APPROVAL VOTING WITH CLUSTER SEATS (AV/CS) A Non-Competitive Voting System for Ontario (Presentation to the Ontario Citizens Assembly on Electoral Reform) Chris Bradshaw, Ottawa, Ontario, January 15, 2007
INTRODUCTION:
I have been interested in voting systems since I attended university – where we elected our student council using something called “fractional redistribution” – and since coming to Ottawa in 1969 and experiencing a voting system which allowed citizens to vote for two ward-council candidates and for four board of controllers. More recently, I have been active in the Green Party, which has championed alternative voting systems that would reduce strategic voting that Greens feel deprive it of votes, let alone any chance of electing MLAs. I have a degree in political science and worked most of my life doing public consultation in municipal planning. Also, I have run provincially twice, in 1999 and 2003, in the Ottawa Centre seat, finishing with the highest % of votes of any GPO candidate both times. I am not, however, speaking for the party tonight.
It was the old City of Ottawa voting experience that is at the basis of the system I propose today. On the one hand, it preventing voters from marking more names than there were seats to be filled, but, on the other, candidates and their supporters urged voters to mark fewer names, a practice called “plumping.” Why should a voter’s ballot be declared ‘spoiled’ if they marked more choices than permitted, but not if they voted for fewer? How many voters marked more names than seats and effectively lost their voting franchise? In fact, why would we devise a voting system that would declare any ballots spoiled? Does marking more than one co-equal choice give that voter more (read undemocratic) power than another voter marking fewer than allowed? No, since marking extra choices simply dilutes one’s vote, while still adhering to the democratic principle of voter fairness: no voter should be able to affect the relative standing between the candidates by more than a unit of one.
CANDIDATE COMPETITION:
When we force voters to either mark only one candidate or even to rank-order them, we are making the candidates more competitive than we need to, and that behaviour taints both election campaigns and the behaviour of parties and their parliamentarians, worried that if they do something good with another party, they could be helping their ‘enemy.’ Minority governments would work better – and last longer – if parties could more easily find common ground on a limited legislative agenda for as long as it took to get it into law, after which the largest party could find new coalition partners for additional legislative work. When candidates see a vote for another candidate as being a lost vote for himself, it induces attempts to get voters to dislike the alternatives; and failing that, to at least discourage the voter from casting a ballot at all! There is too much winner-take-all attitude in politics; only the most partisan voters subscribe to that principle; the rest are just turned off by it and by the behaviour of politicians and their supporters to gain – or stay in – power at all costs. Voter participation is hurt by this.
Ironically, this forced choice on the ballot is not reflected in our other laws and practices: voters can financially support more than one party or candidate, and still receive full tax credits; voters can work for more than one candidate; voters can post signs for multiple candidates on their lawn, and even hold a membership in more than one party (although the parties specifically forbid it, it is impossible to
Approval Voting with Cluster Seats (AV/CS) Bradshaw, Ottawa, January 16, 2007 enforce); and they can mix and match. The supposedly ‘normal’ human propensity to search for the one choice that is “best” was successfully challenged by Herbert Simon of Carnegie-Mellon University won the Nobel Prize in Economics for discovering that people do more ‘satisficing’ (finding the most available option that is ‘good enough’) than optimizing. I urge the Assembly to opt for my proposal that includes approval voting; allowing voters to mark each choice that they are satisfied with seems more practical than forcing them to arrive at “the best,” while still accommodating those that do want to make the extra effort.
THE PROPOSED SYSTEM (Approval Voting with Cluster Seats, or AV/CS1):
I have for some time concluded that all system used by countries or their provinces/states had serious limitations. I believe I have one that avoid their drawbacks, a unique system that could become Ontario’s gift to the democratic world. It consists of the following:
* The total number of seats will be divided up: my preference is for 2/3 of seats being local constituency seats and 1/3 being “cluster seats” determined by recycling ‘unused’ votes.
* Ballots allow voters to mark as many candidates as they want (including marking all or marking none). Each mark is called an “approval” since voters are only indicating which choices they approve of. [cf. http://www.approvalvoting.org/]
* The local seat is awarded to the candidates with the most ‘approvals,’ but only if that candidate is approved by a majority of those casting ballots. Seats in constituencies that don’t meet the majority criteria become – until the next general election – a “cluster” seat.
