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Richard Rorty's Liberalism : a Marxist Perspective

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Richard Rorty's Liberalism : a Marxist Perspective University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1997 Richard Rorty's liberalism : a Marxist perspective. Markar. Melkonian University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Melkonian, Markar., "Richard Rorty's liberalism : a Marxist perspective." (1997). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2299. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2299 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RICHARD RORTY'S LIBERALISM A MARXIST PERSPECTIVE A Dissertation Presented by MARKAR MELKON1AN Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY February 1997 Philosophy © Copyright by Markar Melkoman 1997 All Rights Reserved RICHARD RORTY’S LIBERALISM A MARXIST PERSPECTIVE A Dissertation Presented by MARKAR MELKONIAN Approved as to style and content by: 4 Thomas Wartenburg, Member /lyCX' Robert Paul Wolff, Mempe, John Robison, Department Head Department of Philosophy ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the members of my committee, John Brentlinger, Ann Ferguson, Tom Wartenberg and Robert Paul Wolff for their help. 1 want to thank Kanchana Mahadevan for her encouragement, Richard Rorty for his assistance, and John Brentlinger again for his unusual forbearance, as well as advice that spared me much trouble. Finally, 1 want to thank Suzy Melkoman for her unusual patience. This dissertation is dedicated to Charles and Zabelle Melkoman, in loving memory of Monte. IV ABSTRACT RICHARD RORTY’S LIBERALISM A MARXIST PERSPECTIVE FEBRUARY 1997 MARKAR MELKON1AN, A.B., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES M.A., SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Directed by: Professor John Brentlinger A sympathetic reviewer has noted that the best a critic of Rorty can do is to compare his views invidiously to alternative views. Taking this advice to heart, I contrast Rorty' s social and political views to Dewey's, and then to an alternative account which I elaborate. My standards of comparison are two liberal ideals than according which, to Rorty, none others are higher. These are. ( 1 ) amelioration of suffering, and (2) leaving people alone to pursue their own visions of personal perfection. In Chapter One, I point out that there are significant differences between Rorty and his alleged progenitor, Dewey, notably when it comes to their respective conceptions of how to harmonize personal freedom with public responsibility. Unlike Dewey, Rorty advocates abandoning the attempt to fuse the public realm of altruism and the private realm of sublimity by means of one all-encompassing theory. In Chapter Two, 1 argue that the existing liberal democracies Rorty is concerned to defend bear little resemblance to his democratic utopia, in which "the quest for autonomy is impeded as little as possible by social institutions.” I introduce an alternative vocabulary, according to which political institutions, broadly conceived, traverse nearly the entire length and breadth of the private sphere in the north Atlantic democracies. In Chapter Three, 1 argue that existing liberal democracies fare little better with reference to Rorty's public ideal of ameliorating suffering than they did with reference to his private ideal of making room for self making. Then 1 suggest an alternative setup which I believe to be more promising for purposes of ameliorating suffering. In the final chapter, I argue that Rorty’s private role as ironist and his public role as self-described apologist for bourgeois liberal democracy are not so much incommensurable as they are incompatible. The better he fulfills one role, I argue, the more seriously he compromises the other. VI . TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS , v ABSTRACT . V Chapter INTRODUCTION 1 Framing the Conversation 4 Three Anti-Isms 10 Rorty’s“We’s” 24 1 DEPARTURES FROM DEWEY 35 Dewey and the Public/Private Split 38 Dewey on Liberty and Democracy 49 Rorty on Liberty and Democracy 60 2. THE ELUSIVE IDEAL OF FREEDOM 85 Depicting the Apolitical Private Sphere 88 State Power and the Private Sphere 97 Privatization and Socialism 113 Private Selfhood and Ideology 129 3. THE ILLUSIVE IDEAL OF DECENCY 143 Liberalism and Suffering 146 The Solemn Complement of Liberal Ideals 154 Going beyond Liberalism 168 4. OF LIGHT MINDS AND HEAVY HANDS 176 Rorty’s Politics 176 Rorty’ s Incompatible Roles 196 BIBLIOGRAPHY 214 vii . INTRODUCTION Until recently, the best known liberal thinkers from Locke to the present have imagined