Biting Into Forbidden Fruit
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Analyse De Maliciels Sur Android Par L'analyse De La Mémoire Vive
Analyse de maliciels sur Android par l’analyse de la mémoire vive Mémoire Bernard Lebel Maîtrise en informatique Maître ès sciences (M. Sc.) Québec, Canada © Bernard Lebel, 2018 Analyse de maliciels sur Android par l’analyse de la mémoire vive Mémoire Bernard Lebel Sous la direction de: Mohamed Mejri, directeur de recherche Résumé Les plateformes mobiles font partie intégrante du quotidien. Leur flexibilité a permis aux développeurs d’applications d’y proposer des applications de toutes sortes : productivité, jeux, messageries, etc. Devenues des outils connectés d’agrégation d’informations personnelles et professionnelles, ces plateformes sont perçues comme un écosystème lucratif par les concepteurs de maliciels. Android est un système d’exploitation libre de Google visant le marché des appareils mobiles et est l’une des cibles de ces attaques, en partie grâce à la popularité de celui- ci. Dans la mesure où les maliciels Android constituent une menace pour les consommateurs, il est essentiel que la recherche visant l’analyse de maliciels s’intéresse spécifiquement à cette plateforme mobile. Le travail réalisé dans le cadre de cette maîtrise s’est intéressé à cette problématique, et plus spécifiquement par l’analyse de la mémoire vive. À cette fin, il a fallu s’intéresser aux tendances actuelles en matière de maliciels sur Android et les approches d’analyses statiques et dynamiques présentes dans la littérature. Il a été, par la suite, proposé d’explorer l’analyse de la mémoire vive appliquée à l’analyse de maliciels comme un complément aux approches actuelles. Afin de démontrer l’intérêt de l’approche pour la plateforme Android, une étude de cas a été réalisée où un maliciel expérimental a été conçu pour exprimer les comportements malicieux problématiques pour la plupart des approches relevées dans la littérature. -
A History of End-To-End Encryption and the Death of PGP
25/05/2020 A history of end-to-end encryption and the death of PGP Hey! I'm David, a security engineer at the Blockchain team of Facebook (https://facebook.com/), previously a security consultant for the Cryptography Services of NCC Group (https://www.nccgroup.com). I'm also the author of the Real World Cryptography book (https://www.manning.com/books/real-world- cryptography?a_aid=Realworldcrypto&a_bid=ad500e09). This is my blog about cryptography and security and other related topics that I Ûnd interesting. A history of end-to-end encryption and If you don't know where to start, you might want to check these popular the death of PGP articles: posted January 2020 - How did length extension attacks made it 1981 - RFC 788 - Simple Mail Transfer Protocol into SHA-2? (/article/417/how-did-length- extension-attacks-made-it-into-sha-2/) (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc788) (SMTP) is published, - Speed and Cryptography the standard for email is born. (/article/468/speed-and-cryptography/) - What is the BLS signature scheme? (/article/472/what-is-the-bls-signature- This is were everything starts, we now have an open peer-to-peer scheme/) protocol that everyone on the internet can use to communicate. - Zero'ing memory, compiler optimizations and memset_s (/article/419/zeroing-memory- compiler-optimizations-and-memset_s/) 1991 - The 9 Lives of Bleichenbacher's CAT: New Cache ATtacks on TLS Implementations The US government introduces the 1991 Senate Bill 266, (/article/461/the-9-lives-of-bleichenbachers- which attempts to allow "the Government to obtain the cat-new-cache-attacks-on-tls- plain text contents of voice, data, and other implementations/) - How to Backdoor Di¸e-Hellman: quick communications when appropriately authorized by law" explanation (/article/360/how-to-backdoor- from "providers of electronic communications services di¸e-hellman-quick-explanation/) and manufacturers of electronic communications - Tamarin Prover Introduction (/article/404/tamarin-prover-introduction/) service equipment". -
Wsemail: a Retrospective on a System for Secure Internet Messaging Based on Web Services
