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CwFOD PDHCEo Phloto jw P.maubusI. HB.ou dad Mumm Commbdwm PINCHOT, PROHIBITION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES: THE PENNSYLVANIA ELECTION OF 1930

BY IRwIN F. GREENBERG' IN 1930 the Democratic party, nationally, was going through a period of transition. While many Democrats attacked the practices of large corporations and advocated increased govern- mental regulation of business, the leaders of the Democratic National Committee, Chairman John J. Raskob and Executive Chairman Jouett Shouse, took the opposite position. Raskob had been a Republican until Al Smith named him chairman of the Democratic National Committee in 1928. Before taking that post, he had held high executive positions with DuPont and General Motors. Shouse also had close ties with big business. He was a corporation lawyer and would later be executive di- rector of the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment (AAPA), a DuPont financed organization. Raskob and Shouse sought to align the Democratic party with the nation's large corporate and financial interests, and the liquor issue played an important role in their strategy. By stressing the "wet" issue above all others, Raskob hoped to prevent criticism of his economic policies. Many Democrats who favored greater governmental regulation of business were also "wet." By 1930, however, Raskob had so closely identified himself with repeal that it became difficult for Democratic politicians to attack him without making themselves seem "dry." Raskob's strategy of concealing pro-business economic policies behind a "wet" facade was clearly evidenced in the Pennsylvania gubernatorial election of 1930. The leaders of the Pennsylvania Democratic party, Chairman John R. Collins and National Com- mitteeman Sedgwick Kistler, became willing pawns of Raskob and Shouse. The Democratic national party officers had a free 'The author received his Ph.D. degree from Temple University and is presently the Editorial Director for Scholarly Resources, Inc., Wilmington, Delaware. 21 22 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY hand in Pennsylvania. Working skillfully and discretely, Raskob and Shouse succeeded in persuading many important Pennsyl- vania financial magnates to bolt the GOP ticket and back the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. Even without Raskob's tactics, Pennsylvania Republicans had serious problems in 1930. Economic distress and bitter factional- ism were taking their toll on the GOP. Factional differences within the Pennsylvania GOP became so bitter that they threat- ened to destroy the party organization. The struggle for control of the party that had started in 1922 with the death of Boies Penrose reached a climax in 1930. Only one of the three com- peting factions, the group represented by William Larimer Mellon and his family's vast financial interests in western Penn- sylvania, no longer had a chance to become the dominant factor in the state organization.'. It still had enough power and in- fluence, however, to swing the balance in favor of one of the two remaining factions, those headed by William S. Vare and Joseph R. Grundy. The Vare and Grundy forces were each allied with important segments of the business community. Grundy represented the state's manufacturers. President of the Pennsylvania Manufac- turers Association since its creation, Grundy's chief goal, na- tionally, was to maintain a high protective tariff. On the state level, he made sure that corporate taxes remained low and such "radicarl labor legislation as maximum hours and minimum wage laws never became law. William S. Vare and his Philadelphia Republican organization spoke for different economic interests, those whose concerns often conflicted with the manufacturers. The Philadelphia or- ganization represented the state's public utility companies, in particular the Pennsylvania Railroad. General William Wallace Atterbury, the Pennsy's president, was a powerful factor in the party. In 1928, with Vare's backing, he was elected Pennsyl- vania's representative on the Republican National Committee. Atterbury's chief political spokesman, Charles B. Hall, the Re- publican leader of the seventh ward, was president of city coun- cil and one of the kingpins of the Philadelphia organization. Though the utilities preferred lower corporate levies, they 'Bruce M. Stave, The New Deal and the Last Hurrah: Pittsburgh Machine Politics (Pittsburgh, 1970), 28-29. THE PENNSYLVANIA ELECTION OF 1930 23 knew that any reduction in taxes would mean less money for the state to spend for their services. The utilities also had the advantage of being able to locate their home offices in another state in order to avoid Pennsylvania taxes. The main concern of the utilities was governmental regulation of their rates. They wanted state utility boards to have as little regulatory power as possible. 