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Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency: Case Study of a Chinese Village in Guangdong, 1978-2011

Huaqi Wang

Ph.D

THE HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY

2014

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency i

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Department of Applied Social Sciences

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency:

Case Study of a Chinese Village in Guangdong, 1978-2011

Huaqi Wang

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

June, 2013

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency ii

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it reproduces no material previously published or written, nor material that has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma, except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.

______(signed)

______(name of student)

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency iii

Abstract

My work attempts to explore why collective egalitarianism continues in post-

Mao era. Irrespective of economic efficiency, peasants always insist equal allocation of collective land benefits, no matter in Maoist or post-Mao reform period. Such collective egalitarianim binding to insufficient non-agricultural employment and equal entitlements in collective land system already gets studied. Based on the shareholding cooperative in Yi village, the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism is discussed. Led by the approach of social relations, social interactions between village cadres and peasants also frame the egalitarianism regardelss of rural livelihood and land property rights.

Yi village gives rise to valid and ample evidences about the continuity of collective egalitarianism. Though peasants’ dependence on land use has declined, collective programs like public security are still significant to them. Simultaneously, land use has been enclosed in the rich while land disposal is concentrated into village cadres. To secure equal allocation, peasants need to restrain the privatization of public assets by village cadres, which is indicated via rural mass participation. In village organs including collective corproate, village cadres control political power, and even delibratively preclude the public participation of peasants. In contrast, peasants of Yi village prosperously participate into public affairs via lineage organs.

Equitable lineage membership helps the mass particpation .

Ultimately, this studies emphasizes the cultural dynamics underlying the consistence of collective egalitarianism. Meanwhile, the strengths of peasants in relation to the state also gets more demonstrated.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency iv

Acknowledgements

This work owes sincere thanks to a large number of people and institutions that contribute to my research and writing. This research started from September, 2009.

First, thanks go to villagers which I interviewed, observed and actually lived for 5 months. To avoid interrupting their life on the grounds of some sensitively financial and political data applied in the dissertation, here I continue to use the same short name I utilized in the field work. In Yi village, two heads of Beinan and Tandong,

Brother Pei and Uncle Yuan groups warmly invited me to their home, and introduced their friends and fellow villagers to help my study. Based on their information, I learned how hamlets run now and in pre-reform time. The candidate of Party Sectary,

Brother Long, also critically showed how cadres at the administrative level ordinarily work. As main informants, Uncle De, Brother Zong, Brother Qiu, Minxi,

Minjian, Uncle Pan, Brother Sheng, Uncle Hong, Brother Fu of Wu Lineage, and

Uncle Rong, Uncle Wen, Uncle Zhi, Brother Hao, Aunt Zhou, Aunt Jiao, Brother

Song, Madam Liu from Liu Lineage, and Uncle Bai from a minor ethnic group of

Liang, all deserve thanks. Moreover, some non-locals also friendly entertain me with unique perspectives about transitional Yi village. Like other migrants, Brother

Jun and his wife Madam Zhong, Uncle Ming, Laoli, Yaohua Mai, Huannan Zhong insightfully tell about Yi village by often comparing it with their home place.

Moreover, special thanks are offered to Shunde Archive Bureau and Leliu township government and some of their workers. They help me smoothly step down to Yi village.

Secondly, I am honorable to have guidance from many teachers in Hong Kong

PolyU. From the very beginning, my research greatly benefits from their expertise

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency v and devotion in academics, and warm hearts after classes. My supervisor, Koo

Ching-hua, Anita, is primarily appreciated here. Based on her detailed guidance, the research topic is narrowed down, necessary data is collected, and expressions in dissertation are properly improved. In a word, I thank her for leading me to the level of PhD. And I thank Dr. Ku Hok-bun very much. With his careful backup, I spent wonderful three years in the campus. And I also gain so much help from Dr. Yan

Hai-rong and Prof. Pun Ngai in their classes and reading groups. They inspired me a lot in establishing a meaningful and available topic on collective land transition and rural politics. And Dr. Ip Fu-keung turned me to a dynamical approach about

Chinese villages. Those teachers were never tired of reviewing my work in every step of my dissertation when I asked for. So did Prof. James Lee. As my co- supervisor, he always paid attention to my work in his busy executive time. Besides,

Dr. Ho Kwok-leung let me learn intensive reading, and Dr. Law Pui-lam once talked to me many lineage studies. Sincerely thank above three people. Meanwhile, I also memorize the happy time that I assisted Dr. Ng Gua-tin and Dr. Sim Boo Wee in their research program. Further, I thank Jonathan Unger and Hui-lin LU for their presentation as my external examiners in my oral examination. I receive precious comments and thoughtful ideas from them both.

It’s delightful to spend four years in PolyU, especially in office 404 for postgraduate students, with so many kindhearted, sympathetic and competitive classmates. Inside the campus, we enjoyed frequent discussions in academics, frank concerns about politics at home and broad, and happy hours in sports. I thus weight much on those people: Yi-yuan CHEN, Zi-cun LIANG, Yu-na MA, Ya LIU, Jing

YANG, Wai-fong SIN, Jun DAITOU, Hang-ying CHEN, Yu-chen HAN, Juan

PENG, Wei LU, Yun-xue DENG, Gabriele DE SETA, Hong-da JIANG.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency vi

Library in PolyU and counterparts in other universities of Hong Kong provide convenient and sufficient academic resources. I appreciate the help of staff there.

The staff of department administrative offices and Research Office of PolyU always gives me considerable and rapid responses to my needs and questions. Thus specially thanks Fanny CHENG, Amy CHU, Wilney YAU and Shirley HUI.

Lastly but importantly, my family and friends are worth more thanks than I could express in words. My parents and two sisters bolster my one-year extension by accommodating and sponsoring me in finance. And a unique thank is given to my wife, Jun-yan DONG, Jersie. I thank her for consistently standing side by side to face all difficulties and turbulence during the past four years of PhD study. She is the best listener, reader, and advisor.

Table of contents

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY...... II

ABSTRACT ...... III

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... VII

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ...... XII

CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION

EFFICIENCY, EGALITARIANISM AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THE

POST-MAO COLLECTIVE LAND SYSTEM ...... 1

1. The Historical Context...... 3

1.1 Egalitarianism in Maoist collective land system ...... 9

1.2 Egalitarianism in the post-Mao collective land system ...... 11

2. The Choice of the Field Site: Yi Village ...... 16

3. The Analytical Framework of Collective Egalitarianism: Embeddedness ...... 23

4. Contributions of This Research ...... 28

CHAPTER TWO- LITERATURE REVIEW

THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF THE POST-MAO COLLECTIVE LAND

ECONOMY: EGALITARIANISM ...... 31

1. Theoretical Debates over the Embeddedness of the Economy: Social

Relations ...... 31

1.1 Two theories of the Chinese transition towards efficiency ...... 31

1.2 The alternative perspective of social relations ...... 35

1.3 The embeddedness of peasant economy...... 37

1.4 The embeddedness of Chinese peasant economy...... 45

2. Latest Research about the Embeddedness of Post-Mao Collective Economy .... 48

2.1 Recent studies over the embeddedness of collective economy ...... 48

2.2 Present Studies about the embeddedness of collective enterprises ...... 53

3. Research Framework: Egalitarianism and Its Maintenance ...... 56

3.1 The continuity and discontinuity of land property rights ...... 56

3.2 The alternations of peasant livelihood...... 58

3.3 Against inequalities in collective allocations: rural public participation ...... 59

CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

POST-REFORM COLLECTIVE EGALITARIANISM: A SINGLE-CASE

STUDY ...... 66

1. Theory-Oriented Case Study ...... 66

2. Sampling: Yi Village as the Single Case ...... 70

3. Main Preoccupations of My Single-Case Study ...... 73

3.1 Measurement and Inference ...... 74

3.2 Causality ...... 75

3.3 Generalization...... 76

3.4 Shortcomings and achievements of my single-case study ...... 77

4. Methods of Data Collection ...... 80

CHAPTER FOUR

LIVELIHOOD IN POST-MAO RURAL CHINA: LAND DISASSOCIATION

AND NEW WORKERS...... 83

1. Peasant’s Livelihood and Its Post-Mao Transition ...... 83

2. Diversification of Rural Economy ...... 88

2.1 Agriculture towards better profit ...... 89

2.2 Flourishing off-farm opportunities ...... 91

2.3 Burgeoning Industrial Factories ...... 94

3. Profitable land Use, Disadvantageous Peasants ...... 95

3.1 Rural entrepreneurs occupy village industrial zone ...... 96

3.2 Rich peasants occupy village fishponds and residential land...... 97

3.3 Market-led enclosure of land use regardless of collective ownership...... 101

4. Peasants Become Workers ...... 103

4.1 The composition of emerging worker group ...... 104

4.2 Unprecedented emphasis on labour by peasants ...... 106

4.3 Dilemmas of rural non-agricultural employment ...... 109

5. A Continue Dependence of Peasants on Collective Corporate ...... 115

5.1 Changes of property rights underlying landshareholding cooperative ...... 118

6. Conclusions ...... 124

CHAPTER FIVE

RURAL PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN VILLAGE ORGANS:

VULNERABLE COLLECTIVE EGALITARIANISM ...... 126

1. Cadres Control Village organs ...... 128

1.1 Cadres control rural political and administrative power ...... 129

1.3 The economic basis of rural administration ...... 137

2. Consistent and Abused Control of Village Cadres in Village Organs ...... 142

2.1 The persistence of cadres’ political and administrative power ...... 143

2.2 The privatization of collective benefits by village cadres ...... 149

3. Exclusively Control and Privatization of Collective Corporate by Village

Cadres...... 152

3.1 Village cadres control TVEs ...... 152

3.2 Village cadres control shareholding cooperatives ...... 157

4. Implications of Cadres’ Control in Village Organs: The Restricted Public

Participation of Peasants ...... 167

5. Conclusion ...... 170

CHAPTER SIX

REVIVING LINEAGE ORGANS: EQUITABLE MEMBERSHIP AND MASS

PARTICIPATION ...... 172

1. Recurring Traditions and Their General Implications ...... 172

2. Pursuits of Lineage Organs: The Survival of Ethnic Group ...... 177

2.1 Dragon boat race: mark cross-lineage hostility or friendship ...... 178

2.2 Ancestral temple: alienating ethnic group to others ...... 183

2.3 Religious temple: conciliatory to others ...... 189

2.4 Discussions ...... 194

3. Membership in Lineage Allies: The Equity of Ethnic Group ...... 196

3.1 Dedicated commissions of lineage unions ...... 198

3.2 Wide supervision ...... 201

3.3 Effective mobilization ...... 204

3.4 Fair allocation ...... 208

3.5 Discussions ...... 213

4. Implications of Lineage Corporate...... 214

CHAPTER SEVEN - DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

CONTINUOUS COLLECTIVE EGALITARIANISM AND ITS

EMBEDDEDNESS ...... 219

1. Consistent Collective Egalitarianism ...... 219

2. Changeable Embeddedness ...... 220

3. Theoretical Implications of Yi Village-Based Case Study...... 227

4. Achievements and Limitations of This Single Case Study ...... 230

4.1 The accomplishment of causality ...... 231

4.2 The accomplishment of generalization...... 232

4.3 Possible improvements of my research in the future...... 234

APPENDICES ...... 238

REFERENCES ...... 239

List of figures and tables

Figure 1: Yi village in Guangdong Province, China...... 17

Figure 2: Yi village in Shunde ...... 18

Figure 3: Social and geographical features of Yi village...... 19

Table 1: Formal public organizations in Yi village: contours and change ...... 19

Table 2: Land price for industrial use in Yi village ...... 97

Table 3: Estimated annual expense in fish cultivation of a 10-mu pond in Yi

village...... 98

Table 4: The cost in dwellings in different periods ...... 100

Table 5: The lease of collective properties in commercial district (September,

2011) ...... 106

Table 6: The Daily Schedule of a Fish Farmer ...... 114

Table 7: The social stratifications of rural households in Yi village ...... 118

Figure 4: the current organic structure and components in Yi village...... 131

Table 8: The contrast between two Party Sectaries ...... 133

Table 9: The annual revenue of Yi village government during 1997-2011

(thousands yuan) ...... 138

Figure 5: The specific rules about rewarding security personals for the

prefectural task of “sanitary and civil city” (The original photo is attached

in the appendix)...... 146

Table 10: The record of the rewards in legal cases of May, 2011 (The original

photo is attached in the appendix)...... 146

Figure 6: The current collective economic organizations in Yi Village ...... 158

Table 11: The comparison between chief and branch temples in offerings ...... 185

Figure 7: The auspicious tablet popular in Wu’s people ...... 190

Table 12: The education fund of Liu lineage ...... 209

Table 13: the asset balance of Ruan lineage of 2011 ...... 210

Table 14: The possible patterns of collective egalitarianism ...... 234

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 1

Chapter One - Introduction

Efficiency, Egalitarianism and Social Relations in the Post-Mao Collective Land

System

Since the early 1990s, market-led agrarian reform has swept through a variety of developing countries. According to case studies across six countries and three continents1 (Lahiff, Borras, & Kay, 2008), neo-liberal2 principals introduced by the

World Bank and IMF have been widely applied in land reform. This neo-liberal paradigm identifies free transactions in the market as the primary mechanism to bring about effective land distribution and use. In this way, wasteful or inefficient land is assumed to be redeveloped by private landowners and supplied to poor or eligible peasants who need it. In addition, these market transactions helps reduce the number of vast farms, and distribute more land to small family farms. In this process, state government is regarded as complementary in providing pre-sale administrative services and post-sale support (finance and jurisdiction) in land transactions. As a result, complications in land transactions, emanating from politics, culture or jurisdiction, should be avoided to protect free market transactions.

However, this study explores practice beyond market-led economic efficiency,3 using the example of Chinese land reform. In contrast to the radical pro-market model, Chinese land reform is more modest. Through socialist collectives, peasants have not yet attained other rights from land use or benefit from it in the long run.

1These “thematic and country case studies” refer to Brazil, Guatemala, El Salvador, Philippines, Egypt and South Africa (Lahiff et al., 2008). 2In terms of the idealistic emphasis on the market, this study equates neo-liberalism with New Classical Economics. When new institutional economics attempts to adjust abstract economic theories to accommodate sophisticated economic realities (Coase, 1937, 1960; Douglass, 1990), rapid development results in the danger of transcending its basic standpoints on market. As a reaction, the new classical economics simply retreats to the fundamental doctrines of classical economics, though it penetrates into broad non-economic fields like family (Becker, 1960). 3Efficiency means the input-output ratio of the production of goods and service. If the output is more than the input, the production is termed as effective. http://en.wikipedia.org.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 2

Their farmland cannot be transferred unless it remains in agricultural use

(construction is forbidden in these cases). Until recently, village communities had to seek state permission to transfer commercial construction land into the market4. Non- commercial construction land is still banned, as well as non-agricultural conversion of arable land. Amid all change to land, the shareholding cooperative system is specific. It implies the transfer of land for high-profit use, especially non-agricultural conversion (Jiang & Liu, 2003, 2004). In this process, village land is unitarily allocated by the cooperative, and eligible peasants are endowed with equal shares for coming dividends and other collective benefits.

This study attempts to address the institutional optimality of peasants, which is an alternative to economic efficiency. It is the egalitarianism inherent to the rural land system (Kung, 1994). Firstly, collective egalitarianism points to equivalent allocation of collective benefits in Chinese village. During the Maoist collective era, this involved time rate remuneration, which roughly estimated the potential contribution of individuals based on undistinguished grades of labour. In addition, the exact equal provision of basic food grains to peasants was also egalitarian. In the post-Mao rural land system, peasants still value egalitarianism. While the equal payment system has withered, the habit of equal allocation survives in the distribution of land use. This study thus investigates whether equality persists in the shareholding cooperative system, and if so, why it continues.

Secondly, this study focuses on grassroots peasants rather than the state, regardless of the state’s important influence on rural land reform (Lahiff et al., 2008).

The state controls land management, which shapes the evolution of the land system.

4The Central Committee of CCP and the State Council: Opinions on accelerating the development of modern agriculture and village prosperity (Jan 31, 2013) (关于加快发展现代农业进一步增强农村发展活力的若干意见)

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 3

The Chinese government adjusts the two-track land system in both rural and urban areas by various legislative and administrative means. Tracing the history of land development through the history of the republic, we can note that the state, especially central government, has always played a key role, although it is heterogeneous, fragmented and sometimes irrational (Ho & Lin, 2003). In contrast, my research here focuses on collective allocation in rural land system, and how peasants at the community level frame it. The rural mass is drawn upon as the critical dynamic underlying the evolution of land institutions. Few studies have taken such an approach. Moreover, this study also explores the framework of state-society relations and emphasizes the role played by grassroots peasant, similar to the work of

Kelliher (Kelliher, 1992). As a result, the state is accordingly identified as exogenous to peasants, the pre-requisite of the latter. The shareholding cooperative is the latest rural land system. The influence of the state on its establishment and evolution is explored in this thesis.

In the rest of this chapter, I am going to discuss the historical context the market-led agrarian reform in post-reform China, and the development of my research questions under such background. Following is an introduction of the field site that I choose for this study. I will briefly explain how its characteristics fit for my research purpose. Then, I will state the approach and the main analytical framework that I am going to use for this thesis. The section also gives an overview of the thesis outline and key findings of each chapter.

1. The Historical Context

Academic work on the post-Mao collective land system often focuses on economic efficiency (McMillan, Whalley, & Zhu, 1989; Qu, Heerink, & Wang, 1995;

Z. Wu, Liu, & Davis, 2005). As the core distinguishing difference between socialist

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 4 and capitalist society, property rights are centrally located in the competence of the two rivalries (Ho, 2001). Amid debates about property rights and economic efficiency, Kornai (Kornai, 1992) demonstrates that the systemic flaws of the socialist planned economy inevitably led to observable inefficiency and shortages.

Totalitarian control by a Marxist-Leninist communist party, as well as other institutions like administrative pricing, perpetuated poor efficiency in socialist society. The fall of the Soviet Union and Eastern European communist states in the late 1980s and earlier 1990s further testifies to these critiques. Thereafter, the notion that private property rights promote economic efficiency has become a shibboleth in economics, especially in relation to socialist countries in transition.

As well as the goal of economic growth, private ownership also involves political debates in national democracies (Perry & Goldman, 2007). It basically constitutes and represents a package of ideal societal prescriptions: “freedom- democracy” (Ho, 2001), involving independent individuals with private property, equal civil and political rights, popular democracy and the rule of law. In this sense, the realization of private ownership is not merely a vehicle to secure economic growth, but also underpins a good society.

However, some research into the post-Mao land system indicates that peasants diverge from the notion of atomized individuals enjoying private ownership. Po

(2008) provides an attractive analysis. In her view, the emerging rural land market derives from powerful rural industrialization. Most early studies (Walder & Oi, 1999) focus on collective enterprise to explore the evolution of property rights, but her study recognizes that adjustments to land property rights also crucially influence rural economic transition, which was neglected for a long time in the literature.

Previous studies address local fiscal motives and the pressure of competition that

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 5 stimulates local state cadres to initiate “local state corporatism” (Oi, 1992, 1995), but

Po recognizes internal equality relied on by peasants also prompts village corporatism: various forms of land shareholding cooperatives allow peasants to benefit from increases in land rent in the urbanization process via equal distribution among members. Since the shareholding cooperative succeeds in mitigating conflicts of interest among peasants, Po observes that local societies have developed different responses to overcome collective land ownership, despite new paths still being bound up in it. Following Po’s work, this study emphasizes the shareholding cooperative system, one type of latest collective land economy. The equivalent distribution of collective land income is the major research focus: if private ownership engenders higher economic efficiency, why do peasants prefer equal collective allocation rather than privatization of land rights?

The transition of the Chinese rural land system in the post-Mao era indeed attracts many attentions. Since the establishment of the Household Contract

Responsibility System (HRS), which constitutes basic decollectivization (Vermeer,

Pieke, & Chong, 1998; Walder, 2002), academic discussion is triggered every time the central government adjusts land tenure or revises land management (Ho & Lin,

2003). Segmented issues around the land system and its transition in the post-Mao era, generally involve three aspects (Ho & Lin, 2003). Firstly, land use; this involves land usage: agricultural or non-agricultural use, industry or residence. Secondly, the property rights of land and real enforcement, involving the allocation of property rights to define the owners and users. Lastly, land management involves formal institutional stipulation of land reallocation. Therefore, unplanned, impermissible or even illegal land use (irrespective of formal usage) is relevant.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 6

Land use in the post-Mao era involves two trends: agricultural growth along with more efficient farmland usage; and large scale conversion of arable land for non-agricultural use. Agricultural development involves multiple factors, including land reform in the socialist commune system to the Household Responsibility

System (HRS). However, according to the widely acknowledged research by Justin

Yifu Lin (Lin, 1992), the transformation of the land system spurred half of the unexpected agricultural growth in the period 1978-1984. Price reform also made a contribution. Furthermore, other factors like the increased availability and input of fertilizers contributed little; these instead mainly account for the subsequent dramatic agricultural fall in output in the period 1985-1987. The fall is largely the results of the drastic loss of labour in the crop area and the reduction of material inputs, stemming from the depressed price of grain products. Grain output decreased. In comparison, cash crops continue to expand in scale. In the final rationale, the establishment of HRS tackled management problems in the collective by giving peasants direct incentives. In later agricultural development, other factors would shape the behavior of peasants and output levels in a new institutional framework.

The transformation of land use in HRS provoked many critiques about the damage to agricultural productivity from both the left and the right (Zhang &

Donaldson, 2008). Deficiencies in the HRS which were “scattered, small and weak” had two aspects: “First, it made it difficult for producers to use modern farming equipment and thus resulted in a loss of economy of scale; second, it made farmers more vulnerable to the risks and shocks associated with specialized commercial farming” (Zhang & Donaldson, 2008, p. 28). Such findings are controversial. The relationship between land scale and productivity is averse according to the theoretical tradition (from Chayanov to Sen), and the substantial evidence of

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 7 subsequent studies (Chen, Huffman, & Rozelle, 2011). Land fragmentation under

HRS actually improved income equality among peasants rather than hampering it

( Xu, Tian, Xu, & Shao, 2008; Zhang & Donaldson, 2008). Ultimately, the efficiency achievement few relates to the scale of land in use, but more stems from the cooperation of agricultural production. It is a consent that peasants should better ally with each other vertically (with transporters, middlemen, processors, etc.) instead of horizontally (planters work together to get bigger scale land use) (Chayanov, 1986;

Huang, 2010) . To support agricultural modernization or commercialization, the

Chinese government recently impelled economic association of peasants in two directions. Firstly, dragon head enterprises (Zhang & Donaldson, 2008) work to mediate between diffuse rural households units and the market by addressing product, labour or even land contracts with peasants. The second involves farmer professional cooperatives. The prosperous development of those cooperatives in the countryside is reflected in the special law, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongmin Zhuanye

Hezuoshe Fa (The Law of Farmers Professional Cooperative of the Chinese Peoples’

Republic). On October 31, 2006, it was enacted to encourage rural cooperatives.

Paralleling agricultural development, the swift development of non-agricultural land use consists of the second trend. Dramatic non-agricultural conversion has consumed enormous cultivated land: “The first comprehensive land survey ever conducted in China found that in 1996, 3.1% of China’s vast territory was allocated to non-agricultural use” (Ho & Lin, 2004). Moreover, “between 1996 and 2006,

China’s cultivated land shrank further from 1,951 to 1,829 million mu, and its amount per capita dropped from 1.59 to 1.39 mu despite the central government’s alarming concern” (Lin, 2009, p. 6). A large part of land loss is believed to stem

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 8 from urban and industrial expansion, though accurate estimates of such conversion are unattainable (Ho & Lin, 2004).

In research into farmland conversion, some preliminary studies have demonstrated various dynamics underlying the conversion of arable land. The rapid enlargement of the urban population resulting from natural growth and immigration, and far-reaching industrialization in cities, prescribed towns, villages and areas connecting highways all encourages enormous consumption of farmland (Ho & Lin,

2004). Simultaneously, push factors also critically come into play. In changing land use patterns, local cadres also vigorously promote land development based on fiscal incentives, geographical conditions, personal career mobility and the banking system

(Ping, 2011). However, the above studies still simplify the complex of working factors. In fact, a variety of factors together account for changing land use (Axinn &

Ghimire, 2011): at the community level, social associations, population size, affluence and technology; at the household level, the crucial life events of peasant families also substantially influence land use.

Early studies seem to use overly static analytical objects to show interactions among factors influencing land use. Research into central government or local cadres, urbanization or industrialization, always seems to fall short of incorporating alien factors. For example, local cadres are motivated by factors such as local financial income or personal career mobility, to stimulate the conversion of farmland.

However, how they confront peasants’ responses, such as discontent, in their land manipulation is not often discussed. The interaction of factors is noted (Axinn &

Ghimire, 2011), but some of the variables discussed are concepts designed to present particular objective facts, such as population size. In fact, what this study (Axinn &

Ghimire, 2011) focuses on is the quantitative correlativity of key factors. Instead, I

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 9 merely explicate how social actors affect changeable land use via real social interactions.

Continuing studies about the overall farmland conversion in the reform and pre- reform period(Cartier, 2011; Ho & Lin, 2003; Hsing, 2010; Lin & Ho, 2005), my research here distinctly concentrates on a fresh phenomenon: the shareholding cooperative. In comparison with state appropriation, shareholding cooperative works as another manner of converting farmland, the one hosted by collective rather than the state. Substantial actors in previous studies, such as state authorities, non- governmental state units and inhabitants of cities, as well as collectives and peasants in the countryside, now are replaced with peasants and cadres inside rural communities. And former complicated interactions between diverse actors are also systemically studied as the one between cadres and peasants, or intra peasants.

1.1 Egalitarianism in Maoist collective land system

HRS derives fundamental qualities from Maoist collective land system. The collectivization of rural private and corporate land was conducted on a national scale not long after the communist revolution in 1949. The class of landlords was firstly eliminated and their land was divided among the peasants. Later, private peasant land was merged into the collective inalienable to individual members. By December

1956, 96.2% of peasants had joined into collectives, most of which arose in two years except several provinces cultivating animal husbandry (Du, 2005). In 1958, the commune system was established. Peasants in secondary production teams worked together on the collective land under the supervision of team cadres subjected to the upper administration of the brigade. In this system, all raw materials and means of production were collectively owned and manipulated. This was maintained until the

1978 reform.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 10

Collective economy based on common land ownership endows qualified members with equal shares of collective benefits. At the initial period, collective outputs were allocated to peasants after quotas were delivered to the state and collective accumulation. Since work-points5 were used to calculate time rates, the allocations of collective members were more equal and fair. Generally speaking, the calculation takes one workday as the unit. Each working day contains about 10 points. In the practice, such calculation tends to align with settled standards rather than the real performance of individuals. As equalitarian standards dominate, income peasants obtained from collective farming also tended to be equal.

However, such equal allocation was limited as the agriculture-based collective economy fell into stagnation. In the Maoist era, collective agriculture achieved great progress in both total yield and employment6, but low productivity was sustained or even aggravated. The value of output per man-day and total factor productivity in agriculture (labour, capital and land) declined unambiguously at the same time

(Rawski, 1979). Intensive or even involuntary labour and land is usually regarded as yielding increased land output (Huang, 1990; Rawski, 1979). Further, limited economic diversification in the collective economy is a core characteristic (Huang,

1990). The state attempted to extract the surplus from peasants by promoting economic growth regardless of the stagnant or even declining return to labour per capita. Moreover, rigid control and the ultimate elimination of commerce, the market and private land were also features. The tremendous intensification of labour in production perpetuated the peasant poverty in socialist collectives.

5http://baike.baidu.com/view/338328.htm. 6Actually, in the two decades from 1957-1975, China achieved substantial economic growth in agriculture. “In the area of employment, as in health, education, regional development and other distributive aspects of economic performance, China’s record compares favourably with results attained in other large, populous, low-income countries” (Rawski 1979).

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 11

To supplement peasant livelihoods, individual families were further endowed very small pieces of land for private use: Zi Liu Di, or self-retained land. Nearly 6% of village land was left to individual families who then cultivated vegetables or oil plants for daily consumption (Brandt, Huang, Li, & Rozelle, 2002). With rare intervention from collective cadres, peasants had rights to control entire products and swap their lands with high security. Since peasants had incentives to invest into self- retained land, the productivity of rationed land was not surprisingly much higher than collective land.

1.2 Egalitarianism in the post-Mao collective land system

The inability of the collective economy to secure a subsistence living for peasants critically spurred the demolition of collective economic production (Du,

1985, p. 1–37). The management of socialist collectives was based on the separation of individual input and output (Lin, 1992), which hampered peasant incentives to produce, and so collective production was abolished. Individual households were rebuilt as the unit of production. As a two-tier tenure system (Dong, 1996), HRS insisted on collective ownership at the levels of former production teams or brigades, which were then termed natural or administrative villages, while individual peasants retained the rights to use land and benefit from it. Peasants controlled the surplus after fulfilling state grain quotas, paying taxes and fees and collective requisitions were satisfied.

Furthermore and importantly, all eligible members of the same community could equally access land resources via birth or marriage in the HRS era (Brandt et al., 2002; Kung, 1995, 2002a; Liu, Carter, & Yao, 1998). Such equal entitlement of land endogenous to collective ownership is described as “licensed open access”

( Kung, 2002a). Based on the persistent collective ownership, equal entitlements to

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 12 collective benefits are preserved among indigenous members. The pre-reform equity in sharing collective subsistence materials was transformed into one involving land

(Kung & Bai, 2011). Although the collective no longer directly allocates grain or other living materials to constituents, it still secures components in the HRS (Brandt et al., 2002). To ensure every family rear its population, land is equally allocated among peasants according to household size. Hence, demographic change is one of the main socio-economic drivers underlying land reallocation (Kung & Bai, 2011;

Unger, 2005). In family cycles like death, marriages or births, families that grow experience more pressure in living, while others that shrink have more land and improved finances. The rigid inequality of land damages the subsistence of some households and the village community can render a new redistribution of land resources towards absolute equity. In this sense, periodic land reallocation is inherent to HRS. According to Kung (2002b, p. 794), “up to 62% of the 800 farm households surveyed across China have paradoxically indicated a preference for periodic land reallocations over the proposed, seemingly more stable, land tenure institution”. In fact, as shown in surveys done by Kung, during 1995-2011, about 76% of villages had already conducted periodic land reallocation based on collective ownership

(Kung & Bai, 2011).

It is controversial that land reallocation negatively impacts the efficiency of land usage and rental, because it is, after all, the rational preference of peasants on the basis of family cycles (Brandt et al., 2002; Kung, 2000, 2002a). Moreover, frequent reallocation attenuates tenure security, disturbs the expectation of peasants regarding land benefits in the future, and therefore damages long-term investment.

To enhance tenure security, land privatization is prompted according to the doctrines of new classical economics or new institutional analysis (Coase, 1937, 1960;

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 13

Douglass, 1990). This is also the goal of the state. The Chinese government firstly consolidated land tenure to 15 years in 1982, and further strengthened it to 30 years when the 15 year tenures ended in 1997. In a local experiment in quasi-private land ownership in Meitan, Guangdong Province, household tenure is forever solidified to test whether it improves investment by peasants, while spontaneous land reallocation is rigidly forbidden (Kung, 2002).

Compared with the efficiency achieved by fixed tenure, peasants nonetheless incline to periodical land reallocation regardless of state suppression or the transactional cost of land adjustments (Kung, 2002b; Kung & Bai, 2011). Their inclination is explained by the rule of equity that peasants continue to abide by to the present day. In empirical verification based on cross-provincial data, land reallocation is exemplified in discussions. In most villages surveyed, it seldom occurs mechanically and village-scale. To the contrary, it is low frequency as it occurs through a variety of concrete factors, mostly involving families who face demographic change. Further, although land reallocation indeed distorts land tenure and curtails investment by peasants, peasants actually tacitly anticipate their contracted plots impacted or not within the tenure. They arrange agricultural production to secure rewards in advance, although their choices are possibly suboptimal (Kung, 2000). In the latest examination of differentiation among types of land reallocations (partial or village-scale), peasants are distinctly motivated by two kinds of transactional costs with respect to equality: mapping or matching costs

(Kung & Bai, 2011). What more significant is, irrespective of above two kinds of cost, the transition of rural land systems accord with amounts of “transactional cost” for equal entitlements rather than “induced institutional change” for better efficiency.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 14

As already suggested, what underlies peasants’ choices regarding land reallocation is the security of their livelihoods (Kung, 2002). As well as producing food, land also secures jobs and income for plentiful residual labour in rural areas, particularly poorly educated peasants (Brandt et al., 2002). As regards underdeveloped markets and scant off-farm economic opportunities in the post-Mao countryside, the norm of definite equality inherited from the socialist collective system is sustained by peasants. If the primary aim of ensuring subsistence is overlooked, any rural land reform aimed at greater efficiency is frustrated. The state just makes such mistakes by simply prolonging the tenure security. This is a worse policy than economic diversification or abundant off-farm job opportunities. The latter two are regarded genuinely help to go beyond basic livelihoods and so restrain land reallocation. The evidence is clearly reflected in land rental for agricultural use

(Kung, 2002b). During the 1980s and1990s, spontaneous land rental by individual peasants was rare. Contrary to some estimates, frequent land reallocation and the insecure tenure of collective villages do not ruin land rental. The stagnation of the land rental market is actually endogenous to another factor: an inefficient labour market. Off-farm job opportunities laterally impacted land rental. Scarce off-farm employment binds peasants to contracted parcels of land. As a result, as the land rental market is built on collective ownership, a diversified economy could spur the transfer of land for more efficient usage.

In sum, it is necessary to trace peasants’ economic preference in the new collective economy. Po (2008) discusses egalitarianism continues in the shareholding cooperative. As she notes, the potential conflicts in collective distribution force peasants to compromise with each other in an equal manner. For me, it is still doubtful that whether collective egalitarianism can stem from other factors

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 15 regardless of potential interest conflicts among peasants. Given that prosperous market development, industrialization and urban development have spurred far- reaching economic diversifications in rural China, peasants may turn to new livelihoods as past subsistence is over. In another word, equivalent land use and frequent readjustments may be undermined.

Equivalent land use is not relevant to my analysis on Yi village, however.

Collective egalitarianism endures in the period of land shareholding cooperative, just as Po (2008) studies. Unlike Po (2008), my study will not keep “potential conflicts” as the explanation. Instead, this study further seeks to explore why egalitarianism can continue in the shareholding cooperative era. In detail, inspired by previous studies on collective egalitarianism (Kung, 1994, 1995), this research tests broader pre- requisites of egalitarianism in the new environment of shareholding cooperative era:

(1) Undergoing land property rights and its variances

As one of the prerequisites of collective entitlements, property rights structure of shareholding cooperative may have extensive differences from the one of HRS. In the circumstance of HRS, the entitlement of equal land use among all collective members, and subsequently frequent land allocation consist of the main feature of property rights structure. To answer this question, the pattern of land usage, the compositions of current users, and the distribution of land use, the control and allocation of land income are all explored with the case of Yi village.

(2) Livelihood of peasants

As another prerequisite of equality, off-farm opportunities may flourish during rapid rural industrialization and urbanization, and peasants may reduce their land use as well as their dependence on land income. The transformation of peasants’ livelihoods may have been much studied, but my study analyzes it from the angle of

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 16 collective egalitarianism. It means to investigate its outcome of livelihood transition on collective equal allocation.

(3) To maintain equal entitlements

When equal entitlements abide in the newly collective economy of shareholding cooperative, they also face new challenges, e.g. economic differentiation of peasants, the vague accountability of village cadres in collective organs. This study thus further justifies how peasants bolster egalitarianism. Here, I assume that peasants secure their land interests via their public participation into public affairs. If they fail in the participation, they hardly protect their interests realized in collective egalitarianism. Hence, the political process of decision-making, conduction, and monitoring in shareholding cooperative as well as other formal public organs would be illustrated.

2. The Choice of the Field Site: Yi Village

In order to look into the collective allocation of land, peasants’ livelihood and their interactions with the state, I choose a village in Shunde as the field site of my research. Equipping with some characteristics clarified as following, Yi village can provide abundantly and exactly replies to my concern about collective egalitarianism.

Yi village locates in Shunde, 40-60 kilometers from Guangzhou city in

Guangdong province (See Figure 1 and Figure 2). Yi village has about 4,900 native residents (from about 1,300 households). Moreover, nearly 7,000 migrants work and live in Yi village.

The village aims to develop an advanced economy in the longer term. In the

Maoist era, while other villages mainly produced food grains, Yi village focused on cash crops such as pond fish; there was little other industry at that time. In the post-

Mao era, township and village enterprises (TVEs) arose, and later private industries

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 17 flourished. As an indicator, Yi village recently established an industrial zone, similar to neighboring villages. In 2011, more than 160 factories were located in the village,

110 of which were large-scale enterprises in the industrial zone. Major products include electrical equipment, engineering goods, clothes, plastics and other manufactures.

Figure 1: Yi village in Guangdong Province, China

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 18

Figure 2: Yi village in Shunde

As a village in the Pearl River Delta, Yi village is consisted of nine natural villages, deriving from the 19 natural villages of the Maoist collective era. One of the salient features of villages in the delta area is peasant lineage forming the basic fabric of life. According to the classical analysis of Freedman (Freedman, 1958, pp.

1–18), lineage is a type of patrilineal kinship group or an agnatic organization, which consists of the descents of the same head ancestor (including wives of married males and unmarried sisters of males), located intensively in a territory with clear boundaries. These spatial borders were mostly inherited by socialist collectives.

Although the patrilineal organization was challenged and its assets removed, this deep structure, which lives in the mind of peasants, was sustained and further reinforced in Maoist collectives(Potter & Potter, 1990, pp. 251–269). In fact, the distinction of lineage territory mostly endures even in the post-Mao era. The resident sites can be subordinate to these structures, and so exhibit inter-lineage or intra- lineage limits, albeit collective organizations experienced lasting adjustment in the

1980s. This is all also true of Yi village (See Figure 3 and Table 1)

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 19

Figure 3: Social and geographical features of Yi village

Additional remarks of Figure 3: The yellow areas are fishponds (about 2000 mu7). The central and western areas are residential zones; the southern area is the industrial zone.

Table 1: Formal public organizations in Yi village: contours and change

Villages Lineages Maoist Post-Mao Shareholding The new

before production teams villager cooperatives cooperative

1949 teams (1994.1- (1997-

1996.12) now)

Tanyi Liu Team 1,2,3 and 4 Tandong Tanyi Yi village

Ruan Tanxi Tanxi

Majiang Wu Andong, Anxi, Anlong Anlong

Anzhong

Zhengdong, Dongxi

Zhengxi

None Dawosha Dawosha

Wu Futian, Sanshe Fulian Fulian

Xinmiao, Nanshe Xinnan

Shangxiajie, Beinan Kangdong

Nanjie,

Additional information of Table 1:

(1) Lineage

7 15 mu equalizes to one hectare.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 20

There has been little change in lineage from the pre-1949 time to the present.

The leading surnames are Wu and Liu. The two lineages once respectively inhabited two independent villages, Majiang and Tanyi. Wu lineage, the most prosperous one with about 13 large branches, takes Majiang as the base. And in terms of Tanyi, Liu lineage was entitled this territory since about A.D. 1370-1400. Despite the prior two, the third lineage of Ruan migrated to Tanyi later. As a result, Ruan people are weaker in the politics of Yi village. Meanwhile, villagers in the team of Dawosa are most marginal in village politics. Previously, this residential place was a temporary port for sheltering fishermen in the bad weather. Today, there are not yet mature lineages there. People live there with diverse surnames.