* All approvals not used to determine the winner go into the provincial ‘pot.’ Includes are approvals for those not winning, as well as approvals cast for winning candidates that exceed either the majority criterion or exceed those garnered by the second-place candidate.
* Elections Ontario divides the ‘pot’ among the ‘unused’ approvals, after adding to the cluster seats those local seats that could not be awarded, due to the lack of a majority for any of the candidates. Each party then divide the constituencies they did not win into the number of geographically contiguous (regional) clusters equal to the number of cluster seats they earned. Elections Ontario then names that party’s constituency candidate in that cluster of constituencies that had the highest percentage of approvals in their own race (using percentage rather than absolute number of approvals ensures that different populations or different voter turnouts do not become a factor).
The result is that voters have a local MLA for their constituency and a cluster MLA for each other party whose candidate they approved of. There are no province-wide MLAs or double ballots (e.g., MMP).
1 I submitted an earlier paper on this system to the Law Commission of Canada in the winter of 2003 Approval Voting with Cluster Seats (AV/CS) Bradshaw, Ottawa, January 16, 2007 ANALYSIS:
Approval voting is an old concept that has only recently become used in professional societies, together representing 450,000 professionals. The secretary-general of the U.N. is also elected via AV. The use of ‘unused votes’ is borrowed from the single-transferrable vote (STV).
Using the guide’s list of criteria (plus two additional criteria), here is my assessment of my system:
1. Legitimacy – This is probably the most difficult to predict, since the confidence of the electorate comes only with experience. It is the simplest and most transparent.
2. Fairness of Representation – AC/CS is better than any at reflecting every voter preference with equal weight. It also provides every MLA with a clear constituency, either all the voters in a constituency, or all the voters of his party in several adjacent constituencies. And, because all ‘unused’ approvals get a second life, no vote is wasted and no ‘safe’ (i.e., lopsided and unvarying support for a particular party) vote or electoral district is taken for granted, and therefore ignored. FPTP is also unfair because it discourages small parties with wide geographical appeal and a positive message, while it encourages smaller parties with regional appeal and negative messages.
3. Voter Choice – I find both FPTP’s one-choice limitation and STV’s and alternative-voting’s rank- order voting to be confusing, confining, and intimidating. Approval voting overcomes these problems. First, there is no spoiled ballots, since multiple choices are allowed, and any kind of unambiguous mark is acceptable. Second, there is no chance that, on long rank-order ballots (e.g., STV), a voter will use a number twice, or leave out a number in sequence. Third, the voter is not placed into a moral dilemma, where he has to act ‘strategically,’ either by eliminating in his mind less popular (in other voters’ minds) choices, or to rank the choices in a way to have the most impact on the results. With my system, every mark has an equal impact, with no ‘pecking order.’ With AV, voters are able to give their support to candidates that are effective legislators and to those with their policy priorities. To be able to voice the what as well as the who of the next government is liberating to not just the voter, but the people elected.
4. Effective Parties – I would ask, if FPTP is so satisfactory, why is it not used by any Canadian party to elect its leaders or its candidates? And, compared to list systems, AV/CS denies parties the prerogative to guarantee the election of unpopular candidates by putting them at the top of their fixed-lists.
5. Stable and Effective Government – FPTP does best of any to create majority governments, but it does so only by skewing election results in a way that growing numbers of voters say is not legitimate. On the other hand, since all the alternatives reduce the chance for majorities, you want a voting system that engenders parties and candidates to better prepare for working across party lines, to find a majority of parliamentarians who can agree on a particular initiative. AV/CS is the most successful, as the voter does not have to treat the choices as mutually exclusive. No other system does that.
