‘Belief in the superiority of western civilisation’, Robert Edgar and Luyanda ka Msumza add, ‘was accompanied by faith in gradual constitutional change’ (2018: 14). Although Congress itself certainly rejected trusteeship (and most certainly indirect trusteeship) as a shield for continuing white supremacy, its own political view was partly shaped by its paternalistic foundations, with the early Congress leaders aspiring to the role of leading representative or trustee of African interests. The Constitution of the SANNC set out among its objectives, ‘to be the medium of expression of representative opinion’ and ‘to educate bantu people on their rights, duties and obligations to the state and to themselves collectively’ (SANNC 1919). Although we might argue that this conception of democracy emerges from an elitist tradition, appeals to the public and government were not seen as the preserve the educated alone. Rather, they required articulation by an organised body of trustees able to challenge white precon- ceptions where their fellow countrymen lacked capacity to do so. The small stratum of African middle class viewed itself as able to represent and articulate the interests of Africans who lacked both the education and political consciousness to challenge the system themselves. Cape liberalism and the qualifed franchise were in line with this perspective (van den Berghe cited in Gerhart 1978: 8). The notion of representation embraced by Congress largely correlates with that originally theorised by Edmund Burke, whereby ‘trustees … use their best judgment on behalf of those they represent’ (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 8). Applying Hannah Pitkin’s classifcation of the ‘senses’ of representation (1967), the Congress leadership sought to bring to the Cape liberal model both descriptive representation through race (in the sense of being like those for whom you are standing) and symbolic representation through Congress (in the sense of bearing a certain property which sym- bolizes those you represent). Although this form of representation may accord limited agency to those who are represented, it would be unfair to say that Congress did not aim to increase the status of those it spoke for. ANC President, Dr. Xuma, emphasised in 1941 that ‘All its efforts are and must be concentrated upon raising the status of the African people from their semi-serfdom to citizenship’ (Xuma 1941). It was Congress, however, that would appropriate and remain the voice these citizens. As the ANC’s Pallo Jordan described, ‘As the “parliament of the African people”, the ANC assumed unto itself the role of custodian of ideals, aspirations and political values that had no place in the “offcial” 2 PARTICIPATION IN THE HISTORY … 39

White parliament’ (1983: 4). Xuma thus claimed the ANC to be ‘the mouthpiece of the African people of South Africa’ (ANC 1941). The nature of trusteeship cultivated by Congress was thus not of the elitist variant propped up by the government of segregationist South Africa, but a notion of trusteeship as embodiment, in which Congress constituted the sole representative of people and nation. Although, after 1940, trusteeship’s conservative origins no longer constituted a dominant intellectual current, it nevertheless formed the basis on which the ANC’s early ideas of democracy lay. Its signifcance lies in the manner in which new ideological doctrines that infltrated Congress after 1940 in fact served to buttress this role. Despite Xuma’s pronouncements that a future democracy could not merely be government by proclamation but must be accompanied by the participation of Africans (ANC 1941), there is nothing to suggest that this was understood as anything other than democratic decision-making by elected (African) representatives. The documents of the time generally suggest adherence to a liberal and representative form of democracy: there is no evidence at this stage that participatory features were also envisaged. The 1943 Africans’ Claims in South Africa is indicative of this tradition. Africans’ Claims included a Bill of Rights which signalled not only adherence to representative democracy but to a culture of rights that demanded ‘the extension to all adults, regardless of race, of the right to vote and be elected to parliament, provincial councils and other representative institutions’ (ANC 1943). Even amongst the ANC’s more radical elements, there is no suggestion that democracy was understood as anything beyond representative in form. The 1948 Basic Policy of the Congress Youth League reiterated the goal of political action as the achievement of ‘a true democracy’ in which ‘all the nationalities and minorities would have their fundamental human rights guaranteed in a democratic Constitution’, encompassing ‘direct representation in parliament on a democratic basis’ (ANC Youth League 1948). The democracy envisaged was, arguably, utilitarian in nature, with participation taking the form of voting. Representative government remained the lynchpin of Congress’ democratic demands. Although, by 1949, the election of a number of youth leaguers to the ANC’s National Executive Council (NEC) symbolised the rise of a new leadership generation, their radicalism was not so much a replacement of paternalist liberal values as it was a challenge to the method of achieving its objectives. Gerhart notes a signifcant shift away from the earlier 40 H. BROOKS

‘realist tradition’ of attaining freedom via constitutional means, toward a focus on mass organisation and membership (1978: 93–94). Secondly, although Africans’ Claims contained rights to freedom of assembly and of the press (ANC 1943), a corresponding demand for multi-party competition was absent. The lack of any assurance of a role for a plurality of representative vehicles reinforced the ANC’s leadership role. While the ANC’s paternalism may have remained, the liberal democratic rights discourse refected in Africans’ Claims was the recipient of internal challenge by both Africanist and Communist elements (Dubow 2012: 20). Saul Dubow argues that radical Africanists within the Youth League ‘rejected’ non-racialism, while communists were ‘disdainful’ of the ‘bourgeois’ character of human rights that ‘neglected the primacy of class-based oppression’ (ibid.). Yet nationalism also posed a challenge to political pluralism. The Youth Leaguers described the ‘historic task of African nationalism … [as] the building of a self-confdent and strong African Nation in South Africa …. African Nationalism transcends the narrow limits imposed by any particular sectional organisation’ (1948). The ‘self-confdence’ it referred to refects the Youth League’s push for increased mass action in challenging the state. Its notion of African nationalism as ‘crystallising’ in the Congress Youth League and requiring ‘concrete expression in the creation of a single African national front’ (ANC Youth League 1948) also reinforced a view of the ANC as the leading vehicle in that process. Congress’s concern after 1940 to root itself amongst a mass following, served the purpose of consolidating this position. The Youth League, it claimed, ‘will be a coordinating agency for all youthful forces employed in rousing popular political consciousness and fghting oppression and reaction. It will educate the people politically by concentrating its energies on the African homefront to make all sections of our people Congress-minded and nation-conscious’ (ANC Youth League 1944). The frst president of the Youth League, Anton Lembede, described it as ‘necessary that young people be imbued and indoctrinated with Congress spirit based on African nationalism – the ideology underlying our struggle for national liberation’ (Lembede 1947). Notably, however, the shift in the ANC’s approach toward becoming a ‘mass movement’ did not beget a concurrent shift toward consultation with its new mass base. Political infuence was to be achieved not through participatory structures but by ‘rousing popular political consciousness, and making the people ‘Congress-minded’ (ANC Youth League 1944). The idea of trusteeship was moreover reinforced by 2 PARTICIPATION IN THE HISTORY … 41 not only a conception of the popular will as easily discernible, but by a portrayal of ‘true’ African nationals as being collectively in agreement. At the meeting of the committee to produce Africans’ Claims, Xuma affrmed the importance of unity and the smoothing over of differences: ‘In a mass liberation movement there is no room for divisions or for personal ambitions. The goal is one, namely, freedom for all. It should be the central and only aim for [sic] objective of all true African nationals’ (ANC 1943). It invoked, as Dale McKinley describes, ‘images of an indivisible and inalienable African nationalism’ (1997: 16). The advent of the Youth League and assumption of its leadership role also did not augur any greater ideological clarity. By the mid-1940s, the ANC housed a variety of intellectual infuences including liberalism, Christianity, African nationalism and Marxism. Christianity, notably, remained present in Lembede’s radicalism, demonstrated in the fasci- nating use of biblically-inspired language referring to ‘Congress gospel’ (Lembede 1944a). In this conceptual melee, trusteeship was not erad- icated entirely. Rather, both the traditions of African Nationalism and Marxism—which grew in infuence as the decade progressed—indirectly sustained its values. The form it took, however, began to break loose from the framework of a representative democratic system. With the ANC’s banning in 1960, African nationalism and, more gradually, Marxism-Leninism facilitated this shift, such that the ANC’s self-identifcation became that of a representative whose role and legitimacy transcended democratic contestation. As a liberation movement seeking popular unity, both the overthrow of apartheid and the crushing of racial oppression required a hegemonic project. Over the coming years, however, these intellectual infuences shifted the principle of trusteeship from a form of representative democracy to the fulflment of an historic role. With the movement’s transition to exile after 1960, trusteeship would more visibly take the form of vanguardism.

Origins of ‘Participation’ The materialisation of nationalist thinking in the Youth League was strongly infuenced by Lembede, whose ideas built on Africanist traditions rooted in the independence and unity of the African nation and assertion of African identity and self-confdence (Gerhart 1978: 54–64). Lembede, along with Youth League co-founder, A. P. Mda, combined earlier iterations of liberal thought with revolutionary socialist language 42 H. BROOKS and asserted the need for African strength as an autonomous force for self-determination (Lembede 1946; Mda 1948). The theoretical understanding of mass organisation encompassed in African nationalism invoked mass support as the bedrock of Congress organisation. Thomas Karis and Gwendolen Carter argue that the relationship between African nationalists and others on the Left were often ‘extraor- dinarily complex’ (1973: 107), with emergent nationalist currents not only existing alongside Marxism and liberalism but overlapping with them as well. Both Mda and Lembede read and familiarised themselves with Marxist literature (Edgar and ka Msumza 2018: 22) and, in the 1946 Policy of the Congress Youth League, Lembede referred specifcally to ‘African socialism’ as emerging after national freedom (Lembede 1946). While the ‘foreign’ imposition of a class analysis was rejected by the Youth League (ANC Youth League 1948), the specifc content of ‘African socialism’ was left undefned in its discourse. Lembede, like Mda, was clear that the ‘immediate task’ was national liberation (1946), but looking at the features of Africanism as an ideological framework, its ‘economic basis’ was arguably socialism (Leatt et al. 1986: 94). During the late 1940s, Marxist thought began to have a more discernible impact in ANC circles. The policy of apartheid from 1948 and state repression of anti-government forces increasingly united many nationalists and Communists. Ben Turok’s attempt to map out the diversity of ideas which have shaped the ANC’s policies and actions, indicates the range of infuences on the movement, from founding texts of classical Marxism and the ideas of Mao-Tse Tung, to the work of key nationalist fgures in Africa’s independence and the ideology of African socialism (Turok 2011). Marxist infuence was by no means uncontested, however, and, by 1959, ideological differences resulted in the breakaway of the ANC’s Africanist faction and formation of the Pan-African Congress. The Youth League’s ‘Programme of Action’, moreover, did not provide any further detail or clarity regarding the content of goals such as ‘national freedom’, ‘political independence’ and ‘self-determination’ (Gerhart 1978: 82). Its signifcance for emergent ideas about democracy was, rather, its implied characterization of participation as mobilisation, and the supposition that ‘mass protest, boycotts and passive resistance would in fact create the basis of mass support’ (Walshe 1987: 351). The 1952 Defance Campaign was designed as a programme of non-violent resistance against apartheid laws and institutions, invoking the extra-legal tactics and mass action proposed by the ANC Youth 2 PARTICIPATION IN THE HISTORY … 43

League. The issues on which the campaign was based, however, were notably not derived from an understanding of the practical issues affecting the communities. As such, the ANC’s positioning of itself during this period has led Tom Lodge to argue that the movement viewed the struggles of the 1950s as a ‘manifestation of the general will’ (1983: 92). The assumption that Africans would naturally come to recognise the need for the ANC’s leadership, is refected in the Joint Planning Council’s programme for the Defance Campaign, which maintained that ‘mass action’ would ‘gradually embrace larger groups of people, permeate both the rural and urban areas and make possible for us to organise, discipline and lead the people in a planned manner’ (Sisulu 1951). The strategic shift within the ANC toward of a view of mass mobilisation from above as instrumental to liberation was a product of both nationalist ideology and the rise of Marxist thought. Increasing focus in the ANC on the role of mobilisation coincided with the softening of anti-communist sentiment and an overlap in thought and personnel between the movement and the CPSA. Both ideologies found affnity in conscientisation and collectivity: African nationalism espoused a collective understanding of the African people, underpinned by a belief in a united will—albeit one that needing rousing by the movement. Marxism-Leninism, not dissimilarly, was underpinned by socialism’s historic inevitability and the role of a political vanguard in leading the working class to these ends. Just as Marxist-Leninists believed that the masses would come to see the desirability of socialism, so, too, did Lembede’s nationalism assume a ‘natural striving amongst the masses toward ‘unity and national self-assertion’ (Gerhart 1978: 78–79). For Lembede, whose ideas inspired the Youth Leaguers that followed, it was the ‘true instincts’ of the people toward nationalism that would bind them to their leaders (Gerhart 1978: 79). The ANC, as he expressed it, was ‘a fundamental feature of a stage in the evolutionary process of the African people’ (Lembede 1944b), and the popular spirit into which the ANC tapped, unquestionable. With the mobilisation and moulding of a ‘Congress-minded’ following, the Youth Leaguers envisaged the creation of active participants. The democratic dividend to be derived from the process of mass action, however, was not yet recognised by the ANC. Rather, there was a tendency to mobilise around particular issues without establishing longer-term structures to outlast such campaigns. In an extract from his Presidential address to the Transvaal ANC in 1953, Mandela remarked 44 H. BROOKS that ‘the general political level of the people has been considerably raised’ and ‘the ties between the working people and the Congress have been greatly strengthened’ (1953). These ties, however, were a short- term result of mobilisation rather than sustained participation. Natal Indian Congress President, Monty Naicker, commented on Congress’ ability to ‘rouse people by mass propaganda’ but added that ‘at the cessa- tion of our activities we lost support and general interest in the struggle waned’ (1985 cited in Everatt 2009: 173). It perhaps points also to a distinction between forms of mobilisation from below, rooted in community claims, and more top-down forms of mobilisation which deny such agency and control. It was this disconnect from the people, and the movement’s confessed lack of direction (Everatt 2009: 173), that led to proposals by Congress leadership for the development of a ‘people’s charter’ and a plan to co-ordinate and organise the ANC into a stronger, more tightly structured organisation.

2.2 Participation Through Mass Movement Politics Although African nationalism and Marxism-Leninism were gaining ground in the ANC by the 1950s, there was, as yet, no indication of a clearly articulated democratic discourse. Its expression of a general principle of ‘direct representation’ does not appear to have referred to anything more radical than parliamentary-style democracy. In the absence of a corresponding commitment to political pluralism and individual rights, neither did this imply a strictly liberal democratic sense of representation. In the shift toward mass movement politics, however, the ANC absorbed new ideas and theories which would have bearing on its democratic thought.

Colonialism of a Special Type The reconstitution of the CPSA as the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1953 was surrounded by debate amongst leading Party theorists over the extent to which the class basis of communist ideology could be reconciled with the growing popularity of an African nationalism. The solution was found in the theory of Colonialism of a Special Type (CST), the starting point of which was the unique conditions of South Africa as ‘both an imperialist state and colony within a single, indivisible, geographical, political and economic entity …’ (SACP 1950 2 PARTICIPATION IN THE HISTORY … 45 cited in Everatt 2009: 90): Non-white South Africa was a colony of white South Africa (SACP 1962). The CST thesis adapted Marxist theory to South African conditions, arguing that the deliberate suppression of the growth of an African bourgeoisie had resulted in relatively little class differentiation within the African population itself. Correspondingly, the development of a united multi-racial working class was stunted by apartheid’s labour legislation such that the struggle against oppression in South Africa had a naturally national as opposed to class character. The concept of CST was frst developed by the Comintern in the 1920s, encompassing an early articulation of what would become a two-stage theory of revolution. It was through this that Moscow fore- saw a role for national liberation movements in the greater struggle for socialism. The ‘special type’ of colonialism that existed in South Africa, frst ‘called for an independent native South African republic as a stage towards a workers’ and peasants’ republic with full, equal rights for all races’ (Executive Committee of the Communist International 1928).3 Although it was not until 1962 that the SACP endorsed CST formally, during the 1950s some leading Party theorists were arguing that there was a role for the small African bourgeoisie (SACP 1962; Drew 1997: 25–26; Everatt 2009: 93; Lazerson 1994: 126–129). Through the SACP’s two-stage theory, national liberation would form a frst and necessary stage in the transition to socialism. Only under the conditions of what was referred to as ‘national democracy’—a stage both ‘non-capitalist’ and ‘socialist-oriented’ (Hudson 1987: 54)—could the way be paved for a socialist future and an eventual state of communism. The ANC therefore saw itself as engaged in a phase of National Democratic Revolution (NDR) for political freedom. It was in this context of dual ideology—between African nationalism and Marxism- Leninism—that the ANC-SACP alliance grew. Even the liberal-inclined Chief Luthuli, in 1953, claimed that the ANC ‘can well regard itself as being the vanguard of the movement in the Union’ (ANC 1953).

The Freedom Charter Campaign The aftermath of the Defance Campaign saw the formal establishment in 1953 of the Congress Alliance—a multi-racial grouping under the leadership of the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, South African Coloured People’s Organisation, the South African Congress 46 H. BROOKS of Democrats (COD)4 and South African Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu). The content of a people’s charter was to be formulated through a public assembly, a ‘Congress of the People’ (COP). The COP campaign was hailed by many leading ANC fgures as marking a change or ‘shift’ in Congress thought and practice toward a new era of mass participation. Rusty Bernstein, a member of COD and a fgure heavily involved in drawing up the people’s charter, described it as a signifcant moment for the ANC and Congress Alliance in changing its view of democratic practice: ‘It meant campaigning in a radically new way - no longer telling people: “This is what we stand for! Support us!” But instead asking them: “What do you want? What should we be fghting for?” It required that they listen to and learn from the people rather than exhort or instruct them’ (1999: 148). Alfred Nzo, an ANC leader involved in the COP campaign, similarly asserted that ‘the Congress of the People came as the culmination of the most widespread and thorough canvassing of opinion, of the most truly democratic process South Africa had ever witnessed’ (Nzo 1980: 28). In order to regenerate popular mobilisation following the Defance campaign, then Cape ANC President, Z. K. Matthews (1953) proposed the idea of a COP to draw up a Freedom Charter. The campaign was intended to gather ideas as part of a consultative process. Popular demands were collected by teams of organisers and collated by a committee headed by Bernstein (Everatt 2009: 189). Accounts of the demands collated refect the ordinary realities of those consulted, addressing issues such as ‘homes, jobs, living standards, civil liberties’ (Bernstein 1999: 150). Only a few, according to Bernstein, were ‘carefully formulated opinions about such general issues as the economy, civil rights, democracy and racism’ (ibid.). Although the diversity of attendees at the COP (Karis and Carter 1977: 61) indicates that attendance was more broadly representative of South African society than any preceding event, there are suggestions that its content took second place to the popular mood and mobilised support for Congress which the broader campaign sought to ignite. Z. K. Matthews himself described the underlying aim as ‘the instilling of political consciousness into the people and the encouraging of political activity’ (n.d., in Karis and Carter 1977: 57).5 Bernstein took this further and spoke of the demands collated during the campaign as follows: 2 PARTICIPATION IN THE HISTORY … 47

We stuffed them away in an old cabin trunk, just as we received them, to be pondered over later – not for lack of seriousness but because at that stage, the Charter seemed far off. We were concentrating on the COP itself … the Charter seemed to be the incidental spin-off from the new political culture of listening to and learning from the people. Tacitly we deferred collating the demands into a draft Charter in order to focus on what seemed like the core issue. (1999: 150)

Although the Charter was to refect the will and input of all South Africans, the central aim of the campaign appears to have been mobilisation. While we might liken the approach to ‘informing’ or ‘consulting’ citizens—helping them to understand problems and inviting their opinions (Arnstein 1969)—the SACP’s Joe Slovo, at a meeting of the COP National Action Committee in 1954, referred to the campaign’s ‘main aims as being mobilisation, organisation and instilling in the people a “Freedom Consciousness”’ (Everatt 2009: 170). A 1954 report of the ANC NEC which hailed the most powerful ‘form’ of struggle as that of ‘the power and will of the people’, suggested that ‘the people’s will’ be ascertained via mobilisation (ANC NEC 1954). Everatt’s conclusion thus seems particularly apt: that ‘the COP campaign was the culmination of a particular strategy … [of] … using popular participation in the pro- duction of documented statements of principle as tools of mobilisation and organisation’ (2009: 170). In the context of the time, the Campaign’s organisers could do little other than mobilise around popular concerns. Popular movement was restricted and activists faced banning orders and threats of arrest for public participation. In such a context, the use of the public meeting is refective of intentions to consult. The COP also sought to ignite awareness amongst a population lacking in capacity to organise through linking the daily symptoms of inequality to their roots in the broader political system. There is limited evidence to suggest, however, that it marked a shift in Congress’ democratic thought.

The Charter: Mobilising and Unifying In terms of what the content of the Charter can tell us, conclusions are also limited. Since its launch, the Freedom Charter has instigated debate about the detail behind its demands. With regard to democratic thinking, the clause ‘The People Shall Govern’ is of most relevance. Sketching 48 H. BROOKS an ambiguous picture of democratic institutions, the Charter asserts that ‘All bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-government’ (1955). Do these organs then refer to institutions of direct democracy? Could they be likened to a form of soviet, or do we place too much emphasis on the content of the Charter to explain the ideas underpinning it? Karis and Carter argue that the Charter was merely a restatement of previous aims (1977: 63); it remained largely liberal in content and continued to emphasise freedom within the framework of representative institutions. The demand that ‘Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and stand as a candidate for all bodies which make laws’ (1955) suggests features of representative democracy. Yet there is no qualifcation that this is understood in a liberal democratic sense. It is even less clear whether the model implied in ‘democratic organs of self-government’ is that of representative or direct democracy. One of the most detailed re-collections of the drafting of the Charter belongs to Bernstein who recalled compiling the Charter alone, having been handed the task by the Working Committee (Bernstein 1999: 153). This recollection is at odds with his earlier accounts which claimed that that ‘the content of the Charter was a matter of concern to the leadership of the national liberation movement as a whole, and that it was pondered over for some time’ (1987 in Vadi 1995: 151). Ismail Vadi also refers to the statement of an anonymous activist that: ‘There was substantial collective input by the leadership from all organisations’ and that ‘a great deal of discussion had taken place beforehand’ (1995: 151). In his autobiog- raphy, however, Bernstein asserts that he just got ‘a general favour’ of the demands and then stuffed them back into the box, ‘using those demands which seemed to ft, and discarding those which did not’ (1999: 154). The demands also seemed to carry unequal weight. Bernstein himself commented that ‘This was not a straw poll where every demand counted equally with every other’. He also confessed that ‘the most diffcult part of the exercise was to keep … [his] … own opinions from determining the fnal draft’ (1999: 154). A member of the underground SACP, Bernstein expressed his bias towards a socialist economy, but mentions nothing of his views of democratic structures other than to say that ‘On many of the topics covered by the “demands” I had strong views of my own’ (ibid.: 154–155). He did admit, however, that the writing of the charter ‘required that a compromise or a consensus be read from – or read into – what was on the paper’ (1999: 155). 2 PARTICIPATION IN THE HISTORY … 49

At the COP itself, there appears to have been no discussion of the meaning of ‘democratic organs of self-government’. Speakers referred to participation in parliament (COP 1955) but provided no other description of the envisioned forms that self-government might take. There was certainly no reference to direct democratic institutions. However, in a fas- cinating discussion by Joshua Lazerson (1994: 122) about the role of the COD, he refers to a series of lectures and discussion notes produced by the COD in the run-up to the campaign. One of these dealt directly with the institution of parliament as an instrument of the ruling class. In its place the lecture advocated the construction of ‘a People’s Democracy’ (ibid.). Dubow highlights the theoretical signifcance of this rejection of parliamentary institutions given the prominent role played by Bernstein, a COD member, in drafting the Freedom Charter (2012: 21, 46). Perhaps even more intriguing is evidence of an undated ‘preliminary draft Charter’ which contained a more detailed statement of the clause, ‘The People Shall Govern’, than that which appeared in the fnal version (Lazerson 1994: 176–177). Although Lazerson claims that ‘nothing was done to alter the meaning or intent of the original’ (1994: 177), the reference to ‘parliament’ appears to have been removed (n.d., cited in Lazerson 1994: 176–177). Moreover, the preliminary draft did not refer to ‘democratic organs of self-government’ as the fnal version would, but instead asserted that ‘the bonds between the people, the organs of public opinion and their elected representatives should be close, and consultation between the people and their representatives should prevail at all levels and at all times’ (ibid.). It is not clear which actors made the amendments to this draft, nor precisely when this took place. However, it appears that the earlier inclusion of popular consultation and a form of participatory as well as representative democracy, were replaced with a more ambiguous description of future institutions. Given Bernstein’s description of the writing process, it seems unlikely that the Charter was an accurate amalgamation of the demands received. His account suggests that it was written by him, not by ‘the people’ or even by a body of the ANC. It is also probable that Bernstein’s own views crept into the formulation of demands but doubtful that the intended meaning of the clauses were interpreted uniformly across the ANC. Mandela still seemed to have envisaged democracy in a purely representative sense, reiterating this defnition in an article in 1959, that ‘The organs of government must be representative; that is to say, they must be freely chosen leaders and representatives of the people, whose 50 H. BROOKS mandate must be renewed at periodic democratic elections’ (1959). In his court statement during the treason trial in 1962, Mandela referred to the democratic form of the traditional African council—the ‘imbizo’, ‘pitso’ or ‘kgotla’—through which all tribe members could participate in deliberations’ (Mandela 1962). Yet there are no other statements expanding on the features of such a participatory model, nor its desirable application in the contemporary context. Rather, in the very same statement, Mandela confrmed that the traditional council ‘certainly could never measure up to the demands of the present epoch’ (ibid.). That being said, the Charter was also by no means a transparent resemblance of liberal democratic aspirations. It made no mention of mechanisms to cater for political competition and alternatives, nor was it explicit about the rights of individuals beyond those of groups or races. The contention that the Charter’s ambiguity can be explained by one of its main objectives—to unite the disparate strands of the movement through a ‘unifying ideological statement’ (Everatt 2009: 175)— carries considerable weight. The lack of indication of the ANC’s vision for a future state refects both the underdevelopment of its democratic thought at that stage, and a deliberate, understandable, strategy to broaden the alliance of forces under its hegemony.6 The ANC of the mid-1950s could thus be described as a hybrid of political persuasions whose endorsement of the Freedom Charter attempted to contain differences in the interest of unity, while mobilising and politicising the black population.

2.3 revolutionary Theory and the Popular Role The period following the ANC’s banning in 1960 was characterised by a number of shifts. Perhaps most visible was the effective formalisation of its alliance with the SACP, consolidated in 1961 through the founding of the armed unit, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the decision to embark on armed struggle. It also marked, more defnitively, the end of the liberal tradition which had characterised opposition politics until now (Fine 1992: 20). Closely linked to this was the ANC’s re-birth as a revolutionary movement. The ANC’s dominance within the Congress Alliance accompanied its move into exile. With the decision that the exiled structures of the ANC would act as the ‘sole spokespeople’ of the liberation movement, Nhlanhla Ndebele and Noor Nieftagodien suggest that the Alliance became virtually defunct as a consultative body (2004: 2 PARTICIPATION IN THE HISTORY … 51

578). The ANC’s assertion by 1963 that it remained ‘the one and only vanguard of the oppressed people in this county’ (ANC NEC 1963) also led to a decline in internal democracy—a culture that was buttressed by the requirements of secrecy and discipline. The establishment of the organisation in exile as the ANC ‘proper’ also produced growing distance between the leadership and its support base at home. From the outset, the formation of an armed organisation was located in the context of political struggle, situating MK frmly ‘under the overall political guidance’ of the national liberation movement (ANC 1961). The formation of an armed unit had its roots in both the anti-colonial revolutionary experience of Africa at the time and in Marxist revolutionary thought (Barrell 1993). The Leninist variant of Marxism, prominent in the SACP, often embraced violent methods as a means to seize power. With the commitment to armed struggle, a theoretical leadership position for the SACP emerged. The closeness of its alliance with the ANC is refected in the militarisation of the latter’s language and increasing visibility of Marxist theory. By 1960, with the exception of Oliver Tambo, all of the ANC’s top leadership in exile were members of the SACP.7 The conditions in which the struggle took place undoubtedly shaped organisational practice and the development of democratic tradition. The ANC’s embrace of revolutionary theory and its theoretical position on armed activity, however, themselves had implications for popular democratic involvement. Despite the ANC’s pronouncements to the contrary, Barrell (1993) suggests that in reality the movement side-lined political organisation in favour of military struggle. Indeed, he attributes the ANC’s eventual military failure not only to the ‘overestimation of what armed activity was capable of achieving’, but also to the ANC’s ‘appropriation [of] Marxist-Leninist strategic discourse’ which ‘devalued’ political activity (ibid.). The drawing of many members of Sactu into MK highlighted not only the ANC’s military priority but a disregard for the forms of political organisation emerging within black labour. According to the ANC’s and SACP’s Jeremy Cronin, in the early 1960s, ‘the ANC- SACP treated the trade union movement as a simple adjunct to the political struggle’. When the armed struggle was launched, ‘the trade union movement was seen simply as a recruitment terrain for guerrillas’ (Cronin, interview with Helena Sheehan 2001). With regard to armed activity, the ANC initially emphasised its longstanding policy of non-violence, remarking that the choice to ‘[strike] out along a new road … is not ours; it has been made by the 52 H. BROOKS

Nationalist government which has rejected every peaceable demand by the people for rights and freedom’ (ANC 1961). Its Operation Mayibuye (1963) also referred to the white state as offering the people ‘only one choice’ (ANC 1963). In contrast, however, the position taken in the ANC’s 1969 Strategy and Tactics espoused the view of a pre-destined path to victory via revolutionary violence. What it terms the ‘so-called reformist’ activities of the ANC’s earlier years are presented as necessary for ‘advancement into the new phase’ of armed struggle (ANC 1969).

From Trusteeship to Vanguardism The ANC’s adoption of a revolutionary discourse also induced shifts in the conception of its relationship with the people. It was during the movement’s period in exile that the earlier exercise of trusteeship and sole representation began to manifest themselves as vanguardism. The idea of a political vanguard originates with Marxist-Leninist theory, and is particularly characteristic of revolutionary parties. The ANC’s conceptual shift of the mid-1940s (in which the notion of trusteeship-as-representative democracy merged into an understanding of trusteeship as external to democracy) laid the conceptual foundations for its further transition into vanguardism. The NEC in 1963 had already asserted the movement’s earned status as ‘the one and only vanguard of the oppressed people in this country’ (ANC NEC 1963). With the adoption of its Strategy and Tactics in 1969, the ANC seemed to envisage that ‘the moulding of mass political consciousness’ would lead naturally to popular recognition of both the need for armed action and the necessity of a leading vanguard (ANC 1969). Concurrent with the ANC’s vanguard discourse was not a jettisoning of democracy as representation but the advancement of a form of representation in which the ‘representative’ was not only indisputable but also chosen by history. This engendered not only a conception of democracy as pre-determined but of popular participation as requiring the vanguard’s direction. The ‘correctness’ of the ANC’s ideas—claimed frst of the Freedom Charter (Nzo 1980) and then of its revolutionary theory (ANC 1969)—required the mobilisation of the masses behind it. For the achievement of ‘political power’, African unity was ‘indispensable’ (ANC NEC 1963). The following chapters of the book trace the signifcance and implications of vanguardism for the ANC’s understanding of participatory democracy. Chapter 3, in particular, explores vanguardism as a 2 PARTICIPATION IN THE HISTORY … 53 conceptual thread of people’s power, while Chapter 5 discusses the survival of this discourse after 1994. It is the 1960s, however, to which we can trace its surfacing in the ANC. It is thus worth setting out the programmatic framework in which vanguardism emerged.

Marxism-Leninism and African Nationalism From 1969, the ANC’s revolutionary theory was situated in a framework of Marxism-Leninism with the retention of African nationalist elements. Its Strategy and Tactics document situated the South African struggle ‘within an international context of transition to the socialist system’, while making clear that ‘national liberation is the chief content of the struggle’ (ANC 1969). The document also set out the ANC’s adherence to the basic tenets of CST and the two-stage theory of revolution. The struggle was simultaneously contextualised, however, within a framework of African nationalism, the achievement of independence on the African continent and the continued fght against colonialism and racism. While these dual nationalist and communist discourses in many respects reinforced one another, there was also a degree of tension. There is evidence that, prior to its adoption at the 1969 Conference of the ANC, an earlier draft of Strategy and Tactics, produced by the SACP’s Joe Slovo8 was ‘corrected’ by fellow party members Joe Matthews and Duma Nokwe (Matthews 2008: 30). Slovo’s draft had not contextualised the South African struggle amongst broader African struggles for independence. Yet, the fnal report placed signifcance not only on the alliance with the SACP but also with the Zimbabwean African People’s Union and on the strategic role of pan-African unity with the region’s national liberation movements (ANC 1969). This is perhaps a refection of the differences of opinion within the Party itself, possibly between African and non-African members. It also omitted the danger, inferred in Slovo’s version, that South Africa might follow the fate of other independent African states where little had been done to advance their societies toward socialism (Slovo 1969: 22). Slovo had alluded to the risk of the white bourgeoisie being merely replaced by a black bourgeoisie should revolution not proceed through both ‘stages’. The fnal document, however, reiterated the ANC’s observance of both Marxist-Leninist and African nationalist thought. Despite these nuances, Strategy and Tactics made clear a number of points about the synergy of military and political activity; the role of 54 H. BROOKS revolutionary theory in guiding strategy; and the conquest of power as the end goal of struggle. Within this framework, two themes emerged: the need to mould political consciousness to the necessity and correctness of armed struggle; and a conception of the popular role as an enabler for the seizure of power. The ANC was guided not merely by pragmatic considerations in the face of state repression but by theoretical considerations as to the best framework for revolutionary success. Despite the need to retain contact with home, the ANC’s conception of mass activity still did not draw on local experiences, perspectives or conditions. Instead, organisational practice implied a top-down transmission of ideas from vanguard to people, the latter’s mobilisation requiring communication of the 1969 conference’s ‘perspectives and decisions’ (Matthews 1969: 5). It also carried suggestions of the foreclosing of democratic space, making reference to the falling by the wayside of those leaders not willing to move with the hidden powers of history—those who the ANC refers to as ‘unable to adjust to the new revolutionary mood’ (ANC 1969). Differences of opinion within its own ranks would be contained through the construction of an ‘authoritative organ’ to prosecute the revolution (Matthews 1969). Such a structure seems to have been envisaged as directing mass action and opinion toward that which was theoretically correct. The extent to which the ANC’s external mission became dominated by the SACP, or by individual communists, is not a debate for which there is space here. Views about the nature of this relationship can be found elsewhere.9 Analysis of the ANC’s language at the time, however, suggests a growing infuence of the Party’s ideas. The ANC’s hierarchi- cal and centralising tendencies, which became most apparent in exile, can be attributed, in part, to the SACP’s own modus operandi and were reinforced by an overlap of personnel. However, their lineage can also be traced to the ANC’s own African nationalist roots. The promotion of participation as form of mobilisation from above found resonance in nationalist currents, which continued to employ a trustee idea of leadership in which the ANC embodied people and nation. Broader pan-African infuences, which drew on anti-colonial sentiment and the ideology of African socialism, were also gaining ground in other parts of the continent. It is not clear from the ANC’s commentary to what extent the African socialism of Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, for example—where the ANC based itself from 1963—left imprints on its own outlook. It was, however, a primarily nationalist ideology which claimed 2 PARTICIPATION IN THE HISTORY … 55 to correspond to the traditions and roots of African society (Leatt et al. 1986: 153). Leatt et al. maintain that African socialism was itself an ideology of ‘conscientisation’—‘a socialism planned by an elite for the people’, in which Parliamentary democracy was generally seen as unable to provide suffcient leadership (ibid.). Once the ANC was in exile, these formative ideas of the people as a cohesive whole whose natural instincts would lead them to nationalism, were combined with the SACP’s ideas of ‘democratic centralism’ and the necessity of a leading vanguard. With the growing infuence of Leninist thought, trusteeship eventually emerged as vanguardism. Although the Party’s access to military resources undoubtedly bolstered its infuence on strategy, the notion of an SACP take-over seems somewhat simplistic. The formulation of ideas and their translation into practice required something more than external imposition: it required that the ANC adopt centralising tendencies in its own right. This is not to say that the SACP did not seek to win-over non-Communist comrades or increase Party infuence. Its emphasis on the leading role of the working class in socialist struggle, however, must be understood in the context of its two-stage theory in which national liberation was to be achieved frst. Refecting on the more recent past, the SACP’s marginalisation after 1990 can be understood as resulting not only from global ideological shifts and the discrediting of the former Soviet bloc, but from the ANC’s transposition of itself as the political ‘vanguard’ of the people. Fundamentally, this entailed the ANC’s own adoption of the view that the people’s role could only be realised through the leadership of a vanguard movement. The conceptual framework of the NDR, in which the focus of the struggle remained on the frst stage, allowed the development and later retention of the ANC’s vanguard position.

2.4 conclusion The ANC’s shift toward mobilisation and mass movement politics in the 1950s was consolidated over subsequent decades through the development of a revolutionary theory focused on the conquest of state power. By the 1970s, the process of mass struggle (both political and military) was viewed by the movement as instrumental to achieving liberation. While this theorisation was characterised by the growing infuence of Marxism-Leninism, it was also supported by the ANC’s nationalist 56 H. BROOKS heritage which itself contained characteristics of a top-down theory of organisation. Although African nationalism elevated a role for the masses, this was viewed as needing to take place through a process of conscientisation and under the direction of a dedicated leadership. Exile conditions of course inficted on the ANC very limited contact with home. Under these circumstances, factors beyond the movement’s control imposed constraints on its relationship with the people. Irrespective of such conditions, however, the correctness of the revolutionary theory adopted by the ANC appears to have been seen as irrefutable. Although the movement’s liberal origins were barely visible by the time it re-grouped in exile, we are able to see how early paternalist ideas of representation provided favourable conditions for the subsequent emergence of leadership in the form of vanguardism. The subsequent chapters take up this theme further displaying how vanguardism has proven to be powerful in shaping ANC democratic thought.

Notes 1. The Cape qualifed franchise was based on the Liberal Party’s slogan ‘equal rights for all civilised men’ (Gerhart 1978: 7). The defnition of ‘civilised men’ originated from the Cape Colony’s Constitution of 1853: ‘people who owned property, who earned an income of a certain value, who had a certain level of education’ (Jordan and Radebe 2010: 41). 2. See, for example, the excerpt from Mandela’s Courtroom Statement: ‘I am Prepared to Die’, at the Rivonia Trial in April 1964 (Mandela 1964). 3. For an account of the theoretical infuence of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and origins of the concept of internal colonialism (or ‘native republic thesis’), see Drew (2000). 4. COD was a white organisation on the democratic left formed in 1953 to provide a vehicle for whites to support the liberation struggle. As many members of the banned CPSA joined COD, it was often accused by liber- als and Africanists of being dominated and controlled by communists. For an account that challenges this perception, see Everatt (2009: 98–122). 5. Although this extract is undated, it is taken from a memorandum by Z. K. Matthews prepared for the defense in the Treason Trial. We can thus sur- mise that it was written in approximately 1956/1957. 6. o n the ambiguity of the Charter’s clauses for economic transformation and failure to provide power for the working class, see McKinley (1997: 20–23). 7. Alfred Nzo (ANC Secretary General), J. B. Marks (Chairman of the ANC National Executive), and Moses Kotane (ANC Treasurer General) were all members of the SACP. 2 PARTICIPATION IN THE HISTORY … 57

8. The document is an annotated copy by Joe Slovo written in March 1969 before the ANC’s First Consultative Conference in April 1969. 9. See Shubin (1999), Ellis and Sechaba (1992), and Hugh Macmillan (2009).

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Discourses of ‘People’s Power’

The conceptual nuances of people’s power are often overlooked in what is perceived to be either a spontaneous uprising from below or an African National Congress (ANC)-orchestrated phenomenon. Although people’s power was characterised by geographical division and ideological variety, analysis of its theory and practice reveals a series of interlinking conceptions of the role of popular participation. More often than not, these ideas overlapped, drawing upon one another’s sources of inspiration or displaying a similar ideological lineage. As such, it did not incorporate any singular, uniform conception of participation. Rather, while remaining a phenomenon of the broad ANC camp, people’s power was shaped by a multiplicity of ideological and intellectual currents, producing what was a complex and nuanced discourse.

Parts of this chapter are derived in part from articles published in Politikon: Brooks, H. (2018): Popular Power and Vanguardism: The Democratic Defcit of 1980s ‘Peoples Power’, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/, https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2017.1398992l; and in African Studies: Brooks, H. (2018): Differential interpretations in the discourse of ‘people’s power’: Unveiling intellectual heritage and normative democratic thought, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/, https://doi.org/10.1080/000 20184.2018.1475653.

© The Author(s) 2020 63 H. Brooks, The African National Congress and Participatory Democracy, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25744-6_3 64 H. BROOKS

As a result, although we can identify many common threads in its constitution, we can also identify conceptual discomfort in the understandings of participation and popular power that emerged. Given their integrated nature, it is erroneous to separate the various conceptions into mutually exclusive categories: They certainly weren’t experienced as such at the time. What is possible, however, is the identifcation of themes or discourses in the theory and practice of people’s power. It was noted in the introduction to this book that analysis of the 1980s has often framed people’s power as an altogether grassroots phenomenon, and one which held the promise of a participatory democratic future. Yet the very multiplicity of ideas which shaped its practice, led not only to a form of popular power that was not entirely democratic, but produced some important conceptual discord in the nature of participation that emerged. The chapter begins by providing an overview of the context in which people’s power emerged, locating it within mounting popular unrest in the 1980s and a burgeoning ANC hegemony. It then goes on to draw out the ‘themes’ visible in the discourse and practice of people’s power, touching on its role as both a mode of struggle and a conceptual inspiration for a democratic future. The discussion then links these themes to their intellectual heritage, demonstrating the critical and sometimes reciprocal role of ideas in shaping practice. The third and fnal section analyses the implications of its conceptual development for the theory and practice of a participatory model of democracy.

