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Mivloscow MELTDOWN for the ineptitude and double-dealing of Gera- shchenko, his counterpart at the Russian Central A guide to the infighting. Bank. In the last year of the Communist regime, Gera- shchenko was chairman of the Central Bank of the Soviet Union, and with Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov (later one of the coup plotters) he summarily declared that the fifty-ruble note would be withdrawn from circulation. As with last week's action, the osten- iVlOSCOW MELTDOWN sible purpose was to control inflation by limiting the M money supply. In fact, the 1991 action led to a public panic, a flight from tbc ruble into dollars and, in the By Jeffrey Sachs end, no actual witbdrawal of notes from circulation, since the measure was effectively overturned by later f Russian politics is akin to a chess match, the actions. But it was a chilling tremor of tbe tragi-comic reformers and the reactionaries are in the end- events of last week. game. Last week's ludicrous currency reform—in Ironically, Gerashchenko's and Khasbulatov's actions I which old rubles were summarily declared void by were a counterattack prompted by the successes of the Russia's Central Bank—was a ruthless gambit by the reformers after the April 25 referendum. Buoyed by reactionaries, as explicable in political terms as it was public support sbown in the referendum, Federov was senseless economically. able to assert operational control over the Russian Cen- The struggle is in many ways an economic Fathers tral Bank during May and June. The Bank remained and Sons. The old guard, epitomized in the persons of nominally under tbe Parliament's control, but with the Parliament speaker Ruslan Khasbtilatov and Russian blistering rejection of the Parliament in the referen- Central Bank chair- dum, Federov found man Viktor Gera- new room for maneu- shchenko, continues ver vis-a-vis the Bank. to fight the arrival of The initial results Russia's new genera- were as dramatic as tion, led by the re- they were frightening formist minister of to the reactionary finance, Boris Fe- opposition. Federov derov, and tbe privati- quickly secured an zation minister, Ana- agreement with the toly Chubais, both in International Mone- their mid-30s. tary Fund, imposed One of Yeltsin's new operating guide- remarkable traits, lines on tbe Cen- aside from his skill at tral Bank and re- democratic politics, established budgetary has been his commit- di.scipline within the ment to shielding the (cabinet with Yeltsin's younger reformers backing. In early June from the intrigues of the ruble began to politicians of his own 11.1.1 S I kA I IC)N HV M J t.AN i Rh. \<; FOR T H K, NKW RKPI IU It. stabilize, and even generation. Federov strengthened, after was actually Yeltsin's first finance minister when Yeltsin two years of downward spiral. Federov publicly became head of the Russian government in 1990. At declared, as he left for a trip to the United States, that that point. Yeltsin was still under Ciorbachev's thumb, the conditions for ruble stability through September and real reforms in Russia were blocked by the Soviet had been achieved. He jokingly offered a $50 bet to any Communist Party. Federov resigned in frustration at the takers that the ruble would hold firm over the summer end of 1990 and joined the capital markets group of the months. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Successes came in other areas as well. Chubais won in Lcindon. At the end of 1992 he moved to the World the Cabinet's support (with Yeltsin's arm-twisting) for Bank as Russia's executive director, and then was called an acceleration of tbe privatization program, which has back to Moscow by Yeltsin at the start of this year. so far succeeded In privatizing more than 70,000 enter- Chubais, the brilliant tactician of Russia's mass privati- prises. At the same time, Yeltsin pushed the political zation program, is a remarkable blend of policy-maker reform agenda by convening a constituent assembly of and hands-on politician who rose to prominence in St. Russia's eighty-eight regions and autonomous republics Petersburg's first democratic elections. in order to fmalize a draft of a new constitution. The Federov's talents are matched only by his disdain assembly completed work on the draft and sent it back 26 THE NEW REPUBLIC AUGUST 23 & 30,1993 to regional assemblies for comments, mth the intention overturned by presidential decree and that the Central of reconvening in Moscow in August. But most shock- Bank governor be pressed to resign (an outcome that ing of all to the political class was the confident talk by seemed imminent in view of the public outcrv). the reformers of new parliamentary elections in the fall. Federov spelled out the economic irrationality' of the In the April referendum, 65 percent of the voters had action and stressed that it violated various