6. Effective Parliament – My system does this best, thanks to the cooperative nature of AV/CS ballot structure. Candidates and parties that are both clear about their priorities and committed to work with other parties will be the most successful at getting ‘approvals’; those who campaign negatively
Approval Voting with Cluster Seats (AV/CS) Bradshaw, Ottawa, January 26, 2007 will be ‘punished’ as not having the attitude to allow a coalition government to work. At the same time, parties that try to please all voters’ priorities with overly long platforms will do more poorly than those with clearer agendas that suggest what their priorities are. Although FPTP is given credit for parliamentary stability, its ‘reverse Robin Hood effect’ (taking from poor parties and giving to rich ones), gives inordinate power to ‘swing’ voters. Just 5% of voters shifting from the government party to another can not only cause a change in government, but large changes in the MLA population, resulting in significant discontinuities in parliamentary experience and effectiveness.
7. Stronger Voter Participation – Voter participation continues to drop. This is due to: a) the growth of negative campaigning (see point 11); b) failure to hold parties accountable (next point); c) decline in civic engagement (see Putnam), and d) a limited choice of candidates and parties that are thought of as ‘elect-able.’ One of the features of AV/CS is the ability of voters who don’t find any choice acceptable to take a ballot and then deposit it without marking any choice, thereby decreasing the chance that any candidate will reach the majority threshold. It is interesting to note that the Green Party provides for this in its internal elections by always include the choice, “NOTA” – none of the above. The GPO also is the successful party after the NDP to have a clear political philosophy that voters know is deeply committed to.
8. Accountability – AV/CS gives voters the means to support more than one choice, allowing the voter to use one or more of his choices to support a choice more for its priorities than for its ‘govern- ability.’ Without this, voters usually ignore smaller parties with clear priorities, to avoid ‘wasting’ their ballot. Under one-choice ballots or rank-order systems, those choices are discriminated against, reducing the chance that the winning party will learn about voter preferences by looking at support received by smaller parties (e.g., A winning Conservative government would become more environmental if the Green Party attracted a lot more votes that usual – but under FPTP, the Green support is always eroded at the last minute in the voting booth by citizens worried that a vote for the GPO would be wasted in deciding who the government is. Under AV/CS, the voter can influence both the who of the next government and what).
9. Simplicity, Practicality, Etc. – [Kudos to the Assembly for adding these criteria]. There is nothing simpler than voters being able to look at each name on their ballot, one at a time, and decide whether or not to give it a ‘thumb’s up’ or not, without considering the effect of their other choices. And when ballots are counted, all marks on the ballot are counted at the same time and given equal weight without considering their rank-order. And voters will feel less nervous when they know their ballot cannot be spoiled.
10. Role of MLA and Constituents (Not an Assembly criterion) – One of the strengths of FPTP is the strong unique relationship between an MLA and 40,000-60,000 voters that share a common geography. PR systems with list seats create two kinds of MLAs, one with this kind of relationship and the other without it. And STV creates large, overlapping multi-member districts that represent a single type of MLA, but a bad compromise). AV/CS, in contrast, retains both the local seats (only slightly larger than now - unless the total number of seats is increased to closer to what Ontario once had before federal ‘harmonization’) and creates cluster seats that will give each party an MLA for its supporters in that region.
11. Style of Campaigning (Not an Assembly criterion) – There has been much talk about the growth in negative campaigning. Candidates focus more on their major competitors’ faults than their own
Approval Voting with Cluster Seats (AV/CS) Bradshaw, Ottawa, January 26, 2007 strengths and defending their own record. Under all systems except AV/CS, supporters use negative info about opponents, rather than selling their own. This creates a ‘politics of resentment’, and a cycle in which the next government only has the mandate to not be like the previous one.
CONCLUSION:
I want to leave the Assembly with the clearest of messages: As much as politicians might like a winner- take-all political system, only the most partisan voters share their preference. Ironically, under FPTP, such voters’s support is taken for granted, leaving the majority of voters – who I consider non- competitive voters – to being the ‘swing’ voters that politicians during a campaign focus their platforms on. If these jaded voters were to appear on the Dr. Phil Show, he would ask them, “How’s it working for you?”
Approval Voting with Cluster Seats (AV/CS) Bradshaw, Ottawa, January 26, 2007 Annex A: SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES:
1. By-Elections: When a local MLA resigns, dies, or is barred from serving for the rest of the legislative session, Elections Ontario will hold an election in that constituency, using the same rules as for general elections, with the exception that unused approvals will go into the next general election’s provincial approvals-pool, rather than be used during the by-election, since there will be no cluster ‘pot’ activated between elections (see next). The rule requiring the winner to have majority support will not be applied in by-elections.