WSEmail: A Retrospective on a System for Secure Internet Messaging Based on Web Services Michael J. May Kevin D. Lux Kinneret Academic College University of Pennsylvania, Rowan University [email protected] [email protected] Carl A. Gunter University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign [email protected] Abstract 1 Introduction Web services are a mature technology nearing their Web services offer an opportunity to redesign a va- twentieth birthday. They have created the founda- riety of older systems to exploit the advantages of a tion for highly interoperable distributed systems to flexible, extensible, secure set of standards. In this communicate over the Internet using standardized work we revisit WSEmail, a system proposed over protocols (e.g. SOAP, JSON) and security mech- ten years ago to improve email by redesigning it as anisms (e.g. OAuth (IETF RFC 6749), XMLD- a family of web services. WSEmail offers an alterna- SIG [5]). Legacy systems and protocols must be tive vision of how instant messaging and email ser- reevaluated to see how they can benefit from mod- vices could have evolved, offering security, extensi- ern architectures, standards, and tools. As a case bility, and openness in a distributed environment in- study of such an analysis and redesign, we present stead of the hardened walled gardens that today's an expanded study of WSEmail [20], electronic mail rich messaging systems have become. WSEmail's ar- redesigned as a family of web services we first imple- chitecture, especially its automatic plug-in download mented and presented in 2005. feature allows for rich extensions without changing the base protocol or libraries. -
How Secure Is Textsecure?
How Secure is TextSecure? Tilman Frosch∗y, Christian Mainkay, Christoph Badery, Florian Bergsmay,Jorg¨ Schwenky, Thorsten Holzy ∗G DATA Advanced Analytics GmbH firstname.lastname @gdata.de f g yHorst Gortz¨ Institute for IT-Security Ruhr University Bochum firstname.lastname @rub.de f g Abstract—Instant Messaging has gained popularity by users without providing any kind of authentication. Today, many for both private and business communication as low-cost clients implement only client-to-server encryption via TLS, short message replacement on mobile devices. However, until although security mechanisms like Off the Record (OTR) recently, most mobile messaging apps did not protect confi- communication [3] or SCIMP [4] providing end-to-end con- dentiality or integrity of the messages. fidentiality and integrity are available. Press releases about mass surveillance performed by intelli- With the advent of smartphones, low-cost short-message gence services such as NSA and GCHQ motivated many people alternatives that use the data channel to communicate, to use alternative messaging solutions to preserve the security gained popularity. However, in the context of mobile ap- and privacy of their communication on the Internet. Initially plications, the assumption of classical instant messaging, fueled by Facebook’s acquisition of the hugely popular mobile for instance, that both parties are online at the time the messaging app WHATSAPP, alternatives claiming to provide conversation takes place, is no longer necessarily valid. secure communication experienced a significant increase of new Instead, the mobile context requires solutions that allow for users. asynchronous communication, where a party may be offline A messaging app that claims to provide secure instant for a prolonged time. -
Is Bob Sending Mixed Signals?
Is Bob Sending Mixed Signals? Michael Schliep Ian Kariniemi Nicholas Hopper University of Minnesota University of Minnesota University of Minnesota [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT Demand for end-to-end secure messaging has been growing rapidly and companies have responded by releasing applications that imple- ment end-to-end secure messaging protocols. Signal and protocols based on Signal dominate the secure messaging applications. In this work we analyze conversational security properties provided by the Signal Android application against a variety of real world ad- versaries. We identify vulnerabilities that allow the Signal server to learn the contents of attachments, undetectably re-order and drop messages, and add and drop participants from group conversations. We then perform proof-of-concept attacks against the application to demonstrate the practicality of these vulnerabilities, and suggest mitigations that can detect our attacks. The main conclusion of our work is that we need to consider more than confidentiality and integrity of messages when designing future protocols. We also stress that protocols must protect against compromised servers and at a minimum implement a trust but verify model. 1 INTRODUCTION (a) Alice’s view of the conversa-(b) Bob’s view of the conversa- Recently many software developers and companies have been inte- tion. tion. grating end-to-end encrypted messaging protocols into their chat applications. Some applications implement a proprietary protocol, Figure 1: Speaker inconsistency in a conversation. such as Apple iMessage [1]; others, such as Cryptocat [7], imple- ment XMPP OMEMO [17]; but most implement the Signal protocol or a protocol based on Signal, including Open Whisper Systems’ caching. -
