Discerning the Determinants of Ethnic Repression in the Former Soviet Union

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DISCERNING THE DETERMINANTS OF ETHNIC REPRESSION IN THE FORMER

SOVIET UNION

David Tyler Hodgin

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF RUSSIAN AND SLAVIC STUDIES

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTERS OF ARTS

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2020

Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………....4

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………..5

Conceptualizing Ethnicity and Repression…………………….……………………………….6

The Argument for Collective Memory & Cultural Identity…………………………………....12

Consociational and Centripetal Ethnic Systems……………………………………………….16

The Primordialist, Constructivist, and Instrumentalist Approaches…………………………...19

Data Sets…………………………………………………………………………………….…22

CIRI…………………………………………………………………………………....22

EPR…………………………………………………………………………………….23

Case Selection ………………………………………………………………………………....25

Comparative Analysis …………………………………………………………………………28

Kazakhstan…………………………………………………………………………….29

Latvia………………………………………………………………………….……….41

Estonia…………………………………………………………………………………48

Ukraine………………………………………………………………………………...54

Cross Analysis…………………………………………………………………………………60

Discussion and Conclusion……………………………………………………………...……..63

Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………..…..66

References…………………………………………………………………………………..…72

Abstract

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought undeniably drastic changes to the stability of the ethnic landscape across the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Consequently, in the effort to establish new national ideas, FSU states have largely promulgated policy centered around the promotion of the state's historical ethnic group. As a result, states have begun to repress ethnic groups under various pretexts. The onset of state sponsored ethnic repression has been relatively ignored in modern conflict scholarship. Accordingly, this project constructs a theoretical framework to analyze the determinants and consequences of repressing ethnic-Russians repression in post-

Soviet Kazakhstan, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine. The ethnic make-up, strength of democratic institutions, and human rights track records of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) states provide preliminary evidence as to how the treatment of ethnic-Russians has evolved over the last thirty years. Current findings suggest, that even strong democratic institutions in the FSU may not protect ethnic groups from experiencing violations of physical integrity rights or linguistic and cultural repression. Additionally, the FSU states inability to reconcile their Soviet era grievances has led to the development of anti-Russian sentiments embedded into their national ideas.

Introduction

Nearly thirty years ago, the collapse of the Soviet Union radically shifted the configuration and political landscape of Eurasia and Eastern Europe. The dissolution of the

Soviet Union resulted in the complete collapse of the regional economy, leaving the new sovereigns in an extremely precarious situation. Additionally, ethnic discord throughout the former Soviet Union plunged a number of former Soviet Union (FSU) states into various ethnic conflicts. Now, in 2020, the economies of the FSU countries have rebounded, however, for many of these states, ethnic disharmony, repression, and conflict, remain unresolved issues.

Interestingly, various FSU states have engaged in physical integrity rights violations through repression of the ethnic-Russian minority within their borders. However, the rationale behind states indiscriminately repressing ethnic-Russians in the FSU remains largely unexplored. As a result, this study poses a series of theoretical explanations and arguments to examine possible determinants of ethnic repression. Additionally, this study applies those same theoretical arguments as a means to explore repression of ethnic-Russians in FSU states.

To overcome the dearth of previous scholarship concerning the onset of ethnic repression, it is necessary to construct theoretical foundations bridging various fields of study.

First, borrowing from the sociological and historiographical school of collective memory and cultural identity, this study considers how the failure of governments in Kazakhstan, Latvia,

Estonia, and Ukraine to internally conciliate Soviet era repressions, has resulted in the appearance of anti-Russian sentiment and repression of ethnic-Russians. Second, integrating scholarship from the field of nationalist studies, this project discusses the applicability of the primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist theories of ethnicity, as a means to identify potential causes of ethnic repression. Finally, this study explores the dynamic situation of ethnic-

Russians in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine with the aim of discerning the mechanisms by which these governments decide to repress ethnic-Russians. In total, this chapter hopes to isolate initial answers to the following questions:

1) Under what conditions does a state decide to repress an ethnic group?

2) What mechanisms in the post-Cold War era cause ethnic-Russians to face

repression in Former Soviet Union states?

3) Why have the Republics of Kazakhstan, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine adopted an

anti-Russian and anti-ethnic-Russian stance, and subsequently decided to repress

ethnic- Russians more intensely than other marginalized ethnic groups?

4) Which mechanisms do states adopt to try to avoid the use of repression?

To corroborate support for the claims of this study, I gathered data from official state documents from the Republics Kazakhstan, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine. The primary goals of collecting these data are to analyze the use of specific language and phrases by governments to indicate aversion to ethnic-Russians or the Russian Federation. In addition to data from official state documents, this study uses news reports and available Demographic and Health Survey data to further explore potential mechanisms of ethnic repression. Moreover, it is necessary to consider population statistics to pinpoint the impacts of various repressive policies, such forced migration, on the Russian population in the FSU region. Both census data from respective countries and a cross-check using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Data set account for population statistics in the analyzed countries.

Conceptualizing Ethnicity and Repression

Finding an agreed-upon definition to the category "ethnic group" is one of the most contentious and persistent questions in scholarship. Accordingly, this project combines two closely related definitions of ethnicity and ethnic group. First, in line with Milton Yinger, an ethnic group may be defined as a division of a larger society "whose members are thought, by themselves and/or others, to have a common origin, to share important segments of a common culture and who participate in shared activities in which the common origin and culture are significant ingredients" (1985, pg. 159). Additionally, I use Donald Horowitz's definition of ethnic group, which is as follows: "Ethnic groups are defined by ascriptive differences, whether the indicium is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof" (1985, pg. 17). As a result of combining these two definitions, this study defines an ethnic group on the foundation of attributable similarities in which the members of a group identify themselves and dissimilarities that the members of a group use to separate their group's unique qualities from others. An ethnic group's identity is a medium by which even small groups are able to mobilize for, or against a cause. Moreover, Horowitz's argues that a sense of “fictile kinship” is the driving force behind an ethnic groups' acceptance or aversion to other groups' norms.1

According to Williams (1994), since the end of the World War II, half of the world's states have, or are currently, experiencing some form of ethnic conflict. Additionally, Williams

(1994) finds that eighty percent of deaths from political violence have been domestic to nation- states. Furthermore, while it is not possible to assume all domestic conflict occurring in

Williams' time frame has directly resulted from ethnicity or ethnic groups, Gurr (1993)

1 As Horowitz (1985) explains, fictile kinship is a group characteristic which ascribes a false sense of blood relation to other people based on similar looks, beliefs, or cultural practices.

substantiates the fact that between 1950 and 1989, ethnic minorities engaging in violent protest increased by over 400%. In addition, ethnic minorities engaging in non-violent protest increased by over 200%, and finally, rebellion by ethnic minority groups increased by nearly 400%. Given the sizable increase of a state’s chance to experience some form of ethnic conflict, one may assume that state repression versus an ethnic group, in part, gives rise to the mobilization of the dissident ethnic groups.

Defining repression is much more straightforward. This project dichotomizes two types of state sponsored repression. That is to say that the scope of this study does not consider the actions or presence of non-state actors, such as paramilitary organizations or organized criminal gangs. The first type of repression is non-violent repression. Generally, when a state utilizes non- violent repression, it will create policies that have negative effects on certain groups (Poe &

Tate, 1994). This can include a state banning certain political organizations, which represent the repressed group. Additionally, this could include government policy, which delegitimizes or even criminalizes the use of certain language. An example of this would be the Soviet Union’s repression of minority languages throughout the USSR (Grenoble, 2003)2. Violent repression, on the other hand, generally encompasses any act that would compromise the physical integrity rights of an individual. Some examples of violent repression include, the use of torture, disappearing, extrajudicial killings, or political imprisonment (Cingranelli & Richards, 2009).

Moreover, violent repression is a complex mechanism used by states to control power dynamics between the government and the people. In the Soviet context, the most notable uses of mass violent repression were the blatant violation of physical integrity rights during Stalin's purges.

2 In the 1930s Stalin era, language policy drastically shifted. Formerly, the use of the numerous languages across the USSR was promoted as a means to retain individual ethnic identity as long as the individual would conform to ideas of the Soviet Union. However, Stalin sought to Russify the language policy and made Russian language compulsory in an official state degree in 1938 (Grenoble, 2003).

Although there is a lack of literature concerning the determinants for ethnic repression, work in related subfields explores various closely related phenomena. Previous scholarship finds that the ethnic composition of a country has varying levels of effect on the probability of political violence (Muller & Seligson 1987), rebellions within countries (Hibbs, 1973; Lewis, 2017), civil wars (Fearon, 2003; Fearon & Kasara, 2007), and foreign policy behavior of countries (Moore,

2002). Importantly, Walker and Poe's "Does Cultural Diversity Affect Countries' Respect for

Human Rights?" investigates the impact of ethnic diversity on a variety of human rights provisions. However, Walker and Poe (2002) find extremely limited support for their hypothesis that ethnic diversity reduces a state's respect of human rights. In the existing ethnic repression literature, the quantitative measures are seemingly the most inhibiting factor in establishing a robust connection. Consequently, the sheer lack of the particularly specific data needed to corroborate results conducive to explicating the mechanisms of ethnic repression has created the need to use qualitative methodology to explore the complexity of the onset of ethnic repression on an individual country basis.

One may argue that the onset of ethnic repression is more likely, given the presence of a previous ethnic conflict. For example, countries who have experienced ethnic civil war, although dependent on the outcome, may suffer a decline in respect for human rights against the ethnic groups involved (Dyrstad, 2012). For example, conflict and subsequent repression of minority ethnic groups occurred in the Russian Federation over long standing religious, cultural, and land disputes, between the Russian government and Caucasian ethnic groups in the 1990s.3 Later, however, the Chechen civil war, in its second iteration, would devolve into a conflict on the lines

3 See Dyrstad (2012) for an in-depth discussion concerning the development of ethno-nationalism and post-war ethnic disharmony in former Yugoslavia.

land and religion instead of ethnicity.4 Presently, the Russian victory in both Chechen conflicts saw the onset of repression against ethnic-Chechens outside of Caucasus region. Additionally,

Chechen dictator Ramzan Kadyrov's growing record of poor human rights practices is makes matters worse for ethnic-Chechens in both Chechnya and the neighboring autonomous Russian republics (Cingranelli & Richards, 2009; Goble, 2001). Another pertinent example of ethnic repression appearing following conflict is in former Yugoslavia.5 At the onset of the Yugoslav civil war, the various Balkan peoples divided on ethnic and religious lines. Subsequently, the different belligerents began to commit mass killings and use forced migration against opposing ethnic groups.6 Shortly after the resolution of the civil war, ethnic prejudice and ethno- nationalism coalesced as a mainstream topic in the politics of former Yugoslavia's emerging democracies (Hodson & Kunovich, 2002; Massey, Hodson & Sekulić, 2003; Dyrstad, 2012).

Consequently, compounding the complexity of ethnic conflict with presence of autocratic institutions, which Poe and Tate (1994) find to have significantly less respect for human rights in general, may prove to result in greater probability of a government to repress minority ethnic groups.

There is also a consideration that must be made for the onset of ethnic repression given

4 Two important conflicts in the Russian Federation exemplify the move to violent uprising versus non-violent uprising. As mentioned, the Chechen republic in the 1990s violently rebelled against the Russian Federations central government seeing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the poor economic standing of the Russian government as an opportune time to secede and regain historical autonomy. Interestingly, foreign fighters from neighboring Islamic countries, namely Syria, were factors which escalated conflict from a war of ethnic secession to a religious conflict vying to establish a caliphate (Karim, 2013).

5 One may argue that repression after conflict is expected, although the CIRI index gives high marks to all former Yugoslav countries, although, event data suggests that repression and divisions among ethnic lines persists.

6 See Greble (2011), Jovanović, Dunjić, & Alesandrić (1996) for further analysis on ethnic dimensions and atrocities of war in former Yugoslavia. See also Fenton (2004) for accounts of religious cleavages and growth of nationalist movements in Yugoslavia during the 1991-2001 Yugoslav civil war.

large gaps between conflicts. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have a long-standing history of conflict, fighting four civil wars between 1507-1627.7 Since this period, the Kazakhs and Uzbeks have generally enjoyed a mutualist relationship, although, land disputes broke out during the mid-twentieth century, coming to a head following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the

1990s, Kazakhstan made irredentist claims against large portions of Uzbekistan, claiming that

Tashkent, among other strategic areas, historically belonged to Kazakhstan, and thus was technically under their direct ownership given the results of the fourth Kazakh-Uzbek war in

1627 (Moore, 2002; Dughlt, 2008).