In the case of a cluster MLA seat being declared vacant, the seat goes – without the need for a by- election – to the candidate of the party of the departing MLA who finished second in that cluster in the previous general election.
2. A Local Race Ending in a Tie: If the tied candidates both have a majority that exceeds any other candidate’s majority, those candidates tied would simply flip a coin. The approvals of the “loser” (along with his name) would then go to the provincial pool, while those of the winner would not. No tie is possible for cluster seats.
3. Party Status: It is proposed that a party must have two or more seats to qualify as a party after an election. Those seats can be local or cluster. For a party to be awarded a cluster seat, it must have at least 6% of the cluster vote (equal to two cluster seats), or have won one local seat, in which case, it would need 3% of the cluster vote to be awarded one (province-wide) cluster seat.
4. “Orphaned” Approvals cast for Independents and for candidates whose party did not get party status: Those approvals in the provincial pool that did not win a party seat will be clustered together to create a non-party cluster seat, and the CEO will award it to the independent or non-party-status candidate with the largest voter approval. If more than one such seat is awarded, Elections Ontario will do the clustering.
5. MLAs Changing Party Affiliation – Sitting MLAs who change party affiliation would be allowed to do so (but have to face the electorate in the next election), but cluster-seat MLAs would not, since they were awarded their seat using approvals from the ‘pot’ which mostly is made up of those cast for other candidates in their party.
NOTE: Could approval voting and alternate (rank-order) voting be combined in the same ballot? Apparently they can. See Annex B for a URL reference.
Annex B: SOURCES:
* http://www.approvalvoting.org/ * http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/brams/theory_to_practice.pdf * http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/brams/approval_preference.pdf (discussion of two ways to combine preferential and approval voting) * Policy Options, August 2001 [my speech to the Institute on Research in Public Policy on electoral
Approval Voting with Cluster Seats (AV/CS) Bradshaw, Ottawa, January 26, 2007 reform, as leader, Green Party of Canada] * Putnam, Robert (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community * Milner, Henry (1999) Making Every Vote Count Annex C: “Electing” the Electoral System
Why should FPTP get a ‘bye’ into the ‘finals’ by a process in which only the ‘best’ of the alternatives is put onto a ballot with the existing system? I strongly suspect that this process will eliminate AV/CS, which is a new system with no “field experience.” Consider how many candidates enter the leadership races in major parties, thanks to a voting system on which they all appear on the first ballot. But if the government used a different ballot structure, such as AV/CS, it could include all distinct alternatives and still not ‘split’ the anti-FPTP sentiment.
To this end, I propose a process that will meld two challenges: 1) to test how people’s voting behaviour is affected by the ballot structure, and 2) to arrive at the best Ontario electoral system by using the best electoral system.
A major disappointment in the literature on electoral systems is the fact that the different outcomes asserted by those proposing new systems cannot be proven, since only one voting system can be used for each election. But since the possible electoral-reform referendum is not a regular election, and its results somewhat advisory (since there is an arbitrary 60% threshold requirement, below which the government says it only might order a change), it might afford a chance to some a relevant experiment.
This could be done by listing the election alternatives on three ballots on the same piece of paper given to each voter. I suggest three, because between all the alternatives, there are really only three ballot structures used (the MMP ballot is not relevant, since there is no party lists at play). Each ballot sections would have its own instructions: 1) the first would direct the voter to mark only one name on the ballot (FPTP), 2) the second would direct the voter to mark a priority by each name, with “1" being the first, and “6" being the lowest (alternative voting), and 3) the third directing the voter to mark as many choices as were acceptable to him as the constituent’s representative (approval voting).
Such a system would not allow for a test of list seats, list choices, or multi-member districts that are part of the single-transferrable vote (STV), but it would be good enough to use in the 2007 election to sort out voters’ preferences for the electoral system. They would be given the list of alternatives and allowed to mark their preferences under the three ballot-rule regimes that are possible. Since the results are only advisory to the Cabinet, anyway, the Cabinet would have the three outcomes to compare.