In addition, people in separate territories are not entirely homogenous; these regions are not entirely occupied by people with the same surname. A few families with divergent surnames may also share the same sphere. For example, Liu lineage has alien households with different surnames in its territory, which makes up no more than 10% of the total population. However, the Liu is certainly the dominant lineage.

(2) Formal village organizations

The formal organs of Yi village have changed a lot. In the Maoist era, commanded by the state, the production team-brigade structure was established. As the lowest unit, production teams were quite small in scope and so scattered, although two places of Tanyi and Majiang were combined together. The production teams almost overlap lineage and subordinate branches in the geographical location, and can clearly exhibit local social fabric. While the Wu lineage has 13 teams, Liu lineage was divided into four teams (8 branches in all).

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 21

In post-Mao era, the concentration of scattered teams takes more geographical reasons into account, though lineage is still the main one. As sheet 1 indicates,

Tandong village is comprised of the Liu lineage, and Tanxi team is composed of people with the surname of Ruan. While Wu lineage involves five large villagers’ teams, a distinct group of peasants with various surnames occupy the small territory of Dawosa. This merging of production teams into villagers’ teams target at the convenience of top-down administration. Their number of villager’s teams may reflect this intention: previous 19 production teams are replaced by 9 new entities in the post-Mao era.

My field work involves data from one villagers’ team of the Wu lineage,

Beinan village, and one village of the Liu lineage, Tandong village, and their social and demographic features are as follows:

ⅰ, Beinan village

This village consists of 153 households in total. More than 10 of these households are among the richest, while 3-5 of the poorest households attain economic relief from the state or village. The rest exchange labour in the market: half are workers in factories and 20% -30% are run self-employed, running their own businesses. The top richest families own assets of at least 5 million yuan8, and are generally in private trade or industry. Some families with workshops can earn hundreds of thousands yuan per year. In terms of industrial workers, most earn monthly incomes of around two thousand yuan. Fewer earn 3-5 thousand yuan and a handful of families earn more than ten thousand yuan. There are 17-18 households in agricultural fish farming.

ⅱ, Tandong village

8 yuan is the basic unit of Chinese RMB: 1 yuan = 0.163 USD dollar (2013-06-09 exchange rate)

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 22

Here, 3-4 households cultivate fishponds, and another three families operate their own factories. Moreover, another 7-8 households are in private commerce. The remains work in factories in native or neighboring villages.

(3) The shareholding cooperative

As a collective economic organ, the Yi village shareholding cooperative was initiated in 1994 by decrees from the Shunde prefecture government. As the sheet displays, four cooperatives were initially organized. This amalgamation is for geographical convenience rather than reflecting lineage. Therefore, as indicated on the sheet, Tandong and Tanxi villages were merged. The Dawosa and Wu villages work together. At that time, cooperatives only worked in a nominal sense. Instead, the committee of every villager’s team independently controlled native land assets and collective benefits. In 1997, the four cooperatives were combined together, and then the actual full co-operative business started in earnest.

Yi village cooperatives are particularly effective. Compared with neighboring villages which are larger or similar in size, it built a unitary cooperative, while others mostly involve more than one entity. Moreover, compared with neighboring single cooperative villages, Yi village more effectively provides public goods (such as infrastructure, relief funds and social security), by using cooperative income.

In conclusion, Yi village is typical both in the development of collective economy, and in maintaining traditional allies of lineage. A series of phases of collective economy are completely embodied in Yi village, no matter the past TVEs or the undergoing shareholding cooperatives. In particular, the shareholding cooperative in Yi village is so advanced that it is set at the level of administrative village, the phenomenon scarcely seen. The cooperative also notably devotes to public welfare, another distinguishable feature. Secondly, extensive activities of

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 23 lineage also help the research task here of interactions between peasants and village cadres. Faced with formal village organs, peasants also live in traditional social fabric of lineage. Based on concrete interactions between peasants and cadres underlying the distribution mode in Yi village, equal collective allocation gets deeply probed.

3. The Analytical Framework of Collective Egalitarianism: Embeddedness

To discuss opinions of egalitarian distribution in the fresh context of shareholding cooperative, social relations are explored as an analytical tool in this research. Following previous studies, which discuss the egalitarian preference of peasants via institutional analysis (Kung, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2002b), extensive factors broader than production are also regarded important. The institution of agriculture and other land use are underpinned with peasants’ livelihood as well as the land system. Faced with scarce off-farm opportunities, peasants have to count on farming land for their livelihood, which can result in egalitarianism. In addition, this also involves other institutional factors, such as the transactional cost of collective distribution, demographic change or land qualities. They all shape the allocation of land use and its readjustments. This institutional analysis counters the neo-liberal beliefs on utilitarian efficiency. Since the equal allocation is prior to higher efficiency in collective corporate, the belief of atomized individuals for maximized utility should more consider about social relations. Divergent alternative to better efficiency emerged in rural collectives. However, those institutional studies just step forward very limited with regard to its theoretical stance of atomized individuals, similar as the one of studies that it criticizes. The view that peasants bound to social relations is still overlooked here.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 24

The new approach of social relations arises from arguments with thoughts based on atomized individuals pursuing utilitarian self-interest. A social relation literally means “any relationship between two or more individuals”9. As a comparison with social interaction, it involves “a scheme of social interactions”10.

Further, according to Granovetter (Granovetter, 1992), ongoing social relations at least contain personal social networks, and at most mean social structure. Social relations can frame economic phenomena, because economic activity intertwines with ongoing social relations rather than occurring in a vacuum. This is described as

“embeddedness” (Granovetter, 1985). Economic activities are embedded in social relations: Economic goals are definitely associated with social goals; economic phenomena have a wider basis than personal motives, and are forever influenced by on-going social relations in which they are embedded; even economic institutions are socially constructed, because they rely on complex sophisticated social relations and norms, which often endure in the long term.

Based on a social relation approach and the concept of embeddedness, which counters the notion of individuals merely rationally pursuing maximum utility

(utilitarian rationality), the egalitarianism in collective land benefits could be better understood. First, it helps to specify the non-economic goals of peasants. Some fundamental dimensions like peasants’ livelihoods underlying collective distribution of land benefits are therefore referred. To cope with undergoing livelihoods, peasants establish their economic rationalities in the collective economy, including the equal distribution of collective corporate. Accordingly, their economic choices towards public benefits definitely evolve according to concrete social and economic

9http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_relations 10Ibid

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 25 circumstance. Continuing previous concern on peasants’ subsistence on traditional agriculture, this study would examine the new pattern of their livelihoods.

Second, we can explore the impact of ongoing social relations on the collective land economy. One of the basic bonds of social relations is property rights (Walder

& Oi, 1999), which represents social relations of stakeholders around certain properties. In post-Mao period, property rights in land use and transfer keep changing in Yi village. From HRS to the shareholding cooperative era, land tenure is shortened from 30 years to 3-4 years, and land users also concentrate into the minor rich. Moreover, villagers’ entitlements of land disposal are deprived by village cadres for an intensive manipulation. These inequalities of land use and transfer can be definitely implied with regards to the analytical tool of social relations. And thus the impact those adjustments of property rights on collective egalitarianism would get verified.

In the end, inspired by the notion that economic institutions are socially constructed, this study focuses on the endeavor of peasants to maintain egalitarian collective distribution. Face various challenges to collective equality, peasants are assumed to actively resist that. One of such conflicts occurs between village cadres and peasants. In formal village organs, village cadres surely hold the managerial power. It is quite popular that party cadres abuse the positional power to usurp public benefits, as many studies on the privatization of public assets in transitional society indicate (Putterman, 1995; Walder, 2003). Peasants have to fight against this trend, if they want to bolster equal collective allocation. Thus their public participation into village affairs through formal avenues like villagers’ committee is certainly checked.

Further, this study also points to another style of public participation through traditional lineage organs. As the case of Yi village shows, peasants devote to kinds

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 26 of mass unions of lineage. They settle diverse public projects based on the lineage structure, such as the dragon boat race or banquet for elders. Though such public participation is informal, they definitely impact village cadres as well as egalitarian collective allocation.

To elaborate egalitarian allocation in detail based on theories of embeddedness, the following chapters include six parts:

The literature review explores the research framework of embeddedness, which is extended to the case of Yi village. The research question is why peasants insist equal allocation instead of better efficiency in collective economy since Mao’s era, as previous studies notes. To answer this research question, the perspective of social relations is applied as the analytical tool. It sets a three-level framework of the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism, which integrates peasants’ livelihoods, land property rights system, and the power structure where peasants interact with cadres together.

The next chapter discusses the methodology of single-case study and relative methods. As a case study, past opinions on collective egalitarianism are re-examined in the new case of Yi village. Further, since the perspective of social relations is adopted, Yi village also help to verify a distinct aspect, interactions between peasants and cadres. Extensive organs of Yi village in formal and traditional domains can meet the analytical task here. As the core methodological goal, causal relations between three variants and collective egalitarianism (peasants’ livelihoods, land property rights, and social interactions between cadres and peasants in public organs) need to be established. Further, this part also needs to prepare for some theoretical inferences. Theories of state-society relations are referred here. Yi village can satisfy this methodological standard through its substantial and convincible details.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 27

Chapter four explains two things: the evolution of peasants’ livelihoods as well as their land property rights in three decades after Mao’s ruling. Marketization and rural industrialization stimulate far-reaching changes in the countryside, especially in the Pearl River Delta. One aspect is off-farm economic opportunities burgeoning.

Thus how peasants adapt to the change from agriculture to off-farm departments would be illustrated. Meanwhile, the transformation of their livelihoods accompanies with the alternations of land property rights. How it is determined by state and grass- roots cadres is added. Based on changes of above two sectors, how collective egalitarianism transits in post-Mao era would be stated in the end.

The fifth chapter examines the power structure in formal public organs. It involves the power distribution in general political locus and collective economic organs. Drawing on many the organizations, the people which control village affairs can be clearly disclosed. Adding the maneuver of positional power, village cadres’ impact on public interests is quite clear. In the end, this part would state the impact of the power relations between cadres and peasants on collective egalitarianism. If peasants have inadequate participation into public affairs, their interests attaching to equal allocation secured in collective organs is doubtful.

Subsequently, chapter six would demonstrate the implications of reviving lineages in terms of rural mass participation. In Yi village, although lineage allies no longer orient to land assets, they still points to the survival of native group. For this reason, lineage assemblies can effectively mobilize peasants. With regard to the public participation, it is ensured by the equitable intra-group relations. Without equitable membership, lineage programs could not abide in a long run, as I suppose.

And the regular lineage programs actually repeatedly educate peasants how to deal

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 28 with public benefits (in an equitable manner). And this enables peasants to deter cadres controlling formal village organs.

In the seventh chapter, the conclusive part, the generalization of this case study is examined. Based on precedent descriptions about the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism at three levels, a comprehensive remark on the findings is available.

Nonetheless, by referring to several other villages (involving open or secret mass movements for land benefits), the influence of lineage associations on village public affairs, especially collective egalitarianism, becomes complete. In this sense, conclusive remarks of this study get mediated proofs. Finally, by referring to theories of peasant-state relations, peasants are proved to have strengths in shaping rural

China transition. Their cultural constructs should not be overlooked in promoting the public participation as well as grass-roots democracy. Consequently, the limited findings based on evidences of Yi village can gain certain theoretical significance.

4. Contributions of This Research

Through examining the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism, this study makes contributions at both empirical and theoretical levels: firstly, the study renders new insights into the changing collective equivalent allocation. Though collective egalitarianism has already been elaborated, the shareholding cooperative system added can improve relative academic debates. These insights primarily refer to the varying optimal preferences of peasants. In post-Mao period, the population of Yi village has adjusted collective distribution for several times. The first is the reallocation of land use, and subsequently is the one of public welfare. If Yi village is recognized convincible, such changes can elaborate in general that collective distribution always intertwines peasants’ livelihoods. Even when peasants turn to

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 29 off-farm jobs and cancel their dependence on farmland, they still count on the collective for their new living needs.

Second, there is a clear focus on potential or real damages to collective distribution. In practice, egalitarianism is possibly impeded by changes of land usage and benefit allocation. In post-Mao time, land use turns to be highly commercialized, and so the equal distribution of bulky collective benefits also becomes very sensitive in the village. Any inequalities of collective distribution may induce the mass discontent. Through investigating the power structure in general political locus and collective organs, current relations between peasants and cadres can be unambiguously seen. This reality means a lot to academic communities in the topics of grass-roots political transition, or rural land development. And accordingly, it is also helpful in devising state policies in these two aspects.

At last, to reveal the social constructive process of collective egalitarianism, this study identifies the significance of traditional community associations in promoting the mass participation. Peasants have their interests vulnerable in formal village arenas, as their frustrated participation there. For privative interests, village cadres possibly abuse their managerial power in collective organs. Unlike formal village organs, traditional unions of lineage promote the public participation. For the survival of native ethnic group, lineages not only compete or negotiate with other groups, but also need to respect the equity amid members. This principal incorporate but is broader than equivalence. Based on the criteria of equity, circulating lineage assemblies train peasants repeatedly in coping with public matters. Though such route is informal, they indeed increase the popular participation. Consequently, such repeated activities also deter village cadres in charge of collective assets. Therefore, this study can disclose the complicated interactions between cadres and peasants. By

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 30 looking into the public participation via formal and informal channels, cadres’ harms and peasants’ support underlying collective egalitarianism are crystallized.

My study also refers to theories of state-society relations by examining cadre- peasant relations in the end of analysis, despite the main task of extending theories of social relations. While the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism is testified by abundant facts of Yi village, this case study simultaneously contributes to academic debates about state-society relations. There is some chaos in the discussions about state-society relations, which partially stems from a vague definition of concepts like state and society. To remedy it, a regional dimension can be applied (Perry, 1994).

As the unique case in the Pearl River Delta, this study of Yi village represents a special type of collective egalitarianism in light of prosperous lineage activities.

Rather than formal self-governance organs, traditional ones effectively mobilize peasants to participate into collective economic institutions and protect their own interests there. Thus it complements explanations about Chinese transition which almost center on the state. Based on the cultural dimension of lineage, pioneer elaborations on peasants’ power from political or economic dimensions are further modified. Moreover, it also contributes to the issue of grassroots democracy (Perry

& Goldman, 2007). Irrespective of economic growth or top-down political reform, reviving ethnic factors of lineage definitely promote such democracy. It thus modifies the classical perspective about democracy, in which atomized individuals ask for universal entitlements via national democracy. In the Chinese style transition, peasants living in special kinship corporate pursue grass-roots equity via restoring traditional organs.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 31

Chapter Two - Literature Review

The Embeddedness of the Post-Mao Collective Land Economy: Egalitarianism

Irrespective of economic efficiency, the continuous phenomenon of collective egalitarianism has its theoretical explanation, which is embeddedness. Underlying equal allocation of collective corporate, peasants’ livelihood, rural land property rights, and social interactions between village cadres and peasants are all influential.

In the shareholding cooperative era, the embeddedness of shareholding cooperative can be further examined from these three aspects.

1. Theoretical Debates over the Embeddedness of the Economy: Social

Relations

Based on peasants valuing egalitarianism in contrast with academic notions of economic efficiency, we can discuss more profound theoretical debates concerning economic and non-economic norms. During these controversies, the third perspective of social relations emerges. Beyond the concept of embeddedness, this approach spurns the mechanistic image of human actions, whether these actions are deemed rationally utilitarian or not.

1.1 Two theories of the Chinese transition towards efficiency 11

Over and above the rural land system, the whole transition of China involves debates about neo-liberal economic efficiency and opposition to such an approach.

Chinese reform has a very particular position in the socialist camp; the notable economic success of this model within a socialist party state has surprised some

11Some other theoretical frameworks which are also influential are omitted here, such as Chinese federalism (Montinola et al., 1995; X. Zhang, 2006). The new political basis of successful reform in China has been dubbed federalis m, Chinese style. In this special version, federalism critically transforms the relationship between central government and local government, and addresses some of the basic limitations of central power to obstruct economic transition. Federalis m in China does not greatly comply with the general definition related to individual-state relationships. However, it does relate to many aspects to western perceptions of federalis m and decentralization of power.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 32 observers. Unlike radical privatization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries, China has used moderate reform and hybrid property rights in the former state and collective economy. Radical, swift privatization can spur supposed economic growth as the private ownership of public assets is achieved (Peng, 2001;

Walder & Oi, 1999), however, Chinese semi-privatization has supported remarkable economic development. According to a National Bureau of Statistics bulletin, annual

GDP growth has reached 9.8%, one of the highest growth rates of the second half of

20th century12.

The particular economic success in China has attracted numerous academic researches into the rationale of economic development in transitional economies.

New Classical Economics and New Institutional Economics 13, in the second half of the 20th century, respectively emphasize market and non-market factors in the

Chinese transition. While critiques of Market Transition Theory (related to socialist transitional efficiency) comply with classical market economics, theories of non- market institutional transformation (such as local state corporatism), are influenced by institutional economics.

Market Transition Theory(Nee & Cao, 2002; Nee, 1989, 1996), explores post-

Mao efficiency in China by comparing socialist redistribution and market exchange.

Such studies draw on research by Ivan Sezelyni into the Eastern European transition, itself partly based on work by Karl Polanyi. Market exchange complements socialist redistribution; inequalities are reduced to some extent (Walder, 1996). Regarding transition in China, Nee does not merely examine the growing strength of free

12http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-10/27/content_1132281.htm, “Da Gai Ge, Da Kai Fang, Da Fa Zhan (Great reform, Broad openness, Notable development: A series of reports of the socio-economic achievements of three-decade reform)”, Oct 27, 2008 13Discussion of the development of modern economics appears in Granovetter (Granovetter, 1992). The two branches originate from a similar view of neo-classical economics and move towards new institutional analysis.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 33 market trade in social stratification, but anticipates a decisive tipping point at which time market exchange will replace socialist redistribution. Therefore, a particular emphasis on the efficiency of the market goes beyond Polanyi, and even contradicts

Polanyi. In free market exchange involving atomized individuals, Nee optimistically anticipates a society dominated by the market determining economic status, opportunities and incentives. In contrast, Polanyi argues that market exchange is only one means to achieve economic efficiency. If individual economic rationality comes in conflict with society, a modern market economy can lead to disaster rather than triumph. However, adjustments to socialist redistribution (such as local state corporatism), will inevitably lead to the final replacement of socialist stratification by the market, according to pro-market theorists.

The second approach of general institutional analysis proposes many critiques to the market approach. This approach focuses on the substantial interactions of institutions, and primarily uses empirical evidence. For instance, in a symposium about the ambiguous property rights of the rural collective economy, this approach illustrates how public property rights have evolved over time and region in post-Mao

China. There are implications for these institutions of property rights if they are related to the target of economic efficiency (Walder & Oi, 1999). In this way, this work does not directly respond to theories of property rights and socialist transformation except in relation to privatization. Nevertheless, according to such researchers, all theories are grounded in accurate understanding of reality. Evidence can be used to develop theory.

The first argument focuses on the muddy conception of market exchange. Nee’s conception derives from Karl Polanyi’s notation, which merely defines market exchange as “the absence of redistribute power”. When he discusses “the decline of

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 34 cadre power”, he simply attributes it to the spreading of market exchange (Walder,

1996), irrespective of the reality of market growth, or the casual relations between the two. In terms of Polanyi, he rarely clarifies how redistributive system transits to the market one. This blank is rapidly filled with pre-install values of Nee, which identifies “the decline of redistributive power” intrinsic to uprising market through invalid corroborations.

General institutional analysis further explores the potential conflicts between market and other institutional factors, which are overlooked in Nee’s work. A primary example is found in the notable economic achievement of Township and

Village Enterprises (TVEs). The pro-market theory supposes intrinsic market effects spur this economic outcome. Free market exchange determines transaction costs and people autonomously understand market exchange only if it is reopened in the transitional stage. As a comparison, general institutional analysis focuses more on concrete alterations by the Lennist party state, such as the gradual shift of property rights (Lin & Chen, 1999; Vermeer, 1999; Walder & Oi, 1999; Whiting, 1999), or increasing benefits for cadres (Oi, 1992). They are seen as stimulating remarkable rural economic growth. Meanwhile, proponents of market exchange regard TVEs as exceptional and incomplete. Only at the end of the reform do the redistributive advantages of rural cadres decay and become testable14. The general institutional approach counters with notion on the grounds that Market Transition Theory never

14To better understand TVEs, Nee and Cao (2002) later established the “continuity-discontinuity” model to supplement market transition theory. The continuous structure of socialist redistribution maintains the redistributive advantages of political elites, while the discontinuous aspect complies with market exchange and enables household entrepreneurship to attain new benefits. As a result, ultimate market-oriented transition is decided by concrete interaction between redistributive and market forces. He admits a current shortage of empirical data to support his theory. Market society starts from the margins of the old structure, and its development is in the long term; in addition, as the redistributive regime persists for a long period, it provokes path dependence.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 35 defines an explanation applied to the whole transitional period. Otherwise, it would need to largely renew its original content (Walder, 2002).

In short, the pro-market perspective is similar to neo-liberalism and is strongly countered by general institutional analysis. However general institutional analysis seldom denies the standpoint of neo-liberalism. To transcend this popular but narrow orientation to free market exchange by atomized individuals, this study adopts an alternative dimension of social relations to investigate its impact on economic behavior.

1.2 The alternative perspective of social relations

The new perspective of social relations addresses two popular assumptions regarding individual action (Granovetter, 1985): firstly, human actions under- socialized. Classical and New Classical Economics assume that social actors maximize their interests merely via instinct. Adam Smith was a pioneer of free markets based on individual self-interest and social relations are termed as frictions to economic transactions in economics. They seem burdens rather than boosting economic exchange as they are deemed to disturb individual economic rationality.

In contrast, the second model of over-socialization emphasizes social elements, such as social norms, popular customs, and counters the utilitarian assumptions of atomized individuals. Parsons and his followers specify that individuals are always determined by social norms. Social actors are bound by social rules according internalization. Irrespective of natural characteristics, behavior is governed by social norms derived from society. For this reason, individual behavior can be explicitly evaluated and predicted by social circumstances, such as class position.

Granovetter (Granovetter, 1985, 1992) argues that these two branches are essentially the same as they both see social action in mechanical terms. In their view,

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 36 the reflectivity of social actors is not possible. People seem isolated from ongoing social relations and historical and concurrent social relations seem to disappear. As a result, they are completely governed by instinctual or external forces which mechanically react to circumstance according to fixed codes determined by natural instinct or social culture.

Thereby, an alternative perspective emerges in economic sociology: as a crucial part of social action, economic activities embed themselves in social relations. This is a new alternative to the view of atomized self-interest or social action. New

Institutional Economics approximately transcend this point, and so threaten its own principal in analysis. Parsons’ functionalism goes to another extreme that similarly ignores the reflective capacity of social actors. As a comparison, social networks indeed go beyond utilitarianism in social action. To be concrete, the embeddedness of economic performance can be defined at three levels (Granovetter, 1992): Firstly, the pursuit of economic goals also involves non-economic social goals; secondly, economic phenomena do not rely on individual motives alone, because it is also embedded in ongoing social relations. In another word, the economic motives of humans are always impacted by on-going social relations; thirdly, economic institutions usually depend upon a complex of social factors and their interactions. In practice, they are socially constructed.

To transcend narrow and utilitarian neo-liberal notions of economic efficiency, this research adopts the social relations approach to explore broader determinants of economic action beyond individual self-interest. For example, transactional costs, personal social networks, or vaster, institutional links all challenge the supposition of perfect individual rationality (Zhou, Zhao, Li, & Cai, 2003). Furthermore, the alternative approach also involves analysis that goes beyond the limited notion of

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 37 economic efficiency. This is a natural result of adopting a new approach encompassing economic pursuits often intertwine with non-economic aims.

1.3 The embeddedness of peasant economy

Generally, the social relations approach and the concept of embeddedness can add to long-standing debates about the characteristics of the peasant economy.

Arguments in this field are basically concerned with whether non-capitalist societies enable alternatives to the utilitarian rationality of capitalist society. The utilitarian standpoints are explicit in classical research into “transforming traditional agriculture”

(Schultz, 1964). Regarding the lower efficiency of traditional agriculture compared to modern methods, this eventually results from traditional social circumstances rather than the peasants themselves. In this study, peasants seem identical to people in capitalist society, rationally conducting agricultural production based on self- interest, irrespective of pre-capitalism or contemporary underdevelopment.

Traditional agriculture always is stagnant at a low level of economic equilibrium, albeit the best equilibrium in that rigid social context. A higher equilibrium realized via “technical progress” is always emphasized because peasant knowledge is outmoded. In contrast to new productive materials, peasants’ ideas about the diverse organizations of such materials determine the economic outcome. Hence, the transition to modern agriculture is not successful without developing peasants’ knowledge.

The “human capital” of peasants reveals another intriguing issue: peasants’ knowledge of agriculture involves social and political relations. It is not easy for traditional peasants/farmers to change their technology of agricultural production.

The long-term equilibrium of traditional agriculture arises not only from natural conditions, but also from non-individual interests underlying individual

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 38 arrangements. Agricultural technologies such as the use of labour and land are probably drawn into the public interests of community-based peasants. In another word, social and political relations circumvent the rational calculation of individual peasants. They actually swamp the utilitarian rationality of peasants when traditional agriculture is sustained for a long time, albeit peasants closely connected to the market instead of existing in isolation.

The opponents of universal utilitarianism propose differing theories on the economic action of peasants (Chayanov, 1986; Daniel Thorner, 1986; Shanin, 1986).

The capitalist economy establishes itself on complete information of market transactions, such as the rent of land, the price of goods, the interests of capital and so on. For this reason, individuals get used to conducting input-output calculations to maximize net profit. As a comparison, non-capitalist economies have one or more type of transaction information not available in the market and this makes utilitarian calculations unfeasible. As a non-capitalist alternative, peasants focus on family farms, but this is not rationally utilitarian as their labour is not accommodated in the market. The supply of peasant labour is normally based on families rather than individuals. At the same time, the family is also the unit of consumption. Hence, economic optimization for family farms is rooted in the balance between consumption and drudgery. To increase total income and improve livelihood in accordance with customary standards, peasants input more labour in farming despite the net profits or marginal efficiency. These particular economic actions by peasants stem from the fact that peasant families are simultaneously production and consumption units. In peasant families, investment and income are together; moreover, the labour of family members indicates little differentiation.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 39

What is more striking is that family farms survive in competition with capitalist farms. The special optimization of peasant families produces resilient in competition. These farms survive; meanwhile, capitalists find it difficult to maximize profit. Huang (1990) also observes the durability of the subsistence-level peasant economy in China through optimization and the maximization of aggregate family income, and despite rural commercialization. Huang discusses the concept of economic involution in contrast with previous notions of economic development and stagnation. Economic involution involves the growth of the aggregate output seldom leading to higher efficiency, and this distinguishes economic growth from development. The intensification of population forces peasants, at the level of the family, to prefer commercial crops instead of common ones. Furthermore, this explains why peasants have to live at a subsistence level despite advanced rural commercialization and increased labour.

While economic research into agricultural transformation confirms the utilitarian rationality of peasants, substantial studies of economic history15 underline the importance of particular optimization by peasants, the maximization of family income. Much economic research presupposes that peasants always seek maximized profit in any given social circumstances and increased agricultural efficiency is the result of changing social conditions exterior to peasants. In contrast, the second approach discusses the unique characteristics of peasants’ economic preferences.

Based on different views of peasants in terms of economic rationality, notions of social relations in the peasant economy also conflict. Economic research based on neo-liberal assumptions confirms the influence of social relations on peasants’ rationality, but is more inclined to define their impact as inevitable friction. When

15Chayanov (1986) outlines five alternatives to capitalist economy in the history of Russia and other places. Despite being family farms, they still embody the serf economy, slavery, fiefdoms and the emerging socialist collective economy.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 40 peasants inevitably take social and political relations into consideration, their influence should be reduced into the minimum. To modernize traditional agriculture, peasants need to renew those non-economic relations. The key is to improve the knowledge of peasants. In contrast, the substantive approach mostly relies on social relations to explain peasants’ action: customs outline the living criteria proper to peasants who endeavor to reach them. For example, in a living circumstance full of drudgery, peasants seek subsistence together via family cooperation.

However, the above two approaches both overlook economic differentiation among peasants. In their discussion, peasants are deemed homogeneous and are assumed to act similarly. Meanwhile, rural society also has few internal conflicts amid its components as it merely represents the accumulation of such homogeneous units. However, some other inquiries reveal the economic and political differentiation of peasants. Huang (1985) found that different classes of peasants adopt the principals of net profit and accumulated income. Rich peasants in pre- revolutionary North China were more likely to construct capitalist farms with finite cultivation of cash crops. They deliberatively controlled the risk of investment to earn maximum profit. Meanwhile, the poor group surprisingly invested all their land in cash crops. Their decision is reasonable in terms of the special optimization by peasants using very small plots of land. They have to input the most self-owned labour in their puny pieces of land to seek greater total output.

Social relations are more clearly evaluated by another two schools of thought: the moral economy and political economy. The concern over utilitarian rationality is sharpened in the context of peasant society. Therefore, relations between tenants and landlords and between individual peasants and the aggregate village have attracted much research (Huang, 1985). The school of moral economy emphasizes single or

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 41 multi-strand client relations with power holders like landlords in the village. In these dyadic relations (Landé, 1977), the prestige of the patrons is legitimized. They provide benefits to clients to meet subsistence needs. Since these patronages are in line with social norms rooted in “village paternalism”, patrons thus legitimize their prestige. Moreover, as regards peasants, they also depend on the rich and power holders to sponsor religious projects and sustain individual subsistence through such means as credit, capital, tools and tenancies.

Notions of the moral economy also emphasize that the village works not only as a cultural and social unit, but also an economic institution to guarantee the subsistence of villagers. Peasants establish mutual aid in the economy, which enables the poorer to receive aids from better-off neighborhoods. Social norms - that every villager deserves at least a subsistence living - bears on the village unit. There are clear responsibilities concerning work and leveling wealth; providing jobs or plots of land to fellow members and redistributing extra properties (of the rich) to prevent vast economic polarization become corporate responsibilities. In addition, the village provides many public programs for the benefit of all villagers, among them being village drainage and irrigation.

The political economic school counters notions of the moral economy. In terms of village goods, it notes the inherent and widespread dilemma of “free riders”.

It is difficult to achieve a consensus between individual interest and collective benefits. There are normally several questions in the input-output calculation of peasants before they decide to contribute to the village or sacrifice benefits for collective programs: (1) whether he could share the collective benefits if he does not join; (2) if he contribute to the village, is his voluntary contribution clearly recognized by the village and other peasants?; (3) When he and other normal

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 42 peasants voluntarily submit aid and support the village, does the village leadership realize collective programs? Many village goods, like social security, allow peasants to attain benefits without making any contributions. Thus the problem of free riders possibly appears in the former situation. Moreover, when most peasants suffer reductions in income, the tension between individual and public interests certainly can escalate. If public projects (e.g. social security) are hardly trusted as low efficiency or accountability, peasants definitely turn to private ones realized via individual investments. In fact, there is no single way to ensure the realization of collective programs, as they rest on the coordination of many factors, such as past experience, current leadership, the economic environment, political institutions and socialnorms. Altogether, the achievements of village public goods can overcome the difficulties of personal interests, especially when there is strong distrust among peasants.

Notions of the political economy further identify patron-client relationships as being to the behalf of patrons. Unlike in notions of the moral economy, the exchange of benefits is not so equal between two parties. The balance between the two sides is so weak that clients need aid from patrons. According to notions of the political economy, patrons establish individual ties to construct personal prestige as well as avoid group pressure from tenants. Clientelism depends on the capacity of patrons to build these ties.

Similar to debates on the nature of social action (between utilitarian and non- utilitarian ideas), these two schools also differently recognize the characteristics of peasants (Popkin, 1979). The moral economic school argues that the transition of rural society is closely linked with peasants’ risk-averse choices. In contrast, the political economic school emphasizes peasants’ “investment and gamble” tendencies.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 43

Peasant aversion to risk still leads them to invest for economic benefits in the long or short run. “Safety first” spurs various methods of investment: in children, land, instruments, and so on. The primary aim of investment is security in old age. Across different regions, peasants invest in their children to construct reciprocal relationships with their offspring. Another form of investment is property control by parents, because the loyalty of offspring sometimes is unreliable. Despite the security for aging lives, peasants who get rid of bottom-line subsistence, naturally incline to conduct more investments for higher income. Moreover, if tenants can get quick and large sums of repayments, they may conduct gambles by risking small and tolerable losses.

Debates about the peasant economy and peasant behavior are rooted in debates between the utilitarian perspective and its rivals. The two schools also contest optimization by peasants; whether optimization is subordinate to maximized utility or not. If utilitarian rationality is regarded as universal, peasants maximize individual utility. Otherwise, peasants possibly prefer different goals, such as the maximization of total family income based on the logic of subsistence. In summary, grounded by general theories of social relations and embeddedness (Granovetter, 1992), economic performance and human nature in peasant society manifest in three aspects:

First, the economic goals of peasants always tightly intertwine with political and social goals. Whether guided by individual profit or family subsistence, economic optimization by peasants explicitly involves social embeddedness.

According to the substantial opinion (Humphreys, 1969), in any society, market exchange tends to depart from social constraints to self-regulate based on the atomized self-interest of individuals. However, as regards other economic patterns, such as reciprocity or redistribution, they depend on social norms and respect non-

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 44 economic aims. In Southeastern Asian rural society, moral economy emphasizes

“safety first” to ensure individual interests and collective interest are balanced over- class coordination among peasants. In contrast, political economic analysis emphasizes the conflicts between individual and collective interests or other individuals. The moral economic approach barely illuminates where and how “norms” as “minimum subsistence” arise in the village, because social norms essentially are neither fixed nor consistent. Peasants prefer the norms in accordance with their private benefits, and negotiate with paradoxical value to gradually make the rules explicit.

Economic actions evolve along on-going social relations regardless of personal motives. Despite the insistence on norms of subsistence or profit maximization, peasant choices of private or public interest actually depend on social relations.

Overseas Chinese in southeastern Asia heavily rely on kinship when they conduct economic activities among fellows. In transactions with outsiders, they accurately measure private interests to maximize benefits (Granovetter, 1992). In practice, on- going social relations mainly involve punishment and rewards for people involved to frame their actions (Granovetter, 2005; Nee, 1998). Obviously, the more intense social ties are, the more effective are the economic interests of peasants. Otherwise, they would be punished. Furthermore, social relations are wider than pre-existing relations like kinship. People can artificially construct personal social ties through acquired actions. This category of social relations refers to friendship, deference, compliance and so on. Those close-knit personal networks sometimes are remarkably effective. The 19th century industrialization of electricity in the United

States was built on personal networks (Granovetter, 1992).

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 45

Lastly, the economic institutions of peasant society are socially constructed. In terms of the emergence of economic institutions, the political economic school attributes the forging of social norms as based on individual self-interest. Meanwhile notions of the moral economy barely illuminate how “norms” like “minimum subsistence” rise in the village. Granovetter (Granovetter, 1992)argues that the rise of economic institutions seldom obey “social needs”. Instead, he uses constructivism to reveal the real construction of economic institutions. His constructivism discusses three types of economy: first, the families of overseas Chinese in southeastern Asia exchange among fellows according to substantial norms; second, as the core institution of the capitalist world, alliances of core families bolster trade so intensively that they promote local or national industrialization; last, forcible personal networks of top individuals in the United States in the 19th century constructed the electricity industry.

1.4 The embeddedness of Chinese peasant economy

Based on the long history of peasantry society, China can help to promote past arguments on the rise of market-led institutions, whereas insights of moral economic and political-economic schools. Skinner (1964, 1971) importantly clarifies unconventional market institutions. As he notes, at first, the standard market at township level actually replaced the village as the basic social unit of peasants. The standard market system works as the primary societal nucleate, in which peasants accomplish both economic and non-economic tasks. In this cellular structure, the point where the standard market is located also works as the center of the local marriage network and the initial stage of local authorities. Economic activities also run differently according to the intensity of social relations. In their exchange with alien factors (such as itinerant artisans and merchants), peasants plainly adhere to the

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 46 principal of self-interest as independent individuals. However, simultaneously, the flows of products and benefits inside the village community still surrender to competitive principals of reciprocity and reallocation.

Last, in terms of the evolution of this market system, the cycle between village closure and openness persists. Villagers usually prefer the marketing system rather than self-reliance if possible. When outlier economic exchange is disrupted, the rural community often withdraws from market exchange to reciprocity and redistribution.

The self-reliant closure thereafter takes place. In fact, this circulation of the rural market economy also resembles the political domain.

However, Skinner has shortcomings in addressing how the marketing system arises. His work is in line with functionalism: first, the scale of standard market is rooted in transport. The radius of the each market almost corresponds with a comfortable walking distance for peasants. A round trip on foot to the market should take more than a single day. Secondly, the rural standard market is based on meager profits. The daily operations of a single standard market are barely sustainable on its lean benefits. The market may barely open for two days in its turn during a long circulation consisted of several markets. Or it merely lasts several hours rather than a whole day if it is a daily market. As a result, itinerants have to visit different markets, and utilize varied strategies to maximize their gross profit. Thirdly, the schedule of the market circle is based on the traditional lunar calendar. Since an entire round takes either one Xun (ten days) or one fortnight (every fourteen days), a circuit of standard markets often consists of five to seven units. Fourthly, immediate markets superior to the standard market use similar schedules and cycles, although they are open for longer periods than standard ones. A central market of a county can be open almost on a daily basis because of the numerous gentry and state officials present.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 47

“Social needs” in four aspects obviously comply with utilitarian self-interest.

While ordinary peasants calculate the realistic walking distance to the market, businessmen calculate profit in the market. Moreover, irrespective of the type of market, the circuit of markets is convenient for participants. The marketing system meets the economic needs of peasants. Economic production and differentiation in local regions are regarded as the dynamic of the local market system because local society is the aggregate of various economic relations and their outcomes (Siu, 1990).

Skinner helped spur new ideas about the dynamics underlying the formation and evolution of economic institutions. Siu (1990) examines the cyclic rituals and the different types of interactions between the state and local society. According to her, the narrow emphasis on the economy should be replaced by comprehensive cultural analysis, including materials, political power and cultural meanings.

Traditional rituals are revealed in interactions among the central state, local society as well as self-interested local officials.

Process analysis is also undertaken by Shue (1988) to better understand dynamics and structure, institutions and behaviors in Chinese politics and society. In the evolution of Chinese state-society relations in the pre and post reform periods, perpetual interactions between state bodies and local society comprise the main dynamic reshaping political institutions and social organizations (Shue, 1990).

In short, analyzing social relations can reveal the embeddedness of economic performance and overcome the shortcomings of an approach based solely on market efficiency. This study does not aim to discuss optimums distinct from utilitarian ones.

Instead, this research focuses on the significance of the new approach by adopting it to explore the peasant economy and society, including: the combination of economic and non-economic motives, the immersing of on-going social relations and economic

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 48 activities and how economic institutions are developed. In particular, analysis of the

Chinese peasant economy contributes to understanding the dynamics underlying economic institutions, including sophisticated interactions amid broader factors beyond purely economic ones.

2. Latest Research about the Embeddedness of Post-Mao Collective Economy

Analyzing social relations can help to understand the changing rural land system. Within the constraints of collective ownership, peasants can build credible property rights, as it is noted (Po, 2008). Further, Ho (2001) indicates that efficiency can stem from credible property rights institutions, whether they are private or not.