3.1 the Context for a Popular Movement The period of popular unrest during the 1980s was presaged by a number of domestic and international pressures. The state’s economic crisis in 1983–1984 marked the onset of a period in which ‘resistance took hold nationally’ (Marks 2001: 40). Deepening recession, rising labour militancy and mounting state debt led to measures of both repression and reform. The Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 and proposals in 1983 for a Tricameral Parliament to house Whites, Indians and Coloureds to the exclusion of Africans, also triggered a new set of challenges. Resistance to these structures generated popular, largely urban, protest, leading to the breakdown of relations between communities and local government. The ANC, by this stage, had successfully re-grouped in exile—basing its headquarters from 1977 in Lusaka, Zambia—while consolidating 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 65 some of its senior leadership on Robben Island. The Soweto uprising in 1976 led to an exodus of young black South Africans joining the movement abroad, while many people formerly in the Black Consciousness Movement gravitated to the Congress camp. Reviewing its own strategy in light of these shifts, the ANC reoriented its vision toward a strategy of a ‘people’s war’ in which popular organisation at home would provide the basis for military challenge to the state. ‘People’s power’, as a concept and practice, emerged against this backdrop. While it may not strictly be a product of these events, the way in which popular organisation evolved can be explained by both changing domestic socio-economic conditions and a broadening ANC hegemony. Amidst growing politicisation, a number of civic, community and issue-based organisations were formed. The United Democratic Front (UDF), originally established to protest the tricameral elections, had by the end of 1984 turned its attention to broader political organisation and became largely associated with the banned ANC. As a ‘front’ structure, comprised of a multitude of sectoral and civic affliates, the UDF saw its role as linking ‘local struggles’ to ‘national interests’ (UDF c.1987). It was from emergent local organisation around bread and butter concerns that ‘organs of people’s power’ transpired. In the examination that follows, reference is sometimes made to the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM)—a term incorporating the range of civil society forces in the 1980s aligned with the ANC. This included the UDF, civic organisations, sectoral organisations and trade unions. In many cases, activists and participants belonged to more than one of these groupings and a cross-pollination of ideas took place. As a consequence, there is often a lack of linearity in the sequencing of events and ideas. It is notable that the term MDM, while resonant of the 1980s, has continued to feature in ANC terminology. Although its role and status was reduced considerably after 1994—with many of the MDM’s composite organisations either disintegrating or effectively folding into the ANC—at the latter’s national policy conference in 2012, it notably made reference to the need to rebuild the MDM’s structures as part of a broader process of renewing the ANC-as-movement (ANC 2013). The party’s resurrection of this current of its movement tradition is covered in Chapter 5. While dealing with the subject of participatory democracy, the analysis here also refers interchangeably to ‘participation’ and ‘popular participation’. The term ‘participatory democracy’ was not generally used by 66 H. BROOKS participants in popular structures at the time. Indeed, the introduction of this term into ANC lexicon from the late 1980s is, in itself, signifcant and is dealt with in Chapter 4. What many activists involved in the establishment of popular structures envisaged, however, was akin to bottom-up and participatory modes of organising. It is equally worth stating that examination of people’s power must take account of location and context. The liberation struggle was conducted under conditions of illegality, state repression, and an absence of the civil and political freedoms that enable organisations to operate openly. The nature of the practices that emerged were both shaped and constrained by this broader environment. As such, what we demand and expect of popular structures should be mindful of this context. This does not, however, preclude a critique of such forms of organisation, not least when historic and contemporary accounts lament the form of democracy they pre-fgured.

3.2 themes and Ideas in the Conception of ‘People’s Power’ In its general sense, people’s power referred to the era between 1985 and 1987 of popular organisation and challenge to state authority. In its more specifc sense, it referred to structures and organisational activity instigated within communities to exert a measure of popular control. Established largely by activists and civic organisers, ‘organs of people’s power’ took the form of structures such as people’s committees (yard, block, street and area committees) and forums for popular justice (often referred to as people’s courts). The purpose of these structures ranged from providing advice and services to residents, to challenging the legitimacy of the local state through acting as de facto organs of self-governance.

Active Participation and the Inadequacy of Representative Democracy Underpinning people’s power was a belief in the inadequacy of representative democracy. This was by no means a wholesale rejection of representation. Both the civics, UDF and organs of people’s power involved elections and tiers of representatives. Representative democracy alone, however, was seen as insuffcient (Morobe 1987; Boraine 1987; Seedat 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 67 interview, 2013). In a speech by acting publicity secretary, Murphy Morobe, the UDF set out its view of democracy, asserting ‘not only are we opposed to the present parliament because we are excluded, but because parliamentary-type representation in itself represents a very limited and narrow idea of democracy’ (1987: 82). The statement did not reject the value of the right to vote but portrayed ‘real’ democracy as something richer and more meaningful than voting in elections: ‘When we say that the people shall govern, we mean at all levels and in all spheres, and we demand that there be real, effective control on a daily basis’ (ibid.). The UDF’s discourse thus made a distinction between ‘real’ and ‘representative’ democracy. The former constituted popular control, not via elites or professional politicians, but by affected people themselves. It also extended the democratic principle to all areas of daily life (Boraine 1987: 8). Although the term ‘participatory democracy’ was not always used to describe what was happening, some activists were clear that people’s power was understood as just that (ibid.; Cronin interview, 2012). UDF National and Western Cape Executive member, Andrew Boraine’s critique in 1987 of the insuffciency of ‘constitutions, voting procedures and competing political parties’ (1987: 11), highlighted the ANC’s and UDF’s concern with issues beyond procedural democratic rights. Neil Coleman, an MDM activist and editor of the UDF journal, Phambile commented: ‘it was inconceivable to us at the time that you would have a narrow form of formal, parliamentary democracy in which all those forms of democratic popular participation would simply disappear’ (interview, 2013). The UDF’s stance was also juxtaposed to liberal versions of democracy advocating political pluralism: ‘liberal approaches look at abstract models, and, in particular, they lay great stress on multi-party systems as opposed to supposedly ‘undemocratic’ one-party states. A future, liberated SA may have a one-party or a multi-party system. That, for us, is not at all the most important question’ (UDF 1987a: 21). The nub of the UDF position was that the essence of democracy lay not in pluralism or contestation but in mass organisation (ibid.: 22). This emphasis on mass participation as a condition for ‘real’ democracy represented a rejection of elitist approaches, while seeing representative structures as needing to be supplemented by participatory mechanisms. Several interviewees involved in the UDF or civic organisation during the 1980s expressed that, in the future, they envisaged some measure of popular democratic control would be exercised at a grassroots level 68 H. BROOKS

(Mufamadi interview, 2012; Masondo interview, 2013; Mayekiso interview, 2013; Cronin interview, 2012; Tsenoli interview, 2013). Amos Masondo, an activist in the Soweto Civic Association, explained that they ‘were not struggling just to have people in parliament or in the legislatures … [but] would encourage, in between the various elections, deep participatory processes that will ensure that, apart from the elected public representatives, people at a local level would still be engaged in activities’ (interview, 2013). Beyond references to something greater and more participatory than representative democracy, however, it was not always clear on a practical level what precisely would be its replacement. For many activists, the 1980s was a period of war and struggle in which the priority was not theorisation as to what would replace the current state but rather making the existing system unworkable (Coovadia interview, 2013). Nonetheless, while concerns may have centred on the immediate struggle, organisational practice came to bear the marks of normative conceptual infuence. What were often produced were ‘rudimentary principles’ of popular power, if not clear institutional forms (Steinberg 2000: 190).

Discipline and Hegemonic Unity An important feature of the phenomenon was its predominantly Congress or Charterist character. The ANC, by the 1980s, referred to itself as ‘a genuine people’s organisation’ and ‘the genuine representative of all the people’ (ANC 1985a). Despite weaknesses in its contact with popular struggles, the Congress movement as a whole remained sure of domestic support (ANC NPC 1985: 4–5; Barrell 1993; see also ANC 1985a: 1). The consolidation of the ANC’s reach supports Raymond Suttner’s concept of a ‘hegemonic unity’, which he defnes as seeking ‘overall leadership and representation of all forces in all sectors struggling for liberation under specifc banners’ (2011: 15). The ANC’s consultative conference in 1985 affrmed:

Without the ANC, in contact with and as part of the masses of the people, enjoying their support and confdence and leading them into many-sided action, our victory is impossible. The ANC is a genuine people’s organisation as the product of their sacrifces, the inheritor and the continuation of the revolutionary experience of the oppressed people as a whole, their organiser and leader. (ANC 1985a) 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 69

The hegemonic position of the ANC was reinforced by the UDF who affrmed its view of the movement as the vanguard of the struggle (MDM c.1988; UDF 1990; Molefe 1990b). The UDF, according to Suttner, considered itself ‘under ANC discipline and carrying out its strategies’ (2004: 699). The unity that Suttner describes was thus not only aspired to but realised. The nature of being a hegemonic movement implies that the leadership position is accepted by those who are led. Establishing hegemonic unity was also underpinned by requirements of revolutionary discipline. For the UDF, ‘discipline’, or ‘revolutionary discipline,’ was a means of maintaining unity (UDF 1985: 25–26). Personal indiscipline and lack of revolutionary maturity were sometimes used to explain or excuse instances of violence and coercion. An article in its theoretical journal, Isizwe explained: ‘Unless indiscipline is eliminated, our organisations are threatened with disunity, division and suspicion … We are working not in our individual capacities but as activists of a people’s front’ (ibid.: 24). In this sense, the maintenance of hegemonic unity required not only personal but political discipline, as well as the commitment to a collective identity and undertaking. The same article defned the concept of discipline as arising from ‘a political understanding’: ‘the discipline we speak of is a discipline that involves the conscious and willing decision to subordinate one’s own will and immediate personal inclinations to that of the collective, or more precisely to the organisation to which one is responsible’ (UDF 1985: 23). The notion of securing this discipline corresponded with the UDF’s democratic discourse: just as it rejected liberal notions of democracy as adversarial and pluralistic, its concept of organisational discipline necessi- tated unity and control as a collective. Coleman explained that ‘the understanding at the time in the movement was that we’ve got to make these organisations as non-sectarian as possible while at the same time being vehicles of the mainstream movement which was the Congress movement’ (interview, 2013). Although Cas Coovadia, a leader of the Civic Association of Johannesburg (CAJ) remarked that alternative political tendencies were still recognised as part of the ‘progressive’ movement, tolerance of their presence sometimes seems to have been earned by virtue of their minimal threat to Charterist dominance (interview, 2013). The establishment of unity and discipline, while forming a part of the UDF narrative, was also used to invoke more localised forms of control. In the township of Alexandra, north of Johannesburg, Belinda Bozzoli shows how insurrectionary activity was a cause led predominantly by the 70 H. BROOKS youth (2004: 80–81, 92). Challenging the authority of the police while trying to direct and mobilise the community, young ‘comrades’ sometimes inficted a reign of terror which instigated fear in ordinary, often older, members of the community (ibid.: 84). Theirs was a project which sought the overturning of all authority (ibid.: 91) and, while their activities may have fallen outside of formal organisational control (Seekings 1993 cited in Bozzoli 2004: 109), it is possible to see how those on the ground drew strength from the insurrectionary narrative (Simpson 2009: 175). Some authors have been heavily critical of the UDF and ANC for not intervening in instances of local violence (Wentzel 1995; Jeffery 2009). While these accounts have, on the whole, been unfortunately state-sympathetic, the ANC and UDF were not without fault. On some accounts, the ANC was a somewhat powerless and ‘distant observer’ (Butler 2013: 214). ANC secretary-general, Alfred Nzo, famously said at the time: ‘Whatever the people decide to use to eliminate those enemy elements is their decision. If they decide to use necklacing1 we support it’ (1986, cited in Butler 2007: 214). A document on armed struggle from the ANC’s 1985 conference not only insinuated that some targets were legitimate but recommended that, when captured by guerrillas, the ‘hated puppets, police’ should be dealt with ‘publicly’ as part of the process of ‘political mobilisation’ (ANC 1985c: 4).

Struggle and Insurrection A further factor shaping people’s power concerned the extent to which it was understood as a means or an end of struggle: a method of challenging the state or an end goal in itself. For the ANC, the insurrectionary focus of popular structures appears to have been foremost (Barrell 1993: ch. 9; see also Butler 2012: 48–49). Its strategy of ‘people’s war’, adopted in 1979 and inspired by the revolutionary struggle in Vietnam, was defned by the ANC as ‘a war in which a liberation army becomes rooted amongst the people who progressively participate actively in the armed struggle both political and militarily (sic) with the fnal aim of seizing power’ (ANC 1985c: 1). Organs of people’s power in this context were understood as ‘organs of insurrection’ (ANC, n.d.: 4)—‘clandestine and semi-clandestine organs[s] for mass participation in insurrectionary tactics’ (O’Malley cited in Barrell 1993: ch. 9). As a result, the ANC underground began to consciously ‘participate and encourage’ the creation and revival of popular structures (Pallo Jordan interview with Barrell, 1989). 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 71

Although it was perhaps only in 1985 with the onset of the state of emergency that people’s power took on an insurrectionary edge (Seekings 2000a: 71, 173), the ANC’s military strategy was underpinned by a sense of participation’s strategic utility. Notes from its exile collection, fled as ‘1970s–1985’, drew on how recruitment into armed units was reliant on the masses to provide an ‘inexhaustible source of supply’ (ANC London Collection, n.d.-a). The ideological framing of the struggle in South Africa was in some ways comparable with Vietnam, understood also as needing to go through a stage of a ‘national people’s democratic revolution’ in order to achieve socialism (ibid.). The experiences and models of Marxist-inspired struggles elsewhere—in Vietnam, Cuba, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Angola and Algeria—were widespread amongst activists, and their infuence cut across both the ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP). Some people drew on the ‘liberated zones’ established in the Vietnamese struggle which, in addition to representing guerrilla bases, seemed to carry a pre-fgurative element as ‘models of a new life of a new regime’ (ibid.). Interpretations of the popular role in revolution, however, were by no means uniform. Ben Turok, a member of the SACP stationed in London,2 dismissed the notion that organs of people’s power were understood as structures of democracy—a view perhaps refective of those for whom the aim of the struggle was not liberated zones but taking state power. According to him, the concept of people’s power as self-government did not enter into the discussion in South Africa: ‘- there was no prospect of liberated zones … the issues of empowerment or participation didn’t arise. Our conception was we would take over Pretoria’ (Turok interview, 2013). Janet Cherry, a member of the ANC underground from 1982, also, did not recall much discussion about ‘the nature of democracy’, adding that the idea of organs of people’s power was linked to a ‘revolutionary and insurrectionary objective’ (interview, 2012). In contrast, Coleman, a member of the Transvaal UDF who helped to produce UDF propaganda in the second half of the 1980s, portrayed the inspiration for people’s power as emerging from the bottom-up: ‘It’s about people’s movements that have really been rooted in popular struggles’ (interview, 2013). The more top-down conception of participation as a revolutionary vehicle was not exclusive to the armed pillar. Although, as a legal organisation, the UDF could not align itself openly with the armed struggle, several interviewees involved in the UDF and its affliates referred to 72 H. BROOKS organs of people’s power as being mobilising structures intended to build capacity to fght the regime (Mashatile interview, 2013; Coovadia interview, 2013; Boraine interview, 2013). The UDF’s Valli Moosa described them as ‘features of a low-level insurrection’ (interview, 2013). It was also the case that, for some activists, their role in the longer term had not yet been thought through. Former UDF General Secretary and Alexandra Youth Congress leader, Paul Mashatile, while conceding that infuences from that period can indeed be seen in present-day structures, commented: ‘I think in the main at the time it was more the capacity we needed to mobilise to fght against unjust laws’ (interview, 2013). Both he and Boraine surmised that organs of people’s power were not consciously being built with a view to the future (ibid.; Boraine interview, 2013).

Pre-fguring a Future State Given the insurrectionary role apportioned to people’s power, it is signifcant that a discourse can also be identifed which understood it as an end in itself. For some in the movement, popular structures were not only a means of struggle, but a prototype of what was being fought for. Their formation prompted or deepened a process of normative theorising about democracy. In a refection on the year of 1985, the UDF asserted: ‘it is possible to build mass bases, democratic organisation, which in the course of confronting and challenging the existing state, begin also to lay the seeds of a future society’ (UDF 1985–1986: 2; see also ANC London Collection, n.d.-c). In the ANC’s concept of national democracy, the UDF and its affliates concentrated on the ‘democratic’, unveiling a two-fold conception of democracy as both the aim and means of struggle (Morobe 1987: 82). An article in Isizwe in March 1986 introduced the notion of pre-fgurative democracy:

The building of people’s power is something that is already beginning to happen in the course of our struggle. It is not for us to sit back and merely dream of the day that the people shall govern. It is our task to start to realise that goal now. We must start the process of liberating South Africa. We must begin to place power in the hands of the people, in all spheres … Even in the present we must start to build the beginnings of our future society … Building people’s power is a training ground, a school for the future. (Underlining in original; UDF 1986a: 2–3) 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 73

The linking of popular structures and localised struggles to ideas about democracy appears to have taken place within the ANC from about 1986, although organs such as street and area committees began to form as early as 1983.3 It is interesting that the ANC frst made reference to ‘people’s power’ in its January 8 Statement of 1981,4 commenting on Angola’s ‘involvement in the battle for the total liberation of Africa and in the struggle for the consolidation of people’s power’ (ANC NEC 1981). It is not until its statement of 1986, fve years later, however, that the ANC began to develop what it meant by people’s power. This timing aligns with its emergence in the lexicon of the UDF, whose frst publication on people’s power appeared in Isizwe in March of that year. Two years previously, the ANC had made a direct connection between the slogan ‘power to the people’ and the acquisition of state power (ANC NEC 1984). The form of state envisaged, however, was given little more detail than in the Freedom Charter. It is also not clear that people’s power was at that stage understood in terms of democracy. In its statement of 8 January 1985, the ANC’s focus was again on forging the conditions for the establishment of ‘mass revolutionary bases’ (ANC NEC 1985a). The ANC’s ‘Call to the Nation’ in April 1985, however, was more specifc. Here it called for the replacement of ‘collapsing government stooge councils with people’s committees in every block which could become the embryos of people’s power’. It also depicted people’s power as a dispensation to which people could only be led by the ANC (ANC NEC 1985b). In January 1986, it took this further by linking people’s power conceptually to the power of the ANC (ANC NEC 1986). It was only in its ‘Call to the People’ in May of that year, however, that the ANC made reference to specifc structures—‘people’s committees’, ‘street committees’, ‘comrades’ committees’, ‘people’s courts’, ‘people’s defence militia’ and other ‘popular organs of justice’—as a replacement of existing state administration (ANC 1986). Whether a response to ANC policy or to grassroots needs, the establishment of people’s power said something about the society envisaged— both during the phase of struggle and into the future. The UDF made quite clear that the radical democracy it envisaged was emulated in these popular organs: ‘- street committees, defence committees, shop-steward structures, student representative councils, parent/teacher/student associations’, it maintained, ‘represent in many ways the beginnings of the kind of democracy we are striving for’ (Morobe 1987: 83). Identifable was a 74 H. BROOKS common discourse that ‘people’s power’ was being fought for. What was not consistently clear is what this people’s power would look like.

Grassroots Governance Alongside national-level discourses, a series of more localised meanings were imparted to popular organisation. While still interwoven, these narratives are in some senses distinct to those outlined already in that they can be attributed to the particular experiences of UDF affliates. The activities of grassroots organisations, according to Suttner, did not always ‘ft’ with dominant theoretical formulations (2004: 692). As a result, their discourses are often less identifable in the ‘offcial’ ANC and UDF literature. Local understandings were of course not impervious to the liberation context. Activists and participants absorbed the ANC’s narrative in their conceptual and strategic approach, and the language and imagery of liberation permeated the structures that emerged. Engagement in local struggle was civics’ primary weapon against the state and many activists at the time made clear that what they sought, through their actions, was the replacement of current institutions with non-racial, democratic ones (see Mayekiso 1988: 3062; Mdakane 1988: 2315). Nonetheless, a focus merely on the revolutionary or national political role of popular activity risks overlooking the specifc meanings that participants as subaltern actors imparted to these activities. The forms of self-governance discernible at a local level can be divided into two categories. In the frst instance, organs of people’s power were related to grassroots democracy and in some cases, although not always explicit, this was also a pre-fgurative exercise. A paper produced by the UDF in approximately 1987 captured this perspective:

People’s power referred to the actions taken by ordinary people, in and through democratically controlled structures, to exert control over their lives either by taking direct action to change conditions or by infuencing others to do so. The element of accountability to the community and of changing the balance of forces in favour of the people by concrete inter- vention are key elements in the concept. (UDF c.1987: 8)

While there is evidence that this was often part of a broader Charterist hegemony, a discourse is discernible which is unconnected to the 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 75 national democratic project. As such, the ideological and strategic direction of popular structures was not always their most important feature. Lechesa Tsenoli, an activist in Durban during the 1980s, described the building of people’s power as something pre-fgurative but also drew on notions of democracy that involved a change in power relations and a greater role in decision-making for ordinary people. This, for him, emulated the Freedom Charter’s call that ‘the people shall govern’ (interview, 2013). Tsenoli’s reference to the Charter refects a direct and participatory democratic interpretation, but also highlights some conceptual variation within the ANC itself. Tsenoli, who worked in youth and civic activism as well as being part of the ANC’s underground, held a view of the future that involved not merely taking power but changing power relations. While his reference demonstrates the connection, made by many activists, between the attainment of democracy and Charterism, even notions of people’s power tied to an ANC-led future often carried with them an additional conceptual dimension. Here, participatory democracy—if only at the most local level—was valuable in its own right. A key element of this concept was the building of accountable and empowered structures. The CAJ’s Coovadia remarked: ‘We were absolutely clear… that these were democratically elected structures that formed the bedrock of the strategic direction given to the organisations that represented them and I think under very diffcult conditions we worked very hard to maintain their democratic content and to ensure that they were reported to, they informed, and they did participate in a very real way in developing strategy for the work we needed to do’ (interview, 2013). Similarly, in a guest column in the Sowetan newspaper in August of 1986, Morobe explained the value of self-governance not just theoretically but at a very practical level: ‘In setting up street committees and democratic village councils, we are beginning to understand practically the meaning of people’s power. Our people are effectively showing through such committees their suppressed desire to govern their own lives’ (Morobe 1986). Amongst this contingent of participants and activists, collective action to improve material conditions stimulated a political consciousness involving the imagining of new forms of resistance and democracy. Uitenhage Civic leader, Weza Made emphasised how people were learning ‘to participate over their problems … making decisions about what they need or what they desire for the future of this country’ (interview, n.d.). In this sense, people’s power’s educative characteristics were 76 H. BROOKS signifcant. It was at the local level that individuals could most effectively ‘learn democracy’. Through participation in those issues most directly affecting their everyday lives, real education, as Pateman suggested, could occur (1970: 30–31, 37–38). Although it is not clear to what extent people’s committees infuenced strategic direction, they do seem to have instilled a greater sense of empowerment. Made, in particular, commented on the value of the street committee in enabling people who were not confdent to ‘express their ideas’ at a mass meeting, and to feel comfortable doing so (interview, n.d.). Through instigating mobilisation from below, drawing on real and felt problems, the participation it generated became developmental. This strand of people’s power thus exhibited a degree of agency and subaltern power not present in the narrative from Lusaka. What it sought to produce was not just ‘active’ and ‘mobilised’ masses but educated and empowered ones. The benefcial impact of self-governance was also understood in relation to more direct benefts of social order, cohesion and upliftment. Cherry, who was working on a township adult education project during 1985–1986, did not recall people saying that the formation of street and area committees was going to be about democracy per se. However, she did note that those structures were used to facilitate education: ‘to empower people further through offering them literacy skills, numeracy, life skills, political education, access to information, and so on’ (interview, 2012). The Alexandra Action Committee’s (AAC) establishment of popular structures was not only part of the national liberation struggle; its stated aims also included elimination of illiteracy, adult education, assisting the unemployed to earn money, after-school care and family housing (Mayekiso 1988: File 9, HH8). In Alexandra, the formation of yard committees was welcomed as a way to bring people together, reduce community and ethnic confict (Tshabalala 1988: 3730–3731) and resolve differences and fnd solutions to shared problems (see Bozzoli 2004: 194–195). A second theme in local discourse concerned service provision and self-help. Although related to the discourse of grassroots democracy, its inspiration stemmed not so much from normative democratic thinking as from the need to address the neglect of the state. The activities of civics and other structures were thus often oriented toward social welfare. The discourse of service provision manifested in two ways: one was a culture 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 77 of self-help or ‘doing things for oneself’; and the other involved using popular structures to negotiate with local authorities to improve the provision of services. The frst of these refected a culture of initiative and organisation in which communities flled the gap left by the state. Even the people’s courts which took on a function of alternative justice, dealt with a range of community-based disputes, sometimes addressing social problems originating with the political struggle itself.5 The second of these facets—securing concessions from the local state—relates directly to the frst. Swilling asserts that once the civics had won mass support they needed to sustain that support by showing that people’s efforts could reap benefts (1989 cited in Botha 1992: 65). The objective of some civic initiatives was therefore to force the state to do its job. The tradition of negotiating concessions preceded the discourse of pre-fgurative democracy. Thozamile Botha of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) noted that ‘[a]s far back as 1979 PEBCO sent a number of delegations to meet with the East Cape Administration Board’ (1992: 69). In Alexandra, the AAC set itself up as a democratic organisation that wanted recognition from local state administrators (Mayekiso 1988: 3017–3018) and to represent the community and their problems to the authorities (Bapela 1988: 3966; Mdakane 1988: 2135). Negotiation with local authorities was still seen as a form of democracy: communities were involved in decision-making about how to approach the state and sent delegates to meet the authorities and negotiate on their behalf. In this sense, the civics saw themselves as structures of civil society whose role was not only to represent communities but to hold the government to account. The role of service provision was for some people seen as reformist (UDF NWC 1986) and perhaps refected unease at the risk of either civic co-option or the permanency of dual power. Lusaka discouraged civics quite frmly from acting as service providers. This was partly on the basis of their lack of capacity to fulfl municipal government functions (ANC 1985d: 12), but there is also a suggestion that the civic strategy of negotiation was viewed by the ANC as reformist. Its January 8 Statement of 1986 affrmed: ‘We are not fghting and are not dying in order to have a better system of waste disposal. We are engaged in struggle for the inalienable right to govern our country in all its parts’ (ANC NEC 1986). Local concerns about urban space and services, moreover, often became obscured by the national liberation agenda (Swilling interview, 2013). 78 H. BROOKS

3.3 ideologues and Influences The various themes identifable in people’s power construct a picture of its constitutive parts. They can also be linked, however, to particular ideological or theoretical roots, providing a greater sense of the normative ideas generated about participation. Alongside the lived experience of individuals, people’s power’s intellectual heritage produced a nuanced interpretation, both of its role in struggle and of the normative alternative to liberal democracy.

The Role of Intellectuals An important infuence on the theorisation of people’s power was the role of leading intellectuals. Within the UDF, such individuals were especially infuential in developing ideas about democracy. Often, they held multiple memberships and organisational allegiances and so it is not possible to link emergent ideas to individuals in an isolated manner. Nonetheless, there is value in identifying intellectual and personal infuences to trace the spread of ideas. As noted already, the structures that came to be known as ‘organs of people’s power’ were not initially imbibed with a pre-fgurative content. Prior to 1985, the UDF had been largely disconnected from local material struggles—focusing, instead, on the campaign against elections for a tricameral parliament. That being said, although according to Cherry, the UDF had no ‘grand plan’ of where it was going, its leadership did have ‘lots of ideas about democracy’ (interview, 2012). Swilling contends that the pre-fgurative discourse of people’s power was developed by people within the UDF who ‘now had to develop a theory for all of this in terms of national liberation’:

So they brought in a discourse of pre-fgurative people’s power in order to create a political language that they laid over these local struggles. And some of the local leaders who were connected into those networks would absorb that language to just legitimize what they were doing. But most of them, it was just a struggle, against eviction, for land, consumer boycotts, boycott services, etc. (Interview, 2013)

Not everybody therefore took a theoretical approach, or at least not initially, to what became known as ‘people’s power’. For many participants, 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 79 local revolt was about material struggle. Cherry, who herself undertook research in Kwazakele near Port Elizabeth, suggests that activities were really being driven at the local level. While the UDF’s theorists were writing about people’s power and what it meant, she commented: ‘[p] eople here weren’t reading that stuff; they were just doing it. They were saying we are making the township ungovernable, we are taking control, putting into place our own structures, and so on’ (interview, 2012). Academic, Jeremy Seekings who himself researched the UDF extensively, also suggests that ‘people’s power’ became a good way for the UDF to ‘package’ what was taking place (interview, 2013). From the archives of the UDF and ANC it is diffcult to ascertain the extent to which local affliates were reading theoretical texts or were infuenced by similar ideas to the Front’s intellectual activists. Suttner, who wrote for Isizwe and contributed to the theorisation of people’s power, conceded: ‘I’m an intellectual and I make a lot of it. But for a lot of people … it’s just a very practical thing’ (interview, 2012). The shortage of documented records on more localised activity is perhaps one explanation for the primary focus of existing accounts on regional- and national-level discourse. Nonetheless, the ideas which surfaced through ideologues such as Suttner and Jeremy Cronin, Swilling argues, ‘became the offcial ideology of the UDF’ (interview, 2013). Suttner, along with Cronin, spearheaded the infuential campaign in 1985 to re-popularise the Freedom Charter through the celebration of its thirty-year anniversary. Although the UDF did not offcially adopt the Charter until 1987, the anniversary was used to build a theoretical connection between mass activity and the Charter’s democratic demands (UDF 1987b). Cronin noted: ‘- it was also an attempt to go back to those roots – the last period of sustained popular mobilisation … The Congress of the People, the collection of demands and so forth, were all attempts to stir up an alternative form of democracy and participation by people to talk about their, you know, what they wanted’ (interview, 2012). In particular, the clause of the Charter which referred to replacing structures of minority rule with ‘democratic organs of self-government’ was resurrected in the 1985 campaign as a representation of precisely what was taking place: ‘The Charter says that all bodies of minority rule shall be scrapped and replaced by democratic organs of people’s power. The democratic organs being built today by our people in the towns, villages and factories will lay the basis for the government of the people’ (UDF 1987b). 80 H. BROOKS

What Cronin and Suttner sought to achieve was a correlation in theory and practice between people’s power, on the one hand, and the Freedom Charter’s vision of democracy, on the other. Suttner made the following comment about how this connection was made:

At the objective level, what it meant for me as an intellectual was for the frst time I was seeing the ‘popular’ in the masses, in creativity; and the way they conducted themselves led me to think that the meaning of the Freedom Charter was being re-read … The emphasis had been on the vote. Now the activities were not emphasising the national parliament … and what I interpreted it to mean, and what some of them – they didn’t have the same theoretical interest as I had – but what some people said, as I say, what we are doing in Uitenhage in street committees is implementing the frst clause of the Freedom Charter. (Interview, 2012)

Suttner’s interpretation was that the Charter needed to be re-read and reinterpreted in light of new events. Sydney Mufamadi—a civic and trade union activist as well as a member of the ANC’s underground structures—made a similar observation that many of the ideas set out in 1955 would come to make sense over time, with greater signifcance being added to them as people continued to experience the brunt of apartheid (interview, 2012). Although it was not at all clear that the drafters of the Charter had envisaged ‘democratic organs of self-government’ as participatory democratic institutions, some of the movement’s theorists sought to attach to them a new but organic meaning. As such, although the pre-fgurative narrative was inspired by grassroots activity, the concept itself seems to have originated with the movement’s intellectuals. Seekings referred to the frequent quotation of the 1987 speech by Morobe on behalf UDF which referred to people’s power as pre-fgurative. However, he interestingly doubted very much that it was written by Morobe, instead citing someone such as Andrew Boraine as a possible author (interview, 19 February). Similarly, the oft- cited speech by Zwelakhe Sisulu on ‘People’s Education for People’s Power’ (1986) seems to have been mostly written, according to Suttner, by Neil Coleman who he described as ‘a very important invisible theorist’ (interview, 2012). Sydney Mufamadi was another important theorist, although he didn’t write on popular power, and the article on ‘discipline’ in Isizwe, although anonymous, was written by Suttner himself (Suttner interview, 2012). 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 81

It is thus not evident whether the theorising that activists undertook during the 1980s is an accurate refection of what most people envisaged. Boraine conceded that he didn’t know how widespread the debates about a pre-fgurative democracy were, or how many people were reading what was published about it (interview, 2013). It is intriguing that Boraine, who elsewhere in a study of Mamelodi township had presented people’s power quite unambiguously as pre-fgurative participatory democracy (Boraine 1987) was cautious with hindsight about overstating the connection between the future dispensation and the struggles of the 1980s:

You know we may theorise about them and, you know you can build people’s parks and - a lot of it is just symbolic… it’s saying to the apartheid regime: ‘stuff you, we’re going to do what we want to do’, you know. And it was sometimes deliberately provocative to show that. And most of the time I would say they were strategies for mobilising participation in the struggle, which in itself is educating about democracy, but it wasn’t necessarily consciously about building the new society. I would be hesitant to kind of go that far. (Interview, 2013)

Even at the most local level, distinctions also existed between the strata of activists/organisers and the individuals in communities who carried out popular directives. A case in point is popular justice which, for many of its advocates, embodied notions of social cohesion, accountability and rehabilitation. Yet, in practice, the courts sometimes resorted to violence, terror and the arbitrary issuing of punishments (see Bozzoli 2004; Scharf and Ngcokoto 1990). Relevant to the analysis of discourse is also the issue of race. A number of the UDF’s leaders and prominent activists were White or Indian, raising the question of whose voices were dominant in emergent discourses, and whether the pre-fgurative narrative of democracy was resonant amongst participants themselves. This issue speaks to contemporary debates about the role of scholar-activists in working class social movements and the extent to which the theories they apply to the collective struggles of the poor merely suit their own ideological commitments.6 That being said, the interviews undertaken for this research indicated no clear difference in the discourses of black activists. While the concern is valid in a racially-divided society, activists such as Mufamadi, Tsenoli, Masondo and Mayekiso drew on similar texts, activist experiences and 82 H. BROOKS their identifcation with the liberation movement. The distinction thus seemed not to be one of race so much as social class, education or organisational and movement affliation. What many ordinary participants were inspired by is, nonetheless, unclear. Although the pre-fgurative discourse became the dominant one in the UDF, it was not uniformly adopted across the ANC camp. Cherry, for example, did not recall participants themselves connecting their activities to the Freedom Charter (interview, 2012). The location of popular struggles in a context of the Charter’s demands instead seems indicative of the role played by activist-intellectuals in sowing conceptual seeds. Yet, visible in popular organisation was also a more organic and bottom– up discourse of democracy which, as the preceding section showed, took shape under its own steam. The UDF and other activists, keen to build on this momentum, perhaps lay over these subaltern projects, a dominant, and more ‘public’, discourse of ANC-linked popular power. The dearth of primary sources and literature from those participating in local structures, not only contributes to what has become a dominant discourse in the ANC, but renders challenging the depiction of an accurate picture of the balance between grassroots and top-down narratives. The role of intellectuals, nonetheless, fags the issue of identity and affliation. On the one hand, ANC cadres at home and abroad saw themselves as part of the same movement and the multiple affliations of many individuals—between the ANC, SACP, UDF, civics and labour—led to conceptual cross-pollination. Yet, in contrast to the discourse of pre-fgurative local democracy, prominent in the UDF, Cherry remarked that the ANC, whose focus was on revolutionary objectives, ‘was saying nothing about democratic structures’ (ibid.). Suttner, who saw a need to ‘re-think the meanings’ of the Freedom Charter in light of popular activity, also remarked: ‘I don’t know whether people in Lusaka did that because sometimes the ANC statements would say what we are going to do is we are going to establish a state of people’s power. Now, when they talked about that they were really talking about smashing the apartheid state and having some sort of ANC-led government … What that meant for the direct, local, I don’t think they had thought out that’ (interview, 2012). The UDF’s leading ideologues were also not the same as those of the ANC itself. In exile, the ANC had its own intellectuals, such as Pallo Jordan (Head of the ANC’s Research Department), Joel Netshitenzhe (the editor of Mayibuye) and the SACP intellectual and leader, Joe Slovo. The tone of the publications emerging from exile did not always have the 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 83 same focus as those of the UDF. Thus, although we are able to identify many common threads, the movement’s cadres were also infuenced by slight variations in ideological thought.

Marxism-Leninism Marxist infuence in the ANC comprised not only a variety of currents but was found across all strands of the movement. Notions of radical democracy, revolution and the active participation of the people derive from the Marxist tradition. Although we must exercise caution in attributing particular characteristics to those ‘in exile’, the infuence of Marxist-Leninist theory was indeed more visible here than in the MDM. The ANC’s adoption of the strategy of ‘people’s war’, for example, was informed not only by strategic interests but by debates in revolutionary theory, which themselves had bearing on its democratic vision. Lusaka’s theorisation of people’s power, as it relates to democracy specifcally, seems to have been undertaken by the ANC’s Political Commission. In 1986, the movement produced a discussion paper entitled ‘Ungovernability and People’s Power’ which, although left anonymous, is referred to elsewhere as a ‘Political Commission Discussion Document’ (ANC PC 1986: 6). Its aim was to ‘establish broad guidelines’ for the further advancement of people’s power and is described as ‘a response to the request of activists on the ground’ (ANC, n.d.). As well as drawing on reports and experiences of specifc locations inside South Africa, the document is described as potentially serving as a guide for further activity. Notably, it depicted people’s power as a replacement democratic authority for the structures of the old order (ibid.: 1) but was unclear as to the precise form this authority was expected to take. A notable conceptual infuence in the text is Lenin’s notion of ‘dual power’, originating with the events of the 1917 Russian revolution and drawing heavily on the model of the 1871 Paris Commune. The idea of ‘dual power’ and the extent to which a counter-authority to the South African state was established during the 1980s was debated amongst ANC activists. Hassen Ebrahim, who was based with the ANC in Botswana, emphasised that popular control of territories was important not only as a method of resistance but in ‘shaping and developing our own ideas with regard to power and what type of power should replace the current power’ (interview by O’Malley, 1999). The ANC’s document drew on the emergence of organs of people’s power in other 84 H. BROOKS revolutionary contexts, and characterised their rudimentary form in South Africa as emerging ‘at the point when the masses start to address the question of the seizure of power’ (ANC, n.d.: 2). The seizure of power by the people was, moreover, linked by the ANC to the process of NDR. The ANC’s description of the power envisaged in NDR bears a strong resemblance to the ‘dual power’ described by Lenin, established by the Paris Communards and, later, the Russian Soviets: Both accounts emphasise the seizure of state power, popular initiative and mass character of the struggle, as well as its distinction from parliamentary ‘bourgeois’ revolutions (ANC, n.d.; Lenin 1917). Like South Africa’s organs of people’s power, the source of the alternative power described by Lenin is the Soviets—‘the direct initiative of the people from below, in their local areas’ (1917). The ANC’s Political Commission notably encouraged a structure not dissimilar to the Soviets in which ‘the Street and Area Committees should link up in a pyramid fashion and form a central people’s organ’ (ANC PC 1986). As these committees were formed in South Africa, this is precisely how they were structured, with a large number of yard, block or section committees at the base of the pyramid, moving upwards to a decreasing number of street committees, and an area committee or council (see Fig. 3.1). Although the ANC laid emphasis on the national democratic, as opposed to socialist, nature of the South African revolution and the spec- ifcity of South African conditions, so, too, did it reinforce the instrumental role of people’s power structures: a focus on ‘ensuring all the time that they carry out the revolutionary task that is expected of them’ (ANC, n.d.: 19). Organs of people’s power, from this perspective, were only democratic in so far as they incorporated everyone, elected their representatives, and involved active participation. They were not multi-interest forums or pluralistic structures but were imbued with revolutionary purpose. While the ANC’s direct control over popular structures may have been limited, its belief in an externally-led revolution nonetheless remained steadfast. Barrell contends that the failure of the ANC, ultimately, to instigate a popularly-based armed struggle resulted from the lack of any real degree of autonomy granted to those inside the country (1993: ch. 9). A revolution led by the vanguard trumped the cultivation of popular initiative. At home, there were some similar intellectual inspirations. Activists were infuenced by ideologies relating to state power and revolutionary 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 85

Fig. 3.1 Hand-drawn image of the structure of organs of people’s power in Alexandra township (action council and street, block and yard committees) (Source Mayekiso, M., and four others, trial records, Historical Papers Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa) change, particularly the works of Marx (Seedat interview, 2013; Mashatile interview, 2013; Carrim interview, 2013; Steinberg 2000: 187–188). In Alexandra, activist Mzwanele Mayekiso compared the AAC to the Paris Commune (1996: 83). Rashid Seedat, who was involved in the UDF and youth organisation in the Indian community, indicated the strong infuence of the Soviet model amongst people in the ANC and UDF (interview, 2013). In particular, he referred to the models of the Paris Commune and the Russian Soviets as informing the theorisation of people’s power (interview, 2013). There was also some lack of uniformity in revolutionary inspiration. Some activists were infuenced by the Soviet Union and East Germany, as well as by African states such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola (Mashatile interview, 2013). For others, the revolutions in Latin America made more of an impression (Boraine interview, 2013). That the UDF did not draw more publicly on some of these theoretical linkages is 86 H. BROOKS understandable: The opportunities available as a result of its legal status were not something the Front wished to jeopardise. As Seedat explained, the UDF would need to ‘temper’ what it said (interview, 2013). Nonetheless, according to Brigitte Mabandla, who was part of the external mission in Lusaka, the ANC, like many liberation movements of the time, was ‘very much infuenced by socialist theory as articulated in the Soviet Union’ (interview, 2013). From analysis of archival documents, there is no strong suggestion that the ANC or UDF drew on the Soviet Union as a model for a future South Africa. Nonetheless, the Front’s rejection of liberal, parliamentary- style democracy was fairly unambiguous. Moosa’s claim, that the UDF had always envisaged features such as political pluralism, freedom of speech and a bill of rights as fundamental (Moosa interview, 2013) seems somewhat implausible: Neither UDF nor ANC discourses resembled the parliamentary and gradualist ideas of Marxists like Kautsky or Eduard Bernstein and, instead, refected the infuences (albeit themselves divided) of Lenin and Left-wing Marxism. In terms of the latter, there is little evidence of the commitment to civil liberties within socialism as defended by Lenin’s adversary, Rosa Luxemburg.7 Coovadia observed that, although the UDF was very insistent on organising democratically—on democratic practice and accountability—according to him, in ‘the throes of struggle’, discussion about a multi-party future or bill of rights did not take place (interview, 28 May 2013). What is possible to identify, is that different strands of Marxism carried more weight in some parts of the movement than in others. The SACP had very close ties with Moscow and examination of the syllabus and lectures of the ANC’s Department of Political Education (DPE) indicates its focus on socialism and the example of the Soviet Union (ANC DPE 1986–1988). Interestingly, a document from the ANC’s archival collection, entitled ‘Reading List for Study Groups on Guerrilla Warfare-Tactics and Strategy’, with ‘T. Mbeki’ noted in hand- writing at the top, is informative in the texts it recommends. These include Lenin, Marx and Gramsci, as well as Basil Davidson on African revolution, Amilcar Cabral’s writings on Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, the Mozambican academic and liberation movement leader, Eduardo Mondlane, Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara, Vietnam’s General Giap on people’s war, Mao Tse Tung on China and guerrilla warfare, and Regis Debray on Latin American revolution. The list also includes South African writings from Joe Slovo, Govan Mbeki, Harold Wolpe, and Jack 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 87 and Rae Simons, as well as a list of articles from Sechaba and the African Communist (ANC London Collection, n.d.-e.). The DPE syllabus, however, also dealt with nationalist ideology—a refection of the ANC’s mixed intellectual heritage—and referred specifcally to ‘the cross-pollination of ideas between communism and nationalism’ (ANC DPE 1989). Some individuals in the UDF were also members of the SACP, and so the infuence of Marxism-Leninism— and through it revolutionary strategy—undoubtedly seeped in through underground structures and academia. That Lusaka’s guidance document on ‘Ungovernability and People’s Power’ was issued in response to requests from domestic activists indicates the circulation of ideas. The infuence of Marxism amongst those at home, however, incorporated a greater variety of currents. Within the MDM, alternatives to orthodox Marxism-Leninism were also taking root.

