The Role of Islamic Feminists in Moroccan Legal Reform

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The Role of Islamic Feminists in Moroccan Legal Reform Copyright by Rachel Christine Brooks 2020 The Report Committee for Rachel Christine Brooks Certifies that this is the approved version of the following Report: The Role of Islamic Feminists in Moroccan Legal Reform: A case study of the 2018 law on violence against women APPROVED BY SUPERVISING COMMITTEE: Hina Azam, Supervisor Victoria Rodriguez, Reader The Role of Islamic Feminists in Moroccan Legal Reform: A case study of the 2018 law on violence against women by Rachel Christine Brooks Report Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Master of Global Policy Studies The University of Texas at Austin May 2020 Abstract The Role of Islamic Feminists in Moroccan Legal Reform: A case study of the 2018 law on violence against women Rachel Christine Brooks, MA, MGPS The University of Texas at Austin, 2020 Supervisor: Hina Azam Abstract: This report focuses on some of the women's rights activists and organizations that have been central to issues of gender equality in Morocco, specifically Nadia Yassine of the Islamist movement Jamaat al-Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Spirituality Association - JSA), Bassima Hakkaoui, current Minister of Solidarity, Women, Family, and Social Development, and secular organization Mobilising for Rights Associates (MRA), or Imra’a (“Woman” in Arabic), This study focuses on the specific strategies and rhetoric used by Yassine, Hakkaoui, and MRA to achieve increased rights for women in Morocco, as well as the creation of Law 103-13 and Morocco’s eventual codification of domestic violence as a crime. Despite the contributions of Hakkaoui and MRA to Law 103-13, the law did not meet all of the demands of Moroccan activists or international organizations, and there are criticisms of iv the law requiring future legislation and amendments. This study reviews both the law’s strengths and shortcomings. v Table of Contents Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1 Background: Domestic Violence and Islamic Feminism ...........................................1 Research Question ......................................................................................................5 Sources and Methodology ..........................................................................................5 Thesis ..........................................................................................................................6 Report map ..................................................................................................................7 Literature review of Islamic Feminism ................................................................................9 Islamic Feminism and Domestic Violence ...............................................................12 Morocco and Domestic Violence Legislation....................................................................16 History of Key Women’s Rights Achievements in Morocco ...................................16 Feminist Activism and Moroccan Legislation ..........................................................27 Nadia Yassine and al-Adl wa al-Ihssan ........................................................28 Bassima Hakkaoui and the PJD ....................................................................34 MRA – Mobilising for Rights Associates .....................................................38 Morocco’s Demand for Domestic Violence Legislation ..........................................40 Content Analysis of Law 103-13 ..............................................................................44 Criticisms of Law 103-13 .........................................................................................46 Morocco and Domestic Violence Awareness After Law 103-13 .............................52 vi Conclusion .........................................................................................................................55 Appendix A: Unofficial English Translation of Law 103-13 ............................................57 Appendix B: Official French Version of Law 103-13 .......................................................69 Appendix C: Official Arabic Version of Law 103-13 .......................................................85 Works Cited .......................................................................................................................98 vii Introduction BACKGROUND: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ISLAMIC FEMINISM Violence against women is a global issue stemming from a multitude of factors such as a lack of women’s empowerment, which in turn stems from economic disparity and strong patriarchal cultural systems. The organization UN Women estimates that 35 percent of women globally have experienced physical or sexual intimate partner violence or sexual violence by a non-partner at some point in their lives.1 In addition to the prevalence of violence against women, many women around the world lack legal protection or options for recourse against violence. In the phenomenon of violence against women around the world, violence within the family or within a marriage is less often codified as a criminal behavior. Globally, the World Bank estimates that more than one billion women lack legal protections against sexual violence by a partner or family member.2 As violence against women is a global problem, it also exists within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which faces unique challenges as many MENA nation-states are governed to some extent by Islamic law. Sometimes these laws are in direct conflict with international human rights standards. There are many types of violence against women, including four types of internationally recognized violence: physical, psychological, economic and sexual. Violence against women, of all four types listed above, also occurs in two separate domains: the private sphere and the public sphere. This paper specifically focuses on domestic violence against women, referring to violence typically found in the private sphere conducted by a family member or intimate partner. The World Bank in 2017 estimated that only about one in four women in the MENA region3 1 “Facts and Figures: Ending Violence against Women,” UN Women (November 2019), https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-figures. 2 Paula Tavarez and Quentin Wodon. 2017. Global and Regional Trends in Women’s Legal Protection against Domestic Violence and Sexual Harassment. Ending Violence against Women Notes Series. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 3 The World Bank’s definition of MENA includes the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 1 were legally protected against domestic violence, with approximately one-third of countries in the region having codified law against the practice.4 According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2019 report on gender justice in Arab states,5 Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia have stand-alone domestic violence legislation which provides protection from gender-based violence and is substantially compliant with international standards.6 In particular, Morocco faces challenges regarding women’s rights and violence against women as shown in the country’s ranking in international gender indexes. In the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2020, Morocco ranked 143 out of 153 countries based on four categories of criteria: economic participation and opportunity; educational attainment; health and survival; and political empowerment.7 Similarly, UNDP’s 2019 Gender Inequality Index, which measures inequality between men and women on issues of reproductive health, empowerment, and the labor market, ranked Morocco 129 out of 187 countries.8 Statistics regarding domestic violence are difficult to obtain due to fear of reporting and other pressures women face. The Moroccan Ministry of Solidarity, Women, Family and Social Development under the leadership of Bassima Hakkaoui conducted a national survey in 2019 of Moroccan women ages 18 to 64. Of the 9000 respondents, 54.4 percent said they have experienced violence, showing that more than half of Morocco’s nearly 18 million women have been victims of any type of violence, whether physical, sexual, psychological or economic.9 The 4 Tavarez and Wodon. 2017. Global and Regional Trends in Women’s Legal Protection against Domestic Violence and Sexual Harassment. 5 UNDP’s Arab States include: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. 6 UNDP. Gender Justice & Equality before the law: Analysis of progress and challenges in the Arab States Region. New York: UNDP, 2019. 7 World Economic Forum. 2019. Global Gender Gap Report 2020. Geneva: World Economic Forum. 8 “Gender Inequality Index.” Human Development Reports. UNDP, November 15, 2013. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index. 9 Safaa Kasraoui, “New Survey Shows High Rates of Violence Against Women in Morocco,” Morocco World News, May 15, 2019, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/05/273120/survey-high-rates-violence-women- morocco/. 2 survey also revealed that only 28.2 percent of women reported telling anyone about abuse they
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