7 Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were at one time a singular Khanate, and frequently fought over which pieces of land belong to which group of the Khanate.

The Argument for Collective Memory & Cultural Identity

It is common for Slavists to apply collective memory and cultural memory theories to explain contemporary issues between governments and societies in the FSU countries.

Pioneered by Assmann (1995), he defines collective and cultural memory as a sociological phenomenon, which explains how group structures form their society, culture, and relationships through either prevailing, or failing, to reconcile hardships of their pasts.8 Currently, Slavists applying collective and cultural memory to the FSU countries, focus on how Stalinist terror, the

GULAG, and Soviet repression impact the region. Drawing from this, it is logical to also use these theories to explore how past events shape contemporary relationships between ethnic groups. In turn, this may be conducive to revealing how past events may heighten the possibility of a state repressing a specific ethnic minority.

Assmann (1988) poses an ordered series of events, which isolates the processes through which collective and cultural memory emerge within group structures. Moreover, the principle assumption Assmann makes, is that it is necessary for a group structure to formulate social and cultural elements with respect to past events. This is particular visible in the FSU countries due to the fact that they remerged only after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As a result of the collapse, FSU states scrambled to establish cultural ideals, representative of their country's history. Although states struggle to construct cultural memory given 74 years of Soviet suppression of their culture. Consequently, FSU states that are not ethnically similar to Russians, such as Belarus and the Ukraine prior to 2014, build their culture around ethnic-Russian exclusion (Aleksandrov, 1999; Oreshina, 2011).

In contrast with collective memory and cultural identity pioneers Halbwachs and

8 See “Kollektives Gedächtnis und kulturelle Identität” (1988).

Warburg, Assmann instead theorizes the “concretion of identity” (pg. 128, 1988). Maintaining the theoretical basis for Assmann's concretion of identity, this study defines it as follows: a group constructs an identity, including group consciousness, unity, and culture, through the enaction of ceremonies, which incorporates important elements of the group's historical past. In addition, the formed group identity may inherently exclude other groups, thus creating the potential for ethnic disharmony. Support for the idea that the formulation of a group identity may result in exclusion of other groups, is strikingly apparent in post-Soviet countries. For example, Marxist ideology in the Soviet Union sought to create a singular soviet personality through deconstruction of the cultural identity of over 150 ethnic groups.9 Now, post collapse, ethnic-Chechens struggle to relocate their historical identity, and as a result of the Chechen successionists losing two civil wars, the new Chechen identity is being formed around a central anti-Russian thought. (Shulman,

2001; Foxall, 2010).

Under Assmann's concretion of identity are five additional theoretical claims. First, is the capacity to reconstruct, or the ability of a culture to preserve and reiterate the memory of positive and negative past events, with the goal of fitting into a contemporary narrative. For the FSU states, the capacity to reconstruct is represented through various groups' abilities to build and enforce a certain societal viewpoint of GULAG10, terror under Joseph Stalin, and the collapse of

9 The 1989 Soviet census reported that there were 113 ethnic groups with a population over 1000, however, the Russian Federation in 1991 declared that there were actually 186 ethnic groups within Russia’s new borders. This is particularly important to show the stratification of ethnic groups, which Marist-Leninist and Stalinist ideology condensed to represent one group, the so-called “ethnic-Soviet”

10 The Main Administration of Camps and Detainment Facilities or GULAG, was a Soviet prison system present in each republic with the exception of Armenia. Designed by the Stalin administration, the GULAG system was made to imprison and internally exile both low- and high-profile criminals by invoking Article 58, also known as the Enemy of the People statute. It is extremely difficult to capture the true effect of the GULAG in contemporary Russia and the FSU, although collective memory of the GULAG in the Russian Federation has resulted in present day political grievances (Zhukov & Talibova, 2018).

the Soviet Union. Moreover, FSU states elucidate some of the mechanisms a government may use to encourage the repression of ethnic groups associated with negative aspects of a country's past. Moreover, survey data from the Levada Center shows that this same theoretical approach may work for a government encouraging the public to view a controversial figure in a positive light.11

Second and third in cultural memory are formation and organization, which Assmann defines as the institutional buttressing of communication and the specialization of bearers of cultural memory. An example of this can be found in the Kazakh parliament, where former president Nazarbayev has shown his ability to change Kazakh culture, its formation, and which groups it may coexist with on a whim ("Nazarbaev: Nasha Kul'tura," 2017). Moreover, formation and organization are powerful, as they allow for bearers of cultural memory, such as political elites to control the narrative. The fourth is obligation, which theorizes that there is a clear system of values setting groups apart from one another. In addition, obligation assumes that individuals in a society are to adhere to cultural norms, thus supporting the culture narrative crafted by those who bear the power. Finally, reflexivity, which simply infers that over a period of time, ethnic groups repeating their cultural practices form a more tightly wound group identity, thus having the possibility of being reluctant to let other groups join.12

Figure 1

Theory Summation of Theoretical Claim

Capacity to A group reconstructs past grievances to fit into contemporary cultural and collective memory. The two modes are 1) the mode of potentiality, where

11 A survey conducted by the Russian based Yuri Levada Analytical Center reports drastic increases in Stalin's approval rating from 2016 to 2018 following a pro-Stalin remembrance campaign by the Putin administration. See, "The perception of Stalin," (2018).

12 For a parsimonious explanation of Assmann's theories, see figure 1.

Reconstruct groups consider past events by contemporary groups and 2) the mode of actuality, whereby the groups codify the past events to fit the contemporary mold. Formation Formal organization of cultural memory whereby collectively shared knowledge is transmitted throughout the group structure. Organization Two modes of Organization 1) institutional buttressing of communication of communication, 2) the specialization of the carriers of cultural memory (Assmann, 131). Obligation The establishment of a clear system of values, which must be adhered to by the group structure. This includes obligation to observe values, which inherently alienate other groups. Reflexivity In its most basic definition, reflexivity are ethno- centric rituals.

Consociational and Centripetal Ethnic Power Sharing Systems

For the sake of this study's robustness, it is necessary to discuss the means by which ethnic repression becomes less intense or stopped outright. Moreover, it is necessary to explain why these methods, even when adopted, often fail to work. In many subfields of conflict studies, the mechanisms which mitigate the chance of conflict are consistently at odds with the unpredictable nature of human actors. Consequently, scholars create models that attempt to predict or explain certain government processes in certain periods preceding and following conflict. One such scholar is Donald Horowitz, who explains the dynamic of ethnic power sharing after major political shifts including the collapse of regimes, conflicts, or drastic changes in the ethnic composition of a country.

In regions heavily divided on the lines of ethnicity, race, religion, or language, ethnic divisions greatly trouble democracy. A state with severe ethnic divisions have the problem of ensuring peaceful, majority rule, while also guaranteeing that minority groups do not rebel. In strong and weak democratic systems, typical majority rule most frequently results in a system of ethnic domination by a single group. While this system works for the majority, in a long, drawn out battle against minority groups, there is great potential for rebellion (Horowitz, 2014; Dyrstad,

2012).

To mitigate the chance of ethnic rebellion, governments generally adopt three strategies.

The first strategy is the focus of this project, which is the outright repression of a group to the point of the perpetual lack of ability to mobilize against the repressive forces. While effective in consolidating power, the repression of target groups in a country carries increasing risks given the size of the repressed group and the willingness of outside actors to act on the repressed groups behalf. Furthermore, if a minority group possesses a sizable population and is

experiencing repression, there is great potential for ethnic groups to form anti-government coalitions to try to win concessions or overthrow the regime (Dyrstad, 2012; Lindemann &

Wimmer, 2018). The second and third methods are the development of consociational and centripetal government systems. The consociational method tries to solve ethnic divisions through putting in place a regime of agreed guarantees, which mainly includes proportional group participation in lawmaking and granting minority veto power (Horowitz, 2014).

Conversely, states employing a centripetal method attempt to create electoral incentives for moderates to compromise with the majority and minority groups. Each of these systems are generally put in place after some form of political reworking or conflict. However, as Horowitz

(1985; 2014) explains, complete political upheaval is not a necessary precursor for a state to face the need to develop ethnic power sharing systems. Both the consociational and centripetal regime types seek to trickle small amounts of power down from the majority to the minority groups.

However, there is evidence brought forward by Horowitz (2014) that indicates that consociational and centripetal regimes tend to cease ethnic power sharing as the state either recovers from losses suffered during conflict, or the majority group consolidates enough power to ensure that underrepresenting an ethnic group has low risks.

The goal of both the consociational and centripetal approaches are to create effective means of ethnic power sharing. As such, these methods seek to amend or prevent state sponsored ethnic repression; however, they are extremely flawed in their application and enforcement.

First, one must consider the conditions under which a regime will adopt either a consociational or centripetal regime. The most common prerequisite is the presence of weak democratic institutions being threatened by coalitions of minority groups (Horowitz, 2014). When a minority ethnic group mobilizes, the government may be forced to either give concessions, sometimes in

the form of adopting a consociational or centripetal regime, or risk the chance of violent uprising. Theoretically, if an uprising does occurs and the minority groups prevail, the government will then also be more likely to enact a consociational or centripetal method of government.

In the FSU region, the implementation of a consociational or centripetal method following the collapse of the USSR varied based on the state. In Kazakhstan, Nursultan

Nazarbayev’s regime created a centripetal system to incentivize the ruling Nur-Otan party to work alongside the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan on ethnic harmony (Aleksandrov,

1999). In line with Horowitz’s hypothesis on the duration of ethnic power sharing, the strength of Kazakhstan’s centripetal system began to weaken as the country moved farther away from the collapse of the Soviet Union.13 It can be argued that post-Soviet Latvia and Estonia did not adopt either of these regime types, which resulted in a sheer lack of ethnic power sharing in the post-

Soviet Baltic countries.

13 Data from EPR shows that the weakness came in the form of ethnic aversion, but not necessarily language aversion. The Russian language heavily dominated politics and everyday life, however, ethnic-Kazakhs populated most of positions of central power (Aleksandrov, 1999).

The Primordialist, Constructivist, and Instrumentalist Approaches

In the field of nationalist studies, both the primordialist and constructivist narratives theorize roots of ethnicity and ethnic disharmony. In general, each theory explains ethnic repression and ethnic conflict through a series of parameters concerning the incompatibility of ethnic groups. In addition, each account proposes a nuanced theoretical claim for the origin and definition of ethnicity and ethnic group. This study combines certain parameters of each theory, however, it accepts the primordialist approach to defining ethnicity and ethnic group, while the constructivist definition is not. Finally, the instrumentalist approach has fundamental issues, which prevent the acceptance of any parameters of the theory. When juxtaposed to the primordialist and constructivist approaches, the instrumentalist theory falls short in accounting for the historical significance of ethnic group formation.

The primordialist approach in particular theorizes that ethnic groups and ethnic conflict exist because there are complex, historical traditions and territorial claims that create a feeling of kinship. Opponents to this theory argue that ethnic conflict is sporadic in nature, rather than rooted in long standing feuds. Recent evidence of those who deny the primordialist approach is the Yugoslav Civil War. At the beginning of the 1990s, Yugoslavia, without a history of ethnic disharmony, hastily divided on ethnic lines and plunged itself into civil war (Dyrstad, 2012).

Although, conflict culminating from longstanding ethnic and territorial disputes, such as the

Chechen ethnic conflict in Southern Russia, and the longstanding border conflict between

Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to tear down the idea that ethnic conflict is wholly sporadic in nature.

The main assumption in the primordialist approach is that the sense of fictile kinship allows ethnic groups to think of themselves as a family unit (Horowitz, 1984). Horowitz further

explains this phenomenon as a necessary occurrence during the construction of a society, and moreover, that the absence of kinship would make ethnic groups somewhat indistinguishable.14

The most important aspect of Horowitz's ethnic theory, is that conflict and alienation of those peoples outside of a kinship group has the possibility of occurring at much more intense levels.