2 The tensions between the Vare and Grundy factions came to a head in the Republican primary of 1930. At stake were the party's gubernatorial and Senatorial nominations. The Senate seat was the same one that Vare had been elected to in 1926, but which the Senate denied him in 1929. To fill the vacant post, Governor John S. Fisher had appointed Grundy, who then sought renomination in 1930. Vare had originally intended to run against Grundy himself, but his doctors refused to permit it In his place, the Philadelphia organization slated James J. "Puddler Jim" Davis, Hoover's secretary of labor. As their candidate for the gubernatorial nomination, the Vare forces selected Francis Shunk Brown, a former attorney general of the state. The Mellon interests also lined up behind Brown and Davis. Grundy went after the party's independent and re- form-minded voters by joining forces with Gifford Pinchot, who sought the gubernatorial nomination. Grundy's strategy was: "If you cannot obtain sufficient support from other organiza- tions in the party for your desired 'friendly' candidate, support an independent who no one else is supporting, whether you agree with his political and economic views or not."3 Pinchot and Grundy had worked together when the Forester won his first term as governor in 1922. All of the governor's patronage appointments had gone to Grundy men. Though a reformer in the Bull Moose tradition, Pinchot was politically astute and ambitious enough to know that he had to compromise with Grundy on economic and social issues. He did not risk antagonizing the state's manufacturers. Though labor had sup- ported him in 1922, no legislation favorable to workingmen had been passed during the first Pinchot Administration. Corporation taxes had increased only slightly. In his platform of 1930, Pinchot

'J. Roffe Wike, The Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association (Philadel- phiaIbid., 1960), 225. 283-284. 24 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY

avoided items that were unacceptable to manufacturers. The main thrust of Pinchot's economic program was his attack on public utilities.4 Pinchot and Grundy had a tough fight in the Republican pri- mary. They faced candidates who had support from Philadelphia and Pittsburgh political "machines." Both Davis and Brown would have been nominated easily had not a group known as the Liberal party entered the scene. Claiming that it wanted to "redeem America" and restore the individual liberties of its citizens, the Liberal party was actually a political offshoot of the Pennsylvania branch of the AAPA. Though it drafted a long platform covering diverse subjects, the Liberals directed their zeal almost entirely toward repeal of the prohibition amendment. To demonstrate their political influence, the Liberals entered the Pennsylvania Republican primary. At first they planned only to endorse candidates they deemed deserving. The Liberals asked all of the potential nominees for their position on the liquor issue, but received no satisfactory reply. Pinchot declared that he was committed to the "dry" cause while Grundy upheld the Republican national platform of 1928 which called for rigid enforcement of the Volstead Act. Thus, there was no chance of either Grundy or Pinchot receiving backing from the Liberals. The Liberals had hoped to support Davis and Brown, for both men were personally "wet." They demanded that both candi- dates make a public declaration of their "wet" sentiments. Neither complied. Davis, like Grundy, supported the Republican national platform. Brown kept silent on the subject, arguing that prohibition was not an important issue in the contest. Since no candidate would publicly take a "wet" stand, the Liberals entered their own contenders in the Republican primary: former Con- gressman Thomas W. Phillips of Butler for governor and Francis H. Bohlen, a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania, for United States Senator.5 Davis's refusal to meet demands of the Liberals is under- standable. He was a member of Hoover's cabinet, and remained so throughout the campaign. In case he was defeated by Grundy, he would be assured of his place in the administration. He