Zerohack Zer0pwn Youranonnews Yevgeniy Anikin Yes Men
Zerohack Zer0Pwn YourAnonNews Yevgeniy Anikin Yes Men YamaTough Xtreme x-Leader xenu xen0nymous www.oem.com.mx www.nytimes.com/pages/world/asia/index.html www.informador.com.mx www.futuregov.asia www.cronica.com.mx www.asiapacificsecuritymagazine.com Worm Wolfy Withdrawal* WillyFoReal Wikileaks IRC 88.80.16.13/9999 IRC Channel WikiLeaks WiiSpellWhy whitekidney Wells Fargo weed WallRoad w0rmware Vulnerability Vladislav Khorokhorin Visa Inc. Virus Virgin Islands "Viewpointe Archive Services, LLC" Versability Verizon Venezuela Vegas Vatican City USB US Trust US Bankcorp Uruguay Uran0n unusedcrayon United Kingdom UnicormCr3w unfittoprint unelected.org UndisclosedAnon Ukraine UGNazi ua_musti_1905 U.S. Bankcorp TYLER Turkey trosec113 Trojan Horse Trojan Trivette TriCk Tribalzer0 Transnistria transaction Traitor traffic court Tradecraft Trade Secrets "Total System Services, Inc." Topiary Top Secret Tom Stracener TibitXimer Thumb Drive Thomson Reuters TheWikiBoat thepeoplescause the_infecti0n The Unknowns The UnderTaker The Syrian electronic army The Jokerhack Thailand ThaCosmo th3j35t3r testeux1 TEST Telecomix TehWongZ Teddy Bigglesworth TeaMp0isoN TeamHav0k Team Ghost Shell Team Digi7al tdl4 taxes TARP tango down Tampa Tammy Shapiro Taiwan Tabu T0x1c t0wN T.A.R.P. Syrian Electronic Army syndiv Symantec Corporation Switzerland Swingers Club SWIFT Sweden Swan SwaggSec Swagg Security "SunGard Data Systems, Inc." Stuxnet Stringer Streamroller Stole* Sterlok SteelAnne st0rm SQLi Spyware Spying Spydevilz Spy Camera Sposed Spook Spoofing Splendide -
Online Anonymity Islamic State and Surveillance
online anonymity islamic state and surveillance Jamie Bartlett Alex Krasodomski-Jones March 2015 Open Access. Some rights reserved. As the publisher of this work, Demos wants to encourage the circulation of our work as widely as possible while retaining the copyright. We therefore have an open access policy which enables anyone to access our content online without charge. Anyone can download, save, perform or distribute this work in any format, including translation, without written permission. This is subject to the terms of the Demos licence found at the back of this publication. Its main conditions are: . Demos and the author(s) are credited . This summary and the address www.demos.co.uk are displayed . The text is not altered and is used in full . The work is not resold . A copy of the work or link to its use online is sent to Demos. You are welcome to ask for permission to use this work for purposes other than those covered by the licence. Demos gratefully acknowledges the work of Creative Commons in inspiring our approach to copyright. To find out more go to www.creativecommons.org Partners Credits Commissioned by? Published by Demos March 2015 © Demos. Some rights reserved. Third Floor Magdalen House 136 Tooley Street London SE1 2TU [email protected] www.demos.co.uk 2 INTRODUCTION This is a very short discussion paper about the way in which terrorist groups, and specifically Islamic State, use modern encryption systems to evade surveillance. It examines how the risks of online anonymity are weighed against its many social, personal and economic benefits. -
How the Best Hackers Learn Their Craft