Essentially, Horowitz's theory guarantees that the result of the physical and cultural differences between members of various ethnic groups occupying a single territory, will be ethnic disharmony. For example, in a non-homogenous country, if majority ethnic group holds a monopoly or senior position in executive level politics, one may expect an increased likelihood of repression of groups that do share ethnic traits with those in power.15

Although not in direct opposition with the primordialist theory, the constructivist theory tends to focus less on the historical claims, and instead, considers subnational data to explain the formation of ethnic groups, and subsequently, the onset of ethnic repression. Arguably, the constructivist and primordialist accounts are in agreement with the theory of cultural and collective memory; therefore, it is necessary to consider aspects from both theories when exploring ethnic repression in a given country. Furthermore, Anderson's (2006) imaged communities theory argues that a regions recent history more precisely explains the social construction of ethnic groups, which also includes the mechanisms for the occurrence of ethnic conflict.16

14 See Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985): 61-62.

15 This assumes that other exacerbating repressive determinates may be present. For example, if the situation occurs in an autocracy, there is more reason to believe that the state will repress, in general, and potentially reason to support the idea that non-compatible ethnic groups may be the targets of repression.

16 Constructivists point out the conflict in Rwanda between the Tutsi and Hutu due to the fact that Belgian colonialism drastically impacted the social structure of the country in the latter half of the 20th century (Madani & Herbst, 2001). Additionally, one may argue that the FSU states are less likely to see ethnic conflict as a result of atrocities or land disputes committed by the Russian

Finally, the instrumentalist theory attempts to explain ethnic conflict and ethnic repression through a static concept of ethnicity. However, this study does not consider the instrumentalist account due to the fact that it defines ethnicity to be a fixed perception.

Moreover, the instrumentalist account also relies on the assumption that ethnic mobilization is based on political actors' willingness to exploit quiescent ethnic disparities (Snyder, 2000). In turn, this assumes that the mere existence of non-homogenous states equates to the inherent need to repress ethnicities based on physical and cultural characteristics.

Figure 2

Theory Summation of Theoretical Claims

Primordialist Ethnicity is a complex structure by which groups sharing similar traits band together under the guise of fictile kindship and territory. This feeling of kinship creates the group and allows for the development of cultural norms. Claims against primordialism, are that ethnic repression and ethnic conflict is sporadic and spontaneous rather than bedded in deep, historical hatred. Constructivist The constructivist viewpoint explains ethnicity as a socially constructed entity, which takes recent historical occurrences, such as colonialism or the collapse of a regime into smaller states, and subsequently creates a social system based around those events. Instrumentalist Ethnicity is a static concept and diverse states are preordained to have the inclination to come into conflict with ethnic groups that are not a part of the majority.

Empire, but rather are more likely to see ethnic conflict based on ethnic-Russians being blamed for the atrocities occurring during the Soviet Union.

Data sets

CIRI This paper utilizes the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data set to examine the trajectory of repression in the analyzed countries. The CIRI Data set compiles human rights reports from the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International to gauge the levels of repression in individual countries in country-year.17 Furthermore, CIRI measures for a number of important variables. The first group of variables are “disappearance,” “torture,” “extrajudicial killing,” and “political imprisonment.”18 These variables come together to construct the

“physical integrity rights index” measurement. The “physical integrity rights index” measurement scores from 0, meaning no government respect for disappearance, torture, extrajudicial killing, and political imprisonment, to 8, which indicates full government respect for these rights (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014). The next variable group is the “empowerment rights index,” which measures the government respect for foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, electoral selfdetermination, and freedom of religion. The “empowerment rights index” ranges from 0, indicating no government respect for these rights, to 14, indicating full respect from the government of these rights (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014). This project considers each of these variables as a baseline for exploring violations of these rights against ethnic-Russians in a given country. In addition, the CIRI index’s country-year analysis provides the possibility to analyze

17 A country-year is simply a particular country in a particular year. Therefore, CIRI’s coders only take into account government human rights abuses in a given year to determine the overall scores.

18 For brief explanation of the variables “disappearance,” “torture,” “extrajudicial killing,” “political imprisonment,” “empowerment rights,” “freedom of assembly,” “freedom of speech,” “electoral self-determination,” and “worker’s rights,” please see Figure .

the current development and the trajectory of human rights practices in a given country.

Consequently, the index helps to control for external causal pathways when looking at a state’s practice of repression against ethnic-Russians.19

EPR The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set is integral to this study. The Data set establishes both a quantitative and qualitative baseline for country selection by providing population statistics and the political relevance of ethnic groups in individual countries. The EPR

Data set uses the country-year unit of analysis, which allows for yearly measurement ethnic groups political relevance and access to state power. The EPR Data set only includes countries which pass a population threshold of 250,000 and measure the power of ethnic groups down to those holding .0001% of the total country population. Much like the CIRI Data set, the EPR Data set uses trained coders to determine the political relevance and access to state power for individual ethnic groups. Coders are also asked to focus their measurements on groups' access to power, rather than "under-or-overrepresentation relevant to demographic size" (Vogt et al., 2019, pg. 4). Furthermore, the EPR coders, upon reaching a conclusion, will code an ethnic group with the following: monopoly, dominance, senior partner, junior partner, powerless, discrimination, or self-exclusion (Vogt et al., 2019). This study primarily concerns itself with "powerless,"

"discrimination," and "self-exclusion." The EPR Data set defines "powerless" as, "Elite representatives hold no political power (or do not have influence on decision making) at the national level of executive power," "discrimination" as "Group members are subjected to active intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state," and "self-exclusion" as "Groups [have] excluded themselves from central state power, in the sense that they control a particular territory

19 Reference Figure 4 for a compilation of the CIRI data in the countries being analyzed.

of the state which they have declared independent from the central government" (Vogt et al.,

2019, pg. 5). Notably, groups in the EPR Data set for any given county-year can only be coded under one category. Therefore, even if a group is faced with minor repression in a year, but also holds a great deal of political influence, EPR may not code the group as “powerless” or

“discrimination.” Consequently, it is necessary to consider the qualitative data for years where there may be coding discrepancies to establish whether repression was still present.

Case Selection

To examine the conditions under which states decide to repress ethnic-Russians, a country must meet certain parameters. While there is very little in terms of scholarship reporting on the parameters for the onset of ethnic repression, it is useful here to pull from scholars discussing the escalation to ethnic conflict (Bara, 2014; Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018). The following points are the parameters undertaken in deciding which countries to examine:

1. Looking at Russians in the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) core Data set for FSU countries

and their associated coding. Although this study does not use quantitative methodology,

EPR is helpful in identifying a baseline for which groups experience political exclusion,

and upon further analysis, which ethnic groups experience indiscriminate repression

(Vogt, Bormann, Rüegenner, 2015). Starting in 1991, if the Russian ethnic group in an

FSU state was coded “powerless,” “self-excluded” or “discrimination,” I conducted

further country level research to find evidence and mechanisms by which the state would

repress ethnic-Russians.

2. In many instances, the probability for nonviolent or violent ethnic conflict to appear is

contingent on the share of the population held by the ethnic minority (Lindemann &

Wimmer, 2018). Scholars find that an ethnic group holding less than 10 percent of the

population share have a low to medium-low chance of violent mobilization, 10 percent to

44 percent have a medium to medium-high chance, and 44 percent or higher has the

highest chance. This project utilizes these thresholds to consider countries where ethnic-

Russians comprise between 10 percent and 44 percent of the total population of a given

country.20 In addition, this project only considers the presence of state-sponsored ethnic-

20 Although Lindemann and Wimmer (2018) find a lower and upper threshold concerning the likelihood of an ethnic group to use violent rebellion against the state, the group size parameter does

repression from 1991 onwards. The rationale behind this is that countries where Russians

pose no immediate threat to a regime based on population holdings, such as Poland, may

not help to explore why Russians are experiencing repression. Furthermore, while

Russians do not hold over 44 percent of the total population share in any country outside

of Russia, one could assume that a state is more likely to repress an ethnic group based on

a higher share of the total population.21

3. Various scholars have reported on the negative effects of authoritarian regimes on respect

for human rights and the onset of repression (Poe & Tate, 1994; Davenport, 2007).

Conversely, the same literature suggests that stronger domestic, democratic institutions

are conducive to developing a stronger respect for human rights and a lesser chance of

state-sponsored repression. To dichotomize the countries in the comparative analysis of

this project, I choose to look at FSU states with an autocratic regime and FSU states with

democratic regimes. This parameter hopes to help explore first, whether ethnic-Russians

under different government systems suffer from repression, and second, why democratic

institutions, which in theory should have a greater respect for human rights, choose to

repress ethnic-Russians as harshly as alternative regime types.

In accordance with these parameters, the country's best fit for the purposes of this study are the

Republics of Kazakhstan, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine. To provide a brief outline, from 1991

falter in other instances. In the case of the Buryat in the Russian Federation, which has composed between .3-.4% of the total population from 1991 to 2017 (EPR), managed to negotiate with the central and regional Russian governments for greater language rights (Gallagher-Cunningham, 2017).

21 It should be noted that in the Soviet Union, Russians outnumbered ethnic-Kazakhs in Kazakhstan from approximately 1930 until 1989. The main reason of the initial Russian emigration from Kazakhstan to Russia was fear of conflict and lack of economic opportunity following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

until 2019, Kazakhstan's first president and dictator Nursultan Nazarbayev revamped the country's economy, structure of government, and established a renewed Kazakh culture. While

Nazarbayev's authoritarian government overcame insurmountable issues left by the Soviet

Union, its human rights track record is less than subpar (U.S. State Department Report on

Kazakhstan, 1996; Cingranelli & Richards, 2014). In addition, Latvia, emerging as a democracy after achieving independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, generally respects human rights in their borders, however, the U.S. Department of State reported some complaints concerning abuses from prisoners and non-ethnic Latvians (Latvia Human Rights Report, 2008; 2018). In regards to Estonia, the U.S. Department of State found that Estonian language policy has resulted in job and salary discrimination (Estonia Human Rights Report, 2018). Finally, in Ukraine, the use of violent repression against ethnic-Russians has been growing since 2014. The U.S.

Department of State details multiple accounts of the arbitrary detention of ethnic-Russians under the assumption there may be connection to conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Ukraine Human Rights

Report, 2018). For example, the Ukrainian Human Rights Report states that Ukrainian Security

Services (SBU) detained a Russian man who allegedly spent two days handcuffed to a bed

(2018). The report also notes that the SBU "offered him two options, either to be placed in custody or 'to disappear'" (Ukraine Human Rights Report, 2018). The man was eventually brought before a court and sent to a detention center.

Comparative Analysis

The following section will cover ethnic-Russian repression in Kazakhstan, Latvia,

Estonia, and Ukraine, respectively. Each case study will include a brief overview of the history of ethnic-Russians migration and habitation of the individual country. Additionally, each section includes an analysis of the development of the individual country's national idea. This project hypothesizes that the developing national ideas in Kazakhstan, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine are centered around the promotion of the majority ethnic group's language and culture. As a result, the ethnic-Russian minority are less likely to be adequately represented in government and thus more likely to be the target of state sponsored repression. Moreover, this chapter discusses whether a national idea founded partly on the basis of decrying the Soviet Union creates contemporary grievances towards the Russian Federation and ethnic-Russians. Overall, the development of national ideas are important as they aid in discerning whether ethnic-Russians fit into the mold of that country's national idea. Furthermore, this section serves to present data on the state adoption of laws, which repress ethnic-Russians in the individual states. At the end of each case study, this chapter includes an analysis of the potential determinants of repression, the methods of repression, and how repression has changed or will change based on past and present circumstances. Finally, this chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of the determinants of ethnic-Russian repression across all analyzed states. The comparative analysis seeks to discover three aspects of ethnic repression. First, whether there are clear patterns of ethnic repression in the states analyzed. Second, how ethnic repression may be measured in states that are not a part of the former Soviet Union. Third, which circumstances make the onset of ethnic repression in the former Soviet Union exclusive to the region.