Alternative Currents of Marxism One of the most signifcant of these was the work of Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci (Carrim interview, 2013; Cherry interview, 2012; Tsenoli interview, 2013; Moosa interview, 2013). Infuential on many UDF activists, Gramsci’s ideas seem primarily to have related to revolutionary theory and the practice of struggle (Moosa interview, 2013; Cherry interview, 2012). His notion of ‘hegemony’, in particular, was relevant. UDF strategy, according to Houston (1999), refected Gramsci’s ‘war of position’—a concept based on waging a battle for hegemony through persuasion rather than force. His related concept of ‘civil society’ also inspired many in the UDF. Operating on legal terrain but in opposition to the state, through civil society, organised movements such as the Front could build an alternative ideological hegemony to challenge that of the dominant class. Although Gramsci himself did not tie his concept of hegemony to normative discussions of democracy, his ideas came to inspire Left alternatives to Bolshevism (Killingsworth 2012: 14). Gramsci’s work is hence often viewed as a forerunner to democratic Marxism. Rather than, as Lenin conceived, the interests of the people being pre-determined by history, democratic choice would be a critical component of creating a socialist hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 58–59). In the UDF, however, the Gramscian approach seems to have been discussed more in terms of its strategic utility than its democratic credentials (Cherry interview, 2012). 88 H. BROOKS

In fact, Gramsci’s notion of civil society, Friedman argues, led not to a view of civil society in which hegemony was won through ‘pluralist political activity’ but through the ‘colonisation’ of civil society institutions by ideologists of the liberation movement (1992: 86). The neo-Gramscian acceptance of a parliamentary path to power also does not ft with UDF statements on the inadequacy of parliamentary democracy or with the acceptance by many activists of a Leninist-inspired insurrection. Gramscian infuence on activists at home was notably not identifable in exile—likely a result of the stronger infuence of Moscow, and Gramsci’s location outside of orthodox Leninism. The SACP, in particular, exhibited little awareness of Western Marxist ideas and regarded as suspicious and ‘heterodox’ the socialist alternatives to Marxism-Leninism. The infuence within the ANC’s broader camp of varying strands of Marxism, however, is refected in a comment by UDF activist, Yunus Carrim, who described the Front’s view of a ‘people’s democracy’ as following a more Gramscian approach, whereas that in exile was more ‘neo-Stalinist’ (interview, 2013). This suggestion is given substance by Turok who remarked: ‘we were not Gramsci-ists … we were Stalinists. Central power was what mattered’ (interview, 2013). In contrast, the UDF’s cross-class nature and approach to revolutionary struggle went against the grain of Leninist theory (Houston 1999: 16). Notably, Turok suggests that it was ideological and theoretical differences that resulted in the UDF being seen as a threat by some in the SACP leadership—a perception which he argues, ultimately, led to the Front being ‘closed down’ (interview, 2013). This conceptual division in the ANC camp was quite possibly linked to the split between Marxism-Leninism and alternative Left currents which incorporated Lenin’s dispute with Rosa Luxemburg and Leon Trotsky. Their concern was that the presence of a ‘vanguard’ party may frustrate rather than advance revolution (Geras 1972), a position which is likely to have spoken to contestations between the NDR approach and ‘workerist’ or ‘council’ traditions existent in parts of the MDM. Here, it was not in a vanguard party but in the trade unions and local communities that power would be rooted, and they constituted the primary vehicles for revolutionary change (Schecter 1994: 92–95). This was a position which gained ground in the South African labour and civic movements. Cronin referred to the growing infuence on South African labour of the Polish union federation, Solidarity and, later, the Brazilian Workers’ Movement (interview by Sheehan, 2001). Each of these labour organisations had sought to advance workers’ rights through prioritising 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 89 workplace issues and safeguarding their autonomy from the Communist Party. Solidarity, in particular, was scorned by the SACP. It was in South Africa’s independent trade unions, which mushroomed in the 1970s to challenge the labour relations system that practices of participatory democracy perhaps manifested most clearly. They would also come to infuence modes of organisation in civics and communities. The unions prioritised workplace issues over political struggle and, up until the formation of the ANC-aligned Cosatu in 1985, had remained frmly committed to class-based struggle and a focus on shop- foor issues (Fine and Webster 1989). Their mode of organising, through the creation of shop steward committees and a pyramid structure of committees or councils, succeeded in winning concrete gains for workers to improve their day to day conditions and ultimately their own control of their working environment (Friedman 1985; von Holdt 2003). Concern within organised labour about the dangers of being drawn into national political efforts were well-founded in the context of a national liberation movement whose approach required the submission of localised activities to a revolutionary seizure of state power. The neglect of workers’ struggles in favour of the liberation movement was a criticism levelled at the ANC-aligned Sactu (Friedman 1985). For Lusaka, the need for a revolutionary vanguard movement to guide mass struggle underpinned the ANC’s military strategy and its insurrectionary view of popular power. Individuals such as Cyril Ramaphosa—then a prominent and commanding activist of the independent and burgeoning National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), presented both a threat and a potential recruit for the liberation movement leadership (Butler 2013: 226). Although the ANC’s review of political and military strategy in 1979 had proposed a strengthening of united, working class organisation under the movement’s ambit (Butler 2013: 215, 218), the ANC’s own absorption of the theoretical outlook of organised labour are not apparent. The former’s report on mass mobilisation at the 1985 ANC Consultative Conference in Kabwe, Zambia, expressed unease that the South African working class was ‘bedevilled with various ideological tendencies which are harmful to the development of the national liberation struggle’ (ANC 1985e: 3). It also expressed concern at the lack of a ‘clear political perspective’ amongst expanding civic and community organisations (ANC 1985b). As such, although terms such as syndicalism, workerism and ultra-leftism were abhorred in the ANC’s offcial discourse—and eventually shunned amongst ANC-aligned unions with the formation of the Cosatu in 90 H. BROOKS

19858—some strands of the MDM still retained roots in syndicalist-type traditions. In the case of the civics, such infuences, discussed further below, manifested via individuals also involved in trade union organisation. Visible in the neighbourhood self-government of the street and area committees was the councillist tradition of a pyramid structure of people’s councils or committees (Glaser 1991: 113–114; 1998: 35). Despite Gramsci’s defence of the need for a Socialist Party, he too supported the council model’s emphasis on organisation from below (Schecter 1994: 88–89; Forgacs 1999: 78). Differences in conceptual orientation between the ANC-SACP and MDM thus mirrored divisions within Marxist theory.

Pre-fgurative Radical Democracy Ideas about the future of popular structures were rooted both in ideological tradition and in the practical experience of exclusion. With regard to the former, people’s power’s pre-fgurative element also emerged from a Marxist heritage. Some activists linked pre-fguration of the future to Gramsci’s notion of an ‘interregnum’: between the death of the old society and the birth of the new (Coleman interview, 2013; Boraine 1987: 3). Suttner indeed referred to ‘pre-fgurative democracy’ as a Gramscian term (interview, 2012). Gramsci’s notion that ‘the old is dying and the new cannot yet be born’ was drawn on as a formulation to understand how the ‘goal’ or ‘end result’ could be connected to the means of getting there (Boraine 1987: 3). It was in this sense, according to UDF’s Boraine, that the present, or ‘interregnum’, offered ‘glimpses of the new’ (ibid.). For others in the ANC, the pre-fgurative notion was associated with the model of Marxist-inspired revolutions elsewhere. Especially infuential was the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. Morobe’s 1987 speech drew on the Nicaraguan revolutionaries’ proposal for a ‘permanent dynamic of people’s participation’ as an inspiration for South African ideas about democracy (1987: 83). The ‘democratic’ in ‘national democratic revolution’ was also highlighted as representing a superior form of democracy, involving the ‘taking control by all the people of all aspects of their lives’ (UDF 1986b: 740). A future state would thus not only be democratic but participatory in nature. In a document on the role of extra-parliamentary opposition, the UDF explained that the rise of popular localised struggles around daily living conditions and economic deprivation had led to an appreciation of the importance of seeing the national democratic state as ‘a function of mass organisation’ (UDF c.1987: 7). 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 91

In terms of lived experience, the desire to merely create something that represented the very antithesis of the existing system was arguably more widespread amongst grassroots participants than political or democratic theory. Tsenoli commented: ‘we were seeing our experiences of the apartheid state then, in the way it fragmented communities and it actually disempowered people by denying them of opportunities to participate in decision making, as something that we should not only rem- edy but we should ensure also that what comes into replacing it makes that as part of its modus operandi’ (interview, 2013). Deprivation not only of political rights but control over all aspects of people’s lives—from home life to education and the workplace—engendered a sense that ‘true’ democracy would entail popular control over all of those things. The formation of democratic mass organisation was a way of beginning to ‘realise’ this principle (Mamdoo 1988). From this perspective, popular structures pre-fgured not so much the state as a future society in general (Coovadia interview, 2013; Mayekiso interview, 2013; Tsenoli interview, 2013). In developing ideas about the participatory nature of this future, infuence was drawn from the practices and experience of the independent trade unions. Much more so than the civics, the unions were consciously building democratic structures (Cherry interview, 2012). The exchange of ideas between unions and civic organisations took place as a result of people such as Moses Mayekiso of the National Union of Metalworkers in Alexandra, Cosatu’s Chris Dlamini on the East Rand (Coleman interview, 2013; Tsenoli interview, 2013) and Sam Ntuli of the National Union of Mineworkers in Thokoza (Coleman interview, 2013). Mayekiso transferred his experience of building union shop steward committees and councils to civic work in Alexandra: The building of popular structures with layers of elected leadership in which the civic was given a mandate for action by communities (Mayekiso interview, 2013).9 Such methods of organising in the civic context, however, did not always stem from ideological belief so much as being an effective way of addressing issues on the ground. It is also possible to link the extension of ideas about participation to the post-1960 emergence of the New Left which resurrected participatory democratic discourse internationally amongst socialist movements, intellectuals and students. Cherry referred to an emerging ‘democratic socialist’ tradition amongst young intellectuals in South Africa which was seen as a counter to the Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist infuences 92 H. BROOKS emerging from the Soviet bloc (interview, 2012). According to her, people within this group were reading ‘Gramsci, Laclau, Poulantzas and European Marxists, and debating hegemony and participation’. She also commented that Rick Turner’s The Eye of the Needle (1972), which advanced ideas about worker control and participatory democracy in South Africa, was a very infuential text on that generation of student activists (interview, 2012). Turner’s ideas also sparked interest in particular models of worker control internationally, including Poland’s Solidarity (ibid.; Cronin interview, 2012). Through these lines of infuence, civic and shop-foor struggles became dynamically linked, while normative democratic thought about a participatory society fltered in through unionists, students and intellectuals. The independent unions had begun combining workplace and popular political struggles through what Webster termed ‘social movement unionism’ (1988). Instituting principles of the ascension of power from below, their practices were important in shaping a model of different society. The debate over whether they retained their focus on the workplace or became involved in political work (Fine and Webster 1989) was therefore a signifcant one, not only in relation to the strategic and ideological ‘correctness’ of building racial and class alliances, but in terms of the survival of the principles and processes of democracy that these unions had established. It also underscored concerns that would become more prominent after 1990 about the role and autonomy of ordinary people in both struggle and democracy. Although it would be incorrect to exaggerate the extent to which normative debates about democracy at home took place independently of those in exile, it would also be mistaken to argue that such theorisation was of equal concern across the movement. The debates and ideas amongst democratic socialists and the independent trade unions are notably absent in the discourse from Lusaka. Indeed, it is striking that the publications and documents from the ANC’s exile collection show no traits of union-style organising, nor a desire to replicate workplace methods of representation. In general, the external mission does not appear to have grappled to the same degree with the form of a future democracy, nor do they make the UDF’s link between mass organisations and democracy. As such, while the ANC’s January 8 Statements made regular reference to ‘people’s power’, they did not develop it further as a pre-fgurative democratic idea. 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 93

Activist Discourses and Community Organising: Democracy as Transformative In addition to normative democratic debate, other intellectual infuences are identifable in the domestic movement. Amongst internal cadres, people’s power was also shaped by activist discourse and the applied theory of community organising. This aspect, present in the theme of grassroots governance, is not visible in UDF statements focused on national-level political change. Rather, discussion about the model and application of community organising took place at a local level. In the frst instance, the democratic ethos that community organising came to embody was informed by practical experience and direct benefts. The organisation of communities and their conscientisation drew not so much on a grand narrative of revolution as on concrete local experiences and the inequalities of everyday living. Through tackling basic socio-economic demands and drawing a link with the political system, organisers were raising popular awareness of the reasons behind people’s circumstances (Moosa interview, 2013; Coovadia interview, 2013). Activists involved in grassroots work also appear to have been infuenced by community organising globally. An infuential document at the time was a 1978 manual for organisers written in the Philippines, entitled Organising People for Power (Seekings 2000b: 56–57 and interview, 2013; Cherry interview, 2012). According to Seekings, this was used by South African civics to build popular initiatives around local issues, drawing on both the material needs of communities and their psychological empowerment (2000b: 58–59). Domestic activists, more than those in exile, could appreciate the tangible benefts to communities of organising through people’s power. For those away from home and distanced from domestic activism, Moosa noted that ‘there wasn’t that same level of consciousness about the need to involve ordinary people’. Although he noted that there was no confict involved in this difference, there was, he remarked, a degree of ‘tension’ (interview, 2013). In this way, individuals’ differential experiences shaped their ideas about current conditions and the future they envisaged. Tsenoli (interview, 2013) and Cherry (2000b) referred to Rules for Radicals (1972), written by American community organiser, Saul Alinsky. Alinsky’s work involved guidance for activists on the empowerment of low-income communities and, interestingly, sought deliberately to separate the notion of ‘revolution’ from ideology and from communism in particular (Alinsky 94 H. BROOKS

1972: 9–10). Cherry also noted that ideas being espoused by community activists in the USA, such a Francis Moore Lappe, were similar to those of activists in South Africa: of ‘ordinary people taking control of all aspects of their lives’ (2000b: 26). Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire, whose work emphasised the empowering and liberating potential of education, was also an inspiration (Tsenoli interview, 2013; Coleman interview, 2013; Cherry interview, 2012). Freirian pedagogy covered the conscientisation of the oppressed, the importance of adult and popular education in the establishment of democracy, and the importance of education relating to popular lived experience (Infed, n.d.). In this sense, the construction of democratic processes alongside popular education were mutually reinforcing: participation was, in the Rousseauian sense, educative. Freire’s ideas also resonated with campaigns for ‘people’s education’. While playing to both the liberation nationalism of the ANC and the popular militancy of the class- room boycott, it also drew on ideas of building the new society through education and shaping people to become citizens (Sisulu 1986). It is possible to see how these inspirations shaped ideas about conscientisation and empowerment. The civics were strongly infuenced by the idea that mass action itself could transform popular consciousness (Seekings 2000b: 58). The AAC’s Moses Mayekiso described the act of conscientising people as ‘to make them aware of the conditions in which they fnd themselves and how they can solve them’ (1988: 2100). The active involvement of people in the ownership of problems and construction of solutions thus had the capacity to create responsible citizens. Through such a notion, people’s power both rejected elitist conceptions of democracy and touched on ideas about the development of human potential and intellect. It also rejected the individualistic thinking of liberalism to promote a more communitarian view of democracy: ‘a politics of the common good, in which neighbours look for common solutions to their problems’ (Stoker 2002: 34). While it is not clear to what extent problems and their solutions were debated before agreement was reached, the very idea that popular organisation involved a process of increasing ‘collective’ capacity (Cohen and Sabel 1997 in Stoker 2002: 32–33), speaks to the idea of deliberation in democratic theory. It may not explicitly relate to a process of reasoning as the basis of agreement,10 but the inclusive nature of discussions and the fnding of accepted solutions, is suggestive of a consensus-based, if not a pluralistic, deliberative democracy. 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 95

It was perhaps the currents of people’s power, focused on grassroots organisation, self-help, education and negotiation, that most contributed to preparing people not only for struggle but for governance. It also suggests the presence of bottom-up currents of organisation and consciousness, and a reimagining of democracy from the grassroots. In this arena, people’s power introduced a notion of democracy that was both participatory (in that the process of political decision-making became the realm of ordinary people) and transformative: a process of decision-making in which maximum participation produces not only democratic outcomes but facili- tates what Pateman describes as ‘the development of the social and political capacities of each individual’ (1970: 43). This was a narrative not always visible in the dominant, top-down discourse of the liberation movement.

3.4 implications for Participatory Democracy Examination of the role of people’s power and the central themes of its discourse enables us to link its ideas about democracy to a clearer conceptual framework. In doing so, it is also possible to identify dominant currents and conceptual tensions. The fnal part of this chapter deals with these theoretical nuances, each of which have implications for emergent understandings of participatory democracy.

Vanguardism and Hegemony Although by no means exclusive to people’s power alone, ‘vanguardism’ appears as a key theme in the movement-people relationship. The role of the ANC as a political and ‘revolutionary vanguard’ (ANC PMSC 1979) is both an identifcation the movement gives to itself, as well as one bestowed on it by its support base. The very status of a ‘vanguard’, claimed by the ANC on numerous occasions (ibid.; ANC NEC 1986, 1988; Mbeki 1984 cited in Johnson 2003: 328–329), embodies a belief in its historic role as a leader of the people. In distinction from the idea of leadership, a vanguard is capable of guiding an active and disciplined people in the direction of defned revolutionary ends The concept of vanguard organisation, often overlooked in analyses of ANC identity, is pivotal to both the ANC’s revolutionary theory and its relationship with the people. As Chapter 2 set out, the notion of the ANC as a popular vanguard has its intellectual roots in Marxist-Leninist and African Nationalist 96 H. BROOKS thought. In the South African context, the amalgamation of the Colonialism-of-a-Special-Type thesis with the Soviet push for the establishment of vanguard parties in ‘third world’ states (Golan 1987: 599– 600) produced an ANC-SACP alliance in a two-stage liberation struggle. In the frst stage of liberation through national democracy, the ANC is the people’s vanguard. The second stage of socialist transition, involving the SACP as the vanguard of the working class, cannot begin until the frst is achieved. In its ultimate objectives and doctrinal focus, the ANC was not a Marxist-Leninist party: It was an African nationalist organisation con- forming to a broad-church character. Its conceptual leanings and modus operandi, however, drew from the experience of its communist allies and the ANC’s DPE included the organisation of a revolutionary vanguard in the content of its curriculum (DPE 1986–1988). With the exception of a commitment to the doctrine of scientifc socialism, several characteristics associated with a vanguard party, as set out in a 1976 article of the Soviet Journal, Narody Azii i Afriki (Peoples of Asia and Africa), can be applied to the ANC in exile:

1. Predominance over mass organisations and unions; 2. Representation of ‘progressive classes and social groups’; 3. A membership limited to those ‘capable of assuming all the obligations of the vanguard detachment of society’; and 4. Organised on the basis of democratic centralism (cited in Golan 1987: 599).

Some of the most visible features of the ANC’s vanguard status are captured in (1) and (2), and these particular characteristics inform its view of popular participation. In Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties, organs of people’s power were often understood in a particularly instrumental sense: As Party organs pursuing the Party programme. In the case of the ANC, the portrayal of popular structures was subtler. Organs were not directly described as appendages of the movement but the vanguard role was nonetheless clear. Netshitenzhe, a member of the ANC’s external mission and editor of its journal, Mayibuye described the careful way in which ANC cadres would come to assume leadership positions within structures of people’s power: 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 97

Good ANC cadres at community-level should so conduct themselves, should so distinguish themselves in the context of struggle, should have an appreciation of the general direction of things that when popular democracy expresses itself they would fnd themselves either elected or selected to lead … What the vanguard movement would seek to do … is to ensure that its cadres win the confdence of the people such that when popular democracy expresses itself, it fnds its cadres in those leadership positions. (Interview, 2013)

The dynamic he describes is akin to the vanguard role of enlightened leadership—Lenin’s ‘advanced section’ of the proletariat; those ‘capable of assuming all the obligations of the vanguard detachment of society’. Other ANC accounts of the role of underground cadres are less delicately phrased. The aforementioned ANC discussion paper, Ungovernability and People’s Power, pronounced that ‘U/g structures per se cannot merge with the street committees, but the vanguard movement should be so frmly in control that political distinction between the ANC and the popular organs becomes non-existent (sic) [emphasis added]’ (ANC, n.d.: 18). Popular structures were here conceived as directly linked to the movement: As vehicles of revolutionary strategy. In a context of illegality, the underground infltration of popular organisations was, of course, indispensable. There is no gainsaying that when the ANC made the call in 1985 to ‘render the country ungovernable’ it aspired to shape how this played out on the ground, “to place the ANC at the head of an unfolding social revolution” (Butler 2012: 50). Yet despite the adage that the masses must be their own liberators, what it sought was the controlled development of a revolutionary offensive, guided by a correct popular understanding of the revolutionary programme (see ANC 1985a, b). The ANC’s strategy and tactics envisaged that its underground units would fulfl a ‘vanguard role of leading the people in a united offensive for the seizure of power’ (ANC 1985a). Accordingly, as a domestic arm of the Congress movement, the revolutionary potential of the UDF was predicated upon the ANC’s infuence amongst its affliates. Ivan Pillay, a key operative in the ANC’s Operation Vula (established to secretly return a number of senior ANC leaders to South Africa), admitted: Vula was not an attempt to ‘plant’ new leaders inside the county but rather to shape internal leaders’ key decisions’ (cited in Butler 2013: 230). The ANC leaders, according to Butler, saw their responsibility as “seizing the opportunities presented to them by history” (2012: 50). 98 H. BROOKS

The urgency of ensuring that mass activity indeed carried revolutionary content was emphasised by the statement: ‘-we must infltrate every organisation; we must initiate political organisation among every sector; we must improve the fow of propaganda and information. The ANC’s presence in the country must be felt’ (ANC NPC 1985). Vanguardism thus implied a crucial and active role for the masses on whose participation liberation depended. In the ANC’s theory of revolution, active participation through people’s power comprised a critical component. It was not a thorn in the side of a centralised leadership, but fundamental to its very success. The ANC maintained: ‘It remains one of the fundamental truths of our struggle that victory cannot be won without the active and conscious participation of the masses of the oppressed people themselves’ (1979). National democratic revolution, it argued, ‘is a popular act based on popular experience’ (ANC, n.d.: 3). In this regard, Mandel’s formulation about participation in socialist revolution is a useful comparison to the role of people’s power in fulflling ANC strategy:

You cannot have a spontaneous socialist revolution. You cannot make a socialist revolution without really trying. And you cannot have a socialist revolution commandeered from the top, ordered around by some omnisci- ent leader or group of leaders. You need both ingredients in a socialist revolution: the highest level of consciousness possible, and the highest level of self-organization and self-activity by the broadest possible segment of the population. (1983: 1)

Yet by locating popular activity at the centre of revolutionary struggle, while simultaneously seeking to inject this activity with the correct theoretical content, the vanguard model of democracy assumed by the ANC is subject to the broader ‘inconsistency’ in Marxist doctrine identifed by Femia (1993: 136): Between ‘the demand for both political control from above and popular initiative from below.’ It constituted not the promise of popular control but the promise of mass support. As such, for the ANC to have opted for a strategy ‘which placed greater stress on supporting independent mass organisation’, as Friedman advocates (2012: 28), would have gone against its instincts as a vanguard and its very theory of revolution. If we accept that vanguardism is a defning feature of the ANC- mass relationship, then it carries important implications for the practice 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 99 of popular participation. The hegemony of a movement or party is only established if its leadership position is accepted by those who are led. To be a popular vanguard, as I have argued elsewhere, is a status earned only ‘by virtue of being recognised as such by the people themselves’ (Brooks 2014: 153). The establishment of the ANC’s hegemony was facilitated by the UDF and MDM, who identifed the ANC as the rightful ‘vanguard’ of the struggle (MDM, c.1988; Molefe 1990a). The UDF, Suttner argues, carried a ‘B Team mentality’; its self-conception being that of ‘a “curtain raiser” before the main team arrived on the feld’ (2004: 699). Mufamadi, who was both an activist and a member of the ANC underground in Soweto, made the following comment about how ANC infuence was able to spread via underground cadres into street committees:

Oliver Tambo is the President of the ANC. I am a member of the ANC in Soweto… I live in some street in Soweto … I’m an active member of the street committee. When we sit to discuss what to do and so on, because of my level of consciousness, even the chairman of the committee will feel that, you know, before he or she goes to the meeting there is a more knowledgeable member of our street. Why don’t I consult this person to see how do we do this, so you actually fnd that you play this mentoring role … And before people know it, they think like the ANC. So Oliver Tambo does not have to try and micro-manage me from Lusaka. Because I am just as much a member of the ANC as he is. When I am in my street, I know how the ANC would have acted if it was here. (Interview, 2012)

Mufamadi’s account captures the bond that underground cadres felt with the ANC, and the extent to which its vanguard role and personif- cation of the popular will was felt by activists at home. On the necessity of vanguard leadership, some of the MDM’s own commentary refects similar thinking to the ANC. A UDF discussion paper emphasised that mass organisations could only bring about change through linking with a broader political organisation; that on their own they ‘cannot lead themselves to a new society’ (UDF 1988). Yet while the broader movement recognised this hegemony, it is noteworthy that it did not necessarily result in an equivalent and identical understanding of participation. Instead, there is a conceptual tension in the interpretation of vanguardism itself. Mass mobilisation, for the ANC, was indispensable, but it required careful guidance by dedicated and 100 H. BROOKS disciplined cadres. Its notion of the state was rooted in a theory of revolution in which a vanguard of professional revolutionaries must lead and direct the struggle. For the UDF, the vanguard hegemony of the ANC did not preclude the simultaneous existence of decentralised structures in which democratic decision-making resided with people themselves. It accepted and revered the ANC’s leadership, but its conception of participation also allowed for a considerable degree of popular control: A future democracy, as the Front envisaged, would be ‘forged though mass action from below’ (UDF c.1987). The tension between these versions in some sense mirrors the dispute in Marxist theory between the role of the vanguard and the workers: In the frst version, an enlightened leadership is critical: mass mobilisation is underpinned by an ultimate truth that must be brought to the masses from without. In the second, leadership is also fundamental: the masses are guided to action in a unifed popular consciousness; yet mobilisation also simultaneously forms a basis for building popular power from below. As Lenin’s detractor, Luxemburg, emphasised, there is space for mass control alongside revolutionary objectives (Thatcher 2007: 33). A 1990 statement by Transvaal UDF Secretary, Popo Molefe refected a similar decentralised leaning: ‘When members realise that their problems come to notice of the leadership, when their successes are acknowledged, when they are part of the formulation of policy and decisions, then we can say we a have a living breathing democratic vanguard’ (Molefe 1990a). Many in the UDF maintained a commitment to securing state power under ANC leadership, but also underscored that democratic practice was important in its own right. People’s power not only advanced the cause of a transfer of power but constituted a ‘training ground’ (UDF 1876a: 20–23), building the democratic foundations of a future state and society.

Teleology On the one hand, nuances in the understanding of vanguardism refect the dual nature of people’s power’s as a both a means and an end of struggle. Yet, whether subject to revolutionary imperatives or pre-fguring a future society, it is signifcant that people’s power, overall, served a largely teleological role. For its protagonists and participants, it was a phenomenon explained by the purpose it served and there was little indication that the organs of people’s power themselves would play a role 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 101 beyond the defeat of the state. Even for those individuals who held a pre-fgurative understanding of its role, they were not prevented from seeing people’s power as simultaneously a method of struggle (Cherry 2000a: 92; Suttner interview, 2012). Participation, in this sense, became linked to the realisation of something else: to both a theory of historical direction and a pre-constituted notion of the people. The effect of people’s power’s insurrectionary role was to undermine that which nurtured ideas about democracy. As such, it also obscured many nuances in popular thinking and the extent of more localised, bottom-up conceptions less visible in dominant discourse. Although Suttner contends that he re-thought his position on insurrection during the 1990s, he noted that, at the time, ‘we saw everything that undermined the apartheid state as part of a process of seizing power’ (interview, 2012). Yet, the very idea of a seizure of power itself devalued immediate popular activity: Its ‘relevance’, Suttner explained, ‘is understood purely in relation to realising something else’ (2004: 695–696). This is not to say, of course, that the ANC’s support base did not identify with people’s war, or that teleology was synonymous with the military struggle alone. The ANC’s calls for insurrection were powerful inside South Africa and the emphasis on active popular involvement was a fundamental feature of its approach. Yet the creativity it sought was not unbounded, but rather geared to a particular end. Observations made in an ANC collection on the Vietnamese experience capture what some envisaged: ‘Rev.[olution] must frst awaken people politically, their class consciousness must be awakened and they must be given a political outlook. Must avoid ideas that “cadres” or “leaders” are making the rev.[olution]. It is the masses themselves that make the rev. [olution](sic)’ (ANC London Collection, n.d.-b). The ANC’s understanding of active participation refects Femia’s inconsistency of a two- fold desire for both ‘political control from above and popular initiative from below’ (1993: 136). Consciousness and the correct outlook are imparted to the masses by the vanguard. By the close of the 1980s, the conceptual tension between pre-fgurative and immediate imperatives remained. While activists who adhered to a pre-fgurative view often saw no contradiction in the concurrent fulflment of revolutionary goals, it nonetheless left open to question the role that participation would play after the achievement of such objectives. Parallel to this was a tension between accountability to the community versus the movement. CAJ activist, Coovadia, who understood 102 H. BROOKS the objective of organisation to be the overthrow of the state and its replacement with an ANC-led government, maintained simultaneously that democracy was something being built from the grassroots: not an ‘imposition of either a philosophy or political culture or strategy from the top’ (interview, 2013). Whether or not the civics simultaneously served a function of national liberation, they were also ‘local social movements accountable to their local communities’ (Coovadia 1991: 3). Carrim con- trasted the approach of the domestic movement with that adopted by Lusaka:

For the ANC, the main focus was on overthrowing the state. I think for those inside it was both overthrowing the state and building an alternative source of power where civil society is strong. And some of the activists were then also, even then, warning that even if our own movement came to power, into government, we should still have a strong civil society. (Interview, 2013)

His remarks point to a distinction between the ends of mobilisation from above and below. This tension resonates with the two conceptions of vanguardism. Within the domestic movement, awareness of the need to build and safeguard civil society as an arena distinct from state and party had, by the mid-1980s, already begun to surface. That being said, the teleological view was not confned to the exiled ANC, nor to the military pillar alone. As a whole, the Congress movement seems to have adhered to a vanguard model of struggle. Mufamadi’s refections on the strength of the movement-people relationship indicate that the views from exile and from home cannot be neatly separated. Tsenoli, who became involved in negotiations for the ANC after 1990, remarked that continuation of people’s power in a post-apartheid future was by no means supported unanimously by domestic cadres (interview, 2013). There rather appears to have been a lack of internal consistency in the civics’ and UDF’s own theory. Although we can identify conceptual discomfort on refection, it is notable that neither archival documentation, nor the interviews referred to here, suggest that this was identifed by participants at the time. Many of those at home considered their approach to converge neatly with that of Lusaka. As Mufamadi’s articulation conveyed: ‘[they knew] how the ANC would have acted if it was here’ (interview, 2012). The UDF’s endorsement of the ANC-as-vanguard further reinforced this teleology. 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 103

It was perhaps only after 1990 when the formal (and not pre-fgurative) construction of democracy took place that these tensions would come to the fore.

Bounded and Unitary Democracy Amidst the conceptual nuance, a feature which seems to unite all the strands of people’s power is the promotion of a model of democracy that was essentially unitary in form. The discourses of hegemony, unity, vanguardism and discipline contributed to the construction of democracy as something bounded: A participatory process that was circumscribed by allegiance to the ANC. Although domestic activists were engaged in normative debate about democracy’s empowering role, the structures they envisaged remained limited by Charterist hegemony. Democracy was often enabled only in so far as it conformed to that agenda. The ANC, although less explicit than the UDF about the ‘democratic’ in the NDR, linked the achievement of a democratic future to ANC control of the state. However, while it had less to say about the democratic features of people’s power, and more about insurrection, it would be incorrect to lay the movement’s undemocratic traits only at the feet of those in exile. Through its belief in political discipline and the subordina- tion of one’s will to the collective, the UDF’s own vision of democracy carried little respect for political tolerance or the rights of individuals. Its dismissal of parliamentary democracy, moreover, transpired not only from Marxism-Leninism but from the civic and union councillist traditions. Hence while we can lament the loss of the popular power that mushroomed in the 1980s, we must also examine carefully and critically the type of democracy it implied. The Gramscian philosophy of hegemony, so infuential in the UDF, also engendered, at least in practice, a ‘communal pressure’ to conform (Cherry 2000b: 128). Expanding on the idea that the ‘deepening’ of democracy lay in the formation of mass organisations, the Front emphasised that it was ‘united, disciplined mass action—and not left-wing debating societies’ that would ‘lay the basis for real democracy’ (UDF 1987 cited in UDF c.1987: 7–8). In this sense, it wasn’t just the insurrectionary agenda of people’s power, as Suttner has argued, that undermined its popular democratic value. It was the pre-fgurative element as well. As a method of struggle, people’s power was arguably less problematic: People were, for the most part, united by a common goal to 104 H. BROOKS end apartheid. Differences on the basis of race, gender, social class and age were papered over in a joint effort to construct an alternative, or at least to ameliorate the suffering of every-day living. The pre-fgurative discourse, however, failed to cater for difference, assuming that a future South Africa would conform to Charterist hegemony. This approach appealed to the kind of unitary democracy described by Mansbridge: To building a sense of community and the public-minded ‘good citizen’ (1983). However, her caution about the applicability of such a model must be applied to people’s power. While unitary democracy may be appropriate and benefcial in cases where there is common agreement, in contexts in which this is not the case it may serve only to hide or sup- press differences in the name of a false unity (1983: 4, 34–45). The legitimacy conferred on popular structures by virtue of residents’ participation in them, led to a degree of what Cherry describes as ‘non-violent coercion through communal pressure’ (2000b: 128). The construction of ‘people’s courts’ often held greater legitimacy in the eyes of residents than did the institutions of the state. Their authority, however, was self-conferred; they were governed neither by impartiality nor accountability and made no acknowledgement of the separation of powers (Scharf and Ngcokoto 1990: 343). An ANC document on the practice of people’s power, interestingly, linked the courts directly to ‘questions of political unity’: ‘The courts are not simply to hand out punishment, such as in a bourgeois court, but also to provide political leadership … A people’s court is called to address issues that cause divisions amongst the people’ (ANC London Collection, n.d.-c). The same document also noted that ‘If a stayaway or consumer boycott is called, it is the task of the [street or area] committee to make sure that everyone understands the call and participates in the campaign’ (ibid.). Although there is no evidence that the ANC or UDF leadership sanctioned violence in such instances, the messages issued gave clear instructions to build unity in struggle and, on occasion, ensure compliance with activities (ibid.). Even the deliberative features of people’s power were not distinctly pluralistic. Collective discussion and decision-making was overlaid with political discipline. In a sense, the conceptual tensions in the theory of people’s power were played out in the structures themselves. The offcially non-partisan character of popular structures blurred uneasily with their de facto function as vehicles of the Congress movement. An activist in Kwazakehle in the Eastern Cape remarked on the democratic defcit that could result from this situation: 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 105

It was diffcult for those structures … to be tolerant of views that are opposed to the ANC, because of the assumption that this area … was ANC based, and most structures in the democratic movement were dominated by people who either belonged to the ANC or supported the ANC. As a result our opposition, the PAC and AZAPO,11 did not fnd themselves comfortable within those structures. So from the onset the approach was conservative, because it was not representative of all political opinions within ourselves; it was representative of one opinion, which was the Freedom Charter opinion. (Cited in Cherry 2000b: 96)

In some instances, a more intentional partisanship was implied. In the appendix to a document about building organs of people’s power, the open membership of the street committee is seen as having a ‘discipli- nary’ effect on other political affliations: ‘[I]n some townships … there are a few Azapo [Azanian People’s Organisation] members elected onto the street committees. This is not seen as a problem, because the dominant infuence by far is that of the ANC or the UDF. In fact, participation of Azapo individuals within such structures places them under a progressive and collective discipline’ (ANC London Collection, n.d.-c). There thus emerged a blurred line between the maintenance of social cohesion and the enforcement of political obedience. Coleman noted the prevalence of a view that saw organisations such as Azapo ‘as the aggres- sors, as people who couldn’t tolerate the emergence of this very powerful movement’ (interview, 2013). In Mamelodi township, there is evidence that Azapo was compared to a vigilante grouping and ‘not given chance to operate as an organisation’ (ANC London Collection, n.d.-d: 2). In a sense, the social contract involved in people’s power refected the Rousseauian principle of foregoing some individual liberty while gaining civil liberty: through participation, people would come to see themselves increasingly as ‘public’ individuals (Pateman 1970: 25). But in rejecting outright the exercise of so-called bourgeois rights and freedoms, people’s power sacrifced basic democratic liberties in favour of revolutionary unity.

3.5 conclusion Perhaps the most dominant infuence on the ANC during the 1980s was Marxism-Leninism. Amongst internal activists and intellectuals, however, Gramsci’s ideas were also prevalent, as was a broader democratic socialist tradition which posed an alternative to Marxism-Leninism. 106 H. BROOKS

Within the trade union movement, whose ideas transferred to community and civic organisations, a socialist tradition was also emerging which was increasingly distanced from the SACP. The understanding of people’s power which emerged was often linked to local forms of struggle. As such, those who saw it as a fulflment of ANC policy were not prevented from also interpreting it as an educative and empowering experience or a practical means of self-help. For activists inside South Africa, there was arguably a greater appreciation of local experience and popular agency. Although spurred on by the ANC’s liberation narrative, many individuals involved in popular structures were often concerned as much, if not more, with ameliorating the hardships of everyday life as they were with broader ideological questions. Although the ideas of exiled and domestic activists overlapped and informed one another, it is possible to identify theoretical variation in the views that emerged. While these currents were not confictual, they did generate conceptual discomfort. The multitude of ideas that shaped people’s power preclude a selective analysis of its conceptual composition. When all constituent parts of the discourse are taken into account, nuances in the Charterist camp regarding the normative alternative to liberal democracy bring to the fore an unreconciled tension between the necessity of active participation and the indispensability of vanguard leadership. These tensions left unresolved the amount of leeway provided for popular control. For the ANC, its role as a vanguard was rooted in Marxism-Leninism and informed directly its relationship with the people. For the broader MDM, the acceptance of this hegemony did not preclude a simultaneous vision of tangible local control and a reimagining of democracy from below. It is a tension which, the remaining chapters seek to show, remained largely unresolved as South Africa entered its democratic transition. It also prevented its translation after 1994 into an institutional democratic form. Yet, despite these nuances, what emerged across the board and in the dominant narratives of the ANC camp, was a largely teleological understanding of participation—both in its function as a means of struggle and in pre-fguring a post-apartheid order. Beyond this common goal, there was no standardised vision of what a popular democratic future would look like: many within the ANC spoke of people’s power but had different ideas about what it meant. What can be ascertained is that neither the dominant discourse of the ANC-UDF, nor more localised 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 107 conceptions, made provision for the existence of difference. Even those structures focused on social welfare and collective space papered over political diversity and precluded alternative ideas from fourishing. What their activities presupposed was a unitary democracy, bounded by allegiance to the movement.

Notes 1. ‘Necklacing’ was a practice that became recurrent in popular struggles of the 1980s, whereby a petrol-flled tyre was hung around the neck of known and suspected regime collaborators and then set alight. 2. Turok was later expelled from the SACP in 1976 during a period of disagreement over whether the Party’s London contingent should focus solely on propaganda and solidarity (as it had been) or begin interactions with underground networks in South Africa (SAHO, www.sahistory.org.za). 3. Mufson suggests that it was in 1983 in the Eastern Cape township of Lingelihle, near Cradock, that street committees were frst formed (1990: 110). Following Cradock and Port Alfred, the Transvaal townships of Mamelodi and Alexandra were among the frst to establish such structures (see ANC, n.d.: 9–10; see also ANC London Collection 1986: 9). 4. Each year on 8 January (the anniversary of the founding of the ANC), ANC President Oliver Tambo delivered a statement on behalf of the NEC of the ANC reviewing the movement’s progress and challenges over the preceding year and setting new aims and goals for the year ahead. 5. Seekings refers to courts being established to address the disorder brought about by the political situation and also as a response to growing indiscipline with civics themselves (1990: 124). 6. For contemporary debates in South Africa on the shaping of social movement narratives by Left academics and intellectuals, see, for example, Mdlalose (2014), Bond (2015), and Steyn (2016). 7. o n Luxemburg’s place within Left-Communism, see Thatcher (2007: 30). 8. On Cosatu’s ‘popular-democratic’ character which combined nationalist and class politics, see Pillay (2013). 9. See also Bozzoli (2004: 112) on the infuence of Mayekiso and the union’s participatory democratic tradition. 10. On this requirement, see Young (2000) and Gutmann and Thompson (2004). 11. The PAC and AZAPO refers to the Pan-African Congress and the Azanian People’s Organisation, respectively. Both were alternative liberation movements to the dominant ANC and were driven by Africanist ideology. 108 H. BROOKS

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Interviews Boraine, A.—Telephone interview, 21 May 2013. Carrim, Y.—Pretoria, 16 January 2013. Cherry, J.—Port Elizabeth, 3 October 2012. 3 DISCOURSES OF ‘PEOPLE’S POWER’ 115

Cronin, J.—Pretoria, 27 November 2012. Coovadia, C.—Johannesburg, 28 May 2013. Coleman, N.—Cape Town, 20 February 2013. Jordan, P.—Cape Town, 12 November 2013. Mabandla, B.—Johannesburg, 28 June 2013. Mashatile, P.—Cape Town, 21 February 2013. Masondo, A.—Johannesburg, 13 March 2013. Mayekiso, M.—Johannesburg, 8 April 2013. Moosa, M. V.—Johannesburg, 30 April 2013. Mufamadi, S.—Soweto, 26 November 2012. Netshitenzhe, J.—Johannesburg, 14 May 2013. Seedat, R.—Johannesburg, 13 May 2013. Seekings, J.—Cape Town, 19 February 2013. Suttner, R.—Johannesburg, 25 October 2012. Swilling, M.—Stellenbosch, 20 February 2013. Tsenoli, L.—Johannesburg, 11 March 2013. Turok, B.—Cape Town, 19 February 2013. CHAPTER 4

‘The People Shall Govern’: The Codifcation of Ideas

Although the 1980s marked a period of normative theorising about democracy, the ideas engendered in people’s power did not feature a language of constitutionalism. As such, it is not immaterial that, in parallel to the activities of people’s power, the ANC engaged in a separate formal process of codifying its ideas, not only with regard to a democratic future, but also a constitutional one. From January 1986 with the establishment of a Constitution Committee in the ANC’s Department of Legal and Constitutional Affairs (DLCA),1 the ANC began in earnest to formulate a series of constitutional foundations and guidelines for the future—a move prompted by shifting international terrain and pressure on the ANC to formalise its ideas in the event of a post-apartheid reality. The constitutional principles formulated by the Constitution Committee would later be brought to the table in the multi-party negotiations for an interim constitution, followed by the Constitutional Assembly responsible for drafting South Africa’s fnal constitution.

The content of this chapter on the Constitutional Committee is derived in part from research published in the Journal of Southern African Studies: Brooks, H. (2017): ‘Merging radical and liberal traditions: The Constitution Committee and the development of democratic thought in the African National Congress’, 1986–1990, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/03057070.2018.1403742.

© The Author(s) 2020 117 H. Brooks, The African National Congress and Participatory Democracy, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25744-6_4 118 H. BROOKS

The frst part of this chapter analyses the ideas about participatory democracy that emerged from this constitutional work and assesses how the notion of popular participation was linked to constitutionalism. It incorporates analysis of ANC thinking about democracy generally, for the very reason that the Constitution Committee not only represented the frst attempt by the ANC to codify its democratic thought, but also marked a shift toward the formal acceptance of some classically liberal democratic features. These events provide important context to the com- plimentary forms of radical, participatory democracy also envisaged by the movement. The second part of the chapter looks at the development of ideas about participation in the local arena. From 1988, there is evidence that the ANC began to envisage participatory democracy as something linked to the local or community sphere, encompassing ideas about both local government and the role of civil society. With the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, a number of local government negotiating forums were established which shaped the movement’s ideas about citizen participation. This section thus focuses on the ideas that emerged through this process, identifying some of the key actors and intellectual infuences on participation at the local level. The chapter also considers the extent to which the traditions and principles of people’s power were infuential in shaping both constitutional thinking and the notion of democratic local government.