In his study, he points out that the privatization of land property rights always risks being circumvented by the Leninist party state, despite the rapid reform progress.

The central government decides how far land privatization can proceed in rural areas.

Nonetheless, without a focus on social relations, it is yet difficult to fathom how efficient rural property rights can emerge and sustain. Moreover, without such an approach, it is difficult to ascertain why credible property rights towards economic efficiency can emerge sometimes, and in most times, peasants prior prefer equal allocation in collective economy.

2.1 Recent studies over the embeddedness of collective economy

The reform of rural land has triggered amounts of research into effective rural economics and credible property rights in present China. The state is commonly recognized as crucial in shaping land institutions. While the state can devise and promote privatization of land use (2001), it also establishes the land market (Lin &

Ho, 2005). In the market system, the heterogeneity, distraction and contradictions of the coercive state are exposed. Set apart from the model used by western countries, the state should not be entirely dependent on as a single analytical factor in a

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 49 transitional economy. As for alternatives, some studies reveal a variety of institutional factors and their interactions (Sargeson, 2011). The interactions between the state and societal factors, such as individual householders in the city or village corporatism in the countryside, can be drawn upon to understand the process and consequences of transitional land system.

Recently in China, the formation of credible land property rights is initially discussed by Jing Zhang (2003). In her study, land use de facto stems from the competition of diverse political forces. Regarding what renders land use credible, rival political power is actually involved. Despite rules of HRS, negotiations among peasants, village cadres, local and higher authorities to secure their own land use never stop. Lawful regulation is deemed deficient, thanks to the distorted legislation of China. In developed western countries, the legislative process absorbs diverse political appeals. Since the legislation considers all competitive interests and reach a compromise, laws are finally passed as the sole authority. In contrast, Chinese legislation often involves narrow interests, and therefore subjects to persistent contests in the implementation. Land use is contented by various alternative patterns to the legal one. Altogether, this research explores how land property rights evolve in the context of political rivalries despite legal regulation.

The following studies further explore the evolution of collective property rights.

Sheng and Wang (2005) argue that ambiguous collective property rights could be identified by land boundaries. Inside the border, peasants collaboratively hold their collective land, everything attached to it and all the output of it. Independent from state authorities, other collectives and outsiders, such ownership is usually recognized as the exclusive right of local people. Moreover, indigenous peasants

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 50 build equivalent allocation of collective benefits, which is set according to community membership.

Nonetheless, equal allocation is found vulnerable to considerable economic and political inequalities amid collective members. The frictions may stem from the coercion of violence, political power or polarized wealth, biases from rules of allocation, personal networks and so on. Nevertheless, peasants always endeavor to maintain equality beneath collective ownership. For example, peasants even launch mass assemblies to preserve equal allocation. Due to constant rivalries between proponents and opponents of equal allocation, collective property rights are in flux, cycling from imbalance to balance amid stakeholders

Zhang (2007) also adopts the concept of embeddedness to explore the formation of rural property rights in relation to natural resources like water. His concept of embeddedness involves multiple bonds of political, economic, cultural and symbolic relations, every of which constitutes of its own “capital”. Zhang argues that those distinct capitals jointly knit rural property rights. In their intertexture, they equally contend as well as complement each other. And another research by Xiong (2009) explores the dynamical transition of rural land property rights over a long term.

Xiong reveals that if one type of land rules triumphs over others in a fixed period, this will render the stability of land property right regime during that time. As long as the dominant rule is formidable, land property rights regime is also stable.

Otherwise, any shifts in such determinant rules consequently change the pattern of land property rights regime.

In brief, diverse dynamics beneath rural land property rights have been explored. Zhang (2003) identifies many political forces; Sheng and Wang (2005) also describe the circle between “equilibrium” and “disequilibrium”; Zhang (2007)

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 51 figures out kinds of social relations and their special outcome of embeddedness;

Xiong (2009) distinguishes different rules of land property rights, and explains their impact on the stability of land property regime. These studies more or less illuminate factors probably impacting collective egalitarianism. However, they still differentiate from the approach to social relations and so get following shortages:

Firstly, the goal of peasants in their economic actions is quite ambiguous.

Zhang Jing simply defines land use as the interest of peasants, which motivates them to fight. She seldom explains what kind of interest that land use means, and how land use becomes that kind of interests. If land is replaced with any other things, the principal that peasants striving for interests is also applicable, in my perception. In fact, the particularity of land use (in terms of its essential relations with peasants) as the research object is implicitly confined at all. Sheng and Wang’s research also similarly mistakes. They describe peasants’ collective act automatically replying to interests (land and its benefits). Collective equivalence or land limits just reflect such benefits. Xiaojun Zhang (2007) actually takes rural property rights as the result of

“capital” competition, since he defines social relations as capitals. As a comparison with Zhang Jing’s research, former single political force is substituted of political, economic, cultural or even symbolic forces. In addition, his research objects include items much broader than land. Actually, he just makes the shortcoming of Zhang

Jing realistic: as the research object, land is replicable. In another word, their definition of study object fails in ambiguity. With regards to Xiong, the dominant rules which he emphasizes in framing of land property rights actually triumph by strengths. His pre-supposition is similarly problematic. In this sense, due to vague study object, above studies seem hardly falsified, and so are less scientific, when they pursue general laws about credible or stable rural land property rights.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 52

Secondly, such studies undervalue the continuity and embeddedness of collective land system. In practice, collective land system robustly endures 16 with unambiguous embeddedness. The reason that those studies underestimate its continuity is they overly emphasize the dynamics of such a system. Changes of political strength, expanding economic inequality, and the alternations of leading social relations or land rules all look easily reframing collective land system.

Nonetheless, such land system tightly binds to the powerful party state, low level of subsistence of the mass, and limited the market development. And if collective egalitarianism is added, how collective land system embeds into social relations is already explicitly discussed, like in Kung’s study (Kung, 1994).

Finally, previous studies simplify peasants’ collective action towards land benefits. In their view, social norms or relations can be used to judge peasant’s actions on the grounds of their automatically move according to “interests”. Zhang (J.

Zhang, 2003)emphasizes interest differences and their conflicts, and omits the mobilizing process. Similarly, Zhang (2007) and Xiong (2009) also put no words about collective action. They just concern the strengths of different types of social relations or rules of land property rights. Lastly, in Sheng and Wang’ discussion, mass assemblies (to preserve collective equality, or unitarily to fight against each alien force) by peasants seems quite easy. Contrarily, collective action of peasants actually seldom occurs. Suffering from insufficient compensation in unfair land appropriation, most peasants stand by rather than participate into the resistance (Guo,

2001). In rural villages, collective movement of peasants need to at least overcome

16Douglass (Douglass, 1990, p. 92–95). The feedback to institutions by people is decided by the information that social actors possessed and the ways they take in expression. Thus the feedback is imperfect with respect to its dependence on the opportunities and incentives provided by existed institutions. The feedback to institutions by people is decided by the information that social actors possessed and the ways they take in expression. Thus the feedback is imperfect with respect to its dependence on the opportunities and incentives provided by existed institutions.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 53 the power inequality between landlords (or cadres) and peasants (Li, 2009; Peng,

2010; Popkin, 1979). Patron-client relations developed by power holders may hinder collective action of peasants17.

2.2 Present Studies about the embeddedness of collective enterprises

It is widely noted that two factors have greatly contributed to the economic progress of TVEs (Peng, 2001). Firstly, in general institutional adjustments: revenue reform has been notable. The notion of local state corporatism involves grassroots cadres practicing entrepreneurship in public enterprises spurred by new revenue incentives. To pursue careers and augment local finance, they make efforts to create wealth rather than seek rent. This perspective reveals an exceptional Leninist state opening to the market (Oi, 1992, 1995; Walder, 1995). Secondly, the market exerts rigid requirements on the budget performance of collective enterprises. As market transactions are restored, TVEs get abundant economic opportunities. However, the additional pressure of market competition is also apparent. TVEs are then forced to improve efficiency. Moreover, there are two other institutional factors: the state banking system and an overall political and economic environment that favors public ownership (Kung & Lin, 2007).

New issues are raised by the decline of collective enterprises. TVEs suggest the economic development is possible using public ownership countering the notion that the private sector must always lead. Since they were workable in the past, why have collective enterprises declined during rapid marketization?

Some researchers insist that private ownership is crucial. Their analysis regards public ownership as exceptional in economic transition, which eventually results in

17 Clientelis m essentially involves a type of exchange (Landé, 1977; Scott, 1977). The exchange is unequal as it is more aligned to the interests of the powerful. Clientelis m in the collective land system can involve village cadres and their s mall circle unequally grasping more land benefits due to their power, despite the customary egalitarianis m. However, this study omits this aspect because the focus is on mass organizations.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 54 conventional market exchange amid self-interest individuals (Kung & Lin, 2007). In terms of such ideas, the institutional requisites of economic development in western countries resemble transition. In the market, hard budget constraints are part of every enterprise. Substantial credit is also vital (Fang & Smith, 2008). However, the most decisive factor is optimization by entrepreneurs. The sales-led optimality of TVEs is identified as self-contradicting (Kung & Lin, 2007). Compared with profit- maximization, there is a risk of deficiency, or even bankruptcy. The rapid expansion of TVEs creates greater economic risk to ultimately erode their credit in state banks

(previously unlimited). The stagnation of TVEs also frustrates political leaders, because of concerns over employment and revenue. In fact, policies indeed did slowly orientate towards private development in the 1990s, and the privatization of

TVEs commenced. Before the complete conversion of TVEs, some reforms like professional management were applied in TVEs. Public ownership, in the view of those scholars, again produces difficulties around monitoring, which hardly prevent the private usurpation of public assets by cadres in charge.

Contrary to proponents of private ownership, some other researches into TVEs more concern about non-market social relations (Zhe & Chen, 2005; Zheng, Chen, &

Ruan, 2011; Zheng, Ruan, & Chen, 2012). Collective corporate based on rural land system is possibly ambiguous in property rights in terms of who represents

“collective” (administrative village, villager’s team, any group of peasants, etc.) (Ho,

2001), this approach finds different incentives in the success of TVEs. Social reciprocity between entities and peasants is implied. According to New Institutional

Economics, the vague property rights of firms probably ruin economic efficiency.

However, these ambiguities in TVEs are complemented by solid norms of community reciprocity. To support the development of TVEs, informal but valid

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 55 contracts between the aggregation of peasants and entities are set. On the condition that peasants together devote resources like land to collective enterprises, losses are shared and there is investment by the entrepreneurship of local cadres. Through this,

TVEs can be successful. At the same time, TVEs should repay peasants in many ways, such as investing in village infrastructure. Moreover, off-farm jobs and public welfare also can be offered to peasants. In these reciprocal relations, public assets and the benefits of TVEs are transparent to peasants.

The subsequent development of private enterprise after the collapse of TVEs also justifies reciprocal relations between the community and enterprises (Zheng et al., 2011, 2012). After the privatization of TVEs, the reciprocal relations between former enterprises and peasants were sustained, although repayment is reduced and mediated (Song & Yang, 2005). Peasants continue to provide community resources to particular private enterprises and simultaneously acquire rewards from them.

Generally speaking, these payments are commonly held and equally distributed to qualified villagers.

Overall, TVEs also embed into social relations. Peasants can develop industry on the basis of public ownership instead of a private one. Even as proponents of privatization notes, TVEs are doomed to decay in a market environment, TVEs embed themselves into social relations all the way. Social relations support rather than obstruct TVEs’ development. Every important institution of TVEs is upheld by the broader community, such as the human resources of entrepreneurs and workers, credit guarantees, capital support and so on. Despite the reciprocity between peasants and enterprises, the central-local government relations also take effect. The optimality of maximized sales of cadres frustrates TVEs. Since this choice stems from special central-local government relations, self-interested officials focus on

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 56 enlarging sales to attain personal career mobility or material rewards. This causes severe economic risks in TVEs. In this sense, collective enterprise is an institution together constructed by central government, self-interested local officials and rural communities. In addition, it deserves to be mentioned that village cadres can gradually offset the advantages of TVEs as they conflict with the egalitarianism inside TVEs. On condition that cadre’s power lacks supervision, their maximization of personal interests eventually contradicts with the equal distribution of TVE benefits among the community group. Though TVEs eventually fail, they can continue to exemplify how economic institutions embed themselves in on-going social relations.

3. Research Framework: Egalitarianism and Its Maintenance

Following previous studies on egalitarianism, this research aims to test egalitarianism in the new case of Yi village to explore how it can survive in shareholding cooperatives. Based on analysis of social relations and the concept of embeddedness, the continuous egalitarian distribution of collective benefits is examined in detail. The adaptive livelihoods of peasants can reflect their optimization, while changing land property rights can demonstrate on-going peasant- peasant as well as cadre-peasant relations. Finally, the social construction of egalitarian shareholding cooperatives can be explored by focusing on how peasants participate in public affairs, either directly towards the collective land system or not.

To fulfill this task, the pre-requisites of egalitarianism are focused upon, and the means by which peasants maintain equal entitlements are also illustrated.

3.1 The continuity and discontinuity of land property rights

Shareholding cooperative systems involve a shift of land use, including non- agricultural conversion of farmland. As a new economic pattern, the shareholding

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 57 cooperative allows peasants, or more exactly, the village collective, to use farmland for significant land rent. Before this institutional innovation, state appropriation was enforced as the only legal channel of land conversion, and land rental or other transfers by peasants were not permitted unless for agricultural production (Ho &

Lin, 2003)18. Using shareholding cooperatives, non-agricultural land conversion by peasants was legalized using collective principles (Fu & Davis, 1998; Jiang & Liu,

2003, 2004), involving collective entities at or above natural village level rather than individuals concentrating and contracting land with commercial or industrial users.

Meanwhile, egalitarianism persists in this place: in general, peasants together hold the income of land conversion and meanwhile equally allocate dividends to eligible members. In addition, new land contracts also allow peasants to freely access land resources, which resembling the previous HRS. These features of the shareholding cooperative illustrate continuity in the collective land system.

Despite such consistency, some small but crucial changes to peasant rights have taken place. Peasants have had their rights of spontaneous transfer, mortgaging, leasing and subcontracting deprived by cadres via the cooperative. According to state declarations, those diverse rights, nonetheless, should be limited to agricultural use and attached to the tenure. These rights of disposition have been widely practiced since the reform (Ho & Lin, 2003), though they were formally admitted by the

Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party until 2008 19. These individual

18The Chinese land market in the post-Mao period consists of two parts which work in a dual-track way: in the primary market, the urban market allows both administrative appropriation and conveyance in the market; the collective land market contains two levels of land involving the free transfer of contracted land if it is for agricultural use, and the conversion of crop land for non- agricultural use within the territory of the collective (Ho & Lin, 2003).The development of the land market stimulates profitable non-agricultural land use, which has converted enormous amounts of arable land to industrial and commercial use. Land profits are so ample that local governments see it as a primary revenue resource. According to Zhou (2007), governmental income from land accounts for about 30% of budgetary revenue and 60-80% of non-budget revenue. 19Zhong Gong Zhong Yang Guan Yu Tui Jin Nong Cun Gai Ge Fa Zhan Ruo Gan Zhong Da Wen Ti Jue Ding (Decisions on Crucial Issues about the Promotion of Rural Reform and Development),

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 58 rights of disposal are eradicated by shareholding cooperatives as uniform formulation and management of land properties is wanted. Since land needs to be concentrated prior to transfer, individual rights in land disposition are therefore lost.

After this centralization of land disposal, peasants are barely left with the right to use land and acquire surplus from it.

As a result, social conflicts can arise in cadre-peasant relations and peasant- peasant relations because equal land use and benefits are disturbed. While peasants lose entitlements to land disposal, cadres in charge of the shareholding cooperative obtain more control in disposing of land resources. Village cadres follow the state, and worse, quite possibly hamper peasants’ interests in land conversion, due to their self-interest (Cai, 2003). As a comparison, peasants’ attitudes towards market-led transformation of land use get few studied. Instead, I am going to expose it through the varying livelihoods of peasants.

Using the case of Yi village, this research explores the economic power of cadres and peasants’ land use in the shareholding cooperative period. Therefore, this study examines whether egalitarianism can be sustained.

3.2 The alternations of peasant livelihood

As another prerequisite of egalitarianism, the livelihood of peasants and their demographic preferences also evolve in shareholding cooperatives. The effects of the burgeoning market economy are noticed. In shareholding cooperatives, peasants are assumed to have more off-farm opportunities and can reduce their dependence on farming. As the literature notes, Maoist collectives primarily satisfied the basic subsistence of peasants via time-rate remuneration and equivalent allocation of food grain. The low subsistence level of peasants and their significant dependence on

October 12, 2008.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 59 collective income engendered robust norms in relation to equal distribution. These norms continued during the HRS and peasants made frequent land adjustments to tackle family demographic pressures.

In a distinct era, the changes to peasants’ rural livelihoods can reframe collective egalitarianism. Due to the rapid expansion of off-farm economic opportunities, many peasants are leaving farming for non-agricultural income. Hu and Saich (2012) have examined the changing income structure in a village of Pearl

River Delta. Based on their survey, the income from family business including agriculture has declined to about 22% of the total, while the one from properties and investment increase to over 50%. If so, the divergent pattern of livelihoods may induce new peasant tactics and attitudes related to egalitarian allocation. At least, peasants may no longer demand land adjustments as they can live on other economic opportunities. In a diversified economy, they may reconstruct demographic patterns.

For example, labour may be critical to peasant livelihoods and they may focus on investments in human capital.

In terms of the changes to of peasants’ livelihoods as well as their optimization, their impact on equal distribution of collective benefits needs further research. This study can ask: What is the new optimization for peasants today? How do they deal with land use and collective allocations now?

3.3 Against inequalities in collective allocations: rural public participation

Albeit shareholding cooperatives were initiated by the state to improve the economic efficiency of land transfer, it is widely exercised by peasants in village communities. In this system, to preserve collective egalitarianism, peasants have to react against inequalities produced by local government, village cadres, halmlets and lineages (Tomba, 2012). This new type of collective corporate of land cooperative,

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 60 cadre-peasant inequalities in power and participation are important but have not been fully discussed yet. According to Hu and Saich (2012), the leadership of village cadres is checked, but which simply describes that an effective and clean leadership is taken in village land corporate in a famous Guangdong village. Similarly, Tsai

(Tsai, 2002) merely take the magnitude of time or village funds into account in explaining which decides cadres’ strategy in producing public goods. The problem of village cadres’ accountability is not referred in her argument. Thus, in my thesis, by examining peasants’ participation in formal collective corporate, how peasants reserve equal allocation in land shareholding cooperative can be better illustrated 20.

In fact, rural communities often contain two kinds of collective corporate providing public goods, including various benefits and social security: on the one hand, traditional lineage corporate reconstructs its own properties (Potters, 1990).

They are often counted on by village cadres in providing benefits or conducting local programs as informal associations (Tsai, 2002), or even supplement the state in engendering public goods or the mass compliance (Tsai, 2011). Basically, lineage corporate serves as the banking system among peasants belonging to the same ethnic group since Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). It establishes common land properties by and allocates benefits to ethnic members, in which credits come from ancestral and religious rituals instead of contracts (Faure & Siu, 2006). On the other hand, socialist collective corporate starts to be dominant in the rural area after the communist revolution. In Maoist period, it apparently aimed to replace and even eradicate traditional lineage corporate in villages (Potters, 1990). During the reform era,

20“Participation in social science refers to different mechanisms for the public to express opinions - and ideally exert influence - regarding political, economic, management or other social decisions”, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_participation, last read on March 21, 2013. This study follows this definition, and restricts itself to the core notions: to express opinions and to exert influence. With a view to holistic cadre-peasant relations in shareholding cooperatives, participation at the individual level is excluded, unless for public aims.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 61 socialist corporate transforms rapidly in its functions and organizations: collective land is rented to households, the compulsory duty of economic production

(especially in agriculture) is removed, and formal production team and brigade organs are abolished. And now, land cooperative becomes the latest variety of collective economy.

In general, the public participation in formal collective corporate and even village administrative or political organs is unsettled, involving popular assemblies, villager elections, public voting and official contacts21. The participation of peasants in public affairs remains is still largely undefined and ambiguous regardless of economic development and political reform (Oi & Rozelle, 2000). Generally speaking, appeals to higher authorities constitute the major pattern of participation in public matters in the countryside (Cai, 2004). In contrast with democratic countries, the petition system channeled by the state is the main route of participation.

Immediate voting and personal contacts with officials in charge rarely takes effect in

China. Official contact is limited and the burgeoning participation of peasants stems from the contradictions between peasants and village officials; for example, cadres may be corrupt or incompetent. Moreover, factionalism among incumbent officials and folk elites seeking political power can have an effect. Their allies can critically impact village politics (Yao, 2009).Public decisions sometimes be the result of competition by these elites, with little connection to ordinary peasants. Lastly, as regards village elections, these are constrained by diverse forces, which are much broader than economic development or interaction between peasants and officials as noted in early discussions (Yao, 2009). In fact, village elections indeed empower

21In terms of peasants’ feedback through legal institutions that the state permits, the public participation of peasants overlaps with rightful resistance (Brien, 1996; Guo, 2001) to some extent. Public participation involves both the construction and destruction of the interests of participants whereas rightful resistance simply involves situations disadvantageous to resist.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 62 peasants in terms of participation, but it merely limits to the election issue instead of affecting entire political affairs.

Despite the restricted effects of formal participation, some informal avenues like traditional allies may effectively encourage rural mass participate. In rural South

China, ancestral worship relating to lineage corporate is deeply-minded (Faure, 2007;

Freedman, 1958, 1966; Ku, 2007; Liu, 1992; Potter & Potter, 1990). Based on patrilineal kinship relations, lineage once was the powerful self-organized corporate striving for territory (land properties). Peasants here live on such corporate for hundreds of years. As an social and economic corporate, lineage always conduct a condensable complex of public assemblies in fixedly time and space to offer their ancestors, or common deities, and conduct some public projects 22.

In terms of the particular agenda of lineage events, they exert rigid moral constraints on constituents. Their strengths are rooted in the fact that peasants are a group of moral practitioners (Madsen, 1984, p. 1–30)23. They not only have moral knowledge of rightness, but also practice what they interpret right in their everyday life. They often ask and exercise what is a good person and right life, especially in the lineage place. In fact, lineage organs represent a genuine community rather than interest groups. An equitable membership is always exerted, in which every constituent is treated fairly and reasonably.

Normally, traditional beliefs are on the behalf of mass actions, irrespective of particular ancestry or religion. They can empower peasants by engendering greater

22These lineage activities can be seen as “moral rituals” (Madsen, 1984). There are two categories to explore moral things: ritual and moral discourse. The latter emphasizes independent and diverse moral acts, opinions, gestures, etc., while the formal refers to more regular ones. This distinction between moral discourse and ritual originates from ideas of Geertz, C. 23This definition of peasants involves an argument between “moral peasants” and “rational peasants”. According to Madsen (1984), although rationality explains a major part of peasants’ actions, rationality can be inconsistent with the notion of common beings. According to the principal of self- interest, individual peasants could freely get away from the common if the latter disfavors their own interests. In fact, it hardly occurs by virtue of the inherently compellable characteristics of common beings.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 63 trust and solidarity (Ku, 2007). Yet, such effects of lineage allies seem quite implicit, regarding their sophisticated composition. Different parts of lineage unions may have divergent or even conflict goals behind. For example, there is a

Chrysanthemum Festival recycling in Pearl River Delta in a long term (Siu, 1990). It is organized by feudal governments, warlords, or the communist party state recently on the ground of diverse interests that it serves24.

Individuals may have controversies in the same lineage part, let alone multiple pursuits underlie comprehensive traditions. During the restoration of a township temple in Sichuan, peasants expressed extraordinarily concern over many issues, such as the quality of government, economic development and societal change(Flower & Leonard, 1998). During their public worship, religious activities embody cooptation and rivalry between devoted peasants and state officials seeking economic achievement and political control. As a result, the pursuits of devotees seem obscure in the aggregate25.

As a kind of volunteerism organization, lineage allies seem blurred in promoting rural public participation as their comprehensive composites. However, the process of lineage organs runs differently. The equitable membership (not equal)26 is ensured thoroughly in every lineage procedure. Thereby, it can stimulate rural popular participations. Such criteria of equity involve affairs of trusting skillful people for management, monitor their implementation, collect money and allocate it.

24Those concrete interactions between central authorities and local society beneath the similar festival are indicated as “acculturation” (Siu, 1990) 25Madsen (1984) also reveals that moral events seldom integrate all followers into a rigid moral unit, but arranges them into unity in general. To use a metaphor, it is like a beautiful “melody” stemming from a particular arrangement of notes, while the same notes could give rise to numerous melodies. 26 The competency to participate into lineage activities often intertwines with gender, age, rank, etc. And lineage allocation always counts on particular qualifications. Not every member can enjoy certain benefits, but they possibly have equal chance to access that, in so far as he reaches the standard.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 64

Volunteerism organs of lineage complement formal village ones in realizing the public participation. Lineage associations lead to robust public participation in two aspects: it can mobilize more people inside the ethnic group, and it more easily produces the coordination among participants, in contrast to formal routes for the mass participation. As it is noted (Lily L. Tsai, 2011), this feature of community- based associations are taken sued by governmental sector in the coproduction of public goods, because it can smoothly concert the mass to more obey the state. Next, lineage organizations educate peasants about the equality. Based on equitable lineage membership, the periodical repetition of traditional rituals also regularly helps peasants address public matters.

Therefore, based on the public participation in formal and traditional public organs, my study can grasp the complete contour of interactions between peasants and cadres. And this is critical to collective egalitarianism, despite pre-conditions of property rights or peasants’ livelihoods. If peasants have few participation, to realize the effective management by agents (mostly village cadres), or ensure their accountability become rather problematic, as I estimate based on some national wide or even worldwide studies (Putterman, 1995; Walder, 2003). In the transitional economy, the privatization of public assets is widely observed, no matter in the state or collective department. Based on collective ownership, the shareholding cooperative is also faced with the disparity between normal peasants and the cadre group in charge. But if peasants can acquire sufficient participation into collective affairs, they can extensively constrain village cadres in decision-making and execution via tight supervision.

Since both formal and informal political channels are examined, the booming lineage organs possibly make the most notable contribution to the public

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 65 participation. If this prediction gets testified, the strengths of peasants deriving from the cultural aspect are clearly disclosed. In contrast to political or economic aspects revealed in theoretical theme of state-society relations, my study can also add cultural insights to that.

In sum, above discussions of livelihoods, property rights and cadre-peasants interactions are all serve elaborating the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism.

Once I ask about why egalitarian allocation is sought by peasants in collective corporate, which sometimes takes the cost of efficiency. To answer this question, the three variants are devised at divergent levels, based on the perspective of social relations: Livelihoods check out post-Mao variances of economic destinations of peasants, no matter of individuals, families, or collective organs; and the transformation of land property rights targets at how on-going social relations

(among state, village cadres and peasants) impact the allocation of land benefits, especially in the era of shareholding cooperative; lastly, social interactions between village cadres and peasants can help to justify the socially constructive process underlying the particularly economic system of shareholding cooperative. Through such analysis, I want to corroborate that rural economic transition in China roots in a complex of forces, in particular the lineage. Despite the widely seen impact of state and market, reviving lineage organs clearly indicates how economic transition twists with cultural force in its proceeding.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 66

Chapter Three - Research Methodology

Post-Reform Collective Egalitarianism: A Single-Case Study

To explore the continuity of collective egalitarianism, the case of Yi Village is selected27.Guided by theories of embeddedness, three inferences about rural livelihood, land property rights, and cadre-peasant relations have already been established, as it is noted in chapter two. The unique features of Yi village in these three aspects get unfolded here. It can help to elaborate why collective egalitarianism continues. The following analysis thus is divided into four parts: First, the orientation of the research design; Second, the sampling of Yi village; Third, main preoccupations of this research design; and finally, methods of data collection and their procedures.

1. Theory-Oriented Case Study28

My research attempts to improve theories of collective egalitarianism.

Generally speaking, the research design of social sciences proceeds in four directions: the improvement of research theories, research questions, data quality, and modify

27Epistemological debates between quantitative and qualitative studies have rumbled on for some time. Winch (1958) claims subjective individual perceptions of social life should parallel with the objectively casual explanation of social reality. This involves the key basis of qualitative studies, and is repeatedly reclaimed later (Buroway et al., 1991; Hunt & Colander, 2004). Moreover, the Marxist concern of qualitative studies combines methodological designs with fierce historical purposes. For example, the extended case method proposed by Buroway is based on participant observation, which also serves the development of mass movements in the capitalist “programmed society” (Touraine, 1984). Rather than the substantial side of qualitative methods, my study mostly inquiries its formal side, including how to collect data, establish casual relations, and so on. 28“Case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods. The case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame — an object — within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates .” (Thomas, 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_studies#cite_note-Thomas-3, last read on May 25, 2013. In contrast to the method of case studies, qualitative studies refer to a wider analytical category. It takes broad methods, including descriptive ones like discourse analysis. As a comparison, case studies adopt narrower methods. For example, it allows description, but scarcely follows any specific descriptive methods. In addition, different from the method of case studies, comparative studies is a narrower domain. It often applies description to reveal differences or similarities among cases. And it can stops at pure description rather than further orienting to any theories.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 67 the old data (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 12–23). In terms of enhancing research questions, there is no definite or scientific rule. Normally, the significance of research questions is emphasized. The first is the practical importance. The research directly or indirectly tackles realistic issues important to certain group of people. The second aspect points to theoretical significance. For example, adding new perspectives to the similar question, or propose new questions by probing into unknown area29. In my research, the understanding about collective egalitarianism can increase, due to my new research question about its continuity. However, my ultimate purpose is to falsify its continuity rather than merely propose a new question (or analytical approach).

I also endeavor to improve the data quality by unclosing the process of field work. When I came to Yi village, the data analysis also started. At the beginning, I focused on the phenomenon of shareholding cooperative. But I was interrupted by village cadres, which doubted my goals in investigating their land economy and village administration. They either directly refused my visit, or omitted me from village meetings, and even precluded me to acquire official documents and statistics.

Not soon later, I had to turn to contact ordinary peasants there. Their grand lineage assemblies impressed me deeply. I was quite curious about why they could effectively mobilize peasants for ethnic funds or feast, etc., and whether those lineage organs impacted official cooperative. In addition, to render my data convincible and sufficient, hundreds of thousands of field notes are wrote down, and

29Such two directions are hardly satisfied at the same time with regards to their splits or even clashes. Theoretical conclusions hardly reach the real world immediately. They may jointly shape social phenomenon over time. And sometimes, theoretical insights are impossibly proved in the practice or even contradictory to that. To conciliate the two directions in one unique investigation, research questions can be improved in three ways: to increase more realistic importance; or to involve more theoretical significance by adding new perspectives to the same question; and proposing new questions by probing into an unknown area. Surely, achieving the proper balance between the two directions is a key to enhancing the quality of research questions.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 68 photos and taping are taken regardless of enormous documents. Moreover, these data become more convincible as I also got information from other villages for comparison. Invited to a neighborhood village to observe villagers’ election, I learned an opposite situation to Yi village: village cadres were so distrusted in local people that a variety of policy and officials were sent there by the township government to keep order. Their shareholding cooperative still equalized land use among members, which looked rather conservative. Nonetheless, improving data quality is not my ultimate goal. In fact, it merely helps to serve my theoretical analysis on collective egalitarianism.

My research is devised to prompt theories30, which is fulfilled through inference falsification. There are two branches of theory-orient case studies: the first one emphasizes the sequence from the data to theory, which is the grounding of theory formation (Eisenhardt, 1989). As a comparison, the other branch recognizes the epistemological similarities between quantitative and case studies. This two all extend past speculations to new empirical evidence for a new falsification, though they have methodological differences in every aspect (George & Bennett, 2005).

Falsifiability is popularly recognized the core feature of theories since Karl Popper

(King et al., 1994, p. 99–114). If theories pass the test based on new data, they can get the generalization in a broader range. Anyway, as long as theories are possibly falsified, our understanding about the world can keep stepping forward. Otherwise, they impossibly proceed and seldom run as “scientific knowledge”, since they are empirically neither wrong nor right (King et al., 1994, p. 99–114). My study follows

30A theory means: “A social science theory is a reasoned and precise speculation about the answer to a research question, including a statement about why the proposed answer is correct. ……A theory must be consistent with prior evidence about a research question. ” (King et al., 1994, p. 19). Above words tell that social theory consist of proposed answer to a research question, which is reasoned and precise organized, and consistent with existed evidence.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 69 the second approach, the falsification of theories via their inferences, which is attributed to the category of post-positivism (Guba & Lincoln, 2005).

To explain why collective egalitarianism robustly endures irrespective of economic efficiency, theories about the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism should be tested again in anew circumstance31. Thus shareholding cooperative is applied. In detail, three assumptions of the embeddedness of peasant economy would be examined with regards to their observable implications. They incorporate peasant livelihood, land property rights, and social interactions between village cadres and peasants.

First, peasants’ livelihood refers to what they mainly depend on for family income. In a long run, they have to count on agriculture due to the scarce off-farm employment. Thus the access to land use is critical to peasants in particular the equal access in rural collective. However, the pattern of land use has been rapidly changing, while off-farm employment becomes massive. Hence the new livelihood may change past collective egalitarianism relative land use.

Second, on-going variances of land property rights are also observable. As a kind of collective corporate for land conversion, shareholding cooperatives suggest how the distribution of land use changes, and the right of land disposal varies.

At last, equal collective allocation is abiding in the shareholding cooperative era, as some studies reveal (Po, 2008). But the public participation of peasants seems problematic. In general, equal allocation is possibly faced with the privatization of public assets by village cadres. Further, lineage organs are unfolded as its special function: peasants may gain their participation in lineage affairs.

31It needs to be marked that theory-orient case studies produce theories not so general in application, compared with some universal theories like transaction cost theory, because “case studies can allow for equifinality, but to do so they produce generalizations that are narrower or more contingent ” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 22).

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These three references indicate concurrent causal relations to collective egalitarianism. They all systematically rather than randomly shape collective egalitarianism. Inspired by previous studies (Kung, 1994, 2000), the impact of rural livelihood and land property rights has been crystallized. The third factor of public participation also takes systematically effects, because it points to how peasants control land benefits.

2. Sampling: Yi Village as the Single Case

Case studies cause many controversies over whether it is “scientific”. The core problem is about theoretical inferences: since the same case or database is actually consistent with many competitive theories, one theory should justify why its inferences triumph over others in adopting the targeted case. The statistical approach increases the number of cases or variables to increase the degree of freedom32 of its conclusions. As a result, it assigns the determination of explanation with regard to causal relationships at the specified level. In this way, its explanations are deemed not unlikely to be random choices or less preferable than other ones (George &

Bennett, 2005, p. 28–29).

In contrast, alternative theories seem too much in number or even infinite for test in the case study method. It is almost an impossible task at all. Normally, the explanation of a single-case study is criticized for few variances of variables. It makes the measurement unattainable, and so causes theoretical inferences unscientific. This is a plausible opinion for the reason that qualitative variable is different from the one of quantitative studies. Variables get variances in the amount for the quantitative measurement. In qualitative studies, variables are different by virtue of their diverse properties, which can be measured via different dimensions

32Literally, “degree of freedom” problem means the number of the tablet of variables minus parameters that are regarded as independent and the one taken as the axis (George & Bennett, 2005).

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 71 rather than the magnitude. Despite the limited quantitative variances, it can acquire qualitative variances in the same case or database (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 32–

33). To address the measurement of variables, qualitative analysis can enriches the amount of variables or discloses more dimensions of the same variable (George &

Bennett, 2005, p. 32–33). Ultimately, extensive qualitative details of historical process can falsify inferences of the targeted theory, and ensure the competiveness of answers to the targeted research question.

As a single case, Yi village helps to corroborate the theory of collective egalitarianism in light of its typical and abundant details. Though Yi village is found occasionally, it is chosen purposively. Based on my pilot reading and analysis during

2009-2010, I decide to investigate shareholding cooperatives in Pearl River Delta.

Non-agricultural land conversion is conducted earliest and most-developed there.

Being contrast to advanced market economy of private ownership in that place, such a kind of collective economy intrigued me too. Before I know Yi village, I first went to the Archive Bureau of Shunde. Through the recommendation of local officials, Yi village was further identified as its complete archives from 1950s until 2000s, which is especially reserved. The transition of collective economy is recorded in detail, including files of policies, general statistics, conference records, official letters, financial accounts, etc. Moreover, to enter into the village, I got the help of several prefectural and township cadres. During contacts with them, I learn more stories on

Yi village out of records.

Evidences of the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism, which are reflected in three speculations (rural livelihoods, land property rights and social interactions), can be satisfied by tracing the historical evolution of collective egalitarianism. Yi village not only realized the equality in land use during the HRS era, but also builds

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 72 a flourishing shareholding cooperative system today. In the former stage, equal land use harmed land tenure and economic efficiency. In the fresh stage of land conversion, Yi village further equips with several special characteristics:

First, Yi village is well-suited to the research question in both economic and political sides. It obtains an outstanding collective economy. As it is noted in chapter one, TVEs once were prosperous. Since 1994, the shareholding cooperative system becomes the dominant collective economy. And in terms of the political aspect, village cadres highly concentrate the power, and effectively manage the collective economy and produce public goods. This is contrast to neighborhood villages, which either conduct weak power or severe corruption, or fail in the manipulation of collective organs and public goods. As a result, both township officials and outliers of nearby villages agree with the extraordinary performance of cadres in Yi village.

Another characteristic of Yi village is its geographical location. Yi village closely associates with a town, which locates to the south of Nanhai District, which is place the earliest experiment of shareholding cooperatives was initiated by the state. A handful of villages were chosen as pilot policies there. Since villages in

Nanhai have already been the focus of numerous academic studies (Fu & Davis,

1998; Po, 2008), this research turns to nearby cases like Yi village, and hope to make a comparison.

Third, in contrast to neighborhood villages of the same town, Yi village particularly keeps historical archives. They are quite complete in detail and large in magnitude. The official documents not only refer to three decades of the on-going reform, but also embody decades of Maoist era. In fact, they started from the foundation of People’s Republic in 1949, and stop until the present. Further, some peasants also wrote down plentiful lineage programs by themselves, despite official

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 73 records of village affairs. In Liu lineage, I found a piece of precise record about entire lineage activities during more than 15 years from mid-1990s to 2011.

Equipping with above characteristics, Yi village is the appropriate case to falsify assumptions of the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism. In general, there are several ways to manipulate single-case study: the success of the least-likely case can amend past hypothesis; the deviant case can falsify old conclusions, no matter the result is falsification or corroboration; and in particular, the most-likely case can falsify pioneer inferences via their failure in new tests (George & Bennett,

2005). This last methodological route is adopted in my study with respects to distinct characteristics of Yi village from that of neighbors. Collective egalitarianism seems fragile in the shareholding cooperative there, though it is already the most-likely instance. Too much power concentration and the usurpation of village cadres induce a great deal of resentment, as the secret complaints of peasants show.

The hypothesis of embeddedness of collective egalitarianism is better crystallized through the analytical method of historical process-tracing (George &

Bennett, 2005). This can render the enrichment of the attributes of the same variable for the falsification. For this measurement, Yi village prepares complete and special information in all the three aspects.

3. Main Preoccupations of My Single-Case Study

To address theoretical inferences in my single-case study, several preoccupations widespread in social science research need to be explicitly satisfied.