#RSAC SESSION ID: HUM-F02 HOW THE BEST HACKERS LEARN THEIR CRAFT David Brumley CEO, ForAllSecure Professor, Carnegie Mellon University @thedavidbrumley George Hotz • First IPhone JailBreak • Playstation 3 • Zero-days in Adobe, Firefox, … Image Credit: https://goo.gl/rhmFEb 2 Richard Zhu • Mozilla Firefox (’18) • Microsoft Edge (‘17 & ’18) • iOS Safari (‘17) Image Credit: https://goo.gl/yY5FRg 3 #1 US Team since 2011 #1 Overall 3 of past 7 years 4 DEFCON wins – most wins in DEFCON history 4 Learning Objectives #RSAC 1. Understand how top experts use capture the flag competitions for deliberate practice. 2. See how hacking competitions gamify learning computer security. 3. Learn how to set up a system for building a top-ranked hacker culture. 5 Basic Knowledge Question Flag 6 Basic Knowledge Answer: FAT 7 Jeopardy-Style CTF Categories Basic Reverse Network Program Cryptography Forensics Difficulty Knowledge engineering security Exploitation Caesar Cipher ... ... ... ... ... 10 pts Frequency analysis ... ... ... ... ... 20 pts RSA Encryption ... ... ... ... ... 40 pts RSA Low Exponent ... ... ... ... ... 100 pts 8 Gamify Learning 9 1 Applied, deliberate practice CTF Principles 2 Autodidactic learning 3 Creative problem solving 10 1 Applied, deliberate practice Reverse Network Program Cryptography Forensics engineering security Exploitation 11 ”Buffer Overflow” User input size programmed Class: 90 minutes lecture 1. Sophomore course 10 bytes 2. Students understand concept long Challenge: Apply knowledge 50 bytes long 1. Real program buffer size? 2. Create long user input? User input given 3. Create specific attack input? 4. … 12 CTF Problem: Show You Can Do It 13 2 Autodidactic Learning Auto: self didactic: learn 14 Romantic, but not real Image: http://www.starwars.com/news/6-great-quotes-about-the-force 2 Auto-didactic Learning Richard didn’t know either. -
Thesis (844.6Kb)
ABSTRACT You Should Have Expected Us – An Explanation of Anonymous Alex Gray Director: Linda Adams; PhD Anonymous is a decentralized activist collective that has evolved using the technology of the information age. This paper traces its origins as a way of contextualizing and better understanding its actions. The groups composition is examined using its self‐ascribed imagery to illustrate its’ unique culture and relational norms. Its structure and motivation are analyzed using the framework developed for social movements and terrorist networks. Finally a discussion of a splinter cell and official reaction delineate both strengths and weaknesses of the movement while suggesting its future development. The conclusion serves to expound on the ideal end for the online anonymous community as a new frontier in meritocratic activism. APPROVED BY DIRECTOR OF HONORS THESIS: ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Dr. Linda Adams, Department of Political Science APPROVED BY THE HONORS PROGRAM: ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Dr. Andrew Wisely, Director. DATE: ________________________ YOU SHOULD HAVE EXPECTED US AN EXPLANATION OF ANONYMOUS A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Baylor University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Honors Program By Alex Gray Waco, Texas May 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface iii Acknowledgements iv Dedication v CHAPTER ONE 1 Introduction CHAPTER TWO 4 The Story of Anonymous CHAPTER THREE 20 A Group with No Head and No Members CHAPTER FOUR 39 Activists or Terrorists CHAPTER FIVE 56 Distraction, Diversion, Division CHAPTER SIX 67 Conclusion Bibliography 71 ii PREFACE Writing a paper about a decentralized, online collective of similarly minded individuals presents a unique set of challenges. In spending so much time with this subject, it is my goal to be both intellectually honest and as thorough as I can be. -
Hacktivism Cyberspace Has Become the New Medium for Political Voices
White Paper Hacktivism Cyberspace has become the new medium for political voices By François Paget, McAfee Labs™ Table of Contents The Anonymous Movement 4 Origins 4 Defining the movement 6 WikiLeaks meets Anonymous 7 Fifteen Months of Activity 10 Arab Spring 10 HBGary 11 The Sony ordeal 11 Lulz security and denouncements 12 Groups surrounding LulzSec 13 Green rights 14 Other operations 15 AntiSec, doxing, and copwatching 16 Police responses 17 Anonymous in the streets 18 Manipulation and pluralism 20 Operation Megaupload 21 Communications 21 Social networks and websites 21 IRC 22 Anonymity 23 DDoS Tools 24 Cyberdissidents 25 Telecomix 26 Other achievements 27 Patriots and Cyberwarriors 28 Backlash against Anonymous 29 TeaMp0isoN 30 Other achievements 30 Conclusion 32 2 Hacktivism What is hacktivism? It combines politics, the Internet, and other elements. Let’s start with the political. Activism, a political movement emphasising direct action, is the inspiration for hacktivism. Think of Greenpeace activists who go to sea to disrupt whaling campaigns. Think of the many demonstrators who protested against human rights violations in China by trying to put out the Olympic flame during its world tour in 2008. Think of the thousands of activists who responded to the Adbusters call in July 2011 to peacefully occupy a New York City park as part of Occupy Wall Street. Adding the online activity of hacking (with both good and bad connotations) to political activism gives us hacktivism. One source claims this term was first used in an article on the filmmaker Shu Lea Cheang; the article was written by Jason Sack and published in InfoNation in 1995. -