4.1 Participation and Constitutionalism One of the most noteworthy points about the Constitution Committee’s formation during the height of people’s power (1985–1987), is not only that the latter did not draw on a language of constitutionalism, but that the Committee appears to have formulated its ideas for the most part in intellectual isolation from the people’s power phenomenon. With the exception of some discussion about provision for participatory democracy, there is curiously little evidence of conceptual cross-pollination between the two. Although the interpretation of many radical democrats was that people’s power represented the model of a democratic future, it was the formulations of the Committee that were the precursor to the democratic negotiations and thus the shape of the Constitution. The Committee was described in 1990 as having been ‘at the centre of all the constitutional thinking in the ANC since its establishment in January 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 119

1986’ (ANC DLCA c.1990: 2). In spite of this, there has been no interrogation of the inconsistency in these discourses of democracy: between the people’s power movement on the one hand, and the Constitution Committee on the other. The Committee’s 1988 Draft Constitutional Guidelines could be considered the ANC’s frst offcial publication since the Freedom Charter of its ideas about a democratic state. Although the Charter represented a programme of ideals, according to ANC cadre and lawyer, Albie Sachs, there was acknowledgement that it ‘didn’t deal with … constitutional structures and the enforcement of constitutional rights’ (Sachs interview, 2005). The purpose of the Committee according to the DLCA, therefore, was ‘to serve as a “think tank” of the NEC’ regarding constitutional developments (ANC DLCA 1986c); and to ‘try and anticipate the current developments in the country and its political effects’ (ANC DLCA 1986a: 1). After 1990, the Committee, along with other experts, would return to South Africa to act as an advisory group to the ANC in the formal constitutional negotiations. The Constitution Committee’s establishment seems to have been prompted by a number of circumstances. The ANC recognised the importance of beginning to codify its own ideas as well pre-empting the constitutional initiatives of its opponents, not least the South African state (ibid.). Joel Netshitenzhe also noted the need to address concerns emerging from the international community and South African business about the type of state that would replace apartheid (interview, 2013). Notably, the Committee itself urged the movement to ‘outline and defne the democratic organs of self-government envisaged in the Freedom Charter and the SACP Programme’ (ANC CC 1986c)—a remark which suggests continued lack of clarity around the implications of this clause. On 7 February 1986, Ruth Mompati, on behalf of the ANC’s National Working Committee (NWC), remarked that the Constitution Committee’s work was ‘the frst occasion on which the ANC has even attempted to give constitutional expression to its programmatic demands’ (ANC NWC 1986: 2). Its work was essentially to produce constitutional principles or guidelines for a democratic future.

Meshing Ideological Traditions: Liberal and Radical Democracy In many ways, the Committee represented a merging of the ANC’s ideological traditions. The principles it put forward suggest a 120 H. BROOKS resurfacing of former liberal ideas, the introduction of new ones, and a desire to retain in principle certain radical democratic features. Its work was overlaid with both the acceptance of recent international human rights conventions and the infuence of other constitutional models, including those of nations not historically infuential on the ANC. While its position on liberal democracy is not of direct concern here, the ANC’s conception of ‘democracy’ generally impacts its understanding of citizen participation. It is therefore worth exploring the core features of the democratic state it envisaged and the traditions from which they emerge.

Multi-Party Democracy and Political Pluralism One of the most important features introduced by the Constitution Committee was the commitment to a multi-party system. The ANC’s 1988 Draft Constitutional Guidelines—the product of work and discussion by the Committee across a period of two years—made a formal commitment to the establishment of a multi-party system and provisions for freedom of speech and association (ANC CC 1988b; see also ANC CC 1986a; ANC NEC 1987a, 1987b). These commitments, among many others, were echoed in the ANC’s working document on a Bill of Rights (ANC CC 1990b), its Commentary on the Structure of a Constitution (ANC CC 1990a), and its 1992 policy guidelines, Ready to Govern (ANC 1992). In South Africa’s fnal Constitution—a result of negotiation between parties in the Constitutional Assembly— these principles would be embedded through a fundamental Bill of Rights. As set out in Chapter 3, neither the discourse of the ANC or UDF had historically drawn on an understanding of democracy that provided for competing alternatives. In some instances, such liberal precepts were rejected outright. It seems that it was only after May 1986 that the ANC gravitated toward a formal position on political pluralism. A memorandum in May of that year, quite possibly produced by the Constitution Committee, indicated that a press statement by ANC President Oliver Tambo on 9 January 1986 was the trigger for the ANC to reach a formal constitutional position on the very issue. Indeed, the memorandum referred to Tambo’s remarks as ‘the only offcial statement from our movement which does refer to the existence of a multiplicity of parties or “political pluralism” in a post-liberation South Africa’ (ANC DLCA 1986b: 2). Tambo’s statement read: 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 121

It is conceivable, of course, that when we win our victory and we are a non-racial democratic and united people, within those parameters, there will be divisions; people will form political parties of one form or another, and that will be permissible. That will not be division about the Freedom Charter or its objectives. It will be that people see the situation differently at the time and have different approaches to the problems which a liberated South Africa will be faced with. There could be many organisations of that kind formed, and they will be exercising their democratic rights in a democratic society. (Tambo 1986: 20)

Reservations within the Constitution Committee about political pluralism seem largely to have centred on the issue of reconciling political freedoms with the need to prevent ethnic and racial hatred (ANC CC, n.d.-a: 9). The proposals thus came to presuppose the existence of multiple parties provided that they did not operate on the basis of race or ethnicity. It is not clear, however, that the principle of political pluralism was uniformly accepted across the ANC. The DLCA’s memorandum on multi-partyism went on to remark that Tambo’ s statement ‘raises many questions especially that we will be one of the last to achieve liberation in Africa and Africa having the experience of one party states’ (ANC DLCA 1986b: 2). A briefng document produced by Pallo Jordan as Director of Research in the ANC’s Department of Information and Publicity in July 1985, spoke out against what seems to have been a penchant in the movement for one-party rule. It read: ‘We shall also have to explicitly pronounce ourselves on the question of political pluralism (the multiplicity of parties and political space for the loyal opposition). There is a sad misconception which has taken root among us, that radical social transformation is only possible under one-party rule. This notion must be dispelled and laid to rest once and for all’ (Jordan 1985). The claim that such a view existed is not far-fetched. Indeed, by pro- claiming a commitment to multi-partyism the ANC would have been defying the trend set by its fellow liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola and elsewhere. The ANC’s Sydney Mufamadi noted the infuence of such states at the time:

You will recall that there was a time when … just looking at the situation globally, outside your classical western democracies, post-colonial societies in some instances tended to see a one-party-state as the best form of democracy. So you must accept that there would have been people who also thought, amongst us, that this is the best way to organise your democracy … It’s not like all of us started off thinking that this one form of organisation is the best and we are unanimous about it. (Interview, 2012) 122 H. BROOKS

Thus, while there may have been those such as Jordan who saw ‘nothing to fear from political pluralism’ (Jordan 1985), in the ANC as a whole this issue was far from fnalised. The Freedom Charter itself did not guarantee the right of individuals to form political parties. It is also apparent that provision for the existence of parties not in agreement with the ANC’s programme remained subject to discussion. The 1986 memorandum set out the issue as follows: ‘The problem arises about what attitude would be taken to those who do not agree or agree fully with the Freedom Charter … Will they be allowed to form parties although they don’t agree with the basic principles of the Freedom Charter?’ (ANC DLCA 1986b: 2). The memorandum’s interpretation of Tambo’s statement is that he envisaged differences existing within the national liberation movement itself (ibid.). As such, there was a lack of clarity on the tolerance of parties that fall outside of the movement’s ambit.

Human Rights A further commitment which emerged at the time was the principle of individual rights. Notably, the ANC’s frst statement committing it to their protection appeared just one year after the Committee’s establishment. In its January 8 Statement of 1987, the NEC provided assurance that ‘the revolution will guarantee the individual and equal rights of all South Africans’ (ANC NEC 1987b). In October of the same year, it extended this by saying that the safeguarding of individual rights could be achieved through ‘an entrenched bill of rights’ (ANC NEC 1987c: 3). Despite claims by Legal Professor and member of the Constitution Committee, Kader Asmal and others that the ANC had a longstanding commitment to human rights (Asmal 1990; Asmal et al. 2005), examination of its publications and archives suggest a gap in this record.2 In fact, in a paper on developing a human rights culture in South Africa, Asmal’s own reference to the ANC’s documents of 1943, 1955 and then 1987 (Asmal 1990) itself highlights the thirty-year gap suggested by Dubow (2012: 98). Just as people’s power embodied a largely unitary conception of democracy, so had the ANC, prior to 1986, dismissed an individual rights-based culture as a feature of bourgeois democracy. At the time of the Constitution Committee’s work, there appears to have been continued aversion within the ANC toward a bill of rights. Importantly, as Sachs made clear, the discussion of rights in South Africa had become associated not only with a discredited liberal tradition, but with the protection of minority privilege (Sachs 1988). 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 123

Although the commitment to both pluralism and rights were decisions taken by the NEC itself, Sachs was a key individual in shifting the perspective on rights within the liberation movement (Seedat interview-a, 2013). As an ANC cadre and lawyer, Sachs produced an infuential discussion paper in 1988 in which he explained that a bill of rights, rather than being an instrument to maintain existing privilege, could instead be used to guarantee those very rights and freedoms so long denied to the majority. His paper refected the way in which mis- conceptions about rights were blocking constructive discussion of their role in a democratic society:

‘The most curious feature about the demand for a Bill of Rights in South Africa’, he remarked, ‘is that it comes not from the ranks of the oppressed but from a certain stratum in the ranks of the oppressors… Instead of a Bill of Rights being associated with democratic advance, it is seen as a brake on it; instead of being welcomed by the mass of the population as an instrument of liberation it is viewed by the majority with almost total suspicion’. (Sachs 1988: 3)

Despite the NEC’s declared commitments in 1987 to the safeguarding of individual rights, the date of Sachs’s paper (1988) suggests that undi- vided dedication to this principle remained tenuous. Asmal continued even in 1990 to caution against the encouragement of ‘a negative culture of human rights … which sees the adoption of such rights as simply a restriction or limitation on a future government’ (1990: 3). Acceptance of individual liberties such as those of association, organisation and speech did not sit all that comfortably with the notion of a unitary democracy, nor with a teleological conception of citizen participation. The re-thinking of rights by the ANC, or at least by some within its ranks, thus seems to have demanded a review of its own convictions, including re-consideration of those democratic features traditionally considered ‘bourgeois’. Its shift during the late 1980s toward a rights commitment is therefore not insignifcant. In 1992, the movement stated its commitment to the introduction of a bill of rights that would ‘enshrine principles for which we have fought all our lives’ and included a wide range of rights and freedoms (ANC 1992). The ANC’s submissions during the sitting of the Constitutional Assembly in 1995 also refected a progressive vision for a bill of rights as including civil, political, social, developmental and environmental rights (ANC 1995a). 124 H. BROOKS

It is interesting that several people involved at the time in the ANC’s theoretical or constitutional debates referred to the movement as not committing itself to ‘liberal democratic’ principles so much as ‘humanis- tic’ ones, or at least to universal values associated with the development of humanity. Asmal referred to the Draft Constitutional Guidelines, the Freedom Charter and Africans’ Claims, as presenting ‘a humanis- tic alternative to the paradigm of apartheid’ (1990: 6). Human rights, he argued, ‘may be seen as inherent in our nature … as vital for the development of the human personality’ (ibid.: 3). Netshitenzhe similarly commented that the commitment to human rights was ‘not a question of the ANC becoming liberal democratic; it’s the ANC appreciating that those things about the freedom of the human spirit … are achievements of humanity that should be embraced by all’ (interview, 2013). One of the main reservations about a bill of rights related to issues of private property. The UDF itself asked ‘how can we successfully secure the protection of human and people’s rights for all through a progressive Bill of Rights and not protect the property rights of the bourgeoisie as per a liberal, bourgeois Bill of Rights?’ (UDF 1989). In the ANC’s own discussions and those of the constitutional negotiations and assembly, there is no suggestion of any reservations about the inclusion of frst generation rights. Rather the ANC’s concerns seem, understandably, to have refected the classic democratic challenge of securing both liberty and equality (ANC 1995: 8 cited in Strand 2001: 51): to what extent could rights secure equality rather than prevent it? In 1986, an NWC Sub-Committee, consisting of Joe Slovo, Pallo Jordan and Simon Makana, was established to read and study the proposals of the Constitution Committee (ANC NWC S-C, 1986: 1). The Secretary of the Constitution Committee, Z. N. Jobodwana remarked that the inclusion of civil and political rights for the ANC was non-contentious. What the NWC Sub-Committee had wanted to see more of, he insisted, was discussion of socio-economic rights (interview, 2006). The ANC’s enunciation of rights in its constitutional proposals thus drew very much on the traditions of the Freedom Charter. By placing emphasis on substantive and socio-economic rights, the ANC objected not to the inclusion of civil and political rights, but to their inclusion alone. The protection of frst generation rights was necessary but insuffcient. Overlapping with the discourse of rights, however, was the suggestion of their restricted application. Unfortunately, the documented detail on this is minimal, leaving open to interpretation the defnition and scope of 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 125 what the ANC considered as ‘people’s rights’. Nonetheless, in the NWC Sub-Committee’s report on the Constitution Committee, there are some worrying remarks about the qualifcation and application of certain rights and freedoms. In particular, the report sought clarifcation on ‘political power and the forms it will take’, asking: ‘do we envisage the enfran- chisement of all or do we foresee disenfranchisement of certain classes, categories of persons, etc.?’. It also suggests some reservations in the granting of civil liberties, asking ‘are these to be limited or unlimited? Do we envisage weighting the actual application in favour of certain classes or leave them as “legally” neutral?’ (ANC NWC S-C 1986: 4). On the one hand, the character of the constitutional document was partly to be determined by its purpose: as either ‘a mobilising tool in the context of struggle’ or ‘a tactical instrument in the event of negotiations’ (ibid.: 5). Nonetheless, it remained unclear to what extent the ANC envisaged rights as being subject to programmatic demands. What we can deduce is that there was some initial uncertainty about their role and extent to which they served a purpose other than the protection of individual freedoms. At the very least, it suggests that prior to 1986 rights had not yet been discussed by the ANC in any detail.

Legal and International Constitutional Infuence Although the Constitution Committee’s documents refected new strands of democratic thought, the earlier period of its work (between 1986 and 1988) refected its ideological roots. In 1986, a recommendation was made that study be undertaken of ‘the People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe’ (ANC NWC-SC 1986) and ‘constitutional evolution of Eastern Europe after World War II’ (ANC CC 1986a). Despite Jordan insisting that such cases had not informed the work of the Committee (interview, 2013), it appears that in early 1987 a delega- tion from the DLCA and Constitution Committee visited the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The purpose of the visit was ‘to study and discuss with experts in the feld of constitutional law in these two socialist countries the historical development of their constitutional law since the smashing of fascism’ (ANC DLCA 1987). Although it is not evident whether or not the ANC concurred with the advice offered, it is clear that guidance, lessons and potential areas for comparison were sought. The ANC’s proposal for a multi-party system appears to have been accepted by the GDR representative, but with a view to all such forces falling within the movement’s broader camp (ibid.). The most 126 H. BROOKS concerning recommendation, however, relates to the provision of a constitutional guarantee for the role of the ANC itself. The GDR’s suggestions included ‘that the ANC as vanguard of the people’s struggle should have that declared in the constitution’ (ibid.). Notably, the ANC seems to have already contemplated this idea itself. A DLCA document on the issue of political pluralism posed the question: ‘will the ANC as the vanguard that would have brought about liberation contemplate any special role for itself which has to be stipulated in the constitution?’ (ANC DLCA 1986b). The same point is also raised elsewhere in the Committee’s material (ANC CC 1986b). It is thus clear that Marxist- Leninist-inspired ideas retained some infuence initially and penetrated the work of the Committee. From 1987–1988 onwards, however, there is evidence of a gradual injection of legal-constitutional language and less and less the revolutionary-inspired language characteristic of earlier ANC documents. This shift marks a largely-overlooked turning point in ANC discourse. Yet, just as ideologues and intellectuals played a role in shaping the discourse of people’s power, so too were they infuential in the discourse of constitutional democracy. The work of the Constitution Committee was shaped by the composition of its members who were constituted largely from the legal profession. The position of Committee Chair was held by SACP member and academic, Jack Simons. The DLCA’s offcer of justice, Zola Skweyiya, took the position of vice chair, and department member Zingisile Jobodwana was secretary (Macmillan 2016: 130). Others involved in the work of the Committee, although not as administrative offcials, were Sachs, Asmal, and Penuel Maduna, all of whom were lawyers (ANC DLCA 1986a: 1, 3). In terms of international infuence, the deliberations between 1986 and 1990 seem to have drawn on a variety of constitutional and country examples. Although the socialist states remained infuential initially, there is evidence that this began to change. This shift was shaped, in part, by those involved in formulating the proposals. Jordan, for example, who was convenor of the NWC Sub-Committee, was a visibly more liberal infuence. He referred to the movement’s familiarity with bills of rights historically (interview, 2013) and, in advocating the adoption of a bill of rights in South Africa, suggested application of the model of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (Jordan 1985). Sachs commented on the preference for what he called a ‘post-dictatorship democracy’ which looked to the constitutional examples of states such as Spain 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 127 and Portugal, rather than either a ‘people’s’ or ‘liberal’ democracy (interview, 2005). Valli Moosa, who was part of a working group on constitutional principles during the multi-party negotiating forum from 1993, said that delegations were sent to countries including Germany, Spain, Portugal, the United Kingdom (UK), USA, India, and Malaysia (interview, 2013). Looking at the international environment, it is likely that the global ideological shifts of late 1980s played a role in dampening radical commitments. It was from as early as 1987—prior to the commencement of offcial talks—that the radical democratic tone of ANC constitutional commitments began to fzzle out. Thanks to more recent accounts, we now know that during 1987 secret talks were beginning to take place in exile between senior members of the ANC and representatives of the Afrikaner academic and business communities (Esterhuyse 2014). There was also increasing pressure on the ANC, including from Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, to work toward a negotiated settlement (ibid.: 46). The onset of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union and the discrediting of communism internationally were tipping the scales toward a new ideological era. Gorbachev’s presidency, which commenced from 1985, aligns with the commencement of constitutional discussion within the ANC’s DLCA. In general, these discussions refect the infuence of the legal fraternity, and the mark of international rights conventions can be seen in the content of ANC proposals. Law Professor, Halton Cheadle, who acted as a legal advisor to the ANC during negotiations for an interim constitution in 1993, commented that the Constitution Committee ‘played an important role in slowly diffusing a rights approach within the ANC’ (Email correspondence, February 2006). With the commencement of the second round of negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) in 1992, multi-party negotiations in 1993, and fnally the Constitutional Assembly in 1994, the liberal approach dominated. In the multi-party negotiations, there was notably greater participation of lawyers and technical advisors to the ANC and less membership participation. Constitution Committee Secretary, Jobodwana later refected that this was how many ideas got ‘diluted’, and drifted toward a more ‘liberal’ type of acceptance of the constitution (interview, 2006). The ANC’s ‘Working Document’ on a Draft Bill of Rights, published for consultation in 1990, referred to the infuence of the 1948 Universal 128 H. BROOKS

Declaration of Human Rights and 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ANC CC 1990b). The introductory note stated: ‘- we have relied heavily on these great documents. We have also drawn upon the European Convention of Human Rights and the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights, as well as provisions dealing with protection of human rights in a great many constitutions, ranging from those of India to West Germany to the USA to Namibia’ (ibid.). After 1990, such infuences persisted through the technical experts commissioned to draft the bill of rights, including Halton Cheadle and fellow South African law professor, Hugh Corder.3 The ANC’s Draft Bill of Rights itself also proposed a ‘constitutionally entrenched human rights commission’ as a watchdog and safeguard for the public (Mayibuye 1992: 21). Both this document and the fnal Bill of Rights that accompanied South Africa’s fnal Constitution encompassed a broad and progressive range of frst, second and third generation rights. By the time the Draft Constitutional Guidelines were published in 1988, the notion of a constitutional guarantee for the ANC as vanguard had disappeared entirely, and there remained no suggestion that the constitution would be in any way prescriptive. The ANC understandably used the Freedom Charter as a point of reference for the Guidelines (ANC NEC 1987a: 2; ANC CC, n.d.-b; Mabandla interview, 2013), but also expressed that: ‘The Constitution should be an open, permissive constitution - allowing for the exercise of political power in any direction rather than a prescriptive constitution. It should not “declare” socialism or a free market economy but it must not prevent a government from executing its political and economic programme’ (ANC CC 1990a: 2). It also stated that ‘The Constitution should be drafted for all South Africans rather than refecting only the political programme of the ANC …’ (ibid.: 3). It is therefore particularly notable that while these ideas were surfacing in the Constitution Committee, within the internal movement there is little evidence of such discussion, at least not until after the circulation of the Draft Guidelines. The ANC’s DPE, up until 1989, continued to draw on the socialist, and largely Soviet, model in its syllabus. Like the Constitution Committee, the DPE was a product of a recommendation of the ANC’s 1985 Conference in Kabwe, Zambia. Yet, the content of political education appears isolated from constitutional deliberations. The DPE syllabus does not seem to have discussed topics such 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 129 as international human rights conventions, the ANC’s rights tradition, or the nature of multi-party versus one-party systems. In fact, between 1986 and 1988—arguably the most formative period in the codifcation of ANC democratic thought—the DPE continued to teach a syllabus focused on the history of struggle and on revolutionary and socialist theory (ANC DPE 1986, 1986–1988). It is telling that, by 1989, additional material was added to the DPE’s study courses, including the ‘Soviet experience reconsidered’ (ANC DPE 1989). Updates in course material also include reference to the Draft Constitutional Guidelines themselves, as well as to ‘the role of constitution and codes of rights (sic)’ (ibid.). Marxist ideology, however, was in other aspects retained as these new elements were intermingled with topics on the state and class society, people’s democracy, socialist transition, and the vanguard and masses in socialism (ibid.).

Retaining Radical Infuence: Introducing ‘Participatory Democracy’ Given the overlap between the formation of the Committee and the manifestation of people’s power, one wonders to what extent ideas of popular power entered constitutional debate. Although ideological cross-pollination seems to have been minimal, popular structures were not overlooked by the Committee entirely. It was through discussion of participatory democracy that people’s power manifested in constitutional proposals. The introduction of the term ‘participatory democracy’ into ANC lexicon can be pin-pointed to September 1986 with the Constitution Committee’s frst set of proposed Foundations of Government in a Democratic South Africa. The document included the provision that: ‘Participatory democracy shall be encouraged by means of involving the community, and community and workers organisations, directly in public and economic administration’ (ANC CC 1986a). In some ways, the constitutional deliberations refected a meshing of the ANC’s intellectual traditions: while it accepted certain principles of a liberal democratic framework, there was also a visible attempt to retain the values of a mass movement. The concern to achieve this balance is refected in the NWC Sub-Committee’s feedback on the Constitution Committee’s initial proposals in February 1986. Alongside the desire to see the inclusion of socio-economic rights, the Sub-Committee remarked that the Constitution Committee’s ‘approach to a future constitution was too wedded to liberal-democratic notions with some slight modi- fcations’ (ANC NWC S-C 1986: 1). The Sub-Committee went on to 130 H. BROOKS comment on its preferred model of democracy, with the implication that people’s power, in some form, should be accommodated:

The type of constitutional framework the document envisages is one very similar to conventional bourgeois-democracy and not a framework arising from or created by a revolutionary struggle. While we recognise that it is diffcult to predict the shape of future institutions there are however already some indications in the embryonic forms of popular power that are being thrown up in the course of the struggle; that new and more far-reaching forms will emerge and that our constitutional thinking must necessarily accommodate these. (ibid.)

It then requested that the Constitution Committee examine how mass organisations could be incorporated in the constitutional model and given a ‘direct role in the legislative framework’ (ANC NWC S-C 1986: 4). It also reported the NWC’s own insistence that it ‘create a framework through which popular power is translated into a reality, i.e. a government which is in reality subject to the people’ (ibid.: 5); and made a recommendation on economic democracy, advocating a basic principle of ‘workers’ participation in the economic management and planning of all enterprises’ (ibid.: 8). Each of these points would prepare the way for an emerging (if less radical) understanding of participatory democracy. The request for a legislated role for mass organisations perhaps speaks most directly to the structures of people’s power. Just as street and area committees became de facto bodies for popular control, so a future dispensation should allow for popular participation in governance and administration. Jordan, as a Sub-Committee member, emphasised cate- gorically that organs of people’s power could never be translated directly into structures of democratic governance, but still remarked that ‘[their establishment] was demonstrative of the fact that people did feel the need to intervene, to run their lives, to govern themselves … and you had to create space for that in whatever democratic dispensation you created’ (interview, 2013). There is, however, no suggestion that any particular model informed this provision. Jordan remarked that they were aware of historic models of popular participation such as the Russian soviets and the Paris Commune, but noted that these examples didn’t arise in formal discussions. He also referred to some people fnding the model of the New England town hall meeting ‘quite attractive’—likening it to the forum or 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 131 assembly in pre-colonial African society (ibid.). Yet, none of these models appear to have played a direct role in constitutional thinking.4 Given the timing of the DLCA’s study visit to the GDR and Czechoslovakia, it is quite possible that these states were initially of some infuence. The GDR’s input on a constitutional model included ideas about popular participation. Learning of the mushrooming of organs of people’s power in South Africa, however, the GDR representative cautioned against too much power being ‘delegated’ to lower organs. In the GDR and Czechoslovakia, it was the central People’s Chamber and Federal Assembly, respectively, that constituted ‘the highest organs of people’s power’ (ANC DLCA 1987). The NWC’s other concern—that popular power be ‘translated into a reality’—was taken on board by the Committee, but the development of its thinking refected the challenge of combining radical and liberal principles. The Committee’s work came ostensibly to involve marrying a desire for popular control with principles of representative government. In a 1986 document responding to the NWC’s feedback, Committee Chair, Jack Simons, translated ‘people’s power’ as ‘a government willing and able to give effect to the wishes of a majority of the population. Their wishes, needs and wants are communicated by and through representatives of voters, organised in one or more parties’ (Simons 1986: 2). Once translated into constitutional terms, it is detached from any radical content: Here, people’s power was conceived as no more than representative government. However, Simons then drew upon the historic tradition in the ANC of the inadequacy of representative democracy: ‘A democracy exists only to the extent that the voters … actually participate in decision-making and the process of government at all levels’ (ibid.). From this perspective, it would seem that constitutional democracy of a liberal-representative type could be supplemented by participatory institutions and features. Democracy, as its radical proponents would insist (Kaufman 1968; Pateman 1970; Barber 1984), is both extended and deepened. The inclusion of mass participation notwithstanding, this earlier work of the Committee still shows traces of Marxist-Leninist heritage. The same document drafted by Simons links the ‘guarantee’ of popular control not to individual free will, political pluralism or even grassroots participation in decision-making, but to the ANC’s historic struggle for NDR. The popular power that Simons describes is likened not to democratic choice, nor the developmental notion of producing good citizens, 132 H. BROOKS but to the ‘fulflment’ of a revolutionary task (Simons 1986: 3).5 The solution to the NWC’s charge that the Committee had adhered too closely to a ‘conventional liberal democratic’ framework was to equate democracy with its own political programme. The development of ANC thought around participatory democracy, while founded on a belief in the inadequacy of representation, thus produced a qualifed understanding of the people’s role. Democracy, Simons argued, could only be realised through the direction of the vanguard: ‘- ceaselessly agitating the people, raising their level of political understanding, organising local communities, trade unions, churches and other mass organisations for development and the fulflment of the tasks of the Revolution’. ‘The task of “revolutionising” the people’, he added, ‘is a process. It will continue for many generations of struggle … under the guidance of a revolutionary leadership’ (ibid.). The Committee’s early articulations refect the conceptual struggle between ultimate revolutionary objectives and rethinking the meaning of democracy as incorporating a plurality of views. The legislated role proposed for the people was not as multi-interest structures of citizens but as ‘mass organisations’. The latter comprised groupings such as trade unions, civics and other sectoral organisations, but were still understood as being aligned to and represented by the movement. Within the ANC, these conceptual tensions manifested. A key individual in the pull between radical and liberal currents seems to have been Tambo. Aware that many in the ANC remained convinced of a military seizure of power (Esterhuyse 2014: 84–85), while cognisant of shifts internationally and within sections of the movement toward the idea of a negotiated settlement, Tambo appears to have trodden a careful line between placating the revolutionary contingent and keeping the avenue of negotiations open. According to Hugh Macmillan, Tambo had indicated to the Constitution Committee from the outset that the draft constitution ‘should provide for a multi-party electoral system … and an entrenched bill of rights’ (2016: 130). Yet the lack of unanimity on this issue would call into question the assuredness of these principles. The notion of a pluralistic framework was perhaps subject to the assumption, articulated in Tambo’s 1987 press statement, that competing parties would naturally agree with the Freedom Charter. It could equally have been a deliberate strategy on his part to create a framework fexible to either liberal or radical outcomes. Macmillan contends that Simons, who was in close touch with Tambo and, as Committee Chair, 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 133 drove the process of producing the Constitutional Guidelines (2016: 133) was already by 1981 convinced of a negotiated settlement (ibid.: 142). Despite his commitment to communism, Simons had not always been persuaded of the role of armed struggle, and we might speculate that this background was not incidental to his appointment as Chair. The Committee’s composition notwithstanding, feedback on its proposals from the NWC refect, at the very least, a lack of harmony in the ANC over the interpretation of democracy itself. Slovo, one of the three individuals appointed to review the Committee’s initial proposals and who fagged concern at its lack of revolutionary content, was notably an avid supporter of the armed approach to revolution. The post-cold-war ideological context also generated conditions less favourable to experiments in radical democracy. UDF and civic activist, Rashid Seedat remarked that the country’s transition to democracy came about in a different ideological milieu. Refecting on the possibility of people’s power being translated into a post-apartheid reality, he specu- lated: ‘if we had taken power in ‘87 or something my guess is that we would probably have experimented with those things’ (interview-b, 2013). Discussions of the Constitution Committee in fact indicate an early awareness that it would have to hold back on more radical participatory proposals. In a document entitled ‘The Preliminary Nature of the Constitutional Document’, which looks to have been written during 1986,6 the Committee remarked:

If we had already succeeded in destroying the coercive power of the apartheid regime and establishing popular organs of government throughout the country, we would be able to proclaim a new constitution corresponding to this new reality. Since, however the question of a new constitution may well be placed separately on the agenda before such a stage is reached, we have to prepare a document consistent with a reality somewhat less favourable to our position. Our document accordingly would be provisional in the sense that if the situation were to advance dramatically and irreversibly in our favour before the new constitution were put into force, it would be possible to propose a new version containing provisions refecting more advanced forms of popular power. (ANC CC, n.d.-a)

The ANC thus had to reach compromises on the structures it envisaged and, despite the NWC cautioning against the confnements of liberal democracy, the Committee’s radical democratic language was toned down during the course of its work. References in ANC discourse to 134 H. BROOKS people’s committees, assemblies or soviet-inspired structures are in short supply from 1988 onwards and, in some cases, are phrased in such a way that they are indistinguishable from representative arrangements. The earlier proposal for the inclusion of worker control is diffcult to locate within any particular socialist tradition; no detail is provided to suggest whether it be linked to a centrally-planned economy or to the establishment of workers’ councils, for example. Either way, by 1988, beyond the inclusion of collective bargaining and workers’ right to strike, the Constitutional Guidelines made no reference to worker participation in planning or management of the economy (ANC CC 1988b). Notably, the term ‘people’s power’ is not used at any point in the published guidelines of the Committee. Of course, the constitutional provisions were designed deliberately to be fexible to refnement, and the ANC agreed that a constitution for South Africa could only be drawn up by an elected constituent assembly (ANC 1991a: 36). Nonetheless, it is notable that provision for participatory democracy as a form of people’s power weakened during the course of discussions. The ANC’s Foundations of Government in 1986 referred to ‘participatory democracy’ specifcally (ANC CC 1986a), and its statement of intent in January 1987 declared that ‘guarantees of genuine and active involvement of the people have to be introduced at all levels of government’ (ANC NEC 1987a: 5). The 1988 Draft Constitutional Guidelines, however, bore little resemblance to the Sub-Committee’s request that constitutional thinking accommodate the forms of popular power emerging from the struggle. In contrast, they stated only that powers be delegated to ‘subordinate administrative units for purposes of more effcient administration and democratic participation’ (ANC CC 1988b). Whether or not this was an attempt to keep the provisions vague, there seems to have been a lack of clarity in the ANC as to how people’s power could be effected in practice. A report of its In-House Seminar on the Guidelines in March 1988 noted that although there was general acceptance of their content amongst participants, it was ‘not clear as to how organs of Local People’s Power would ft into the scheme’ (ANC CC 1988a).

Framing Participation Constitutionally Whatever the role of diplomacy, constitutional convention and strategic choice, it is clear that the ANC did view participatory mechanisms— if in a more limited form—as a desirable supplement to representative 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 135 democracy. Indeed, across all political parties in the Constitutional Assembly, there appears to have been a general consensus about the desirability of participatory democracy. What remained contentious, was its ‘content and constitutional entrenchment’ (CA TC1 1995). The Assembly Committee on The Nature of the Democratic State described participatory democracy as emphasising ‘continuing participation by the citizenry in government between elections’, but noted that as yet there was ‘no clarity on what forms this should take, and whether it should be entrenched in the constitution’ (ibid.). The principle of establishing a constitutional right to participation, including participation in legislative process, elicited disagreement, with a key issue being the constitutional right to consultation by community based organisations. In May 1995, the advisors to the Ad Hoc Committee on Local Government set out their reservations about entrenching such an entitlement, including the views that: governing should rest with a statutory body; elaborate and long-winded consultation procedures could be costly and hamper effciency; people would be able to exercise power through voting; and that to retain a ‘watchdog’ function, civil society should not be too closely and formally linked to local government (1995: 5–6). The document fnally commented that ‘the responsibility of government should not be that of communities. The way in which they govern is what matters. Hence it would be important for local government to create structures and institute processes which will allow and illicit community participation without it being necessarily a constitutional entitlement’ (ibid.: 6). This recommendation was a far cry from the councillist bent of people’s power, in which legislative and executive functions were exercised by people themselves. It also did not align with the (albeit ambiguous) appeal made earlier by the ANC for ‘the active involvement of wide sections of the people in the making and implementation of decisions’ (ANC NEC 1987a: 3). Nonetheless, although the period of the multi-party negotiations comprised a noticeable moderating of radical demands, the ANC continued to push for a legislated role for civil society. In its submission to the Technical Committee on Local Government, the ANC argued that: ‘Civil society and its various organisations have a crucial role in democratising and transforming South Africa. The fnal constitution, supplemented where necessary by national legislation, should provide for the principles and appropriate mechanisms of 136 H. BROOKS participatory democracy, as well as for organs of civil society’ (Ad Hoc Technical Committee on Local Government 1995: 5). In the fnal Constitution of 1996, participation is notably not phrased as a ‘right’. Instead, it is encouraged through provisions for national, provincial and, most especially, local government. The term ‘participatory democracy’ is also not given any clear defnition, stating only that the National Assembly, National Council of Provinces and Provincial Legislatures may ‘make rules and orders concerning its business, with due regard to representative and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency and public involvement’ (RSA 1996: Sections 57, 70 and 116). In the sections on local government, the term ‘participatory democracy’ is not actually used, but they do include the most detailed provisions on citizen participation, including: ‘(a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities’ and ‘(e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government’ (RSA 1996: Chapter 7, Section 152). From 1996, the constitutional provisions formed a basis for formulating policy on participatory governance, taken up in Chapter 5 of this book. Overall, between 1988 and 1994, mechanisms for citizen participation in decision-making were not a visible priority due more to political imperatives than ideological conviction. Before it could be broached, a legitimate and functioning state had to be established. Only after this was the detail of participatory democracy taken up in earnest. Nonetheless, it was as early as 1988 that the principle of participatory democracy was located in the local sphere.

4.2 Participation and the Local Democratic local government means more than just having the right to vote in a local election. It also includes facilitating the creation of a strong, independent civil society, a high degree of accountability, transparency and the right to participate in decision-making processes which affect communities between elections. (ANC—Ready to Govern 1992)

Although the pre-fgurative discourse of people’s power attached its signifcance to the form of a future state, prior to 1986 no offcial ANC statement had linked popular power directly to the sphere of local government. As the Constitution Committee embarked on its constitutional proposals, however, the future of people’s power, and of participatory 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 137 democracy more specifcally, came to be viewed as the preserve of the local arena. One of the Committee’s earliest documents acknowledged the role of ‘popular insurrectionary-type struggles’ in bringing to the fore the link between community and local government (ANC CC, n.d.-a: 14).7 Noting that this relationship would carry even greater importance under democratic conditions, the Committee outlined the signifcance of the structures of regional and local government: ‘They deal with concrete questions directly affecting the lives of the people; they involve large sections of the population directly and actively in questions of government; they will be the scenes of direct transformation of the lives of the people’ (ibid.: 15). Signifcantly, although the NWC had expressed a desire for constitutional thinking to ‘accommodate’ embryonic forms of popular power (NWC S-C 1986), it had not previously linked this to local government specifcally. By 1990, positions on this had reached the clarity of ‘the importance of full participation by members of communities in local and regional government’ (ANC CC 1990a). In a 1991 discussion document on Constitutional Principles, participatory democracy was linked specifcally to the local arena, stating: ‘Local tasks cover all the day to day aspects of living which most directly and intimately affect the citizen … The active involvement of all sections of the population will be necessary in the fulflment of these tasks’ (ANC CC 1991). There is, at this stage, little sense of the institutional form this might take and no mention of possible structures, mechanisms or processes. Yet it was clear that popular participation was seen as being catered for through citizen involvement in local issues. Although the ANC referred to ‘popular participation in all structures of government’ (ibid.), it is not clear that, outside of the local arena, this was envisaged as anything more than participation in elections. In the ANC’s policy document, Ready to Govern (1992), provisions and mechanisms for participatory democracy were discussed in their entirety under the heading, A New System of Local Government. It is also of note that between 1986 and 1990 there was a modif- cation of the envisaged substance of local government. In parallel with the Constitution Committee’s adoption of a more moderate constitutional language, there is a diminishing of the framing of local government structures as features of a Marxist-Leninist style of state. As with the ANC’s thinking on democracy generally, the reduction of socialist infuence in the Committee’s proposals brought with it more explicitly 138 H. BROOKS democratic participatory elements. The Committee’s 1986 document on non-central government structures had provided no assurance that ‘democratic organs of self-government’ would involve popular participation in the formulation of policy. It referred only to their role in its implementation (ANC CC 1986c; see also ANC CC 1986a). It also implied that the making of by-laws with which local units would be tasked would be bound by the revolutionary programme: there was no guarantee that local government would provide opportunity for popular infuence in the policy agenda. In contrast, later documents refer specifcally to participation in decision-making and not just administration (ANC NEC 1987a: 3; ANC 1992). The most explicit statement in this regard was contained in the ANC’s 1992 proposals on local government, quoted at the opening of this section. This emphasised both the limitations of representative democracy and ‘the right to participate in decision-making processes which affect communities between elections’. The proposals also introduced the need to actively include women in decision-making processes and to give civil society groups opportunity to ‘infuence the process of government’ (ANC 1992). In October 1990, the ANC held a consultative conference on local government in which a number of research papers were produced. While these drew on various aspects of local government, the contributions showed the presence of participatory ideas and the importance of establishing citizen channels to infuence government policy (Centre for Development Studies 1991).

