A New Remedy for Northern Ireland: the Case for United Nations Peacekeeping Intervention in an Internal Conflict
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NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law Volume 11 Number 1 IRELAND: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS Article 2 1990 A NEW REMEDY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: THE CASE FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING INTERVENTION IN AN INTERNAL CONFLICT Roger Myers Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/ journal_of_international_and_comparative_law Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Myers, Roger (1990) "A NEW REMEDY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: THE CASE FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING INTERVENTION IN AN INTERNAL CONFLICT," NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law: Vol. 11 : No. 1 , Article 2. Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol11/iss1/ 2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW VOLUME 11 NUMBERS 1 & 2 1990 A NEW REMEDY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: THE CASE FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING INTERVENTION IN AN INTERNAL CONFLICT ROGER MYERS TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction ............................. 3 II. The War of Northern Ireland ................... 9 A. Historical Roots ......................... 15 B. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s .......... 22 C. The Current State of the Crisis .................. 30 D. Great Britain's "Law and Order" Strategy in Northern Ireland ........................ 35 E. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement and Its Aftermath . 54 F. The Likely Scenario of Britain Unilaterally W ithdrawing .......................... 60 III. United Nations Peacekeeping: Justifications for Intervention in Internal Conflicts ................... 64 A. Intervention in Internal Conflicts Is Essential if the United Nations Is to Keep the Peace ............. 65 B. The Traditional, Expansive View of State Sovereignty ........................... 68 C. The Shrinking Scope of State Sovereignty .......... 73 1. Matters of International Concern Are Not Within the "Domestic Jurisdiction" of the States ....... 74 2. Determining When Matters Are of International Concern .................. 75 a. Threats to, and Breaches of, the Peace ..... .. 76 b. Human Rights Violations ................ 79 IV. International Intervention in the Context of the Northern Ireland Conflict ..................... 89 A. Why the Irish Conflict Constitutes a "Threat to the Peace" ............................. 91 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. I I 1. Armed Intervention ....................... 92 2. Civil War ..... ......................... 95 3. International Friction Shy of Civil War ....... .. 97 B. Human Rights Abuses in Northern Ireland Demand United Nations Attention ................... 102 1. Nonderogable Rights .................. 103 2. Nonderogable Rights Are Violated in Ulster . .. 105 3. The Persistent Violations of Rights in Ulster Breach Britain's International Obligations ..... .109 4. The Inadequacy of Internal Safeguards in Northern Ireland ......................... 110 V. Obtaining United Nations Approval for a Peacekeeping Force in Northern Ireland ......................... 113 A. Avoiding the Superpower Veto .................. 114 1. Britain's Obligation to Abstain from Voting . 115 2. The Prospects of a United States Veto ........ .120 3. The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution ........... 121 B. Obtaining British Consent to a Peacekeeping Force in Northern Ireland .......................... 125 1. The Requirement of Consent ................. 125 2. The Pressure on Britain to Consent .......... .. 128 VI. The Potential for Successful Peacekeeping in Northern Ireland ............................... 135 A. The Legal Basis and Political Advantages of a Fact-finding Mission ......................... 137 B. A Proposed Mandate for a United Nations Fact-finding Mission ......................... 142 1. The Possibility of Political Situations .......... 143 2. The Role of the Peacekeepers in Northern Ireland 145 a. Northern Ireland Is Ripe for Peacekeeping . 145 b. United Nations Forces Could Achieve Their Goal ....................... 147 i. United Nations Forces Are Neutral . .. 148 ii. The United Nations Could Effectively Police Ulster, Temporarily .......... .. 149 iii. United Nations Cyprus Experience Predicts Success for Northern Ireland ... 153 3. The Likelihood of Negotiations ............... 159 VII. Epilogue ...... ............................... 