Another advantage of this process is that it emphasizes the learning aspects of this process, allowing the government to insert another process before reform is initiated (or eliminated), as a result. Surely, it is not appropriate to use a process that is less democratic than even the existing unfair system!
Annex D: List of AV/CS’s Major Advantages, in Comparison to FTPT, STV, and Alternate Vote with Lists
FACTORS FPTP STV Alternative Vote w/Lists AV/CS
1. Competitiveness of Very Less competitive (rank- Moderately, but with Much lower, as getting vote Candidates, Parties ordering in multi-member coalition governments more doesn’t require taking it districts allows voters to likely, voters look for away from another choice support more than one ‘reasonability’ party)
2. Comfort Level of Ballot simple, but strategic Most intimidating. (ballot Rank-ordering subject to Simplest. Each choice is Voters voting required. Ballots is very long and voter errors, risk of spoiling given thumb-up or not, with no preference or more required to rank-order); ballot; also, voters don’t like without regard to other than one are considered this type of ballot is very including (‘approving’ of) choices’ acceptability. “spoiled” and not counted easy to “spoil” without low-ranked choices Impossible to “spoil” ballot. computer assistance Negative voting possible without ref. to polls (mark all choices but one)
3. All Citizens’ Votes of Voters have to Yes. This system uses the Many safe seats, but “list All votes either help win Equal Value ‘strategically’ vote to avoid idea that excess support votes” are all equally local seat or get used to wasting, but all voters in gets moved to other valuable. determine awarding of “safe” seats get ignored candidates with lower cluster seats (similar to STV rank-order (but this is system, but far simpler) very complex)
4. Opportunity for Voters Single mark limits ability Doesn’t support one-issue Extra marks on ballot not Issue parties can be marked to Indicate Mandate to send more than one parties. equal in status along with candidates with a Priorities message “chance”
5. Effect on Smaller Discourages them Not as proportional as Smaller parties still rarely Smaller parties can get Parties significantly lists, but better than win local seats, but “approvals” for many FPTP. Smaller parties campaign for “list” votes; reasons, and if reasonable, must strategically be list seats used to overcome might win local seats; some careful not to have too unfair local-seats results. smaller parties will win local many candidates seats when major candidates are too competitive
6. MLA Relationship A MLAs get a local Medium, as all MLAs Same as with FPTP, plus list 2/3 of MLAs have local with Voters constituency, but often not will represent, jointly seat members have no constituency and support of a majority-mandate with other MLAs, large constituency relationship a majority of voters. All multi-member seats. cluster winners have relationship with regional constituencies
7. Levels of Voter “Wasted votes” and Fairness is attractive, but Outcomes of local MLAs Highest, because no votes Participation strategic voting, and unfair ballots have very large still w/o majority; list MLAs “wasted”, ballot is simple, outcomes discourage it. numbers of candidates, distant and cynicism about and strategic voting not Also fewer candidates making it hard for voters party control of list required. result in reduced voter to have enough info to candidates (although it choice. Breeds cynicism. vote intelligently guarantees more minority and women MLAs).
8. Stability Within and Because such a small More stability than with More stability in MLA High stability in personnel; Between number of voters have such FPTP. personnel, but still more and lowest level of Governments a big effect on party rep., competitive than AV/CS, competitiveness means that when there is a shift, huge making coalition more parliamentary numbers of experienced governments harder to form collaboration will occur. MLAs are “retired” and and maintain. huge number of “rookies” come in. Not efficient. Stability lacks integrity.
9. Vote Counts Clearly Vote counts are simple to This system’s ballot and Hardest to document (unless Each mark on ballot (an Documented express, but strategic tally process are the most using fractional “approval”) is counted voting makes them suspect. complex, making it hard redistribution process), since regardless. No need for Also lower voter for parties to gauge dependent on a long, iterative counting. participation undercuts support. iterative process or validity of results. computers (for which voter trust is an issue)
10. Majority Guaranteed No By using priority voting Not for the majority of seats Yes, guaranteed, for local for Single-member for MLAs (like mini- (German system, though, seats. Not an issue for Seats lists), getting a majority is still uses FPTP for local cluster seats. not an issue constituencies)