Themes and Infuences on Participation and Local Government Between 1990 and 1996 the ANC, at its leadership-level, was increasingly caught up in national and constitutional negotiations. During this time, the ANC’s policy position on citizen participation zeroed-in on local government, and the fnal Constitution itself assigned participatory democracy predominantly to the municipal sphere (RSA 1996: Chapter 7, Section 152). Beyond its acceptance in principle, however, citizen participation was only taken up in earnest after the 1995 local government elections. Discussion about participation, by both the movement and civil society however, commenced prior to this, through contributions from the civic movement, trade unions, NGOs and academia. For these groups, whose ideas are discussed here, local-level participation continued to carry great consequence. 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 139

Civic Activism and Negotiation As Chapter 3 showed, activist discourse and the applied theory of community organising was one of a number of infuences on people’s power. From 1990, with the unbanning of the ANC, parts of the activist community came together to embark on local negotiations as part of broader preparations for change. Forums for negotiation between local authorities and the non-statutory sector took place in parallel with national negotiations and most extensively in metropolitan centres. The frst, and most advanced, of these efforts was the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber. The establishment of the Metropolitan Chamber followed the Soweto Accord in 1990—an attempt by the Soweto Civic Association to reach agreement with the Transvaal Provincial Authority and local electricity supplier, Eskom, over the writing-off of payment arrears. When affected communities failed to resume paying the minimum rates agreed by the Accord, participants and representatives sought a more comprehensive solution (Ottaway 1993: 126–127). In April 1991, the Metropolitan Chamber formed and was constituted of representatives from the Transvaal Provincial Authority, the Regional Service Councils, white municipalities, black local authorities, a number of local Democratic Party councillors, and several civic associations from the Johannesburg metropolitan area represented through the Civic Association of Johannesburg (CAJ) (ibid.: 127).8 Although the Chamber’s participants recognised that establishment of democratic, non-racial local government could only come about through formal negotiations aligned to a national-level strategy (Coovadia 1991; Ramaphosa in Collinge 1991: 9; Botha 1991: 20), the total breakdown of black local authorities meant that, by necessity, local negotiations could not wait for new local administrations (Ottaway 1993: 125). Local negotiating forums, like the Metropolitan Chamber, thus sought to negotiate a new integrated local government structure ahead of a national settlement (ibid.: 126). The Chamber established a series of working groups to formulate policy around issues including the tax base, electrifcation infrastructure, water and sewerage systems and housing provision (van Donk and Pieterse 2006: 111). As the ANC returned to resume its role of leading the struggle at the centre, Marina Ottaway suggests that civic associations ‘started devoting more attention to local issues as an end in themselves’ (1993: 114–115). Whereas in the 1980s their focus had been on ungovernability, ‘in the early 1990s they were 140 H. BROOKS beginning to focus on how the post-apartheid city should be governed in the future’ (ibid.). The formation of local negotiating structures aligned with the UDF- ANC ‘One-City’ initiative which argued for non-racial municipalities with one tax base and the creation of interim transitional bodies (Botha 1992: 66). With the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) in 1993, local negotiating forums were formalised in local authorities pending the frst local government elections. Despite these commitments, however, the ANC itself had concerns about the potential dislocation of local and national agreements (Ottaway 1993: 124; Cullinan 1992: 7). This caution at the centre has thus led some analysts to suggest that the real impact of the Chamber was limited. Mirjam van Donk and Edgar Pieterse refer to it as ‘a body without an offcial position or real power’ (2006: 112) and, although it had a formal constitution, it lacked the authority to enforce the agreements reached (Ottaway 1993: 127). Tensions also developed between local civic initiatives and the ANC’s preference that local negotiations should respond to national strategic direction (ibid.: 124; see also Swilling and Boya 1997: 178–179; Butler 2013: 238). The ANC, and some civics, were also concerned that the state’s encouragement of local level forums was part of an attempt to promote regionalism and divide the movement (ANC, n.d.; Mayekiso interview by Cullinan 1992: 1, 3). This being said, while the Chamber may not have succeeded in devis- ing a ‘new, viable system of metropolitan government’, Ottaway suggests that its participants did make conscious attempts ‘to shape the future local government model’, making it ‘de facto impossible for existing local structures to make decisions without consultation’ (1993: 126, 128). Cas Coovadia, who represented the civic movement’s key inter- locutor in the Chamber, noted their awareness of the need to ‘prepare the democratic movement … to begin to infuence the structures of government at local government level’. He also explained that, as the civics’ representative, the CAJ sought a mandate from its members to reach agreement on particular issues (interview, 2013). Negotiation practices thus bore resemblance to established democratic processes in the civics themselves. In some instances where compromises needed to be reached, Coovadia would return to communities to consult them or to sell a particular position. In other cases, where the constituency could not be convinced, he would return to the Chamber to put an issue back on the table (ibid.). 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 141

Through the Chamber’s negotiations, participants engaged in a process of deliberation, involving argument, reason, consensus-building and, sometimes, concession. It opened participants up to a deliberative form of democracy beyond their previous experience and, according to Coovadia, produced new levels of trust between the interlocutors (ibid.; see also Butler 2013: 239). Mark Swilling and Lawrence Boya, both of whom were involved in the Chamber, describe the local forums as ‘schools of the new South African democracy’ (1997: 171), ‘grap- pling’ with the challenge of urban local governance ‘in an integrated and participatory manner’ (1997: 180). The value of the Chamber was also emphasised by Coovadia. Although he did not see it as a model for non-racial local government, he explained how it was preparing people for the process of governing (Coovadia, n.d.: 2). Thozamile Botha, who also participated in the local negotiations and was centrally involved in the formation of the South African National Civic Organisation (Sanco) in 1992, spoke of the Chamber’s work as an indication that ‘civics are not necessarily transforming themselves into local authorities but they are engaged in a process which seeks to ensure that democratic local authorities are properly set’ (1991: 20). It thus refected the key assumption of participatory theory: ‘that participatory experience generates a desire for more participation’ (Bachrach and Botwinick 1992: 139). Other activists involved in or working with the civic movement noted the importance of local negotiations in involving communities and giving them a stake in the system as participants. Crispian Olver, who had established the housing NGO, Corplan in the Eastern Cape and produced research for the ANC’s 1990 conference on local government, noted that, following the commencement of rural local government negotiations in the Border region, among the principles put forward for discussion was that ‘the establishment of interim structures must involve a process of local level consultation that draws in all signifcant interest groups in the area … The process must be designed to empower residents and community activists at the local level and equip them for tasks of local government’ (1991: 170). Coovadia, interestingly, also drew a parallel between the strategy of the civic movement and negotiations between national leadership, noting that the CAJ had grasped the need to move from ‘an insurrectionary agenda to one that had to prepare people for government’ (interview, 2013). His view was that the process of local negotiations also provided individuals and organisations with ‘practical experience about the possibilities and problems of local government 142 H. BROOKS and development in a future South Africa’. ‘If these processes only resulted in this educative process’, he added, ‘it would be a signifcant achievement’ (Coovadia 1991: 334–335). In this sense, negotiations were also transformative, continuing and extending the educative and empowering process begun by many civics through people’s power. Just as community organisations had begun a process of transforming the popular mind-set toward issues of collective good and public citizenship, so did local negotiations begin a process of developing citizens who were ready to participate in the new structures rather than fght them. This developmental process led to what might be described as ‘new conceptualizations’ of participants’ ‘individual and collective self-interest’ (Bachrach and Botwinick 1992: 29). Having said this, there was a degree to which participation was restricted to people as collectives and not as individual citizens. Dominique Wooldridge, who was involved in the Metropolitan Chamber as a support and advisor to the South African Municipal Workers Union, noted that there was a lot of contestation about which organisations had ‘the right to speak on behalf of the people’. She thus added that ‘speaking about citizen involvement often was more about representatives of civil society than direct citizen involvement’. There was little discussion ‘about how an individual citizen would participate in something’. Nonetheless, she emphasised that both Coovadia of the CAJ and Boya of the Soweto Civic Association were key drivers in bringing into the negotiations ideas about participation (interview, 2013). The experience of local negotiations touched once again on notions of democracy as educative and developmental.

Progressive Planning and Development In the development of the civics’ technical expertise, a key role was played by a series of individuals from progressive planning and development NGOs who provided advice and support to the civic movement and their non-statutory compatriots. The support of such organisations and individuals in providing technical advice helped to facilitate a more substantial contribution by civics to negotiations of the Metropolitan Chamber. During the 1980s, the infuence of community organising had shaped NGOs’ approaches to urban citizenship and political action. With the commencement of local government negotiations after 1990, many of these ideas and approaches to planning and development transferred. Several key players in the Chamber also fulflled roles in the National- level Local Government Negotiating Forum (NLGNF) (van Donk and 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 143

Pieterse 2006: 113). This was the formal body responsible for drawing up the LGTA of 1993 which provided formally for local-level negotiations involving representatives of communities. According to Swilling and Boya, the ‘core concepts’ informing the national framework agreed by the NLGNF were ‘developed, designed and negotiated’ within the Chamber: ‘The fnal settlement of the NLGNF’, they maintained, was ‘a vindication of what the Metropolitan Chamber had been working on for some years already’ (1997: 172). In both forums, the NGO, Planact, was particularly infuential and consisted of individuals such as Mark Swilling, Andrew Boraine and Billy Cobbett. Crispian Olver was also involved in local government policy research and Thozamile Botha was an infuential activist, heading both the ANC’s Department of Provincial and Local Government and the local government arm of Sanco. Through such individuals, the work of the Metropolitan Chamber had a big infuence on national-level local government agreements (Swilling and Boya 1997: 172). Via NGOs such as Planact and the Urban Sector Network, key infuences were progressive planning (Seedat interview-a, 2013) and radical political geography (Swilling interview, 2013). van Donk and Pieterse also note the infuence of participatory action research amongst the generation of South African NGOs who became ‘central in formulating the frst round of policy thinking on urban democracy and development’ (2006: 125). Paulo Freire’s ideas about people as conscious agents, which had infuenced community organisers in the 1980s, also penetrated the development paradigm and, by the mid-1980s, development theorists were helping to shift participatory discourse into mainstream development theory (McGee 2002: 94). Given the global intellectual context, it seems likely that these shifts infuenced left-leaning NGOs in South Africa. Swilling, who was heavily involved in the Metropolitan Chamber and the formation of Planact, referred to radical geographers such as Doreen Massey, David Harvey and Manuel Castells as shaping their theoretical outlook at the time (interview, 2013). Massey, interestingly, seems to have attended a workshop in South Africa in 1992 to debate scenarios for regional government (Marais 1992: 4). Harvey had begun in the 1970s to utilise a Marxist theoretical framework to understand urban space and his geographical analysis of capitalism aligned with ideas emerging amongst Marxist academics in South Africa. Castells’ infuential work on social movements as ‘harbingers’ of fundamental social change (Lowe 1986: 2) 144 H. BROOKS was also infuential for planners such as Swilling in understanding collective contestations over urban space (Swilling interview, 2013). It is thus possible to see how this theoretical framing helped planners and activists alike to see local movements as engaged not only in a struggle for political citizenship, but for urban citizenship too. The potential for collective consumption issues to garner popular organisation for change was expressed in the civic movement. Although local spatial contestations of the 1980s had become subsumed in the struggle for national political change (ibid.), the transitional period and local-level negotiations provided opportunity for urban consumption concerns to shape new power relations. For those involved, the NGO movement was ‘trying to think of modes of democracy that were appropriate to the urban space’ (ibid.; see also Coovadia 1991: 334–335). The infuence of the ideas of planners permeated the Metropolitan Chamber and set a participatory precedent as to what was expected in the future. Swilling noted that the vacuum which civics had begun to fll as a result of the collapse of black local authorities, as well as the broad recognition they received as ‘legitimate community representatives’, gave civics ‘political clout and access to technical resources … [enabling them] to deliver tangible benefts to residents’ (Jacobs 1992: 24).9 Moreover, through the support provided to non-statutory players, NGOs also transferred skills and introduced ideas about future local government that incorporated notions of civic involvement. Coovadia remarked:

I think we were fortunate in that we had PLANACT there at that time … A group of progressive town planners who understood town planning and how to actually progress town planning with the involvement of the people for whom this is being done. So, at times it was a very slow and laborious process but you spend that time and I can tell you the buy-in after that is immediate. (Interview, 2013).

Through the process of negotiations in the Chamber, civics embarked on an educative experience of democracy which drew on their past traditions of community empowerment but in a more structured environment. Civic offcials received technical advice and support, but also took their own initiative to develop education and training programmes to build their own expertise and capacity (Coovadia 1991: 345). Progressive planning discourses and ideas of participatory development also ftted nicely with emerging ideas about the role of civics in development and 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 145 reconstruction. A 1990 UDF discussion paper on the implications of current political conditions for the civic movement defned development as ‘a process which builds democracy by involving people in the process and putting power into the hands of the people so that they can control their lives while it also contributes to improving the living standards of the people’ (UDF 1990). Development was linked to both democracy and empowerment. The infuence of participatory development was also visible in the MDM. A set of Development Principles drafted at an MDM workshop in 1990 articulated:

We have always argued that communities should have direct control over the process of development, from determination of basic needs and priorities, to project conceptualisation and design, to allocation of funds, to project implementation, to management and maintenance of development projects. This ensures that communities are empowered and strengthened rather than communities becoming hostages to a development process over which they have no control. (MDM 1990)

This view of development incorporated a notion of participation as a process and an outcome: A means of achieving development goals and a feature of successful development itself. During the negotiation period, Coovadia advocated ‘the building of community-based vehicles for development … rather than waiting for centralized technocratically conceived planning exercises’ or delivery by a future democratic state (1991: 335). These ideas of development thus incorporated features of self-reliance as well as self-governance, echoing the perception of people’s power as having engendered a form of democracy in which participants were empowered rather than dependent (Coovadia interview, 2013). Those involved in the Metropolitan Chamber and in local negotiating forums elsewhere understandably defended the gains they made and the degree to which their input carried infuence. However, as van Donk and Pieterse note, the end of the interim phase of local government and commencement of formal policy development ‘signalled the beginning of a break between NGOs and grassroots movements’ (2006: 125). Since 1994, the exodus of skilled leadership from the civic movement has been much lamented: many civic leaders and those who built up expertise through local negotiations joined the ANC leadership, were transferred to parliament or began work in the new 146 H. BROOKS state structures. Their departure left a gap in both local skills and leadership. Thus, in some respects, the participatory democratic traditions developed in the Chamber did not manifest in the bottom-up development or community-state partnerships envisaged by the Chamber’s proponents. At the same time, the role of experts and advisers—in both the local forums and the NLGNF—speaks to concerns about the exclusionary nature of some participatory processes (Cornwall 2008: 275–276). Glaser, for example, notes the predominance of professionals, professional activists and men amongst civic leaders (1997: 13). Some of the infuential participants who supported the negotiation process and brought their ideological interests to bear were often white or Indian. Doreen Atkinson, at the time, also remarked on the problem that participation by some on behalf of others could produce inequalities within the civic itself (1991: 287). The traditional aggregation of ‘communities’ or ‘the poor’ as homogeneous categories (Cohen and Uphoff cited in Cornwall 2008: 277–278) perhaps did not account for different interests. There are thus grounds to argue that advocates of the Metropolitan Chamber and NLGNF assumed a ‘common good’. Elton Ngcobo of the Amahlongwa Interim Civic Organisation voiced the concern that Sanco, who was included as a participant in the NLGNF, did not and could not represent all civics and their local dynamics (1993). The role and value of the Metropolitan Chamber and NLGNF were thus not accepted unanimously across the civic movement. Having said this, it is not clear that the Chamber’s composition was deliberately exclusionary, and all forms of participatory democracy generally include an element of representation (see Cornwall 2008: 277). Depending on the form this takes, this need not be problematic. Cornwall makes the case that a process which seeks ‘only the engagement of a small group of articulate leaders is something very different to one in which community members delegate power to such a group to engage with the authorities’ on their behalf (2008: 273). Here, as was the case with Chamber, communities ‘receive information’ from their delegates and are ‘consulted on key issues’ (ibid.). Whatever the model adopted, we can argue that the process of both local and national negotiation generated and circulated ideas about participatory approaches. While this did not represent the beginning of formal policy formulation, it began to show the range of infuences, both new and historic, on the ANC’s thinking about local democracy. 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 147

Caution About Decentralised Power: Participation as an Instrument of the Right Support for citizen participation in the local government sphere was not exclusive to the ANC. Indeed, some of the movement’s hesitancy about the devolution of power was a result of a participatory language emerging from the state itself. During the early 1990s a discourse of participatory democracy was co-opted by both the Democratic Party and the ruling National Party (NP). In June 1990, the NP government published the Thornhill Report which set out its ideas for a new local government model. The proposals—widely rejected by the ANC and civics—utilised a strategy of devolving negotiating powers to the local level and allowing towns and cities to establish their own local government charters. Through these proposals, the ANC claimed, the government was trying to: ‘separate local issues from national negotiations’; ‘rule from the grave by preserving local level apartheid’; and ‘end its responsibility for fnancing local authorities’ (ANC, n.d.). Suspicion of the government’s motives may well have prevented the ANC from taking a more radical stance on decentralisation and devolution. The NP’s Constitutional Proposals in September 1991 expressed support for decentralisation and local autonomy. According to Ottaway, ‘[the NP] had decided that local control, particularly if extended to the neighbourhood level, would offer whites the best possible protection after the repeal of the Group Areas Act’ (1993: 119). The ANC position, in contrast, was that non-racial local authorities with one tax base must frst be established before negotiation could begin (ibid.). By encouraging civics to negotiate with local authorities, the NP government was seen to be both putting pressure on civics to reach agreements and compromises (Botha 1991: 17) and shrinking the remit of the national negotiations at Codesa (Cullinan 1992: 6). It was with great irony that the NP referred to its local government proposals as ‘Constitutional Rule in a Participatory Democracy’ (Ottaway 1993: 120). Through the process of negotiation about regional and local government, participatory democracy became ‘the language of the Right’ (Wooldridge interview, 2013). Perhaps one of the most intriguing aspects of the government’s proposals was the idea of neighbourhood assemblies: ‘A common local authority made up of non-racial geographically based neighbourhood management committees with a single tax base and administration’ (Schmidt 1990 cited in Botha 1991: 16). The notion of neighbourhood committees, to which the ANC-MDM had historically laid claim as 148 H. BROOKS radical structures for popular power, were co-opted by the state as structures for the retention of privilege. Devolution of power, as proposed by the government, risked replicating pockets of privilege and underdevelopment. The ANC also voiced concern that neighbourhood committees would draw decision-making powers away from democratically elected local authorities (ANC, n.d.). Thus, while the ANC and NP agreed on the need for local negotiations and, by 1995, on the desirability of strong local government (Siddle and Koelble 2012: 70), they differed on the premise for it.

Popular Assemblies and Trade Unions Although the promise of more radical modes of participation had been toned down in the ANC’s constitutional discourse, as the earlier part of this chapter noted the principle of active participation was not abandoned entirely. The role of workers’ organisations in political struggle had also brought to the fore the practices of trade unions in generating mass participation. The November 1991 edition of the ANC journal, Mayibuye provided one of the most explicit, and somewhat unprecedented, accounts of the ANC’s understanding of democracy: ‘Meaningful democracy is based on the active participation of people in all activities and processes that affect their lives. Through it ordinary people are empowered to take control of their lives in all spheres; political economic and social’ (ANC 1991a: 36). It also presented the Freedom Charter’s claim that ‘The People Shall Govern’ as having been ‘built and expressed in practice’ through the structures of people’s power and the independent trade unions (ibid.). Another article in the same series set out the ANC’s understanding of internal democracy (within the movement itself). In contrast to the discourse of its exile years, this drew noticeably on the traditions of the trade unions (ANC 1991b: 36), including ensuring that leaders are subject to regular election, accountability, mandates and recall. It also emphasised the importance of trade union participation in the ‘control and planning of work’, and that municipalities must consult communities in planning local economic activity and fnance (ANC 1991a: 37). The incorporation of ideas inspired by organised labour refected the integration into the ANC of its comrades in the MDM, but also the greater visibility of the multiple ideas and approaches present in the now-reconstituted movement. The expression of democracy as participatory represented a further attempt to merge the ANC’s liberal and radical traditions. Alongside 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 149 commitments to popular participation in decision-making was the promotion of political tolerance, free political activity, and a strong civil society of multiple interests (ibid.: 36–37). In 1992, the ANC took these principles further in its policy guidelines, Ready to Govern, outlining possible mechanisms for participation relating specifcally to local government. This included: ‘People’s assemblies to debate issues of major signifcance to that town, city or rural area; Local government sub-committees with outside representation to consult on specifc policy areas; and Local government commissions to conduct public hearings and to consider submissions from outside interests on proposed local government activities’. It also emphasised the need for concerted and targeted efforts to bring women into decision-making (ANC 1992). The aforementioned mechanisms, however, were not described as structures for control or partnership, but instead for advice and consultation. Although Ready to Govern went further than the Constitutional Guidelines in suggesting specifc structures, it still did not get to grips with how democracy could be ‘deepened’ beyond a form of consultation. The ANC’s vision of a strong central state alongside local participatory democracy perhaps proved diffcult to reconcile. Yet it also suggests that the participatory modes of organising, celebrated by people’s power and refected in the trade unions, were far less infuential in the ANC’s offcial discourse.

Civil Society as the Domain of People’s Power Within the proposals on local government, there were also indications of linking participatory democracy not only to subordinate state structures but to organisations of civil society. The ANC’s democratic thinking by 1990 had been penetrated by a civil society discourse prominent amongst both liberal and radical democrats globally (Glaser 1997: 5, 8). The role of civil society organisations in toppling the ruling regimes in Eastern Europe and the discovery of the extent of human rights abuses in the former socialist states, reinforced global acceptance of the importance to democratic transition of an active and autonomous civil society. For those on the Left, it also connected participatory structures directly to civil society. Although the ANC had begun to articulate a view of local government as the domain of participatory democracy, from 1990 civil society also came to be understood as a forum for engaging in political issues. The ANC itself asserted the need for both the constitutional protection 150 H. BROOKS of institutions of civil society and their importance to ‘a deep and thorough democratic order’ (ANC 1992). Given that the 1980s discourse of the liberation movement had not made a clear separation between popular and movement structures, Glaser argues that its recognition of the value of an autonomous civil society constituted ‘a remarkable democratic advance’ (1997: 11). It is of note, however, that as the lexicon of people’s power died out in the ANC’s policy discourse, it began to appear more manifestly in the discourse of civil society. Into the 1990s, ‘people’s power’, as Eastern Cape civic leader Guglie Nkwinti described, became a ‘civic activity’: something that needed to be built by civil society (cited in Collinge 1991: 1). Tsenoli remarked that Sanco had a slogan which said that it was fghting for ‘genuine democratic engagement of people in decision-making … to give people a sense of the value of being involved in the decision-making processes’ (interview, 2013). Participatory democracy as an institutional mechanism had become linked to the sphere of local government. The baton of people’s power, however, was picked up by civil society.

Autonomy and Representation Discussion of the role of civic and sectoral organisations was of course wrapped up in the question of the UDF’s future. In 1991, a decision was taken to disband the UDF, proposing instead the erection of a national civic organisation which would come about a year later with the formation of Sanco. While the ANC focused on constitutional negotiation and the broader political framework, people’s power became located amongst civic and other organisations as representatives of their constituents, autonomous from political organisations and the state. Defence of the civics’ independence appears to have been the dominant position in the UDF (UDF 1991). A 1990 UDF discussion paper set out the role it envisaged for civics in the transition:

Civil society includes all organisations outside politics and the state who represent specifc sectors of people in society. Examples include trade unions, civics, student organisation, rural peoples organisations (sic). Civics therefore will be independent organisations representing their constituency, even in a situation where there is democratic government, they should continue to be watchdogs for the community and not become part of the local government structure. It is within this context that we say that 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 151

civics are a crucial part of civil society. They will be key in giving power to the people and building real democracy by involving all the people in the development process. (UDF 1990)

The civics and other organisations would occupy an autonomous space, acting as both a ‘counterweight’ to the state and a forum for participatory democracy (Glaser 1997: 5–10). For the UDF, civil society incorporated both liberal and radical democratic perspectives. A 1991 memorandum of the UDF, ANC and Border Civics Congress on restructuring local government in the Ciskei went further in elaborating the envisaged relationship between state and civil society:

A clear distinction needs to be made between the structures of government and the structures of civil society … The most important way in which we can ensure the future accountability of local government is through the operation of strong and dynamic residents’ associations, which build a cooperative but critical relationship with the local authority. It is important for the entrenchment of democracy that civic organisations representing the interests of the community remain outside the direct structures of government. (UDF—Border 1991: 2)

A key part of this debate was the need for civic autonomy from political parties, while allowing them fexibility to support programmes or organisations when they saw ft (Collinge 1991: 2). There was recognition amongst UDF and civic activists that even under conditions of democracy (including an elected ANC government), ‘government policy may not always meet the aspirations of the residents’ (Conference: Developing Civic Unity, 1991). In this case, civics would need to exert external pressure on government to deliver. At the same time, by virtue of the civics’ role in local negotiations around, Ottaway points out that they were partly stepping into local government shoes (1993: 123–124). Some within the civics also cautioned that their historic alignment with the ANC would implicitly limit their autonomy. Based on the experience of communist Eastern Europe and post-independence Africa, some activists were alert to the danger of civil society groups being crushed or co-opted by the state (Coleman interview, 2013; Coovadia interview, 2013). At the same time, the ease with which civic autonomy could be accomplished was perhaps taken for granted. Former UDF and youth civic activist, Paul Mashatile commented that, although the ANC 152 H. BROOKS was committed to the principle of independent civil society organisations, ‘[on] the question of how you work with them post-the unbanning of the ANC, we thought because the ANC is a broad church we should be able to continue to mobilise all these other forces behind us’ (interview, 2013). From 1990, efforts were directed toward rebuilding the ANC’s structures. Whether or not that approach was correct, Coovadia refected that, at the time, they incorrectly assumed that some distance between party and civics could be maintained (interview, 2013). Feeding into debates about participation was the potential for creating spaces in which civil society and state could interact. Although the formulation of policy on this issue only began in earnest after 1996, discussion of possible structures for engaging civil society were raised during the transition. Although most discussion appears to have taken place amongst civic activists and sympathetic advisors, the ANC itself also began to make some statements. Its 1992 policy guidelines stated: ‘In order to deepen democracy and ensure grassroots participation in the organs of government, the ANC believes that all organs of civil society, such as civic/residents associations, trade unions, traditional leaders, business organizations, cultural organisations, women’s organisations, religious groups, and other interest groups, need to be given the scope to infuence the process of government’ (ANC 1992). Its Draft Policy on Local Government also asserted that, while elected structures would hold power, ‘there would also be room for civil society to infuence local government through people’s assemblies, commissions and appeal boards’ (1992 cited in Cullinan 1992: 7). As participatory democracy became associated with local government it also became linked to a shared democratic space—a ‘participatory sphere’, defned by Cornwall and Coelho as comprising ‘a distinct arena at the interface of state and society’ (2007: 1). During the latter part of the 1980s, the ANC had recognised the need to begin preparatory work on local government, and in 1989–1990,10 commissioned research by both technical experts and its own cadres culminating in an ANC-Centre for Development Studies National Consultative Conference on Local Government in October 1990. As part of this process, proposals were formulated which drew on models for participatory forums. Despite suspicions as to the government’s incentives, the ANC acknowledged the benefts of decentralisation for both democracy and effciency (Skweyiya 1991: 137). At the conference, the ANC’s Botha produced a paper in which he proposed the idea of ‘people’s assemblies’, described as ‘an open forum 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 153 convened by the civics and attended by all elected representatives of state institutions, community organisations, sectoral interest groups and service organisations’ (1991: 21). The people’s assembly would thus not be a structure of local government, but one for democratically engaging with it (ibid.; interview, 2014). Botha cited two cases (Haarlem in the Western Cape and Alice in the Ciskei) where the local civic had taken over the running of the local authority, ‘[appointing] people within their own structures to run the councils while it, the civic, remains outside as a watchdog’. He argued that, in essence, the civics had ‘become local people’s assemblies where all issues affecting the community are discussed and the councillors are mandated to implement them’ (ibid.: 21). What Botha appears to have envisaged is some form of non-partisan assembly that would ‘create fora or forums that would give people, both the state and the public, a platform through which to debate issues that affect them. So, there would be a structure or a structured way of reporting to the state and the state feeding back to the people’ (interview, 2014). In this sense, civics would not replace local government but would occupy an institutionalised space for engaging with it—a form of participatory sphere. What is not clear is the extent to which such an assembly would provide for decision-making powers. Botha seems to suggest that its key role would be one of oversight through monitoring government performance and delivery and holding it to account over commitments made (interview, 2014). Either way, the idea of creating some form of assembly at the interface of state and society appears to have been considered as early as 1990. For activists working with civics in a support and advice capacity, the process of local negotiation itself provided a model for state-civil society relations. Swilling explained that some participants had viewed the Metropolitan Chamber not just as a transitional structure, but as a longer-term participatory assembly: ‘- There was a strong feeling that once we’d established a metropolitan government for Johannesburg, the metropolitan chamber – the forum – would continue as a parallel structure, [and] should continue to meet’ (interview, 2013). In promoting the model of the assembly there thus emerged some dispute as to who legitimately ‘represented’ communities. A tension surfaced between civics’ support for elected democratic government and the belief that they themselves effectively represented constituents. Coovadia remarked on the degree of strain between the ANC and civics over the latter’s leeway to negotiate on their own terms: ‘Rightly or wrongly, I think the ANC 154 H. BROOKS sort of took the view that, look, in many ways you guys were fronting for us; we’re now unbanned, we take over. We said hold on a second; there’s history here, there’s processes, there’s relationships built, and so on’. It was due to these clashes, Coovadia noted, that he then left the movement (interview, 2013). Swilling made a similar point about the civics’ representivity, but in a way more reminiscent of Castells. Just as Castells understood urban social movements as fundamental agents of transformation, ‘ideologically untainted by political party programmes’ (Lowe 1986: 35), so Swilling argued that ‘The civics were social movements in the true sense. They were not guided or goaded by an imposed political agenda, nor were they constitutionally compelled to apply the programmes of national organisations’ (Jacobs 1992: 24).11 Through the creation of a participatory space between state and society, akin to the idea of an assembly, the very notion that ‘the people shall govern’ would be given institutional form. Yet, at the same time, the movement was burdened with a conceptual discord of the ANC-as-vanguard and civics-as-representatives. This dichotomy was underscored by those leaders returning from exile (where a more Marxist-Leninist understanding of participation predominated) and the democratic socialist and New Left traditions that shaped the discourse at home. The continuing tension between top-down direction and bottom-up initiative is picked up again in Chapter 5. However, just as MDM activists drew on a variety of ideas and infuences so, too, did their thinking after 1990 not exist in a conceptual vacuum. Although those with a history of domestic activism often pushed for a greater role for civil society, it would be inaccurate to attribute this view uniformly to those from the MDM. In 1991, at the ANC’s frst national conference since its unbanning, senior cadres from both the external and domestic wings were integrated into the NEC. Sydney Mufamadi, for example—a founding member of Cosatu and Transvaal Secretary of the UDF, as well as having been a member of the ANC underground—joined the ANC NEC in 1991 and was a delegate of the SACP at the Codesa negotiations. Mufamadi observed the continuing infuence of the principle of people’s power after 1990, but also indicated that it belonged to a particular era. For him, the question of its ongoing applicability had to be considered in context:

So, the four of us can be in some committee that emerged in circumstances where it became necessary for a committee to form. The four of us are serving in this committee. It does not mean that if we do something 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 155

that is considered useful today we can remain in this committee in twenty years’ time and be relevant to the challenges of then … [the principles of people’s power] also have to be adapted to the evolving situation. (Interview, 2012)

The ANC’s limited emphasis on institutionalising people’s power could perhaps be seen to imply a weakened commitment to citizen control or a loss of its ideals in a changed milieu. Yet it also signifes a separation of government and civil society critical to the foundation of democracy. The ANC’s proposals on local government emphasised that, although civil society participation would be provided for, power must rest with democratically elected structures (ANC 1992, 1995b). As Glaser has been concerned to highlight, there is a danger in elevating civil society above such structures, as well as conceiving of it in collective terms (1997: 16). Just as alarm bells should sound with the suggestion that the ANC receive constitutional protection, so should we be concerned at the ‘constitutional elevation of particular organisations as representatives of sections of society’ (Glaser 1997: 22). While many in the MDM came to see civil society as the domain of people’s power, if divorced from elected institutions this was itself not entirely unproblematic.

4.3 conclusion The years leading up to 1996, beginning with the founding of the ANC’s Constitution Committee ten years earlier, encompassed a period of codifcation of the ANC’s democratic thought. Discussion of participatory democracy was approached within a framework of constitutionalism and local government, becoming linked more formally to the notion that ‘the people shall govern’. Signifcantly, however, constitutional work in the ANC occurred as a discrete process, distinct both organisationally and intellectually from the phenomenon of people’s power. At the very time that the movement at home espoused a notion of popular power rooted in a popular collective, the Constitution Committee was exploring a variety of debates in constitutional democracy, with evidence of a merging of historical traditions and a visible dissolution of radical democratic language. What emerged in the Committee was a language of liberal constitutionalism, increasingly shaped by the legal fraternity and international human rights discourse. Debates taking place here, and amongst the NWC and NEC, were not apparent in the wider movement. 156 H. BROOKS

Although the formal process of policy formulation on local government did not commence until after 1996, the civic movement and activists at home had already begun to feed into local negotiations their ideas about participation. Amongst this contingent, other currents were infuential, including trade unionism, community activism, progressive planning and participatory development. Linking with these discussions was a discourse of civil society which placed emphasis not only on the importance of an autonomous civic realm, but on its signifcance as an arena for the exercise of people’s power. While the early 1990s produced the beginning of discussions about how to provide for citizen participation, it also brought to the surface new conceptual discords: between the civics’ historic allegiance to the ANC and desire for a new autonomy; and between the ANC’s role as vanguard of the people and the civics as representatives of communities. The unresolved tension between these strands is taken up in the fnal chapters.

Notes 1. A result of the ANC’s 1985 Kabwe Conference, the DLCA itself was established in October 1985 to carry out the ANC’s legal work (ANC DLCA c.1990: 10). 2. For a discussion of the history and development of the ANC’s rights tradition, including the identifcation of such a gap, see Dubow (2012). 3. According to Davis, the interim bill of rights incorporated ‘constitutional borrowings’ from Canada, Germany, and America (Davis 2003: 186–187). 4. The town hall meeting was a form of local-level participatory democracy introduced in town councils in New England, USA (see Mansbridge 1983). 5. See Macmillan (2016: 131) on Simons’ adherence to the two-stage theory of revolution. 6. Although the document is undated, references to it in another document in the same DLCA collection suggest that it was written at some stage during 1986 (ANC DLCA 1986c). 7. on the estimated date, see note 6. 8. The metropolitan area incorporated Johannesburg, Soweto, Alexandra, and Lenasia. Not all civics agreed to participate in the Chamber: half of Johannesburg’s civics opted out, some feeling that negotiation with ille- gitimate authorities was incorrect (Collinge 1991: 8–9). 9. Ben Jacobs was the pseudonym used by Mark Swilling (interview, 20 February 2013). 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 157

10. In April 1989, the Democratic Movement held a Seminar on Local Government in Harare. 11. Here Swilling again writes under the pseudonym ‘Ben Jacobs’.

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Barber, B. (1984). Strong democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press. Botha, T. (1991, October 4–7). Civil society: The case of civics as autonomous organs of grassroots’ participation. Paper of the national consultative conference on local government and planning. Johannesburg. In Local government and planning for a democratic South Africa. Cape Town: Centre for Development Studies, University of the Western Cape. Botha, T. (1992, May). Civic associations as autonomous organs of grassroots’ participation. Theoria, 79‚ 57–74. Butler, A. (2013). Cyril Ramaphosa. Johannesburg: Jacana. Centre for Development Studies. (1991). Local government and planning for a democratic South Africa. Cape Town: University of the Western Cape. Conference: Developing Civic Unity. (1991, May 10). Political perspective: National consultative conference. South African History Archive (SAHA): UDF Collection AL2431. Constitutional Assembly, Theme Committee 1 (CA TC1). (1995, February 28). Theme Committee 1: Supplementary report to amended report from Theme Committee 1. Constitutional Courts Archives: CALS Collection, 7.3.1. Constitutional Assembly—Constitutional Committee. Collinge, J. (1991, May). Civics: Local government from below. Work in Progress, 74‚ 8–10. Coovadia, C. (1991). The role of the civic movement. In M. Swilling, R. Humphries, & K. Shubane (Eds.), Apartheid city in transition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. Coovadia, C. (n.d.). Local government and the role of the civic movement. SAHA: UDF Collection AL2431. Cornwall, A., & Coelho, V. S. (2007). Spaces for change? The politics of citizen participation in new democratic arenas. London and New York: Zed Books. Cornwall, A. (2008, June). Unpacking ‘participation’: Models, meanings and practices. Community Development Journal, 3, 269–283. Cullinan, K. (1992, June). The fght for local control (Reconstruct No. 3).Work in Progress, 82, 5–7. Davis, D. M. (2003). Constitutional borrowing: The infuence of legal cultures and local history in the reconstitution of comparative infuence—The South African experience. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 1(2), 186–187. Dubow, S. (2012). South Africa’s struggle for human rights: A Jacana pocket history. Johannesburg: Jacana Media. Esterhuyse, W. (2014). Endgame: Secret talks and the end of apartheid. Cape Town: Tafelberg. Glaser, D. (1997, March). South Africa and the limits of civil society. Journal of Southern African Studies, 23(1), 5–25. 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 161

Jacobs, B. (1992, December). ‘Heading for disaster?’, Focus: Sanco: Work in Progress. Jordan, P. (1985, July 26). Briefng paper. Lusaka. UFH NAHECS: Oliver Tambo Papers, Department of Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Committee minutes/reports. Kaufman, A. (1968). The radical liberal. New York: Simon & Schuster. Lowe, S. (1986). Urban social movements: The city after Castells. London: Macmillan. Macmillan, H. (2016). Jack Simons: Teacher, scholar, comrade. Johannesburg: Jacana. Mansbridge, J. (1983). Beyond adversary democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Marais, H. (1992, June). Regional debate rages on (Reconstruct No. 3). Work in Progress, 82, 4–5. Mayibuye. (1992, February). Guaranteeing human rights, pp. 20–21. McGee, R. (2002). Participatory development. In U. Kothari & M. Minogue (Eds.), Development theory and practice: Critical perspectives (pp. 92–116). Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave. MDM. (1990, June 2). Development principles of the Mass Democratic Movement. Interim Development Forum workshop. SAHA: UDF Collection AL2431. Ngcobo, E. (1993, November). LGNF off to a false start. Work in Progress: Reconstruct. Olver, C. (1991). Rural local government in South Africa. National consultative conference on local government and planning, 4–7 October 1990, Johannesburg. In Local government and planning for a democratic South Africa. Cape Town: Centre for Development Studies, University of the Western Cape. Ottaway, M. (1993). South Africa: The struggle for a new order. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and democratic theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Republic of South Africa (RSA). (1993). Local Government Transition Act, 1993 [No. 209 of 1993]. http://www.safii.org/za/legis/num_act/lgta1993311/. Republic of South Africa (RSA). (1996). Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/index.htm. Sachs, A. (1988, March 1). Towards a bill of rights in a democratic South Africa (Draft Discussion Paper). Historical Papers Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand, Collection AG2510. Siddle, A., & Koelble, T. A. (2012). The failure of decentralisation in South African local government: Complexity and unanticipated consequences. Cape Town: UCT Press. 162 H. BROOKS

Simons, J. (1986, February 12). Response of the NWC (07.02.1986) to the report of the Constitution Committee (14.01.1986) on the Freedom Charter and the Constitution. Note to the Constitution Committee from Jack Simons. UFH NAHECS: Oliver Tambo Papers, Department of Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Committee, correspondence. Skweyiya, Z. (1991). Regional and local government beyond apartheid. In Local government and planning for a democratic South Africa. Cape Town: Centre for Development Studies, University of the Western Cape. Strand, P. (2001). Finalizing the South African constitution: The politics of the constitutional assembly. Politikon, 28(1), 47–63. Swilling, M., & Boya, L. (1997). Local governance in transition. In P. Fitzgerald, A. McLennan, & B. Munslow (Eds.), Managing sustainable development in South Africa (Chapter 7). Cape Town: Oxford University Press. Tambo, O. R. (1986, January 9). Press statement, Lusaka. UFH NAHECS: Oliver Tambo Papers. UDF. (1989). AGM held on 2–3 December 1989: Report from commission on constitutional guidelines. SAHA: UDF Collection AL2431, UDF W/Cape, Annual General Meeting. UDF. (1990). Discussion paper from the UDF—Towards understanding the current political conditions: Implications for the civic movement. SAHA: UDF Collection AL2431. UDF. (1991, March 1–3). Paper on National Civic Movement delivered at UDF National General Congress. SAHA: UDF Collection AL2431. UDF—Border. (1991, January 15). Border Civics Congress, UDF and ANC memorandum on restructuring local government in the Republic of Ciskei, to be presented to the Ciskei Military Council. SAHA: UDF Collection AL2431. van Donk, M., & Pieterse, E. (2006). Refections on the design of a post-apartheid system of local government. In U. Pillay, R. Tomlinson, & J. Du Toit (Eds.), Democracy and delivery: Urban policy in South Africa (pp. 107–134). Pretoria: HSRC.

Interviews Botha, T.—Centurion, 14 April 2014. Cheadle, H.—Email correspondence, February 2006. Coleman, N.—Cape Town, 20 February 2013. Coovadia, C.—28 May 2013. Jobodwana, Z. N.—Pretoria, 25 January 2006. Jordan, P.—Cape Town, 12 November 2013. Mabandla, B.—Johannesburg, 28 June 2013. Mashatile, P.—Cape Town, 21 February 2013. Moosa, M. V.—Johannesburg, 30 April 2013. 4 ‘THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN’: THE CODIFICATION OF IDEAS 163

Mufamadi, S.—Soweto, 26 November 2012. Netshitenzhe, J.—Johannesburg, 14 May 2013. Sachs, A.—Johannesburg, 21 December 2005. Seedat, R. (interview-a)—Johannesburg, 13 May 2013. Seedat, R. (interview-b)—Johannesburg, 20 May 2013. Swilling, M.—Stellenbosch, 20 February 2013. Tsenoli, L.—Johannesburg, 11 March 2013. Wooldridge, D.—Johannesburg, 12 March 2013. CHAPTER 5

Post-1994 Policy and Movement Discourse

Although not established as a constitutional right, South Africa’s fnal constitution in 1996 provided a framework for participatory democracy alongside representative democratic government. While it specifed neither a defnition nor suggestion of the mechanisms through which this would be achieved, participatory democracy was articulated most extensively in relation to local government. The detail, design and implementation of such a system were then determined in national legislation. From 1994, participatory democracy also found a home in the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which situated citizen participation, not only in the local government arena, but in the development process as a whole. The RDP represented, perhaps, the earliest expression of the ANC’s position as a party of government on the role of participatory democracy, touching on themes of empowerment, citizenship, state-society partnership and people-centred development. The Local Government White Paper in 1998 then formally articulated the position on citizen participation and, in 2000, a new system of local government was introduced. The discourse and practice of participatory democracy since 1994, however, has not only been shaped by public policy. The preceding

Parts of this chapter draw on research published in: Brooks, H. (2017). ‘The mass movement and public policy: Discourses of participatory democracy in post- 1994 South Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 55(1), 105–127.

© The Author(s) 2020 165 H. Brooks, The African National Congress and Participatory Democracy, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25744-6_5 166 H. BROOKS chapters have sought to show the interconnection between the discourse and practice of democracy and the mass movement history of the ANC. An important, yet under-theorized, strand in participatory discourse is linked to very identity of the ruling party. While movement discourse is certainly not analogous with legislation, it does not exist in isolation from it. Indeed, the intellectual history and organisational culture of the ANC has played an important part in how public policy is interpreted and practiced. Intrinsic weaknesses in South Africa’s participatory democracy can partly be attributed to the movement’s dominant discourse of democracy. This chapter thus examines the development of ideas about participatory democracy since 1994, both in public policy and in the ANC itself. It shows how the model of participatory democracy has been shaped by the historical traditions of participation emerging from the liberation struggle, and by new ideas about participation and development gaining ground in the policy arena internationally. The latter, in particular, have shaped not only the contemporary model of participatory governance, but the ANC’s overarching approach to macro-level policy development. At the same time, the very existence of a multiplicity of conceptual currents in participatory policy have themselves played an inhibiting role in its success, pulling between the demands of effciency and affordability on the one hand, and democracy and accountability on the other. Simultaneously, the narrative of popular participation emerging from the ANC-as-movement draws far more clearly on its liberation heritage. Here, an enduring notion of participation guided by vanguardism has both blurred and stood in tension with the framing of public policy. The chapter begins by outlining the legislative framework for participatory democracy, shaped by the drafting of the RDP in 1994 and by the subsequent notion of ‘developmental local government’. It then goes on to examine the intellectual and theoretical infuences shaping the model of participatory democracy, refecting on the signifcance of these ideas for the practice of participation that ensues. The second half refects on the signifcance for democracy of the ANC’s ‘mass’ character and heritage, examining how participatory spaces are understood by the ANC and in what capacity it envisages citizens participating. It closes by identifying the conceptual tensions and parallels identifable in policy and movement and the cost of their coexistence for the realisation of participatory democracy. 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 167

5.1 Participatory Policy in New Local Government One of the earliest expressions of the ANC’s participatory ethos as a governing party can be found in its RDP of 1994. A foundational principle of the document was the notion of ‘people-driven’ development: a process in which citizens would not merely be passive recipients but key actors and agents (ANC 1994a: section 1.3.3). It reiterated the ANC’s position on the need for participatory as well as representative institutions, stating that ‘Democracy for ordinary citizens must not end with formal rights and periodic one-person, one-vote elections … the democratic order we envisage must foster a wide range of institutions of participatory democracy in partnership with civil society on the basis of informed and empowered citizens’ (ANC 1994a: section 5.2.6). The fulflment of citizens’ needs, moreover, was seen as being both reliant on popular energies and on a partnership between state and society. The RDP spoke not only about the institutions of governance but about fostering the development of NGOs, social movements and community based organisations, and enabling organs of civil society to infuence policy making. Critically, the RDP envisaged local government as playing a key role in realising its vision. Not only was local government acknowledged to be ‘the level of representative democracy closest to the people’, it was also stated that ‘local authority administrations should be structured in such a way as to ensure maximum participation of civil society and communities in decision-making and developmental initiatives of local authorities’ (ANC 1994a: section 5.12.14). Chapter 7 of the constitution itself entrenched this vision, requiring that local authorities ‘encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government’ (RSA 1996: Chapter 7; section 152). That the constitution established local government as its own ‘sphere’ was indicative of the role envisaged for municipalities as key agents of both development and democracy. In a publication of the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), then Minister, Sydney Mufamadi, a former civic and trade union activist and member of the ANC underground, remarked: ‘When we introduced the new system of local government in 2000, we correctly positioned this as the sphere of government that is best placed to give practical meaning and substance to the basic political commitment, that the People Shall Govern’ (DPLG & GTZ 2005: foreword). Participatory democracy in local government was linked once again to the traditions of the Freedom Charter. 168 H. BROOKS

The reform of local government as a whole was a sensitive topic. With the restructuring of municipal boundaries, all previously ‘white’ local authorities would be affected and the new system would require not only the negotiation of a new tax base for each municipality but agreement on their powers and functions. As such, detail around participatory democracy in the Constitutional Assembly was kept to a minimum. The priority, according to former UDF activist, Andrew Boraine, who was part of both the constitutional negotiations and the NLGNF, was ‘to get legitimacy into the system’ before the issue of participation was discussed (interview, 2013).

