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Appendix 7 Orleans Basin Field Reconnaissance and Definition of Reaches in Orleans East Bank Basin The basin for Orleans East Bank has been broken down into seven distinct sections to develop both reaches and features definitions for the risk model. These sections are based on General Design Memorandum (GDMs) published by the New Orleans District, USACE and updated by field reconnaissance by IPET Team 10. The Orleans East Bank Basin has been defined by the following sections shown in the figure below: 1. 17th Street Canal 2. Orleans Canal 3. London Canal 4. Bayou St. John Canal 5. Lakefront Levees 6. INHC 7. Mississippi River Levees Volume VIII Engineering and Operational Risk and Reliability Analysis – Technical Appendix VIII-7-1 This report is the independent opinion of the IPET and is not necessarily the official position of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Overview of Orleans East Bank Basin Elevations All vertical elevations in this report are defined in NAVD88 2004.65 datum unless otherwise noted within the text. All horizontal datums are defined in State Plane Coordinates NAD83 – 1702 Louisiana South, UTM NAD83 Zone 15, and GCS NAD83. Elevations for transitions features are top elevation of feature and elevation for the gates are inverts. Section 1: 17th Street Canal (East Side) Narrative The 17th Street Canal Floodwall cross section is typical from station 125+87.45 W/L to 0+00.00 W/L (also Sta. 340+40.00 B/L Lakefront) with a I-wall section at elevation of 14.0 feet Volume VIII Engineering and Operational Risk and Reliability Analysis – Technical Appendix VIII-7-2 This report is the independent opinion of the IPET and is not necessarily the official position of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. NGVD. The elevation changes from station 80+10.00 W/L to 80+40.00 W/L, where the I-Wall crosses under Veterans Highway and the elevation is 14.5 feet NGVD. The elevation changes again from station 100+86.00 W/L to 102+06.00, where the I-Wall elevation is 15.0 feet NGVD. There was a major failure of the I-wall floodwall protection on the east side of the 17th Street Outfall Canal. This failure resulted in a breach located approximately N30°01.02 and W90°07.28. The length of the breach is 455 feet long. Floodwall monoliths, founding levee and foundation materials were scoured away resulting in scour hole with an approximate bottom elevation -21 feet NGVD. A temporary levee was constructed up to elevation +10 NGVD to provide temporary flood protection. Figure 1 shows the breach along the 17th Street Canal. Figure 2 shows the sheetpile repair along the 17th Street Canal. Figure 1. Breach in the 17th Street Canal Volume VIII Engineering and Operational Risk and Reliability Analysis – Technical Appendix VIII-7-3 This report is the independent opinion of the IPET and is not necessarily the official position of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Figure 2. Sheetpile repair along the 17th Street Canal Elevation Stationing (used East Bank for OEB) Section Start End Structure EL Section/Point Length Avg Height Weighted Average 1 0+00 7+45.59 I-Wall 14 S 745.59 14 2 7+45.59 7+52.09 T-Wall 14 P 6.5 14 3 7+52.09 8+14.09 Gate No. 3 14 P 62 14 4 8+14.09 8+20.59 T-Wall 14 P 6.5 14 5 8+20.59 80+10.00 I-Wall 14 S 7189.41 14 Reach 1 14.0 6 80+10.00 80+40.00 I-Wall Transition 14.0 - El 14.5 S 30 14.25 7 80+40.00 80+51.70 I-Wall 14.5 P 11.7 14.5 8 80+51.70 81+63.70 Veterans Hwy 14.5 S 112 14.5 9 81+63.70 100+86.00 I-Wall 14.5 S 1922.3 14.5 Reach 2 14.5 10 100+86.00 102+06.00 I-Wall Transition 14.5 - El 15.0 S 120 14.75 11 102+06.00 125+87.45 I-Wall 15 S 2381.45 15 Reach 3 15.0 End at Hammond Highway Volume VIII Engineering and Operational Risk and Reliability Analysis – Technical Appendix VIII-7-4 This report is the independent opinion of the IPET and is not necessarily the official position of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Features Elevation Feature 15 Pump Station #6 - End of 17th Street Canal 15 Pump Station OP#10 10.6 Gate E9 - Southern RR 7 Gate at OP#10 Pump Station 7 Gate north of I-10 7.3 Gate E4 - Veterans Blvd. 7.3 Gate E5 - Veterans Blvd Definition of Reaches Reach 1-3 (now 45) – This reach consists of I-wall on the east side of the 17th Street Canal at average elevation 15.5 feet with a length of approximately 12,740 feet. There are two transitions (Pump Stations 6 and 10) and five gates in this reach. Section 2: Orleans Avenue Canal Narrative The protection on the east side of the Orleans Outfall Canal starts at the intersection of Lakeshore Drive and Marconi Drive. After short lengths of