As a comparison rather than a prism, the preoccupations of quantitative studies can be applied. In the quantitative study (Bryman, 2004), the generalization of concrete findings via falsification is the core task. Base on the similar function of inferences, case studies are epistemologically similar to statistical methods or formal models in

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 74 quantitative studies. They all regard falsifiability as the major principal to justify and promote theories. Therefore, my tests on inferences follow similar criteria.

Simultaneously, the main difference between quantitative and qualitative studies should be noticed, which is the number of cases sampled: quantitative studies always seek large-N samples for testing, while cases in qualitative studies are usually limited in number(George & Bennett, 2005).

3.1 Measurement and Inference

According to the quantitative approach, reliability and validity are the two standards in gauging concepts. Since concepts are the basic constructs of theories, the exact assessment of concepts is also critical. While measures immediately contribute to quantitatively gauging, indicator is an indirect assessment. The first principal of measurement is reliability. It means the consistency of assessment, including the internal consistency amid measures or indicators. And the second principal of validity refers to whether measure tools truly assess the concept. In detail, it incorporates subordinate requirements like face validity, concurrent validity, convergent validity, etc. Nonetheless, despite strict requirements concerning measures and indicators, they are factually few undertaken: “Most measures are simply asserted. Fairly straightforward but minimal steps may be taken to ensure that a measure is reliable and/or valid” (Bryman, 2004).

In qualitative studies, inferences are also need to be assessed. Being counterparts of the two criteria of validity and reliability (in quantitative studies), there are two alternative standards: parsimony and richness. Parsimony reflects the belief that the world is simple (King et al., 1994). As a comparison with the one in science, it is not an essential goal in social sciences. Only if the fact is simple, it is properly adopted. Instead, qualitative studies often need vastly rich description for

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 75 corroboration. Firstly, the casual relations count on the comparison among factors with sequential historical changes, and so concrete depiction is crucial to address the complicated casual relationships. Secondly, social sciences can further establish descriptive inferences, despite the usually causal ones. They can improve the explanation of social realities or predictions of inferences by distinguishing systematic factors from random ones (King et al., 1994). However, too rich description producing overly extensive information also hampers the falsification of inferences. Hence, to produce better theoretical constructs, an appropriate trade-off between parsimony and richness should be reached in case studies.

3.2 Causality

Exposing causal relations is another core target of case studies. First, the direction of causal relations can be unclosed as early as in the stage of research design. Unlike the one defined by measures or indicators in quantitative studies, the one in qualitative studies may stem from the intuition or primary analysis of the researcher with a limited number of cases. Descriptive inferences, which differentiate systematic and random reasons, can explicitly reveal the direction of causal relations.

Second, casual relations in case studies are often undervalued (George &

Bennett, 2005). In quantitative studies, linear casual relation between independent variables and the outcome is the solo target, in which finitely independent variables are quantitatively calculated to confine their statistical significance or the level of relativity. In contrast, case studies may recognize numerous contingencies in casual effects and mechanisms. As the alternative to causal relations, the phenomenon of equifinality and confinality indicates the complicated non-linear casual relations

(George & Bennett, 2005). Divergent variables may lead to the same outcome, or the

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 76 same variable may result in multiple consequences. And as regards to casual mechanisms in case studies, one variable may need to ally with some others to take effect, or accept the mediation of other ones, or all variables need to work together.

In qualitative studies, the process-tracing method is favored as it can crystallize how

(rather than how much) multiple variables and their sophisticated causal relations result in the final historical outcome.

3.3 Generalization

Generalization is another standard in falsifying inferences of case studies. It concerns about the scope that speculations of theories can be applied to. Quantitative studies utilize statistical tools or mathematical models to make inferences applicable over limited sample. Their explanations are often firstly restricted to the sample upon which they draw (Bryman, 2004). Nonetheless, they always endeavor to claim a general application by setting the statistical significance on limited evidences.

Case studies also make efforts to apply inferences at a more general scope, based on the premise of contingent causal relations instead of statistical or modeling ones (George & Bennett, 2005). It means all theories of case studies are particularly workable, no matter they are falsified or not. If hypothesis pass new empirical tests, the targeted theory can be applied at a more general level. Otherwise, the application of theories is proved wrong. However, failed theories are still valuable as they may increase theoretical leverages (King et al., 1994). No matter falsified or not, theories all work as the insightful leverage, which increases our knowledge about the ambiguous world. Even though some theories are already proved wrong, they still impact people’s thinking and practice, such as Marxism theory or rational choice theory. Those “theories” which are neither right nor false can continue to play as theoretically scientific knowledge.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 77

My research verifies past inferences of the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism in the most-likely case of Yi village. Its embeddedness at three levels has respectively generated one main hypothesis (peasants’ livelihoods, land property rights, and social interactions between village cadres and peasants via the mass participation). Despite collective egalitarianism continues on the surface, its embeddedness may transit rapidly. In another word, three changing variables concurrently determine the enduring collective egalitarianism. Further, the impact of embeddedness was so far-reaching that its third variable (rural mass participation) can be further applied to dialogue with theories of state-peasant relations. In the final discussion of this thesis, I would disclose peasants’ strengths to redefine state- peasant relations.

3.4 Shortcomings and achievements of my single-case study

Case studies inherently attain several flaws at the methodological level, in which my study is also incorporated. Given the significance of case selection in preparing data, the bias of researchers is necessarily to be diminished. Case selection is a process of theoretical sampling in case studies, in contrast to the statistical sampling in quantitative studies (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 532–550). While the quantitative approach randomly involves cases based on the probability of avoiding any particular component (George & Bennett, 2005), case studies, however, rely on special cases. In another word, the selected case definitely embodies the particularities to support theoretical falsification. During this process, the major danger is that case selection is dominated by the presuppositions of researcher, and consequently gains spurious inferences that cannot be applied to its subclass unit

(George & Bennett, 2005). As my sampling part reveals (section 2, this chapter), Yi village matches to my research concern of the embeddedness of collective

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 78 egalitarianism for four reasons. Thus the bias of case selection is reduced to the minimum here.

Further, during the field work, I also adopt multiple methods to reduce the bias in data collection. Case studies generally involve diverse “crafting instruments”

(Eisenhardt, 1989), such as interview or archives. Simultaneous application of diverse research tools allows methods to supplement each other and mutually corroborate data. In particular, participant observation in field work can be more highlighted. Participant observations can obtain the objective aspect of data via observation and benefit from the subjective side of data through participation

(Buroway, Burton, & Ferguson, 1991). Despite diverse analytical tools, I agree that if more than one researcher works together, field work can better improve the quality of data (Eisenhardt, 1989). They can complement each other in the information, or the understanding of that information. In terms of my data collection, I ensured the quality of data by adopting diverse tools (more than participant observation), although I conducted the field work alone. If information from different resources overlaps, it has higher reliability and validity. Otherwise, the data is treated cautiously with regards to its lower testability.

Generally, the pitfall of generalization arises from the fact that researchers wrongly suggest the representativeness of unique findings. In terms of complicated casual relations, the inferences of generic findings from one set of cases being extended to other similar ones is certainly risky. Hence, I admit the limitations of my empirical corroborations in pursuing a general application. Based on the specific case of Yi village, its embeddedness in three aspects yet continues to bolster collective egalitarianism, albeit it may transform fiercely over time. The economic dependence of peasants to collective corporate may abide, even though the content

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 79 or magnitude of economic dependence varies. Similar situation also occurs in the aspect of land property rights: land use and disposal are respectively concentrated into the rich and village cadres, but the inalienable collective ownership abides.

Moreover, though peasants’ strengths seem ambiguous, they may keep taking action or exerting impact towards land benefits. Based on the single case of Yi village, the generalization of these findings may be doubtful. Unlike Yi village, large number of villages may have worse performance in collective egalitarianism, or differently assign the three levels of the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism. Nonetheless, this study can make a general claim in any industrialized or rich villages about the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism by the unstable egalitarianism of Yi village:

Collective egalitarianism would difficultly continue if peasants ineffectively participate into collective corporate, or village cadres in charge fails in accountability, though peasants may have some strength in lineage corporate.

As regards to the complicated causal relations, my study can illustrate the consistence of collective egalitarianism, due to the theory of embeddedness. The causal relations between economic performance and other factors which it embeds itself in are clear at three aspects. Three factors of economic and non-economic goals, on-going social relations and socially construction concurrently take effect. They frame collective egalitarianism together. However, the evidence of Yi village here is unique, though causal relations are set according to theoretical propositions. The empirical findings on such causal relations are rather limited in the further application.

Lastly, the imbalance between parsimony and richness can damage the depictions of case studies. Too much information can overload the demonstration,

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 80 but parsimony is also not the essential goal of case studies. Instead, parsimony subordinates to task of inference: when theory falsification via inference is acquired, the description can proceed along the criteria of parsimony. And my thesis indeed takes inference as the priority, and arranges the parsimony as the secondary aim.

4. Methods of Data Collection

Diverse research tools have been used in data collection. This study simultaneously collects and analyzes data in field work. This is a process of replication between data collection and analysis, in which I keep returning to interpret existed data and going forward to collect new data. In field work, my study is mainly guided by previous research focus on the particular collective economy of shareholding cooperative and its allocation.

The first kind of method applied in my single-case study is participant observation. In the field, I observe how peasants tackle rural land use and allocation of land benefits. Despite the direct observation, I also took notes to repeat what I have observed every day. This enables me to closely approach the indigenous living of peasants, including their farming, the allocation of collective land benefits. Like agriculture, my observation also covers the off-farm economic section and peasants’ activities there. Next, non-economic programs of peasants are caught in my observation, such as the local provision of public goods and services in roads, electricity, social security funds. Third, peasants of Yi Village also frequently hold cultural activities, such as public celebrations for divine birthdays. Participant observation gleans information about how peasants set up associations. Finally, by using participant observation, I also discover the spatial characteristics of Yi village.

The assignment of space reflects how peasants arrange their social lives. For

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 81 example, the religious temple or the ancestral hall may be located in the center of the community, while small plots of land for vegetables are near peasants’ houses.

However, participant observation has several limitations. The first is the spatial limitation. In the short period of field work, it is difficultly to carry out enough observation to get a larger sample. Secondly, many evidences become unavailable over time. The information observed is often not replicable. Key informants may move or die, community outlook may change, etc. After you leave the field site, past information may undergo a variety of variances. It is doomed that every observer, including me, meets above two problems. Nonetheless, during my field work, the third shortage of observation is village cadres intended to hide some key information from me. They concealed official statistics, especially the financial records of recent years. And they refused my request to join in their patrol day and night, or various meetings.

Interview can rectify some of the shortcomings of participant observation. In- depth interview can reveal the subjective side of the data observed and add context.

This study gleans the following information from informants: the choices underlying household farming and off-farming; their relationships with relatives and neighborhoods; negotiation with cadres orienting private or public events; the organization of land tenure and the allocation of land income; and the production of public goods and services.

Nonetheless, data collection through interview is subjective and can be inaccurate. As an additional supplementary method, archives provide objective data and so overcome some of the drawbacks of participant observation and in-depth interviews. Since I speak Mandarin but the informants used Cantonese and I was initially unfamiliar with the village, some of the data was lost or erroneous.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 82

Moreover, some data I could not verify in the field, such as the emotional and rational choices of peasants.

Therefore, archives were very helpful. Two resources were available. First, the

Archives Bureau of Shunde: key documents concerning the whole municipality and the unique village were available. The second source involved the informal records of peasants: their cultural activities and official documents from village authorities.

In conclusion, I comprehensively utilize three different methods in data collection. Every method makes special contribution by collecting particular kind of data. Participant observation let me familiar with the pattern of peasants’ livelihoods, no matter farming or off-farm, economic or cultural activities. And interview tells more subject information, which mostly is unavailable for direct observation, such as lineage fabric and rural politics. Further, archives provide rigidly convincible data, which is replicated. Accurate information and statistics in particular, is much helpful to this thesis. Furthermore, these three means also complement each other. Whereas participant observation fails to directly access to the data, informants may tell you in the interviews. And when subject information lacks hard evidences, archives can supplement it. For these two reasons, the data that I collected effectively upholds my analysis in the end.

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Chapter Four

Livelihood in Post-Mao Rural China: Land Disassociation and New Workers

In Yi village, over the half of peasants work in local factories. Meanwhile, their land again is reclaimed by the village shareholding cooperative. The new collective earns tens of millions by transferring land and real properties in the market, and allocates bonuses to each constituent every year. More importantly, it also establishes an ample program of pension, provides comprehensive allowances in education, medical program, etc., and also invests heavily into infrastructure, such as cement road, park, and so on.

1. Peasant’s Livelihood and Its Post-Mao Transition

Inherent to the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism, peasants’ livelihood and its transformation is evaluated here. The transformation towards non-agricultural employment33 is recognized as the main agenda of rural economic development

(Song & Logan, 2010). From late 1970s to 2006, employed persons in the agricultural department has been keep shrinking, from over 70% to about 45%, while the secondary (manufacturing) and tertiary (service) industries increase to around

30%. Meanwhile, the income of non-agricultural sectors always stays higher than the agricultural one. During 2003-2006, when the agricultural people is paid about 8-10 thousands every year, peasants conduct non-agricultural jobs obtain 12-20 thousands a year. Similar findings also appear in other studies. Until 1998, nearly 40% of rural labour, that is approximately two million peasants, has gone into the labour market for wages or self-employment income (Zhang, Huang, & Rozelle, 2002). And in a

33The distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural employment is always implicit. Cited from the discussion of Song and Logan (2010, p. 143), the former points to “those involved in primary, on farm, agricultural production” while the rest belongs to the latter category. “These other sectors may include agriculturally related employment such as food processing.”

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 84 more strict demographic calculation34, the total non-employment population approaches to 234 million in 2008, which is 44.96% of the total countryside labour

(Tong, 2010).

As one of major consequences of non-agricultural employment, peasants definitely have their income increased. The growth of peasants’ income is just the concern of many studies (Cai & Wang, 2009; Wang, 2011). Further, some different research focuses are also involved in this important economic phenomenon. For example, the rationale of family division between women and men in uprising non- agriculture employment is disclosed (Song & Logan, 2010). Or the progress of non- agricultural employment indicates the patterns of rural economic development, the evolution of which looks like climbing a ladder from the simplest traditional agriculture to the most complicated manufacturing (Mohapatra, Rozelle, & Huang,

2006).

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly (in relation to my work), the booming non-agricultural employment also determines peasants’ investment in land use

(Zhong & Ji, 2010). Where off-farm employment is scarce, peasants rarely conduct more investment in production or enlarge the scale of land use, despite the adjustment of land property rights by consolidating land tenure, or the improvement of land market like more land sale or lease. To spur peasants in expanding amounts of productive investments or land use, intense non-agricultural employment is the much more effective solution. It takes effect via alleviating the social need of mass subsistence on agriculture, leaving land for high-profit use, and ultimately ameliorates land price.

34People of agricultural division means they conduct farming more than 6 months in a year, and people in non-agricultural segment implies that they take non-agricultural job over 6 months a year.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 85

Above precedent studies have the same assumption: agricultural land use results in much lower income than the one of off-farm employments. Here agriculture is of a traditional style. In terms of Schultz (Schultz, 1964), “technology” relative to higher agricultural productivity exposes the divergence between traditional and modern agriculture. Traditional agriculture often obtained the largest efficiency according to the existed technical level. But peasants can only survive in a low life quality, because a large portion of their small income is put on food (Engel coefficient). They definitely have little accumulation reinvested into the agricultural production. And even new materials or labour is added, the rate of return is quite low, the minimum of which approximates zero. As a comparison, modern agriculture revolutionizes its composition by more properly assign labour and capital.

Consequently, as his examples, Japan and Israel fulfilled the growth rate of agriculture a few times as that of industry. In terms of Chayanov, in a non-capitalist agriculture like in old Russia (family farm), peasants maximized the entire family income instead of the gross profit. They keep investing labour until their subsistence is satisfied35 (Thorner, 1986; Shanin, 1986). The capitalist farm refers to the appropriately assignment of land, labour and capital for uttermost profit. As regards to Chinese peasants, they merely can survive in basic subsistence in a long run. In pre-revolutionary North China, rich and ordinary peasants conducted distinct rationality underneath similar agricultural commercialization (Huang, 1985).

Ordinary peasants counted on rather limited land to live a populous family.

Accordingly, they preferred to invest all family labour into the small amount of cash crops to maximize its output, despite the margin return went towards zero.

35Chayanov (1986) defines Russia peasants normally manipulate self-own land, labour and credits to boost the total income, in which the marginal efficiency of labour usage is indefinite, or intentionally obscure. Here peasants pursue an appropriate subsistence instead of maximized profit as their ultimate economic goal. The appropriate subsistence is defined according to popular customs of local society.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 86

Simultaneously, the rich took marginal efficiency into account based on their much larger farm. In Yangzi River Delta, similar commercialization is more explicitly depicted as “involution” (Huang, 1990). It implies to the economic growth taking the cost of economic efficiency, which is stagnant or even falls. Such kind of traditional agriculture lasts from pre-revolution period to HRS of the reform period.

But the impact of non-agricultural employment may decline. When agriculture has become more profitable than the traditional one, and farmland becomes rather valuable in factor market, whether formal strength of non-agricultural employment continue to pull peasants out of farming or not? Suppose land use or transfer exceeds non-agricultural employment in rewards, could peasants already in non-agricultural department restore farming or land transfer?

These questions actually concern how market influences peasants based on collective corporate. Peasants depend on collective corporate for economic benefits since Maoist era. As section 1.2 of chapter two notes, peasants almost depended on collective corporate for basic living in Maoist time. Labour voucher system remunerated peasants in an egalitarianism way. It was the vehicle to allocate the primary living material among corporate members: grains. So did other imperative materials for daily consumption: cloths, oil, etc. Moreover, peasants obtained income in cash, despite the material part. In the northern Zhejiang province, the cash was small in number, which to material rewards ratio was nearly 1:2 (Cao, Zhang, &

Chen, 2001)36. In particular, basic rations for every collective member were ensured during most of Maoist time.

36In practice, peasants sought for more cash in sidelines. Cultivating and selling poultries to the state like pigs by individual household brought considerable cash. Poultries cultivation actually produces thin profit. However, it is the transformation of trivial labour wasted in daily lives, since peasants always have surplus labour out of farming. It takes use of leftovers as the fodder for pigs, the animal excrement to supplement the fertilizer for crops, and deposit spare labour for cash. As a result, many big expenses in rural society get abundantly supported, such as building the house, marriage, and so

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 87

In post-Mao time, economic dependence on collective corporate declines due to thriving non-agricultural employment. As one of signs, the economic power of village cadres falls. Their control on agricultural production, the redistribution among peasants, the manipulation of land use are all lost in the implementation of

HRS. Their authority further declines as the adaption of collective enterprises to market competition, which were ultimately privatized (Vermeer et al., 1998).

Nonetheless, market-led decollectivization never eradicates the dependence of peasants on it. With insufficient non-agricultural employment, most peasants still require the access to land use. Accordingly, realized through periodical reallocation, egalitarian land use definitely suggests the continuous dependence of rural population (see section 1.1 of chapter two).

With distinctly prosperous non-agricultural employment, economic dependence of peasants on collectives further shrinks. Though collective ownership endures, it is almost limited into land sector after the collapse of collective enterprises. Whereas peasants mainly adopt non-agricultural income in their livelihood, they may reduce their dependence on collective benefits to the minimum. But the last minimum dependence of peasants is of my concern, if there is one. Rarely studied before, it indicates the latest shifted impact of collective corporate on individual peasants.

Furthermore, how peasants (already leaving farming for off-farm department) attain the minimum benefits from collective corporate is also explored. The accurate interactions between collective corporate and peasants are involved.

To reply to above research question, my work consists of four parts in analysis:

Firstly, the general trend of rural economic development is portrayed in post-

Mao reform. In Yi village, due to state decollectivization and market development,

on (Cao et al., 2001, pp. 179–185).

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 88 rural economy was diversified, including the emergence of some factories. Peasants got new arrangements about farming and non-agricultural employment. Their specific family strategies of income are elaborated.

Next, I would like to analyze the distribution of land use among peasants. The primary dependence of individual peasants on collective corporate in land use is pointed. In Yi village, approximate half of the total village acreage is kept for high- profit fish farming. In addition, industry and commercial programs also occupy more and more farmland. Thus the variances in the distribution of land use between the rich and the poor would be discussed.

Further, a quite large portion of peasants has become industrial workers, during long-term development of non-agricultural employment. In Yi village, many peasants already get used to this off-farm livelihood of industrial style. Thus this section attempts to disclose characteristics of peasant’s fresh livelihood as industrial workers.

In the end, this part further probe the reliefs of collective corporate based on some shortcomings of non-agricultural employment. The updated needs of peasants unsatisfied in off-farm employment give rise to new functions of collective corporate.

Later, how collective corporate fulfill such responsibilities are also elaborated. In fact, this may suggest the last and irreplaceable dependence of peasants on collective corporate.

2. Diversification of Rural Economy

At the beginning of the reform, the decollectivization of rural production as well as land reform is set according to state policies. According to the establishment of HRS to replace former socialist collective, land is equally distributed among

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 89 villagers for use, though some procedures like contracting varied in production teams.

Some teams enforced equal subcontracts among members, while some others introduced the rule of bidding into contract making. Equal contract meant a team equally divided its production responsibility and land (fishpond) according to household population or labour. Meanwhile, though the bidding augmented some competition, it also realized the equal distribution of land in its two distinct features:

First, solely depending on the money for fishpond bidding; nonetheless, each household was allowed to bid for no more than one fishpond; Second, the bidding for contracts brought collective income, which enabled relative production team to execute some dividends among constituents.

In terms of economic preferences of rural peasants in Yi village, they started to leave agriculture for non-agricultural employment. Soon after collective production was substituted, they immediately pursued off-farm income. For instance, Uncle

Heng rented one power-boat from the brigade for his sand business in 1978 when the household contract system was conducted by the state. He and his several partners collaboratively transported sand from a suburban township in Guangzhou city to construction sites. Peasants currently depend on off-farm occupations after three decades of industrial development. Of the 153 households of Beinan village, half work in local factories located in native or neighborhood village while another 20-30% manipulates various businesses. Only 17-18 households remain cultivating fish by renting collective fishponds.

2.1 Agriculture towards better profit

In Yi village, peasants maintained farming at the beginning of reform. Most peasants contract several plots of fishpond or land for sugar-cane37. Their farming

37Peasants in Yi village customarily live on cash crops and fishponds. This was true prior to1949 and

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 90 constitutes three sectors: sericulture, sugar-cane and fish breeding. While most males actively go outside to seek off-farm opportunities, their wives were left at home to do farming. For example, uncle Qiu and uncle Pan (former brigade veterinaries), began to charge their services to household fishponds when the brigade fishponds were privately contracted. They went to native villages, neighborhood towns, and reached as far as another municipality and suburban Guangzhou named Fangcun for their business. At the same time, the three all preserved their pieces of fishpond at the same time. One of the veterinaries contracted a small piece of fishpond just 3-4 mu in area. His wife engaged in fish farming until he returned home.

Led by natural entitlements and market development, peasant farming gradually concentrated into fish breeding. The sericulture suffered from environmental pollution and quickly decayed in this region. The vast developing brick-kiln severely polluted the land and air in the early 1980s, which prevented the sensitive silk worm from spinning. Therefore, local sericulture failed to be sustained. Sericulture soon withdrew from the plane and survived in mountain area at the margin of the Pearl

River Delta. Besides, peasants also slowly gave up sugar-cane because the sugar market shrunk in this place. As a kind of cash crops, sugar-cane is sent to a sugar refinery to exchange money after harvests. However, sales of sugar-cane fell in post-

Mao China. The state abolished the planned requisition by purchase 38 on sugar-cane in the first half of 1980s. As a result, state refineries in Shunde municipality were all abolished, and the sugar-cane station at Yi village--- the official channel for requisition at village level --- was also eliminated in 1986. On the other side, sugar- cane sold on the free market and brought rare income to peasants. The sugar-cane

in the Maoist era. 38This system was created to deal with the consumption of grain in heavy industry and urbanization in 1953, similar to the Soviet Union. The shortage of grain in urban areas and the unstable grain market is the excuses of the ruling CCP (Yang, 2008).

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 91 was rarely cultivated in the second half of 1980s, and completely disappeared in this village in early 1990s. In comparison with disappearing sericulture and sugar-cane, fish-breeding bucked the trend in Yi village. Fish farming in this place is competitive by advantages in natural conditions and technology. River water for fish breeding in this community is often higher quality than in neighborhoods. The development in technology in fish cultivation was also extraordinary in the Maoist period with several production teams boosting the output of fish in the entire township, and acquired fame in the whole Shunde. In addition, the fish market recovered in post-

Mao China and sustained production. Peasants of neighboring villages and most families in Yi village contracted several ponds to cultivate fish, which finally were sold for cash to cover as much as one year of food, clothing and other expenses.

2.2 Flourishing off-farm opportunities

To earn more money, many peasants in Yi village also took up various off-farm employments. Most peasants maintained fish farming to pay household expenses but at the same time, many of them (especially males) worked outside as workers or self- employed businessmen. Divergent from formal employments with contracts, most off-farm employment took few contracts in the 1980s. These off-farm opportunities mostly concentrated in non-industrial areas during this decade, such as construction workers, peddlers of shoes, sand or fish salesmen, veterinary and embroiderers. At this time, industry was initiated soon after the emancipation of rural land, labour and products from the Commune. The following indicates patterns of economic activities of peasants at that time:

(1) Paid labour force

Salaried occupations involve skilled peasants. Peasants without skills can be coolies, especially coolie in the construction industry. Construction can steadily

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 92 absorb surplus labour and some peasants in Yi village go to construction sites earlier than 1978. Construction worker are paid daily: 1.5 yuan in 1980 and 120 yuan today.

Furthermore, though skillful workers can more smoothly find off-farm occupations, there is a scarcity of decent jobs. One of my informants, who had graduated from the best municipal high school could only got a job as a temporary teacher in a primary school in Yi village in 1975, when he already had lived as a peasant for 15 years. Until 1982, he had a chance to become a formal teacher in 1982 after moving to a neighborhood high school. Moreover, due to the experience of being a cashier in former production team, another two peasants were employed by registered enterprises to be clerk and cashier in post reform China.

(2) Self-employment

As a comparison with salary work, peasants were self-employed because they can procure higher payment without expertise. Private business relies on personal expertise in some places, but more count on market connections. There were three veterinaries leaving the brigade fish-seed group for self-employment around 1981 when the group was privately contracted. Those three partners then privately provided their services to fish breeders. Their clients were large-scale and located in local and neighborhood villages; the furthest of which reached the suburban village of Guangzhou city. They charged fellow villagers 0.04 yuan per fish and outside peasants 0.05 yuan per fish. Nevertheless, more peasants without expertise also operated their own business as traders and retailers. There were several traditional trades like fish in Yi Village. Prior to1949, peasants were collecting silk cocoon from individual households and selling it to filature factories and thus earned a comfortable life. Compared to silk, rice and fish demanded very small capital and their market were also broad, although they produced much less profit. Hence, they

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 93 are always the most common trades in the countryside and involved most peasants.

For example, an economically straitened family with 7-8 children lived without land prior to 1949 Yi village. This household conducted some business in rice and fish to earn money for subsistence while they rented several pieces of common land from their ancestral hall. Some of these traditional trades recurred in the post-Mao era which continued to be the main off-farm employment to ordinary peasants. Many peasants, especially the youth, strived for their economic independence by trading fish. They either individually collected fish from household fishponds and personally sold it in local trade market, or collaboratively with several others collected and transported fish to Panyu by boat, where there is an immense market supplying aquatic products to the whole Delta. Similar as the fish, trades in other goods like beef, clothes, shoes, sand and stone all flourished in the post reform period. By various sorts of self-employed business, peasants could achieve much higher income than agricultural work. When the general waged work pays about 50 yuan per month in the early 1980s, the trader in sand earned 700-1000 yuan per month.

Moreover, there is an apparent gender distinction in self-employed business.

When male peasants preferred to build up market connections to trade by going out, most female peasants stayed at home and embroidery was their non-agricultural work. When the cultivation of mulberry and silkworm faded out in Yi village, embroidery persisted in the 1980s39. Women received raw materials from local agents and sold products to the agent women too. The agent took charge of accomplishing the order and earned money from the price difference when she sold products to the factory. Every worker could earn 38-39 yuan from a piece of

39Embroidery rose in 1940s; weaving had previously been more popular. In the Maoist era, many women embroidered in time away from collective work and sold products to local state embroidery factories to earn private perks. They sustained this sideline occupation in the post-Mao era, although state embroidery was contracted to private capitalists.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 94 complicated embroidery which cost a week and may gain nearly 160 yuan as sideline income every month. Or they could fulfill 5-6 pieces of simple embroidery product every day (2 yuan per one) to obtain up to 300 yuan or 360 yuan a month.

2.3 Burgeoning Industrial Factories

There were few factories in the rural area until mid-1980s. No more than seven or eight factories were located in the town where the township government settled.

However, factories quickly grew in number, as more peasants began creating their own industrial businesses.

Many peasants failed in their pursuits for private industry and some lacked market connections, while some were frustrated by state policies. A former head of one of the production teams at Yi village built up two small wine and incense factories after he retired in 1986. He and several partners cooperatively conducted production and sales by themselves. Due to the low output and bad sales of his products, he failed. Another young peasant returned from Guangzhou city with better market connections failed as politics fluctuated. He constructed his relationship in buying automobile parts from the branch of Honda in Guangzhou city, and invested in a garage which was rare in his home city. When the complete building for the garage was accomplished in 1989, he was obstructed in gaining registration due to the Tiananmen Square protests. Later he had to give up his plan and sell out the garage because upper authorities decided to compress the economy after the political turmoil of the summer. A similar thing occurred with the private brick kilns. When the provincial government commanded that all small brick kilns be closed in 1993, the private kiln belonging to Uncle Yuan and his partners, working more than 10 years, had to close down.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 95

Nevertheless, some peasants succeeded in their industrial business by setting up both political patrons and market connections. Those people took full use of personal linkages to state or collective enterprises from the beginning of their private industry.

The most successful peasant in the Yi village, who established a continent-level automobile parts company, is one example. He was born to a very poor peasant family, and once ran errands for the brigade government in the earlier 1980s. His capacity in establishing relations with others as well as personal linkages to one of his relative, an incumbent cadre with power, helped village cadres in establishing village enterprises and other collective businesses. His privately own business started from the collective shipyard which was sold to him after it deteriorated under the control of village cadres. He almost privatized the entire village enterprise, including the property, the organization and market connections. Another successful family with 3-4 factories of electrical equipment also prepared similar political and market connections from the start. The husband’s family acquired a small school enterprise as her father-in-law was the head of this vocational college. She married into this family two years after the privatization of this collective factory occurred in 1983.

They made huge efforts, described as Chuang (innovation or pioneering) in the business, and good connections to the market augmenting their competency.

In brief, this section comprehensively describes how rural economy evolves in post-Mao era, and more concretely, the sprout of rural economic transition. Several crucial institutional changes, such as HRS, have lay down the basis for further economic diversification.

3. Profitable land Use, Disadvantageous Peasants

Land price remarkably indicates rural economic development since the 1990s, since rich peasants manipulating private factories and fishponds need more land.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 96

After market-led economic development, the allocation of land use among peasants is altered in Yi village. Rich peasants (private entrepreneurs, fish cultivators, business owners and village cadres) obtain most land use. A large industrial zone was constructed in Yi village in the late 1990s, while the agriculture also underwent a revolution and thus continued to inhabit bulky scale. At the same time, most ordinary peasants leave off agriculture. When land remains nominally collective in ownership, more than half of the peasants in Yi village get rid of farming for a better livelihood. The uprising profitable agriculture seems inaccessible to the majority now.

3.1 Rural entrepreneurs occupy village industrial zone

Many industrial factories use cropland for industrial use. Industrial consumption on arable land is visible when factories group together. There were about 15 collective enterprises operated by Yi village authority from 1978 to 1997, which were quite dispersed. At least three factories are located in the center, where the village office is located, producing wood, foam and garments. Another two factories are near two water gates. The only exception is the ceramic factory, built in 1994, and settled in the Tandong industrial zone which was the first condensed industrial field occupying cropland. When Yi village built its own industrial zone in the earlier

1990s, the neighborhood village set up an industrial zone as early as the late 1980s.

Now, there are more than 160 factories located in the Yi village industrial zone after its expansion. In terms of the area, the whole zone takes up about 1,000 mu in arable land, a quarter of the whole Village.

In 2011, prosperous rural industry lead rich rural entrepreneurs to de facto occupy more than 25% village land and employ more than half of local residence who now completely left farmland. Businessmen are variable and the land remains in

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 97 collective ownership; ordinary peasants in Yi village definitely are leaving the farmland from now on. Industrial capitalists in the Yi village zone are compose of both indigenous and outside peasants, while some native entrepreneurs also go outside to set up businesses. While a component of capitalists cross borders, their lease from the village cooperative also varies from 15 to 50 years. There are two types of land contract: the type of lease is limited to 15 years and was conducted before 1997. The second is commonly called “land sale”, because the length of contract is very long. The tenancy is at least 20 years and at most 50 years after 1997.

Further, despite the long tenancy of land leases, high land rent also inhibit ordinary peasants from utilizing industrial land. The price of land rent was divided into three grades during 1997-2005 (see Table 2), which was very expensive:

Table 2: Land price for industrial use in Yi village

Lease in 1997, 2000 < 3 mu 120,000 yuan per mu and 2005 3-10 mu 100,000 yuan per mu

>=10 mu 80,000 yuan per mu

Latest lease (unclear)40 No spare land for lease 150,000-200,000 yuan per mu

3.2 Rich peasants occupy village fishponds and residential land

The industrial development in Yi village lets rich peasants occupy enormous areas of land and the rise of high-priced fish cultivation also allows rich peasants to inhabit bulky farmland. The new market in high-priced fish creates a concentration of farmland for rich peasants. This market formed in 1990, and eel and perch are the main products in Yi village. High price fish are mostly produced for export to Japan or supplied to markets such as the Northeastern provinces. In terms of the profit,

40There has been no land recently leased for industrial use, as the Party Sectary explained that a new part of industrial zone has been left unused for several years as it needs upper permission.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 98 perch and eel generally brought about more than 10,000 yuan a year in the 1990s

(see Table 3), while common carps barely produced several thousand yuan a year.

The rapid development of renewal fish farming further expands its cost and profits in the subsequent two decades, and technology and feedstuff is being constantly upgraded. In conclusion, land profits increased 8-10 times while investment also grew 10 times in fish farming in the recent two decades; land/wage rates grew from

2.0 to 2.5.

Table 3: Estimated annual expense in fish cultivation of a 10-mu pond in Yi village

1990s 2000s

Land rent (yuan) 10,000 60,000

Fish fry 100,000 (eel) 400,000 (eel)

2,000 (perch) 8,000 (perch)

Wage of employee 400- 450 per month, Around 2,000 per month

4,800- 5,400 per month About 24,000 per month

Feedstuff, electricity, and Infinite Infinite veterinary drugs

Total Expense About 20,000 (perch) 200,000-300,000 (perch)

Net profit around 20, 000 150,000- 200,000

Ample rewards of fish farming brought the first wave of enclosing cropland in

Yi village by rich peasants in the early 1990s. Some competitive peasants secretly purchased fishponds from native or neighbor villages. A very capable peasant in

Anlong village bought 70 mu ponds in Yi village and the neighborhood villages and employed foreigner employers. The contract of two or three fishponds was very popular at that time.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 99

Fish cultivation yields another unprecedented concentration of land later. About

2,000 mu of farmland is divided into 280 fishponds in Yi village. It is leased to about

110 cultivators containing local peasants and industrial and agricultural workers.

Due to the Yi village open fishpond use to foreign investment, some outside investors contract some farmland to operate fish cultivation, though they have to find local peasants as partners capable in land bidding and contract signing. Besides, many factory owners in the Yi village factory zone also invest in fish cultivation at the same time. Since the profits of this business remain considerable, factory capitalists also lease some ponds and hire local or outside skilled peasants to conduct the routine work of fish cultivation. There are about 4,900 native residents and 1,300 households in all. The relatively affluent population is about 8.5% of inhabitants (as a rough estimate) but take about half of village land.

In the end, since land value has been rapidly increasing in recent years, indigenous peasants also privately invest into real properties. Due to competitions in auctions and massive investments in advance, commercial real properties are also enclosed by rich peasants. The primary target in such investment is houses, which formerly are used for self-residence. Industrial development brings in numerous migrant workers and many local peasants in Yi village attempt to preserve and increase private assets through investing in real property. The purchase of collective real estate constitutes the first type of private investment. Collective real properties like offices, warehouses and school building mostly remained controlled by administrative village or villagers’ team to 1997, and were then sold to individual peasants in a short period after 2000 via open auctions. The only exception was ancestral temples once confiscated by village governments in the pre-reform era. The temple buildings were widely identified as “Gong Chan” (common assets) in this

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 100 village. The second type of investment is to directly establish private real properties by renovating old house or building new abodes. Land and the dwelling houses always cost money, which rose quickly in the past two decades (see Table 4). They cost Wan Yuan Hu (the household with ten thousands yuan) several years to save the money in 1980s, and resembled the expense on one or two eel fishpond in the late

1990s. Despite the expensive price, rich peasants continue to rush to invest on domicile. Tens of their mansions for self-inhabitation and buildings for rent occupy the dwelling place within the commercial area. Though village cadres restrict every native house to one piece of dwelling land, 110 square meters in area, ordinary peasants are unlikely to compete for the new resident places sold in open auction.

Table 4: The cost in dwellings in different periods

The price of land The price of the The total cost of house

architect construction

Late 250 yuan per square Two-floor house:

1980s meter no more than 30,000 yuan

1999- Third-floor house:

2002 170,000 - 380,000 yuan

Two and half-floor:

more than 80,000 yuan

2007 1, 000 yuan per square Five-floor house:

meter (commercial area) 5,000,000 yuan

2011 3000 yuan per square About 1,000 yuan Four-floor house:

meter (commercial area) per square meter 3,000,000 yuan

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 101

3.3 Market-led enclosure of land use regardless of collective ownership

The change of the distribution of land usage amid peasants involves the market- led transition of rural economy in post-Mao era. To illustrate such process, agriculture is taken as the example: contrary to land property rights, land surplus is an issue less discussed but important41. Land surplus constitutes one of the strongest impetuses of new technical and organizational progress. Combined with land property rights arrangement, land surplus also determines labour input in agriculture

(Arrigo, 1986).

Traditional agriculture (like fish breeding) supplies no more than necessary subsistence, which is much less than non-agricultural livelihood. Here is an example.

One peasant of a neighboring village spent two years to become one of the earliest

“Wan Yuan Hu”42 (a household with ten thousand yuan), in 1984. As a comparison, one business man can earn 700-1000 yuan per month from sand sales at that time.

Moreover, rich farmers relied on too bulky usage of land, far beyond the common land-people ratio in this region. The farmer cultivated 15 mu lands, 10 mu of which was fishpond, 3.5 mu of which was sugar-cane and another 2.5 mu was mulberry. As a comparison, the normal land allocation was 0.5-0.8 mu land per person or 3-4 mu every household under the household contract system in Yi Village. Ordinary peasants with normal allocation of fishponds were generally repaid to barely cover annual daily expenses. Limited profits in traditional fish breeding involve two limitations: the first is the fish product, which is too popular to demand a good price.