Kazakhstan

To understand the use of repression against ethnic-Russians in Kazakhstan, it is first necessary to cognize the history of Russians in Kazakhstan. Ethnic-Russians have inhabited

Kazakhstan since the early 19th century. The Russian Empire, realizing the overall weakness of

Kazakh statehood and the fact that Kazakh military forces were spread thin fighting civil wars, decided to mobilize the imperial army and capture a piece of the region. Finally, in the 1820's, the fractured Kazakh Khanate decided to relinquish control over the Kazakhstan region to Russia in return for the Russian Imperial Army's protection. Since this time, the Russians and Kazakhs have lived in generally harmony with one another.22

Around the time of the February revolution, various Central Asian ethnic and religious groups began to organize political groups in opposition to the failing tsarist regime. The rationale behind the organization of these political groups were propped up by promises of democratic reform coming from the provisional government after the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II (Ubiria,

2016). The most prominent of which was the Alash Orda, or the Horde of Alash, a group of

Russian educated Kazakh intelligentsia. The Alash Orda represented the Kazakh steppe-nomad's interests in Moscow during the time of the Bolshevik revolution (Amanzholova, 1994; Sabol,

2003). However, the provisional government was reluctant to bring radical changes to Central

22 Brief conflict concerning Kazakh independence from both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union during the Bolshevik Revolution and subsequent Russian Civil War (1917-1922) broke out in the Northern Kazakhstan and Akmola regions. Ultimately, the Bolsheviks seized control of Russia and Kazakhstani Bolsheviks entered Kazakhstan into the Soviet Union in 1920 first as the Kirghiz Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic, then in 1925 as the Kazakh Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic, and finally in 1936 as the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. Additionally, the ethnically motivated Jeltokson riots swept the streets of Alma-Ata, resulting in the death of ethnic- Russian A. Savitskiy at the hands of K. Ryskulbekov. Following the riots, ninety-nine people were convicted and Ryskulbekov was sentenced to death for his role in the murder of Savitsky. In 1996, Nazarbayev awarded Kazakhstan's highest civilian medal to Ryskulbekov posthumously causing major uproar from ethnic-Russians in Kazakhstan (Aleksandrov, 1999).

Asia or other Muslim-populated regions. Instead, the provisional government retained the Tsarist political structure of regionally elected representatives to prevent non-ethnic Russians or Muslim groups from consolidating power in the region (Ubiria, 2016).

From the time of Lenin’s April Theses in 1917, the Central Asian leadership was reluctant to join the Bolshevik cause. In addition, during the Russian Civil War, attention initially turned away from Central Asia due to the bulk of Bolshevik resources being used in the

European Russia. However, Bolshevik forces pushed large numbers of the White army to regroup in the Kazakh Steppe (Ubiria, 2016). The Bolshevik victory resulted in the eventually incorporation of Kazakhstan into the USSR. First, Kazakhstan was incorporated as the Kirghiz

Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic from 1920-1925. Second, as the Kazakh Autonomous

Socialist Soviet Republic from 1925-1936. Finally, in 1936, Kazakhstan was renamed the

Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.

The development of ethnic disharmony between Kazakhs and Russian began to manifest during Soviet collectivization and the famines occurring between 1931-1933.23 The famine in

Kazakhstan resulted in approximately 38% of the regional population, or 1,450,000 people dying

(Peleo, 2017). Although a result of Stalin’s policies on collectivized farms throughout Soviet territory, the memory of the famine has been attributed to mismanagement of collectivization policies by Moscow authority (Kundakbayeva, 2017). Moreover, in modern Kazakhstan, the

Kazakh administration condemns the Soviet Union, and more specifically Moscow's mismanagement of nuclear material in the Semipalatisnk region (Pannier, 2009; Kundakbayeva,

2017).

23 The most popular information regarding the Famine covers the famine of ethnic-Ukrainians in the Kuban, Don Cossack, and Volga regions.

After achieving independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly formed Republic of Kazakhstan began rebuilding domestic infrastructure under former vice chairman of the Kazakh SSR Nursultan Nazarbayev.24 Interestingly, only a small percentage of ethnic-Russians decided to leave Kazakhstan following the Soviet collapse. It is possible that the destruction of the regional economy combined with Kazakhstan's relaxed citizenship requirements after 1991 encouraged ethnic-Russians to stay. Kazakh census data shows the

Russian diaspora conglomerating in the North Kazakhstan, Pavlodar, Akmola, and Kostanay regions near the Russian border.

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to drastic changes in Kazakhstan ethnicity and identity policy. At first, the Kazakh governments post-independence constitutions of 1993 and

1995 emphasized the importance and willingness of the state to work towards establishing a multi-ethnic national idea (Konstitutsija Respubliki Kazakhstan art. V, § 1, 1995). Nazarbayev's administration also set up the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, which granted available funding to ethnic-minority groups. From a legal perspective, the Assembly of the People was granted the status of a consultative body working to establish interethnic harmony in post-Soviet

Kazakhstan (Burkhanov, 2017). However, there are limitations to this body, only allowing for small funding packages to be given to ethnic groups (Schatz, 2009; Burkhanov, 2017). In addition, the 2007 constitutional amendments of Kazakhstan increased the number of members of parliament serving on the Assembly of the People, but further limited its power to work among ethnic communities (Jones, 2010). Since 2007, the Assembly of the People has become a

24 Nursultan Nazarbayev initially rose to power through the Soviet state apparatus, eventually being appointed Prime Minister of Kazakhstan, which is second in command to the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev then ruled the Republic of Kazakhstan for nearly three decades from 1991 until 2019.

bureaucratic arm of the Kazakh administration without the power or funding to work on establishing inter-ethnic harmony.

Kazakhstan's current constitution declares that human rights are protected by the state and places strict laws against the discrimination on the basis of "origin, social, official, and property status, as well as gender, race, nationality, language, religion, creed, and place of resident" (Konstitutsija Respubliki Kazakhstan art. XIV, § 2, 1995).25 However, article 5 subsection 8 of the "Laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Political Parties" strictly prohibits the creation on political parties, or political groups on the basis of ethnicity (Zakon

Respubliki Kazakhtan, art. 5 § 8, 2015) Finally, in terms of identity, Kazakhstan's constitution does not outline a cohesive plan. Instead, there is a retention of the Soviet method where individual's ethnicity is written on the national ID cards (Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o

Dokumentakh, Udostoveryayushchikh Lichnost, art. 7, § 4, 2014). The failure of the Kazakh government to adhere to their human rights laws while also limiting the political mobility of groups trying to increase the representation of their ethnic group is a key factor in the repressive measures against various groups in Kazakhstan (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014). Additionally, the

Kazakh administration has introduced new laws to the floor of the parliament, which would restrict various forms of citizen protest in opposition to the government (Mills, 2019; Putz,

2020). Not only do these measures greatly increase repression for Kazakhstani citizens as a whole, but also sets dangerous precedents in the event that ethnic groups become even less represented. If an ethnic groups looks to peacefully mobilize against the government,

Kazakhstan’s new protest law would prevent the group from obtaining any official status in the political field, and instead allow the group members to be arrested as an unsanctioned political

25 CIRI Data indicates that the Kazakh government regularly violates these constitutional provisions (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014).

organization (Putz, 2020).

Unlike Latvia and Estonia, Kazakhstan's post-Soviet citizenship policy sought to grant ethnic-Russians full citizenship rights. Kazakhstan did not require a proficiency in the national language, some form of family tie to the country, or vast knowledge of the country's history.

Rather, Kazakhstani citizenship was given to anyone living within its borders at the time of independence (Zakon Respubliki Kazakhtan). However, it is important to note that Kazakhstan placed bans on dual-citizenship, meaning that ethnic-Russians would have to decide between remaining in independent Kazakhstan or leaving. (Konstitutsija Respubliki Kazakhstan art. 10 §

3). This proved to be one of the main factors in the development of ethnic-Russian discontent within Kazakhstan's borders due to the financial inability of Russians to relocate after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the presently poor economic conditions of the country’s

Northern regions. (Aleksandrov, 1999; Burkhanov, 2017).

The Russian demographic in Kazakhstan is undergoing drastic negative changes. While there are various causes to consider, the bulk of the Russian exodus from Kazakhstan is a result of lack of opportunity and poor economic conditions for the Russian community (Pannier, 2016).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian population in Kazakhstan has decreased from

37.8 percent, or 6.2 million people, to 19.3 percent, or 3.5 million people in 2019. The initial shockwave of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the FSU region caused many ethnic-Russians to either emigrate to the Russian Federation or abroad (Aleksandrov, 1999). However, there are clear additional factors bleeding into the 21st century that help to explain why Kazakhstan's

Russian exodus persists. Most notably is the Kazakh central government's reluctance to improve living standards in the Northern Kazakhstan and Pavlodar regions.26 While Kazakhstan's

26 There are two main reason for ethnic-Russians populating the Northern Kazakhstan region. First, in the Soviet Union, the Virgin Lands Act gave much of Northern Kazakhstan to ethnic-Russian farmers.

government is generally interested in improving regional shortcomings, Northern Kazakhstan and the Pavlodar region has arguably been neglected since an attempt by Russian separatists in

2000 attempted to secure the regions (“A Tale of Russian Separatism,” 2014; Stronski, 2019).

Interestingly, the Kazakh governments solution to preventing further dissidence seems to be the near complete neglect of regions densely populated by ethnic-Russians (Animitsa & Bozhko,

2010). Moreover, this form of repression, at least in the case of Kazakhstan, seems to effectively limit ethnic-Russians ability to mobilize against the state, and may even encourage ethnic-

Russian exodus.

Nazarbayev, in many instances, is the last bulwark for ethnic-Russian people in

Kazakhstan. Arguably, until 2014, Nazarbayev generally protected the Russian minority in

Kazakhstan from state repression. However, there are cases prior to 2014 in which the

Nazarbayev regime has limited the mobility of the Russian population to move freely throughout the country (Aleksandrov, 1999; Zakon Respubliki Kazakhtan). Furthermore, after the 2014

Crimean secession to Russia, the Kazakh government revealed a series of cultural and economic changes, which are disadvantageous to ethnic-Russians in Kazakhstan.27 In the initial drafts of the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, Nazarbayev encouraged the continued cooperation between

Russia and Kazakhstan, and ethnic-Russians and ethnic-Kazakhs to develop the Kazakh economy (Strategia Kazakhstan 2050, 2012). However, following the Russian Federations annexation of Crimea, the document underwent changes, which are now seen as chilling anti-

Second, there is internal forced displacement of ethnic-Russians from small cities and villages to the Northern regions.

27 Following Nazarbayev's resignation in March, 2019, various sources reported a sudden outpouring of ethnic- Russians from Kazakhstan, where they repatriated in Russia or elsewhere (Goble, 2019; Lenta.RU 2019).

Russian policies. The 2012 iteration of the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy describes Russian and

Kazakh ethnic situation as a successful, harmonious "joint statehood," (Strategia Kazakhstan

2050, 2012), however, the 2015 reissue of the plan changes the language to a "new Kazakh statehood" (Strategia Kazakhstan 2050, 2012). More specifically, the 2015 iteration of the

Kazakhstan 2050 documents lays out the following points:28

1. The intelligentsia should become a leading power in strengthening our nationwide values

at a stage when the country has become an established state. We should demonstrate and

create new Kazakh heroes of our time – those our youth will admire and seek to emulate.

2. The intelligentsia can, and must, play a key role in drafting a model of the future of our

country, based on my, [Nazarbayev's], vision of Kazakhstan 2050.

3. We have to continue our work to establish the historical conscience of the nation. A

universal Kazakh identity must become the cornerstone in the minds of our people.