'Ibid., 228-229. 1Samuel H. Church, The Liberal Party in America: Its Principals and Its Platform (New York, 1931), 29-30. THE PENNSYLVANIA ELECTION OF 1930 25 could not take a "wet" stand because it would embarrass Hoover. And even with the defection of a large number of "wets" to Bohlen, Davis still had a good chance of wresting the nominia- tion. Though the Liberal candidate would dram off many votes in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, Davis would compensate for them in other parts of the state. Grundy was not popular in the anthracite regions while Davis, a former coal miner himself, would receive a large share of votes there. The reason for Brown's refusing the Liberals' demands is a mystery. The loss of "wet" votes to Phillips cost him the nomina- tion. Unlike Grundy, Pinchot was not vulnerable in the coal mining areas, and he received a large portion of those votes. To defeat Pinchot, Brown had to carry "wet" districts by large pluralities, which became impossible with Phillips in the race. Such astute politicians as those who constituted the Vare "war board" should have known that Brown could not win with Phillips drawing votes away from him. It was not that the Philadelphia organization was committed to the-national plat- form. Most of its ward leaders and elected officials had publicly declared their "wetness." Vare had run on a "wet platform in 1926. General Atterbury belonged to the AAPA. The Brown and Phillips forces made several attempts at compromise. But none succeeded. Al that the Liberals wanted was for Brown to take a stand in favor of repealing the Snyder- Armstrong Act (the state's prohibition enforcement law) and to place himself on record as against national prohibition. He refused. Fearful perhaps of driving moderates into Pinchot's camp if he took the "extreme wet" position, Brown chose to "straddle the issue." He came out in favor of a referendum on the Snyder-Armstrong Act, one that would determine the voters' opinion on the subject. His compromise was not enough for the Liberals, so Phillips stayed in the race.' The primary results showed that Brown and the Vare "war board" had guessed wrong when they refused to meet the demands of the Liberals. Davis won the Senatorial nomination, but Pinchot won the gubernatorial contest. His margin over Brown was a mere 15,000 votes. If it had not been for the 281,000 votes received by Phillips, most of which would probably have gone to Brown, Pinchot would have been defeated.

elnquirer, Philadelphia, April 6, 8, 1930. 26 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY

Unlike the Republicans, the Democrats were not plagued by serious factional problems. Although tension existed between the "wet" and "dry" factions of the party, the anti-prohibitionists had a substantial majority and were clearly in control of the state organization. The "wets" had no trouble slating their candidates for the primary: National Committeeman Sedgwick Kistler for United States Senator and Lawrence H. Rupp for governor.7 A problem arose a month after the candidates were slated when Rupp withdrew from the race, announcing that he pre- ferred to run for the post of Grand Exalted Ruler of the Elks instead of governor of Pennsylvania. He bowed out of the gubernatorial contest, he explained, because he did not want the burden of campaigning for two offices at the same time.8 In his place, the state committee slated a thirty-nine-year-old resident of West Chester, John Hemphill. The Democratic can- didates had no opposition in the primary. When the state com- mittee met in June, it drafted a "wet" platform. The liquor issue was stressed above all others, making the election a clear-cut contest between the "wet" Democrats and the "dry" Pinchot.' Faced with the threat of a Pinchot victory, the Liberals de- cided to endorse Hemphill. They soon went beyond mere verbal support. The Liberals pre-empted a third party ticket and slated Hemphill as their candidate for governor. Democratic leaders agreed to permit the Liberals to place Hemphill's name on their ticket, even though other Democratic candidates were not slated on it with him. Hemphill, in fact, was the only candidate on the Liberal party ticket.10 In addition to the political support of the Liberals, Democrats were also promised strong financial backing from the AAPA.11 Leaders of the Liberal party tried to persuade Vare to back Hemphill; but he refused. Pinchofs victory in the primary was being contested in the state courts. Brown supporters charged that there were irregularities on the ballots cast in Luzerne 'Record, Philadelphia, February 26, 1930. 8 Ibid., March 21, 1930. 9ibd. March 25 June 5 1930. 10ibid. July 30, 1930; John R. Collins to Jouett Shouse, July 5, August 1, 1930, John J. Raskob Papers, Democratic National Committee Section (Raskob Papers, DNC), Eleutheian Mills Historical Library (EMHL). Collins to Raskob, July 5, 1930, Raskob to Collins, July 7, 1930, Raskob Papers, DNC, EMHL THE PENNSYLVANIA ELECTION OF 1930 27

