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The Torture Memos: the Conflict Between a Shift in U.S Hofstra Law Review Volume 33 | Issue 3 Article 6 2005 The orT ture Memos: The onflicC t Between a Shift in U.S. Policy Towards a Condemnation of Human Rights and International Prohibitions Against the Use of Torture Jonathan Canfield Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Canfield, Jonathan (2005) "The orT ture Memos: The onflC ict Between a Shift in .SU . Policy Towards a Condemnation of Human Rights and International Prohibitions Against the Use of Torture," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 33: Iss. 3, Article 6. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss3/6 This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Canfield: The Torture Memos: The Conflict Between a Shift in U.S. Policy To NOTE THE TORTURE MEMOS: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN A SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY TOWARDS A CONDEMNATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST THE USE OF TORTURE [In the United States, the use of torture] is categorically denounced as a matter ofpolicy and as a tool of state authority.... No official of the government,federal, state or local, civilian or military, is authorized to commit or to instruct anyone else to commit torture. Nor may any official condone or tolerate torture in any form.... No exceptional circumstances may be invoked as a justification of torture. U.S. law contains no provision permitting otherwise prohibited acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment to be employed on grounds of exigent circumstances.., or on ordersfrom a superior officer or public authority .... The United States is committed to the full and effective implementation of its obligations under the Convention [Against Torture] throughout its territory. -1999 Initial Report of the United States to the U.N. Committee Against Torture. 1. U.S. Department of State, Initial Report of the United States of America to the UN Committee Against Torture, Oct. 15, 1999 available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/ human rights/torture intro.html. Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005 1 Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 6 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1049 I. INTRODUCTION "On the dogmas of religion, as distinguished from moral principles, all mankind, from the beginning of the world to this day, have been quarreling, fighting, burning and torturing one another, for abstractions unintelligible to themselves and to all others, and absolutely beyond the comprehension of the human mind ,,2 -Thomas Jefferson In the years following the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington D.C., as well as the thwarted terrorist attempt that led to the destruction of a fourth airplane in Pennsylvania, there has been a dramatic international focus on terrorism. 3 Nations are increasingly searching for ways to protect themselves and their people; 4 but what boundaries on protection are being set? At what point will a nation-state cross the line of permissible protection? International law and policy accurately reflect the changes in the nature of the law today.5 Customary law, international treaties, and domestic laws have been widely accepted as explicitly prohibiting the use of torture by a government, or anyone acting on behalf of a government. 6 Immediately following the attacks, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing President Bush to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks..., or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons."' In applying the permissible scope of this authorization, two memoranda [hereinafter "torture memos"] which are the focus of this Note: (1) The August 1, 2002 Department of Justice Memorandum Re: Standards of Conduct for 2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Matthew Carey (Nov. 11, 1816), available at http://memory.loc.gov/master/mss/mtj/mtj 1/049/0600/0635.jpg. 3. See infranotes 5-7. 4. Id. The United States, for example, enacted Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 2004 (2001), discussed infra note 7. 5. See generally MARK W. JANIS & JOHIN E. NOYES, CASES & COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-19 (West Group 2d ed. 2001). 6. See infra notes 39-42. 7. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss3/6 2 Canfield: The Torture Memos: The Conflict Between a Shift in U.S. Policy To 2005] THE TORTURE MEMOS Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 8 and (2) The March 6, 2003 Department of Defense Working Group Report Re: Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations, 9 suggested that torturing a suspected terrorist in the hopes of preventing future attacks may not only be morally permissible, but may also be legal.'0 Furthermore, those being detained by the United States government (who are also the ones that would inevitably be tortured) are not allowed to challenge the reasons for their detainment since they are "enemy combatants" and not prisoners of war. These documents were just two of a series of memoranda and other documents, originating from the White House, Pentagon, and the Justice Department concerning the Bush Administration's interrogation policies, released by the White House on June 22, 2004."1 In sum, these documents all dealt with the permissible bounds of preventing terrorism. The series of documents are described by White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales as two distinct sets of documents, those that were generated by government lawyers to explore the limits of the legal landscape as to what the Executive Branch can do within the law and the Constitution as an abstract matter; [and those] that reflect the actual decisions issued by the President and senior administration officials directing12 the policies that our military would actually be obliged to follow. In December of 2004, nearly 30 months after the publishing of the original controversial document, the Justice Department released a revised version of its August 1, 2002 Memorandum [hereinafter "Levin 8. See generally Memorandum from U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo] (on file with author). 9. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN TUE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT] (on file with author). 10. See infra Part III.B. 11. The National Security Archive, The InterrogationDocuments: Debating U.S. Policy and Methods, George Washington University, available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB127 (July 13, 2004); see also Pace Law School, Memos and Reports on the Treatment of Prisoners and Detainees, Pace University Library, available at http://www.library.law.pace.edu/govemment/detaineememos.htm (last visited May 25, 2005). 12. The National Security Archive, supra note 11. Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005 3 Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 6 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1049 13 According to the Justice Department, this 17 page Memorandum"]. '' 5 revision 14 "supersedes the August 2002 Memorandum in its entirety. However, the reasons for the Levin Memorandum, the "stripped down" language implemented throughout it, and the timing of its release, may 16 be called into question as trying to achieve some ulterior political goal. In effect, despite these new assertions set forth in the revised memorandum, the United States government has not changed its position regarding torture or the detainment of prisoners. As this Note will point out, it can be argued that the original memoranda set up a legal framework leading to the belief that torture could be legal, or at the very least, excusable.' 7 The Levin Memorandum supports this argument. The Levin Memorandum flatly states that torture violates both United States law and international norms.'8 It repudiated the 2002 Memorandum's interpretation of what constitutes torture and defined torture much more broadly. 19 The narrow characterization of torture was one of the major shortcomings of the 2002 Department of Justice Memorandum. 20 The Levin Memorandum has further diverged from the original August 2002 Memorandum by finding that an interrogator possesses sufficient intent to commit torture, and hence is subject to criminal prosecution, if he is aware that his actions will result in crossing the threshold level of "severe pain. 21 U.S. personnel cannot contend that their interrogation methods were motivated by national security needs 13. See generally Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memorandum Dec. 30, 2004] (on file with author). 14. Id. 15. Id. at2. 16. See generally Human Rights First, New Torture Memo an Improvement but Raises More Questions (Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2005_alerts/ etn_0106_levin.htm (last visited May 25, 2005). 17. Associated Press, Bush Admin. Redefines 'Torture' (Dec. 31, 2004), available at http://cbsnewyork.com/topstories/topstories-story_366081649.html (last visited May 25, 2005). 18. Levin Memorandum Dec. 30, 2004, supra note 13, at 2. Footnote 2 of the memorandum briefly discusses the suggestion that an international prohibition on the use of torture has reached the status ofjus cogens.
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