international called for new legislative elections, and the reformers agreements between Russia and the IMP. At the last predicted that the constituent assembly would ap- moment, however, Chernomyrdin prevailed on Yeltshi prove a new election law in Aiig\ist, at the same time to put aside Federov's proposed action, and merely to that it would give final approval to the draft constitu- water down the Central Bank's order by allowing tion. greater latitude for the public to exchange old rubles for new ones. ow long two weeks in Russian politics can be! It is becoming clear that the Central Bank's action is As Yeltsin and Federov left Moscow in mid-)uly part of the general revolt against the reformers. WTiile for a break, the political opposition went into there is still uncertainty about the exact nature and tim- H action. Kliasbulatov launched a remarkable ing of last week's events, it is very likely that the actions wave of anti-reform legislation: the Parliament sus- of Kliasbulatov, Chernomyrdin and Cerashchenko are pended privatization, tripled the budget deficit and linked even if not tightly coordinated. Chernomyrdin declared part of Ukraine to be Russian territory. has repeatedly defended the Central Bank's actions to Although Khasbulatov himself lacks a constituency (his Yeltsin and to the public. In the grand tradition of the native Chechenskaya has seceded from Russia and has big lie, Kliasbulatov has taken to television to denounce repudiated him as its representative), he was able to Federov as the cause of the Central Bank's actions. accomplish this feat because he runs the Parliament as Meanwhile, within the government, C^hernomyrdin a private satrap. He feathers the nests of the members seems to be maneuvering with conservative ministers with apartments, cars and travel visas, and is their best such as Oleg Lobov, an old (Communist apparatchik, to guarantee against the mortal threat of new elections, hi try to overtake Federov's overall reform program. return, he merely demands unanimous voting support. The Ontral Bank's monetary reform came just a day e're left to wonder: Can Gerashchenko really after the close of Parliament. On the evening of Friday, believe the nonsense he propounds? The sad July 23, Gerashchenko formally notified the govern- answer is: Maybe. The man is economically ment and the president's office of the intention to ban illiterate: his background is disbursing cheap all pre-1993 ruble notes the following day, and to allow Wcredits to Russian industrial enterprises and schinoo/.- only a partial conversion of the old notes into new ing with foreign bankers. But he is also a liar and a notes. The finance minister and the president were out political intriguer—like so many in the Old Guard. His of town, and the conservative prime minister, Viktor "real" \iews are always subject to doubt, and his future Chernomyrdin, convened a government meeting with- actions impenetrable. out even notifying the Finance Ministry. The prime WTiat the past couple of weeks tell us is that elite pol- minister hurriedly declared the government's assent to itics alone will not rescue Russian reform. Wliat's the move, despite the absence of documents or inde- needed for decisive progress is a breakthrotigh to new pendent analysis. The move was announced the next elections that can retire most of the old guard. Yeltsin day, to public hostility and panic, a.s millions of Russians should simply declare an election date later this fall, contemplated the sudden confiscation of part of their even without a formal legislative mandate for new elec- currency holdings. tions. The public is so disgusted with the Parliament Not only is the method of money control—confisca- that Yeltsin would most likely prevail in setting the new tion—as primitive as can be imagined, but the real key election date, just as he prevailed last April in calling a to controlling the money supply lies in limiting Central referendum despite the bitter objections and mancu- Bank credit to finance the budget deficit. This was verings of the Parliament. being done in a careful program agreed to with the IMK The West can do little at this point, except to spell and negotiated over several weeks. (During that time, out the stakes clearly to Yeltsin and hold back on finan- the Central Bank never broached its "alternative" pol- cial aid to the Russian government until the reformers icy.) And after Yeltsin's watering down of the decree, vir- are more strongly in place. (Private sector projects tually all old notes will be converted to new notes any- should continue, however.) Most urgently, the next way. Rubles held in the neighboring republics are round of IMF money should be put on ice until the On- currently flooding into Russia via black markets to be tral Bank is clearly under the reformers' control, with converted into 1993 bills.
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