The most striking language in this document is Nazarbayev referring to the future of Kazakhstan needing to be built in his image. Moreover, given the nature of the other two points,

Nazarbayev's image of Kazakhstan future is a combination of historical and newly established cultural elements, which seek to institute a reborn Kazakh culture based around the exclusion of ethnic-Russians. An additional point to draw from Nazarbayev's points is that the actors are to be

Kazakhs instead of Kazakhstani.29

More recently, President Nazarbayev announced that the Kazakh language would

28 All translations are my own.

29 Simply, the difference between Kazakh and Kazakhstani is that a Kazakh is ethnically Kazakh, while a Kazakhstani is a citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan of any ethnic background.

undergo rigorous changes. First, the country as a whole will abandon the Cyrillic alphabet in favor of a Latin alphabet (Kazakhstan to switch from Cyrillic to Latin alphabet, 2017). Second, in line with the points of the 2015 version of the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, 95 percent of all

Kazakhstani citizens must achieve fluency in the Kazakh language by 2025. Currently, only 74 percent of ethnic-Kazakhs have a native fluency in their native tongue, while 94 of ethnic-

Kazakhs when surveyed report that they first achieved fluency in the Russian language (Chen,

2018).30 Moreover, ethnic-Kazakh politicians claim that, "The amendments make the Kazakh language more practical and functional…It is a strategic decision aimed to work for the nation’s future” (Altynsarina, 2018). In addition, Nazarbayev briefly banned the Russian language from being used in any official government proceedings and has continued to cut funding for Russian language schools around the country (Auyezov, 2018). The new language policies in conjunction with the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, develops an argument for the idea that Kazakh government is repressing ethnic-Russians as a security measure in response to the growing threat of Russian separatist movements in FSU countries, and in turn, as a way to force non-Kazakhs to emigrate from the country.31

There exists an abundance of evidence supporting the collective memory argument for why Russians are now repressed in the Republic of Kazakhstan. After having been reluctant to join the Soviet Union from its inception, the Kazakh SSR served three purposes for the Soviet

Union. First, the Soviet government used the outskirts of the city of Semipalatinsk as a nuclear

30 There are currently no available figures concerning fluency of the Kazakh language among ethnic- Russians in Kazakhstan exist. However, one could assume that these figures will be much worse than the 74 percent of ethnic-Kazakhs who speak Kazakh at a native level.

31 This situation is different for those non-Kazakhs who live in other Central Asian republics because they each share an extremely similar Turkic language, which have all, or are undergoing the switch to a Latin alphabet.

test site, setting off nearly 500 nuclear devices near the Irtysh river (Chance, 2007). Second, during the 1960s the Soviet government expanded its efforts to produce grain for the Soviet population, and decided to force ethnic-Kazakhs to give up their land to construct farms manned by ethnic-Russians (Medvedev, 1982).Third, the Soviet Union constructed KarLag, which was one of the most developed networks of the GULAG system in the entire country. KarLag mainly housed the wives and children of the enemies of the people (Medvedev, 1982).32 As a result of these actions, contemporary Kazakh politicians, including Nazarbayev, frequently acknowledge the atrocities of Kazakhstan's Soviet past, and in turn, associate the misfortunes with the former capital of the Soviet Union, Moscow33 (Najibullah, 2014; Aleksandrov, 1999).

Kazakhstan’s new leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has taken a different approach to the ethnic question. As Horowitz (2014) explains, the Tokayev administration has adopted a more centripetal system. Currently, Kazakhstan's centripetal ethnic power sharing system in 2020 looks to address economic issues in the mainly ethnic-Russian parts of Northern Kazakhstan

(Starr, 2019). However, there is currently no evidence to support the claim that Tokayev will stop or modify the Kazakhification of the language and culture system in Kazakhstan.

Interestingly, these changes have occurred without the occurrence of civil conflict in Kazakhstan and with Nazarbayev still heavily involved in the creation of state policy (Putz, 2019). Moreover,

Tokayev has worked to strengthen Kazakhstan’s ties to Russia, a relationship which has been strained over Nazarbayev’s attempts to manage strong, businesslike relationships with the

32 Breaking down its component parts, KarLag translated to the Camp of Karaganda, a city in Central Kazakhstan.

33 Interestingly, Vladimir Putin has frequently responded to the Kazakh government placing blame on ethnic- Russians for the actions of the Soviet Regime. In 2014 and 2015, Putin made severe comments regarding the legitimacy of Kazakh statehood, explaining that "The Kazakh never had any statehood" (Najibullah, 2014). Additionally, Putin has threatened to leave the Eurasian Economic Union in the face of Kazakhstan's blaming of ethnic-Russians and the Russian Federation for past issues (Sabyrbekov, 2014).

Russian Federation, China, and the United States simultaneously ("Tokayev to Strengthen Ties with Russia," 2019).

While Western leaders have expressed fear that Tokayev intends to weaken ties with the

West, there is currently only speculation for these claims (Starr, 2019). Conversely, Tokayev has stated that his presidency will center around increasing economic ties between Kazakhstan and the West (Starr, 2019). However, Tokayev's presidential itinerary in regards to human rights improvements is problematic. Tokayev has stated his interest in improving the economic situation for Northern Kazakhstan but has not announced any move towards mobilizing forces to deal with Kazakhstan's human rights issues. Quantitative data in the CIRI Human Rights Data set shows that Kazakhstan's respect for human right has decreased since the collapse of the USSR.

For Kazakhstan, CIRI records and codes human rights abuse data from the State Department and

Amnesty International using the country-year unit of analysis. Additionally, the CIRI Data set, only measures government abuses in Kazakhstan.

By 2004, The CIRI Data set shows that Kazakhstan’s physical integrity rights scores had already decreased to the lower half of the coded index.34 CIRI indicates that from 2002-2011,

Kazakhstan’s respect for human rights scores plummeted. In the physical integrity rights

(PHYSINT) category, Kazakhstan scored 6 in 2002, dropping to 3 in 2007, and finally sitting at

2 in 2011. In the empowerment of rights (NEWEMPINX) category, Kazakhstan consistently scores 3 or 4 out of 14 from 2002-2011. The empowerment score indicates that the Kazakh government has low respect for freedom of movement, speech, workers' rights, political participation, and freedom of religion (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014). With this information, one

34 The Cingranelli-Richards Data set for physical integrity rights is coded with a scale from 8 to 1. 8 that a country has full respect for physical integrity rights. A decreasing number over time, or a lower number in general, signifies that there are more occurrences of human rights abuses in that country in the given year.

could argue that the repression of ethnic-Russians in Kazakhstan will not improve based on unchanging human rights violations. However, Tokayev is in the position to enact positive changes in Kazakhstan's respect for human rights, which encompasses respect for the ethnic-

Russian population.

Interestingly, Kazakhstan previously condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea, however, two months after Tokayev took power, he amended those statements. In an interview,

Tokayev states, “First, we do not call what happened in Crimea annexation. What happened, happened. Annexation is too heavy a word to apply to Crimea” (Nemtsova, 2019). Moreover,

Tokayev further backtracks on Nazarbayev’s expressed concern about ethnic-Russian unrest in

Northern Kazakhstan. Tokayev states that “There was no fear,” and even goes as far to state that

“[Kazakhstan] from the start, believed in the wisdom and decency of the Russian leadership”

(Nemtsova, 2019). Tokayev's statements are particularly interesting because the Kazakh government reinforced their Northern border with Russia following the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation (Tynan, 2017). The overall impact of Tokayev on the improvement of the respect for the human rights of ethnic-Russians in Kazakhstan is pending. While Tokayev has remarked that his goal is to improve relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, he has dodged answering the question regarding improving the quality of respect for human rights both nationally and regionally in Kazakhstan (Nemtsova, 2019). Consequently, there is little evidence to suggest that ethnic repression will become less severe over Tokayev’s tenure as president.

Given the climate in the later years of the Nazarbayev administration and the coming

“reformist” period under Tokayev’s leadership, the role of ethnic-Russians in Kazakhstan is nebulous. On one hand, the Kazakh government is pushing forward with the massive language overhaul, which will not only move away from the Cyrillic alphabet, but also imposes strict

language fluency requirements from every Kazakhstani citizen (Strategia Kazakhstana 2050,

2012). In addition, the failure of the Tokayev regime to address human rights concerns in the region does not give scholars insight into how the regime intends to cease the use of repression against ethnic-Russians. On the other hand, however, Tokayev’s promise to strengthen the relationship with the Russian Federation may result in the Kremlin encouraging Kazakhstan’s government to develop a plan to both pursue the Kazakh national idea while also continuing to make society accessible to Russian speakers.

The methods by which the Kazakh government has generally repressed ethnic-Russians comes in the form of economic, language, and citizenship policy. While there are indiscriminate violations of human rights across Kazakhstan, the Nazarbayev regime repressed ethnic-Russians at a greater rate to in turn bolster the Kazakh national idea and to secure the country’s Northern border. Moreover, the evidence in official government documents combined with event data shows that discourse in post-Crimea Kazakhstan took on an anti-Russian stance.35 Overall, there is no evidence to suggest that the Kazakh government has purposefully used violent repression against ethnic-Russians in the region.

35 Event data is defined as information about a change or action that occurred in a specific point in time. This information may come from various news sources or official government reports.

Latvia

As is the case for Kazakhstan, having a foundational knowledge of the historical relationship between Russia and Latvia is conducive to understanding the complexity of contemporary Russo-Latvian relations. One of the earliest accounts with Latvian interaction with

Russians and the East Slavic world dates to the 11th and 12th centuries AD.36 Additionally, conflict between the East Slavic Russians and Latvia began as early as the 15th century when

Ivan III of Russia briefly captured Livonian fortresses as retaliation for an attack on Russian territory (Dukes, 1998). Under Peter the Great, Russian lords launched an offensive against the

Livonian Empire, capturing Riga and bringing what would eventually be the capital of modern- day Latvia under the Russian Empire’s control. Following the Bolshevik coup of 1917 in

Petrograd, a conglomerate of Latvian peasants, intelligentsia, and socialist reformers declared independence in November 1918 (Embassy of Latvia, 2014). Latvia remained independent until the beginning of World War II in 1939. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 23 had secretly defined that fate of Latvia, which would fall in Soviet hands as a station for air and naval military bases (Mole, 2012). Latvia would then reluctantly remain under Soviet control until September 6th, 1991 (Embassy of Latvia, 2014). Finally, the State Council of Soviet Union immediately recognized the independence of Latvia and following the collapse of the USSR,

Russian President Boris Yeltsin would move towards reestablishing relations with the Baltic states.

The Ethnic Power Relations Data set codes ethnic-Russians in Latvia from 1991-2017 as

“powerless” with a 28% share of the total population. As for the Russian population of Latvia,

36 Although, the Slavic and Baltic languages once shared a common origin in the Balto-Slavic language family. It was not until c. 500 CE that the Slavic languages, and thus the Slavic people, began to split and become independently recognized from the Baltic peoples. (Shenker, 2014).

they have never officially held a majority percentage of the population as they had in

Kazakhstan. However, ethnic-Russians have comprised at least 25% of the total population of

Latvian territory since 1959. Moreover, the post-Soviet ethnic-Russian population in Latvia peaked in 2000 at approximately 700,000 people, or 29.6% of the total population. (Ledzivotaju

Skaits Pec Tautibas Regionos, 2018).37 Unsurprisingly, the majority of ethnic-Russian inhabitants live in Latvia’s Eastern regions, which border the Russian Federation (Bilefsky,

2006).

Interestingly, the CIRI data for Latvia indicates that between 1991-2011 their democratic institutions generally respect human rights.38 Referencing the U.S. State Department Human

Rights Report on Latvia 2018 mostly confirms the CIRI coding. In brief, the State Department reports that "There were no reports of egregious human rights abuses" (Latvia 2018 Human

Rights Report, 2018). However, there is one instance reported of the Latvian administration barring a Latvian-Russian politician from a political race. On August 21st, 2018, Tatjana

Zdanoka, who is still a member of the European Parliament and currently cochairs the Latvian-

Russian Union Party, was removed from the ballot because she "Was an active member of the

Communist Party after January 1991, which under law made her ineligible to run" (Latvia 2018

Human Rights Report, 2018). Further referencing Amnesty International’s human rights report shows agreement with the U.S. State Department and CIRI data (Amnesty International—Latvia,

2019).

The Baltic discourse on building a national idea and the integration of ethnic-Russians has been much harsher than in Kazakhstan or Ukraine. Moreover, unlike Kazakhstan in the

37 See Appendix, Population Statistics for census data in Latvia from 1979-2018 38 There has been a slight decrease in the overall respect for physical integrity rights from 1991-2011. The score dropped from 8 to 6.

1990s, the language of Latvian legislation does not signal to the inclusion of minority ethnic groups. Instead, Latvian national identity policy tends to look towards the naturalization and integration of non-ethnic-Latvians into Latvian culture. Under presidents Andris Berzins and

Raimonds Vejonis, the Latvian administration drafted and carried out "The Guidelines on

National Identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy (2012-2018)."The guidelines state "The key goal [is] a strong and united nation of Latvia—a national and democratic community ensuring the preservation and enrichment of its unifying foundation—the Latvian language, culture, and national identity" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Latvia, 2015). In action, these policies have required schools nationwide to adopt Latvian as their primary language of instruction. While these changes will hardly impact communities largely inhabited by ethnic-

Latvians, the ethnic-Russian minority in the East face severe disadvantages. The Central

Statistics Bureau of Latvia reports up to 80% of people living in Eastern Latvia use Russian as their primary language (Centrala Statistikas Parvalde).