County. If the case was decided in favor of Brown, he would receive the Republican nomination. Vare waited for that de- cision. Some of his ward leaders, in the meantime, began to circulate petitions to have Hemphill's name placed on the Liberal ticket.12 On August 21 the state court handed down a decision in favor of Pinchot, who became the official GOP nominee. Once Pinchot's nomination was official, the Vare organization became more active in the Hemphill cause. None of its mem- bers had as yet publicly declared their intention to bolt Pinchot. Throughout September neither Vare nor his ward leaders made any public statement about whom they would support. Mean- while, General Atterbury canvassed the business community of the state, trying to persuade corporation officials to bolt Pinchot."3 In earlv October Vare decided that the time had arrived to come out publicly for Hemphill. James Hazlett, chairman of the Republican City Committee, issued a statement signed by forty-seven out of forty-eight members of the city committee declaring that they would support Hemphill. The only Re- publican ward leader who stood by Pinchot was David T. Hart of the twenty-third ward.' 4 The heads of the state's public utilities and their allied in- dustries followed the example of Vare's organization. Atterbury had prepared them well for the bolt, denouncing Pinchot's "radicalr plans for regulating utilities. In Pittsburgh the heads of more than twenty-five large businesses declared for Hemp- hill. The list included Andrew Wells Roberts of Westinghouse Electric, George S. Davidson of Gulf Oil and Arthur L. Humph- rey of Westinghouse Air Brake. In Philadelphia nineteen leaders of the business and financial world, all of them Republicans with links to utility interests, announced that they had formed a committee to raise funds for Hemphills campaign. Among their number were Samuel M. Vauclain, president of the Bald- win Locomotive Works, John Hampton Barnes, chief legal counsel for the Pennsylvania Railroad, Robert K. Cassatt, presi- dent of a large banking and brokerage firm, and Effingham B. t Inquirer, Philadelphi, August 12, 1930. MSamuel J. Astorio, "The Decline of the Republican Dynasty in Penn- sylvania, 1929-1934" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1962), "4Record, Philadelphia, October 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 1930. 28 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY

Morris, chairman of the board of Girard Trust Company. Atter- bury himself resigned his position as Republican national com- mitteeman in order to support Hemphill.15 The utility interests and Vare's organization were not the only Republicans who backed Hemphill. Many other concerned Re- publicans opposed Pinchot either because they were "wet" or because they considered him too "radical" in his approach to economic matters. William W. Roper, a former Democrat who had left that party in 1916 because he thought the Wilson Ad- ministration too "radical," supported Hemphill. Roper's bolt was significant because ever since joining the Republican party he had been one of Vare's most severe critics. In 1922 he man- aged Pinchofs primary campaign in Philadelphia.1" Also bolting the Republican gubernatorial candidate was Philadelphia pub- lisher Cyrus H. K. Curtis, who had his two newspapers in the city, the Ledger and the Inquirer, come out for Hemphill.'" Paul Block, publisher of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, also bolted Pinchot. One of his editorials expressed the views probably held by many other Republicans when it stated: "The election of Gifford Pinchot to the Governorship would at this time be extremely harmful to the State of Pennsylvania .... Pinchot's attacks upon business and businessmen are not only economically unsound, but dangerous.s Party bolting was not limited to Republicans. Many Demo- crats bolted Hemphill and supported Pinchot. It was, for the most part, the