The RDP and Developmental Local Government Having originally been produced as an ANC policy framework, the RDP eventually came to inform the 1998 White Paper on Local Government (Everatt et al. 2010: 224). A key vision of the White Paper was the concept of ‘developmental local government’, emphasizing ‘the involvement of citizens and community groups in the design and delivery of municipal programmes’ (RSA 1998a). The Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b) and Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) introduced the mechanisms for participation: The former called for the establishment of ‘ward committees’ as elected forums for communities to ‘raise issues of concern’ with their ward councillor and ‘to have a say in [municipal] decisions, planning and projects’ (DPLG, GTZ & ASALGP 2005: 5). The Municipal Systems Act then placed a requirement on municipalities to produce an Integrated Development Plan (IDP), providing the opportunity for citizens to shape municipal planning and budgeting through a prioritization of needs in their area. Although the ward committee is explicitly seen as providing a participatory democratic function (RSA 1998b; DPLG 2005: 7), existing research has revealed substantial failings in practice, including the inadequate powers delegated to ward committees, insuffcient community education, limited representivity, political party dominance and inter- ference, lack of accountability to communities, and unresponsive ward councillors and municipalities (Benit-Gbaffou 2008; Buccus et al. 2008; Piper and Deacon 2009; Malabela and Ally 2011; Kabane, n.d.; see also Sinwell 2011: 371).1 Survey data on the IDP processes, similarly, has shown low community awareness of the IDP’s existence and a direct correlation between awareness and participation (Everatt et al. 2010: 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 169

234–235). A deeper examination of the quality of this participation has led the IDP to be regarded as lip service to any real community infuence: the ‘canvasing’ of public views carries no guarantee of them being addressed (ibid.: 238). While greater resources, improved training, civic education and enhanced institutional capacity are all issues to be addressed, the conceptual underpinnings of the government’s project—and, by implication, the ideas that shape practice—also go some way to explaining the limits to its success.

Intellectual Traditions and Infuences

Popular Participatory Traditions The ANC government’s commitment to participatory democracy is partly a result of longstanding traditions of mass organisation. Chapter 2 of this book located the ANC’s origins as a mass movement in the 1950s, following efforts by the ANC Youth League to develop a mass membership. The post-1976 period, and the 1980s in particular, formed perhaps the most pivotal period in mass movement politics, with the rise of the civic movement and UDF, and consolidation of a strong independent labour movement. People’s power—as both a theory and practice— continued after 1990 to provide a frame of reference for the ANC and MDM in their conceptualisation of the new democracy. Chapter 3 discussed in detail the ideas informing the people’s power discourse. After 1994, however, pre-existing differences within the ANC camp over people’s power-as-rudimentary principle versus a pre-fgurative system, became perhaps more distinguishable as policy makers grappled with giving legislative and practical expression to the ethos of popular power. Historic ideas and expectations of community participation in development permeated policy discussion, often attributable to the actors involved. Many of those who participated in developing and implementing local government policy cut their teeth in the UDF, civic, trade union and student movements. Boraine, a former UDF activist involved in the Local Government White Paper, remarked on the local inspiration for the policy’s participatory elements; that ‘all of us that were writing this stuff or involved in implementing it had been involved to a greater or lesser extent in organs of people’s power, civic organisation, student movements, etc. That was the tradition … that was our point of reference’ (interview, 2013). 170 H. BROOKS

Although policy makers undertook overseas visits from South Africa to look at other local government models, in terms of ideas about citizen participation these were, according to Boraine, of ‘second- ary importance’ (interview, 2013). Several post-1994 government Ministers with roots in the trade unions and civics referred to contemporary structures for citizen participation, including ward committees and community policing forums (CPFs)—discussed in the latter part of the chapter—as being akin or having links to the 1980s organs of people’s power (Mashatile interview, 2013; Carrim interview, 2013a; Tsenoli interview, 2013). Others went back further, linking the commitment to participatory democracy to the Freedom Charter’s demand that ‘the people shall govern’ (Botha interview, 2014; Mufamadi interview, 2012). Ideas informing public policy also echo the ANC’s historic belief in the inadequacy of representative democracy. Former Soweto civic activist and trade unionist, Amos Masondo, who in 2001 became Mayor of Johannesburg remarked: ‘The notion was that democracy would not mean much if it doesn’t involve people and people directly … [Y]ou can’t all be in parliament, in a legislature, and therefore you have to elect some people to represent you but … you would not cede all your power and your mandate to them’ (interview, 2013). Others in the ANC camp were more vehement in their assessment, interpreting people’s power as both a pre-fgurative and superior form of democracy to that presented by parliamentarism. Given the MDM background of those involved in drafting the RDP, it seems likely that the document drew on some of these ideas. The analysis of people’s power contained in Chapter 3 also identifed a discourse on its developmental and empowering potential. Through the act of people taking control of their own lives, activists highlighted democracy’s transformative role. The importance of popular empowerment was subsequently emphasised in the RDP, which asserted that ‘development is not about the delivery of goods to a passive citizenry. It is about active involvement and growing empowerment’ (ANC 1994: section 1.3.3). The idea that participation would be an important component in the development of citizens fowed into policy formulation.

Radical Democratic Theory Ideas about participation also echoed the historic belief in the ANC camp in the inadequacy of representative democracy alone. The people’s power structures, for many of their participants, had constituted 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 171 grassroots structures of decision-making, and their mode of organisation drew both on practices of community organisation and activism, and on models of trade union organising. This radical democratic tradition remains partly visible in post-1994 policy where participatory governance continues to be understood as a necessary supplement to representation. Boraine, who was involved in the development of policy on local government from 1990 remarked that ideas about civic participation were infuenced by the whole notion of needing ‘to go beyond the formal fve-year cycle of elections’ (interview, 2013). The RDP also asserted its own foundations in the principle of participatory democracy: ‘- that people who are affected by decisions must take part in making those decisions’ (ANC 1994b). The former UDF activist, Yunus Carrim, who in 2009 became Deputy Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA)— formerly the DPLG2—remarked of the 2000 Municipal Systems Act that: ‘you can see both state organs based on democracy plus the idea that democracy means more than just voting once every fve years. It means active participation in shaping your life’ (interview, 2013). The South African Local Government Association’s (Salga) Councillor Induction Programme also explains participatory democracy as being ‘where citizens have the right not only to elect their representatives, but to participate actively in government decision-making’ (Salga & GTZ 2006: 49). This, it explained, ‘helps create empowered citizens who have the initiative to continue to contribute to the development of their communities (ibid.: 45). The RDP itself was also rooted in this ethos, refecting, as Maree highlights, the infuence of Cosatu’s ideas about democracy (1998: 30–31). Several individuals involved in producing the RDP had a background in Cosatu and the trade unions (Adler and Webster 1995: 95; Gotz 2000; von Holdt 2000: 100). The imprint of their concern with the importance of social and economic empowerment can be seen in document itself (Stewart 1997: 5). ‘Deepening democracy in our society’ the RDP read, ‘is not only about various governmental and non-governmental institutions. Effective democracy implies and requires empowered citizens. Formal rights must be given real substance. All of the social and economic issues (like job creation, housing and education) addressed in previous chapters of the RDP are directly related to empowering our people as citizens [emphasis added]’ (ANC 1994: section 5.2.9). Ideas about participatory democracy, as the preceding chapters identifed, were also infuenced by progressive NGOs. After 1994, 172 H. BROOKS a great number of these organisations—such as Planact, the Urban Sector Network, Corplan and Idasa—continued to infuence and shape the local government model through expertise and technical advice. Individuals from Planact had already been infuential in the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber, discussed in Chapter 4. Much of the DPLG’s hand- and resource-books for councillors and ward committees, produced in the mid-2000s, have been compiled by NGOs such as Idasa, the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (Eisa) and Afesis-Corplan.3 It is not evident, however, that NGO infuence predominates in the discourse as a whole. The language and emphasis of the DPLG’s guidance differ from base policy documents such as the Local Government White Paper and, indeed, from the language used by the ANC in its own party publications. The guidance documents compiled by NGOs place greater emphasis on the empowering potential of democracy, referring to aspects such as community control and joint-decision-making in municipal planning (Salga & GTZ 2006: 70). The Ward Committee Resource Book refers to a participatory system as not only exceeding the representative dimension of democracy but as a process of democratic deepening; of ‘empowering citizens to fulfl their potential as partners with government’ (DPLG & GTZ 2005b: 10). Not dissimilarly to Arnstein’s gradation of citizen involvement (1969), it highlights the need to distinguish between ‘providing information’, ‘consultation’ and ‘participation’ and their appropriateness in different circumstances (DPLG & GTZ 2005b: 11). Radical democratic discourse is also discernible in other policy documents. One of the most elaborate in this regard, is the DPLG’s 2007 ‘National Policy Framework for Public Participation’ which draws directly on Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’. In setting out the varying degrees of citizen involvement, the document ‘advocates … a partnership approach between citizens and government, moving to citizens represented by ward committees having recognised powers, with delegated responsibilities’ (DPLG 2007: 17). By setting out an understanding of participation as a form of ‘partnership’ between citizen and government, the DPLG appears to recognise participatory democracy as both deliberative and empowering. The framework utilises a defnition of ‘public participation’ as: ‘an open, accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities can exchange views and infuence decision-making. It is further defned as a democratic process 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 173 of engaging people, deciding, planning, and playing an active part in the development and operation of services that affect their lives’ (ibid.: 15). Both Pieterse (2002: 5) and Stoker (2002: 32–33) refer to the re-thinking of approaches to local government in the late 1990s and 2000s as invoking an understanding of democracy as ‘problem-solving’. This draws not only on democracy as universal suffrage and human rights but on ‘our collective capacity to address unsolved social problems’ (Cohen and Sabel 1997 cited in Stoker 2002: 32). Pieterse refers to South Africa’s IDP policy, through which residents can participate in the preparation, adoption, implementation and review of their municipality’s development vision (RSA 1998a, 2000), as embodying just this principle (2002: 6). While the model of democracy it involves may be based on achieving consensus, it is proposed that this be achieved through a process of deliberation and problem-solving. By seeing participation as both a process and outcome of development, it is also something empowering. In some documents, emphasis has also remained on the notion of participation as a ‘right’ and on enhancing citizens’ capacity to exercise that right. The 2006 Handbook for Municipal Councillors emphasises that the right to participate in decision-making ‘helps create empowered citizens who have the initiative to continue to contribute to the development of their communities’ (Salga & GTZ 2006: 45). The very same handbook poses questions for councillors themselves about the extent to which they: ‘are helping to educate constituents’; ‘promoting respect for human rights’; and ‘encouraging the potential and initiative of [their] constituency’ (2006: 46). There is a visible current of thinking which seeks to emphasise the transformative and self-reinforcing role of participation in decision-making.

Participatory Development Also inspiring thinking about local government, was the idea of ‘participatory development’ (McGee 2002). From the 1980s onwards, a wave of thinking emerged in development discourse which located popular participation not only within discrete ‘projects’ but in the development process as a whole (ibid.: 94–95). Associated with the writings of Paulo Freire (ibid.: 94), ideas about the pedagogy of democracy and development, and of people as active agents, had been infuential on community activists in South Africa. With the commencement of local government negotiations after 1990, ideas about bottom-up development transferred, often through the progressive NGO sector 174 H. BROOKS who provided technical advice and support, discussed in Chapter 4. More recently, principles of grassroots organising are identifable in Salga’s guidance for citizen participation in governance, including the promotion of human agency, meaningful participation and community ownership of development planning (Salga & GTZ 2006: 64, 70). Historic traditions of participation, however, no matter their presence in organisational memory, are not immune to other theoretical debates. Indeed, the perceived repeal of ANC commitments since 1994 to a more radical form of democracy link in part to policy shifts internationally and the consolidation of a global economic orthodoxy. The design of a new local government system in South Africa coincided with international shifts in development theory regarding the role of state and citizen. One aspect of this, acknowledged during the constitutional negotiations, involved refo- cusing the role of local government on development rather than delivery. Although it was the Local Government White Paper that formally introduced the notion of ‘developmental local government’ (DLG), the idea appears to have frst emerged during the work of the Constitutional Assembly. Advisors to the Ad Hoc Committee on Local Government in 1995 described DLG by listing a set of characteristics almost identical to those later included in the White Paper. DLG, they described, is where local government is integral to local development and responsible for stimulating local economic growth (1995: 43). Boraine, a member of the Ad Hoc Committee at the time, also highlighted the importance of people participating in decision-making as citizens rather than simply as rate- or tax-payers (CA TC3 1995: 30). The emergent thinking about DLG is substantiated by the editor of the Local Government White Paper, Dominique Wooldridge. She referred to some infuential research produced by local academic, Ben Cashdan during the preceding Green Paper process which advocated the re-direction of local government spending toward developmental ends. It was Cashdan’s paper, according to her, that formed the basis for the DLG concept (interview, 2013). Mark Swilling also referred to the infuence of the Left reform of local government in the UK (interview, 2013), where a more ‘radical’ model of local government had been implemented, focused on community-level citizen participation and not just state delivery of services. Such ideas about citizen participation in development and planning became visible in South Africa’s local government policy. Parnell and Pieterse noted at the time that ‘the most important addition … is the 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 175 current emphasis on the transformation of government itself: on the establishment of democratic municipalities that are in turn structur- ally dependent on civil society forums for input, vitality and legitimacy’ (1999: 73).4 The discourse of ‘civil society’ in democratic theory and of ‘citizenship’ in development and planning circles, together, shaped understandings of the local development process.

Governance The shaping of the new democratic state also introduced international experience to policy discussion. Gaining popularity in development discourse internationally in the 1990s was the notion of ‘governance’. A response to the failure of state-heavy, top-down approaches to development, and widely encouraged by international fnancial institutions and donors, governance has been defned as ‘the entire set of relationships between the state, the market and society’ (Minogue 2002: 117). It is concerned not only with the state but with the relationship between state and citizen, incorporating the idea of citizens as important players in the realisation of effective policies. The general features of governance discourse, such as political accountability, legitimacy and human rights (ibid.: 118–121) complemented simultaneous shifts in the ANC itself toward an embrace of liberal democratic principles. Its values are also assumed in South Africa’s policy documents on public participation in local governance (DPLG 2007; DPLG & LGSETA, n.d.). Such documents describe democratic governance as requiring ‘democratic participation through the voice of all civil society actors in policy and governance processes’ and emphasise the requirements of ‘open decision-making’ and ‘accountability’ (DPLG & LGSETA, n.d., section 1.2: 18).5 The aspects of governance concerned with citizen participation has appealed to Left regimes elsewhere, and the 1990s, in particular, saw a focus on participatory municipal governance amongst other lower and middle income countries such as India and Brazil. In line with the rethinking of local government’s role in the development process globally, states extended their focus beyond government as a service-provider toward its concern with ‘community leadership’ and local democratic input (Stoker 2002: 31). Wooldridge noted that the academic, Brendan Martin, who had been working on the participatory budgeting process in city of Porto Alegre, Brazil came out to South Africa to work with the White Paper team (interview, 2013). 176 H. BROOKS

Yet, although international experience provided some inspiration for South Africa, there is also a considerable degree of contrast. The local budgeting process in Porto Alegre is shown to have delegated a tangible degree of control to citizens (Heller 2001: 140; Abers 1998). Similarly, the neighbourhood Panchayats (or assemblies) in Kerala, India draw in a large number of participants and act as committee structures for local planning of development priorities (Heller 2001: 141–142). In South Africa, the ward committee is merely an advisory structure, providing a mode of communication between council and community rather than any real mechanism for infuence. Municipal councils are under no obli- gation to act on committees’ recommendations and there is no detail in the DPLG’s National Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of Municipal Ward Committees (2005a) as to what councils will do with the input from residents. Theron and Ceasar suggest that the ‘say’ which public benefciaries have correlates more to ‘informing’ or ‘consulting’ than ‘collaboration’ or ‘empowerment’ (2008: 117). Indeed, a recent article on Cogta’s website, while stating that the ward committee should ensure ‘active participation of the community in the municipality’s budgetary process’, still only describes it as a ‘consultative body and communication channel’ (Cogta 2017). International governance standards have also informed strategies used in the application of IDP. Based on the ‘core values’ of the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) (Theron and Ceasar 2008: 112–113), this includes the principle that ‘the public should have a say in decisions about actions that could affect their lives’ (ibid.: 117). However, despite the IDP’s stated purpose to garner the input of residents, research by Buccus (c.2005) suggests that, despite positive perceptions amongst policy makers about the value of participation, the IDP process still only involves community input after major policy decisions have been taken. In this case it serves more to legitimate existing government plans (Everatt et al. 2010: 237–238) than to incorporate community input. At the national level, a form of participation which speaks to similar concerns is the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). Embodying the ethos of state-society partnership characteristic of good governance, NEDLAC constitutes a statutory, tripartite corporatist arrangement (of government, labour and business—and in South Africa’s, case community organisations) to consider proposed labour legislation and any signifcant changes to social and economic 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 177 policy before it is introduced in Parliament (RSA 1994). However, although NEDLAC is more than merely consultative—giving its parties opportunity to join the policy making process itself—it has not produced the radical form of working class power that its advocates in the labour movement might have hoped. Premised on the achievement of consensus, Friedman links the rationale of corporatism to the recognition by government that its goals cannot be achieved without the ‘acquiescence to or active support of organized private constituencies’ (2006: 4). Not unlike the IDP, consensus-seeking structures like NEDLAC may thus be utilised as legitimating mechanisms or provide endorsement of policy proposals merely by virtue of the organised interests being present. Habib suggests that corporatism is one method adopted by the ANC government to “neutralise opposition” to the new neo-liberal economic order (1997: 70–71). The contention that it contributes to the deepening of democracy thus runs up against the same critique as participation in local government: citizen infuence is confned to shaping social and economic policy within the existing ideological paradigm. In some cases, participatory governance has been replaced by technocracy and expediency. During the hearings on the White Paper in 1998 it was questioned whether the IDP would necessarily have the effect of building local capacity, with one presenter highlighting both the lack of capacity in municipalities and the role of contracted consultants in developing much of the ‘know-how’ (Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee, 22 April 1998). The IDP’s implementation was indeed initially met with a lack of local government capacity and, quite possibly, a limited appreciation by offcials of the role of public input. Valli Moosa, who was Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, remarked that there were incidents of some local authorities commission- ing a consultancy to draft an IDP for them (interview, 2013). What appears to have crept into the discourse of governance is a more ‘limited’ and ‘formalised’ interpretation of participation (De Beer 1996: 67). Through increasingly technocratic processes in development, and by detaching popular participation from policy formulation, participatory governance is in effect de-politicised. At the same time, Tapscott points out that ‘because development is so frequently portrayed in technocratic and depoliticised language, this should not disguise that it is rarely if ever politically neutral’: it can in fact serve to ‘reproduce’ existing relations of power rather than induce social transformation (1997: 87). Local 178 H. BROOKS party politics can also impact the dynamics of participatory institutions (Cornwall 2008: 513). This is particularly relevant to South Africa where ward committees are themselves the site of party dominance and intra- party rivalries. While inadequacies in implementation can partly be attributed to logistical, training and resource defciencies, they also lie in the underlying conceptual framework. During the White Paper hearings, some stakeholders remarked that notion of ‘power’ remained too centralised in the document (Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee, 20 April 1998) and that it did not go far enough to empower local government (Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee, 22 April 1998). The resources compiled by NGOs in support of the DPLG and Salga have given further elaboration to the concepts of empowerment and participation. However, the underlying policy still remains lacking. The White Paper notably provided no reference to citizen participation in decision-making itself, and its lack of theoretical grounding in relation to participatory governance, Smith argues, has led to citizen participation being ‘confned to a narrowly prescribed set of structures and processes, to the exclusion of a more open and inclusionary practice’ (2007: 3). Although subsequent guidance and municipal handbooks are more explicit in this regard, the underlying policy does not capture the desire to develop a truly empowered citizenry able to exercise judgement and contribute to decision-making.

Performance Management The usurping of participatory democracy’s empowering features is also attributable to shifts in South Africa’s macro-economic approach. In 1996, the RDP was effectively replaced as a socio-economic policy framework by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR). Focused on a market-oriented, growth-led model of development, GEAR has been interpreted by the Left as not only removing macro-economic policy from the sphere of democratic contestation, but as marking a break with the ANC’s participatory traditions. The closure of the central government RDP offce in the same year correspondingly relocated the vision of development planning to the local terrain of governance (Harrison 2001: 186). Although this side-lining of the RDP arguably enabled a veneer of participation to remain while limiting popular control over the national agenda, local government policy has continued to draw on the need 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 179 for communities to drive development. The participatory endeavours of municipalities, however, have also been accompanied by a technocratic and managerial approach to public sector organisation. Driven by principles of effciency and tight fscal control, this trend has constricted popular infuence on municipal development planning. The discourse of ‘new public management’, associated with the approach of good governance, is concerned not only with state-society relations but with improving the public sector ‘performance’ (ibid.: 178– 179). South Africa’s Municipal Systems Bill, by introducing a system of participatory governance, was explicitly understood as ‘[laying] the foundation for the later Chapters in the Bill in which participatory processes are critical to the success of initiatives such as planning and performance management’ (Provincial & Local Government Portfolio Committee and Local Government & Administration Select Committee, 19 April 2000: 6). As such, although shifts toward participatory development have been spurred partly by the failure of top-down approaches (McGee 2002: 95), the costs of bottom-up development to effciency and delivery are also weighed up (Pieterse 2002: 12; see also Heller 2001: 146). The White Paper itself warned that ‘participatory processes must not become an obstacle to development … It is important for municipalities to fnd ways of structuring participation which enhance, rather than impede, the delivery process’ (RSA 1998a: section B.1.3). During a discussion on the Municipal Structures Bill, then Minister Valli Moosa was recorded as saying that ‘the key criterion for local government’ should be whether citizens are ‘receiving value for money?’; and that local government ‘should develop a business-like approach to service delivery’ (Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee, 1 September 1998). Tied into the ethos of performance management is a cultivation of state-society partnerships which foster the principle of self-help. New development thinking has included a desire to generate greater self-suffciency of citizens by rolling back the state (McGee 2002: 95; see also Leal 2011). As such, while participation is about the extension of citizenship, it is also about shrinking state responsibilities and what Cornwall and Coelho refer to as ‘the progressive exemption of the state from the role of guarantor of rights’ (2007: 5). As the state has reduced its own role in service delivery, so it has placed increased emphasis on citizens working with the state, not against it. It is a push for cooperation which takes two forms: The frst stems from new public management’s preference for a depoliticised 180 H. BROOKS development controlled by experts. Questions of strategic and ideological direction are not for popular debate. The second emerges from the limited capacity of the state itself which has generated renewed interest on the part of the government in local initiative and community organisation. As opposed to citizen engagement in what has been termed ‘community protest’ (Alexander 2010), what the government would pre- fer to see is the cooperation of citizens. While emphasising the importance of strong civil society formations, Masondo, a former Mayor of Johannesburg, argued in an interview that it would be more effective if civil society engaged with the question of how it could help government, rather than just criticise it (interview, 2013). As Deputy Minster of CoGTA, Carrim also referred to organisations such as NGOs and CBOs as constituting ‘organs of people’s power’, which he viewed as ‘any organisation whether national or local or provincial which actually seeks to advance the needs and interests of people on the ground who are disadvantaged’ (interview-a, 2013). He also recognised the role of extra-state methods of participation, such as protest, as a non-institutionalised form of participation that ‘municipalities are forced to come to terms with’. However, while noting that there is value to protest, he remarked that ‘it would be more productive and they would be able to achieve far more if they also used state structures beside their own’ (interview-a, 2013). There is also some encouragement—perhaps even nostalgia—for a form of partnership in which government delivery is supplemented by the forms of community self-help that were prevalent in the 1980s. Paul Mashatile, who was an activist in the Alexandra Youth Congress and later Member of the Executive Council for Safety in Gauteng and provincial Premier, refected on the impact of civil society’s demobilisation after 1990:

I think we need to be gradually assisting to ensure very vibrant organs of civil society … [W]e realised that government can’t do everything on its own and that reality has dawned now to say that, you know, we need organs of civil society. We need people, because they will assist to get people involved, rather than people going out and then there’s service delivery protests. Protest will always be there but you need a greater appreciation of people that this is also our responsibility to change the conditions and lives in our communities. (Interview, 2013)

Mashatile linked the importance of a role for civil society to the introduction of structures such as constituency offces and ward committees, 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 181 but also to citizens’ responsibility to help themselves through their own initiatives—an ethos which he saw as refecting the organising and self-reliant ethos of people’s power (interview, 2013). He described the ANC’s 2009 election slogan, ‘Working Together’, as signifying the desire ‘to move away from the notion that government delivers to you whilst you are sitting. We want to say to citizens, no, this is partnership, let’s work together to do all these things’ (interview, 2013). Through cost-recovery, outsourcing and a rolling-back of the state, local government has been encouraged to operate in a more business-like fashion in which citizens are customers not partners. It is in the feld of development planning in South Africa that this tension is especially visible: between the neo-liberal concerns of effciency and performance and those focused on bottom-up development (Harrison 2006: 202). South Africa’s IDP embodies just this conundrum, trying to ensure fscal responsibility, effciency and effectivity as well as providing space for citizens to infuence development priorities. Decentralisation trends in South Africa, as elsewhere in the world, have also not necessarily meant that control of policy design is relinquished by the centre (Harrison 2006: 190). The failure of the IDP accordingly results from its state- led character and lack of local control and autonomy (Heller 2001: 146, 147; Everatt et al. 2010: 225). Mechanisms for citizens to infuence planning in South Africa are circumscribed even at the most local level, closing off from popular democratic debate any real control over policy and expenditure.

Radicalism Versus Realism A further strand feeding into conceptions of participation is not so much rooted in a theoretical framework as in the day-to-day exigencies of governing. Here, policy makers’ interpretations have been shaped by changing ideology, political imperatives and pragmatism. A notable theme amongst some of those interviewed about participatory policy concerned the extent to which the changed ideological milieu between the 1980s and the democratic era altered perceptions about what was both possible and desirable. Boraine, a former UDF leader who became part of the NLGNF, as well as the Ad Hoc Committee on Local Government in the Constitutional Assembly and the early stages of drafting the Local Government White Paper, refected on the idealism with which many in the ANC-UDF camp had viewed popular power during the 1980s. Looking back at the ideas which infuenced them at the 182 H. BROOKS time—Che Guevara, Fanon, Lenin, Gramsci—he remarked ‘a lot of that’s romantic … [It] was part of the struggle culture of the time and that’s what we believed’ (interview, 2013). Rashid Seedat, who was also involved in civic activism and later in work on the post-apartheid local government model, commented that their understanding of the role of civics in the 1980s and their vision of a democratic future had been shaped by the local and global ideological context of that time. For him, not only was the milieu different, but in the intervening period there was a shift in the institutional memory of the ANC as an organisation, its leadership and membership (interview-b, 2013). He also refected on the extent to which many ideological principles in the preceding years had often been accepted unquestioningly: ‘Our belief in the ’80s in socialism and all that was almost like a religious belief. It was sort of like one took a completely uncritical view of things. I mean, as things changed, and we spoke about Slovo’s ‘Has Socialism Failed’… you know those things don’t work anymore’ (interview-b, 2013). The shift of many such individuals into state and civil service positions are perhaps themselves telling. Others, such as former civic activist Cas Coovadia, have since moved into the private sector. International geopolitical changes, as the previous chapter noted, also instigated shifts in the ANC’s own ideological outlook and, in turn, its democratic thought. The liberal democratic principles to which the ANC made commitments after 1986 took effect not only at the leadership level but also amongst those activists who would come to participate in policy-making. Seedat remarked on how these shifts impacted the democratic project, changing not only the possibility but the desirability of institutionalising people’s power:

If we had taken power in ‘87 or something my guess is that we would probably have experimented with those things because, number one, you’re seizing power; number two, you believe this is now kind of a revolutionary context … I think that actually, in a funny way, maybe it wasn’t a bad thing that we didn’t do it because I think we were forewarned about particular issues. And I also think the issue around formal institutions of procedural democracy and so on is actually quite fundamental. You can be quite sort of, dismissive of it … But if you don’t vote every fve years you’re basically not a democracy. (Interview-b, 2013)

His remark suggests a new appreciation for certain democratic principles and practices, previously overlooked or dismissed. Wooldridge likewise 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 183 remarked that there had previously been a ‘strong suspicion’ of what they referred to as ‘neo-liberal democracy’ (interview, 2013). As Butler has remarked of this older generation of ANC activists, in contrast to their contemporary counterparts, many had been witness to the “practical lessons of history”—to the failures and abuses of communist states, and the dangers of a dogmatic Leninism (2012: 51). Seedat’s refections also address the challenges of converting theory into practice. While spontaneous organisation and direct popular power were conducive to the cause of revolution, he refected that their implications in a post-revolutionary context had not been thought through:

The diffculty with that is how do you apply this uniformly across the country? What rules do you put into place? What mechanisms do you establish to get them set up and so on? Because these things happen spon- taneously and so on, right? Whereas in many ways democracy has to be organised - I think that’s the reality. I think you need rules, you need precepts … Because you want to ensure equality and you want to ensure fairness and all those sorts of natural-justice principles. How do you make sure that everyone has an equal chance to be part of an organ of popular power? (Interview-b, 2013)

This observation speaks to wider critiques of participatory democracy and to the challenge of extending and deepening democracy without undermining individual freedom and choice. Ensuring equal access to participatory structures and preventing their domination by narrow interest groups, are challenges raised by various development theorists (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Cornwall 2008). Yet there is also the challenge of converting theory into practice. Wooldridge reasoned that, although she felt most people were committed to the principle of participation, ‘when it came down to what it would mean in practice there were a lot of diverging views’ (interview, 2013). Referring to the IDP process during his time working for the City of Johannesburg, Seedat commented that, despite real commitment to making it work, they struggled methodologically with implementing it (interview-b, 2013). Refecting on these comments, there is value in considering whether ANC policy-makers either felt that the principles they once held belonged to a period of history, or whether the realities of governing simply instilled in them a new pragmatism. Some of the obstacles to implementation highlight the challenge of citizen education. Mufamadi, 184 H. BROOKS as former Minister of the DPLG, referred to participatory systems of government as ‘knowledge-intensive’, observing the discrepancy that sometimes exists between the aspiration of a policy and reality:

[It] presupposes that people know something. If you say integrated development planning, if you are dealing with a community in which there is a level of illiteracy which is as high as seventy per cent, theoretically people have got this right but they don’t have the means to exercise it … So it imposes other obligations: how do you equip people to enable them to exercise these rights that they have? (Interview, 2012)

That being said, pragmatism was not the only factor guiding policy makers. In reference to drafting the constitution, Moosa noted some ‘tension’ between the instincts and approach of those with a background in the MDM and those who had spent their time in exile. For the latter, he felt ‘there wasn’t that same level of consciousness about the need to involve ordinary people … And people didn’t always think that it was workable or that it was practical to want to consult fairly uneducated people about the constitution’ (interview, 2013). Moosa’s refection also speaks to the conceptual divergences in the ANC about the role and future of people’s power: between those for whom it represented a democratic ideal and those for whom it served as a means to establish an ANC-led government. The required overhaul of local government after 1990 also posed an array of challenges which demanded attention before citizen participation could be contemplated. The introduction of a system of representative democracy itself was no mean feat. The ANC’s DPE, according to Suttner, had poured its effort into electoral education in the run up to 1994, such that attention was diverted from the issue of popular power (interview, 2012). Moreover, due to the power-sharing arrangement between 1994 and 1999, Wooldridge remarked that political considerations (and the potential for participatory structures to facilitate local opposition strong- holds) put a brake on more radical commitments (interview, 2013). Particularly intriguing is the suggestion that, in contrast to the participatory and empowering function assigned to ward committees today, they seem originally to have been conceived, not as mechanisms for empowered local government but as a concession to the opposition. Refecting on the White Paper process, Wooldridge remarked that, although the ANC-camp was generally committed to participatory 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 185 principles and to the importance of building a strong civil society, the location of participatory democracy at the lowest level of government, as noted earlier, was a position adopted by the Right (interview, 2013). For opposition parties, whose constituents resided in the white suburbs, small and decentralised local government and retention of their own tax base would not only preserve the existence of white enclaves but also give them greater autonomy (Boraine interview, 2013). ‘In a way it was very awkward’, remarked Wooldridge, ‘because here we were the good guys on the side of democracy and participation and so on, arguing against that in order to not get, and not end up supporting, a fragmented city and a fragmented tax base!’ (interview, 2013). Ironically, then, the case for decentralisation and local-level power, both of which were features of civic and UDF discourse, in fact pos- sessed the potential to limit transformation. According to Wooldridge, the ward committee system specifcally was largely proposed as a way to placate opposition parties: meeting them half-way by granting communities a degree of local autonomy, while the ANC continued to push the case for a single tax base. As such, while ward committees have since been located as a centrepiece of democratic local government, they were not originally conceived as an empowering mechanism. Wooldridge remarked:

To a large extent, the idea of ward committees was a fob. They were adopted nationally as a way of kind of sweetening the pill, or trying to sweeten the pill, so we said it’s not a move to macro-government because there are these small ward committees … I mean I’m crudifying it a bit, but that’s my broad sense of it; that there wasn’t that much commitment to establishing ward committees or any smaller level of really empowered government. (Interview, 2013)

The ANC’s aversion to small local government is certainly logical: In order to fulfl the RDP’s transformative objectives—for which local government was the primary vehicle—the devolution of power to existing communities of privilege would act as a block on transformation as well as restrict the power of national government to effect change at the local level. On the other hand, research on the ward committee system has identifed the insuffcient powers held by local councillors as a hindrance to its effectiveness as a participatory mechanism (Benit-Gbaffou 2008). Although White Paper discussions on aspects such as social housing drew 186 H. BROOKS on participatory traditions, these debates apparently took place quite separately from those on ward committees (Wooldridge interview, 2013). Their purely ‘advisory’ role in the existing system would support the contention that they were never envisaged as providing any substantial degree of local control. The romanticism of the 1980s and the possibilities for people’s power after 1994 began to clash with the realism of what was possible and desirable. The emergence of this realist sentiment was, at various stages, prompted and reinforced by several factors, including shifts in ideology, a realignment of democratic thinking, the pragmatism of implementation, and the exigencies of state delivery, all of which overlapped with efforts to introduce the system of participatory governance.

5.2 Participation in Movement Discourse It was stated earlier that participatory discourse in democratic South Africa has not been the preserve of public policy alone, but has continued as a current of movement discourse in the ANC itself. The theory and practice of participatory democracy must therefore take into account the governing party’s own infuence, not only in the formal channels of policy development but in its role as a mass movement.

From Building People’s Power to Building the ANC The constitutional and local government negotiations, and subsequent processes of policy formulation, took place in parallel with the re-building of the ANC. Until 1990, ANC structures in South Africa had been either non-existent or underground. There was thus a focus from 1990 and through the transition on rebuilding the organisation and its leadership capacity. Efforts toward establishing organisational presence involved both the ANC and its Alliance partners. Given the overlap between the rebuilding of the movement and the conduct of constitutional and local government negotiations, it is of little surprise that ANC tradition—both organisational and ideological—penetrated policy discussion. At the centre of its movement tradition is the ANC’s relationship with the people.

Linking Movement and People Into the present, the ANC continues to reiterate its role not only as a political party but also a mass movement. The 1997 document, ‘The 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 187

Character of the ANC’ linked its movement identity to three historic factors: the desire to be ‘a movement of mass participation’; its tradition as a ‘broad church’ and ‘hegemonic organisation’; and the ‘style’ in which it has functioned, ‘[attempting] to be a force for cohesion in the centre of a broad range of allied organisations, mass democratic and community based structures’ (ANC 1997a). As per the ‘mass party’ typology originally theorised by Duverger (1964: 63), the ANC draws its strength and raison d‘etre from its link to the masses (Brooks 2014). Darraq insists that the membership of the ANC is ‘very strikingly and emotionally attached’ to the organisation’s ‘national liberation movement character’ (2008: 439). Indeed, its link to the masses is what makes the ANC more than a political party; ‘the power of the ANC’, the movement asserts, ‘lies in its mass base’ (ANC DPE 1991a).6 As the ANC reconstituted itself from a struggle movement to a pro- spective government, however, its relationship with popular structures became far less clear. The MDM and its constituent parts represented both part of the new ‘civil society’ and the broad movement of forces that identifed with the ANC historically. Although, amongst civics themselves, the dominant view was that they would act as autonomous safeguards of community interests and a check on government power (UDF 1990; UDF—Border 1991: 2), the ANC’s Commission on Organisation Building was cautious about the civic role and its potential to develop into oppositional politics:

We need to remember that civics were created by the ANC at a time when there were few other legal formations. The fact that the ANC has been unbanned does not make the civics redundant. They have a crucial role in uniting the masses of our people across the political spectrum … Now there are tensions between the two and we need to provide discussion around the role of ANC members in civic structures in order to see that the civics are part of the broader democratic movement - otherwise they can and will be used by other forces against the interests of the people. (ANC 1991: 5)

Although, for mass organisations, the struggle for people’s power had shifted to the civic terrain, for the ANC it remained a pillar of its own reconstruction. While emphasizing that its unbanning did not make the civics ‘redundant’, the ANC continued to characterise their role as one of allegiance. 188 H. BROOKS

While shifting away from a politics of resistance the ANC has still sought a continuation of its national liberation traditions (ANC, n.d., c: 13). A political education document of the ANC elaborated on the ongoing relevance of broad popular unity, clarifying that ‘The ANC’s link to the masses is not only vital to its character but it is also essential to its strength both in the current period and under a democratic government …’ (ANC DPE 1991a). Following the frst democratic elections in 1994, the ANC asserted that, ‘Despite the very real organisational diffculties the ANC is confronted with, we do have in South Africa the unique reality of a party which is solidly anchored in a broad social movement’ (1994b: 4). Wary that the people do not become mere ‘spectators’ of governance (ANC 2012: 3, 44), into the present the ANC has retained a keen movement discourse promoting popular participation and the linkage of movement and people. Even into its most recent policy conferences, the extension of its national liberation character has been emphasised in discussions and policy documents (ANC 2017a). The ANC, as President Cyril Ramaphosa emphasised at the start of 2018, belongs not to its leadership but ‘to the people of South Africa’ (ANC 2018).

Renewing the Vanguard In assuming the dual identity of both a party and a movement, however, the ANC embodies ‘a complexity of characteristics and traditions’ for which a purely organisational typology cannot account (Brooks 2014: 153). Chapter 3 of this book dedicated signifcant attention to the presence in ANC after 1960 of a dominant discourse of vanguardism. The movement’s self-identifcation as a vanguard refects its dominant roots in both African nationalist and Marxist-Leninist thought. It is this heritage which helps to explain the ANC’s display of certain features reminiscent of a vanguard-type party, while aspiring to retain the broad ‘united front’ politics of a movement (see also ibid.: 154). It was also argued that the role of vanguardism is often overlooked in analyses of ANC identity. Yet, its relevance is pertinent not only to its history as a liberation movement but to its ongoing role as a governing party. The ANC today continues to identify itself as a vanguard of the people—an organisation able to give revolutionary leadership to state and society. In various documents and statements since the transition and into the present, the ANC refers to itself directly as: ‘the vanguard of the liberation struggle’ (Nzo 1991); ‘the vanguard of the NDR’ and of 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 189 the ‘motive forces of the NDR’ (ANC 1997a); and as ‘a vanguard movement’ for transformation (ANC 2012: 67; ANC 2017a: 17; see also ANC 2018). At its National Policy Conference in July 2017 it stated: ‘The ANC has to operate as a vanguard movement with political, ideological and organisational capacity to direct the state and give leadership to the motive forces in all spheres of infuence and pillars of our transformation’ (ANC 2017a: 17). The ANC’s perception of its vanguard status links to its claim to an historic role. In 1991, then Secretary General of the ANC, Alfred Nzo explained this status as having been achieved not by ‘proclamation but by the correctness of our policies and by concrete actions’ (1991: 28). At successive policy conferences in the democratic era, and in its adopted strategy and tactics, the ANC has reiterated its role as a ‘vanguard’ movement (ANC 2007a, 2012, 2017b), conducting the struggle for national democratic revolution across the mass terrain and locating itself in all ‘centres of power’ (ANC 2017b). It is an identity and a narrative that has both survived the transition to democracy and outlasted the broader decline of the ideology from which it originates. In the context of democracy, just as in struggle, the relevance of the vanguard identity lies in the relationship with the people it implies. Vanguardism, as Chapter 3 sought to show, cannot be imposed. Rather it requires that the people themselves identify with and actively participate in the achievement of revolutionary objectives. The ANC’s 2017 document on organisational renewal restated that the ongoing struggle in South Africa ‘must be lead by a vanguard leadership that leverages the ANC as an instrument of struggle’ (sic). ‘The ANC, it continued, “must enjoy hegemony amongst all classes, races, social strata, social forces in keeping with its revolutionary mass character…’ (2017a). We must, however, distinguish between the ANC’s vanguard identity and that of the SACP. While the SACP is the vanguard of the working class, the ANC understands itself to be the vanguard of the people. While the SACP is a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party at the head of the struggle for socialism, the ANC is the vanguard of national democracy. Although there is no inherent confict between these roles, there is perhaps a degree of tension, and it is arguably the continuation of the phase of ‘national democratic’ struggle—alongside a more global decline of support for communism—that enables the ANC to retain its intra-Alliance dominance. In the present period, the implications of vanguardism are related fundamentally to context. Although the ANC’s mass character can be 190 H. BROOKS traced to the 1950s, it was during its period in exile that it also displayed characteristics reminiscent of a vanguard-type party. After 1990, while seeking to retain its vanguard identity, the movement also recognised the requisite of opening up its mode of operation from that of underground units to visible branches where ordinary people could participate (Moosa, interview with O’Malley 1990). Breaking with the practice of centralised control, however, did not necessarily come easily. In the ANC’s absence, it was the civic movement that had worked hard to establish popular connections and networks. Tensions thus surfaced over representation and the continuation of a multiplicity of mass structures versus an all-encompassing ‘ANC’. On the latter’s return to South Africa, Seedat recalled suggestions by the movement that the Indian Congresses should disband and collapse into the ANC: ‘They were coming and saying, listen, you guys have to close down because there’s only one show in town; that’s the ANC’ (interview-a, 2013). In the PWV region a tension existed between those ‘stalwarts’ of the ANC who were part of the organisation before its banning, and activists who had ‘borne the brunt of the mass struggles in recent years’ (ANC PWV Region 1990). In reconnecting itself with the people, the ANC to an extent overlooked the value of relationships established by other Congress organisations. Seekings, at the time, referred to the ANC’s approach as one in which local leadership and protest were understood ‘as simply part of the national political struggle’; concerns at the local level were confated with the intentions of national leadership (1991: 296–297). Some individuals, such as the ANC’s and SACP’s Blade Nzimande and Mpume Sikhosana were charged with suggesting that there was no need for separate civic structures once the ANC was legally re-established (Mayekiso 1993: 27). They contended that both civics and ANC branches were part of the NDR (Nzimande and Sikhosana 1992: 26). Given Ben Turok’s claim that some within the SACP leadership viewed the UDF as a threat (interview, 2013), it is perhaps likely that there remained a concern after 1990 to limit the latter’s conceptual infuence. At the SACP’s own consultative conference it was noted that ‘unnecessary overlaps’ should not be created ‘in treating the UDF as another entity of the Alliance’ (SACP, n.d.: 8). From 1994, with the departure of much of the civic leadership to the structures of party and government, the civics also contributed unintentionally to their own demise. As the ANC rebuilt itself to compete in electoral politics, it also fought to maintain the predominance over mass organisations that 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 191 characterised its liberation leadership. As early as 1991, the ANC remarked that the ‘aura and respect’ it had commanded as a ‘clandestine vanguard’ was receding at an ‘alarming pace’ (ANC 1991: 1). Over more recent years, the fragility of popular support has loomed even larger, ren- dering the movement increasingly aware of the need to reconnect itself with its mass base. Following the ANC’s national consultative conference in 2007, the National Executive Council (NEC) was tasked with establishing ‘a period of renewal’ (ANC 2007b). The ANC’s subsequent policy conference in 2012 placed even greater emphasis on the danger of losing contact with the people (ANC 2012), while Ramaphosa, in 2018, maintained that the centre of the ANC’s efforts ‘must be the fundamental renewal and revitalisation’ of the organisation (ANC 2018). As the ANC has sought to both maintain and renew its relationship with the people, its movement discourse continues to shape its understanding of democracy.