Russians have never held a majority of the population in Latvia as they had in

Kazakhstan, however, since 1959, ethnic-Russians have comprised at least 25 percent of the total

Latvian population (Population by Ethnicity in Regions, 2018). Furthermore, the Russian population in Latvia has generally conglomerated in the Eastern regions of Latvia, which borders the Russian Federation. (Bilefsky, 2006; Tugdar, 2013). Moreover, There is evidence to suggest that anti-Russian sentiment in Latvia existed during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

(Jubulis, 2001; Ethnic Commentary Sees anti-Russian Attitudes in Latvia, 2012). Additionally, the Latvian government has limited Russian speakers' ability to send their children to Russian speaking schools, and instead promotes programs aiming to "Preserve [Latvian] as a part of the cultural heritage" (Tugdar, 2013, pg. 44). In the post-Crimea FSU region, closing language

schools is an effective, minimally provocative way to repress ethnic-Russians without inciting a drastic response from the Russian Federation (Epifanova, 2018). Although speculative, the lack of Western response for repression against Russians in the Baltics may an interesting point. The

West may consider the development of Latvia’s national idea to justify the lack of integration of ethnic groups. Alternatively, the tensions between the Russian Federation and the West may also reduce the likelihood that any Western nation would comment on the suppression of language and citizenship rights in Latvia.

There is evidence to suggest multiple reasons as to way the Latvian government has repressed ethnic-Russians after the fall of the USSR. First, it is possible that historical historically poor relations on the grounds of national identity and culture between the Russians and Latvians have driven a wedge between the two countries their people. Additionally, the primordialist would argue that modern Latvian state building apparatus' call to define its culture on the lines of historic Latvian believes and borders has put a strain on the interethnic relations of Russians and Latvians. Unfortunately, the Russian government continues to deny occupation and the atrocities committed in Latvia under various Soviet leaders ("Russia denies Baltic

'occupation,'" 2005). Consequently, one may infer that the Latvian government is reluctant to provide support for their Russian minority. Instead, it is possible that there is incentive to further repress ethnic-Russians on the ground that Latvia has not reconciled the collective memory of

Soviet era repression and terror. Interestingly, the shutdown of Russian language schools in

Latvia has occurred since the 1990's, yet there is no sign of Russian exodus from Eastern Latvia.

Conversely, Northern Kazakhstan has seen steady decline in its Russian population following the start of school closures in 2014 (Pannier, 2019).39

39 This may also be due to the fact that there is little economic incentive to stay in Northern Kazakhstan. This is especially true if those leaving are victims of the Kazakh government's forced

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Latvia has adopted an anti-ethnic-Russian rhetoric that frequently invokes the memory of Soviet terror (Tugdar, 2013). That is to say that the reinvigoration of the Latvian national idea paired with government invoking resentment towards the Russian SFSR during the Soviet period has resulted in the promulgation of legislation, which represses the ethnic-Russian minority. For example, on April 2nd, 2018, former Latvian president

Raimond Vejonis announced that he “has signed laws approved by Saeima that will see a switch to Latvian-language teaching in school that now use other languages for the bulk of their teaching” (Latvian Public Broadcasting, 2018).40 The reasoning of the president and governing officials working to implement the new law is to “provide equal opportunities for all young people to obtain quality education and build their lives in Latvia in order to study and work here”

(Latvian Public Broadcasting, 2018). The law’s provision to “limit Russian as a language of instruction,” provoked scathing responses from both the Russian minority in Latvia as well as the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow (Kim, 2018). These laws seek to bolster Latvia’s cultural and language heritage at the cost of marginalizing the language of a sizable piece of their population. The Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed extreme discontent with the decision of President Vejonis and called his decision “odious” and “hypocritical”

(Lavrov, 2018). Interestingly, the language laws were adopted on the initiative of the right-wing

National Alliance party.41

Post-Soviet Latvian residency laws did not grant the Russian minority the right to

relocation programs.

40 Saeima is the formal name for the Parliament of the Republic of Latvia.

41 This is a combination of the far right Latvian parties All for Latvia! And For Fatherland and Freedom (Engel, 2019)

citizenship (Mole, 2012). However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia states that "Non- citizens enjoy equal protection under the law both in Latvia" (Lobzova, 2018). Additionally, former conservative President Raimonds Vejonis introduced legislative reforms that would see

"Children born to non-citizens parents after June 1, 2018 would be automatically registered as

Latvian citizens unless parents choose the citizenship of another country" (Ekmanis, 2017).

Moreover, the development of Latvian citizenship policy is interesting because it seeks to include ethnic-Russians as Latvian citizens, while language policy seeks to exclude the Russian language. Additionally, president Raimond and the Saeima may be using the new, inclusive citizenship laws as a means to more quickly integrate non-citizens into Latvia and thus encourage those individuals to integrate into the culture of the state.

The University of Maryland's Minorities at Risk project points to three conditions worrisome for the ethnic-Russian minority in Latvia. The Minorities at Risk model shows that for an ethnic-conflict to erupt, there must be "a collective motivation of minorities to protest against discrimination, the ability of minorities to conduct joint action against authorities responsible for discrimination, and the presence of external opposition" (Epifanova, 2018).42 The

MAR model is particularly interesting because ethnic-Russian repression in Latvia has already led to minority group mobilization against the central authority with support of the Russian

Federation. In light of expressed concerns of underrepresentation from the ethnic-Russian minority in Latvia, the Latvian government seems to be unmoved in their decision to take

Russian out of schools (Epifanova, 2018). If the ethnic-Russians in Latvia continue to be underrepresented in government and lose language rights, there is a much higher possibility for ethnic conflict (Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018; Dyrstad, 2014).

42 The Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set records levels of political and economic discrimination for all relevant groups (Asal & Pate, 2008).

Given the current mobilization of the Moscow backed Russian minority against the

Latvian central government's language policy, there is speculative potential in regard to an increase of conflict intensity (Dyrstad, 2014; Asal & Pate 2008). However, it is extremely unlikely that any armed ethnic conflict between the Russian minority and the Latvian government will occur. The Russian minority would first need to find the means to acquire armaments. Although, if conflict did erupt, the Russian Federation would be faced with deciding whether to back the Russian dissident groups in a NATO member state.

Currently, the Latvian government has refrained from using any modes of violent repression against the ethnic-Russian minority. Instead, Latvian politicians pass language laws to restrict the use of Russian in schools and the workplace. In turn, areas with dense ethnic-Russian populations that are not Latvian speakers have the potential to suffer from job and social discrimination. Surprisingly, Latvian citizenship policy seems to be working towards granting full citizenship rights to residents born after June 1st, 2018, rather than creating further obstacles for future non-citizens. Furthermore, the growing sense of nationalism in the Baltics has led to the construction of Latvia's national idea around historical, ethnic cultural elements (Hartman,

1992; Lane, 1994). While this may seem like an unavoidable process of state building in some cases, it also brings a fair share of xenophobic sentiments. Consequently, Latvia has often employed the suppression of the Russian language and the call for a "united Latvia under a united Latvian language" (Latvian Public Broadcasting, 2018). The situation in 2020 shows the continued repression of the Russian language, but the future integration of all willing individuals as Latvian citizens. (Lukumiete, 2003).

Estonia

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the independent Republic of Estonia was left with a sizable population of ethnic-Russians. According to the Estonian census bureau, ethnic-

Russians comprise approximately 25% of Estonian’s total population (Eesti Stastistika, 2020).

Furthermore, the EPR Data set codes ethnic-Russians in Estonia as ‘powerless’ from 1991-2017.

As a result, the presence of repression of ethnic-Russians in Estonia brings forth two noteworthy points. First, that a country would openly repress a minority group, whose marginalization will undoubtably have an impact on the nation's political stability and potentially on the economy.

Second, that in Estonia, the ethnic-Russian population has not declined as rapidly as it has in

Kazakhstan even when faced with arguably harsher modes of repression.43 Moreover, Estonian repression against ethnic-Russians in 2020 seems to be rooted in two potential, intertwined causes. Similar to Latvia's political rhetoric, Estonian officials and lawmakers use language that attempts to recall and condemn Soviet era repression (Joesalu, 2012; Koresaar & Joesalu, 2016).

Additionally, the same authorities invoking the memory of the Soviet Union are also working towards building a nation-state centered around the Estonian ethnic group. As a result, ethnic-

Russians in Estonia are undergoing similar treatment to Russians in Latvia.

The history of Russian-Estonian relations dates back to the age of Kievan Rus (Tvauri,

2012). Throughout the middle ages, Estonian rulers were typically at odds with the Russian people and the Russian Tsar (Tvauri, 2012). In the 20th century, amidst World War I and the

Bolshevik Revolution, Estonia waged a war of independence from 1918-1920, resulting in the

Treaty of Tartu (Republic of Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The Treaty of Tartu ended the

43 In brief, the lack of economic incentive for Russians to work in Kazakhstan may explain why the country has lost such a number of ethnic-Russians. (Zhatkanbaeva, 2012).

fighting between the Russian SFSR and Estonia, while Soviet Russia also redacted any land claims on Estonian territory.44 In 1940, Soviet forces occupied Estonia during World War II and set up rigged parliamentary elections to ensure a landslide victory for the Communist Party

(Jones, 2011). In the first years of Soviet occupation of Estonia, Stalin’s June Deportation saw the removal of around 10,000 Estonian civilians to Siberia (Lovell, 2011). Furthermore, Estonian census data reveals that Stalin's deportation of ethnic-Estonians also saw the mass injection of ethnic-Russians into Estonian territory. From 1934-1959, there was a 14% decrease in the population of ethnic-Estonians from 992,520 to 892,653 and a 12% increase of ethnic-Russians from 92,656 to 240,227. Moreover, during Stalin's June Deportation, the Red Army took in approximately 30,000 Estonian nationals for their labor divisions. 40% of which died within a year (Lovell, 2011). Estonia would then remain a Soviet Republic until the its government declared independence in 1990.

The repression of ethnic-Russians in Estonia after the state gained independence occurred almost immediately. The Estonian government requested that the Soviet Union, and later the

Russian Federation, remove their troops from Estonian territory by the end of 1990 (Nadein,

1994). However, Russia lacked both economic resources and the housing infrastructure necessary to withdrawal the whole of their troops by the end of 1990. Instead, Russia proposed that they be given until the end of 1994 to demobilize troops in Estonian land. (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). In addition to the large population of Russian military personnel, there was a large non-military Russian population remaining in in Estonia. The Russian diaspora proved troublesome for both ethnic-Russians and the Estonian government, as Estonian leadership pushed new citizenship reform, which blatantly excluded Russians from obtaining a guaranteed

44 Although, the comintern attempted a communist coup in Estonia in 1924. They were unsuccessful. (Jones, 2011).

citizenship (Trimbach, 2017). Moreover, the strict labor laws incorporated into Estonia's citizenship policy would severely limit nearly 25% of Estonia's work force to blue collar jobs.

Interestingly, Estonian administrators argued that the return to its pre-Soviet citizenship policy, was retribution for years of illegal Soviet occupation (Vara, 2010; Hankewitz, 2019).45

After the complete departure of Russian military infrastructure from Estonian territory in

1995, the Estonian government revised its citizenship legislation; however, it arguably had no real positive change for many of the ethnic-Russian population. While the revisions to the citizenship policy saw the incorporation of citizenship upon birth laws, it also put in place costly, but necessary, exams in both Estonian history and language for non-citizens. At the time of the revisions, the economic and social climate did not provide Russians, or many other non-citizen group with the ability to afford the process of naturalization (Trimbach, 2017). Estonia’s

Citizenship Act of 1995 Section 6, § 3, states that the first necessary condition for acquiring

Estonian citizenship through naturalization is for the individual to "Be proficient in the Estonian language" (Citizenship Act Riigi Teataja, 1995). Additionally, the Citizenship Act of 1995 requires all applicants to have proof of eight years of legal residence in Estonia and are barred from political participation and certain occupations in the public sector (Aliens Act Riigikogu,

2009). In reference to the EPR Data set, it is clear that under Estonia’s dissemination of new and reformed citizenship laws, ethnic-Russians are disproportionally affected on a national level.