liberalism as standing on “the grounding in natural law, the appeal to the light of reason, the evocation of homo humanus Their opponents, from Robert 2 Filmer to the Frankfurters, have disputed this characterization. Critics both on the right and the left have endeavored to show that Reason does not dictate the practices and institutions associated with liberalism and human nature does not 2. legitimate them, the assumption being that this in itself constitutes a definitive indictment of liberalism. In recent years, however, some self-described liberals themselves have abandoned the familiar philosophical rationales for their tradition. While conceding that liberalism is no more rooted in universal reason or human nature than any other 1 ) Comay, p. 120. A wide variety of beliefs and authors have been associated in various contexts with the word liberal and its cognates. I will offer a few preliminary words of clarification forthwith and expand on them in Chapters One and Two. ) Refer to Filmer, pp. 251-308, and to Rorty's discussion of Horkheimer and Adorno in Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (henceforth CIS), pp. 56-7. All source references from Rorty's works are listed by title or abbreviated title and appear chronologically under the author’s entry in the bibliography below. All other references appear under the name of the author. political creed, they have nevertheless maintained their allegiance to liberal institutions and counseled others to do so, too. Richard Rorty may be counted among the latter category of liberal His particular defense of liberalism does not depend for its force on claims to be grounded in reason, or on epistemological guarantees or transcultural and ahistoncal notions of human nature. He tells us he wants to “retain Enlightenment liberalism while dropping Enlightenment 4 rationalism.” Thus, what he has to say in defense of liberalism is likely to be received with sympathy by an audience which, having read lots of books by, say, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and the communitarians, has come to doubt still-prevalent enlightenment assumptions about human nature, community, historical progress and so on—assumptions which traditionally have been deployed to repel attacks against liberalism. Moreover, if it turns out that Rorty's case against Philosophy with a capital “P”~that is, roughly, his case against foundational ism, representationalism and essentialism discussed below in this mtroduction-is incompatible with alternative political and social views, then so much the worse for those alternative views. If, on the other hand, the discussion in the following pages succeeds in breaching Rorty’s defense of liberalism, then readers whom he has convinced to abandon more traditional defenses might well register this as a blow against liberalism per se. What is at stake in the present discussion, then, is the defensibility of liberalism when it is stripped of its familiar enlightenment rationales. 3.) Refer, for example, to Rorty, “Dewey between Hegel and Darwin,” p. 68, and to his paper, “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism.” 4.) CIS, p. 57. 5 Rorty understands a liberal, in its occasional meaning borrowed from Judith Shklar, to be a person who thinks that ‘'cruelty is the worst thing we do.” He also uses liberal and its cognates to describe certain actual and imaginary' political set- ups. These include his preferred utopia, characterized by the public and private ideals introduced in Chapter One, as well as a number of existing institutions characteristic of what Rorty, following Roberto Unger, has dubbed the “rich North " f Atlantic ' democracies Rorty holds these institutions to be paradigmatically liberal. In the course ot this discussion, it will become increasingly clear that there are discrepancies between Judith Shklar's liberals and the institutions and practices ot the “rich North Atlantic democracies.” Before proceeding to examine Rorty’s defense of liberalism, a few words are in order to frame the discussion in relation to the larger body of his own writings on other topics. In the balance of this introduction, 1 will do several things: After saying a few more words in the first section about why it is worthwhile to take a serious look at Rorty’s social and political views, I will indicate gesturally in what 5. respect I agree with him and why. This will motivate the discussion in the chapters 6. that follow and help to narrow its scope. Remarks in the second section about his views on some chief concerns of analytic philosophy segue to related observations in the third and final
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