Participation in What Capacity? The earlier part of this chapter interrogated the ideas woven into participatory democratic policy, showing how it has been informed by a multitude of concepts and intellectual traditions. From a domestic history of popular organisation to radical democratic theory and development paradigms, these various threads have contributed to some well-developed policy. Yet they have also generated a conceptual tension between the goals of citizen infuence and the exigencies of effciency and management. Analysis of the ‘forms’ of participation constituted in institutionalised mechanisms suggest that, in practice, most citizen participation conforms to a type of consultation. Nonetheless, there are visible strands of this discourse which place a high value on citizen empowerment. Both policy frameworks and legislation, moreover, are clear that institutionalised participatory mechanisms constitute politically pluralistic spaces for engagement. The ideas informing the ANC’s own discourse, however, are somewhat different. Since 1990, the ANC has continued to situate participation largely in a context of movement-building (ANC 2012) or has confated popular will and citizen choice with its own vision of the national democratic programme. The conception of participatory democracy refected in ANC documents, speeches, publications and commentary, draws less on ideas from development theory and governance and more on its own identity. 192 H. BROOKS

Partners for Hegemonic Unity In keeping with the ANC’s vanguard character and the relationship with the people this entails, popular participation is often portrayed as a form of partnership. In the context of the democratic state, this draws not only on a discourse of nation-building but on the idea of ‘progressive’ civil society working with and supporting government. While the partnership strand of thinking is also found in policy discourse—and refected in the collaborative and self-help currents of governance discussed above—in ANC discourse there has been a linking of popular participation to the establishment of hegemonic unity. Having recognised in the 1990s the dangers of social distance, the ANC since the mid-2000s has acknowledged openly the weakening connection with its support base (ANC 2007c, 2012, 2018). This admission has brought with it a revived movement discourse in which the cultivation of popular participation is linked to the strengthening of its own hegemony. Left democratic debate in the early 1990s came increasingly to view an independent civil society as a requisite feature of democracy (Friedman 1992: 83, 84; Glaser 1997) and was a position supported by the ANC (ANC DPE 1991a). With regard to the civic movement, although consensus of opinion appears to have been in favour of their independence, nuances existed in precisely what this meant. On the one hand, the ANC emphasised the importance of ‘strong mass organisations’, separate from political parties and the state. Yet it also encouraged ANC members to continue building mass democratic structures and envisaged an organisational and leadership linkage between party and civic movement (ANC DPE 1991b: 7). It was ‘political leadership’ and the raising of ‘political consciousness’ that that the ANC envisaged providing to civic struggles (ANC DPE 1991b: 7). The ANC’s position on civic loyalty was expressed in a statement by Alfred Nzo which fagged the ‘lack of coordination between ANC structures and civics’. ANC leadership, he warned, had ‘found that regions and branches were not consistently trying to mobilise the broad democratic forces like religious bodies, cultural and sporting organisations, etc. behind the programme and the positions of the ANC’ (Nzo 1991: 10). The role of the civics envisaged by Nzo was of programmatic and ideological compliance. That being said, the MDM itself often acted to reinforce this position. Civics themselves were not clear as to how their historic identifcation with the ANC could be reconciled with the desire for autonomy while infuencing policy formulation. Civic activist, Thozamile Botha who, 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 193 in 1991, became a leader of South African National Civic Organisation (Sanco) into which former civic structures were merged, highlighted both the challenge of re-defning the civic-ANC relationship and the dilemma of translating participatory theory into practice:

There was no clear structured way of saying how we would facilitate participation of civil society. It took quite a lot of lobbying and mobilisation and asking the government to help fnance some of these organisations … But, of course, Sanco itself became part of the ANC alliance… [So it] gets to a stage where it is not clear whether it is part [of those] that should push for the agenda of the ruling party or whether it should identify issues - because those issues that were raised through civics in the ‘70s won’t disappear because there’s a democratic government. (Interview, 2014)

The continuation of the civics’ role as champions of residents’ interests sat uncomfortably with the idea of assuming support for an ANC government. While the ANC encouraged the building of civil society formations, it continued to envisage itself as the driving and facilitating force. For some civil society activists, such a dilemma had not been foreseen. Rather many individuals had simply envisaged that the interests of civil society and ANC would continue to converge under a democratic government (Wooldridge interview, 2012; Mayekiso interview, 2013; see also Fine 1992: 19). In a sense, this very assumption undermined the simultaneous emphasis on civic autonomy. For the ANC’s part, its emphasis on independent mass organisations carried a subtext: Although civics should remain autonomous organisationally—even ideologically—this applied only to their immediate local- level activities. The ANC’s role was still to provide political leadership in the national policy picture. The civics’ role, in addition to engaging in local bread and butter issues, was to participate actively in the general task of political struggle. As such, their individual interests should converge with those of the whole. Three years into democracy, at its National Conference in 1997, the ANC remarked:

We have attempted to be a force for cohesion in the centre of a broad range of allied organisations, mass democratic and community based structures. We have, as the ANC, not undermined the ideological and organisational independence or autonomy of these organisations, but rather to interact with them, and fuse or combine their energies, constituencies and diverse capacities into a common national democratic purpose. (ANC 1997b) 194 H. BROOKS

This discourse of participation drew on its mass traditions, while injecting the notion of popular participation with a programmatic objective. It also resonated a familiar quality in the democracy envisaged by the movement: An uneasy coexistence of both bottom-up initiative and vanguard leadership.

The New ‘Organs of People’s Power’? It is not only civil society organisations, however, that the ANC has linked to its movement tradition but structures of democratic governance. ‘The Character of the ANC’, in 1997, stated: ‘This movement tradition, which can be referred to as the masses in movement, is continued in our present commitment to a people-driven RDP. It is found in our attempts to develop, in the new conditions of our country, many new forms of popular activism and governance (ranging from CPFs, to participatory local government budgeting, to work-place forums)’ (ANC 1997a). The ANC’s longstanding belief in active participation emerges from this tradition, in which the people are not passive bystanders; they are ‘masses in movement’. Yet the ANC’s discourse of participatory governance contains some internal confict: On the one hand, popular participation and empowerment are key ideas: Its National General Council in 2000 set out one of the NDR’s ‘strategic tasks’ as ‘the mobilisation of the masses of the people to govern themselves in the context of the objective that “the people shall govern”’ (ANC NGC 2000). At the same time, in contrast to public policy, in which the structures of participatory governance are a civil society function—providing a means for citizens to interact and engage government in the realisation of effective policies—in the ANC’s own discourse, they are located in the context of movement-building. Although, in the RDP, the ANC emphasised principles of participatory democracy, it also offset the promise of popular power with the prioriti- sation of its own infuence:

If the RDP is to live up to its vision of ‘democratising power’, such that ‘democracy’ means the active participation of the people affected in decision-making and policy formulation, then the ANC must not only survive, but thrive, as an organisation outside government. Furthermore, the ANC must also ensure it is frmly and deeply rooted in the organs of civil society, encouraging the growth of such organisations, and ensuring that people do have the necessary vehicles through which to contribute to reconstruction and development. (ANC 1994b: 3) 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 195

On the one hand, it recognised the need for participation not merely in the form of legitimation but in the sense of agency and infuence— involving affected people ‘in decision-making and policy formulation’. It also reiterated the movement’s longstanding belief that ‘democratising power’ meant going beyond representative democracy. The counterpart to this, however, was the corresponding belief that it also required the extension of its own hegemony—a process by which the ANC ‘is frmly and deeply rooted in the organs of civil society’ (ANC 1994b: 3). In linking the RDP to the reorganisation of the ANC itself, the movement failed to make a clear distinction between participation and mobilisation. Participation, as Sartori reminds us, is ‘self-motion’: it is the ‘the exact reverse of being put into motion (by another will)’ (1987: 113). The ANC also blurred the line between the institutions of participatory governance and those of party mobilisation. Even in 2017, in its discussion document on organisational design, it reiterated the need to retain its liberation movement character, ‘review[ing] the structural reach of the ANC such that the broad force the ANC organised under the then UDF to topple apartheid remain mobilized under the ANC political and ideological hegemony’ (2017a: 2). Expansion of infuence and mobilisation of support are of course objectives of all political parties and, indeed, form part of pluralistic democratic life. Yet there a confation in ANC discourse of popular mobilisation and participatory democracy. On the one hand, the RDP represented a clear statement of participatory democratic commitments. Parallel statements of the ANC, however, from 1994 and into the present, blur the line between participation and mobilisation, and between democracy and hegemony. Referring to the continuation of the people’s power ethos in the democratic era, government minister and former activist, Lechesa Tsenoli linked the idea of organs of people’s power to the ‘Building Organisation’ Commission of the ANC (interview, 11 March 2013)—a structure geared toward ‘building the ANC and maximising support around our positions’ (ANC 1991: 1). The role of popular organisations, as understood by Tsenoli—himself a founding member of Sanco!—was not to provide opportunity for public involvement in decision-making, but to build support for the ANC. Of the structures for participatory governance, since their establishment in 2000, it is the local government ward committee that has been particularly linked to the extension of ANC hegemony. The legislation providing 196 H. BROOKS for ward committees, as discussed in the earlier part of this chapter, estab- lishes them as structures for the enhancement of participatory democracy. However, in public and academic discussion, it is not uncommon to hear it argued that ward committees are dominated by the ANC, functioning as forums for intra-party contestation rather than real citizen infuence. The ANC is by no means blind to this, nor to the system’s limited effectiveness. At its 2010 Summit on Provincial and Local Government, it was noted that a number of weaknesses remained in the ward committee system, including: the negative local impact of ‘seasoned’ ANC cadres moving out of local government; tensions between political and administrative roles in municipalities; the limited enforcement of councillor accountability; intra-ANC and -Alliance factionalism; and the rise of service delivery protests (ANC 2010: 14). As such, the ANC went on to propose ‘a fundamental review’ of the model, recommending that ‘critical areas of legislative and functional reform include making the establishment of ward committees legally mandatory and providing for a more developmental role that is adequately resourced’ (ibid.: 17). However, the ward committee is not only a feature of the municipal policy arena but of the ANC’s own movement discourse. In the latter, ward committees are located not in the context of empowering citizens to participate in decision-making but in the context of strengthening the movement. Given the extent of ANC electoral dominance, we might argue that its effective monopolisation of many ward committees is somewhat inevitable, and that the principle of committee members representing a multiplicity of interests in the ward is not necessarily incompatible with the ANC dominating each of those sectors. Closer examination of the origins of the ward committee system, however, suggests that its initial conception differed from that later published in legislation. As well as originally being a means to placate opposition parties who objected to ‘big’ local government, Wooldridge remarked that the ward committee was also linked to the objective of re-establishing the ANC. In an interview regarding the origins of the ward committee model, she remarked: ‘I think the ANC very explicitly, from some informal discussions more than anything formal, they explicitly saw ward committees as a way to rebuild ANC branches’ (interview, 2013). Rather than being seen as way to link citizens with the decision-making processes of local government, on this account, ward committees were seen as a way of strengthening the connection between movement and people. Although Wooldridge qualifed that she was not sure how much consensus existed 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 197 on this approach, she recalled the strategy being used in Johannesburg and that one of its ‘drivers’ had been Yunus Carrim, who she recalled ‘talking about it nationally’ (interview, 2013). With this in mind, it is possible that weaknesses in the ward committee may relate to its theoretical heritage. ‘I think part of the reason why they didn’t work very well’, Wooldridge observed, ‘was that in a lot of people’s minds they were never really seen as multi-interest forums. And when they became multi-interest forums it led to confict. So, ja, I think the ANC very much linked the re-building of branches to ward committees, to the detriment of ward committees’ (ibid.). Yet they were not only understood as playing a role in re-rooting the ANC organisationally but in establishing popular unity behind its policies. As Chairperson of the Provincial and Local Government Portfolio Committee, Carrim gave political infection to ward committees directly in an article in Umrabulo in 2001, noting that ‘Ideally, the ward committee should be used to mobilise the broadest range of interests in the community behind progressive goals as part of the overall national democratic transition’ (2001). The inference is that community shaping of development is subject to movement imperatives or is somehow an intra-ANC activity. Masondo, despite supporting the idea of the ward committee as a multi-interest forum, still saw the ANC as ‘a very, very important role player in terms of making sure the ward committee exists, that the ward committee is properly constituted’, adding: ‘Where it’s not properly constituted it’s a refection on the ANC local structures there as well. So, the relationship between ward committees and ANC local branch culture is a very close one’ (interview, 2013). The injection of programmatic content into purportedly non-party structures renders uncertain the protection of civil society’s autonomy as a check on state power. Yet this current of the ANC’s discourse resonates with the teleological conception of participation in the movement historically. It also echoes the idea of people’s power as proposed by the Constitution Committee in 1986, in which its guarantee into the future was fulflment of the NDR. In the ruling party’s contemporary discourse, there remains a tension between the guarantee of political pluralism and the confation of democracy with ANC hegemony.

Loyal Civil Society Amongst the debates about the civics’ role in a new dispensation, documented discussion suggests that predominant emphasis within the 198 H. BROOKS

UDF and civics was placed on their watchdog function (UDF 1990, 1991; Conference: Developing Civic Unity 1991; Ebrahim 1990, 1991). At the civics’ National Consultative Conference in May 1991, the importance of their autonomy from political organisations was underlined:

The new conditions require that the civic movement should be broad and straddle the political spectrum. Our civic must be open to all the residents. Members of Azapo, the PAC, IFP, should be free to join the civic. And the civic association should be independent of political organisations. If it should support the position of any political organisation, it should be because it agrees with that organisation’s position on a specifc issue or with certain aspects of the organisation’s policy. (Conference: Developing Civic Unity, 1991)

The commitment to autonomy, however, was easier said than done, and did not prevent corresponding pressures on civic leaders to join councils as ANC representatives (Mawby 1994: 81). The civics also did not appear to put forward any clear, institutional model for their own participation in governance processes. Instead, their role in re-building the ANC became something of a priority. For its part, the ANC had demonstrated unease at civil society’s function as a check on state power, as well as at the continuation of local practices of participation established during the transition. Swilling and Boya highlight that it was in 1994 that political parties became fully involved in the Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber—Johannesburg’s local negotiating forum for an integrated local government structure. They emphasize that the delay in political parties joining the Chamber, ‘was caused in part by the belief amongst certain provincial ANC leaders that the MC [Metropolitan Chamber] was a threat to their own desire to centralize political control of the transition’ (1997: 178–179). Mark Swilling made the following comment about the ANC’s view of the Chamber’s role, and of democracy in general:

I think that one of the frst things that the hard-line ANC people did when they moved in and took over that whole process was to kill that whole idea [of the Chamber as a parallel structure]. So the notion that the metropolitan chamber would continue after you have a metropolitan government was, like, seen as madness … I think it was just a very limited conception of … the nature of power in a democratic society. There was a genuine assumption that the state would be seized as an instrument and 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 199

the people would be able to deploy it, so why you would then have to have checks and balances; why you would have institutional arrangements for institutionalising and formalising the involvement of a whole bunch of organised civic parties when, afterall, that’s what councillors are going to be representing for people? There was nothing, absolutely nothing, in their conception of democracy that prepared them to think about that. (Interview, 20 February 2013)

It is not clear to what extent Swilling’s view was widespread within the movement. It perhaps resonates more particularly with views amongst activist intellectuals of a radical democratic society. Nonetheless, by the time the attention of policy makers turned to citizen participation following the local government elections in 1995, the locus of participatory democracy had moved almost entirely from the civil society sphere to the realm of institutionalised state structures. By this stage, the voice of the civic movement had diminished substantially. Within the ANC, despite formal commitments, it is clear that the idea of an ‘independent civil society’ was initially treated with some suspicion. In an early political education document on its relationship with the civic movement, a critique of the concept was provided:

Some comrades in the civics, as well as in other organisations, see the civics as part of ‘civil society’. The words ‘civil society’ come from liberal social science. It refers to all those parts of society which are not part of the state … Comrades are using the term ‘civil society’ because they feel that one of the lessons that we need to learn from Eastern Europe is the need for a strong and independent ‘civil society’. A strong civil society can balance the power of the state and through providing channels for participation by ordinary people, ensure that democracy is built and strengthened. However … the argument for a strong civil society often contains some incorrect assumptions. Some comrades putting forward this argument assume that the ANC is not capable of democratising itself and when it comes to power it will automatically be opposed to the democratisation of society. (ANC DPE 1991b: 9)

The ANC thus recognised the theoretical premise of civil society as important for the defence of democracy—balancing the power of the state and facilitating participation by ordinary people. Yet there is a simultaneous subtext that linked it disparagingly with liberal thought. Its statement that some comrades ‘see the civics as part of “civil society”’ 200 H. BROOKS is not an affrmation of this position but an endeavour to right such ‘incorrect assumptions’. By correcting what it believes to be a misplaced emphasis on civil society, the ANC discouraged the civics from playing a political role. Since assuming power, the ANC’s preference for partnership over political independence has been revealed in its chastisement of those civil society structures who see their role as keeping a check on government. Nelson Mandela, in 1997, attacked those sections of the NGO sector ‘which seek to assert that the distinguishing feature of a genuine organisation of civil society is to be a critical ‘watchdog’ over our movement’ (Mandela 1997). In other instances, the ANC has branded as anti-transformative those groupings adopting a critical stance (ANC 2012: 18). The liberal tradition from which the notion of civil society emerges, as well as the space it promises for community and other associations, sits uneasily with a top-down tradition of nationalist politics. The narrative of the strong yet loyal civil society has remained a feature of ANC discourse and has been notably resurrected in the 2000s in efforts to reconnect the movement with its support base. Consecutive ANC conferences in 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012 generated resolutions to strengthen relations with the Alliance partners and civil society (ANC 1997c, 2002, 2007b, 2012). ANC conference and discussion documents from 2005 onwards focus, in particular, on the need to reinvigorate ANC branches, with Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe in 2006 making the notable observation that the ANC was ‘dead on the ground’ (cited in Darraq 2008). As recently as 2018, President Ramaphosa remarked that the structures of the movement had been weakened and the confdence of the people in the ANC ‘eroded’ (ANC 2018). Yet, while the movement has often affrmed its role in encouraging and working within ‘progressive’ civil society (ANC 2007a), there has been an important shift in this narrative which relates fundamentally to context. During the 1980s it was the structures of the MDM through which people were able to participate in political struggles. Today, the idea of the MDM or ‘mass democratic formations’ is somewhat redundant. Yet it occasionally surfaces in ANC parlance as a catch-all phrase for ‘progressive’ civil society. The ANC’s 2012 policy conference notably set out the intention to revive civil-society-based structures in a way that implies a return to a past relationship (ANC 2012). Among the conference resolutions was a decision ‘to build and revive structures of the mass democratic movement and progressive civil society’ (ANC 2013: 8). 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 201

Yet in these proposals lies a democratic defcit: When it is the ANC that holds claim to defning what constitutes ‘civil society’, this undermines not only its autonomy and independence, but also the legitimate existence within such a society of the presence of political opposition. It mirrors the very situation of which Friedman warned at the time of the transition: ‘the colonisation of civil society’ by the former liberation movement (1992). ANC discourse implies that ‘progressive’ civil society’ constitutes those who associate with and support it (Friedman 1992: 83, 86–88; Glaser 1997: 12). As such, there is a tension between the re-birth of civil society and the liberation movement’s view of a collective people. This narrative has continued through recent years. Speaking in 2013 as deputy minister of CoGTA, Carrim highlighted the importance to democratic local government of a ‘strong civil society’, but also moved to defne it as those who fall within the MDM:

Even if you actually have popular power at local government level via the state structures, you also have to have a strong civil society movement as well … If you have a strong civil society it empowers the municipality and if you have a strong municipality, it should I believe empower civil society too … Of course, the term civil society is being increasingly contested in our movement … because of the nature of some of the organisations, individuals and other actors that occupy this space in recent years, and the crude juxtaposition of some of them that civil society is all good and the state is all bad … [I]ncreasingly some of us speak of progressive civil society as important. Or we might, in a more limited way, speak of the mass democratic movement when we speak of progressive actors that engage in civil society. (Interview-b, 2013)

According to this view, local government can only be strengthened by civil society actors identifed by the ANC as progressive. It poses the danger that those who seek to challenge the movement, or make their voices heard through other actors and organisations, are somehow non-transformative. Features of the post-1994 state such as ‘democracy, human rights, transparency and mass involvement’ have come to be seen by the ANC as ‘double-edged swords’ (ANC DPE 1996: 7). It remarked, ‘we are able to utilise them even in the early stages of the changeover as the most effective and suitable forms of revolutionary self-defence. But they can also be used by criminals and counter-revolutionaries’ (ANC DPE 1996: 7). Although this may well be a reference to those societal forces seeking to inhibit a non-racial 202 H. BROOKS democracy, there remains an underlying suspicion of political alternatives and of ‘bourgeois’ democracy’s offerings of rights and constitutionalism. With it emerges an ambiguous category of counter-revolutionaries. The very notion of civil society, in the ANC, is thus contested. The participation advocated in this discourse falls into the category of support and cooperation. Rather than ceding some control to citizens and an equal right to infuence decision-making, cooperation centres on civil society’s role in supporting the government. There is no reason why this cooperative role of civil society should confict with the simultaneous existence of self-help. The distinction, however, is that while the support and cooperation discernible in public policy emphasises participation through the structures of governance, within the ANC’s movement discourse, it is encouraged primarily through structures of the movement.

5.3 conceptual Tensions and Parallels The revolutionary language which remains a feature of ANC discourse is, today, considered rhetoric, not least in light of the ideological confict of neo-liberal policy realities and NDR commitments. As policy on participatory democracy has itself come increasingly to absorb a multitude of other infuences—some rooted in domestic traditions but others drawing on international orthodoxy—one might consider the ANC’s revolutionary discourse to belong to a bygone era. Yet notions such as vanguardism, national democracy and mass organisation should not be too readily dismissed. The ANC continues to see itself as engaged in national democratic struggle, while the legal and rights-oriented constitutional language that penetrated the movement from the late 1980s is no longer easy to discern. In contrast to the suggestion by some authors, that the ANC has become an elitist, liberal party with a rhetoric of participation (Johnson 2003), I argue that it has rather retained many of its African nationalist and Marxist-Leninist traditions. Both of these currents have historically promoted a certain conception of participation: Conscientisation of the people is critical and, while the path may be planned for the people by the leadership, parliamentary democracy is generally seen as insuffcient. As Butler has argued, ‘the “bourgeois democracy” of rights, parliaments and constitutions’, by many ANC intellectuals is seen as ‘only a provisional accomplishment at best’ (2012: 117). Far from being ‘elitist’, mass participation remains critical to the ANC. Its 2000 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 203

National General Council reiterated ‘the centrality of the concept of popular and participatory democracy to our understanding of the functioning of the democratic state’ (ANC NGC 2000); and at the start of 2018, the ANC’s January 8th statement reiterated its commitment to ‘strengthening the instruments of representative and participatory democracy’ (ANC 2018). The extension of these ideas into legislation shows that they are not mere rhetoric. The question is not whether the ANC is committed to participation, but what it understands ‘participation’ to mean. This book’s examination of the theoretical currents shaping participatory democracy has sought to bring to the fore the critical role of ideas— exemplifed in statements, commentary, policy documents and internal discussion. The fnal sections below draw together the ideas identifable in movement and public policy discourses. While there are overlaps in intellectual infuence, however, there are also unresolved tensions. It is the presence of this battle of ideas—the coexistence of multiple conceptions of participation—and the continued entanglement of the ANC with the very existence of democracy itself that has repercussions for the effectiveness of policy.

Restricted Participation Through Policy and Movement Although the various infuences on participatory policy have led to conceptual tension, failure can in part be explained by some mutually reinforcing imperatives. One of the most contentious points in policy evolution is the ANC’s shift toward economic liberalism. While preserving a discourse of NDR, its ideological contender is the elephant in the room. The eclipsing of the RDP with the programme of GEAR rests on the neo-liberal assumption that market growth will facilitate development. At the same time, the RDP’s principles and values of people-driven development remain apparent in legislation. While perhaps toned down from the more radical mechanisms envisaged by some on the Left, municipal guidance nonetheless advances the importance of cultivating informed citizens who are empowered to shape development. The realisation of this objective, however, is undercut from both sides. The strand of good governance promoting new public management prioritises the need for effciency and delivery over bottom-up control. This performance-driven, technocratic approach has been key in nar- rowing the agenda for participation and circumscribing the degree of 204 H. BROOKS popular infuence. As such, South Africans have forums for participation but on a limited range of issues, carefully controlled by budgetary prescriptions and public sector performance priorities. In parallel, this restricted understanding of participation, ‘stripped of the political volatil- ity of direct popular involvement’ (De Beer 1996: 67), has for the ANC sustained its vanguard tradition by enabling a top-down mode of development to continue. A void and ambiguous promise of NDR simultaneously enables the governing movement to mask where power really lies. It is with some irony that in the participatory project the ANC draws, not on its own people-driven RDP, which originally informed public policy, but on the vacuous notion of NDR and its historic ‘movement tradition’. Worlds apart from its formal commitments to a neo-liberal framework, the ANC’s failure to critically review the NDR’s applicability has confned it largely to political rhetoric. Friedman goes so far as to suggest a misplaced hope amongst the ANC’s Left critics that NDR was ever anything more than ‘non-racial capitalism’ (2015: 270). The fundamental ambiguity which characterises the language of NDR has, for Butler, been essential to both its survival in post-Soviet conditions, and its utility in justifying policy choices to the ANC’s various constituencies (2012: 75–76; see also Butler 2005, 2013: 375). Yet it is possible to see that the centralisation of control and technocratic creep facilitated by policy have enabled the ANC to simultaneously remove from popular contestation its own policy programme. What Heller describes as the emergence of a ‘bureaucratic and commandist logic’ of local government is both in ftting with the ANC’s vanguard legacy and has also been enabled by the extent of its hegemony (2001: 134). Its ideological roots in a philosophy characterised by historical inevitability and the ‘scientifc knowledge’ of the movement do not sit well with democratic politics (Butler 2012: 57). As such, the rise in public policy of a discourse of governance and public management has limited the scope of democratic debate in which policy formulation is centralised and macro-economic choices protected from popular challenge. Local government policy—including that on citizen participation—has been penetrated by the same concerns of public sector effciency, reduced state resources, and retention of policy direction by central government. This technocratic process has thus simultaneously enabled the ANC to remove the NDR from popular scrutiny and contestation. While at the most local of levels South Africans have the opportunity to infuence municipal planning, this is divorced from 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 205 their ability to contest policy itself. Challenge to the broader agenda, is thus markedly confned. At the same time, the ANC’s vanguard discourse encourages the active participation of MDM structures. Yet by virtue of the ANC determining which contributions from civil society are considered ‘progressive’, both the policy framework and vanguard discourse carry a self-sustaining function. New public management and movement discourses may have starkly different ideological origins—one seeking performance and effciency and the other a hegemonic unity. Yet their simultaneous usage has been mutually reinforcing. Technocratic and performance-driven elements of public policy have enabled the ANC-as- movement to narrow the feld of popular infuence. As such, a weak or more restricted understanding of participation in public policy has enabled a continuation of top-down development, appearing at the level of the movement as ‘vanguardism’. Important to clarify, however, is that a particular type of vanguardism has been reinforced by the neo-liberal shift. In Chapter 3 it was argued that a tension was present in the concept of the vanguardism that penetrated people’s power: Whereas those in the UDF and civics recognised the ANC as the rightful vanguard, they did not see this as precluding the coexistence of bottom-up structures of popular power. Although the MDM reinforced the ANC’s vanguard status, it also encouraged the development of people’s power as an educative and empowering experience. Its goals were political, but participation was valuable in itself. The strand of vanguardism parallel to this was more visible in the exiled ANC and characterised much of the movement’s offcial discourse. This current carried greater concern to ensure top-down direction, whereby mass participation was controlled by the guiding hand of the movement. It did not exhibit a culture of individual development and empowerment, nor did it cultivate popular initiative outside of the NDR. Organs of people’s power were weapons of struggle through which the line between ANC and masses was blurred. Due to its prevalence amongst top leadership and some of the movement’s most infuential cadres, it was this strand of vanguardism that was arguably most dominant in the ANC itself. The infusion of a bottom-up vision of participation in the municipal policy framework owes itself to the frst of these currents. MDM activists’ ideas about community involvement, as Chapter 4 set out, informed the policy process and it is due to this strand of political 206 H. BROOKS culture that such infuence is visible. Within the ANC, itself, however, this empowerment ethos is arguably much weaker. The predominance in the ruling party of the second version of vanguardism is a result of the ANC’s history—both ideologically and organisationally—and highlights the survival of traditions emerging from Marxism-Leninism. It is thus with great irony that this vanguard discourse has been bolstered by its ideological nemesis: Neoliberalism’s trend toward technocratic process, the use of experts and the push for effciency and performance have protected economic policy from the powers of participatory governance. Top-down development processes, control from the centre and the cultivation of a mass, but bounded, democracy appear at the level of the movement as vanguardism.

Teleology and Bounded Democracy From this ironic parallel is also an identifable tension. In the ANC’s own framing of participation, it is notable that infuences of democratic and development theory are far less discernible. The revolutionary rhetoric espoused in discussion documents, publications and speeches of the ANC does not draw on the empowering potential of participation found in public policy. The movement’s recent commentary even contrasts to that contained in its own RDP. Instead, those aspects of policy advancing an understanding of democracy in which citizens ‘exercise judgement’ and ‘contribute to debate and discussion’ (DPLG & LGSETA, n.d., section 1.2: 18), are undermined by a teleological discourse that links participation to the extension of ANC hegemony. The dissipation of the wider ANC camp has certainly had some bearing. Those voices pushing for a retention of participatory traditions are now increasingly found outside of the movement—a trend that has escalated notably in the 2000s as those with a history of civic and trade union activism have passed through government or left party politics altogether. It is also attributable to what the ANC itself acknowledges as the space of mass mobilisation being left open to alternative forces (ANC 2012: 18). The rise of popular and community protests in South Africa points to a diminishing of its vanguard claims. Yet it is also, I argue, attributable to the movement’s dominant discourse of democracy. As noted earlier, the ANC has always constituted a broad church, encompassing a range of organisations and structures as part of its wider camp. Yet with dominant ideological traditions in both African Nationalism 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 207 and Marxism-Leninism, it also in many respects bears resemblance to a vanguard-style party. The popular mobilisation this role demands constitutes an important and legitimate activity: The revolutionary theory by which the ANC in exile was guided required the active participation of the masses. It is problematic, however, when such mobilisation is confated with the process of governance—when public policy is paired with an understanding of citizen participation as an intra-movement activity. Not long after the publication of the Municipal Systems Act (2000), an article by Carrim, made a direct correlation between the structures of local government and advancement of political objectives: ‘We are not just seeking to effect a new system of local government’, he remarked, ‘We are also seeking to use this new system to signifcantly advance the national democratic transition’ [emphasis added] (Carrim 2001). Political infection was particularly given to ward committees (ibid.). Later, at its 2007 policy conference, the ANC branch was also linked to the ward committee. Amongst branch responsibilities, was ‘to give leadership to the developmental agenda of each community by spearheading community participation in the IDP process and strengthening the ward committee’ (ANC 2007c: 13). The paucity of any substantive content in the application of the term ‘national democracy’ does not prevent its use as a euphemism for the maintenance of hegemony, nor as an historic justifcation of the ANC’s right to govern. The consequence of encouraging the use of ward committees for advancement of ‘national democracy’ is the undermining of simultaneous efforts to reduce their subjection to party political control. As Deputy Minister of CoGTA in 2013, Carrim himself stated: ‘We are considering reviewing the legislation to explore the possibility of reduc- ing the prospects of … party-political activists dominating the ward committee’ (telephone interview, 2013b). The DPLG’s ward committee resource book also emphasised the risks to democracy of party infuence on ward committee nomination processes, warning that it ‘brings a high degree of party infuence into what, in policy terms, is intended to be a civil society function’ (DPLG & GTZ 2005: 31). The suggestion that they be utilised to mobilise communities behind progressive (read ‘ANC’) goals thus undermines their role set out by the DPLG as ‘a function of civic society’ which should operate ‘independently of the structures imposed by party alliances’ (ibid.: 34). As suggested earlier, democratic defcit in the ANC’s understanding of participation is linked to traditions in its own camp historically. 208 H. BROOKS

The structures of people’s power in the 1980s met democratic criteria in so far as they incorporated community members, elected their representatives, and involved active participation. However, they were not multi-interest forums or politically pluralistic structures. Mechanisms of participatory governance, in contrast, must be characterised not only by the involvement of citizens in decision-making, but by the openness and uncertainty of outcome that we expect of democracy generally. They cannot act as vehicles for predetermined political ends. The ANC’s reintroduction of ‘street committees’ in 2008 fags this very problem. Under apartheid, structures of people’s power such as street committees flled a crucial gap: their activists and proponents developed alternative ways of organising society in the face of state neglect and an absence of political and civil rights. Today, South Africans live in a formal democratic state, in which people’s rights have constitutional protection and they are able to vote for the structures of government. Mechanisms and programmes designed to advance development and foster the realisation of such rights must therefore operate within the bounds of accountable institutions. What the street committee initiative leaves unclear is how it will relate to such institutions. The most obvious example in this regard is that of CPFs—formal structures, established in line with the South African Police Service Act of 1995, to improve community-police relations and mobilise communities to assist in crime prevention. Yet there is no real clarifcation of the role of the street committee in relation to the CPF. Resurrected by former president Jacob Zuma in 2008, the role of the street committee was set out by the ANC’s Nathi Mthetwa (2008), who subsequently became Minister of Safety and Security, as being supplementary ‘to the work of the other civil society and governance organs and institutions’. While not offcially structures of the movement, however the implication was that street committees be imbued with ideological purpose—addressing the potential for vigilantism through ‘ideological training’ to prevent their exploitation by ‘counter-revolutionaries’ (ibid.). Rather than address existing weaknesses in the community policing system, the solution proposed was that street committees play a role as the ‘revolutionary nucleus’ of CPFs (Nzimande 2008). Government minister and SACP General Secretary, Blade Nzimande elaborated by saying that street committees should not be party political but should ‘seek to organise our people irrespective of political affliations’ (2008). Yet he was also clear that they were linked to the ANC’s identity, 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 209 commenting that ‘By taking a lead in re-building such structures, the ANC will be affrming its ‘dual’ but necessary, roles as both a ruling party and a mass mobiliser of the people’ (ibid.). Caution about their resurrection is not to dismiss the potential of street committees in either crime prevention or community development. However, the solution to challenges of participatory governance should not be the introduction of seemingly partisan structures which fall outside of legislation. There is nothing to stop the ANC from introducing street committees as party political structures, perhaps intended to link residents at street-level with the local ANC branch. However, the problem arises when they are created under the pretence of political neutrality, or at the expense of improvements to existing mechanisms for participatory governance. As such, while these structures were revived as a way of ensuring that people play a role in their communities (The Citizen, 1 June 2015), at the Gauteng re-launch of the street committee in Ekurhuleni in 2015, ANC chairperson, Baleka Mbete declared that ‘the ANC is taking ownership of the street committee launch to ensure we are able to drive and direct them’ (ibid.). They seem to remain, as Nzimande envisaged, both ‘organs of people’s power’ and ‘a platform to intensify the struggle for the renewal of the revolutionary vales of our movement’ (2008). Attempts to increase party infuence over multi-interest structures might be interpreted as a response to declining hegemony. The revival of struggle-era terminology and the notion of ‘people’s power’ has certainly overlapped with both a rise in social protest and the surfacing of internal threats to the ANC’s political stability. Yet currents of hegemony and vanguardism in the movement’s participatory discourse represent consistencies not deviations. Popular protest in recent years—across local communities, residents’ organisations, student movements and organised labour—has certainly drawn greater attention to a weakening of the ANC’s mass movement status. In this context, the idea of extending its hegemony across both civil society and structures of governance may well be the chosen solution. The ANC’s teleological view of participatory democracy, however, represents not a post-1994 shift, nor a reneging on its policy commitments, but lies at the core of its conception of participation. The confation of structures of democracy with those of the mass movement can be located in the organisational history of the ANC camp, in which its own claim to the status of mass movement derived 210 H. BROOKS from the very structures and organisations now part of civil society. The tension between the ANC’s role as mass governing movement and its history as a mass struggle movement is played out in the intertwining of participatory democracy with the extension of ANC hegemony; in the pull, and unresolved tension, between bottom-up initiative and vanguard leadership.

5.4 conclusion This chapter has sought to show that, much as the history of democratic thought in the ANC has been subject to contesting ideas, so too can we identify conceptual discord in the contemporary policy and practice of participatory democracy. Indeed, the reality that South Africans are yet to experience anything amounting to an empowering form of participatory democracy can in large part be explained by weaknesses in the underlying theory. Not only does public policy contain tensions between technocratic managerialism and citizen empowerment, but it is also undermined by a parallel, and infuential, discourse of participation in the ANC itself. Since the onset of the democratic era, a number of theoretical disci- plines and intellectual traditions have fed into the formulation of public policy. Participatory traditions in the ANC camp itself and the experience of ‘people’s power’, in particular, gave impetus and shape to the establishment after 1994 of popular decision-making forums for ordinary people. These traditions, in turn, spoke to trends in development discourse internationally, emphasising the active participation and agency of benefciaries in the development process itself. The policy mainstreaming of the idea of ‘good governance’ from the 1990s also stressed the importance of the relationship between citizen and state. At the same time, this assorted heritage has created a confict in policy objectives. The model of new public management associated with governance discourse has had the effect of curbing popular infuence by prioritising fscal constraints and effciency over democracy and empowerment. The change in ideological milieu from the late 1980s, as interviews in this chapter have shown, also brought with it new perspectives about both the possibility and desirability of institutionalised people’s power. The content of policy make-up and conficting imperatives of the macro-economic framework can thus help to account for impediments in practice. 5 POST-1994 POLICY AND MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 211

Yet neo-liberalism has not been alone in facilitating a narrow form of participation. Alongside the emergence of new and international approaches to governance, the ANC’s own conception of democracy is entwined with its mass movement heritage—a status earned by virtue of its mass support base and hegemony over a range of popular organisations and structures. Although, as a mass movement, it is within the ANC’s own ranks that the radical democratic heritage of contemporary policy can be found, it is not insignifcant that, prior to 1994, these participatory traditions were an intra-movement and self-sustaining activity. Participants were united by a common goal—working with the movement not against it—and it is to this organisational history that the ANC’s discourse of participation is tied. In the post-1994 context, the sections of its broader camp are a part of civil society and are amongst the very citizens for whom participatory governance forums are intended. A discourse of democracy in which participation is seen teleologically—as a means of bolstering the ANC—undermines the very function of these mechanisms as multi-interest structures for the infuence of citizens. The shielding of the policy agenda from the arena of popular infuence, and confation of the ANC’s programme with the democratic will of citizens, does not aspire to the degree of popular agency required in public policy. A conceptual intertwining of mass movement and democracy, and mutual reinforcement of the ascendance of technocracy, have contributed in South Africa to the failure of participatory democracy to realise its objectives in practice.

Notes 1. See articles by these authors on weaknesses in the ward committee system generally, as well as in particular locales. The report produced by Kabane (n.d.) for Afesis-Corplan looks to have been published c.2012. 2. The Department was renamed in 2009. 3. See DPLG & GTZ (2005a, b) and Salga & GTZ (2006). 4. on ideas about ‘partnership’ in the White Paper, see Pieterse (2002). 5. The workbook constitutes certifed course material produced by the DPLG & LGSETA and is therefore undated. The acknowledgements listed in the document, however, suggest that it was published after 2007. 6. For a further discussion of the ANC’s mass character and its use of historic claims in its own organisational renewal, see Brooks (2014). 212 H. BROOKS

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Conclusion: The Power of Ideas

The theoretical tensions and linkages elucidated in the pages of this book may, on the one hand, mean very little in the history of government in South Africa. Participatory democratic policy has failed to fulfl its legislated promise. Against more than three decades of policy formulation and two decades of implementation, South Africans are yet to see the realisation of an acceptable experience of participatory democracy. The present political climate of distrust of the executive, parliamentary non-accountability, factional party politics and the crumbling of historical alliances within the African National Congress (ANC) camp, in many ways forces South Africa to re-evaluate how it wants to build and ground its form of democracy. This must be done in a way that takes account of historical context and local conditions, including the intellectual heritage of its movement politics and aspirations of popular political struggle. Discussion of ‘movement identity’ in the ANC may perhaps be treated with some irony. The depth and viciousness of divisions within the movement over the past ten years, let alone the personal aggrandisement that has come to accompany public offce, renders the notion of a single movement with a single vision obsolete. In these circumstances, its assumed vanguard character is increasingly called into question. Nonetheless, we remain, for the moment at least, faced with the existence of a democratic landscape shaped by this movement history. The conceptual contestations and tensions it has produced can be seen in the playing out of participatory democracy.