However, on a case-by-case basis, survey data shows varying personal thoughts of ethnic

Russians. David Trimbach's survey, which asked ethnic-Russians in Estonia whether they

“perceived ethno-linguistic ‘glass ceiling’ within Estonian politics and society” showed that

Russians feel underrepresented in Estonia's political system (2017). One respondent expressed

45 Estonia’s pre-Soviet Citizenship Law of 1938 prioritized the citizenship principles of jus sanguinis (blood) over jus soli (Soil) (Trimbach, 2017)

concern over the proper carrying out of Estonian voting laws due to his inability to join the local ballot (Trimbach, 2017). On the topic of political inclusiveness of ethnic-Russians on a national level, a respondent states that:

Naturally [politicians] are interested in preserving their Estonian culture, their language.

Of course they probably feel the historical enmity that existed during the Soviet Union.

But there is already a generation that doesn't even remember who Stalin is. But

nevertheless for some reason, they are having to pay for these mistakes (Trimbach 2017).

The feelings of Russian speakers toward the underrepresentation in Estonian politics shows in part the failure of the Estonian state to associate ethnicity to something more than just a part of belonging to a certain nation state. Consequently, the Estonian government may wrongly assume that their minority Russian population identifies less with Estonia and more with Russia.

Trimbach's (2017) survey has shown that ethnic-Russians living in Estonia typically identify more with Estonian culture and society than to Russian culture and society.

Estonia, much like Kazakhstan, has instituted an economic and cultural plan. Although,

Kazakhstan is looking to propel itself in the top 30 economies in the world by 2050, Estonia’s plan, in accordance with European Union planning committees, is set to be accomplished by the end of 2020. In addition, Kazakhstan’s Strategia Kazakhstana 2050 contains measures which seeks to continue the repression and delegitimization of the Russian language, Estonia’s Eesti

2020 is actually a turn away from its generally harsh ethnic policy. Similar to Tokayev in

Kazakhstan, the Estonian government in Tallinn has seemingly turned towards building relationships with their ethnic minority instead of promulgating guidelines, which inhibit their ability to live comfortably.

The data from Estonia, suggests that there is evidence that repressing ethnic-Russians

may develop from economic incentives. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the mass liquidation of state-owned properties quickly developed into privatized sectors of light and heavy industry in the Baltics (Savchenko, 2002). Moreover, Shafir (1995) concluded that the transitioning market in the Baltics will “surely lead to unemployment… as many large industries will be forced to trim excess labor in order to produce competitive goods” (pg. 69). Additionally, Shafir (1995) finds that the trim of "excess labor," which was mainly comprised of ethnic-Russians would force Russians to leave the country in search of work.46 However, Estonian census data shows that the decrease of its ethnic-Russian population has been less than .5% per year since 2000

(Eesti Stastistika, 2020).

Out of the cases studied in this project, Estonia arguably has the strongest anti-Russian sentiment prior to the Crimean conflict in 2014. In addition, Estonia's construction of a post-

Soviet national idea has generally promoted an anti-Russian stance since the collapse in 1991.

Much like Latvia, the Estonian government seeks to implement integration policies focused around the reinvigoration of the Estonian language and culture, while pushing out the Russian language (Feldman, 2001). Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union has promoted the

Estonian administration to quickly join supranational institutions like the European Union. While an advantageous decision for a post-Communist state looking to rebuild its economy, supranational organizations like the EU generally have regulations member-states must follow in order to retain membership (European Commission, 2017). For Estonia, however, the government has looked to minimize the influence of supranational organizations on its citizenship and minority rights policies (Feldman, 2001) Consequently, Estonia's language and citizenship laws

46 Interestingly, Dreifelds reports that a Latvian newspaper in 1990 published the following: “It would be beyond the bounds of human restraints for future Estonian government not to use unemployment as a means of encouraging Russians to leave (1990, pg. 199).

have not provoked responses from the European Commission's board of the inclusivity program.

Ukraine

The EPR Data set codes ethnic-Russians in Ukraine as “Junior Partners” from 1991-

2014, which is defined as, “Representatives participating as junior partners in government…

Junior partner depends on the group’s absolute influence in the executive-that is, irrespective of group size” (Vogt et al., 2019). From 2014 onward, Russians in Ukraine have been coded as

“self-exclusion.” Vogt et al. explains “self-exclusion” as “The special category of self-exclusion applies to groups that have excluded themselves from central state power, in the sense that they control a particular territory of the state which they have declared independent from the central government” (2019). The “self-exclusion” coding is important to explore because it does not elucidate whether ethnic groups are repressed even though they control an autonomous territory.

Ukraine is one of the most difficult states to tackle in this analysis. This is chiefly attributed to the dynamic historical relationship between the Ukraine and Russia in addition to the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region. Moreover, after the collapse of the Soviet Union,

Ukraine's geographical location is disadvantageous for politicians to establish a strong, developed democracy. Ukraine's close proximity to Central Europe and has influenced Western minded reformist politicians to build relationships with the European Union and to subsequently seek membership (Makszimov, 2020). On the other hand, the sizable Russian minority in

Ukraine, specifically in the Donbas region, has made the decision to break away from Ukraine and petition for unification with the Russian Federation.

Ukraine, following the dissolution of the USSR inefficiently began rebuilding their system. It is difficult to truly place blame on the newly independent republics given that they inherently lacked mechanisms to cope with the economic disaster as a result of collapse. When juxtaposing Ukraine to Kazakhstan, there are evident differences between the handling of the

reconstruction of state apparatuses which included officials who would work on ethnic policy. In

Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev quickly consolidated power, established a set of strong central authorities and efficiently distributed resources to the public (Aleksandrov, 1999; Loshkariov &

Sushentsov, 2016).47 Ukraine, on the other hand, was being pulled primarily in three directions.

In brief, Ukraine would need to find a balancing act between developing a relationship with

Western Europe, keeping tensions with Russia at bay, and simultaneously develop independent, self-sustaining systems that would eliminate Ukrainian reliance on either side (D'anieri, 2007).

The Ukrainian government granted citizenship rights to all legal residents of the

Ukrainian SSR at the time of the enactment of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine

(Aslund, 2009).48 The state sponsored integration of ethnic-Russians into Ukrainian society after the collapse of the USSR would provide a measure of stability between the ethnic tensions mounting throughout the majority of the former Soviet Union. However, there is evidence suggesting that post-Soviet ethno-nationalization in Ukraine has resulted in minor levels of ethnic-Russian repression on the basis of language and identity. Consequently, as explained in

"Radicalization of Russians in Ukraine: From 'Accidental' Diaspora to Rebel Movement," the ethnic-Russian population, faced with underrepresentation in the social and political spheres in

Ukraine, began to radicalize and mobilize against the state. The Ukrainian government’s inability to effectively reconcile domestic dissidence resulted in the mobilization of both ethnic-

Ukrainians and ethnic-Russians. Moreover, underrepresentation of the Russian minority at the executive level arguably drove ethnic-Russians to break away from the Ukrainian central government to create the autonomous Donbas region (Loshkariov & Sushentsov, 2016).

47 It is possible Kazakhstan geographic distance from Central Europe following the collapse may have proved useful in smoothing out the transition into an independent republic with an internal consensus about national interest. 48 Interestingly, a survey from the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine survey in 1991 reported that 75% of ethnic-Russians living in Ukraine did not identify themselves with the Russian nation (Kuzio, 1998).

There is hardly a parsimonious explanation of the history and development of the

Ukrainian national identity. Ukrainian scholar Denys Kiryukhin considers the development of nationalism and national ideas in Ukraine to be deeply rooted in the Soviet period. Kiryukhin states, "Contemporary Ukrainian nationalism is a heterogeneous phenomenon… Ukrainian nationalists waged guerilla warfare against the Soviets" (2015). This constitutes a mythology that has played a large part in the formation of contemporary national identity (2015). In post-Soviet

Ukraine, the national discourse calls back in anger towards the repressions of the Soviet regime, but ironically began development under former Communist Party elites in the 1990s (Brubaker,

2011). The paradox of renouncing the Soviet terror yet allowing its former party leadership to build a newly independent state from the ground up has glaring issues. First, the Soviet leaderships' establishment of ethno-cultural policy in the 1920s and 1930s were fundamentally ambivalent (Bhabha, 1990). As Kiryukhin (2015) explains:

Practices of ethno-cultural identity were combined with the ideology of the formation of

a special identity – the new ‘Soviet person’. But in spite of all official declarations

regarding the new communality of ‘the Soviet people…', the Soviet government was

engaged in the systemic development of national cultures and national intelligentsia in

the republics.

Comparatively, this remains largely true for Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Estonia. Ethnic groups in the Soviet republics developed a sense of fictile kinship with one another that arguably undermined the development of a singular, Soviet identity. As such, one may argue that post-

Soviet ethnic identity is heavily tied to the individuals connection to a nation-state as an inherent piece of their group identity. As a result, there is a possibility that government officials often develop policy, which reinforces their ethnic identity as if it were inherently dependent on the

existence and promotion of their country.

Survey data from the Kiev International Institute of Sociology and the National Academy of Science of Ukraine shows gradual declines of Russian Federation and ethnic-Russian approval in Ukraine. Data from the National Academy of Science of Ukraine released in 2010 shows results from 1994 and again in 2010 to a question whether they held a positive attitude towards ethnic-Russians. In 1994, 15% of Western Ukraine, 60% of Central Ukraine, 70% Southern

Ukraine, 75% Western Ukraine, responded with a positive view of ethnic-Russians. In 2010,

Western Ukraine remains unchanged, except that 7% would banish Russians from Ukraine.

Central Ukraine fell from 60% approval of Russians to 30% approval and 8% of Central

Ukrainian residents would banish Russians from Ukraine. Southern Ukraine fell from 70% to

60%, and Eastern Ukraine fell from 75% to 64%. Although the survey data points to public opinion of ethnic-Russians declining, it is difficult to link this state sponsored repression against ethnic-Russians. However, there has been a presence of far-right nationalist government organizations and regional nationalist leadership, which have called for repression of Russians

(Luhn, 2014; Bureychak, 2015). Moreover, the far-right political party All-Ukrainian Union, or

Svoboda, has invoked radical anti-Russian rhetoric in Western Ukraine. Leader of Svoboda and former member of the Ukrainian parliament, Oleg Tyahnybok, has previously argued that a

“Moscow-Jewish mafia” was ruling the Ukraine from behind the scenes (Pastukhova, 2008).

The importance of the development of ethnic identity behind the backdrop of a collective

Soviet identity largely fits the model of fictile kinship. However, following the collapse of the

Soviet Union, the theoretical sense of fictile kinship across a single Soviet identity quickly disappeared. As a result, the FSU states experienced a return to ethnic identity based on individual nation-states. In the case of the Baltic states, long developing nationalist sentiments

have led to the state promulgation of ethnically homogenous policies such as laws on language and citizenship, which have marginalized and repressed ethnic-Russians in the region. In

Ukraine, there was minimal repressions against ethnic-Russians outside of the Western regions until the beginning of the conflict in Crimea and Donbas in 2014 (Vogt et al., 2019). The data in

CIRI and EPR point to the onset of the ethnic repression of Russians in Ukraine being gradually increased until the group mobilized in early 2014. Some scholars have concluded that the ethnic-

Russian population in Ukraine is an “accidental” diaspora, which, having been largely overlooked for nearly two decades, has radicalized (Loshkariov & Sushentsov, 2016; Brubaker,

2011). The onset or management of ethnic repression is evidently tied with the agenda pushed by the regime. In Kazakhstan, after 2010 Nazarbayev turned to a more Kazakh-centric policy agenda which did not include ethnic-Russians. Ukraine did not adopt an exclusionary stance on ethnic-Russians until the events in Donbas and Crimea. Regardless of the developed outcome of

Russian action in Crimea and the ongoing conflict in the Donbas, ethnic-Russians in Ukraine may experience aversion as a consequence of conflict and Ukraine’s push to strengthen western ties.