Fish cultivated in Yi village just consists of herring, grass carp, silver carp and

41See the discussion of Arrigo (1986) about the quantitative relationship between land productivity and the extent of land concentration in ownership in pre-revolutionary China. The author emphasizes land productivity first. Philip Huang (2008) also insists limited land surplus along with demographic pressure is the base of both historical and current rural development in China. 42Ten thousands yuan was a huge economic achievement during late 1970s - 1980s, since the wage of a local primary school teacher was 30-50 yuan every month. It meant hundreds of times of ordinary income.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 102 bighead, the “four Chinese carps” popular everywhere. The second reason is low output. The tool and feed in traditional cultivation are very simple. When the main feed is grass, farming is mostly done by hand with a few tools like hay cutters until the early 1990s. As a result, male peasants normally emphasize their off-farm jobs more than agricultural opportunities like fish farming.

When updated fish farming called for much more extensive input of capital in the 1990s, farmland also produced unprecedented surpluses. The industrial revolution in fish farming underwent two key steps: the move from popular fish to high-price fish in the early 1990s; and the renovation of fishpond in the early 2000s.

As a result of this innovation, the annual profit of one fishpond was five times more than the usual wage of workers in the 1990s, the ratio of which continued in the following decades (see Table 4). Now the net income has risen to the level of hundreds of thousands of yuan.

However, the transformation of agriculture also renders the concentration of land in the hands of the minority rich rather than ordinary peasants. Just in a decade of 1990s, soaring cost of land lease, and high-risk of fish farming rapidly disassociated ordinary peasants from farmland and concentrated land usage in the hands of the rich minority. As a successful businessman in sand transportation and sale, Uncle Heng accumulated about 300,000 yuan in 15 years since the 1978 reform.

He later invested all his money into fish farming in 1995, but failed in a severe market downturn of 1997. After he went bankrupt, he had to live on his own labour in many temporary jobs in the following 15 years, as an employee or in self- employment. He went to work for a friend for a salary of 3,000 yuan per month. This wage was lower than expected and he soon returned and bought a motorbike to be a taxi driver. He also tried to work for others in the sand business, earning only 2,200

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 103 yuan, and worked in the factory zone as a repairman. Now he is one of the crew managing a village trade market for a monthly wage of about 2,000 yuan. Further,

Uncle Yuan similarly became a common officer in the village government for a monthly salary after his money was wiped out in the same market recession of 1997-

1999. As a shareholder of a brick kiln before, he earned over 100 thousand yuan and ambitiously took part in building another factory in 1986. The failure of fish farming affected him greatly: he currently has to worry about daily family expenses and the medical bills of his old mother. In fact, every setback in fish farming is unbearable to the self-employed family. He needs to do his best to meet the repayment of 500-700 thousand yuan invested in two fishponds.

In short, along with the market frustration around 1997, most peasants withdrew from profitable fish farming, leaving it to peasants who can afford large investments and resists ample market risks, or gain extraordinary skills. A peasant called Bo Fu (older uncle) works as a doorkeeper in a commercial dormitory, although he is 79 years old. He was born in 1933, and lives together with his wife away from his sons and daughters. He spent most of his life as a fish farmer until the early 1990s. In the pre-revolutionary era, his family leased land from their common lineage. Later, he continued to work on the collective farmland in his production team. Moreover, he still contracted several fishponds to preserve a farming livelihood in the 1980s. Nevertheless, he gave up fish farming in the 1990s and now works as a night doorkeeper. Meanwhile, his sons all work in local factories instead of farming.

4. Peasants Become Workers

Accompanying market-led transformation of land usage under collective ownership, peasants also turn into workers, and gain new income from non-

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 104 agricultural section. However, peasants prefer to overuse their labour, just like what they did before in agricultural era. To explore this predicament of off-farm income, the off-farm employment which is yet fragile would be discussed.

4.1 The composition of emerging worker group

Albeit land use is concentrated into rural capitalists and rich farmers, ordinary peasants with scant access strive for income in the non-agricultural department. First, most females and some young males work in factories and stay distant from agriculture. As early as the 1990s when factories expanded, the factory wage already exceeded other payments to females. Popular wages were 200-300 yuan per month in 1980s and remained little more than 300 yuan in 1993. However, the total factory payment with over-time payments was 400-500 yuan at that time and kept rising to

800-900 yuan in 1998, to over 1,000 yuan after the year 2000. As a comparison, the income of women embroiders was 120- 260 yuan from the 1980s to 1990s. The embroidery intermediary agent in Tandong village had to give up her business enduring for three decades and went to an electronic accessory factory (of her relative) in 2001. Many young male workers went to factories too. The young generation of peasants born in 1970s and those around 20-years old widely graduated from middle or high school. They had little career mobility, though their current wages increased to between 1,500-3,000 yuan every month. In hardware factories, many in Yi village, the mobility of ordinary workers is to be a skilled “master” to attain a higher salary. Nonetheless, they are unable to overcome the divide between workers at the production line and the office, because they have no educational diploma and cannot transcend the gap of capital to establish their own factory.

Construction sites, kitchens and office rooms of the village authority display further alternatives that local peasants leave farming for non-agricultural income.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 105

The wage paid to construction workers has also kept increasing since the 1990s and has reached 3,000 yuan per month at present. Of them, coolies earn 100-120 yuan per day and skilled worker earn 150 yuan per day. Cooks, ordinary officers and security guards employed by the government also receive 2,000-3,000 yuan of the factory and construction workers. There is clear career development in these occupations, which allows peasants to build up their own business. For instance, a local headman who started to work as a coolie now controls 70%-80% of construction projects of Yi village, and has some other programs in neighbor area.

Or a former cook presently is one of the two stockholders of the grandest restaurant in Yi village.

Self-employed businessmen indicate the third kind of non-agricultural employment. For instance, the catering businesses rose up in earlier 1990s. Many peasants embarked on this business by building a simple shed on the road side, as that was sufficient to start a productive business. After two decades, some of those simple sheds were upgraded into shops or restaurants which demand users to pay for the land or building in use. Moreover, a big rural fair was established by the village committee in 2006, surrounded by three sides of shops. Amounts and types of business are listed in Table 5. As a comparison with former free booths outside the old fair, the new fair accommodate more kinds of trades, including temporary sale of self-produced vegetables.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 106

Table 5: The lease of collective properties in commercial district (September, 2011)

Routine booths Rent Exceptional shops & Rent (yuan/month)

(yuan/month) booths (yuan/month)

Pork 2500-500 Temporary booths 110-30

Chicken 2000-400 Crafts products

Fish 2000-400 West booths for 1200-400

costume

Vegetables 1200-200 East night market 4500

Fruits 3500-300 North shops 1500-790

Roast 1800-350 South restaurants 1200-800

Products of bean 600-400 The supermarket 300,000 yuan/year

Cereals, Oils 1700-900

&Foodstuffs

Frozen Food 600-350

4.2 Unprecedented emphasis on labour by peasants

In a time full of non-agricultural employment, the main economic concern of both the rich and poor is about labour, in contrast to the one on land use before. The evidence not only stems from ordinary peasants, but also roots in the group of rural industrialists.

In the market-led enclosure of farmland use, ordinary peasants resort to labour for salaries or self-employment income in Yi village. They nowadays incline to precisely manage their labour to attain maximized income from paid work. Contrast to implicit labour use in traditional peasant families, it is explicitly assigned in

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 107 modern industrial sector43. In the context of rural industry, peasants are accustomed to realize labour value via clear input-output calculation to maximize personal income. In practice, despite factorial workers, self-employment peasants are also assessed by their monthly income. A fish peddler who currently conducts his business similar to what his elder brother did before. To describe his economic achievement, his elder brother, Brother Pei, said: “He earns 3,000 yuan every month”.

The first performance of the emerging vision of income is that peasants working in factories precisely calculate their working time. A wife from a fish farming family described how the factory where she works shuts down one or two days every week, which causes losses for her. The salary of industrial workers is generally counted by the day in this region. Previously, she rested two days in one month, but now she has four or more days out of work every month as the firm frequently closes down for power shortage44. She expressed anxiety about this situation: “Every workday has a piece of payment, and none is for the rest”. She complained that she already spent four days at home in the first half of June 2011, including the annual Dragon Boat Festival holiday. She prefers to work in the factory to earn more money.

Another phenomenon is gender relations become more utilitarian, due to the calculation of labour. In Yi village, the household division adapts to the new non- agricultural livelihood. If women go to factories through the day, males with spare

43The virtual definition of capitalist economy involves how it realizes maximum profit. As the most rational system of production, capitalist production clearly clarifies the four factors in the calculation of input-outputs: money, land, labor and credit. Compared to the capitalist economy, the peasant economy is unable to evaluate labour as the unique logic of family organization and thus becomes incompatible with maximizing profit. Instead, it incorporates the maximization of total income as its economic optimality. Co mparing capitalist and non-capitalist production, peasant families are not as efficient or rational as a capitalist firm, but it is probably more competitive than the latter, because it bears the loss of efficiency in accordance with the goal of income. 44Electrical power for industrial use is cut down one day every week during the peak.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 108 time at home often do the housework. The wife of Brother Jun spends all her time on factory work, and leaves most housework to her husband who has more leisure as an officer of villagers’ committee. She often works overtime in the factory to 9:00 p.m. for extra money and since 1994 has let her husband cook meals. A similar situation appears in another family with five workers. Uncle Yuan is an officer with the village government and cooks for the whole family. His wife, daughter, son and daughter in law all work in factories. Generally, these workers return home at noon and quickly have the lunch prepared by Uncle Yuan, hurry upstairs for a short rest and later leave home for work on time. This household life seems not traditional in style, as most wives stay at home to look after other family members. They earn money at home through embroidery because they had little off-farm opportunities out of the family in the 1980s.

Thirdly, peasants strive for higher payment for their labour through frequent job-hopping. The mate of Brother Jun changed factories no less than ten times in about 15 years. She mostly works in hardware factories and also tried a clothing factory. She often left factories after several months when she felt that they were not suitable in diverse aspects, such as thin payments.

In addition, the “input-output” attitude towards labour also pervades into other family agenda. Peasants who become workers also measure the worth of education by future repayment. The daughter of Uncle Pan once gave up higher education for well-paid work in a factory. When she passed the college entrance exam, and received an offer in the 1990s and she also found a job in a beeper paging company.

She preferred the salary of over 1,000 yuan to the campus. She said, “Since I will find a job after the graduation, why not the ready-made one now?” Even parents like

Uncle Qiu (who supported his children in higher education in 2000s) also regard a

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 109 college diploma as the end of educational investment because the real imperative is to find opportunities to earn money as soon as possible.

While peasants become used to carefully reckon labor in their daily life, rural entrepreneurs more emphasizes the efficiency in labor use. The retired village doctor,

Uncle De, now goes to his son’s factory to give medical treatment to the workers. He explained that the treatment is helpful to the family business by reducing the sick leave. As labor becomes a wide shortage in this area 45, the sick leave of workers possibly hampers the routine production, especially when his factory adopts line production. His timely medical cure effectively lets ill workers with mild sickness or injury continue to work, and thus is a help to his family factory.

4.3 Dilemmas of rural non-agricultural employment

Though traditional agriculture may vanish in further developing area, some of peasants’ choices of livelihood survive in the industrial environment. That is income maximization. No matter with or without land, in or out of farming, peasants pursue the maximum income by investing labour as more as they could. Contrast with the implicit labour input in traditional agriculture, labour rewards in non-agricultural sector is explicit, especially in industrial enterprises. Nonetheless, peasants also seek to exhaust their labour to earn most income. As a result, such strategies are exploited by rural capitalists in the instance of overtime work. Peasants agree with it as they want to gain as more payments as they can. And industrialists also can reap more benefits in overtime work. The evidences are as following:

First, self-employment business also adopts overuse labour. Many peasants conducted business via the cooperation of couple in booths and small restaurants.

Every morning Mr. Chen, a migrant peasant, went to the abattoir to purchase pork

45Guangdong Min Gong Huang Bei Hou de Zhen Wen Ti (The real problems hiding in the shortage of migrant labour in Guangdong), Yangcheng Evening News, March 2, 2007, http://www.southcn.com/opinion/gd/200703020631.htm

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 110 meat back, and let his wife later charge of the sales in the trade market of Yi village.

At noon, the wife returned home for cooking and Mr. Chen took over the booth. The same thing occurs at night. This couple carefully calculates their income and expense and little save their labour. According to their experience, selling out a whole pig is their routine work every day to assure their living. In this business, they just fight for the most income by using out all their strength every day.

Second, peasant preferences of overtime work also pervade in rural industry.

Overtime work is widespread in Yi village as well as neighborhoods. Workers commonly hope to work longer or even go to work in public holidays to earn extra money. To earn over-time payments, the wife of Brother Jun preferred to work to 9 p.m. every day, which lasted for several years. She dislikes the weekly closure of factories at the weekend. But she was not as anxious as the wife of Brother Pei. In the summer, factories closed down a day or two every week due to power cuts 46. She complained about it reducing her income. In the past, she merely took a rest of two days every month.

The most extreme instance of labour overuse appears in the contract system of industrial production. In this system, a master worker signs the production contract with the factory owner. The latter simply pays a fixed salary for a quantity of qualified products, while the master makes a production plan, organizes the production, to get and pay subordinate workers. This kind of industrial contract is popular in hardware factories in that area, which mostly count on large magnitude and quick turnover of production for profit. The income of such make-to-order is so tight that the master always employs the least subordinate workers to reduce labour costs. As a result, the master often just takes his wife to work, and employs a third

46The municipal government compelled factories in this area to close every Tuesday in the summer of 2011. Power cuts indicate a shortage of power in this Delta. With the spike in the summer, the Electric Bureau cuts off an entire current beyond the threshold.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 111 worker only in some particular busy time. For example, a master and his wife contracted one of the workshops in a screw factory. The two operate around 20 machine tools at the same time, and work long hours to produce 20-30 million screws in a month. The more screws they produce, the more money they earn. In this way, they earn about 6,000 yuan per month. As widely known in peasants, this kind of work is indeed drudgery, though it brings 1,000- 2,000 yuan more than the normal level. In the hot summer, the temperature in the workshop becomes so high that even up to six big electric fans are inadequate.

Peasants’ choices of labour overuse indicate some dilemmas in their non- agricultural employment. Most peasants have their income limited to non- agricultural department, which is less than the one of renovated farming. Occupied by rich peasants rather than ordinaries ones, new agricultural land use reflects the market competition of high-risk farming. Peasants’ emphasis on labour is also rational as they rely on non-agricultural sector. Their tactic of labour overuse just root in the fact that their income is unstable:

Off-farm section in the countryside engenders very unstable income. Despite self-employment business which is inherently uncertain about profits, workers in rural factories also encounter payments quite changeable. The contract system in industrial production is widely seen. In this situation, peasants (migrant peasants consist of most masters and ordinary workers) associate their income to final products. If the result is unsatisfied, the master and his subordinate workers have to quit and look for new employment, whether they afford other economic loss or not.

In the hardware industry, customers set stricter requirements for numerous small factories relying on orders. In the hardware factory that Zhongtai (the wife of

Brother Jun) serves, goods are frequently returned. In fact, masters and their team

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 112 sometimes prefer job-hopping for a better remuneration. In general, workers would leave for a better treatment in another place if they become skillful after several years’ learning, as she told.

Next, regular workers in the same workplace also have their income unfixed.

Many regular workers are native villagers which may work in the same unit for many years. Their concern about too much intervals of production should stem from their income, which associates to the length of work day. Whenever they work, they receive salaries. Otherwise, they acquire no payment for their absence. Sometimes, even when one enterprise is open without work at all, workers present at that time also get paid. As a warehouse keeper, Zhongtai experiences it many times.

Thirdly, the employment is unstable in many other industries. Catering and construction industry regardless of diverse factories also adopt contract system between employers and workers. In the catering process, a practiced cook with strong personal network could contract the whole kitchen of a restaurant. Before that, he needs to establish a team by recruiting other cooks. The similar case appears in the construction industry. The foreman organizes his group and pay constituents, while he need to connect to clients for construction programs. However, these employments are internally unstable. As a cook for more than 15 years, Song told me that a cook usually has to quit due to his bad skills, and is also probably fired as his outstanding performance. Every restaurant consistently calls for updating its menu.

A cook or an entire group of them has to retreat from a restaurant when the innovation of new dishes ceases. Accordingly, a cook often changes his workplace every few years. In addition, I was told by the headman called Brother Sheng that his workers at least rest for 5 days every month in light of insufficient projects. As the

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 113 largest headman of Yi village, he definitely likes to earn 30-day money a month, albeit it means a much bitter work.

Non-agricultural employment has ameliorated peasant’s livelihood. They no longer depend upon traditional agriculture for basic subsistence. Over half of peasants in Yi village have entered into factories, which also centers on labour income. However, the non-agricultural department seems deficient in helping peasants disassociate (traditional) agriculture and become workers. Peasants continue to bear labour overuse, which is as similar as the one of traditional agriculture. Such abiding economic preference derives from the fact that off-farm income remains difficultly reliable. To resist the variable payment and changeable employment, peasants just attempt to acquire more remuneration before it changes.

They are insecure in non-agricultural occasion, like they were in traditional agriculture.

To sum up, this economic optimality sweeps the countryside. In Yi village, peasants in high-profit fish farming are also involved, though they are the secondly rich group.

Many peasants prefer to work by themselves in fish farming. Farming involves extensively drudgery works regardless of massive investments. Many investors choose to employ agricultural workers, but there are still many pond owners conduct the farming by themselves. The agricultural employee rose up as early as the 1990s, which almost composes of migrants from interior provinces. Nonetheless, there are a large part of local peasants doing the work by themselves individually or collaboratively. Many establish collaborations of capital or labour inputs. For example, several together contract more than one fishpond (seven or eight ponds at the most), and cooperate in work. Fish farming involves heavy routine work:

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 114 breeding, defending, water controlling, and so on. Single male peasants need to work hard to look after one fishpond, but two males can easily take care of two ponds by cooperation. There are some extremes like Brother Pei. He cultivates two fishponds by himself, which is definitely a tough work. He sleeps in a small shed on the bank of the pond at night and his day routine is as following (see Table 6)

Table 6: The Daily Schedule of a Fish Farmer

Get up around 5:00

a.m.

Fish breeding (perch) 6:00

a.m.

Breakfast

Fish breeding 9:00- 10:00

a.m.

Trivial things

Fish breeding 2:00-3:00

p.m.

Sleep

Trivial things

Fish breeding 5:00-6:00

p.m.

Dinner

During four periods of fish breeding, he always consistently conducts trivial matters like repairing tools, throwing veterinary drugs, paving electronic wires and fences near the pond, or cutting grass. Altogether, he does the work of two people.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 115

He works so hard because he strives to earn more money for his family. He is preparing for the return of his single son who is going to establish his political career and a new family.

5. A Continue Dependence of Peasants on Collective Corporate

Peasants continue to rely on the collective corporate to gain crucial public benefits and social security. In the reform era, Chinese welfare regime offloads the responsibility of producing social security to the family, market or local government

(Saich, 2008). In another word, collective corporate continues to be the main source of social security and other public benefits to rural families (Hu and Saich, 2012;

Tsai, 2002). For example, over the past three decades, workers seldom receive economic reliefs from local enterprises in Yi village, , especially in injury and medical insurance. Industrial entrepreneurs often buy the least insurances for a common use, whenever an emergency occurs. According to an example that an interviewee uses, if a factory has 100 workers, the owner seldom buys 10 plots of injury insurance to cover whoever gets hurt in work. Furthermore, factory owners always avoid their responsibility when their subordinate workers get seriously injured. In 2010, a migrant woman from Sichuan Province wounded a finger in work.

She obtained a repayment from the employer to deal with the emergency, which refused to give extra money for the compensation later. Mediated by village cadres, she received 1,200 yuan as the final compensation, which was much lower than stated in state law47. In terms of factorial owners, they dislike illness or injury of employees. As a retired doctor who worked in his son’s factory said, a sick worker harms the employer more than himself. Since most factories adopt line production, absence of workers definitely inhibits the entire industrial production. As a

47This compensation offered by the employer broke Rule 37 of Gong Shang Bao Xian Tiao Li (Injury Insurance Regulations) in both money amount and items. The Village government and factory capitalists collaboratively reduced the legal benefits of the injured worker.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 116 protective step, the doctor diagnoses and cures workers in time to prevent their leave for illness or injury. In order to attract the workers in his factory, he generally conducts the cheapest cure.

In terms of pensions of local peasants to cope with aging, local factories also contribute little. Pension seems even smaller than injury and medical insurance in quantity. If factory owners pay the pensions for workers in their factory, they barely buy for several followers with their credit. Not only factory workers, but also officers working in village authorities did not have pensions until 2003 or 2004.

Therefore, peasants make full use of security programs set by higher authorities to cope with problems such as illness and aging in Yi village. The most influential pension program is the insurance organized by Shunde prefectural government. It allows all registered citizens under 60-years old to participate (rural or urban workers), in waged work or in self-employment. The premium contribution is complete in 15 years, or there can be a single payment of about 50,000 yuan and the insurance payment is a little more than 900 yuan every month at the beginning. An elder regretted that he had missed the purchase of this insurance as he was over age, and now he uses two investments on houses for lease.

Another pension program is entirely built by the village committee. Yi village authority provides pension for all over 55-years old from 2001 and everyone is acquired at 60 yuan per month. The premium was raised six times and finally reached 300 yuan in 2011. This collective premium helps to deal with the aging problem of local peasants. For instance, one elderly woman who missed the prefectural insurance program (as her too old age) now much relieved in the village pension.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 117

As regards to medical insurance, peasants rarely enjoy relative public programs.

Even if there is one set by collective corporate, the premiums seem low. In fact, there is medical treatment system in collective corporate in Yi village. Clinics entirely relied on former brigades and later the administrative village committee before 2006.

Later the collective clinic was incorporated into the urban hospital system as a rural branch. In terms of medical insurances, peasants did not harness several public programs until 2000s in Yi village. The Nong Cun Xin He Zuo Yi Liao (new rural cooperative medical treatment system) is a national program established in 2003; a prefectural program covers the outpatient expense of all native residents, initiated since 2007; finally, village cadres also provide medical subsidies to peasants whose medical expenditure exceeds 1,000 yuan. With respect to national cooperative account which mainly deals with inpatient expenses, the state granted about 20 yuan for each peasant every year in 2003, and peasants needed to contribute 10 yuan too.

The criteria is raised to 200 yuan, and the reimbursement for inpatient is expected to be about 70% in 2011. Moreover, the prefectural program further covered the outpatient expense on the basis of inpatient part. It lifts peasants’ contribution to 256 yuan in 2011, and solves 80% outpatient cost regardless of the inpatient part.

However, some rural families in Yi village still suffer huge inpatient costs for specific illness. At this time, the medical subsidy from collective corporate reveals particular significance. For example, one day I sat near the center of Tandong village, and saw a middle-aged man with a sick wife enquired of his village head (Uncle

Yuan) about the delayed medical assistance from collective corporate.

Yi village also funds various kinds of allowances and widely covers investments in infrastructure among members. It establishes an educational fund to honor students who have good achievements in entrance examination. In 2010,

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 118 students who were admitted into junior college would get 600 yuan. The amount would increase to 800 yuan for those who got into college. It also provides allowances in broad aspects including serious illness, death, poverty, and army enrollment. In 2010, families fall into poverty, disability and illness received

1,089,222 yuan in total from village public funds. And new army recruits are paid by the village with “salaries” of 198,000 yuan in 2010. Moreover, village authority also constructed nine playgrounds with basketball stands for nine villager groups, despite many small parks scattering along the river.

5.1 Changes of property rights underlying land shareholding cooperative

Such economic dependence of peasants on collective insurance programs takes the pre-condition that collective corporate is in economic prosperity. Current collective economy mainly has its income resulting from the conversion of land use. Based on collective ownership, shareholding cooperatives are devised to take charge of such transfer, as Po (2008) reveals

As one of the consequences of conversing land use, the rich encloses most land use. Based on individual occupations, the rough classification on rural population reveals that farmland is used by about 20% of top rich households in Yi village (see

Table 7).

Table 7: The social stratifications of rural households in Yi village

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 119

Tandong Beinan The entire

Village Village Village

Factories 3-4 more than 10 About 160

Business with hiring 7-8

Fishponds 3 17-18 About 110

Salary jobs and self- Total 153, about 50% of About 1300 in all employment which work for salary, 20%- business 30% of which live on small

business, 3-5 receive relief

money

Speculation on Nearly 20% Nearly 20% peasants using land

No matter flourishing collective corporate, or the enclosure of land usage by the rich, they all derive from successful land conversion. It implies to accurate adjustments of rural land property rights, which is the concentration of land disposal.

In contrast to farmland individually disposed in the 1980s, it gradually falls into the control of collective cadres later. In practice, rural reform has entitled individual peasants certain right of disposal during their 15-years tenure after 198448. They exert rather autonomy in maneuvering their plots. Peasants not only have the discretion in arranging agricultural production, such as what to plant and how to plant, but also in processing farmland itself. Each family independently decides to

48The Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, 1985, Guan Yu 1984 Nian Nong Cun Gong Zuo de Tong Zhi (The notification on 1984’s agrarian work), January 1st.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 120 preserve the land to keep agricultural cultivation, or privately transfer it to others, so far as it is kept in agricultural use.

Private land transfer has been frequently exerted in Yi village and its neighbors since the reform. According to a woman born in the neighbor town of Yi village, her parents ceased to cultivate fish as early as 1980 when the production team used open bidding to increase the fishpond rents. At that time, someone who wanted to give up farming could transfer his fishpond to village fellows, and collect repayments from the latter. Another kind of autonomous land transfer is mutual exchange of land. A peasant from a village nearby Yi village exchanged his 8 mu farmland with 10 mu of another family in 1982. In his village the farmland was adjusted according to household population. When he wanted to cultivate more than his allocated area, another larger family intended to harness a smaller one. This tendency appeared clearly when the revolution of fish cultivation arose in early 1990s. Some rich peasants like Brother Qiu in Yi village privately purchased fishponds from fellows to exert large-scale cultivation.

There is a divergent attitude regarding the discretion of peasants between the central and local government. Generally, the central government attempts to consolidate peasants’ rights in cropland. It prolonged land tenure again for another

30 years49. And peasants are clearly admitted as the primary subject in transferring farmland in 200850. They can conduct the subcontract, transfer, lease, exchange and cooperation of farmland, and more importantly, based on their own free will.

Nevertheless, the discretion of peasants in conversing farmland was expropriated via

49The Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party and State Council, 1993, Guan Yu Dang Qian Nong Ye He Nong Cun Jing Ji Fa Zhan Ruo Gan Zhen Ce Cuo Shi (Several policies and measures on current agricultural and rural economic development), November 5th. 50The Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, 2008, Guan Yu Tui Jin Nong Cun Gai Ge Fa Zhan Ruo Gan Wen Ti De Jue Ding (The decision on several critical matters of promoting rural reform and development), October 12th.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 121 the establishment of shareholding cooperative of Yi village in 1993. Nine cooperatives at the level of villager’s team were set up to withdraw farmland from peasants to conduct unitary development according to cadre plans. From 1993 to1996, committees of villager’s team initially increased their revenue via the non- agricultural conversion of farmland. For instance, Tandong village sold several plots in the southern and northern edge of native territory as house sites. These sales generated amounts of money, and native constituents got some dividends. At the same time, Tanxi and Anlong village separately established two small industrial zones for emerging factories, and more benefited from that. Furthermore, collective corporate raise more income by shortening farmland tenancy to speed up the circulation. Village cadres conducted the discretion of land that they replace state 30- year tenure with a 3-year one. To convert land to more competitive peasants with a better price, village cadres exerted three adjustments in land tenure: replace the consolidated use with a recycling use; apply open bidding in the contract; and change long tenure into short tenure. Grassroots cadres here thus depart from state policies towards consolidating land tenure.

Based on collective ownership, the discretion of village cadres immediately confronted peasant’s preferences with regards to rationing land and tomb land.

Inherited from Maoist collective corporate, peasants retain ration land to supplement its basic subsistence through planting vegetables and so on. As a kind of land to bolster basic subsistence, it differentiates from typical farmland on the grounds of peasants having complete discretion without agricultural tax, compulsory state-quota delivery (grains), governmental or collective administrative fees. The land is charged little in village authority. The price varies from 10 yuan to around 100 yuan per year.

However, in the 1990s, some ration land was cancelled due to the factory zone

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 122 program in Yi village. The village authority relocated the ration land of Tandong team, and compensated peasants in remote place. Accordingly, the outrage of

Tandong people about it was consistent. Ration land customarily locates in the periphery of a villager’s team and close to the residence place to facilitate the planning. Since the new ration land sits far away from Tandong territory, local people give the usage up. Meanwhile, they just openly rebuked their team head for losing their ration land. Land disputes emerged again when the village built up its first industrial zone in 1994. Since the tomb area was formulated into the factory use, tombs were moved to a public burial park far away and the burial ground of neighborhood district. Peasants nowadays take one or two-hour car drive to worship their ancestors. Every tomb was compensated with 200 yuan. It is humored that peasants were dissatisfied with such arrangement at that time.

The combination of shareholding cooperatives in 1997 shows the further enclosure of land discretion by village cadres. Former nine discrete shareholding cooperatives and their independent collective assets were combined together. And cadres of administrative village were delegated to manage it. All the land is uniformly operated in one shareholding cooperative now. In fact, the new shareholding cooperative was merely the proposal of several top village cadres. In the implementation, cadres of administrative village merely negotiate with cadres of nine villager’s teams to get their support. As a comparison, common villagers rarely participated in this adjustment of collective corporate. As the head of Tandong team introduced, “The combination of cooperatives was the intention of several cadres of the administrative village. It was conducted when heads of nine villager’s team agreed. At the same time, villagers knew little about this issue and thus expressed little objection.”

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 123

The definite disparity between cadre and peasants on land discretion is also exhibited after the renewal of shareholding cooperative. Several leading village cadres like the secretary of party branch are capable to initiate and conduct their own industrial plan in land development. Simultaneously, ordinary peasants have little discretion about that. For instance, those village cadres made a far-reaching plan in

1997: they decided to invest in paving roads, building industrial zones, and constructing various real properties like cold storage warehouses and dormitory mansions. This situation was clearly revealed in the case of Wai Gong Lou

(dormitory for migrant workers). The head of Yi village went to several local private businessmen and ultimately borrowed 2.5 million yuan. Rich profits of such collaborative investments become enormous today. Forged by several cadres and businessmen, this program once was suspected by most peasants at the beginning.

In shareholding cooperative, since cadres deprive ordinary peasants of their discretion on collective land use, the misappropriation of collective land benefits by village cadres seems unavoidable. For example, the price of non-agricultural land conversion falls into the control of village cadres, and sometimes is concealed to ordinary peasants. According to the words of industrialists and ordinary constituents of Yi village, the price of industrial land is mostly made out based on personal opinions of several senior cadres. If one senior cadre proposes a price with no oppositions of others in a small assembly, the price is issued. The horrible thing is no interviewee had an exact idea about the total acreage of their village industrial zone.

In recent years, industrial land was converted to businessmen with an unknown price or scale, which was utterly black-box operated by several supreme cadres. At the same time, they collect gifts and other bribes from businessmen. As a rising factory

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 124 owner told, businessmen ceaselessly go to village cadres’ house to send gifts or money when festivals or auspicious time come.

In short, collective corporate remedies some shortages of peasants in the non- agricultural department. Since peasants have their security of labour use guaranteed by collective corporate in some extent, their dependence on collective corporate abides. However, collective corporate also encounters some problems in the accountability of village cadres. In this sense, even the impact of collective corporate is also risky unless village cadres get accurately restrained.

6. Conclusions

Rural economic diversification prominently promotes non-agricultural employment for peasants. Their income increases in such market-led economic transition. The core trend is ordinary peasants disassociate themselves from farming, and turn into factory workers.

In terms of land use, the uttermost profitable land use is unattainable to ordinary peasants. Through market competition, the richest group encloses most high-reward land usage. It is difficult for peasants in non-agricultural department getting industrial land use or upgraded fish farming. Though collective ownership endures, the equal land use in traditional agricultural period no longer exists.

Thereafter, ordinary peasants have to entirely live on their labour.

Simultaneously, along with a developed non-agricultural sector, such booming rural economy still has peasants stuck in some straits. Since the non-agricultural economic system is still unstable, peasants incline to overly use their labour. To maximize their income, peasants prefer to exhaust all their labour when the final income is predicable. Overtime work every day, full workday every month or contract system in the industrial production is consequently desired by peasants.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 125

They still gain little leeway in their livelihood, which resembles the past trap of traditional farming.

Yet collective corporate help peasants to overcome some of their economic dilemmas. Such dependence derives from the shortage of labour repair in the industrial circumstance. In contrast to the excessive significance of labour to peasants, they get too small protections and compensations from employers, the state or local government. Rural industrialists should have afforded the direct responsibility of social security to his workers. And the state also should have relieved peasants in their risks of injuries, illness, aging, and so on. In Yi village, collective corporate makes some limited but crucial contributions to members.

Village programs of pension, medical subsidies, etc., effectively keep the bottom- line security of peasants in labour use.

As my final research goal, the last economic dependence of peasants on collective land is displayed, since their dependence on agricultural land use has already fallen. And this is also accomplished based on the collective ownership. The concentrative non-agricultural land conversion is realized by village cadres through stripping peasants of land disposal. Nonetheless, in collective corporate, village cadres exclusively control public affairs and also corrupt in some extent. They even purposively conceal some public issues to the mass.

In sum, current rural economy is quite risky in terms of the unstable non- agricultural employment and collective corporate. Following off-farm opportunities for better income, peasants also need to make sure their collective corporate is steady by constraining village cadres’ power.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 126

Chapter Five

Rural Public participation in Village Organs: Vulnerable Collective

Egalitarianism

Whether peasants could preserve egalitarianism in the shareholding cooperative is questionable. In shareholding cooperative period, collective egalitarianism sustains.

Nonetheless, the decreasing dependence on land use of peasants and the concentration of individual land disposal in the hands of a few cadres renders such egalitarianism unsustainable. In the past, peasants strongly exert equal household use, and dominate the periodic reallocation of village land resources to maintain equivalent land use. In the new circumstance, most peasants neither directly utilize nor dispose collective land. Further, the profit of land conversion is directly controlled by village cadres now.

In practice, peasants have to face the fact that the privatization of public assets in the collective as well as state department of transitional economy is pervasive

(Putterman, 1995; Walder, 2003). In principle, village cadres, as collective representatives, manage public affairs in village political and administrative locus, and in particular, collective assets and benefits in collective corporate. Peasants nominally delegate village cadres to manage and preserve public interests. But the result is possibly contrary: most of the village cadres scantly follow the will of peasants but privatize public assets.

The control of village cadres on collective economy is explicitly disclosed in the sphere of TVEs. Village cadres critically promote the development of TVEs (Oi,

1992, 1995). Other than advantageous state policies or better market competition, local governments and grassroots cadres are recognized as another key of the

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 127 progress of TVEs. Spurred by distinct incentives of local revenue and personal interests, rural cadres devoted to develop collective enterprises.

However, their impact on land economy is scarcely studied in English literature.

In previous concern about cadres’ impact on rural land benefits (Ho, 2001; Hsing,

2010; Lin & Ho, 2005; Sargeson, 2011), they mostly concentrate on the interactions between grassroots and central state authorities. In contrast to the state, the role of village cadres seems marginal and vague in the local-central state relations on land issues. Furthermore, some other studies allege that the authority of village cadres in village affairs decays in post-Mao period, due to the decay of TVEs in late 1990s

(Qiu, 1999), or the decollectivization of land system (Ku, 2007). Nonetheless, Yi village exposes contrary evidences. Cadres there hold robust power and intensively manipulate collective land economy, as it is noted in chapter one.

To prevent village cadres to usurp public land benefits in the shareholding cooperative era, there is an urgent need for peasants of Yi village to exert their control on village affairs to share their pubic interests derived from land conversion.

Such phenoemonon can be estimated via the mass participation. Discussed in section

2.3 of chapter two (footnote 19), rural public participation means peasants “express opinions and exert influence” on public affairs. In this chapter, it particularly points to whether peasants effectively realize equal land benefit allocation.

In detail, rural public participation involves questions in three aspects, which would be examined in distinct four parts, based on the case of Yi village:

First, whether peasants were really involved in village political and administrative affairs in post-Mao period? This is a question concerning about the distribution of rural political and administrative power in the village community. By

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 128 checking peasants’ participations in village political and administration affairs, the strengths of peasants to maintain egalitarianism would be much clearly clarified.

Following, even if peasants have participated in rural political and administrative affairs, would their involvement persist? This part explicates the impact on peasants’ power during the political-economic transition.

Thirdly, peasants’ involvements and decision power in shareholding cooperative and other collective corporate are also examined. I would further test whether they have a control on the shareholding cooperative or TVEs over the three- decades of reform.

Through the analysis, in the end, I argue that over decades of post-Mao rural transition, village cadres continue to hold village organs and collective corporate tightly. Since the cadres intentionally privatize public benefits and restrain the public participation of peasants, collective egalitarianism in the shareholding cooperative phase become vulnerable.

1. Cadres Control Village organs

To elaborate the power distribution in village self-governance, this chapter first analyzes usual village organs, and then reveals the main political procedures that peasants participate, and lastly look into the economic basis of village administration.

The first aspect refers to the sources of political and administrative power in the countryside. This is an analysis about static village organs. And the second one explicates the mass politics to figure out the strengths of peasants and cadres. It points to the main political locus involving the mass peasants out of village organizations. Ultimately, the dynamics underlying village affairs are discussed, referring mainly to the economic one.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 129

1.1 Cadres control rural political and administrative power

Rural political organs mainly consist of two parts: the administrative part of villagers’ committee and the Party branch. According to laws 51, villager committee is the organ of mass self-governance. It is built through direct election of native peasants, and work as an administrative body to conduct state policies. Meanwhile,

Party branch represents another kind of political power. Every village has a branch according to the Constitution of Chinese Community Party (CCP). It is nominally locally constructed, but actually top-down approved by upper authorities of the

Party52. In terms of relationship between the two, the committee is led by the Party branch. Generally, the secretary of the branch concurrently takes the post of committee chairman. And deputy sectaries also hold jobs as vice-chairmen.

In terms of village committee, it de jure stays out of the government rank, but de facto works as the lowest unit of public administration. While formal administrative governments are elected by the legislative of People’s Congress, villagers’ committee is authorized by informal ones, villagers’ or villager representatives’ assemblies. Though it runs informally, it still implements responsibilities delegated by the state: the state endows the power and responsibility of “assisting township government to process its duties”53. Once in Maoist era, its predecessors, the brigade, had already worked as the grass-roots administrative unit of the Commune government. Initiated in 1983, the committee continues the administrative function.

51Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Cun Min Wei Yuan Hui Zu Zhi Fa (Law of Chinese People’s Republic on the organization of villager committee), September 4th, 1998 (Revised on Oct 28th, 2010) 52At least three party members firstly submit the application for the subsequently verification of supper authorities. 53The central committee of CCP, the state council, October 12, 1983, Guan Yu Zheng She Fen Kai Jian Li Village Zheng Fu de Tong Zhi (The Notice on separating government administration from commune management and establishing Village governments); Article 5, The Organic Law of Village Committee of the People’s Republic of China, firstly promulgated in November 25, 1987, and latest amended in October 28, 2010.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 130

At the same time, the village party branch obtains its power from the Party by following party commands from above. Due to CCP grasps the entire state power, its grass-roots branch also charges of the public authority in village community.

Thereby, the village branch attaches to the state power, though villager’s committee is not yet a unit of state government. Moreover, several standing members are set to lead other party members. As the core part of the party branch, a power hierarchy is assigned according to the difference of every standing constituent.