© The Author(s) 2020 219 H. Brooks, The African National Congress and Participatory Democracy, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25744-6_6 220 H. BROOKS

This book has sought to argue that the ANC’s conception of democracy remains interwoven with its mass movement history. The ANC was, and still operates as, a broad church popular movement, but where the ‘broad’ is narrowly defned. Prior to 1990, it was operating under all-too-real repressive conditions, with understandable negative consequences for democratic decision-making. Yet in a contemporary context in which it wins over 57% of the electoral vote—far exceeding that of its opponents—it also presents itself as threatened by counter-revolutionary forces, foreign agents, and right-wing white interests. The dissipation of the wider ANC camp has certainly had some bearing on this shift. Those voices pushing for a retention of participatory traditions are now increasingly to be found outside of the movement—a trend that has escalated notably in the 2000s as those with a history of civic and trade union activism have passed through government or left party politics altogether. It is also attributable to what the ANC itself acknowledges as the space of mass mobilisation being left open to alternative forces (2012: 18). The rise of so-called ‘service delivery’ protests and burgeoning of Left social movements points to a diminishing of its vanguard claims. Yet the weakening of the Congress camp is also attributable to the movement’s dominant discourse of democracy. In the absence of a clear articulation of its democratic theory, this book has sought to trace the development of ideas within the ANC to reconstruct its theory and practice of participatory democracy. It embarked on an analysis of 1980s people’s power, the codifcation of ANC democratic thought from the late 1980s onwards, and the formulation of post-1994 policy on participatory democracy. This considered the way in which ideas (incorporating theories, ideologies, intellectual traditions and schools of thought) have informed the ANC’s project for popular participation in a democratic state. Although the period of focus is from the 1980s onwards, the analysis is rooted in an understanding of the ANC’s ideological lineage. Based on the premise that ideas inform practice, the dominant ideological currents in the ANC and the development of its democratic thought more generally, prove crucial to understanding its ideas in the present. The book has also sought to challenge existing approaches to analysis of the 1980s which have tended to view the democracy established after 1994 as inferior or unrelated to that pre-fgured by people’s power. Instead, I have argued that the discourse and practice of people’s power has had bearing on the character of South Africa’s democracy, and that 6 CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF IDEAS 221 people’s power, itself, did not constitute an entirely democratic form of participation. Its proponents, while embracing ideas of decentralised grassroots control, also embraced a notion of participation as teleological. For those in the ANC and United Democratic Front (UDF), people’s power was tied fundamentally to the achievement of political goals. It also rejected many of the features of democracy that allow for freedom of political choice and association, establishing structures for popular power that were aligned predominantly to the ANC. It has also sought to show that defciencies in South Africa’s democracy cannot be attributed to a change in the ‘character’ of the ANC from that of a popular democratic organisation to an authoritarian elite-driven structure. It also contends that democratic defcits should not be attributed to the acceptance of political and economic liberalism alone. Such accounts ignore the presence of ideas about people’s power and a radical form of democracy that themselves lacked key democratic features. Instead, it has suggested that the source of undemocratic and centralised tendencies in the ANC can be found in its dominant ideological traditions of African nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, both of which fostered notions of leadership as vanguardism and active participation as teleological. These traditions and the ideas that they encompass, rather than being attributable only to a particular ‘strand’ of the ANC, constituted powerful conceptual infuences on the theory of people’s power. Thus, while conceptions of participatory democracy in the ANC have been shaped by numerous traditions and theories, they cannot be delinked from undemocratic traits in the theoretical heritage of the ANC generally. What the book has drawn out is a series of themes and sub-themes in the discourse of participation. It has traced the way in which these ideas have been woven through the policy process. It examined the extent to which those currents infuential in the theory and practice of people’s power have been carried over into the post-1990 period of policy formulation, as well as tracing the emergence of new infuences and schools of thought. Examination of the development of these ideas reveals that there is no one, identifable theory of participatory democracy in the ANC but that it is possible to identify a number of dominant themes and conceptions. This enables us to formulate a much clearer understanding of the ANC’s conception of participatory democracy. It is argued that this conception has developed out of a variety of intellectual traditions which can be linked to specifc points in the ANC’s history and to 222 H. BROOKS particular strands of the movement. It has also been shaped by strategic considerations and external theoretical and political infuences, both within South Africa and internationally. This multiplicity of infuences, however, has led to some conceptual tension. Firstly, South Africa’s public policy on participatory democracy— focused largely on local government—draws on a range of local and international ideas. These include radical democratic theory, domestic traditions of popular participation, participatory development theory, progressive planning, and discourses of governance and performance management. This array of infuence has made for some well-researched policy. Ideas emerging, in particular, from local activist traditions, radical democratic thought and participatory development have contributed to aspects of policy which seek not just the consultation of citizens but their empowerment to contribute to decision-making. This draws on both the effciency benefts to be gained from enlisting local insight, as well as the democratic benefts of developing more empowered citizens. However, the policy strands rooted in governance and performance management focus not so much on the democratic aspects of participation as they do on the desirability of a more effcient state. Under this infuence, participation is ‘detached from its radical nature’ (Leal 2011: 76). Citizen participation thus takes place within the existing policy framework and popular infuence on decision-making is reduced to the most local of levels. The second conceptual tension is that what has emerged since 1994 is a discourse of participation found in public policy and a separate, distinct discourse of participation found in the ANC as a movement. In the latter, mechanisms for participatory governance, intended to allow for the infuence of a plurality of civil society interests, are equated by the ANC with mechanisms for the extension of its own hegemony. Structures intended in legislation to be vehicles for participatory democracy are characterised in ANC discourse as both party political and teleological. While South Africa’s public policy on participatory democracy is not without its weaknesses, the ideas and theories that shape it should in practice not only strengthen citizenship but provide people with a degree of infuence in decision-making, at least at the local level. The parallel discourse of the ANC as a movement, however, rooted in historical claims, risks undermining the democratising objectives of South African public policy. An identifable theme throughout the development of the ANC’s thinking is an ongoing and unresolved tension between a desire 6 CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF IDEAS 223 for political control from above and popular initiative from below. Post- 1994, this can be framed more concisely as a tension between vanguardism and participatory democracy. Chapter 1 set out the scope of this work, locating the book’s pre- occupation within a framework of democratic theory. It outlined the intellectual traditions from which participatory democratic thought has evolved, as well as drawing on other traditions outside of democratic theory which have played a role in shaping participatory experiments within organisations, the workplace, in development projects and municipal government. This sought to show that the lineage of participatory democracy is not only varied but that its history on the political Left has itself not gone uncontested. The existence of normative democratic debate amongst theorists and practitioners strengthens the case for an analysis that allows for competing conceptions. Discussion of a normative idea of participatory democracy, its credentials and outcomes provided a benchmark against which to examine the ANC’s own understanding. Existing accounts of 1980s people’s power also emphasise the gap in current research on the role of popular participation as part of a broader trajectory of ANC democratic thought. Chapter 2 provided an overview of participation in the conceptual evolution of the ANC historically. Given the ANC’s existence for over seven decades prior to the 1980s, an understanding of the main ideological infuences on the movement and its view of the popular role, historically, was critical for the exploration of subsequent years. The ANC’s early decades were characterised by a conservative liberalism and the favouring of parliamentary representative democracy. Its democratic thought, at that time, was infuenced by the notion of trusteeship—a form of representation in which Congress would act as a trustee of African interests. Representation as a form of embodiment would not involve popular participation but rather the entrustment of this role to Congress, who could best understand and determine the interests of their people. The ANC’s perception of itself as a spokesperson of Africans formed the basis on which its early ideas of representative democracy lay. The chapter then explored the spread of African nationalism in the ANC which, with the rise of a new leadership generation from the ANC Youth League, became the dominant ideology of Congress from the mid- 1940s. It also highlighted, however, that from 1950, through its contact with the Communist Party, Marxist ideology began to permeate 224 H. BROOKS the liberation movement. By the close of the 1950s and the banning of the ANC, both African nationalism and Marxism-Leninism constituted dominant ideological infuences. Despite the rise of these new currents, ‘democracy’ as articulated by the ANC still appeared to be nothing other than representative in form. The infuence of African nationalist and Marxist-Leninist thought, however, had two critical implications. Firstly, the introduction of African nationalism from the mid-1940s induced a shift away from delegations and reformist appeals toward the conversion of the ANC into a mass movement. The type of mass participation it generated, however, constituted a form of mobilisation. The key goal of the ANC’s campaigns in the 1950s was mass mobilisation behind the goal of political freedom. The Freedom Charter itself, while constituting a broad statement of aims, did not generate greater clarity on the model of democracy sought. The lack of indication on this point refects both the underdevelopment of ANC democratic thought at that stage, and a deliberate strategy to broaden the alliance of forces under its hegemony. Secondly, despite comprising vastly different sets of ideas to their liberal predecessor, both African Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism served to buttress the premise of trusteeship. They each contained theories of organisation that entailed an active role for the masses and the political direction of a dedicated leadership. Just as trusteeship entailed representation of the people by a leadership best able to determine their interests, so too did African nationalism and Marxism-Leninism embody the idea of a movement able to convince the people of the need for its leadership and the correctness of its revolutionary objectives. Leadership, as conceived by the ANC, thus shifted from one top-down form to another. Early paternalist traditions provided favourable conditions and a conceptual foundation for a new view of leadership as vanguardism. It was in exile from 1960, with the growing infuence of Marxism-Leninism and the decision to embark on armed struggle that this new conceptual infuence would manifest. Concomitant with this was the consolidation of its view of the masses as active participants, and the increasing subjection of participation to the revolutionary imperative of seizing state power. Chapter 3 focused on the 1980s, tracing the ideas informing the ANC’s conception of people’s power and, in particular, its role and future. It showed how people’s power as a phenomenon constituted a web of interlinking ideas and themes. Perhaps the most dominant 6 CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF IDEAS 225 infuence on the ANC was Marxism-Leninism. Amongst internal activists and intellectuals, Gramsci’s ideas were also prevalent, as was a broader democratic socialist tradition which posed an alternative to orthodox Marxism. Within the trade union movement, whose ideas began to transfer to community and civic organisations, a socialist tradition was also emerging which was increasingly distanced from the South African Communist Party (SACP) and its alignment to the Soviet Union. This understanding of people’s power was linked to localised forms of struggle and, within organised labour, developed into a powerful social movement unionism. Committed to internal democratic practices as part of the transformation of South Africa, the unions provided not only an effective organisational model for the civics in tackling material problems, but the principles and ethos of locally accountable democratic structures. As such, those who saw popular power as a fulflment of ANC policy were not prevented from also interpreting it as an educative and empowering experience or a practical means of self-help. For activists inside South Africa, there was arguably a greater appreciation of local experience. Although spurred on by the ANC’s liberation narrative, these individuals were often concerned as much, if not more, with ameliorating the hardships of everyday life as they were with broader ideological questions. With the formation of Cosatu in 1985, the unions own struggle for working class empowerment became subject, if unintentionally, to overarching movement control. Although the ideas of exiled and domestic activists overlapped and informed one another, it is possible to identify conceptual discomfort between the views that emerged. While these strands did not confict as such, they generated theoretical variation, not only between people’s power as a means versus an end of struggle but in the interpretation of vanguardism and the masses as creative participants. For the ANC, its role as a vanguard movement was rooted in Marxism-Leninism and directly informed its relationship with the people. ‘Democracy’ was thus rooted not so much in local democratic control as in the fulflment of revolutionary objectives. Active participation required that political consciousness be brought to the people from without, and that mass participation for revolutionary ends take place under the guiding hand of the movement. The ANC’s vanguard status and the depth of its connection with the people was never questioned by the MDM. However, acceptance 226 H. BROOKS of this hegemony, and use of popular power for revolutionary ends, did not preclude a simultaneous vision of tangible local democratic control. Democracy, for the UDF and civics, was also linked to their own role as independent organisations connected to grassroots concerns. Thus, while political conscientisation was characteristic of UDF discourse, this also involved raising people’s awareness that collective organisation and democratic practice could themselves ameliorate shared problems. For organised labour, amongst whom the tackling of shop foor issues had taken precedence over support for national political struggle, vanguardism perhaps posed even greater challenge, both to the retention of the union’s role as the vehicle for working class empowerment and to the participatory forms of democracy that were the bedrock of its organisation. Amongst this strand of the movement, and amongst the civics, ideas of grassroots organising, community self-help, and democracy-as-developmental shaped their view of the future. It is of note that these conceptions were often not interpreted at the time as potentially at odds with one another. Indeed, what emerged across the board was a largely teleological understanding of participation, both in its function as a means of struggle and in pre-fguring a post-apartheid order. While the UDF and civics may have envisaged a form of democracy in which communities would govern and control their affairs, this was still envisaged as taking place within the remit of Charterist hegemony. Even those structures focused on social welfare and collective space papered over political diversity and precluded alternative ideas from fourishing. Thus, although they fostered notions of popular activity which embodied empowering and educating characteristics, its manifestation in participatory democracy failed fundamentally to cater for political difference. What was produced was a unitary form of democracy, bound by allegiance to the movement. From 1990 as the ANC moved into a process of clarifying and formalising its democratic ideas, these conceptual tensions remained unresolved. The failure to reconcile the premise of vanguard leadership with the concurrent belief in popular initiative manifested in a tension between vanguardism and democracy. Moreover, beyond the shared goal of political freedom, there was no common, standardised vision of the institutionalised form that people’s power would take. The lack of a mutual resolution by the end of the 1980s as to what people’s power implied for a democratic future had a knock-on effect in the codifcation and formalisation of ANC democratic thought. 6 CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF IDEAS 227

Chapter 4 explored this very process. The frst part of the chapter focused on the period of constitutional discussion from 1986, frstly within the ANC and then in the multi-party constitutional negotiations from 1993. It was suggested that this marked a decisive period in the codifcation of ANC democratic thought. The analysis made three critical points: Firstly, it identifed that, with the formation of the ANC’s Constitution Committee in 1986, this process of codifcation took place within a framework of legal constitutionalism and that the work of the Committee represented a merging of liberal and radical democratic ideas. Between 1986 and 1996 new theoretical infuences penetrated the ANC through support from the legal fraternity. The infuence of lawyers succeeded in bringing a rights-based discourse to the ANC’s constitutional formulations. Statements of the ANC’s Constitution Committee during the late 1980s, which culminated in the publication of its 1988 Draft Constitutional Guidelines, signifed the frst formal commitment by the liberation movement to the principles of a multi-party system and individual civil and political rights. Secondly, and particularly importantly, this process of constitutional discussion and written codifcation of the ANC’s ideas took place largely in conceptual isolation from the phenomenon of people’s power. Examination of the documents of the Committee and the ideas fltering into its discussions suggest very little conceptual cross-pollination between the two. During the late 1980s, the discourse of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) and broader ANC was not at all penetrated by ideas of constitutionalism, human rights or the merits of a multi-party system. The domestic movement was also not moved by the same urgency to clarify its ideas about a future state form. Instead, in the broader movement other ideas continued to be infuential, including revolutionary theory, Marxism-Leninism, and the more localised, home- grown experiences of popular organisation and control. Thirdly, the chapter identifed that, during this period of constitutional discussion, the ANC began to locate participatory democracy in the local government arena specifcally. Although people’s power had, by its nature, taken place at a local/community level, the ANC had not previously given any indication of the institutional location of popular participation in a future democratic state. The discussion of constitutional principles and guidelines, however, seemed to situate participatory democracy within a framework of local government. Although the formal process of rebuilding local government did not commence until after 228 H. BROOKS

1996, it was from 1990 with the unbanning of the liberation movement that civics and activists at home began to feed their own ideas about participation into local negotiations. The second part of Chapter 4 thus explored the discussion of these ideas. Some of this debate took place quite separately to discussions of the ANC itself, whose leaders were preoccupied with national-level negotiations for a political settlement. The exchange of ideas and discussion of new local government was taking place at the local level between municipal administrations and representatives of the non-statutory camp. The chapter drew, in particular, on the example of the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber which pioneered and provided a model for other metropolitan areas to address the collapse of local administrations and the interim provision of services in the absence of a national agreement. Although the Metropolitan Chamber did not succeed in developing a new local government model, through technical support from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and academics, it did provide non-statutory participants with the opportunity to infuence its direction. The Chamber and other forums like it set a precedent for the involvement of civics in governance and in the formulation of development strategies. It also prepared them for engaging the state rather than fghting it. Amongst those involved in discussing new local government, a number of ideas and traditions were infuential, including trade unionism, community activism, progressive planning and participatory development. Linking in with local government discussions was the theme of ‘civil society’, an idea that grew in popularity in democratic theory globally in the early 1990s. The experience of the socialist states in Eastern Europe and of post-independence Africa demonstrated to South African activists the risk of popular organisations being crushed or co-opted by their liberation movements. The discourse of civil society thus placed emphasis not only on the importance of an autonomous civic realm but on civil society as an arena for the exercise of people’s power. What seems to have taken place from 1990 onwards is a shift away from the ANC as delivering people’s power, toward people’s power as a project of civil society, autonomous from the ANC-in-government. In ANC discourse, revolutionary and radical democratic language became replaced by that of constitutionalism, while the language of people’s power began to appear more manifestly in the discourse of civil society. 6 CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF IDEAS 229

This did not mean that the ANC was no longer expected to provide for participatory democracy. On the contrary, participatory structures would constitute the key interface between government and civil society. ‘People’s power’, however, became something that could only be guaranteed by civil society itself. Under a democratic state, civic organisations and others in the MDM began to see themselves, and not necessarily the ANC, as the legitimate representative of popular interests. Thus, while the early 1990s saw the onset of discussions about how to provide for citizen participation, it also brought to the surface a conceptual discord: Between the civics’ desire for a new autonomy and the ANC’s distrust of an oppositional civil society; and between the civics as representatives of communities and the ANC as the vanguard of the people. Against the backdrop of this genealogy, Chapter 5 focused on the ideas informing post-1994 policy alongside the expression of popular participation in the ANC’s own documents and commentary as a governing movement. Although it has been argued that the ANC’s democratic discourse by the early 1990s had been stripped of its more radical character, the idea that South Africa’s constitution embraces a notion of both representative and participatory democracy is widely accepted. Indeed, it is seen by the Parliament of South Africa as ‘a strengthening or expansion of formal representative democracy to include greater levels of participation by civil society’ (2001). The chapter therefore showed how some of the theoretical strands constituting people’s power continued into the post-1994 period and were woven into public policy, with a focus on the primary arena for its realisation: local government. Into the 2000s there has been a series of policy frameworks, municipal legislation, guidance and handbooks detailing participatory local government. Participatory traditions of the 1980s as well as radical democratic thought from within the ANC camp generally (most especially its longstanding belief in the inadequacy of representative democracy) formed the very basis on which the project to institutionalise participatory democracy lay. Direct association is often made today between the idea of popular participation in governance and the Freedom Charter’s premise that ‘the people shall govern’. Strands of people’s power embedded in ideas of community organising, education, empowerment and development remain visible in government policy, attesting to the infuence of the ANC-aligned movement in shaping a policy framework that takes account of local experience. The import of past traditions on establishing 230 H. BROOKS a participatory democratic system can be attributed to the involvement of individuals from the UDF, trade unions and civics. That being said, policy has also absorbed new ideas and experiences. After 1994, activist traditions surfaced more visibly through the infuence of progressive planning and development theory. These strands, alongside models of participatory municipal governance internationally, can be identifed amongst the infuences on policy. Although development and planning traditions were identifable in the 1980s, particularly amongst intellectuals and NGOs, during the period of policy formulation they came much more clearly to the fore as shapers of the governance project. As such, the guidance and handbooks provided for municipalities—with the support of NGOs and donors—draw out the benefts to be gained by both communities and municipalities from engaging citizens in governance. They reinforce the value of municipalities responding to the needs of communities; of making use of the range of skills and experience within communities that can beneft the municipality; and the development of better community understanding and ownership of the projects being implemented (DPLG & LGSETA, n.d., section 1.3: 22). The chapter also showed, however, that debates about democracy and development absorbed dominant global discourses of Western governments, international fnancial institutions and technical advisors. Contained within this paradigm are the ideas of good governance and performance management. Both of these strands provide some complement to citizen participation, encouraging bottom-up development, a greater role for civil society and a reduced role for the state. Yet they equally pose a challenge to it: through the emphasis of a model of new public management, the exigencies of performance are weighed up against the costs of facilitating citizen input. Partnerships with civil society remain a key feature of governance discourse. Their primary concern, however, is effciency and doing more with less. As such, the exigencies of being more business-like often sit uncomfortably with more elongated processes of citizen participation. The potential for participation to slow down development therefore undermines it being seen as a crucial step in the process. Constraints on citizen infuence are thus attributable to the nature of the state and its development strategy. In South Africa, the tendency to control policy direction from the centre and to convert participatory exercises into technocratic ones has had the effect of removing from public democratic infuence South Africa’s macro-economic framework. 6 CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF IDEAS 231

As such, schools of thought which place a premise on citizen participation have also by their nature restricted citizens’ ability to exercise infuence beyond the most local of levels. From 1990, the reassessment of local government globally, alongside the change in ideological milieu, generated new perspectives in the ANC about the possibility and desirability of people’s power. After 1994, with the pressure of governance and delivery combined with a lack of forethought regarding its institutionalised form, previously radical ideas about participation began to be replaced by a creeping realism. Rather than granting citizens real infuence in decision-making processes, public participation in South Africa often takes the form of consultation. Despite aspects of policy aspiring to empower communities, this has rarely been the result. The ease with which participation has fallen into a category of informing and consulting, or, at best, cooperation, perhaps relates both to the lack of detail ascribed to it during the ANC’s own constitutional formulations and to the more moderate feel given to participation during the Constitutional Assembly. In both cases, there remained a lack of clarity as to how participatory democracy would be realised. The claim is therefore made that the absorption of a language of ‘participation’ into mainstream development discourse has actually been used as a way of making neo-liberal development more palatable and people-friendly (Leal 2011: 71, 75–76). The notion of partnership incorporated in good governance language should not be mistaken for a sharing of power between citizen and state. Rather, the encouragement of self-help initiatives in civil society reduces pressure on the state to deliver. By civil society structures fnding their own solutions to development challenges, their ‘participation’ via self-help plays into the hands of the neo-liberal trend of ‘shrinking state responsibilities’ (Cornwall and Coelho 2007: 5). It was argued in Chapter 1 that there has been no clearly articulated theory of participatory democracy in the ANC historically. The opening to this conclusion also contended that a singular, standardised conception cannot be identifed from examination of its ideas and practice. What can be detected however is, frstly, that multiple ideas and conceptions of the role of participation have fed into post-1994 policy; and, secondly, that there are two distinct but parallel discourses of participatory democracy in the post-1994 period: one contained within public policy and the other in the commentary of the ANC. The second part of 232 H. BROOKS

Chapter 5 thus explored the latter of these, examining the ANC’s understanding of participatory democracy as expressed in its own discussion documents, publications and commentary. In contrast to the variety of infuences on public policy, the ANC’s ‘movement’ discourse draws far more heavily on its liberation heritage. Here, the concept of vanguardism, prominent within the exiled ANC and in the discourse of people’s power, continues to inform the movement’s understanding of popular participation. Vanguardism, and the relationship between people and movement it implies, remains a fundamental characteristic of the ANC’s identity.

6.1 vanguardism and Democracy One of the key emphases of this book is the ANC’s relationship with the people. As both a movement and political party, its identity must be understood through the lens of historic struggle and ideological tradition. The emergence of vanguardism in the ANC was identifed in Chapter 2 as a strand born from the growing infuence of Marxism- Leninism and complemented by existing nationalist sentiments involving popular conscientisation and the role of a dedicated leadership. The argument for its signifcance was developed further in Chapter 3 through examination of the conceptual relationship between vanguardism and people’s power. Chapters 4 and 5 showed how vanguardism has remained a conceptual current in ANC discourse, and has indeed under- gone a revival in recent years. Regardless of the decline of the ANC’s left commitments and concomitant rise of its market-oriented approach to development, vanguardism remains relevant not only to the ANC’s history as a liberation movement but to its role as a governing party. The ANC today continues to identify itself as a ‘vanguard’. What Chapter 5 brought to the fore, are its implications for participatory democracy. The very premise of vanguardism is the need for a dedicated movement or party able to give ideological, moral and intellectual leadership through a process of conscientisation. As such, the people themselves come not only to see the vanguard’s revolutionary objectives as in their best interests, but also to see leadership by that vanguard as essential for those interests to be secured. It implies a fundamental connection between the people’s needs as a collective and the leadership of their vanguard organisation. Secondly, and importantly, an active role for the people is critical both to the endurance of vanguardism and, in South Africa, 6 CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF IDEAS 233 to the continuation of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). Thus, while the path maybe planned for the people by the leadership, active participation remains critical. Although the form of participation this requires may not meet normative democratic criteria, it is a form of participation nonetheless and, perhaps most importantly, is understood by the ANC as constitutive of participatory democracy. While the NDR may well constitute a cover for neo-liberal policy, its continued utility by the ruling party cannot be ignored. Into the present, the ANC uses a language of liberation and national democracy for the retention of political hegemony. Refecting on these ideas and the form of participation they imply, the chapter highlighted the conceptual tension between the discourse of participation in public policy and the discourse of the ANC as a movement. Although the ethos of education and empowerment in public policy its attributable to the infuence of the ANC-aligned movement, it is perhaps precisely the predominance in policy formulation of actors from the MDM (rather than the central ANC leadership) that helps to explain the conceptual tension between policy and movement discourse. In the latter, not only are theoretical infuences such as international development, planning and governance absent, but traditions from the MDM’s own heritage—of education, empowerment and democratic grassroots control—also do not feature. In the ANC’s discourse of participatory democracy today, the surviving strands of people’s power are those shaped by the current of vanguardism. Conversely, while South Africa’s policy on participatory democracy is not free from internal tension (between the demands of effciency and performance and the commitment to bottom-up participation), it remains frmly a function of democratic governance, involving the engagement in decision-making processes of a pluralistic civil society. While much more needs to be done to redress the tensions in policy imperatives, the framework still draws on a democratic discourse that seeks both a democracy that is developmental and a citizenry that is empowered. The risk to participatory democracy in South Africa is this: The discourse of participation emerging from the ANC itself risks undermining the parallel discourse contained in public policy where participatory governance is intended to provide for the infuence of a politically pluralistic society. The ANC’s equation of democratic participation with mass mobilisation, and linking of objectives of participatory democratic structures with the extension of its own hegemony, takes us further away, 234 H. BROOKS not closer to the realisation of a deeper democracy. As such the national democratic objectives of the ANC-as-movement trump the democratic policy objective of achieving popular empowerment. Current weaknesses in the realisation of participatory democracy can be explained in part by this discord. Its roots, however, also lie in the conceptual tensions within people’s power which remained unresolved by the end of the 1980s. The strands of the movement that placed value in local democratic control have lost out in the post-1994 era to a form of people’s power in which participation must be exercised through the vanguard. Civil society must be independent yet loyal, while the confation of ‘revolutionary’ policy with the popular democratic will undermines the policy objectives of citizen agency and infuence. Examination of participatory democracy in the discourses of policy and movement also draws attention to another weakness in the theory. This time, however, its source is a conceptual parallel, in which the question of macro-level policy frameworks, in both policy and movement discourses, are protected from democratic contestation. In South Africa, participatory democracy is located primarily at the local level, and the post-1994 shift toward a more technocratic approach to local government has removed from popular challenge the direction of broader economic and development policy. As such, although South Africans can participate in municipal development, they lack infuence and power over the policy agenda itself. Processes of participation which take place from the grassroots upwards collide with the simultaneous imperatives of controlling policy at the centre, enlisting the help of experts and raising performance and effciency. At the same time, the thin participation of the technocratic approach has enabled the simultaneous continuation of the ANC’s vanguard discourse, which removes from the sphere of contestation its own programme of NDR. Through the requirements of a hegemonic unity, the ability of citizens to contest the ideas of government is effectively removed. Despite differences in their ideological premise both the ‘performance’ and ‘vanguard’ discourses facilitate a narrow form of participation. While undertaking an exercise in normative democratic theory, this book has sought to unravel the ANC’s own theory of participatory democracy. In so doing, it has shown how the ideas that inform the commitments of policy makers and governments are just as important as their practice. That being said, ideas are not the only factor infuencing 6 CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF IDEAS 235 policy implementation. Existing fndings on the effectiveness of participatory mechanisms have pointed to a number of other implementation challenges, including limited resources, inadequate civic education, insuffcient municipal capacity and logistical diffculties. Party political infuence over ward committees also presents a challenge, not only to the incorporation of other interests in the ward but to ensuring that councillors are accountable to their constituents before their party. The actions of individuals and parties are thus shaped not only by ideas, but by other circumstances and interests, and it would be unrealis- tic to suggest that all action is theoretically driven. The range and depth of ideological and conceptual infuence featured in ANC discourse, however, suggests that ideas have historically played an important function. The adoption of revolutionary theory after 1960, and the linking of its strategy and tactics to theoretical frameworks of African nationalism, Marxism-Leninism and NDR imply the infuence of ideas. Throughout the 1980s the ANC and UDF produced a number of theoretical publications. Even where discussion was not necessarily focused on the form of a future state, activists and cadres drew on theoretical frameworks and the infuence of international revolutionary experience. The UDF’s theoretical journal, Isizwe often complemented its articles with questions for further discussion by its readers and affliate organisations. The ANC’s DPE played a prominent role in exile and much of the material included in its syllabuses and lectures related to the ideas developed and espoused in the movement’s key documents. Moreover, while some theoretical infuences can be attributed to particular intellectuals and ideologues, their ideas fltered through parts of the movement and shaped offcial discourse. It is also clear that theory did not guide all participants equally. As Suttner noted in reference to people’s power, for some individuals ‘it would be just a practical thing’ (interview, 2012). However, whether or not actions were guided by theory from the outset, it is possible to argue that much of the organisational work undertaken by activists and local structures themselves generated principles and models for further action. There are, of course, limitations to this research. It has not been possible to examine more fully the ideas and conceptions of ordinary community members, nor to elicit the views of everybody involved in people’s power and policy formulation. However, the book has tried to draw on insights from across the liberation movement, and has incorporated the views and accounts of those in a variety of roles: in exile, at 236 H. BROOKS

ANC headquarters, in the trade unions, community structures, NGOs and underground movement. There is also more coverage of some local cases than others: The example of Alexandra was drawn upon most frequently in discussing people’s power and, when looking at that the transitional local government negotiations, the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber was highlighted as the leading example. The book has not, however, provided an analysis of any organisation or locale in its entirety, precisely for the reason that its primary concern is the study of ideas. To date, there has been no interrogation of the theory of people’s power as part of a broader trajectory of ANC democratic thought. Our existing understanding of participatory democracy has been missing an examination of conceptual continuities and discontinuities. This book therefore makes that contribution by linking together the study of ideas from the 1980s into the post-1994 period, enabling a far more complete picture of how the ANC understands a form of democracy to which it frequently refers but about which it has provided little articulation. It has challenged both the view that the democratic traditions of the 1980s have been forgotten entirely, and that the post-1994 model of democracy in South Africa is wholly unrelated to that pre-fgured by people’s power. It has also sought to avoid a rose-tinted account of what people’s power entailed and has rather highlighted the variety of currents, traditions and infuences that fed into what was a complex and nuanced discourse. In so doing, the book has made two important points: Firstly, democratic ideas and models during times of struggle can tell us something about the forms that then emerge under conditions of democracy. The model of democracy espoused in the 1980s is not entirely unconnected to the post-1994 dispensation. Far from the conceptual infuence of people’s power coming to an abrupt end, the ideas and traditions from that time have been fed into policy formulation. Many of those involved in the labour movement, civic activism and UDF leadership carried their values and ideals with them into the new local government model. Pre- existing ideas of community organisation, citizen empowerment, participatory development and education can be identifed in the post-1994 framework. An additional feature, absent during the 1980s, is the language of constitutionalism and rights. Through this addition, popular participation has been un-bounded. Once delinked in public policy from political partisanship or affliation, citizen participation is situated in a democratic framework of individual rights and political pluralism. 6 CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF IDEAS 237

Secondly, it has challenged the idea that people’s power in itself represented a thoroughly democratic model for the future; and, had its pre-fgurative character been realised, that it would have guaranteed a model of democracy superior to that which exists in South Africa today. People’s power was shaped and guided by a multiplicity of ideas, not all of which sat comfortably with one another. Aspects of the discourse rooted themselves in democratic ideals and local experiences. Many were shaped by their participants’ own ideas and beliefs, while some responded to existing theoretical frameworks and others to immediate material concerns. Most importantly, however, people’s power constituted a web of interlinking themes, none of which can be considered in conceptual isolation. Rather, they formed a part of the whole. Some strands of the discourse rooted themselves in ideas about empowerment, decentralised control, resolving shared problems and bottom-up decision-making. Others, however, were not premised on such democratic ideals or, if they were, they allowed for local infuence and control only where it conformed to broader political objectives. Although the UDF and civics saw themselves as establishing structures of local democratic decision-making, what they practiced was a bounded and unitary form of democracy. Organs of people’s power were predominantly aligned to the ANC. Even where structures were open to all residents, the subtext remained that participants should agree with the ultimate objectives of political struggle. The idea of individual rights and a pluralistic parliamentary-style dispensation were considered by many in the UDF to be features of bourgeois democracy. Whether or not they were democratically constituted and locally controlled, organs of people’s power served a largely teleological function. We therefore cannot be selective in our conceptual analysis of people’s power. Across the ANC-aligned movement, there were different interpretations of its role and future. As such, we must resist the urge to overlook those aspects rooted in traditions that undermined or openly sought to eliminate democratic principles and practice. Currents which placed emphasis on vanguard leadership, the conscientisation of the masses and the active participation of the people were ideas also rooted in Marxist- Leninist theory. While we can agree that elements of people’s power held democratic process in high regard and emphasised the developmental benefts of democracy, not just its revolutionary objectives, we must also accept that people’s power constituted other conceptual threads which included the direction of a vanguard leadership and the belief in a foretold will. 238 H. BROOKS

For those who see participatory democracy as a feature of the past, now lost to a liberal democratic present, attention should be paid to its conceptual foundations. Not only did the form of democracy espoused by people’s power lack certain democratic features, but the democracy espoused in ANC discourse today retains some of its characteristics. The teleological nature of participation, the push for a hegemonic unity, and the parallel desire for political control from above and creative participation from below can be identifed in people’s power. Participatory democracy remains central to the ANC’s governance programme and the movement continues to reiterate this in its documents, statements and conferences. It may not meet normative democratic criteria, nor may it draw on the traditions of the 1980s that many in the MDM had hoped. It remains, nonetheless, a conception of participatory democracy whose weaknesses can be found in its intellectual and ideological heritage. The work of the ANC’s Constitution Committee, covered in Chapter 4, has been given insuffcient attention in existing research. This is perhaps a consequence of the Committee’s discussions taking place in an isolated manner. It’s proposals and reports appear to have been shared with the National Working Committee (NWC) and its sub-committees, but not much more widely than that. The frst published document circulated through the broader movement seems to have been the Draft Constitutional Guidelines in 1988. The Committee’s elevation of a rights-based discourse, moreover, was not representative of the broader movement. It is precisely for this reason that its ideas require interrogation. The formulations and proposals of the Committee bear little resemblance to democratic discourse in the broader ANC. They refect neither the radical democratic tone of people’s power, nor the African nationalist, Marxist-Leninist inspired language of the ANC’s own documents. Yet it was the thinking of the Committee that became the ANC’s offcial discourse in its constitutional proposals for a democratic future. The fact that it was not a discourse that emerged organically from the ANC as a whole, nor was it immediately embraced by the broader ANC camp, goes some way to explaining the endurance of the vanguard discourse into the democratic era. It is hoped that the fndings of this book will enable policy makers and practitioners to re-examine the extent to which the content of participatory democratic policy enables the objectives set out in legislation. It points to some competing policy imperatives between democratic deepening and public sector effciency. It also highlights a conception of 6 CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF IDEAS 239 participation in which citizen infuence is reduced to consultation or is fenced off from the discussion of broader policy direction and content. Those proposing measures to target logistical and capacity constraints in local government may do well to consider whether civic education, increased resources and improved training of municipal staff will succeed in combatting challenges that are located in the conceptual framework. Furthermore, limitations to the realisation of participatory democracy in South Africa remain fundamentally linked to the discourse of the ruling party. The ANC is not only in power but remains electorally dominant. Pervasive infghting, lack of public trust, and most recently the exposure of state capture point to a mass movement whose popular democratic appeal is a shadow of its former self. The replacement of Jacob Zuma with Cyril Ramaphosa as President of the ANC, and of South Africa, in February 2018 is possibly a step on the road to a moral regeneration. Ramaphosa’s leadership was further endorsed by the electorate in South Africa’s sixth national elections in May 2019. Yet the ANC’s history shows it to be a more powerful force than one man alone. In these elections, it was not only the ANC’s mass character but its hold on state power that was at stake. For now, the movement has survived this test and, for the foreseeable future, South Africa’s political landscape remains innately entwined with its history. Movement identity, historic claims and the complex requirements for a viable and compelling alternative loom large in the struggle for a more democratic future. Amidst this, the weakening of the mass democratic character of the ANC does not necessarily bode well for democracy. From this perspective, although policy revisions and improvements can be made, this will not necessarily bring about a more democratic form of participation. It is of note that the ANC’s acknowledgement of its fedging connection with the masses and subsequent launch of its ‘period of renewal’ coincided with the publication of the DPLG’s National Policy Framework on Public Participation (2007), as well as the release of a series of hand and resource books for the implementation of the ward committee system. These publications contain valuable guidance on understanding the principles and benefts of citizen participation, as well as tips for its practical application. At least ten years on, however there is little sign of a renewed approach to citizen engagement or a challenge to existing practice. So long as the corresponding discourse of participation from the ANC as a movement links the structures of participatory governance to realisation of the NDR and renewal of its own 240 H. BROOKS mass character, there remains no guarantee that participatory democracy can be realised in practice. It is the pull between these two—between vanguardism and participation and between democracy and teleology— that places a limit on the extent to which participation in South Africa can generate the democratic infuence of its citizens.

References African National Congress (ANC). (2012, April 10). Organisational renewal: Building the ANC as a movement for transformation and a strategic centre of power. Discussion document, National Policy Conference, Mangaung. Cornwall, A., & Coelho, V. S. (2007). Spaces for change? The politics of citizen participation in new democratic arenas. London and New York: Zed Books. DPLG. (2007, June 25). National policy framework on public participation. Public Participation and Empowerment Chief Directorate. DPLG & LGSETA. (n.d.). Public participation in local governance: Workbook and guidance for ward committees. Module 3, a skills programme for the national qualifcation in ward committee governance, NQF 2, Part B. Leal, P. A. (2011). Participation: The ascendancy of a buzzword in the neo-liberal era. In A. Cornwall (Ed.), The participation reader. London and New York: Zed Books. Parliament of South Africa. (2001, June). A people’s government, the people’s voice: A review of public participation in the law and policy-making process in South Africa. https://www.parliament.gov.za/peoples-government-peoples-voice. Accessed 29 November 2017. Suttner, R. (interview)—Johannesburg, 25 October 2012. Index

A Constitutional Assembly, 117, 120, African nationalism, 16, 36, 37, 123, 127, 135, 168, 174, 181, 40–45, 53, 56, 206, 221, 223, 231 224, 235 Constitution Committee, ANC, 120, African nationalist. See African 121 nationalism documents, 120, 125, 128–130, Armed struggle 133, 134, 137, 138, 188, 227, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), 50 238 formation and work, 6, 25, 117– 119, 126, 227 C membership, 122, 126, 127 Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Cosatu, 89, 91, 154, 171 Chamber Cyril Ramaphosa, 89 civic involvement in, 144, 156, 228 formation, 139, 172, 198 role and work, 146, 153, 228, 236 D Civics, civic movement. See Mass Department of Political Education Democratic Movement (MDM) (DPE), ANC, 86, 87, 96, 128, Charterist, 103, 104, 106 129, 184, 188, 192, 199, 201, 235 Charterism, 75 Draft Constitutional Guidelines, 1988, Colonialism of a special type, 44, 45, 119, 124, 129, 133, 134, 149, 53 238

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license 241 to Springer Nature Switzerland AG, part of Springer Nature 2020 H. Brooks, The African National Congress and Participatory Democracy, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25744-6 242 Index

F M Freedom Charter, 82, 119 Mandela, Nelson, 36, 43, 49, 50, 200 campaign and Congress of the Marxism People, 45, 46 African socialism, 42, 54 content, 4, 7, 9, 47, 52, 73, 75, 80, communism, 18, 37, 87 82, 122, 148 councillist/councillism, 8, 90, 103, drafting of, 46, 48, 49 135 thirty year anniversary, 79 Gramsci, 87, 88, 90, 105 Marxism-Leninism, 16, 17, 36, 41, 43–45, 53, 55, 83, 87, 88, 91, I 103, 105, 106, 206, 207, 221, Integrated Development Planning 224, 225, 227, 232, 235 (IDP), 23, 168, 173, 176, 177, Marxist infuence, 37, 42, 83 181, 183, 207 socialism, 17, 43, 53, 86 Marxist-Leninist. See Marxism-Leninism J Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), Jordan, Pallo, 36, 38, 56, 70, 82, 121, xv, 6, 9, 65, 67, 83, 87, 88, 90, 122, 124–126, 130 99, 106, 145, 148, 154, 155, 169, 170, 184, 187, 192, 200, 201, 205, 225, 227, 229, 233, L 238 Local government civics/civic movement, 4–6, 10, 65, Cooperative Governance and 66, 74, 76, 77, 88–91, 93, 102, Traditional Affairs (Cogta), 138, 145, 169, 229 171, 176, 180, 201, 207 constitution, 6 Department of Provincial and Local trade unions, 5, 9, 12, 19, 65, Government (DPLG), 143, 89–92, 138, 148 167, 171, 172, 176, 178, 184, 207, 239 Municipal Structures Act, 168 N Municipal Systems Act, 168, 171, 207 National consultative conference, negotiating forum(s), 25, 118, 139, ANC, 152, 191 140, 145, 198 National consultative conference of the South African Local Government civic movement, 198 Association (Salga), 171 National democratic revolution white paper, 165, 168, 169, 172, (NDR) 174, 181, 184 as an ANC programme, 9, 45, 55, Lusaka, ANC headquarters, 64, 77, 84, 98, 103, 131, 190, 204, 86, 102 234 Index 243

as deriving from colonialism of a S special type, 44 Sachs, Albie, 10, 119, 122, 123, 126 national democracy, 7, 45, 72, 96, South African Communist Party 189, 202, 207, 233 (SACP), 9, 16–18, 44, 45, 47, National Executive Committee 48, 50, 51, 53–56, 71, 82, (NEC), ANC, ix, 39, 47, 73, 77, 86–89, 96, 106, 107, 119, 126, 95, 120, 122, 128, 134, 135, 154, 189, 190, 208, 225 138, 154 Soviet Union, 86 New Left, 11, 91 Gorbachev, 127 Lenin, 16, 83, 84, 86, 87, 97, 100 Moscow, 45, 86, 88 O soviets, 16, 18, 84, 85, 130 Organs of people’s power Stalinist/Stalinism, 88, 91 Establishment and role, 66 as a form of councillism, 85 people’s courts and popular justice, T 66, 73, 77, 81, 104 Tambo, Oliver, 51, 99, 107, 120–122, street committees, 73, 75, 76, 84, 209 132 Trade unions. See Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) P Policy conferences, ANC. See National consultative conference, ANC U Political Commission, ANC, 83, 84 Umkhonto we Sizwe, 50 documents, 83 United Democratic Front (UDF), 97 Political education, ANC. See documents and statements, 88, 90, Department of Political 93, 99, 100, 235 Education, ANC formation, 150 leaders and activists, 5, 65, 67, 72, 81, 82, 87, 88, 151 R Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), 7, 165–168, V 170, 171, 178, 185, 194, 195, Vanguard, 10, 16–18, 43, 45, 51, 52, 203, 204, 206 54, 55, 69, 84, 88, 89, 95–100, Revolution, 101 102, 106, 126, 128, 132, 156, in Africa, 86 188, 189, 192, 204–206, 219, in Latin America, 86 220, 225, 226, 232, 234 in Nicaragua, 90 vanguardism, 25, 36, 41, 52, 56, revolutionary theory, 51–56, 83, 87, 63, 95, 98–100, 102, 103, 166, 95, 207, 227, 235 188, 189, 202, 205, 206, 209, in Vietnam, 70, 86 221, 223–226, 232, 240 244 Index

W Y Ward committees Youth league, ANC handbooks and guidebooks, 172, documents and statements, 39, 42 207, 239 formation, 36, 42 legislation on, 7, 195, 196, 207 leaders, vii, 41, 43, 223 in practice, 168