The rationale behind the Ukrainian government's repression of ethnic-Russians is distinctly related to conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Prior to the Crimean accession to the

Russian Federation, there was arguably only regional repression of ethnic-Russians. Moreover, it is evident that far-right parties with regional power instated the call for repression of the Russian language and Russian books (“Lviv Bans Books,” 2018). Prior to 2014, the push for anti-Russian language policy and an ethnically homogenous state exclusively belonged to right-wing parties such as Svoboda. In 2020, the strain between the Russian population and the Ukrainian government has not improved, as there is still conflict in Eastern Ukraine and tensions remain

over the secession of Crimea.

Cross Analysis

Each case features a few major commonalities in the modalities of repression and the dimensions of the ethnic-Russian minority group. First, the delegitimization of the Russian language is at the forefront of contemporary policy making in all Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Moreover, the conscious suppression of the Russian language in these countries has elicited official responses from the Russian Federation. Interestingly, Kazakhstan and Estonia's governments in 2019 and 2020 are working to revise their previously harsh policies against the

Russian language. Consequently, there may be possibility for the severity of government repression against Russians on the basis of language in these countries to decrease. Under

Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, the logical assumption would be that the Kazakh government would continue to repress the Russian language given there is no alternative incentive to cease current protocol. However, Tokayev has made his intentions clear with respect to strengthening the ties between Russian and Kazakhstan and slowing the disintegration of Russian language during the course of Strategia Kazakhstan 2050. Currently, to redress ethnic-Russian repression, Tokayev would need to revisit the state decision to abandon the Cyrillic alphabet, and the country-wide closure of Russian languages schools.

There is evidence to suggest the use of repression as a reactionary measure against the

Russian minority in Kazakhstan and Latvia following the Russian annexation of Ukrainian owned Crimea.49 Moreover, the head of the Kazakh parliament's risk assessment group expressed particularly deep concerns of ethnic-Russian mobilization in the Northern Kazakhstan,

Pavlodar, and Kostanay regions (Birnbaum, 2015). However, Tokayev delegitimized these concerns in an interview (Nemtsova, 2019). Official statements from the Ministry of Foreign

49 See Dyrstad (2012) for a look at the dynamics between post-conflict ethnic groups.

Affairs of the Republic of Latvia confirm strong opposition of Russia's "illegal annexation of

Crimea," and "condemns the Russian Federation's aggression in Ukraine and stands up for maintaining the integrity of EU sanctions" (Martinsone, 2018, p. 1). Shortly after Latvia decried

Russia for their involvement in Crimea, ethnic-Russians took to the streets in Riga to protest the

"right-wing extremism" occurring in Latvian politics. The protestors asked for "equal rights for our languages, and we want social and economic rights (McGuinness, 2014). Since these protests, Latvia has introduced even stricter language laws, which limits the use of Russian in certain workplaces and schools nationwide (Kim, 2018). Estonian Foreign Minister Sven Mikser has stated, This [marks] the fifth anniversary of the illegal annexation of the Crimean

Peninsula… We strongly condemn this act… To Estonia, Crimea is and will remain part of

Ukraine" (“Estonian FM Mikser”, 2019). However, there seems to be an improvement for ethnic-

Russians in Estonia in regard to respect for physical integrity rights and language rights even after the events of Crimea in 2014. Consequently, there is currently no evidence pointing towards the use of repression against ethnic-Russians as a reactionary security measure in Estonia.

The perspective of the FSU governments is an important angle to consider when determining the rationale behind the repression of ethnic groups, and more specifically ethnic-

Russians. From the perspective of FSU states, the actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine sets a dangerous precedent concerning the liability of unchecked, sizable ethnic-Russian minority groups. Consequently, post-Crimea policies coming from FSU states, look to bolster security in regions with large groups of ethnic-Russians through repressive means. Although relatively unexplored in this paper, Georgia seems to follow a logical pathway in the onset of ethnic repression of Russians. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, tensions mounted in the

Caucasus region, resulting in the First Chechen Conflict. In addition, the emerging Republic of

Georgia sought to define its independence by disallowing Russian forces to use their land a base of command to fight back against the Chechen independence movement. After the resolution of the Chechen conflicts, and the Georgia's loss against the Russian army in 2008, the Georgian government has started to repress Russians through closing Russian language schools and cutting funding for the support of Russian language accommodation in the region (Gonzalez, 2018). In spite of the fact that there are no quantitative Data sets measuring the amount of repression ethnic- Russians are experiencing in Georgia, the situation regarding the government's viewpoint towards Russians and the Russian Federation seem to be deteriorating. In 2018, Georgian officials at the European Court of Human Rights accused Russia of ethnic cleansing in the lands gained through the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict.50 Moreover, other FSU states, with the exception of Belarus, seem to express the same fears of Russian separatist movements in their countries. While unexplored here, there are issues in Estonia, and the not-quite-Soviet Balkan states regarding the delegitimization of the Russian language, and the marginalization of ethnic-

Russians in post-Crimea Europe (de Pommereau, 2018; RFE/RL Balkan Service, 2019).

50 Russian officials responded by calling the allegations baseless, and in spite of the court's ruling, Russian statutes passed in 2015 allows for the Russian Constitutional Court to essentially disregard international court rulings if deemed to be in violation of Russia's constitution ("Georgia Accuses Russia of 'Ethnic Cleansing' At European Court, 2018).

Discussion and Conclusion

Due to the lack of data, a quantitative study of the mechanisms of ethnic repression is not currently feasible. Therefore, this project has turned to combining theoretical foundations to explain why states repress certain ethnic groups. In the context of ethnic-Russians, there are a few clear patterns to consider. First, resentment stemming from 74-years under the USSR is a factor which has not only seen the growth of states aversion to the Russian Federation, but also states aversion to large Russian populations in their countries. Moreover, the Russian Federation has flourished under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, who has brought Russia from the absolute lowest point in its modern history to the highest level of world powers. While in theory, Russia's recovery from complete collapse in the 1990s should not increase the repression of ethnic-

Russians in neighboring countries, I argue that it in fact has that effect. Second, the longer temporally the state has been removed from the Soviet Union, the more clear their national idea becomes. The analysis of state documents elucidate the fact that the national idea of many post-

Soviet states does not necessarily establish apparatuses for the promotion of ethnic inclusivity.

Additionally, state documents setting out social and economic planes such as Strategia

Kazakhstan 2050 and Eesti 2020 generally exclude language promoting the necessity of including minority languages. However, states seemingly pose two solutions for ethnic-Russians to “escape” repressions. First, is to outright leave the country, and the second is to assimilate, learn the language and integrate into the society of the country in which they live. In Kazakhstan, however, this has become difficult due to the fact that the central government has wholesale cut funding in their fiscal policy to areas which house large ethnic-Russians populations. Therefore, while assimilation is possible, it may be more advantageous or desirable to relocate outside of

Kazakhstan.

There is very little data to suggest what the repression of ethnic-Russian outside of the

Russian Federation will imply in the future. One may assume it will simply continue to break down relations between the Russian Federation and the repressor state, given the severity or timeline of the repressive measures. Alternatively, it may spark, as it has in Ukraine, Russian rebel movements to appear in opposition to central governments, seeking greater respect for their cultural and language rights. This could also be why the Kazakh government has increased military force on the border. Some may argue that it would be uncharacteristic for a country like

Kazakhstan with generally good relationship with Russia to repress ethnic Russians, especially that close to the Russian border, however, evidence has shown that the Kazakh government does not fully respect the physical integrity rights or the cultural rights of ethnic-Russians within their borders. Evidence also suggests that following the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula after the referendum in 2014, both Estonia and Latvia adopted more hardline stances in ensuring their Russian population is unable to mobilize in a similar fashion.

There are two limitations to this study. First, there is a massive lack of previous scholarship on the determinants of ethnic repression. However, that is also a great strength of this study, as it allows for a novel contribution to the theoretical explanations for the onset of ethnic repression. The second limitation is the absence of population data in Ukraine. More specifically, the lack of population data in the Ethnic Power Relations Data set and official census documentation for Ukraine in the post-Crimean annexation world creates difficulties in pinpointing whether or not Russians are potentially feeling pressured by the regime to leave the country.

This paper considered how the onset of state-sponsored repression against a specific ethnic group occurs. Moreover, it is clear that current data is not yet developed enough to

establish a systematic means to explain this the onset of ethnic repression in a cross-national study. However, there are clear mechanisms through which ethnic repression occurs when examining individual countries. Furthermore, this study's primary concern was the impacts of collective memory, cultural memory, and the development of a national idea on the onset of ethnic repression in the former Soviet Union states of Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Ukraine.

Each state analyzed in this study shows that the development of a national idea in the FSU region generally cannot reconcile their grievances from the Soviet era. As a result, the development of nationalism in the FSU states has generally taken an ethno-centric stance, which excludes ethnic groups including ethnic-Russians. The most interesting result is that the actions of the Russian

Federation in Ukraine and the breakaway republics in Eastern Ukraine illicit reactionary responses from neighboring states in the form of repression of ethnic-Russians and security along their Russian borders (Tynan, 2017). Additionally, both Kazakhstan and Latvia seem to use methods of non-violent repression, such as shutting down Russian language schools or forcing Russians to move out of large, wealthy areas, into poorer regions a considerable distance away from large political hubs.51 There were minor bouts of violent repression used in

Kazakhstan in response to dissident groups forming during Tokayev’s election, but they were not inherently targeting ethnic groups (Putz, 2020). Future endeavors regarding this topic should aim to explore ethnic-Russian dissidence and its impact on increased repressions or rise to conflict.

Qualitatively factoring in the impact of dissidence is daunting, however, it will help to control for exacerbating factors not wholly accounted for in this project.

51 Analogously, the delegitimization of language plagues various countries. In the Slavic world, ethnic minorities such as the Buryat and Tatars in Russia fight to retain, or regain, language rights in their home regions. In South- Western Europe there seems to be a reversal of this role. Spanish speakers in general claim that ethno-nationalist minority groups, who speak minority languages are repressing Spanish speakers in given regions (Keeley, 2008). Although a key difference in these cases is that the repressed generally have nowhere to emigrate, whereas Russians in Kazakhstan are able to return to Russia on special citizenship programs.

Appendix

Figure 1

Theory Summation of Theoretical Claim

Capacity to A group reconstructs past grievances to fit into contemporary cultural and collective memory. The Reconstruct two modes are 1) the mode of potentiality, where groups consider past events by contemporary groups and 2) the mode of actuality, whereby the groups codify the past events to fit the contemporary mold. Formation Formal organization of cultural memory whereby collectively shared knowledge is transmitted throughout the group structure. Organization Two modes of Organization 1) institutional buttressing of communication of communication, 2) the specialization of the carriers of cultural memory (Assmann, 131). Obligation The establishment of a clear system of values, which must be adhered to by the group structure. This includes obligation to observe values, which inherently alienate other groups. Reflexivity In its most basic definition, reflexivity are ethno- centric rituals.

Figure 2

Theory Summation of Theoretical Claims

Figure 3—CIRI Data set definitions

Term Definition* Disappearance Cases in which people have disappeared and political motivation for the disappearance is likely. Typically, the victim has not been found and the public has no knowledge of what may have occurred to the individual. Torture Torture is the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government agents, or private individuals at the instigation of government officials. Extrajudicial Extrajudicial killings are killing by government officials without due process Killing of law. Political Political imprisonment refers to incarceration of an individual on the basis of Imprisonment their speech, non-violent opposition to government policy or authority, religious beliefs, or their membership to an ethnic or racial group. Empowerment This index encompasses the government respect for Freedom of Assembly, Rights Speech and Religion, Electoral Self-Determination, and Worker’s Rights. Freedom of Right of citizens to freely interact or associate with other persons in political Assembly parties, unions, cultural organization, or other interest groups. Freedom of The extent to which freedoms of speech and press are affected by government Speech censorship. Electoral Self- This variable measures the extent of citizens’ enjoyment of freedom of Determination political choice and the legal right and ability to petition a change in legislation through free and fair elections. Worker’s This variable measures the extent of workers ability to freely association at Rights their workplace and the freedom to bargain with their employees. It also measures the presence of compulsory labor, minimum age for employment of children, and occupation health and safety. *All definitions are derived from the CIRI Data set codebook (Cingranelli-Richards, 2014).

Figure 4 – CIRI data set coding

Population Statistics

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