In line with the state political structure, formal organs of Yi village exactly follow the party leadership. Villagers’ committee has three core leaders, the chairman, the vice chairman and women director, which consist of the top three members of the party branch. Several other directors charging of concrete administrative stuff: one works for collective asset office, one for village security, another one as the chief accountant and the last one as the chief cashier. However, none of last directors take positions in the party branch. Simultaneously, the standing member of the party branch contains five: the secretary, the vice secretary, and other three members. Despite the front three concurrently seizing top committee positions, the last two members are respectively responsible for broad administrations. In another word, they lead directors of concrete administration in their jurisdiction. For instance, as the fourth member, Brother Long takes control of public security, people’s militia, public infrastructure, etc., while the fifth, charges of the matters of village industry.

In sum, the source of rural political power comes from both the party and administrative government. Thus the nature of rural power also incorporates two parts: the party one and the self-governance one in post-Mao era (see Figure 4)

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 131

Party Government Power hierarchy: 1, Party sectary (Chairman)

2, Vice Party sectary (Vice Political and Chairman) Party branch 3, Female member (Women director) Administrative= Village Committee = 4, Fourth member (industry)

Village organs 5, Fifth member (local public affairs)

Villager assembly and vote

Director of collective asset office, Director of village security, Chief accountant, Chief cashier, and other parallel posts

Figure 4: the current organic structure and components in Yi village

The upper party authorities command the village branch. The top five leaders get appointed by them. And this party branch controls villagers’ committee via the people in office. With respect to the party-peasants relations, the party works as “the

Vanguard of the Working Class”, which leads the popular rather than the reverse.

According to the party constitution, the party consists of the most advanced element of the working class which represents the advanced productive force. Despite keeping tight contacts with the people, the party more devotes to preserve the leadership in the village.

1.2 The mass politics of peasants

In general, villagers vaguely impact village matters in the places of mass politics. The primary occasion is villager’s election. Its effects keep uncertain and indefinite in a long run since it started from 1987, and it even produces pessimistic results that the improved public participation rarely develops along with the newly democratic election, or the market-oriented economic growth (Oi & Rozelle, 2000).

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 132

In Yi village, the mass election shows minor influence to village cadres with regards to the fact that there are merely two sessions of the party secretary (village chairman) in four decades since 1970. The first leader took the position from 1970-

1994, and the second has already occupies the same position for 18 years of 6 terms until nowadays. The two Party sectaries all hold power quite stable. In the 23th election of village committee on March of 2011, the top leader of Yi village again got the support rate of 99%.

The second locus is the assembly of villagers or villager’s representatives.

Generally, the function of this institute also stays implicit in the decision-making process. It is doubtful that whether it barely discuss and approve the decisions proposed elsewhere (Oi & Rozelle, 2000). Due to difficulties like too large scale, too long interval or the advantages of cadres in such popular assembly, these organs which nominally have the highest authority in villages are indeed limited in effects, in contrast to the daily decision-makings by village cadres. In Yi village, their function is indeed secondary with respect with their qualities and amounts. There are three main assemblies in Yi village:

(1) The assemblies of villager’s representatives

It opens five to six times for some critical matters relative to the whole community every year. Villagers’ representatives are separately elected in nine villager’s team, each of which has delegates of six to nine people. The village assembly thus aggregately consists of 69 delegates.

(2) The assemblies of representatives of the shareholding cooperative

The representatives of stockholders were also elected by villagers since 1997.

Nevertheless, this election disappeared 3 years later. Instead, villager’s representatives and party members took part in the assembly if it is organized.

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(3) The assemblies of the party members

The assembly is held twice a year, one of which is on 1st, July, the memorial day of the birthday of CCP, while the other one is Spring Festival. During these assemblies, party members travel or dinner together. There are more than 100 members in Yi village.

Lastly, the two sessions of the party secretary help to demonstrate the features of village political process. As the top village cadres in four decades (across Maoist to post-Mao), their characteristics in office can reflect the one of political process in

Yi village: peasants keep powerless (see Table 8).

Table 8: The contrast between two Party Sectaries

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Uncle Liu (1970-1994) Uncle Wu (1994- now)

Relationship with Absolutely obedience and Wide friendship with upper authorities exactly implementation with upper individuals and

little regard on the sacrifice organs; active but

of local villagers; selective execution;

Upper patronage and trust is Wide upper patronage along

steady with many secrete distrust

Duties and Focused on TVEs; average Focused on land conversion; achievements appearance in economic notable at the collective level development entrepreneurship

Free from corruption; Corruption;

Nepotism Nepotism

Little personal bonds Close individual

with private industrialists alliances with rich

entrepreneurs relationship with Ruthless to all villagers Obliging to local residents peasants Suffers from the open Receives many secrete

hostility and apathy of suspects but intensive open

peasants support of peasants

Notes of Table 8: both the consecutive two heads in Yi village emphasize the compliance with the upper state authorities, yet their executive style is somewhat different. When the former rigidly conducted top-down disciplines, the latter prefers a more pragmatic way: his conduction seems smooth and evasive. As a result, the state fully patronizes secretary Liu, but doubts secretary Wu for the reason that his

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 135 personal alliance with a super-rich businessman who always disregards the township and prefectural governments.

Albeit the divergent personal style, the two chiefs both hold a long term of office. Due to the steady patronage of upper state rather than any other reasons like personal qualities, village cadres crowdedly followed after the Chief, Uncle Liu. In general, he seldom accomplishes any outstanding achievements. Instead, his indifferent level of entrepreneurship caused the wide loss in TVEs. As a comparison, the present chief, Uncle Wu, successfully promotes economic development by his personal talent in business and his intelligence in personal network with rural capitalists, upper state authorities, etc. His obtain the valid backup of Boss Qiang who owns a continent-level enterprise and close relationship with provincial cadres.

Once Boss Qiang went on errands for Chief Liu before he became rich in earlier

1980s. When he was rightly starting his private business in mid-1980s, the head of

Uncle Liu turned hostile to him. Suffered from the intentional hits from Secretary

Liu in land use and some other stuff, he left the village to the neighborhood of

Huanglian with his business. Nevertheless, he already had friendship with Uncle Wu before his move, which was the leader of one production team at that time. When

Uncle Wu gained the post of Party Secretary in 1994, he also returned. Thereafter, the two friends have tight cooperation in many places, which critically helped Uncle

Wu in his career.

The last and most important statement from Table 8 is the two hold the power regardless of opinions of fellow peasants. The former leader, Uncle Liu, faced the strong resentment and indifference of the mass, as some informants told, beside of his upper patronages. He was so ruthless in exerting state policies that he never respected Ren Qing (personal relationship) with fellow members of his lineage, let

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 136 alone peasants of other lineages. He even disregarded local taboos in his conduction.

Once in an exertion of birth control, he let village officials break the bed of a family into apart. This was an extreme offense to local people, because only the death had his bed disassembled. Thereby, he was completely isolated by local inhabitants, albeit they could do nothing more. His words had few listeners in the mass except subordinate village officials. If he encountered fellow peasants in the street, even no one spoke hello to him. Despite he was agreed with the incorruption, people were really outraged by him. After his retirement in 1994, he and his family had to move to the prefectural city, and stayed far away from his fellow countrymen until today.

This is a tragic ending with regards to the fact that people here almost live in their ethnic group. Nonetheless, his power can survive in the popular dissatisfaction, as it is stated in above details. As a comparison, Uncle Wu contrarily established an eminent prestige in the whole village, and his proposals are always supported by the mass. Despite his corruption widely known, he is appreciated by his promotion of local economy, good solutions of public affairs, and excellent trade-offs with upper state authorities. Hence, he also kept his position for nearly 20 years regardless of his noticeable abuse of managerial power for private interests. Since peasants also complain about his greedy corruption, he gets tolerance of upper authorities for his obedience, as I knew. In the tenth anniversary celebration of elder fund of 2011, upper authorities were present. In brief, the two leaders at least corroborate that their power could abide in the opposition of peasants, no matter they corrupt or not.

Instead, they also testify another fact: obeying to upper state all the while, otherwise their bad leadership or corruption has no shelter. In this sense, peasants stay powerless in formal village organs even in the post-Mao era.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 137

In sum, peasants have uncertain strengths in village political process, if they are not definitely minor. Their performance in villager’s election, villager’s assembly and party assemblies all is blurred, since the result little follows their wills. Rather than controlling village organs or determining public matters, they often have to accept the outcome decided by upper authorities or village cadres, no matter they satisfy or not. For example, in about forty decades, they just bore two leading party sectaries, though they always got discontent (one was less competitive in entrepreneurship and brutal in administration, and the second corrupts a lot). In my perception, such kind of tolerance of peasants stems from their ambiguous power.

1.3 The economic basis of rural administration

Despite political organs of the village cadres, village income also frames the rural power structure. The economic growth influences rural politics as rural industrialization or exchange relations to outside world (Oi & Rozelle, 2000).

Village income is normally composed of three parts: the appropriation from upper governments, the self-produced profit from collective (entities) and charges collected from peasants. Firstly, Village cadres depend on upper authorities to acquire appropriations and policy favors. Both central and local governments always supply considerable funds aiming at agricultural development, reliving rural poverty, infrastructure construction, and so on. In Yi village, cadres succeeded in gaining the appropriation for fishpond renovation during 2001-2004. The total expense on fishpond is 2,500 yuan per mu, in which the municipal government appropriated 400 yuan per mu and the township government supplemented another 500 yuan per mu.

Hence, the village attained the upper aid which is 36% of its entire expenditure of 5 million on fishponds. Not all the villages can compete for that fund. In fact, the upper appropriation always has some requisites to address the competition of

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 138 subordinate villages. In this appropriation, village cadres need to prior finish the whole program. Yi village cadres spent four years doing that, and received the fund several years later after the check and acceptance of upper authorities.

Despite the upper appropriation, village cadres of Yi village also count on collective income for the basis to conduct their plans, though sometimes they utilize the help from private entrepreneurs. Collective land, TVEs, etc., all compose of the economic basis. The state defined rural land collectively owned and juxtaposed it with the state ownership since late 1950s (Lin & Ho, 2005; Pei, 1999). Though HRS allocated land into individual households, collective land ownership sustains now54.

Moreover, TVEs virtually were the industrial transfer of collective land profit (Pei,

1999), and thus was once tensely controlled by grass-roots cadres. TVEs and land conversion not only supplied the budgetary income, but also generated enormous extra-budgetary funds. For example, the revenue income from land conversion generally takes up 60%-80% in the extra-budgetary funds, and also inhabits another

30% of the budgetary income in the township, county and prefectural level (Zhou,

2007). In Yi village, cadres’ income also relies on non-agricultural land conversion.

The rough reckoning about collective income probably outlines how much village cadres rely on land development (see Table 9).

Table 9: The annual revenue of Yi village government during 1997-2011

(thousands yuan)

54The regulation of Shunde municipality on land in 1998 also proves this basic structure, see Shun De Guo You, Ji Ti Tu Di Suo You Quan Que Ding De Gui Ding, (Regulations on the clarification of state and collective ownership on land), April 17, 1998.

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Fishpond Industrial Zone Real Property for Proportion

industrial use And Total

1997 4,000-6,000 10,000 Less than 1,000 5:10:1; 16,000

1998 4,000-6,000 10,000

1999 4,000-6,000 10,000

2000 4,000-6,000 10,000 5:10:1; 16,000

2001 4,000-6,000 10,000

2002 4,000-6,000 10,000

2003 4,000-6,000 10,000

2004 4,000-6,000 10,000

2005 8,000-12,000 10,000 About 1,000 10:10:1; 21,000

2006 8,000-12,000

2007 8,000-12,000

2008 8,000-12,000

2009 8,000-12,000

2010 8,000-12,000

2011 Over 10,000 Over 100 Over 1,000 100:1:10; 11,100

Notes of Table 9: Since the exact and complete data of this case is unavailable, this table contains many rough estimates. The resource of data comes from three times of land lease of the industrial zone, the changes of fishpond lease, and the growth of rent in the real property. To facilitate the evaluation of annual revenue of

Yi village, the total income of industrial zone is meanly allocated into the length of

15 years. Altogether, it tells the large amount of revenue village cadres get from the

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 140 land, no matter in short or long tenure55. The peak income of TVEs arrived at

3,520,000 yuan in 1994. However, village cadres realize 3-6 times income of that since 1997. In addition, the calculation about industrial zone and real properties cancels Qi Ye Guan Li Fei (the fee of enterprise administration) and Wei Sheng Fei

(Sanitation Fee), which brings more than 4,000,000 yuan every year. This amount of fees depends on the acreage of land that a factory occupies or the number of rooms in the building, and so virtually consists of land income. However, they remain administrative charges, and do not belong to land rent56.

Further, village cadres sometimes count on private entrepreneurs to realize their duties57. The financial supports of rich friends or followers seems significant to village cadres who are short of economic income. In fact, both the former and present party sectaries of Yi village establish the alliance with private businessmen.

During TVEs in earlier 1980s and non-agricultural land conversion in 2000s, these programs all cost a large number of money. Based on personal network, the two leaders all better addressed the financial problem in processing their schemes.

Thirdly, the economic dependence of village cadres on peasants in Yi village wanes, despite economic growth in post-Mao time. One reason refers to newly HRS and reopened market, which emancipates land and labor from the control of village cadres, as the comparison with Maoist peoples’ commune. Accordingly, village organs have their income from peasants decreased, except some public welfare or

55Some industrial land and real property is in short tenure, while most land in industrial zone is in long tenure from 15 years to 50 years. This latter lease is widely called “sale”, because all rural land eternally belongs to collective ownership according to current state institution, and the longest tenure has arrived the extreme term of private usage. 56Similarly, the elder fund based on collective land is also extinct. Its initial capital results from the appropriation of shareholding cooperative, and sometimes plus the appropriation of the office of asset administration. There are many news on the establishment of elder fund, such ashttp://www.cnelder.cn/zc/2010/01/535836.html 57Many early studies have shed lights on individual bonds in power (Schmidt, et al, 1977), and the special cases of Chinese state cadres, agencies and the village counterparts (Oi, 1989). They illuminate that private relations like patron-client or faction virtually serve for individual benefits against unfavorable institutional environment.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 141 economic programs58. There are two village schemes directly collecting money from peasants: the first is funds raised from local residents for collective enterprises. The waterworks built in earlier 1992 collected 700 yuan from each family, in which villager’s team paid 300 yuan, and the administrative one paid 100 yuan. Over 800 thousands in total were raised from villagers. Another transfer is the legal charges of

San Ti Liu (three kinds of fees: village accumulation, public welfare and the salaries of village cadres), which lasted until 2006. According to state laws, village cadres can extract those items from peasants who use land and other collective materials.

Since Yi village took bidding in land contract as early as 1985, peasants who give up land bear a few in this sphere. When most peasants chose to leave fish farming as their loss or bankruptcy in a market depression in 1997-1999, only a few rich who continues farming needs to pay high rent to villager’s committee. In fact, unlike industrialists, farmers, and businessmen, more than half of village population in Yi village has very limited economic responsibilities towards villagers’ committee, due to they become industrial workers.

In short, the general power structure in Yi village favors village cadres in post-

Mao time: village bodies and cadres’ actions are commanded by the state rather than peasants. Village cadres are still primarily relied by the state for political and administrative aims. As a comparison with village cadres, ordinary peasants few control village organs on the grounds of they can seldom constrain village cadres, when the latter depart from their wishes.

58Some scholars identified the patron-client relationship between village cadres and peasants sustains in post-reform time as the former attains new power in agricultural inputs, market and sales opportunities, salaried job opportunities (Oi, 1989: Chapter 9); however, some disagreements (Ku 2007) argued that the land and revenue decentralization broke down the economic resources of cadres and caused them almost entirely losing the power. However, this study finds that village government finds new economic resources on TVEs and later returns to the land, and thus holds their power in rural society. Nevertheless, peasants in the market-led environment mostly control private labor and capital, and access credit and land. However, some critical public commons like sanitary, infrastructure and social welfare turn to be out of their control.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 142

2. Consistent and Abused Control of Village Cadres in Village Organs

Despite market-led rural industrialization, the state also takes crucial effects in the variances of land use and rights. Firstly, the state gradually abolishes constrictions on commerce, industry and trade in 1980s (Du, 1985). At the beginning of reform, the central government barely targeted at the decollectivization in the countryside. This reform sought to replace collective production with family production in land system, production pattern, exchange mode, etc. HRS accordingly was initiated. In 1982, the state recognized that peasants almost contract with former teams and brigades to afford the productive obligations59. Meanwhile, they also reallocated the collective production materials like land and attained the use right, though the collective ownership was still stressed. Further, the dismantlement of socialist collectives also releases labour to the market60. Thereby, peasants recover their private economy, in which household is often taken as the basic unit regardless of the enduring collective department. In addition, this decollectivization accompanied with the restoration of free trade market. The state primarily admitted rural fair as well as sidelines and ration land as the imperative supplements of socialist public economy in December of 197861. As a sign of the market development, the system of state planned purchase and sale was demolished in 1985

(Yang, 2008), which was the main institution of socialist planned regime in the countryside.

59The Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, 1982, Quan Guo Nong Cun Gong Zuo Ji Yao (The Meeting Summery of National Agarian Issues) 60“San ji suo you, dui wei jichu” (The commune is an unite collective economic corporate with three levels): commune-brigade-production team, in which production team is the fundamental. Those collective corporate commonly own productive materials like land, and commonly manipulate the labour of components. 61The 11th Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, 1978, Di San Ci Quan Ti Hui Yi Gong Bao (The Bulletin of The Third Conference), December 22.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 143

Such decollectivization definitely reshapes the power of village cadres, no matter in administrative organs or collective corporate. As prior studies reveal (Ku,

2007; Oi, 1989), the erection of HRS weakens the control of village cadres by denying their control on agricultural production, market exchange of land outputs, and other village affairs. However, as it is noted in section 1, peasants’ control actually sustains. To explain it, why cadres’ power survives and even increases is replied at first. Moreover, as one of the consequences of cadres’ dominance, their usurpation of public benefits is also discussed.

2.1 The persistence of cadres’ political and administrative power

Despite economic reform, the state also renew its bodies with new motives

(Cai et al., 2007), which is regarded as a Chinese style of federalism that prompts economic development (Montinola et al., 2012). In detail, the politic body of the state seems similar as the Maoist one in light of the authoritative ruling of the singly

Lennist party. The small but critical change is about incentives. Imposed with the new fiscal ones, state officials become devotional to economic growth. Local governments are empowered with considerable fiscal and administrative discretions.

Such pragmatic rather than ideological reform induces Target-oriented

Responsibility System (TRS)62 in the administration in particular (Wang & Wang,

2009).It refers to the pattern that upper governments utilize to motivate its subordinates. Material rewards or punishments linking to responsibilities are set in policy implementations. Whenever one scheme or program is about to being

62TRS originally is one method of economic management, which is later adopted by local bureaucracies in post-reform. The upper government makes an aggregate contract of the goals that lower government should achieve, and signed it with the primary heads of the latter. The contract consists of quantificational and detailed indexes. The heads of lower government then accordingly allocate work to subordinate departments and individuals, and set clear rewards or punishments among concrete agents. This method provides quantitative instruments for upper authorities monitoring and assessing the implementation of the subordinate authority or agents through verifying the achievements in accordance with explicit contracts.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 144 enforced, material incentives (rewards or punishments) is often set via responsibility certificates. Fiscal appropriation, positional promotion and policy exceptions are incorporated as incentives. Inherent to the duty pledge, reciprocal exchange is allowed or encouraged by two parties involved, which means some illegal discretion of inferior officials can be tolerated for duty accomplishments 63. In addition, TRS is overwhelming. The ruthless competition among local governments and cadres for local revenue, personal promotion or policy exceptions is the reason.

Similar as other villages, Yi village is also involved in the general political reform. In the countryside, characteristics of village organs varied a lot. The Maoist brigade and production team adhering to people’s commune was replaced by the organ of self-governance in 1983. They get rid of the immediate state directions as they were in Maoist time. In the commune era, the commune government embodying production teams as its subordinate branches, the whole of which is taken as the grass-roots unit of the state. Since the political reform, the township government no longer directly commands villages, let alone villagers’ teams beneath (administrative) villages. Instead, the township authority can guide the village one, and the latter should assist the former one, as the state laws declare.

In particular, TRS is still droved at the village level. Village cadres need to execute various administrative tasks of upper governments, though they serve self- governance. Responsibility certificates full with explicitly quantitative goals are utilized between upper governments and the village. For instance, during March and

August of 2011, the entire government of Yi village was busy with a task appointed

63This control model sufficiently sheds light on formal exchange relations and informal patron-client relationship swarming in the work of local state agencies (Wang & Wang, 2009). For example, the local government initiating circumventions or even violations to the regulations set by central government is tolerated or encouraged by its upper government in line with the accomplishment of their contracts. These particularlis m conspiracies are striking significant to latest regional economic development in China, and recently draw some academic attention like Huang (2010).

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 145 by the prefectural government, which was competing for the honor of “Quan Guo

Wei Sheng Wen Ming Cheng Shi” (the sanitary and civil city at the national level)64.

It gives trivial and precise tasks in sanitation, public security, etc, which are all defined quantitatively. Village cadres spent more than half year in preparing numerous documents, statistics, items, etc, for the inspection of upper authorities.

Such application by the prefectural government is seen inherently uncompetitive, and their work is ultimately regarded meaningless by those peasants. However, they have to conduct commands of upper governments, despite the complaints. In order to accomplish impossible tasks and meet unreasonable standards, they admitted that many records and statistics were false, and many work is merely done in the surface.

The most ironically is these cheats are tacitly allowed by local or even the central governments, as they are the inherent elements of TRS (Wang & Wang, 2009).

Village cadres also utilize this vehicle of TRS in conducting local governance.

Faced the primarily assigned agenda of the honor in 2011, village cadres discompose the work in detail, and makes particular responsibility certificates with every official in charge (see Figure 5 and Table 10). The work division is made amid village cadres and directors of different offices. Then directors disintegrate total duties in detail, for which duty pledge is made with every subordinate. As a result, based on the daily monitoring to every officer, accurate material rewards and punishments in line with the performance are applied.

64This program is organized by a branch office of the central CCP, which focuses on ideological, moral and civil education and conduct the construction of “spirits” since 2002. The office made a complicated Scale composing of 119 indices to assess the level of popular ideologies, intellectuals and ethics, and so on. See: http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/22220/53479/53480/3712338.html

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 146

1, During the application of “Sanitary and civil city” which lasts to

August, every patrol who catches the outsider breaking the following rules would be rewarded 20 yuan:

(1) the one who distributes the bill without permission should be caught and registered in the village;

(2) the one who pastes the bill or paints on the wall without permission should be caught and registered in the village

2, During the application of “Sanitary and civil city” which lasts to August, every patrol who catches the outsider breaking the following rules would be rewarded 30 yuan:

(1) the one who topples and heaps construction waves without permission in the village;

3, During the application of “Sanitary and civil city” which lasts to August, every patrol who catches the outsider breaking the following rules would be rewarded 50 yuan:

(1) the one who topples and heaps industrial waves without permission in the village Note: when someone is caught, he should be brought back to the office for the instructions of upper leaders.

The Notice of the office

2011.04.23

Figure 5: The specific rules about rewarding security personals for the prefectural task of “sanitary and civil city” (The original photo is attached in the appendix).

Table 10: The record of the rewards in legal cases of May, 2011 (The original

photo is attached in the appendix)

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 147

Date and The performance of the officers Reasons Officers Rewarded

Time amount

per person

6th, 20:15 The suspect of stealing in fishpond Former Jiesheng, 50 yuan

sheds was caught near the gate of criminals Zhaoguang,

the factory named Ri Chang Youquan,

Xixi, Jiarong

8th, 6:55 One was found painting without Painting Weiliang 20 yuan

permission via 10th surveilliance without

camera and caught by informed permission

patrols

8th, 7:00 One was found painting without Painting Zhonghuan, 20 yuan

permission via camera and caught without Zhaojun,

by informed patrols near the middle permission Liqing,

school gate

8th, 6:40 One was found pasting without Painting Zhonghuan, 20 yuan

permission in the square of the trade without Zhaojun,

market permission Liqing

Figure 5 promises four kinds of rewards in money, including forbidden pasting, forbidden painting, forbidden dumping the construction and forbidden disposal of industrial rubbish. Each village patrols can respectively gain rewards of 20, 20, 30 and 50 yuan in above four situations. In addition, Table 10 shows the genuine conduction of above rules. Regarded of the four aspects, broad public stuff is involved, such as catching criminal suspects65.

65In fact, there are also similar punishments in money on security patrols if they did not stop or detect

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 148

In fact, village cadres prefer to follow upper state agencies. Firstly, as the grass- roots medium between the state and peasants, top-down economic appropriation is also important to village cadres. In addition, their political power also largely derives from the ruling party, as previously organic analysis shows. Secondly, the compliance with upper policies is the key to obtain extra top-down transfers. Village cadres have to fight for extra material favors and policy exceptions as they are always quite particularly offered. Due to the reciprocal exchange of TRS, the one most helpful to upper authority may gain most economic favors. As an active follower to upper state authorities, Yi village also gains ample benefits. Village leaders like Uncle Change get the fame in skillfully operating such exchange relations. In 2001, a new middle school was constructed for students of neighborhoods of Yi village. Since it involves a variety of money appropriated from the township government and other economic profits, it induces contests at the village level. Despite the less competitiveness in geographical location, economic performance, or population, Yi village still triumphs in better networks with state authorities. Regardless of township government, the village also approaches to the prefectural one. They are selected as one of the few “model” villages in maintaining traditional village appearance. For tourism goals, it attains about three to four millions yuan to renovate its public infrastructures.

In sum, the general political and administrative power of village cadres seldom declines in terms of grass-roots political reform. Though they nominally work for self-governance, their administrative responsibilities abide. Despite the party section, they also prefer to subject to the want of upper state authorities for economic benefits.

TRS is the main pattern that village cadres and upper state authorities work together.

crimes. For example, every loss of a motorcar would deduct 15 yuan from the personal on duty.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 149

Despite pervasive reciprocal exchange, there are also particular allies between the two sides. The typical situations of reciprocal exchange or special partiality between village cadres and upper state officials are all visible in Yi village. In another word, village cadres keep their power regardless of rural political reform.

2.2 The privatization of collective benefits by village cadres66

Cadres’ power also survives in the grass-roots economic decollectivization in light of the enduring collective ownership. Started from earlier 1950s, cadres’ impact to collective organs and assets just coincide with the public ownership. The ownership problem refers to who and how to control corporate properties and benefits. In modern economic corporate, dispersive shareholders rely on agents to manage economic activities, and so they need to control agents to ensure their wills followed (Walder, 2011). Despite normal vehicles like careful selection at the outset, effective supervision, etc, shareholders have other two tools to ensure their ownership: revenue right as well as residual right (Putterman, 1995). The revenue right refers to acquiring benefits of targeted assets, and the residual right implies to the discretion in case of pre-arranged agency contracts surmounted. Owners can finally dispose fundamental issues like corporate reorganizations, alternations of long- or even short- term schemes and renewals of manager. Meanwhile, modern economic units need to prevent the privatization of corporate assets/benefits. In practice, agents more or less have some direction on collective assets, and they can gain amounts of private compensations openly (bonus, stock, etc.), or secretly

(corruption, embezzlement, etc.) if possible.

Collective ownership gets its characteristics since the beginning of rural collectivization in 1950s67. Led by the newly ruling party, grass-roots cadres

66The ownership on certain assets normally contains the right of usage, the right to acquire the benefits originating from the usage, and the right of transfer these benefits to others (the right of alienation) (Putterman, 1995).

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 150 establish the control on collective assets and benefits. As it is noted (Ge, 2012; Shue,

1980; Wu & Wu, 2011), based on voluntary pooling or compulsory merge, private land was primarily combined and became alienable to collective members.

Collective entities were further concentrated in the second stage of Maoist socialism.

Economic corporate of peasants was directly subordinated to state government. Such collectivization resembled in Yi village. Before that, land was privately or corporately owned. Lineages or lineage branches constructed certain common land for rent. Native poor may get a cheaper price in lease than the regular one in the market. This traditional corporate land was called Tai Gong Tian (ancestral land), which refers to the sacred common ancestors68. Those assignments of land were reframed towards collective ownership. As a top-down state project, the freedom of retreating from collective organs was abolished shortly after the beginning. As it is told by an elder informant (born in 1939), Uncle Wen, several Tandong villagers once attempted to retreat from the cooperative. Their upper petitions to state authorities were unaccepted, and further, they were punished as “purposively impeding the revolution” in the village. Moreover, the commitment of mutual benefit also became nonsense. His family once input private assets as valuable as about

2,000 yuan to the cooperative, such as fishponds, fishing instruments, etc. Though such a family was marked as the “model” of joining cooperative, it was never received even a piece of informal receipt for assets contributed.

67 There are two stages: Collectivization (from Mutual Aid Team to cooperatives at different levels) and People’s Commune. The latest arguments center the coherence between in contrast to that of previous studies (Ge, 2012; Wu & Wu, 2011). Adhere to socialist ideologies of public ownership and pragmatic needs of industrialization, collectives are regarded definitely stepping forward into communes after 1958. 68Usually, the typologies of tenancy between landlord and peasants can be seen in Wei Anguo (Wei & Ye, 1982), Fu Yilin (1982), and Yang Guozhen (1988). Liu Keqiang (2001) depicted the national wide deterioration of peasant economy and the polarization of land relationship during 1927-1937. The collapse of rural society aroused fierce date and huge worry among Chinese intellectuals, and consisted of the main historical background of the uprising of CCP later.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 151

In fact, peasants had their economic activities decreed by the state, in which team and brigade cadres represented the state authority at the grassroots level 69. Just based on their position, team and brigade cadres charged of agricultural production, fulfill state procurement, and maintain the subsistence of members (Oi, 1989). They are depended by peasants for promoting collective income, ensuring private income, and community welfare (Oi, 1989, p. 134). In brief, collective ownership does not yet implies to cadres’ revenue or residual rights on collective assets and benefits.

Nonetheless, it renders the privatization of cadres’ power based on their positions. In

Maoist collectives, the popular clientelism relations manipulated by cadres imply to strong pursuits for private benefits despite rigid public ownership and state suppression (Oi, 1989, p. 131–152).

Impacted by the land reform of HRS, cadres lose the most important control on collective assets. However, their positional power is preserved in many aspects: due to the consistent collective ownership, cadres can adjust the allocation of land or franchises, allocate off-farm opportunities in collective enterprises, or determine accesses to important economic materials in the hand of governments (Oi, 1989, p.

183–192). The arbitrary contracts with friends or relatives in collective land, the clientelism relations in arranging off-farm jobs, and amounts of particular favors and exceptions in allocating public resources all suggested that subjective criteria based on cadre’s personal profits abides.

To sum up, village cadres keep controlling village organs, and conduct severe privatization of public benefits based on their positional power. In so far as they continue to be the mediation between the state and peasants, their political and administrative power sustains; the worse is that as long as they are the middleman

69Shun De Da Shi(The critical historical events of Shunde) (1956-1958), http://www.shunde.gov.cn/zjsd/?id=3

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 152 between the market and collective corporate, they definitely privatize collective interests by abusing positional power. In the whole country, village cadres never stop grabbing public benefits. Yi village is not an exception. Accordingly, peasants definitely have public benefits in collective corporate suffered from that privatization.

3. Exclusively Control and Privatization of Collective Corporate by Village

Cadres

Based on their control in village governance and collective corporate, village cadres possibly abuse their positional power to privatize public benefits. Such abuse can be respectively examined in detail through collective industrial enterprises and cooperatives for cropland conversion. As one of prominent development of rural transitional economy, TVEs clearly exhibit the control of grass-roots cadres in collective organs. Meanwhile, since non-agricultural land conversion produces new ample profits (Jiang & Liu, 2004; Lin & Ho, 2005)70, new collective corporate can further reveal which kind of control that village cadres restore in land.

3.1 Village cadres control TVEs

Collective enterprises emerged much earlier before the Reform, which became more prosperous in post-reform. Collective enterprises were led by the constant efforts of peasants for economic development in both socialist and reform era. The beginning of rural industrialization was producing steel in the Great Leap Forward

(1958-1960), which jointly provoked massive famine in following three years. At that time, steel-making reached the county and even township level (Du, 1985)71.

70Land conversion in collectives occupies about 67% of the total until 1998 (Lin & Ho, 2005). 71The earliest industrialization in the Great Leap Forward around 1958, accompanied with small blast furnace, rustic supply of fuel and raw materials, and popular mobilization. Nearly 28% steel and about 30% iron was scrap in the end of 1958 (Du, 1985, p. 180–187). Moreover, the deficit of this steel-making movement was 5 billion yuan, which cost a large number of financial subsidies (Du, 1985). In the following two years 1959-1960, most small factories with rustic blast furnaces were closed down and only a few steel factories with large scale and better efficiency survived. In the last socialist movement of rural industry in 1978, many collective enterprises soon turned to be waste due to the bad profit (Du, 1985). Another reference:

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The second wave of industrial movement occurred during 1970-1977, in which the commune and brigade enterprises procured some achievements. The last socialist trial of rural industry, a national wide industrial movement, occurred in 1978 when the central government sought for a big jump of rural collective enterprises. As a result, a large number of small mechanical and accessory factories were built national wide (Du, 1985). Those Commune and Brigade enterprises were based on the agricultural surplus in essence (Pei, 1999). They essentially targeted to relieve local dependence on state supplies in fertilizers, machineries, power, and other materials necessary for local economy by utilizing all local resources in hand (Shue,

1990).

The central government promoted collective enterprises by removing suspicions at the beginning: the genuine profit of rural industrial enterprises, the risk of overlapping investment, the waste of economic resources, and the economic confrontation with state enterprises (Du, 1985, p. 180–187).The central government attributed the past failures of rural industrialization to its pattern: the past rural industrialization took the way of popular mobilization rather than the regular law of industrialization. As a new version of rural industrialization, the central authority emphasized the economic profit, local demand, and ultimate the rural market as the criteria to develop collective enterprises.

Further, the state alters the revenue system and so endows village cadres with new incentive. As it is already noted (Oi, 1992; Zhou, 2006), the revenue as well as tax systems most prominently influence economic activities of local governments.

Since the state permitted local governments to obtain residuals, if revenue quota is

http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/%E4%B9%A1%E9%95%87%E4%BC%81%E4%B8%9A#_note-0

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 154 met72, local governments dedicated to TVEs. During the following decades, TVEs not only produced the budgetary income, but also became the enormous extra- budgetary funds for local governments. Furthermore, when the central government conducted another revenue reform targeting on revenue centralization in 1994, local governments newly inclined to give up those enterprises. The new revenue reform lets the central government draw out most profits of TVEs, and enforces local cadres to take the small part with most risks.

Despite ample state effects, village cadres also conduct the development of

TVEs in light of the governmental ownership of collective assets and organs. Village cadres maintain their control on collective assets based on their administrative power.

TVEs are not exceptional.

When collective agricultural production is eradicated, and land use is distributed to peasants, village cadres maintain TVEs collectively manipulated. The relations among state, collectives and peasants in the agriculture are redefined in

HRS (Pei, 1999). It allows the state and the collective to draw out the fixed amount of grain, and also allow peasants to enjoy the rights of land usage, benefit and transfer (limited in agricultural use). Village cadres merely retain the power of land reallocation amid peasants. However, despite of crop land, village cadres still continue to handle collective assets like TVEs. For example, a neighborhood of Yi village left a large piece of land for future industrial use when all other land is contracted to constituents. At that time, village cadres normally reserved certain public assets regardless of TVEs, such as village clinic, elementary school, power station, warehouse, office room, etc.

72The decentralization of state tax system also contributes to the series of policies in the name of “reform and open”, which was applied to fix the densely centralized tax system in Maoist time.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 155

Applying the market and revenue incentives, village cadres in Yi village develop a variety of business and industries based on past and fresh collective income. For instance, they did their long-distance trade on soya-bean cake in North

China in mid-1980s. Not only them, but also the branch office the Grain and Oil

Breau of the prefectural government was also there doing business. Such branch office in Dalian City, one of the major harbor cities in North China, helped to transport their commodities back73. Moreover, Yi village also possessed a warehouse in Whampoa Harbor, Guangzhou City, for trades of steel, etc. Meanwhile, Yi village early or late set up approximate 15 enterprises during two decades from 1978 to

1997, producing woods, foams, garments, lighters, clothes, glasses, iron ships and so on.

In Yi village, cadres’ control on TVEs can be easily learned. As an official document notes74, villagers committee erects responsibility-reward plan for every enterprises. It covers chief managers and main technicians in detail. Generally, cadres conducted their control in three aspects. Firstly, they appointed incumbent officials as the leaders of collective enterprises. For example, Uncle Chang was delegated by the Party Secretary to operate the plastics plant in late 1980s. Village cadres called themselves “firemen”, which means a cadre is immediately matched to any enterprise whenever he is needed. Secondly, village cadres take over the core jobs of enterprises. They basically searched for markets to import raw materials or sell products. For example, Uncle Bai went national wide to conduct purchase and sales in 1980s. At that time, he was a common official rather than a cadre in Yi village. Thirdly, village cadres have strong personal network, which plays significantly to acquire credits and technologies. For example, in the construction of

73It charged of the purchase and transportation of scarce materials like soya-bean cake from Northeastern China back to hometown by train and sea. 74The Aggregate Plan of Agricultural and Industrial Sectors of Yi village of 1994

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 156 a shipyard, Yi village invited several skillful technicians via informal networks from

New China Shipyard, one of the three state shipyards in Guangzhou city, to train local peasants.

Finally and most importantly, special institution of Qi Ye Guan Li Ban Gong

Shi (Enterprises Management Office, EMO) is built to manage TVEs. This is a popular method in the prefecture of Shunde. Not only villages, but also the township and prefectural governments also erect EMOs. Through this organ, the township government helps subordinate villages to get loans from state banks with their approvals. Moreover, when the state commanded to privatize TVEs75, the EMO of

Yi village indeed implemented the state policy in four years (1997-2000). Formal

EMOs continue to work with a new name of Zi Chan Guan Li Ban Gong Shi (Assets

Management Office, AMO). In 2000, faced the problem of addressing residual assets and debts of TVEs, the township government where Yi village locates transformed

EMOs into AMOs, while other towns preferred to name them “companies”. This office in Yi village later refers to managing the industrial zone by collecting Guan Li

Fee (Management Fee). It is an administrative charge from industrial enterprises in village industry zone. The fee is counted on the land acreage of private firms.

In short, TVEs represent a sphere that village cadres completely controlled from its rise to its final decay. Village cadres boost its development, but also gain considerable private interests from it. Despite distributing the access to off-farm jobs, as it is noted in pioneer studies (Oi, 1989), they may also corrupt in their management, as peasants of Yi village said. In terms of the public participation into

75In late 1990s, following the changed direction of the state, village enterprises experienced complete privatization which was called “conversion” in Yi village in late 1990s. This demolishment of TVEs coincided with the option of the central and provincial governments, which tried to promote the efficiency of public enterprises by clarifying property rights in various forms of privatization. During1997-1999, cadres of Yi village transferred all the village enterprises via auction, lease, and bankruptcy to native or outside capitalists and investors.

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TVEs, peasants are noticeably vague power. Faced the pervasive loss in TVEs caused by incapable or corrupt village cadres, peasants hardly intervene. There was no institute for account audit, or channel for popular decision-making, or route for supervising the distribution in TVEs. The solo thing peasants did is requiring the compensation when TVEs declined. If enterprises raised funds from peasants, they need to return money back. Otherwise, peasants fiercely chase after village cadres in charge. In Yi village, cadres firstly pay off debts to peasants, leaving other parts like bank loans unsolved for many years.

