CENTURION I 8.1. the First British “No” the Introduction of Tanks Into

CHAPTER EIGHT CENTURION I 8.1. The First British “No” The introduction of tanks into the Swiss Army was a contentious issue during the post-war period. In addition to the question of whether tanks were necessary at all, and if they were, what type ought to be secured, there were continuous budget constraints, which further complicated the introduction of such an expensive weapon. Nevertheless, from the late 1940s on, the military leadership held the view that the acquisition of tanks was unavoidable if defensive action was to be successful. Further- more, first through the increasing international tensions of the late 1940s, and then through the Korean War, the Federal Assembly took a more gen- erous attitude on military spending.1 Thus, the equipping of the Swiss Army with tanks became increasingly likely. Yet a tank force would have to be built up from scratch. The Swiss Army had only 150 G-13 tank destroyers, Jagdpanzer 38(t) Hetzer from the Czech Skoda factories, which had been bought between 1946 and 1947 for little money. The Hetzer, which had originally been developed for the German Wehrmacht, did not replace a modern tank, mainly because it lacked a turret.2 Therefore, by early 1949, the Swiss began their search for tanks in earnest. But they had little idea of the type of tanks needed, did not have a supplier, and there had been no tank development work similar to that of military aircraft: in the late 1930s, the Swiss had produced 12 Czech tanks under licence, and the development of tanks, which had begun during the Second World War, was immediately abandoned after the war.3 Almost instinctively, they turned to the British, who not only supplied the Swiss Air Force with military aircraft and engines, but also advised the General Staff on defence issues. Would Britain, however, be willing to supply tanks to neutral Switzerland, while its own armed forces and Allies were 1 Supra, ch. 5.2. 2 Braun, op. cit., p. 244. 3 Die Frage der Fabrikation von Panzerwagen in der Schweiz, MTS, 02.05.1950, SFA, E 27, -/9001, 18505, Bd. 1. On Swiss tank development and acquisition in general see Vautravers, op. cit., pp. 120–135. 208 chapter eight rearming after the signing of NAT, and especially in the wake of the Korean War? And did Berne turn to London for reasons other than the armament link and British defence advising? In autumn 1946, a Swiss delegation visited British troops in Udine, Italy, to study tanks. On their return, the delegation’s members advocated the purchase of the Comet, which was a World War II medium tank.4 As the Swiss military leadership had not yet decided on the question of tanks, this request did not lead to any decision. It was almost three years later, in May 1949, that the Swiss looked again to the UK for tanks.5 Interestingly, however, military considerations were not the main incentive at that time. In spring 1949, the Federal Department of Public Economy’s Trade Section and the Military Technical Service agreed to increase the arms purchases from Britain to re-equilibrate the Anglo-Swiss balance of pay- ments. But almost immediately it appeared that this would be difficult, because the foreseen purchase of Vickers artillery tractors was opposed by the Army. Nonetheless, pressured by the Head of the Federal Department of Public Economy to buy additional weapons in Britain, the Federal Military Department began to see an ideal opportunity to acquire tanks.6 The Head of the Light Troops, Divisionary-Colonel Pierre de Muralt, jumped on the occasion, for the tanks would probably be introduced into his troops. Arguing that it was unquestionable, that tanks were needed as soon as possible, and that for the sake of Anglo-Swiss commercial rela- tions it was desirable to purchase war material in Britain for an amount of SFr. 65 million, he requested that a mission be sent to Britain to study the availability of suitable tanks. According to de Muralt, the tanks needed to have effective firepower, the greatest possible mobility, a turret, and should not be heavier than 25 tons and wider than 2.65 metres to suit Switzerland’s bridges and streets.7 Although the Chief of Instruction dis- agreed on the weight of the tanks, he supported de Muralt’s request, reminded Kobelt that he himself had emphasised the need for tanks, and that the Federal Military Department had to take advantage of the Trade Section’s desire for additional arms purchases in Britain.8 Yet on the Head of the Military Technical Service’s advice, the Defence Minister decided that before a mission would be sent, the Military Attaché would have to 4 Bericht über die Studienreise nach Udine-Triest, Kuenzy (FMD), 23.10.1946, SFA, E 27, -/9001, 18505, Bd. 4. 5 Kuenzy (FMD) to Rieser (London), 11.05.1949, SFA, E 27, -/9001, 18505, Bd. 4. 6 Supra, ch. 6.2. 7 Muralt to Frick (both FMD), 17.06.1949, SFA, E 27, -/9001, 18505, Bd. 1. 8 Frick to Kobelt (both FMD), 04.08.1949, SFA, E 27, -/9001, 18505, Bd. 1..

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