Democratic "dries" who came out for Pinchot. Vance McCormick announced early in the campaign that neither he nor his Harrisburg newspapers would back Hemphill.'g William B. Wilson, who had been the Democratic Senatorial candidate in 1926, followed McCormick's example, citing Vare's support for Hemphill as the reason for his bolt. Actually, Wilson had made up his mind to vote Republican because of the liquor "Ibid., October 10, 1930; New York Times, October 4 1930; Astorino, "Decline of Republican Dynasty," 126-127; Collins to Raslob, October 15, 1930, Raskob Papers, DNC EMHL. After the election, in the interests of party harmony, the Repubiican State Committee permitted Atterbury to retain his seat on the national committee. "Clipping from Post-Gazette, Pittsburgh, October 16, 1930, Gifford Pinchot Papers, File 535, Library of Congress (LC). "Record, Philadelphia, October 21, 1930. ISClipapingom Pos-Gazette Pittsburgh, October 16, 1930, Pinchot "Record, Philadelphia, July 22, 1930. THE PENNSYLVANIA ELECTION OF 1930 29 issue long before the Vare organization came out for the Demo- cratic candidate s2 Roland S. Morris, a prominent Philadelphia Democrat, also supported Pinchot.21 C. Burgess Taylor, a Demo- cratic state committeeman from Philadelphia, also joined the party bolters. He, too, cited the party's "wet platform and the support of the Vare organization as reasons for his action. 22 Pinchot's campaign tried to play down the liquor issue and concentrate on Vare's organization and the utilities. Pinchot had long been a foe of the utilities, demanding that they charge fair rates and even suggesting, in some cases, public ownership. Al- though his enemies charged that he was anti-business, that was not so. His attacks were directed solely at the public utilities. He claimed that the state's Public Service Commission, whose responsibility it was to make sure that taxpayers were not over- charged, was controlled by the utility companies. It permitted them to charge exorbitant rates. Pinchot wanted to abolish the Public Service Commission and replace it with' a Fair Rate Board, which would be elected by the voters. The new board, Pinchot promised, would make sure that utilities charged fair rates, which had been defined by the United States Supreme Court as a profit not greater than 8 percent.23 The utilities adamantly opposed the changes advocated by the Forester. They were determined to do almost anything to defeat him. Pinchot was aware of their hostility. He referred to General Atterbury as his "arch enemy."24 He confided to a friend about "the violent fight the public utilities will put up against me, . . . [who] are willing to go the whole way to get what they are after." Pinchot feared that his corporate enemies would resort to underhanded tactics to defeat him, such as trying to involve him "with some woman of bad character." He even took precautions against such a possibility, being "very careful to take a stateroom or compartment" whenever he traveled by train at night, and having his male aide in an adjoining room in every hotel where he stayed. Pinchot also

X Ibid., October 19, 1930; William B. Wilson to Rose Forrester, July 21, 1930, William B. Wilson Papers, Historical Society-of Pennsylvania. 2tRecord, Philadelphia, October 31, 1930. October 10, 1930. 3Ibid., "The Public Utilities Issue in Pennsylvania," Pinchot Papers, 541, LC. - Gifford Pinchot to Philadelphia Voters, October 18, 1930, Pinchot Papers, 537. LC. 30 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY feared that his opponents would "attempt to place liquor or incriminating letters" in his car.25 The utilities were not Pinchot's only campaign issue. He re- served a large share of invective for the Vare organization. His problem was that most of his tirades against Vare's "machine" wound up as attacks on Philadelphia in general. When added to his identification with the rural areas and his "dry" stand, Pinchot appeared anti-urban with a special dislike for Phila- delphia. Pinchot's supporters tried to alter this impression. They sent every registered voter in Philadelphia copy of a letter signed by Pinchot. The first two sentences read: "I am your friend. The corporation-fed politicians have lied to you about me." He cited instances of corruption and exploitation by the utilities and Vare's "machine." He ended his plea by again stressing that he was "Philadelphia's friend." He told the voters that, if elected, he would "take from the throat of your city the stranglehold of the corporations that