3.2 Village cadres control shareholding cooperatives

Since TVEs waned in late 1990s, cadres of Yi village turned to collect land rent via shareholding cooperative. In fact, they already initiated the shareholding cooperative system according to wills of prefectural government in 1994. At that time, TVEs just reached its peak prosperity. Again, this new institution is created by the state. In 1992, the central government experimented on the new system in Nanhai, the neighborhood prefecture of Shunde. The regime of shareholding cooperative is invented for non-agricultural land use and much profitable income, in comparison with the one of HRS. It was copied by Shunde in late 1993, and was promoted in its jurisdiction later.

The shareholding cooperative establishes another income basis for village cadres. In Yi village, they conducted a series of projects of land development, especially after the adjustment of shareholding cooperatives in 1996. A north-south cement road in village center was paved, a vast industrial zone was constructed and entire fishponds were renovated. Moreover, based on increasing land income, village cadres further build another three collective organs out of the shareholding cooperative for detailed manipulation (See Figure 6).

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From 1994; Land dividend, Shareholding Collective land, public welfare, b Collective Organs of Yi village

real properties and public Cooperative capital infrastructure

From2000; The expense of the Office of asset Former TVE government; management assets; Fees Industrial depreciation; public welfare

From 2000; Elder Welfare Real Properties for Monthly pension Fund Commercial Use for elders

Relieving the poor Charity Fund From 2010; plus other social Donation welfare

Figure 6: The current collective economic organizations in Yi Village

As Figure 6 notes, four organs are distinct from each other in functions, but they

more or less rely on land rent. The office of asset management (AMO) is a branch of

the government, which receives the remains of TVEs, and charges administrative fee

on industrial land and commercial real properties in Yi Village. As a comparison, the

shareholding cooperative resulted from the merge of four independent ones. It

combines assets of nine villagers’ teams, including their land, real properties, money,

etc. Next, the elder fund also counts on land income. It collects income from some

public real properties in commercial use, such as the rentable apartment and local

trade market. This fund has boosted its assets from original 3.6 million to 20.12

million yuan, and raised the payment from 60 yuan to 300 yuan every elder per

month until 2011. Lastly, the charity fund was newly established in 2010, which

draws upon donations of the popular. Over two million yuan was collected in the

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 159 first year. According to the guidelines of the prefectural government, it can relieve the poverty, and complement other expenditures on social security.

Despite AMO being subordinated to villagers’ committee, other institutes seems independent rather than attached to the committee. However, other three programs actually fall into the control of cadres, as programs coinciding with village benefits and policies of upper state authorities. The elder fund affiliates to AMO, and it is operated by accounts and cashiers of that office. As I found in 2011, two women, one account and one cashier, hosted the monthly distribution of pensions in the hall of office building. Old people came on and off to get the cash. In contrast, the expenditures of relief fund needs the signature of village leaders. Last, in terms of shareholding cooperative, cadres’ control can be described in detail.

(1) The formation of shareholding cooperative

The birth of shareholding cooperative was decided by the prefectural government and operated by village cadres. From 1993 to 1994, the conduction of this policy had few relations with villagers. Meanwhile, it was even a duty secondary to village cadres, inferior to other parts of the annual schedule. As “1994’s Plan of

Agricultural and Industrial Management of Yi village” shows, village cadres primarily endeavored to prompt economic development. The establishment of shareholding cooperative was put aside with other tasks like the reform of accounting required by the township government. As village cadres told, such program was falsely manipulated to deal with the command of upper governments.

In addition, another proof is those newly organs even had no constitution, as an elder informant remembered. As the earliest constitution of shareholding cooperative displays, it was made in the first meeting of representatives of constituents in 1997, three years later than the initiation. Moreover, the independent accounting of nine

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 160 villagers’ team also corroborated the carelessness of village cadres. Despite the beginning of shareholding cooperative organs, scattering collective entities based on land sustains. For example, Team of Dongxi distributed 532 pieces of dividends to

303 constituents in 1994. Each piece cost 221.65 yuan. In the same year, Team of

Shanglong allocated 627 segments of dividends to 359 members, and each is paid

405.97 yuan.

Four shareholding cooperatives in village were combined together in 1996, by which most collective asserts of natural villages are concentrated too. The top village leader of Uncle Chang poured impressive zealousness to this adjustment. Relied on personal allies of entrepreneurs, he negotiated with cadres of villagers’ teams to persuade them backup his blueprint. As a result, former assets of nine teams have been concentrated into the hands of village cadres, including land resources. As the head of Tandong team said, villagers rarely participated into this reorganization:

“The combination of cooperatives was the plan of top cadres of administrative village. It was smoothly conducted with the agreement of nine heads of nine teams.

During that process, villagers knew little about this issue. If not, they rarely expressed objections. ”

In the events of initiations and alterations of shareholding cooperative system, village cadres are proved that they can handle the concrete contour of collective organs, and allocate collective land assets in detail. Though the type of new collective economy is proposed by the prefectural government, it is addressed by village cadres at the grass-roots level. However, ordinary villagers rarely participate into such public affairs.

(2) Decision-makings in shareholding cooperative

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Despite the establishments and adjustments of organs, village cadres also control the decision-makings in shareholding cooperative. First, the meeting of representatives of shareholders, that is the sole legitimate power of cooperative, takes rather small effects. As the official institution declares, shareholders can assemble whenever they think necessary. In that locus, they can elect or remove council members, or cope with critical events. However, such kind of assemblies is held at most 5-6 times every year.

Next, representatives of stockholders lost their independence soon after the renewal of cooperatives in 1996. Normally, they are elected by villagers (stake holders), which occupies 2% of the latter. Until 2005, there are 67 representatives.

Nevertheless, those particular positions had already been canceled around 2000. And they are substituted of representatives for villagers’ committee assemblies. In the latter instance, 69 people in total are set for many years. At least from 2005 to 2011, independent assemblies of shareholding cooperative are quit, which are put together with the one towards villager committee.

Third, the representative assembly is always passed carelessly. The popular conference is always quite short in time, and the discussion of key events is often so paste that they are not explicitly crystallized. An informant complains about the one of April 2011:

“57 representatives attended the conference. They just sat there for a listening, because they even had not copies of reports in hand for a review. The assembly was quickly finished in a forenoon. Generally speaking, village cadres should detailed demonstrate which one takes charge of industry, or sanitation, etc, and the results of their accomplishments. But there was no such clarification at all, leaving collective

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 162 affairs not transparent. In the final vote by hands, I was the only person objecting

(the resolution), despite the rest 56 approve (the resolution).”

Lastly, the council of shareholding cooperative also disobeys the constitution, which lets the routine work is completely decided by several cadres. Nominally, the council is the standing body of the meeting of stakeholder’s representatives. It should be opened once every month, and more times if it is needed. However, council conference is barely held, as I saw for months. Instead, the council director and the vice one cope with the routine affairs every day, based on the help of an account and a cashier. The council director simultaneously afford duties of the vice director of committee and the vice secretary of party branch. In addition, council members should be elected by stakeholders. However, the position is occupied by village cadres or officials with a few elections. Despite two directors, council members consist of nine heads of villagers’ team.

Regardless of decision-making problems, shareholding cooperative also has its expenditures exclusively manipulated by village cadres. Nominally, expenditures over 5000 yuan need the approval and signatures of all council members. However, it is never exerted. Instead, several top leaders in the party branch can permit expenditures over 5000 yuan. It points to the highest three in the rank of party branch, including the secretary, the vice secretary and the women director. Based on their personal signatures, and another one of ordinary officials specifically implementing the item, most payments of shareholding cooperative are decided. In contrast, the exceptional occasions truly calling for the mass assembly merely refers to the bulky investments or far-reaching public projects.

In the end, village cadres also control the audit of cooperative expenditures.

Attached to the council, an audit team is required by the township government to

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 163 monitor cooperative account since 1994. Nonetheless, the team mostly consists of village cadres or officials, which again is divergent from institutional claim of “60% of the team is representatives of stockholders”. In 1994, the team consisted of four village cadres and one representative. And in 2010, three village cadres and heads of villagers’ team with one villager representative are its component. The similar composition appears in 2011 by covering three village cadres or team heads and two representatives.

(3) Income and allocation in shareholding cooperative

The performance of land development and magnitude of cooperative income rely on the capability of village cadres. They collect income from four aspects:

- The compensation of land appropriation from above state authorities or units

- The income from the auction of resident land

- The rent of collective land and buildings leased to industrialists76

- The rent of fishponds77

In terms of land leased for industrial use, the vice party secretary told that the price completely counts on the market (in Chinese: sui hang jiu shi). But peasants differently regarded that it is freely decided by village cadres. In the discussion with several top cadres, if the price proposed by one is not opposed by others, then it becomes official. Simultaneously, when the lease of collective industrial buildings is renewed, whether the price increases or not and how much it increase all depends on the wills of village leaders. An industrialist said:

76There are two types of land lease for industrial use. The first is commonly called as “land sale”, in which one-time rent for 20 years or more is collected. The rent should be paid in a short time. The second is one-time rent for 15 years and paid monthly. Moreover, the tenure of industrial buildings is 3-5 years and paid monthly too. 77 The contract of fishponds takes the manner of open bidding. The winner should pay for 4-years use every quarter.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 164

“As regards to the (updated) price of using collective industrial buildings, it is already made out by villagers’ committee. If you accept, you can continue the use.

Otherwise, you should immediately move your factory away, and empty the place for new lessees.”

At last, the price of resident land in auction is also decided by village cadres.

Before the day of public auction, the announcement, in which the price of land is already written out, is sent to every family. The potential buyers need to submit the precise number of money to the special account of villagers’ committee. In the auction, they just pick up the plot each one wants.

Despite collective income, village cadres also mostly control allocation of shareholding cooperative. In that distribution, collective rather than individual attainments are prior secured. In 2005, the sequence of allocation is state taxes, management expenditures, welfare funds, and lastly the part of dividends (collective and individual shares). In detail, such allocation is as following:

10% for the elder fund + 40% for collective constructions 78+ dividends (20% for collective shares79, and 80% for individual shares)

Ordinary peasants have different impressions about the expenditures of shareholding cooperative. The head of Tandong team think it is consisted as following: 40% for constructions, while another 60% is composed by 20% for assert appreciation, 10% for elder fund, and 70% for individual dividends. As the further alternative, another informant regarded the composition is 40% for construction, and the left 60% for dividends. In the latter, 20% is for collective share, 20% is for township government’s share, and 60% is for individual share.

78 It is called San Tong Yi Pin, which points to the investments in infrastructures. To attract private investments to the industrial zone, the electricity, water, road, and leveling ground are all needed to be fulfilled first. 79The collective share will be invested into village welfare, and to supplement medical security and educational subsidies, etc.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 165

In short, the three calculations similarly recognize that individual peasants obtain 40% of the allocated via dividends, and 60% is left in the cooperative and arranged by village cadres.

(4) Positional power in shareholding cooperative

Despite collective asserts like land, formal position is another significant resource in Yi Village. Positional resource is a special feature of socialist redistribution regime, in which cadres always attain material privileges due to their positions (Walder, 2003). Some studies (Oi, 1989)argue that advantages of positions remain in the economy transition, which overcomes the scale of living materials.

In Yi village, village cadres indeed attain extra economic advantages due to their positions. First, cadres take use of positional power to look after private business. For example, the party secretary has a four-floor industrial building, which is managed by his son. His family is rumored to have private properties over 10 million yuan. Meanwhile, the vice secretary jointly cultivates four fishponds with another cadre, which can bring him around 800 thousands yuan every year; the woman director invests more than 3 million yuan to a five-floor apartment for lease, while her husband owns a small factory. Based on their official positions, cadres have more frequent and closer contacts with state authorities, such as Tax or

Industrial Bureaus. Based on these connections, their private business should be facilitated or even sheltered, no matter through formal relationship or personal network. In case of a factory causing a woman injured of 2010, village committee helped the industrialist to make a deal with the migrant. With the minor compensation of 1,200 yuan, the women with her hand badly hurt had to promise not to sue the factory owner in the future. Such favor is quite possibly appearing in cadres’ business, since they occur in ordinary entrepreneurs.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 166

Another positional favor is that the payment for land use can be reduced. Faced with the state prohibition, Guan Li Fei (administrative fee) is still collected by villagers’ committee. In line with the acreage of land used, such fee is charged every half year. Though there are two specific officials implementing the collection, it is still a loose “policy”. Some businessmen merely pay a part or nothing as their worse profits, while some industrialists may save a part or the whole by bribing village cadres. And these are all tolerated. In another word, this charge falls into the discretion of cadres in some extent. An entrepreneur with a small factory told me that the charge may be saved if the entrepreneur is close to top cadres. Similar, it is not an unreasonable guess that cadre's business avoids the cost of their business in this aspect, in so far as private entrepreneurs already do it via cadres.

Further, cadres also receive considerable gifts in light of their positional power.

There is a common belief that cadres “deserve” some economic rewards from the entrepreneur if they give him some favors, particularly the one seeking to start business in Yi village. At festivals, many entrepreneurs go to cadre’s home to present gifts or money. No one knows the specific number that cadres get as gifts.

Nonetheless, they are widely known grabbing too much than what they deserve. No cadre is out of corruption, “senior cadres largely corrupt while the junior ones corrupt smaller”, as an informant said.

Finally, cadres deliberately usurp collective benefits via setting up off-book accounts, which is widely called as “Xiao Jin Ku” (slush funds). Clearly distinguished from the open account, secret funds are hided from villagers who well know the formal account. To prevent potential protests of villagers like the one in

Wukan Siege of 2011, village cadres rarely grab the formal income from leased land and other public properties. Meanwhile, they still find ways to squeeze private

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 167 interests from the public one. When cooperative money is loaned to private users, they take up the part of interests. That is once the main source of their slut fund.

Thus public fund of 10 million yuan can definitely engender rich profit to village cadres themselves.

In sum, village cadres acquire their control in collective corporate by restricting the participation of peasants, despite the political and administrative power endowed by the state and the managerial power entitled by collective ownership (see section 2).Village cadres also dominate many public matters like benefit allocation in spite of their management in collective organs. They restrict peasants in decision-makings, interest allocation or mass supervision.

Simultaneously, they abuse positional power to privatize public interests and corrupt in other ways in Yi village. Thus, the abuse of managerial power corroborates the exact outcome of collective ownership with insufficient mass participation. Inspired by the third level of embeddedness, peasants need effective participation in village affairs. Otherwise, their benefits are insecure in face of village cadres.

4. Implications of Cadres’ Control in Village Organs: The Restricted Public

Participation of Peasants

Taking Yi village as example, land benefits allocated to peasants rapidly increased. Before the phase of shareholding cooperatives, villager’s team merely allocated land bonus of tens yuan a year per capita. As Table 9 notes, village administration enlarges its income from the non-agricultural land conversion after the improvement of shareholding cooperative in 1997. The individual dividend has been raised to 1,894 yuan until 2011.

Regardless of direct dividends, peasants also retain many programs of public welfare. When the industrial zone was still in a slight scale and industrial enterprises

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 168 were still small in number, 575,471yuan in 1994 was spent on 11 public programs like subsidies to the elders, social development like subsidies to the primary school, and kinds of infrastructures. When the cooperative engenders more money from land conversion, it also paved cement road all over the village, and built public squares with basketball courts in every natural village, and input huge money in other infrastructures. In addition, security funds have been improved largely as comparison with the past. The total expenditure of AMO, the Elder Fund, the shareholding cooperative and the Charity Fund is nearly 1,600,000, which is 28 times as more as it was in 1994.

However, these benefits are rather possibly unstable in terms of the feeble public participation in self-governance. Peasants acquire quite small participation in the collective affairs, especially in controlling the managerial power of village cadres.

In fact, as this noted in section 1 and 2, village cadres get more power due to entitlements of the state and collective ownership. In addition, village cadres deliberately oppress the public participation to control more public benefits.

As the representative of collective corporate, village cadres can restrict the public participation of peasants if they want. Some cadres may respect the public opinions. In Yi village, Uncle Wu is an example (the village party secretary for 18 years). Learned from another village cadre, Brother Long, Uncle Wu always negotiates with rivals, or mobilizes the major villagers to follow him. In his words, dissimilar to private industrialists, village leaders need to seek the admissions of the major population before carrying out plans, while the capitalists can arbitrarily enforce their own decisions. Nonetheless, this is an entirely personal behavior based on individual choices. If the secretary shut down the door of public opinions, his control on public affairs can also run well, just like the former secretary did. Due to

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 169 the powerless of peasants, they can handily impose restrictions to the popular participation.

Latest economic transition further undermines the public participation of peasants in village affairs. In Yi village, the collective economy is yet strong enough to pay for village cadres. In contrast, most villages in China retain a few or even none of that at all to live the cadres. The top-down governmental transfer payment has already become the main income of villages, after a series of rural tax reform80.

And village cadres now are directly paid by the state 81. Even in the Yi village, village officials also need the upper transfer in their rewards, though it is secondary to local collective payment in most occasions. In the village security team, tens of patrols have their half wage paid by the upper government. As it is noted in section

1.3 of this chapter, economic contributions to village administration also frame the latter. And peasants exert a quite small one.

To sum up, village cadres’ emphasis on the public benefits of ordinary peasants seems coincident rather than unavoidable in Yi village. Their adherence to peasants’ interests is quite individual instead of institutional. The abiding rural power structure and collective ownership, in which rural cadres work as the mediate (between state and peasants, market or collective organs), have enabled them to prevent the mass participation, or even abuse managerial power. Whether the consequences come into being or not just depend on their individual wills. In Yi village, the cadres have done

80Rural tax reform of 2001 abolished heavy administrative charges by grass -roots governments by combing them into state tax defined by laws. Another one of 2006 further removed all state taxes on peasants. From then on, peasants simply receive subsidies in agriculture and reliefs in livelihoods from the government. 81Cun Guan Gong Zi Zen Me Fa? (How to pay village cadres salaries? ) http://www.21gwy.com/ms/cjzl/a/6059/416059.html, last read April 29, 2013. Several official documents (Changsheng Xiang, Heilonglongjiang Province, 2012; Yun Xian, Hubei Province, 2012) at the county or township level also confirm this transfer style of salary payment in North East China and Central China, where economic development is quite modest.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 170 not bad or even good in the appearance also block the participation of peasants, and usurp the public benefits in some sense.

Along with their vague political power and weak control, ordinary peasants get their mass public participation frustrated in collective corporate. For this reason, I am afraid of collective egalitarianism in allocation difficultly workable. It is seriously disturbed by the privatization of public properties by village cadres. The less effective of the mass participation, the more risk of discontinuity of collective egalitarianism. Without rigid power or effective participation, peasants hardly constrain village cadres to protect collective egalitarianism. In Yi village, village cadres obviously harm equal allocation by usurping public benefits, and peasants take few actions to that.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has portrayed the constrained public participation and its outcome via analyzing rural power structure in village political and collective entities. Despite the state decollectivization in economy (land system of HRS, the demolishment of state purchase and sale, restoration of market exchange, etc.) and political reform

(village turn to self-govern), the political and economic mediation of village cadres is consistent. Meanwhile, peasants’ impact to village matters is rather limited: they hardly demand public affairs to accord with their own desires, such as reducing the privatization of public assets by village cadres.

Based on the ineffective public participation of peasants into formal village affairs, this chapter claims that collective egalitarianism is quite vulnerable in shareholding cooperative era. In light of peasants’ insufficient participation, their efforts to bolster collective egalitarianism are doomed ineffective in village organs.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 171

Despite the surface of accurately equal distribution of shareholding cooperative, collective egalitarianism is actually eroded.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 172

Chapter Six

Reviving Lineage Organs: Equitable Membership and Mass Participation

Uncle Yuan is the head of Tandong team, Liu lineage. He has been in office since 1995. The major difficulty that he encounters is about ration land. During the combination of shareholding cooperatives in 1996, Liu people lost their ration land and are compensated with a new one, which is far away from their residence.

Normally, they plant some vegetables in those plots for self-use. Due to the rapid increase of vegetable price in recent years, many peasants blame Uncle Yuan for losing the land. The alternative one is actually given up as its too long distance.

1. Recurring Traditions and Their General Implications

While peasants are structurally vulnerable to village cadres in formal village organs, they probably have other alternatives to protect their interests in village affairs. In the theoretical paradigm of state-society relations, the strengths of peasants in village matters are generally found in three aspects: First, economic power. In Maoist state, peasants directly produced and fought for grain (Kelliher,

1992). In the reform era, economic progress can ultimately reconstruct the state power towards democracy (White’s research)82. Second, their political power imposed by their class position in Maoist era (Kelliher, 1992). Last, the improvements of formal participation. The progress of the ruling of law enables the rightful resistance of peasants (Obrien, 1999). And the one of grass-roots democracy also provides the legal avenue for the discontent of peasants. Formal self- organization helps to supplement their impact on village affairs. Nonetheless, the economic enforcing the state democracy is testified ambiguous (Solinger’s

82This is cited from Perry (1994).

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 173 research)83, and formal participations also take finite effects, as my analysis of

Chapter five shows. As a comparison, recurring traditions involving the public participation in Pearl River Delta are worth further study.

Dragon Boat race is now commonly seen. For example, every village of the town, Da Liang, equips with at least one dragon boat and at most sixteen boats in

2010. Another example is the town of Longjiang, which consists of 26 villages, owns one hundred and forty six boats in all until 201084. Another representation of such traditional race is the scope it involves. Local government also engages with it regardless of regular participants like village communities. Some local officials attempt to gain the popular will by organizing or participating into the race85. In point of fact, Dragon Boat race just represent a part of traditional revitalization in this Delta since 1980s. Moreover, ancestral and religious temples are also involved.

Each natural villages of Yi Village have restored at least one divine temple except the one of Dawasha86. Besides, three important natural villages have quietly constructed ancestral temples for indigenous lineage or lineage branch, which involve Tandong village of Liu, Tanxi village of Ruan and Aalong village of Wu. As what I observed in Tanxi village, it has two smaller ancestral temples for different branches of Liu Lineage, despite the chief one for the whole lineage. And one of the two branch temples is told by informants that it was secretly constructed as the state prohibition. When I went to visit in 2011, the locked temple was so clean that there were no any marks in the doors and walls.

83Ibid. 84The statistics is informal from dragon boat fans: http://www.sdlongzhou.com/simple/?t3.html; the latter website http://www.sdlongzhou.com/read-htm-tid-48-page-1.html. 85Five majors of Guangzhou Municipality attend Dragon Boat Race, Guangzhou Daily, June 13th, 2011. 86There is little data collected about traditional associations of Dawosha.

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These restored traditions reflect the revival of lineage, which means the unilineal agnatic group in South China(Freedman, 1958, 1966). Based on the patrilineal kinship fabric, lineage refers to the self-organization of peasants with several requisites as following (Freedman, 1958, p. 1–2):

Firstly, follow the same first surname. In this kind of group, common agnatic descendants with the same surname are respected, and exogamy with distinct lineages is normally enforced.

Next, compactly live together with exclusive territory. The village inhabited by merely one lineage is not often seen. When different lineages live in the same village, they always distinguish each other by setting clear territory boundaries.

Lastly, agnatic organization had commonly economic bases before the triumph of communist Party. Land consists of the main part of lineages properties.

Against earliest studies of 1930s regarded lineage corporate as backwards, it was until Freedman that lineage is taken as an entity. Normally, Freedman adopts

British functionalism in his elaborations (Siu, 1990; Wang, 1996). Lineage rise up as it satisfies fundamental social needs, including the self-protection of migrants in frontier region, cooperation in rice plantation, management of water conservancy or irrigation. However, paradigm on lineage overlooks too much historical details.

Social needs can incorporate what is clarified by Freedman but go far beyond.

In fact, the functionalism concept of lineage has been challenged by Faure

(2007). He disagrees with the idea that lineage is the naturally agnatic group proliferating from the common ancestor and inhabiting specific territory. Based on the historical research on lineage origins, he recognizes that common ancestor actually is the vehicle applied to confirm the territory ownership to rival competitors, and justify the membership of corporate properties to inhabitants.

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Next, in contrast to the functionalism perspective, the focus on interactions between the state and society enables explanations to capture more complicated realities. Despite economic or political dimensions, cultural dimension is also referred. Though Skinner (1964) regarded economic motives of peasants determine the scope of community unit based on market exchange, villages actually have broader dynamics underlain. Recycling cultural traditions actually reflect diverse political and economic competitions, and simultaneously relieve tensions of such competition (Siu, 1990).

In China, latest studies also concern the dynamics underlying revitalizing lineage. The first topic is about its impact to modernization (Wen & Jiang, 2004)87.

Unfortunately, it is popularly regarded as old-fashioned or even backwards, though some others accept resurging traditions due to they follow the view of peasants.

Further, some also focus on the economic effects of the restored lineage traditions (Wen & Jiang, 2004; Yang & Liu, 2000). Their impact on the development of rural industry is analyzed. Generally, the economic influence of lineages varies radically. Before the communist revolution, lineage is found mainly working as a kind of land corporate (Freedman, 1958; Liu, 1992; Potter & Potter, 1990). This land ownership was eliminated in subsequent Maoist era. Since lineages were regarded coinciding with interests of “exploiting classes”88, they was harshly repressed. At that time, lineage assets like land had already been collectivized since 1950s. In post- reform era, reviving lineages seem accompany with rapidly market-led economic growth, tremendous urbanization, and little involves land properties anymore.

87Ideologies of modernization are pervasive in the academic sphere concerning rural society and peasants and dominate large number of studies in this domain (Xu & Xu, 1999). 88The Central Committee of CCP, 1966, Decisions Concerning the Proletarian Cultural Revolution (关于无产阶级文化大革命的决定), People’s Daily, August1st.

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At last, many Chinese researchers also turn to the political impact of lineages.

For example, it jointly shapes cadres’ selection and performance in the countryside

(Yang, 2000). The continuity of lineage custom in reform or even Maoist era is identified, based on the same framework of state-society relations. In their research, peasants constantly count on lineages to exert daily communications or follow beliefs on common ancestors. At present, lineages can frame the selection of village cadres, which often take interests of native lineage into account.

In order to reveal lineage impact on rural popular participation, this study endeavors to requisites of lineages: the territory and the membership. Compared with former Chinese and oversea studies, the research perspective of interactions among diverse forces are similarly adopted. Nonetheless, the research focus is changed. At first, territory points to land properties that lineage group commonly inhabit and farm. It is the base of survival and development of lineage groups in a long term, as

Freedman (1966) illuminates. Therefore, lineage competition or confrontation for the land can impact the results of public participation in the cross-lineage scope in a village. And how relations between the lineage and the outside world (with other lineage groups, village cadre group, and state authorities) transforming consists of the first research objective here. Further, as another requisite of lineage, membership is also probed. Despite the unilineal agnatic hierarchy, the equitable assignments of common benefits is also critical for maintaining village solidarity. Inner relationship can involve harmful economic competition among members, and inequalities of allocating common benefits (Potter & Potter, 1990, p. 251–269). Since these intra- lineage factors also affect the public participation of peasants, this chapter thus secondly investigates how the evolution of lineage membership impacts rural mass participation.

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2. Pursuits of Lineage Organs: The Survival of Ethnic Group

Based on lineage organs, traditions have been restored in three main places: dragon boat race, ancestral temples, and religious temples. However, the focus of lineage activities has transited a lot. In pre-revolution period, peasants mainly count on land for subsistence. Lineage corporate needed to compete for land resources due to population proliferation (Freedman, 1966). The failure in land expansion may lessen group population, and decouple the ethnic group in the end.

In Maoist era, lineage structure was further reinforced, though its assets, organs and symbols were eradicated (Potter & Potter, 1990, p. 251–269). Formal corporate economy sustained, which replaced former lineages or sub-lineage branches with production teams. And collective people continued to adhere to the land corporate to maintain livelihoods. Moreover, collective economy conducted equal allocation among constituents. Due to this adjustment, the solidarity inner the ethnic group was intensified, while sharply economic competition among members faded. In short, land territory remained the core of interactions of collective people.

However, in the reform time, the adherences of peasants to land resources as well as collective organs definitely reduce, as Chapter Four notes. Peasants live on individual labour in present Yi village. And present village organs supply crucial public goods. The last corporate organ coinciding with lineage structure, villagers’ team, was also cancelled in mid-1990s. Later, lineage peasants do not depend on traditional projects for public goods any more.

In contrast, peasants still devote to lineage traditions, as the spreading phenomenon indicates. As I estimate, their disadvantages in formal village organs intensifies lineage organs to protect their interests. In another word, despite the loss of economic base of land, peasants still endeavor to protect their group “territory”

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 178 via lineage organs and cultural symbols. The new territory points to interests they deserve in village shareholding cooperative, based on land resources they have contributed. As a result, equal allocation of public goods and dividends of village is imperative. And the unequal ones are what peasants attempt to restrain via traditions of lineage.

Based on the pursuits of lineage survival, lineage impact on the mass population is discussed in the last section of this chapter.

2.1 Dragon boat race: mark cross-lineage hostility or friendship

Dragon boat race is corroborated interdependent with lineage structure (Potter

& Potter, 1990, p. 251–269). It authentically displays inter-lineage competitions and the intra-lineage solidarities at the same time via a symbolical route. In Yi Village, dragon boat race emerged earliest. It was nearly the end of the Cultural Revolution when dragon boat had been eradicated by the state for two decades. Some young men, including Uncle Rong, decided to restart this tradition regardless of local officials’ suppression, as soon as they learned from newspapers that Chinese Party

Secretary, Hua Guofeng, rowed a dragon boat in Beijing. This convention later quickly spread in neighborhoods.

Generally speaking, dragon boat race indicates the hostility among rival lineages. Potter (Potter & Potter, 1990, p. 251–269) has made wonderful descriptions about it. In southeastern China, failed peasant group faced many humiliations. In one race, two lineages almost clashed for their deserved rankings. In the race of reformed version in Yi village, every unit of former production team endeavors to win the race by supplying best sportsmen and raising sufficient funds. Peasants feel quite proud of native triumph when they talk about it.

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The fierce competition among lineages incurs cross-lineage ally. The inter- lineage coalition can favor the ones involved in the competition. In the Dragon boat

Festival of 2011, Yi village involved two contrast boat races. On the one side, a boat representing the whole village attended a race held by a friendly neighborhood,

Longyan village89. This cross-village race is formally hosted by village cadres.

Nonetheless, simultaneously, Liu lineage itself joined in an independent one organized by another two from neighborhood village, Guan and Zhang. Lius joyfully accepted the invitation. In fact, this is a long-term custom among the three. They often launch dragon boat together to parade their intimateness instead of rivalry. In

Yi village, Liu at least need to cope with the bulkier lineage Wu, though it is not clear whether lineages of Guan and Zhang have to contest with other ones in their own village of Huanglian. Besides, they also intensively back up each other in other occasions, especially at some vital festivals, despite dragon boat race. In the end, as local peasants know, lineage group of Liu, Guan and Zhang is far from the unique case in Pearl River Delta.

Dragon boat race always stimulates active participation of native members, while it is definitely attractive to none of rival lineages. In the common sense, dragon boat competition held at the Festival is a ritual for avoiding diseases of the coming summer. Despite this auspicious excuse, the wide participation of indigenous peasants enhances the solidarity of native lineage, and displays the strengths of that.

On June 6, 2011, the Dragon Boat Festival, the three-lineage boat race that Liu lineage participated began at about 3:00 p.m. Aloud noises from drum and firecrackers crossing the whole village intrigued me in the lodge. Numerous people,

89According to the following news, this is a conventional assembly of dragon boats for auspiciousness by a number of villages in Pearl River Delta, which lasted for more than 600 hundreds years. In 2011, there were 60 villages joined. See news: Sixty Sou Longzhou Huiju Shunde Dianjing (60 艘龙舟汇聚顺德点睛), Foshan Daily, June 5th, 2011 http://epaper.citygf.com/szb/html/2011-06/05/content_445604500.htm

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 180 no matter men or women, elders or children, crowded along the river at the center of their inhabitance to watch the foreplay of dragon boat race. The audience joked with, encouraged and cheered for athletes who are indigenous peasants. Lighted firecrackers were thrown into the river and exploded there, which is identified as the symbol to drive evil and disasters (Potter & Potter, 1990, p. 251–269). In the crowd, two elders, Uncle Rong and his younger brother, carried a box of bottle water from home and assigned them to crews. This is their extra donation to native team.

Nevertheless, there was little audience from other lineages. Though the dragon boat went through the pivotal bridge between Wus and Lius, few people of Wu came to watch the race. As a comparison, many migrant workers stopped at the river bank to have a look.

Intra-lineage solidarity is further promoted by celebrations after the boat competition. Villagers of Liu often stage popular dinners for race achievements. A mass banquet came into being on October 10, 1996, the National day after their participation in the dragon boat race of township. Lius ranked about 6th to 11th among 22 participants, and were rewarded with third-class prize. They got 6,500 yuan and a pennant. Due to this remarkable achievement, 113 tables were held.

There were more than 1,000 people present. In terms of local people, this was a rather memorial event. At the first time, the population attending the banquet went over 1,000. As a result, it was particularly marked as “Qian Ren Yan” (banquet of one thousand people).

Further, the investment into dragon boats also reflects coherence of constituents.

Traditional dragon boat costs a large quantity of money and is seldom used except a few festivals in a year. In 2011, the dragon boat of Liu was more than 20 meters in

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 181 length and 1 meter in width to load 38 oars in all90. As regards to the cost, a new dragon boat made of wood needs around 50 thousands yuan. In earlier 1990s, Liu lineage firstly ordered a dragon boat when no others did this. In 2009, another new boat was added. For this project, an announcement was posted out to call for the donation of followers in June. It announced that it was the consent to make a new boat, partly because of the old boat had already broken up, and partly because of a new dragon boat helped to carry forward their culture of dragon boat and show their inner solidarity. Based on villagers’ intense donation, the total budget became as high as 91,220 yuan plus 11,500 HK dollars. As a result, successful fund collection just demonstrates the solidarity of peasants.

Despite ethnic divisions is intensified, dragon boat race can also be utilized to produce harmony. The villager committee of Yi village has exerted dragon boat race of new style every second day after Lunar New Year. Started from 2001, this race replaces customarily long boat with the three-people cockle. It takes former production team as the unit, and allows each one to have four cockles in race. Since former production team implies to all lineages or sub-lineage branches, the minorities with diverse surnames and weak lineage organs in Dawosha also participate. In the past, lineage-based traditional race can exclude marginal people with few lineage organs in Dawosa. This new boat race attracts the considerable attention of inhabitants over the village. Every lineage or sub-lineage branch vigorously raised money via plural ways. For instance, Lius once purposively held a public banquet among members before the race and collected 20,600 yuan at that time.

90To propel the boat, every two of oars sat side by side while a motor standing in the middle and beating drum to encourage oars and control the pace.

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This reformed dragon boat race coincides with the purpose of solidifying villagers. Village cadres emphasize the identity to the entire village instead of any other sub-village components like natural village or lineages. This goal seems obtainable as the wide participation of peasants. Due to this new boat race, the authority of cadres, especially top leaders, become more acceptable amid native villagers. Perhaps, such good consequences are recognized by village cadres. From then on, the new race is fixed. And further, probably due to such flourishing new race, the traditional one seems fading. Until recently, there are merely three old- pattern boats in Yi village, two of which respectively belongs to villagers’ committee and Liu lineage

In fact, not only village cadres try to utilize this cultural channel, but also the new state authorities at the township, prefectural or provincial level all seeks for similar trade-offs with peasants via this old tradition. When governors of the

Guangzhou city still set economic goals in holding international dragon boat race, the township one more emphasize social solidarity and political legitimacy in its jurisdiction. The township government named Leliu once held a traditional boat race on October 1, 1996. On the National Day, many lineages were invited. In terms of township officials, their authorities get more compliance from peasants. As one of participants, Liu lineage held two popular banquets before and after this race to confirm their honorable participation and achievements.

In conclusion, such new customs exert far-reaching implications. When traditional boat race counts on lineage or sub-linage, the new one organized by village cadres surpasses such divisions. While village cadres seek for cross-lineage solidarities in the village scale, the state also do similarly. They endeavor to obtain the harmony with ethnic groups in much larger scope.

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2.2 Ancestral temple: alienating ethnic group to others

Reconstructed ancestral temple is directly in line with the recovery of lineage organizations. The first ancestral temple rebuilt is by Lius in 1999. The patri-lineal ancestral worship is core to lineage organization, but it is exclusive. It is hardly for the state or different lineages to use this cultural vehicle to establish compliance or peace.

The outlook, location as well as name of the temple clears exhibit the separation of lineages. In Tandong village of Liu lineage, Dazong Ci (The Chief Temple) which represent the whole lineage of Liu looks grandest in scale and best beautified. This temple comprises of three courtyards, the first of which has 3 rooms. The last one is decorated with sea shells on the wall to memory the old temple, which once all wore shell before the successful revolution of 1949. As a comparison, temples of sub- lineage branches look smaller and simpler in outside decoration. For instance, the third branch of Liu rebuilt its own temple in 2004, which consists of two courtyards and every yard only has one room. Next, the location of temples also shows the distinction between lineage and its branches. In Liu lineage, the sub-lineage temple locates in the territory occupied by the branch people, while the chief temple of the entire lineage inhabits in the center of the whole living residence. Furthermore, the inscribed board on top of the gate more directly tells the distinction among lineages, or the subordination of sub-lineage branches to the chief one. In Tandong village, the surname “Liu” is singly inset in the chief temple, as it is named Liu Shi Da Zong Ci

(Liu’s Chief Temple). But in terms of branch ones, the names of living residences are put before the surname of “Liu”. For example, the temple of the third branch is called Ne Village Liu Gong Ci (Liu’s temple of Ne Lane), and the one belonging to five branch is named Bi Tan Liu Gong Ci (Liu’s temple of Green Lake).

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The public assemblies held in ancestral temples subjects to lineage separations and strengthen that, no matter they are memorizing predecessors or not. The major public memorial takes place every Ching Ming Festival. In this day, lineage members who like to present, gather together in the morning and take bus to the cemetery in a hill far away. Plentiful items for this memorial are prepared, such as firecrackers, flowers, fruits, wine, a toast pig, etc. Besides, mass banquets in the temple are always held after the sacrifice. In 2011, Lius even staged that twice. 13 tables were arranged in the lunch, and another 20 tables were settled at the subsequent night. The second popular project held in ancestral temples is Jing Lao

Yan (the banquet to respect elders). In the Chief Temple of Lius, all elders over 60 are qualified to these banquets. During 2000s, this popular program is done at least one time a year, though there is no fixed time or regular frequency. The third one relative to ancestral temple is the popular gamble, which rises up in recent years.

Based on the name of ancestors, public gambles are sometimes organized in the

Chinese New Year. Despite public entertainment in the festival, certain income is collected for the temple maintenance. Lasting 11 days of 2007, this item raised more than 13,000 yuan. During 6 days of 2011, this income increased to 16,830 yuan.