Going Dark: Impact to Intelligence and Law Enforcement and Threat Mitigation
GOING DARK: IMPACT TO INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THREAT MITIGATION Bonnie Mitchell Krystle Kaul G. S. McNamara Michelle Tucker Jacqueline Hicks Colin Bliss Rhonda Ober Danell Castro Amber Wells Catalina Reguerin Cindy Green-Ortiz Ken Stavinoha ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to first thank the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) for its generous funding and support for our study and learning journey to the DEFCON hacking conference. We are also very grateful to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for its support during the duration of the program. We could not have completed this study without the unwavering support and dedication of Ms. Bonnie Mitchell, ODNI Deputy National Intelligence Manager for the Western Hemisphere and the Homeland, our devoted Team Champion who steered us throughout this study and helped turn an idea into a product. We would like to acknowledge and thank each member of our public-private sector working group for their tireless efforts from around the U.S., which includes Krystle Kaul, G. S. McNamara, Michelle Tucker, Jacqueline Hicks, Colin Bliss, Rhonda Ober, Danell Castro, Amber Wells, Catalina Reguerin, Cindy Green- Ortiz and Ken Stavinoha. We are very thankful for all the unique insight we received from interviewees who contributed to this report by educating our group on the many aspects of ‘going dark,’ and we take full responsibility for any and all errors of fact or interpretation implied or explicit in this paper. Our interviewees include the Village sponsors at DEF CON, private sector industry experts and government officials. We are thankful for the interesting and diverse perspectives particularly from senior government officials and private sector experts. -
Introduction to Computer Security
CSCI-UA.9480: Introduction to Computer Security Spring 2019 Instructor: Nadim Kobeissi Office Hours: TBA, TBA – TBA. Email: [email protected] Office Number: Room TBA. Course Information: • Course number and section: CSCI-UA9480. • Course title: Introduction to Computer Security. • Course description: Technology increasingly permeates every aspect of our lives, including commu- nication, finance and health. The security of the computer systems that enable these services has become a critical issue. This course will cover basic principles of computer security and security engineering. It will introduce fundamental computer security concepts, principles, and techniques. It will also cover notions of real-world cryptography, the mathematical building blocks that underlie any digital security construction. This course will focus on security from an attacker’s perspective (threat modeling) and the defender’s perspective (building and deploying secure systems). Specific topics will include operating system security, network security, web security, applied cryptography, security economics and security psychology. Course projects will focus both on writing secure code and exploiting insecure code. • Prerequistes: CSCI-UA.0201 (Computer Systems Organization) and experience with computer sys- tems level programming languages (e.g. C, and C++ programming). Recommended prerequisite courses include CSCI-UA.0202 (Operating Systems), and CSCI-UA.0480-009 (Computer Networks). Experience with web development will also be helpful. • Class meeting days and times: Mondays and Wednesdays, 3:00pm – 4:30pm. Room TBA. • Course website: https://computersecurity.paris. Course Overview and Goals: Upon completion of this course, students will be able to: • Understand the basic principles of computer security. • Understand the basic principles of the cryptographic constructions underlying modern computer security.