have throttled your port, created op- pressive monopolies out of every service that you require, imposed an increase in street car fares, given away your streets, and exploited your city treasury until you must pay more taxes next year."26 Pinchot tried to implicate Hemphill and the Democrats with Vare's organization. Although Hemphill denied making any sort of deal with the Philadelphia "gang,"2 7 Pinchot continued these charges throughout the campaign. The Pinchot campaign committee distributed a broadside entitled "Shall the Philadelphia Organization Rule this State?" It charged that the Vare leaders had made a bargain with Democrats in exchange for their sup- port of Hemphill. The crafty politicians who guided Vare's "machine," the tract argued, did not "give their support first and try to make their deal afterward. What they are fighting for-with unprecedented fury and by an unparalleled procedure -is to elect a man who would be a . . . Vare Organization Governor." 2 8 Pinchot to Ceorge W. Woodruff, September 24, 1930, Pinchot Papers, 573, LC. Pinchot to Philadelphia Voters, October 18, 1930, Pinchot Papers, 537, LC. 5Record, Philadelphia, September 11, 1930. ""Shall the Philadelphia Organization Rule this State?," Pinchot Papers, 541, LC. THE PENNSYLVANIA ELECTION OF 1930 31

No direct evidence exists to prove a deal was made between the Democrats and Vare's organization. Circumstances indicate that some mutual accord must have been reached. Vare was too wily a politician to risk censure for bolting the GOP candidate and endanger his party standing in exchange for nothing. For the Philadelphia Republican organization to encourage party bolting, no matter who ran, was unusual. It was done with the greatest reluctance. Its continued electoral success depended on the principle of party regularity. Factional warfare within the Pennsylvania Republican party was especially severe in 1930. Pinchot was allied with Vare's rival for party leadership. If Pinchot won election, Grundy's power would increase. Pinchot's attacks on the Philadelphia "gang" made Vare cringe. He threatened to investigate munic- ipal contracts, reform the city's finance system, inaugurate changes in election procedure and do whatever else possible to make life miserable for the Vare "machine." Then there was the personal factor. Vare hated Pinchot. He had never forgiven the governor for sending the Senate his "certificate of doubt" in 1926, which led to an investigation of Vare's election and the ultimate refusal of the Senate to seat Vare. If Pinchot was elected, Vare could expect a reduction in patronage, less in- fluence in state party councils, increased power for his factional enemies and reforms that could weaken his organization's con- trol of Philadelphia. Yet the question still remained-could he have expected to fare any better with a Democrat in the gov- ernor's mansion? The Democrats played into Vare's hands when they permitted Hemphill to run as the only candidate on the Liberal ticket. The third party slate was tailor-made for cuffing. The Liberal party designed their ballot to make ticket-splitting easy for voters and safe for other IRepublican candidates. At the same time it made the Republican voter feel that he was retaining his party regularity, for he would still place an "X' in the Re- publican party square. To cast his ballot for Hemphill and the rest of the Republican ticket, all a voter had to do was mark both the Liberal and Republican party squares. By doing this, explained a sample ballot distributed by the Liberals, "you will be voting for every Republican candidate except Pinchot and by so voting retain your regularity as a Republican.?' "Sample ballot of the Liberal party, ibid. 32 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY

The Liberals must have made a deal with Vare whereby he would support Hemphill on the condition that he was the only candidate on the third party slate. Why else would the Liberals have refused to place a Senatorial candidate on their ticket to oppose James J. Davis? His stand on the liquor issue was the same as he had taken in the primary, when the Liberals ran a candidate against him. They did not oppose Davis in the gen- eral election because he was Vare's candidate, and the Phila- delphia "boss" wanted him elected. If the Liberals had been sincere in their goal to defeat all "dry" candidates, they would have slated on their ticket Sedgwick Kistler, the "wet" Demo- cratic nominee for United States Senator. The Liberal party and the AAPA were practically synonymous. Democratic State Chairman John R. Collins told Jouett Shouse, when Hemphill was slated on the Liberal ticket, that the Liberals would endorse Kistler but not place his name on their ballot.30 The endorsement was given to Kistler as promised, but not by the Liberal party. It was the AAPA that issued a statement calling for Kistler's election. A New York Times reporter even quoted an AAPA official as saying that it had pre-empted the Liberal party name in Pennsylvania. 