161 1990] UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PROPOSAL A NEW REMEDY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: THE CASE FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING INTERVENTION IN AN INTERNAL CONFLICT ROGER MYERS * It is a proverb of Old date, that the pride of France, the treason of England, and the war of Ireland, shall never have end. Which proverb, touching the war of Ireland, is like always to continue, without God set it in men 's breast to find some new remedy that was never found before. -English civil servant, 16th Century I. INTRODUCTION August 1990 marked the twenty-first anniversary of the inception of England's most recent effort to end the War of Ireland. 1 On August 14, * Associate, Steinhart & Falconer (San Francisco); B.A., 1980, San Jose State University; J.D., 1988, Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley. I thank David D. Caron, Acting Professor of Law, Boalt Hall, for his insightful suggestions, Frank C. Newman, Jackson H. Ralston Professor of InternationalLaw, Emeritus, Boalt Hall, for his belief in this project and the potential of the United Nations and international law to protect human rights and civil liberties regardless of national boundaries, and Wiltrud Harms, Boalt Hall International Document Specialist, without whom the research on this project might never have been completed. I also thank Professor D.S. Greer of the Queen's University of Belfast for his valuable criticisms. I have taken the liberty of addressing Professor Greer's primary concerns in the body of this Article. A special word of thanks to the editors and staff of the New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law for their patience and assistance. I am deeply indebted to Tanya Smith of the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights for her invaluable aid and insights. Of course, the views expressed herein are solely my own. A word on methodology. To quote a recent chronicler of the conflict in Northern Ireland, "[t]here is a persistent problem, given the nature of this war, in ensuring accuracy of detail for each incident described here .... [T]here are usually, at the very least, two different versions of events that occur in the Six Counties." K. KELLEY, THE LONGEST WAR: NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE I.R.A. at xvi (2d ed. 1988). Although I cannot guarantee this Article to be free of factual error, I have endeavored to avoid uncorroborated interpretations of events in Northern Ireland, except where necessary to illustrate various partisan viewpoints. I. The genesis of the modem Irish "troubles" is generally set at August 12, 1969, the culmination of two years of Protestant violence against Catholic civil rights advocates. On that date, Protestants staged their annual march through Catholic sections of Derry to N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. I11 1969, British troops, bayonets fixed, marched into the Bogside to protect the Catholic ghetto outside the ancient walls of Derry2 from marauding armed Protestant police forces incensed by a two-year civil rights campaign challenging a half-century of Protestant economic and political domination in the North of Ireland.3 There is some evidence that at least one of Prime Minister Harold Wilson's motivations in dispatching soldiers to the besieged Catholic quarter was to preempt international intervention. The previous day, the taoiseach4 of the predominately Catholic Republic celebrate the siege of that city in 1689, a march which quickly disintegrated into the cataclysmic Battle of the Bogside that led to the introduction of British troops two days later. During the battle, eight died and at least 189 police and nearly 1,000 total were injured. Two of the most exhaustive examinations of this turning point in Ulster's modem history are the government's own two-volume TRIBUNAL OF INQUIRY, VIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN 1969, REPORT TO PARLIAMENT, 1972, CMND. 566 [hereinafter SCARMAN REPORT] and R. STETLER, THE BATTLE OF BOGSIDE (1970). 2. Derry is the Catholic name for the town, Londonderry the Protestant. Since a majority of the town is Catholic, its Catholic name will be used throughout this report. Cf. Thomas, Bloody Ireland, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., May-June 1988, at 31, 37. 3. Northern Ireland had been building to the August 1969 conflagration for months. The previous October, a march by more than 2,000 unarmed Catholics to protest discrimination in employment and public housing was attacked by the Protestant police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which charged without warning and, in the words of a governmental committee of inquiry, "used their batons indiscriminately" and "wholly without justification or excuse." See DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969, CMND. 532, at 24-29 [hereinafter CAMERON REPORT]. Hospital officials treated 96 casualties, R. STETLER, supra note 1,at 40, including two policemen. CAMERON REPORT, supra, at 30. In January, more than 200 armed Protestant extremists and police, led by the Reverend Ian Paisley, ambushed unarmed Catholic civil