floodwall and cantilever sheeting, the protection consists of a levee that extends to Robert E. Lee Boulevard. South of this intersection, the protection consists of floodwall that extends to the pumping station near Interstate Highway 610. This line of protection is in satisfactory condition and does not appear to have been damaged during Hurricane Katrina. Definition of Reaches Reach 4-10 (now 46-49) – These reaches consists primarily of I-walls with levees at the lakefront entrance on both on the east side of the Orleans Avenue Canal at average elevation 14.0 feet with a length of approximately 9,280 feet, 3,155 feet, 9,110 feet, and 3,610 feet respectively. There are one transition (Pump Stations 7) and four gates in this reach. Section Structure Length Elevation Section Structure Length Elevation 1 I-Wall 3404 13.6 1 I-Wall 3430 13.6 2 I-Wall 2712 13.6 2 I-Wall 2545 13.6 3 I-Wall 2627 13.4 3 I-Wall 2643 13.4 4 I-wall 180 13 Reach 4 4 I-wall 160 13 Reach 8 5 Levee 2210 13 Reach 5 5 Levee 2948 13 6 I-wall 500 12 Reach 6 6 Levee 226 12 Reach 9 7 Levee 665 13 Reach 7 7 I-wall 482 13 Reach 10 Volume VIII Engineering and Operational Risk and Reliability Analysis – Technical Appendix VIII-7-5 This report is the independent opinion of the IPET and is not necessarily the official position of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Features Elevation Feature 15 Pump Station OP#7 FW - End of Orleans Canal 7 Gate at Harrison Ave 7 Gate at Harrison Ave 7 Gate at Filmore Ave 7 Gate at Filmore Ave Pump Station #6 Section 3: London Avenue Canal Narrative There was a major failure of the I-wall floodwall protection on the east side of the London Avenue Outfall Canal immediately north of Mirabeau Avenue Bridge. This failure resulted in a breach located approximately N30° 00.52’ and W90° 04.167. The length of the breach was 425 feet long. Floodwall monoliths, founding levee and foundation materials were scoured away resulting in scour hole with an approximate bottom elevation -28 feet NGVD. A provisional levee was constructed up to elevation +10 NGVD to provide temporary flood protection. Figure 3 shows the sheetpile repair along the London Avenue Outfall Canal. Volume VIII Engineering and Operational Risk and Reliability Analysis – Technical Appendix VIII-7-6 This report is the independent opinion of the IPET and is not necessarily the official position of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. There was a second major failure of the I-wall floodwall protection on the west side of the London Ave Outfall Canal immediately south of Robert E. Lee Boulevard Bridge. This failure resulted in a breach located approximately N30°01.218’ and W90°04.26’. The length of the breach was 720 feet long. Floodwall monoliths, founding levee and foundation materials were scoured away resulting in scour hole with an approximate bottom elevation -20 feet NGVD. A provisional levee was constructed up to elevation +10 NGVD to provide temporary flood protection. Figure 4 shows the sheet pile repair and also a failed I-wall floodwall section. Figure 3. Sheetpile repair along the London Ave Canal – East Side Failure Volume VIII Engineering and Operational Risk and Reliability Analysis – Technical Appendix VIII-7-7 This report is the independent opinion of the IPET and is not necessarily the official position of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Figure 4. Sheetpile repair along the London Ave Canal – West Side Failure Definition of Reaches Reach 11-18 (now 50-53) – These reaches consists primarily of I-walls with levees at the lakefront entrance on both on the east side of the London Avenue Canal at average elevation 14.0 feet with a length of approximately 12,130 feet, 3,880 feet, 12,765 feet and 3,030 feet respectively. There are two transitions (Pump Stations 3 and 4) and three gates in this reach. Elevation Stationing - WEST (START AT PUMP STATION #3) Elevation Stationing - EAST (START AT PUMP STATION #3) Section Structure Length Elevation Section Structure Length Elevation 1 I-Wall 9712 13 Reach 11 1 I-Wall 9827 13.2 Reach 16 2 T-Wall 300 15 Transition PS #4 2 T-wall 240 18 Transition 3 I-Wall 1984 13.4 Reach 12 3 I-Wall 1974 13.2 4 Levee 537 12 Reach 13 Between Robert Lee and Simon 4 I-wall 672 13.1 5 I-wall 190 12.5 Between Robert Lee and Simon 5 I-wall 130 13 Reach 17 6I-wall9213Reach 14 6 Levee 3647 12.5 Reach 18 7 Levee 3276 12.5 Reach 15 Volume VIII Engineering and Operational Risk and Reliability Analysis – Technical Appendix VIII-7-8 This report is the independent opinion of the IPET and is not necessarily the official position of the U.S.
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