31 As part of its deal with Vare, the AAPA must have agreed to cut down on its financial support for other Democratic can- didates. Most of the AAPA's money went to the Hemphill cause and was handled by the Liberal party. In early July, before the "wet group made its deal with Vare, the AAPA promised to give the Pennsylvania Democrats strong financial backing.32 By September the AAPA reneged on its pledge. Chairman Collins constantly complained to Raskob that he did not have enough money to run a thorough campaign. Most of the AAPA's funds were sent to Liberal party headquarters in Philadelphia, where they were supposed to be divided equally with the Demo- cratic State Committee. But the Democrats never received their share.33 If the Democrats could honestly say that they had not made a deal with the Vare organization, they could not say the same Collins to Shouse, August 1, 1930, Raskob Papers, DNC, EMHL. t New York Times, August 3, 1930. Raskob to Collins, July 7, 1930, Raskob Papers, DNC, EMHL. Collins to Raskob, August 19, September 4, 24, October 31, 1930, Raskob to Collins, September 22, 1930, ibid. THE PENNSYLVANIA ELECTION OF 1930 33 about the public utilities. The Pennsylvania Democratic party openly sought the support of these business interests. And, as evidenced by the actions of Atterbury and the Pittsburgh utility leaders, these tactics proved successful. The credit for bringing utility magnates into the Democratic camp, however, did not lay with the state party leaders, but with the national chair- man, John J. Raskob. Although they feared Pinchot, the utility interests had to make sure that the Democrats were safe before they took any action. The task of assuring them that their financial interests would be secure under a Democratic governor was handled by Raskob and his executive chairman, Jouett Shouse. The two Democratic leaders had been negotiating with Pennsylvania's two corporate giants, General Atterbury and William Larimer Mellon, before the other utility leaders made their formal bolt in October. Mellon never publicly bolted Pinchot, possibly because it would have embarrassed his Uncle Andrew, who was Hoover's sec- retary of the treasury. But he must have played an important role in convincing other utility leaders to bolt. Evidence of negotiations between Atterbury, Mellon and the Democratic national leaders is seen in a note sent by Shouse, in which he told Raskob that he could "say to W.L.M. [William L. Mellon] that the matter which you and I talked over, and which was discussed over the telephone with the Philadelphia general [Atterbury], will be handled in a manner entirely satisfactory to W.L.M."34 The platform adopted by the Pennsylvania Democrats fitted well into Raskob's plans. The utility interests had little to fear from it. Unlike Pinchot's proposal, the Democratic platform did not call for abolition of the Public Service Commission. Guber- natorial candidate Hemphill, in fact, declared that "nothing is wrong with the Public Service Commission," and urged that no changes be made in its powers.35 Neither were other planks in the Democratic platform meant to make conservatives shudder. Drawing on their Jeffersonian tradition, the Democrats attacked centralization of government and called for a return to more local self-government. They also promised reduction in taxes, but did not say how they would "Shouse to Raskob, September 24, 1930, ibid. inquirer, Philadelphia, September 25, 1930. 34 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY achieve this goal. Tax reforms shifting greater burdens to the wealthy and the large corporations were not suggested. The only planks that could be characterized as liberal, aside from the one dealing with the liquor issue, were those affirming or- ganized labor's right to collective bargaining and calling for revision in the workmen's compensation law.'e Though many Republicans voted for Hemphill because they considered him more conservative on economic issues, few Democrats appear to have bolted to the GOP because they thought Pinchot more liberal. The Forester's appeal to liberal Democrats was muted by his "dry" stand and his alliance with Grundy. One Democratic politician quipped that the initials 3 GOP stood for "Grundy Owns Pinchot." 7 Just as Hemphill would have had to yield to the utility interests if he had been elected, Pinchot would have to compromise with Grundy and the manufacturers in areas of taxation and labor legislation. The gubernatorial election placed Philadelphia's only non- Republican newspaper, the Record, in a difficult position, one that was perhaps shared by many liberal Democrats. Under a new management that claimed to be liberal, non-partisan and independent, the Record had urged Pinchot to enter the Re- publican primary in the spring.' 8 Though it was wary of Vare's reasons for supporting Hemphill and agreed with most of Pinchot's program for the public utilities, the Record still backed the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. Pinchot's alliance with Grundy no doubt was a factor. Equally important were the Forester's stand on prohibition and the state's Sunday blue laws. Even if it overlooked Pinchot's "dry" stand and argued that the utility issue was more important, the Record would have looked foolish backing a candidate who favored retention of the blue laws. The newspaper had just waged a militant campaign for their repeal. The Record called for a Democratic victory as the only means of registering "an honest, clear and EFFECTIVE mandate against prohibition and Blue Law discrimination."3 9

"Ledger,Philadelphia, June 5, 1930. "tPub~icity Release of the Democratic State Committee, n.d., Pinchot Papers, 5 41, OfM 8, 1930. F dcondthed Rechod s8Record adlhia,d I March 8, 1930. For a discussion the Record's new owner and his e'ect on the Democratic party, see Irwin F. Greenberg, "The Philadelphia Democratic Party, 1911-1934" (Ph.D. Thesis, Temple University, 1972), 405-414. " Record, Philaelphia, September S, November 3, 1930; J. David Stem, Memoirs of a Maverick Publisher (New York, 1962), 174-175. THE PENNSYLVANIA ELECTION OF 1930 35

The Democratic campaign focused almost entirely on the liquor issue, blaming prohibition for all of the state's problems. Hemphill referred to prohibition as "the real and most im- portant issue" of the campaign. But he did not explain how the return of legalized liquor would reduce unemployment and end exploitation by big business.4 0 A Democratic campaign circular noted that "the government of both state and nation are suffering from serious ailments," and, it contended, only Hemp- hill knew the correct treatment. Hemphill found, the broadside continued, that the state was "afflicted with a devastating cancer called prohibition, which is ... slowly but surely destroying" it.41 Some analysts claimed that the Democrats' emphasis on the liquor issue cost them the election, arguing that the defection of the Democratic "dries" was the difference between victory and defeat. 42 Pinchots plurality was a slim 58,000 votes. Al- though Democratic bolters may have been a factor, the election was actually decided in Pittsburgh. The Democrats assumed that the Republican organization there, which was "wet," would follow Vare's example and back the Liberal ticket. They were wrong. Patronage promises induced leaders of Pittsburgh's Re- publican party to turn in for Pinchot, and the Forester carried the city by 60,000 votes.48 The election of 1930 was important for several reasons. Pin- chot's victory weakened the power of Vare's organization and increased factional strife within the Pennsylvania Republican party. For the Democrats, the election of 1930 had important ideological consequences. John J. Raskob successfully imposed his economic views upon the policies of the Pennsylvania Demo- cratic party. He made it the defender of big business, in par- ticular the public utilities. Pennsylvania Democrats who opposed Raskob and his economic policies had no voice in the party. They did not become an important factor in the party organiza- tion until 1932, when they'tied their political fortunes to the presidential ambitions of Franklin D. Roosevelt Most important, Republican victory brought reform to the Commonwealth. Pin- chot fulfilled his campaign promise by having the Public Utility Commission created to replace the Public Service Commission. Inquirer, Philadelphia, September 25, 1930. " "Here Is the Real Pinchot," Pinchot Papers, 541, LC. Inquirer, Philadelphia, November 9, 1930. Church, Liberal Party, 30.