Money for temple programs is raised in accordance with lineage structure. In the name of ancestors, lineage funds are not only collected in temples, but also obey their rank. In Liu lineage, donations primarily go to the chief temple. As regards to fund raisings of branch temples, they are much lower in frequency and standard. It is not due to the less population or income of the branch, but because of the hierarchy between the chief and subordinate one. This is justified by the dual donations of some members: they simultaneously offer money to the chief and branch temples according to tacit amounts. As it is noted in Table 11, the former is much higher than

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 185 the latter, no matter the aggregation or average. In Ching Ming Festival of 2001, two temples receive offerings in Liu lineage: the chief one and the branch one of Ne

Lane. The details of offering are noted in the following Table 11:

Table 11: The comparison between chief and branch temples in offerings

The chief temple Temple of Ne Lane

Criteria of sacrifice 50 yuan per adult; 30 yuan None

per child; 9,900 yuan

collected

Criteria of donations Lowest: 100 yuan No more than 100 yuan

Highest: 2, 000 yuan

Number of donators 11 people，4 of which 9 people

overlaps with the one

donating Ne Lane

Number of donations 2, 030 yuan 780 yuan

Expenditures on sacrifices 13 items 2 items

Popular banquets 33 tables, cost 8, 950 yuan None

Above symbols and ceremonies of ancestral temples strengthen traditional beliefs of lineage, in which some backward limitations have further been adjusted.

Old ideas about gender relations disintegrate in the reform era. The agnatic organ never counts on the solo principal of offspring multiplying. Instead, methods of adoption and son-in-law were widely seen before the revolution (Freedman, 1966).

And it is remains not rare nowadays in Yi village. Some male migrants marry into families only bearing daughters. For example, a youth named Laoli, which comes from Guangxi province, married with a local girl of Wu lineage. And another local

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 186 aunt called Ajiao of Liu lineage had two sons-in-law. She lives together with daughters in the same three-floor building. In brief, more and more peasants put similar emphasis to affinity relationships or personal network by copying the consanguinity relationship (Yang & Liu, 2000)91.

Moreover, paternal lineages reduce the restrictions on females in temple activities. Held in the chief temple and based on common ancestors, the public banquets of Yi village permit women to join, despite the criteria of age (generally more than 55 or 60). For the constant state rectification on property inheritance 92, gender relations here are more equalized in reform time. In Maoist period, Uncle

Yuan of Wu part entirely inherited legacies of his parents on the ground that his three sisters preferred to rich their only brother. As a comparison, the young cadre of

Brother Long, born around 1985, explicitly understands his older sister is eligible to equally share fathers’ money in terms of inheritance law.

At last, since branch temples cover very limited constituents, they may decline if their economic power or population shrinks. In pre-revolutionary time, weak lineages easily failed to build branch temples with respect to fewer descendent or economic incompetence (Freedman, 1966). In Liu lineage, 8 branches once respectively constructed 8 temples. Later, two collapsed down as they bore no off- springs while another incapable two merely made small shrines respectively. In the reform stage, the one of green lake seems little sacrificed. When I arrived in the

Tandong village after the Ching Ming Festival of 2011, income and expenditure of the festival had been announced in the chief and Ne Lane temples. Written in ink on a large piece of red paper, the notice is conventionally put up next to the temple door.

91Personal network refers to the clusters of people base on friendship, deference and other informal bonds. See Steffen W. Schmidt etc.(Guasti, Landé, & Scott, 1977). 92According to Rule Nine, Chapter Two, People's Republic of China Law of inheritance published in August 4th, 1985, both male and female has the equal right in property inheritance.

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It is normally kept until next popular item. In contrast, there was no red paper or even the trace of paper seen in the one of Green Lake.

However, the major obstruction towards ancestral temples derives from the state. Local lineage always faced the objection of the state in its cross-region alliance before successful revolution, though it fostered lineage traditions at the beginning

(Freedman, 1958, p.1-18; Yang et al, 2000). Since the reform of 1978, the state forbiddance remains, as I heard from the field work. It is clearly stated in Tan Dong

Cun Da Shi Ji Lue (the record of major events of Tandong village). During the event of Wu Fang Ci Chong Jian Luo Chen Qing Dian (The celebration for the completion of reconstruction of five-branch temple) in 2003, it is said that (people) use cement in the top of the building to disguise it, due to the prohibition of upper governments.

In general, wood and tile are used, which looks quite distinguishable to attract top- down inspections. Moreover, for the similar reason, the inscribed board was also hung on two years later after the completion. This situation resembles in another temple of Ne Lane. It pretended to be the locus of residents’ entertainment in its renovation of 2005. Rather than typical memorial tablets of ancestors, it is equipped with one table-tennis table and two Majong tables. Further, many lineages or lineage branches erect no ancestral temple at all. Xi Qin Lou (auspicious hall) is widely adopted as the substitute of ancestral temples. Most lineage branches of Wu do not restore ancestral temples yet. Though the hall always locates in the address of former temple, the substitution looks crude. Most of which is bald without any remarks or extra decorations, and their utility seems dull. This real estate is set for public and private banquets. If individuals plan to hold a feast for marriage or birthday party, they could rent the hall. Therefore, the hall is popularly devised like a restaurant. It provides a capacious site and imperative requisites like electricity and water, and

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 188 charges very little. To alleviate the cost of ordinary peasants, the charges embody little more than the one of electricity and water. As a comparison, one branch of Wus,

Anlong, has newly established a typical big temple. It seems a precautionary item.

There is no sign in the outlook yet. And the main gate is locked, while the side one is open with an old man guarding on a chair behind a desk. When I came close, the man just vigilantly stared at the stranger.

As a comparison, village cadres show more coherence to lineage groups.

When the ne temple of Liu was completed, villagers’ committee sponsored table- tennis and majong tables beside of some money, despite gifts of cross-lineage friends.

As it is mentioned in last paragraph, it was the disguise to overcome the state prohibition. When temple rebuilding is compelled to be more secret later, village cadres prefer to ignore it, though they no longer exert celebrations. Both Lius and

Wus have respectively reconstructed one ancestral temple. For this topic, I merely heard about the regrets of village cadres about Maoist destruction on ancestral temples of his lineage. Born in 1985, Brother Long still gets familiar with details of ancestral faiths in Maoist time and even earlier.

In sum, programs of ancestral temples engender harsh interactions with outside world. While dragon boat race simply reveals inner solidarity, the worship of common ancestors directly claims exclusive interests. Thus lineage organs and symbols are pressed by the state, which emphasizes collective land ownership in the rural area. As a comparison, village cadres keep peace with lineages. They after all live in the agnatic kinship fabric. Similar as other peasants, they also believe in common ancestors and need to follow common interests of native lineage, despite their role as state agents.

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2.3 Religious temple: conciliatory to others

Unlike ancestral rituals objected by the state, the recurring religious temples are prosperous, and faced with little state interference. Religious temple recovered in late 1980s, which was later than dragon boat but earlier than religious temple. In contrast to depressed ancestral temples, every villager’s team seems having at least one deity temple in accordance with their folk religions. Religious rituals appear so comprehensive that public assemblies always go across-lineage or conciliate the state.

Religious temples respect lineage structure due to their disciples live into separate lineage groups. At first, just like the chief ancestral temple, every lineage recognizes its paramount religious temple. Wu lineage offers Yue Bei Niang Niang

(the lunar deity), while Lius and Ruans believe Kang Da Zhen Jun (a deity who alive was a general in the distant dynasty of Song). Meanwhile, in terms of the branch religious temples, every one distinctly respects its own deities, despite the lunar one.

There are 7 villagers’ teams covering 13 branches of Wu, which invite 9 deities in scattering temples (see Figure 7). Every administrative team (one or more sub- lineage branches combined) erects its deity temple, two of which respectively builds up two. These deities are believed to conduct distinct supernatural powers, such as richness, health, safety, exorcizing disease and evil, etc. They reflect the diverse but comprehensive faiths in Taosim, Buddaism and folktales. Nevertheless, every deity is said working universally in the whole cosmos. Though peasants respectively invite different deities in their own temple, they believe theirs universally bless all human beings and even living things.

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Figure 7: The auspicious tablet popular in Wu’s people

Notes of Figure 7: There are nine deities in this large tablet, which is rather popularly seen at followers’ home. From left to right: Hui Fu (A fairy takes charge of child-birth), Hua Tuo (the god similar as Asclepius, who alive was an outstanding doctor), Yue Bei Niang Niang (the lunar goddess), Tian Hou (Mazu, the god of seamen, travelers, businessmen, etc.), Guan Shi Yin (Kwan-yin Boddhisattva), Xuan

Tian (the god of the north who fight against evils), Guan Sheng (The god of war), Yi

Ling (another god like Asclepius), and Cai Shen (the god of fortune).

In contrast to offering deities in distinct temples, Wu people believe in the nine deities together at home. This home offering thus surpasses the limits of temples. As

Picture 1 notes, those nine deities are jointly put in the same tablet. It is said that almost ninety percent families of Wu lineage invite one in their main house.

Here the celebration for the birthday of the lunar deity is a typical case to elaborate how religious temples promote the associations of peasants. The temple of

Luna Goddess locates in Xin Nan village of Wu lineage. In the divine birthday,

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 191 lineage members from other branches also come to present sacrifice and donate money. When the mass feast and Cantonese opera opens, they have the meal and watch the play together. On April 15, 2011, the vast feast entertained over than one hundred of tables in the square next to the Luna temple. At the side, the temporary stage for opera performance was also built. Thus, villagers appreciated their favorite

Cantonese opera when they enjoyed the lavish dinner. The opera exhibition normally lasted for three nights.

Those ample feast, opera as well as ceremonious sacrifices reflect the firm devotions of native members. During that day, followers lit the straight incense, bowed to the deity sculpture and inserted the incense into burner. Despite a big burner in front of the principal hall and a smaller one inside, many self-made burners with incenses were placed along the lane due to the crowd around the temple.

Simultaneously, many women individually burned hell money along the road, and a handful of incense towers were hung on the ceiling of the side hall. Three Taoists were paid to help religious rites. Wore Taoism costume, they kept playing the drum and cymbal all the night. When opera actors who came to salute the deity before the opera beginning, they were guided by those Taoists. In addition, this sophisticated ritual also contain many other symbols like small hills made of streamed buns, roasts, steamed chickens, flowers, fruits, and ceremonious clothes.

Due to the comprehensiveness of religious rituals, lineage hostility gets relieved.

At the fixed auspicious day of each deity, the divine temple receives amounts of sacrifices and donations from people of native as well as contending lineages.

Financial notices on the shrine wall corroborate the conciliation of religious rituals.

In the assembly in lunar temple of Wus, one person of Liu presented a hill of streamed bun, while another villager of Ruan did the same thing. Besides, it was said

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 192 two persons of Liu offered 200 yuan, and two Ruan people sacrificed 20 yuan for ceremonious clothes. Moreover, more people from Liu, Ruan and Liang donated money for lamp oil. And the similar case happens in Liu’s celebration. Another notice about the birthday celebration of Liu’s deity, Kang Da Zhen Jun, says that many donations for lamp oil come from Wu and Liang. The largest number in the list of donation is 10,000 yuan, which comes from an entrepreneur of Wu. As a result, these mutual sacrifices in divine rituals promote the unity among lineages.

Another characteristic of divine rituals is the salient significance of women.

During the feast for the Luna deity of 2011, women were not only actively in salutation, but also helped to conduct the whole ritual. They seemed more enthusiastic than males. A group of aged women prepared divine items by folding paper into gold-ingot tower, looked after the bun hill as well as other sacrifices, such as flowers, fruits and meats. Moreover, women seemed quite devout in rites like burning hell money, or praying to the joss. Besides, many women directly devoted themselves to the pubic ritual. Three women from Xin Nan branch took charge of feast subscriptions. In another divine birthday assemble for Hua Guang (a fairy who is believed to eliminate demons), Bei Nan village of Wu, some female elders took responsibility for money donation. Since the donation continued to the start of mass banquet, they just stayed in the temple to look after donation boxes for late prayers.

And they similarly charged of maintaining sacrifices like flowers, fruits, incense and oil burning. An in Liu lineage, several female cashiers managed all trivial expenditures. In sum, religious rituals promote more female participation than ancestral rituals.

Religious rituals also involve the state, though it is in a metaphysical way. As a historical study about self-governance on water conservancy of South China notes,

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 193 religious rituals were often hosted by state authorities (Zheng, 1995). Despite the real intervention in some crucial occasions like water management, the state also impacts religious dogmas. It is demonstrated by the couplet put on two sides of the temple door. For example, the one of Liu’s temple says: Xin Di Guang Ming Tian Jun You

Zhu, Shuai Xing Xian Yue Min Wu Jie Kang93. It means their faith is upright and pure-minded, and the deity dominating the entire cosmos also blesses the secular world and ensures the prosperity of all living things. As the inferior authority in the mortal world, the state gets patronization of the divine power. However, this coincidence of divine rituals to the state looks tacit rather than explicit. For instance, in the temple celebration of 1997 of Lius, the increase of money raised was attributed to the progress of macro political and economic trends 94:

It is a time of Hong Kong’s unification, over which the whole country rejoices.

During the first month of the Hong Kong recurrence, the state is stable, the economy keeps developing, and the mass continues their peaceful life. For those reasons, adherents turn to be more passionate in attendance and more eagerly to donate money. As a result, the money collected reaches to over 63,400 yuan and 2,100 HK dollars this year, which is much more than 50,000 yuan a year before.

In fact, such assignment of auspiciousness to the nation is not rare found in the local record. And it explicitly tells the coordination between local religions with the state.

In terms of village cadres, they attend religious assemblies as similar as ordinary peasants. As I note, religious programs always limit to divisions of lineages or sub-lineage branches. It produces two consequences: cadres of Yi village may participate into religious activities, but seldom lead that. They always stand for the

93 It is said in Chinese characters as following: 心地光明天君有主，帅星显跃民物皆康。 94 Tan Dong Cun Da Shi Ji (Record of Major Events of Tandong)

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 194 aggregation of the overall village rather than any part of it. They may also go to the assemblies as a member of their own lineage, but they should better not host any traditional assemblies. In my speculation, once they interrupt into one lineage assembly, they need to satisfy all others. As I observed in the feast of lunar temple of

2011, the village cadre of Brother Long indeed attended the ritual with his family.

But he did nothing else except burning incenses and subscribed one table (a way of fund raising).

To sum up, religious assemblies promote inter-lineage coordination, or the one between lineages and the state, based on their comprehensive faith. They can accept the state and rivalry groups as pursuits at the cosmos level. Therefore, peasants can get harmony with rival lineages, or concert with state authorities. In particular, the resurgence of religious temples faces with little state intervention, though their harmony with the state is much spiritual. Further, village cadres also treat religious activities, which just like ordinary peasants. They respectively follow the faith of native group.

2.4 Discussions

Recycling traditions reflect the efforts that peasants concert relations with other groups, village cadres or the state, to protect their territory and ultimately group interests. Though former territory have blurred, as land is amalgamated by collective entities, lineage organs sustain as the mass dependence on collective organs is vulnerable. Diverse lineage organs are purposively restored to preclude potential harms in village organs, as my speculations reveal. It can be testified in the story at the beginning of this chapter. The open blame is on Uncle Yuan rather than village cadres, when their welfare deriving from team (lineage) land is harmed. As the team head of Lius, Uncle Yuan was chosen by some lineage fellows to protect group

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 195 interests, as he said. Thus, it is reasonable that Uncle Yuan gets rebuked, because peasants never expect village cadres of other lineages can well look after their interests.

Lineage activities also verify such functions. Dragon boat race is held to flaunt group solidarities to deter other lineages. Such function is further displayed in the race of cross-lineage allies. When it is maneuvered by the state and village cadres, lineage interests can acquire top-down ratification, though village cadres or the state also obtain more obedience.

As a comparison, ancestral worship suffers the state repression in light of its exclusive goals in land territory. The state exerts alternative organs and interests in the countryside, which are collective entities based on collective land system. As alienated counterparts, ancestral beliefs and exercises therefore seem intolerable.

Nonetheless, religious assemblies get rid of narrower economic pursuits of group territory and interests from that. Followers insist that auspicious things cover both native lineage and others, though other ones meditatively enjoy divine blessings as lineage or branch boarders. As a result, they rarely have state interrupts, or disagreements of village cadres.

It hardly distinguishes the impact of lineage programs to the mass participation.

The reason is the complicated relations among lineages. While lineages confront each other via dragon boat race and ancestral worship, they are also compatible in the religious domain. Since lineage corporate definitely fights for exclusive land territory, the public participation at the village level may fall into conflicts among groups, and is limited in effects. In religious assemblies, this confrontation cannot be entirely eliminated, even if some cross-lineage harmony based on universal faiths is fostered.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 196

In the standpoint of the state, it applies distinct strategies to deal with diverse lineage activities. The state tends to encourage the dragon boat race, and little interrupt religious temples. And it clearly opposes ancestral temples. As a result, the public participation of lineage corporate via state routes is ambiguous.

Finally, village cadres seem friendly to lineage traditions, and even learn from them. Initiatives of new dragon boat race let them be more popular. And they also admit or even support ancestral projects. In addition, no matter believers or not, they also tolerate the popular religions instead of disturbing them.

3. Membership in Lineage Allies: The Equity of Ethnic Group

Lineage organs focus on the survival of native ethnic group, its effects on public participation is vague. Lineage activities look sophisticated but pursuits of three segments is unambiguous: ethnic territory and group interests from that.

However, their impact on rural public participation is uncertain yet. Lineage programs can realize either inter-lineage hostility or conciliation, coincide with or confront the state. They hardly tell to enhance or deteriorate the mass participation.

In detail, segments of dragon boat race and ancestral assemblies intensify lineage rivalries, and so hamper the mass participation. As a comparison, the fragment of religious assemblies causes some cross-lineage conciliation, which improves the popular participation.

However, the influence of lineage do not limit to its sophisticated connections to outside world. In fact, the inner membership of lineages also refers to the mass participation. Led by the definition of Faure on lineage (Faure, 2007), this study discovers the membership of lineage organs is dissimilar to the one of collective economy. In collective entities, based on collective membership, peasants attain the equal distribution of benefits. As a comparison, equivalent distribution of lineage

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 197 benefits is feebly conducted, and equal usage was also seldom exerted in lineage land. In the pre-revolution era, more lineages just provided land to the poor to ensure their subsistence. In the case of Yi village, the lease price was lower than the one in the market. Meanwhile, more lineages put the land in the market for higher rent, which invoked quite unequal land use among indigenous members. Generally, lineages either circulated the control of land properties among constituents to let them enjoy the income as well as take charge of public affairs in turn (Freedman,

1958, p. 73–76). Or they first trusted one or more native convincible men with the common land for an effective management, and later collected and divided land rent among components in return (Liu, 1992; Ye & Zhou, 2007). No matter in which way, lineage distribution was possibly unequal as the income was rather unstable.

Traditional agriculture embodies a risk of unstable output as changeable weather, backward technology, etc. Further, despite land use and benefit allocation, lineage organs also endeavor to support public goods. In a long term, lineage corporate was the main supplier of local welfare. Altogether, according to preferences of peasants, the equivalence is not ensured in benefit distribution and land use in lineages.

Meanwhile, public goods are emphasized in lineage expenses. Based on these unique characteristics, lineage membership actually meets the criteria of equity, in contrast with egalitarianism of collective organs. Literally, “equity” means to be fair and reasonable. In this study, it refers to the fair and reasonable disposal of common properties or interests among lineage members.

Inherent to lineage corporate, equitable membership is extensively practiced.

The following analysis test how equity is maintained in intra-lineage relations. After that, this part illuminates why it enhances the participation of peasants into public affairs, no matter in lineage domains or formal village locus.

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3.1 Dedicated commissions of lineage unions

To effectively operate organizations, traditional programs around dragon boat, ancestral and religious programs all need skillful management. Thus the popular should select experts or skillful people and endow them the duty of management. In

Yi village, the selection of agents in various rituals is testified fair and reasonable.

Whenever there is a traditional public assembly, peasants prefer to trust publicly known professionals full with relative skills. To achieve good scores in dragon boat race, amounts of money should be raised in time, necessary items like drinks and firecracker should be prepared, and whether/how to hold celebration feasts also should be arranged beforehand. Thus, in each unit of former production team or lineage, a special account is purposively established. Attached to it, an extra person is always delegated as the account keeper. In Liu lineage, Uncle Yuan is the agent, while Weiwen works for Ruans. Also learned from the announcement on the wall of lunar temple, Xin Nan branch of Wus collect donations for the program of boat race, though there is no statement about the people in charge.

And, when large-scaled pubic events occur, such as the mass feast for dragon boat race, a temporary commission is further entrusted. This is a group of native inhabitants selected in terms of several criteria: Firstly, most of them are old males, which have widespread reputation in personal characters. They are normally respected or trusted even in daily lives. Secondly, they all have extraordinarily plentiful experiences on rituals, and control extensive knowledge about traditional things in particular, such as the lunar calendar, the pedigree of lineage or clan, old- styled sacrifices for ancestors or deities. Ultimately and most importantly, volunteers compose of the committee. Normally, the committee is consisted of about ten people, which work voluntarily by being paid not so much, and receiving a few stretched

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 199 economic or political favors. This is a job very honorable rather than profitable. In terms of the temple committee of Kang Da Zhen Jun (Liu’s religious temple), nine agents retired from it are rewarded 30 yuan per capita, as the account posted on the wall told in 2011. And the total reward to incumbent ones is merely as low as 480 yuan. Surely, these volunteers can claim some reimbursements during their service, such as the expenses in the restaurants during the celebration for the deity birthday of

2011. As the notice said, their meals cost 3, 950 yuan in five days. If ten people are counted, every meal was paid 400 yuan, the mean expenditure in that place. In practice, the solo exception of higher economic return is to account keeper. The open notice clearly declared that 1,250 yuan was given to three cashiers who had served religious and ancestral temples last year. And sometimes, account keepers can gain extra salaries for their temporary inputs. In 2001, Uncle Wen helped Lius’ religious banquets for 6 days, thus he obtained 200 yuan.

These organs run provisionally, as above evidences show. When rituals come in a regular time, they are prior arranged. When public assemblies finished, they are dissolved, leaving several account keepers to tackle the public funds. But, they are definitely self-organized entities involving the mass. It is important to investigate its relations with village cadres. Based on the case of Yi village, ordinary peasants are proved dominating the traditional organs.

Not absolutely precluded, cadres seldom compose of volunteers. However, in the realm of villagers’ team, team heads always take the lead of lineage projects. In

Yi village, villagers’ teams now are composed of lineage or sub-lineage branch, or the combination of several branches of the same lineage. Thus, team leaders coincide with lineage members. Based on my field work, such traditional projects become the main schedules of team heads. In the annual rituals for Kang Da Zhen Jun (Liu’s

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 200 deity), Uncle Yuan, as the head of Tandong team of Liu lineage, has been one of the chief people in charge for many years. The similar situation appears in Bei Nan

(north-south) team of Wus. As the primary agent, Brother Pei took part in the temporary lineage commission of his territory. He has ten collaborators there. He paid three or four days in preparing the birthday celebration of Hua Guang (a fairy with three eyes to confront demons) in 2011. He was the leader in the commission, and so concerned numerous items. For example, he contacted the Opera troupe for the three-day performance, and contracted with a restaurant for the evening banquet.

In that evening, he also gave a short speech to all participants before the opera began.

In these instances, team heads seldom interrupt traditional union in light of their ruined power in shareholding cooperative era. Since the adjustment of shareholding cooperatives in 1997, cadres of villager teams are deprived of economic independence and the function of governing also shrinks. The latest arrangement of village cadres in Yi village in 2011 illustrates that all leaders of nine villagers’ team stay out of the rank of village cadres. As the officials of villagers’ committee and other formal village entities, they are simply hired and keep distance to the political power. Generally, they need to bridge formal village organs and the mass. For example, he distributes official will from the top, and collect the mass opinions from the bottom. Besides, he needs to have the working conference if major tasks of village committee proceed, such as birth control, conscription, fishpond reallocation, etc. As a comparison, their role to lineage rituals of the formal duties does not conflict with the one in formal locus. In fact, the participation of team heads still counts on their personal prestige and professional knowledge. They can much easier attain the trust of fellows as their formal positions. And their experiences of tackling public affairs cultivated in formal organs further endow them capacities in

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 201 constructing lineage coalitions. Brother Pei is an example by serving the sacred assemblies. He is fresh but already gets familiar to these responsibilities since he takes over the position of team head for about two years.

In sum, lineage commissions realize the equity among members. The sincere heart and professional background is considered superior to political status or private wealth. Those commissioners are commonly regarded devout to public affairs of native lineage, and their expertise and personal morality are also reliable. They are apart from pre-revolution gentries, the local elites occupying lineage organs to control land management and public affairs of rural lineages (Ye & Zhou, 2007).

And the volunteerism of commissioners can be testified by their low repayments.

Their economic rewards are so small that they are simply an honorable thing.

Altogether, lineage members faced little economic exploitations or political ruling of village cadres. Further, the selection of trustees also most depends on public opinions.

Divergent from direct selection or popular voting, it still coincides with wills of the mass. As a retired high school teacher, Uncle Rong of Liu lineage had taken over keys of the chief temple and the branch one of Ne Lane for many years. Meanwhile, he was also the account cashier of elder banquets and ancestor worship. But, until recently, he had to give up managing chief temple, and hand over the public accounts.

He was annoyed by humors of corruption despite his overdue “resignation”. The slander that he gains personal advantages from the public money provokes much grievance of his. Added his age (born in 1940s), he decided to load off the duties and transfer them to the youth.

3.2 Wide supervision

Aside of management, the durative supervision of lineage members also impact agents. It begins in the phase of preparation. Regular lineage assemblies refer to

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 202 massive preparations beforehand. Agents need to have meetings in advance to deliberate the coming affairs and divide the work. During this period, their bargain would entirely leak to the popular. Later, the detailed plan is often announced publicly much early to the day of assembly. Those lineage issues incorporate two parts: First, the routine segment. Regular lineage assemblies consist of recycling customs, which are familiar to the popular, as the commissioners and ordinary peasants told. For example, Uncle Pei spent three or four days in contacting food suppliers, opera troupe, manipulating table subscriptions, notifying the mass, etc.

Despite his personal capacity, those events all routinely exercised for many years.

Second, the breaking fragment. Lineage sometimes encounters abnormal instances.

For example, in the combination of land in mid-1990s, Uncle Yuan stood for the team head and ultimately succeeded. As an industrialist before, he jointly contracted a bulky brick-kiln outside and just returned to the village in 1994. Since the team account of Liu was about to be amalgamated, some zealous fellows looked for him to be the head. To protect the interests of native group, he finally decided to afford such duty after many negotiations. This case seems different from traditional lineage activities, because it belongs to the formal village affairs. However, enlightened by this case, the general avenue to cope with sudden changes is more explicit. The general mode of rural popular resistance, which is consisted of leaders, active followers, and major bystanders (Guo, 2001), is properly applicable here. It is sometimes the way by which lineage members tackling abnormal events: only some passionate members take the action for lineage benefits. Nonetheless, their actions are actually in accordance with the widespread feelings and ideas.

During lineage assemblies, peasants can directly supervise organizers. Work divisions among volunteers also help to conduct the mass supervision. In the

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 203 committee, there is little power hierarchy clinging to the work division. Their job is assigned via common discussions. Thereafter, every one independently takes charge of his section, and seldom commands others or vice versa. They just follow the common decisions, and take responsibility for that. For instance, in the hua temple celebration of Bei Nan team of 2011, two old women took care of the donation box, while several others sat behind one table outside to receive money. The money put into the box was counted without the name of donators. It was different from the one conducted outside, which had written down the names of donators. Those old women just exerted distinct duties. As a result, peasants can directly observe the performance of volunteers due to the plain work division.

At last, the method of public notice enables the mass supervision more precise.

Generally, all income and expenditure of lineage activities are detailed recorded, and published after the event. It is also a customary deed. A large piece of red paper is applied to make the notice. Full of exact information of particular or general accounts, it is published in the heart of lineage or sub-lineage branch inhabitance.

Thus every lineage villager can watch it conveniently. Through this notice, peasants can be precisely aware of results of their volunteers.

To sum up, the mass supervision protects the equitable membership in lineage benefits. It is firstly achieved among the volunteers through equal work division.

Secondly, peasants ensure the accountability of voluntary agents in lineage assets by referring to routine works, direct observation, and open notice. Based on these channels, they can subject voluntary agents to lineage interests. However, such supervision is vague in effects. Since lineage is self-attained, which almost counts on the volunteerism in the organization, formal regulations of laws are out of work. And customary constraints are still vague except the one of public notice. For these

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 204 frustrations, peasants in Yi village frequently rely on more special vehicles like public condemnation or rumors. For instance, one member of Liu lineage was publicly blamed for a bridge paved without permission. To save the cost of new house in proceeding, the family targeted temporarily built a bridge to transport construction materials. It was once tacitly viable. But the bridge sustained too much longer than it was supposed to be. To stop that, an anonymous letter on a red paper was published similarly as other notices in June of 2011. It openly accused the family involved of randomly paving bridge on the public river for two years. Some fierce diseases had been invoked thereafter, as it said. It also admonished the object to sow virtue and not induce extreme outrage of the mass. In the end, it appealed to the team head to implement the demolishment of the bridge in ten days. Mentioning other situations of blocking the traffic, the anonymous man also urged the team leader to take actions. This condemning letter takes the superiority of public traffic as the excuse, and clearly shows the severe opposition of the popular, albeit it is secret. And it indeed worked out the bridge problem several days later after the poster was soon tore apart by someone unknown too. Further, in terms of the impact of rumors, the retreat of Uncle Rong from the committee can corroborate how they work, as it is noted before (section 3.1 of this chapter).

3.3 Effective mobilization

Lineage programs definitely interested constituents and relevant people. In the dragon boat competition, villagers of native or friendly lineages like to attend. As it is noted in section 2.1 of this chapter, crowds of Lius participated into the Dragon

Boat Festival of 2011. People swarmed into the river banks, or stood on buildings along the river. Fireworks continually exploded for about an hour during the prelude of race. As the neighborhood side by side, the west part of Tanyi village, some

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 205 audience from Ruan lineage also showed up to have a look. In the cadre-host boat race of 2011, the river running across the whole village attracted amounts of people, no matter the start or the end, as official photos display.

More direct participation occurs in shrines for deities and ancestors. The mass feast in ancestral worship normally contains about 30 tables, while the one for deity birthday celebrations now often go over 100 tables. Since lineage rituals such as ancestral temple are still restricted by the state, the comprehensiveness of divine faiths, more people attend divine assemblies.

Meanwhile, lineage programs involve extensive outliers. In lineage assemblies, outliers from alien lineage or village can join into the public feast through the invitation of indigenous members. It is a remarkable honor to those involved. In the dragon boat race of Lius in 2011, some villagers of Yi village attended the popular banquet hosted by Liu’s allies in neighborhood village. As the rivalry to Liu, parents of Sister Xi of Wu lineage went there. They and other relatives got the invitation of their daughter who married there. Similar situations appear in mass banquets of ancestral and religious temples. While offering to the deity is open to outliers, at it is explained earlier, the banquet also allows them to join via the invitation. In contrast to the honor, those which want to be present but not can become rather frustrated. In

May of 2011, talking about the celebration for lunar temple of Wu lineage, one village cadre with surname of Liang felt outrage. While Uncle Yuan, the team leader of Liu lineage, said that merely native components attend the divine celebration,

Uncle Bai of villagers committee resentfully told me that he preferred not to go even if he had been invited. The lineage with surname Liang is one of the minorities, which is inferior in village politics. The invitation is also noticed in lineage branch assemblies. In the banquet for the deity of Hua Guang of Bei Nan village in 2011, I

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 206 was invited by Brother Pei. Just before that, I met two accountants in the shareholding cooperative office of Yi Village. They and Brother Pei belong to the same lineage. In the past, they seemed close to Brother Pei, and so I asked them to go or not. Sister Xi said she had no time because she needed to pick up her son after school, and Uncle Yuan, the cashier, hesitatively told me that they cannot join unless they were invited.

The participation of outliers also incorporates some emigrants. Far away and moved out in a long term, many emigrants still keep tight contact with hometown.

They zealously donate money to lineage projects, especially compatriots in Hong

Kong. In Liu lineage, the kang temple raised 2,100 HK dollars. And until the end of

2010, it owns 31,120 HK dollars, despite the RMB part. In addition, the construction of new dragon boat again received 11,500 HK dollars. In 1990s, when most peasants had limited money for lineage affairs, emigrants in Hong Kong hugely support the improvement of local infrastructure. In particular, an elder who kept single in Hong

Kong donated his entire legacy to hometown. He had already sent money back for many times in the past. Moved by his devotion, Liu people established a pavilion to commemorate him at the center park.

To sum up, the mobilization of lineage organs is effective in light of the participation of lineage members, people of alien lineages or the one which has moved away. And this is another requisite of lineage membership. In the reform era, lineage relies on the donation of followers, because they lose land properties, as it is noted at the beginning of Chapter two. Without sufficient mobilization of followers, common assets come from nowhere.

However, the mass mobilization faces with inequalities among components.

Peasants explicitly bring in their economic differentiations during lineage assemblies.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 207

According to local villagers, personal “face” is important in the public locus. They possibly want to earn more reputation, despite normal expectations on private wealth or other mortal things like health. Thus they may like to compete in the sacrifice, donation or feast. In practice, lineage organs encourage the competition amid the rich to raise more funds and entertain the public. Surely, they attain reputations and blessings from the mass by joining into specially devised programs. In the popular banquet of lunar temple of 2011, five strings of auspicious firecracker were set for open bidding. One cost a rich man as much as 4,980 yuan. And similarly important, competitive bidding turned to be the live show of that night. Over a thousand people watched the entertainment, and appreciated the one obtaining firecrackers. As a comparison, the more regular method is the price of banquet table. The price is purposively fixed higher than the one in the market to engender surplus. Table subscription always proceeds very early, because not all capable peasants incline to subscribe. Still in the assembly of the lunar deity, Uncle Yuan donated 100 yuan for the opera performance but did not book any table, which needed 318 yuan per one.

Further, during that assembly, every part all received donations from the rich. In the opera program, three businessmen offered 13,888 yuan, the largest one in all donations. Even in the small item of divine clothes (burned for the deity), the difference between the rich and poor also exists. While the biggest donation is as high as 680 yuan, the smallest one is 5 yuan. In short, people accept economic inequalities among lineage organs as the rich contribute more to the public assets, though the latter also acquire personal fame. This also coincides with the principal of equity rather than equivalence.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 208

3.4 Fair allocation

The allocation of lineage properties ultimately and directly indicates the functions of lineage alliances. Primary cost is produced in lineage assemblies and the maintenance of fixed properties. Generally speaking, the dragon boat, ancestral temple, and auspicious hall cost little for the daily maintenance. They can endure a long time without any repairs. In fact, both dragon boat and ancestral temples are rarely used except several regular festivals in a year. Otherwise, as I observed, they are locked for preservation in normal times. The auspicious hall gets more used, but which depends on the choice of peasants. Since more peasants become rich and prefer formal restaurant, the usage of hall also probably decreases. As a comparison, the religious temple keeps open to the followers. The incense tower or oil lamp also lights every day. In another word, it needs daily guarding and cleaning. Therefore, many religious temples in Yi village have one or two elders for the daily maintenance. For example, the kang temple of Lius has one cleaner and one safeguard. As a comparison, the hua temple of Bei Nan village of Wus is much smaller in scale and number of disciples. Since it merely saved around 10,000 yuan after the deity birthday of 2011, it hardly gets special cares in ordinary times.

Next, lineage organs invest much money to local public goods. Take Liu lineage as the instance. The first one is the education fund. It is given the name of lineage deity, Kang General. Lineage offspring who have remarkable achievements in the end of middle and high school can be rewarded. Passing the exams for good- quality high schools or universities is proudly emphasized. To make this reward looks more serious and fair, the family using back door to get ideal results is excluded. And the reward actually incorporates emigrants of native ethnic group.

Their children outside of hometown are also eligible for the reward if they contribute

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 209 to local lineage. The amount of rewards is not very large, but remains considerable to ordinary families (see Table 12)

Table 12: The education fund of Liu lineage

Level of exam Good school and universities Reward

Up to campus National paramount colleges 2,000- 10,000 yuan

( 12 ones are designated)

Provincial key colleges 1,200-1,500 yuan

(student should achieve the state

primary line of college entrance exam)

Normal colleges with formal letter of 500-1,200 yuan

admission (The secondary line is

1,000-1,200 yuan; the

third line is 800 yuan; the

fourth line is 500 yuan)

Up to high Municipal schools 500-600 yuan school

Up to middle Municipal schools 600-1000 yuan school The township school of Le Liu 500 yuan

Notes of Table 12: This temple fund has rewarded 32 students in ten years of

1999-2008. Those students have their names, father or mother, rewards, results of exam and levels of achievements recorded as “major events” of Liu lineage.

This lineage project had adjusted to two changes later. The first one derives from new education fund set by village cadres. Village program rewards all students going to colleges without restrictions on lineage or achievements. It thus overlaps with the one of Lius. Added the rapid enlargement of campus enrollments leading to

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 210 the quick growth of lineage students in the university, the expenditure of Lius gets more difficult. Hence, this lineage program no longer rewards students who merely achieve the primary line of the national exam for college, nor the worse ones. And it also reduces the money for students up to middle or high school, though the criteria sustains. In October of 2008, the second adjustment further reduced the money for middle school students. Middle school students who neither pass the prefecture exam nor the county one are not qualified for the reward anymore.

Furthermore, temple funds of Liu lineage also endeavor to relieve followers in case of the death or disease. In terms of elders’ death, the divine temple normally sends 1000 yuan in each case. And as regards to the instance of hospitalization, temple representatives bring 300 yuan to the patient. In the lunar year before my field work, there were four relief expenditures: three for death and one for the illness.

To reach above goals, lineage accounts often support each other. For example,

Ruan lineage inhabiting in Tanxi village combines the account of dragon boat race with the one of ancestral worship. Until August 10 of 2011, the new asset balance is

38,010 yuan (see Table 13).

Table 13: the asset balance of Ruan lineage of 2011

Last balance 47,169.2

yuan

- Expense for dragon boat race95 6,143 yuan

- Money donation for this worship 3,740 yuan

- Outlays on diverse sacrifices for worship 6,755 yuan

Credit balance 38,010.2

yuan

95It is the one hosted by village cadres of Yi village.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 211

The combination of lineage accounts resembles in Liu lineage. The kang temple is taken as the total account there. Money collected from dragon boat race as well as elder feast is also put in. As those two projects, there was 9,150 yuan saved in last year of lunar calendar.

Moreover, lineage assets once integrated with the formal one of villagers’ team in use. As it is noted in chapter five, based on HRS and subsequently spurious shareholding cooperatives in Yi village, villagers’ team of Lius owned collective properties and established independent account until 1996. Despite the adjustments of shareholding cooperative system in 1996, a section of collective surplus is still held by Tandong. That is the income from farmland conversion before 1996.

According to Uncle Yuan, the head of Tandong team, this part is named as “Gong Ye

Ji Jin” (industry fund). It was normally used to pay for public goods. And for many times, it was once used to supplement the accounts of dragon boat race, ancestral worship and public feast, according to the words of Uncle Yuan. This is contrast to the team of Tanxi. Ruan people never allow formal village account to merge with the one of lineage traditions. And reversely, the traditional assets also complement the formal ones. In 1994-1996, four cement roads were built in Liu’s territory. This project costs very much. Despite formal team accounts and the appropriation of Yi village committee, a variety of donations were raised from lineage members, no matter native and abroad. When the program was finished, more than 40,000 yuan was left. Since the account of team had been already eradicated in that period, this residual is thus amalgamated with the account of lineage feast.

In conclusion, the allocation of lineage benefits also corroborates equitable membership of components. As a comparison with equal allocation of collective entities, the use of lineage assets more concentrates into public goods for the ethnic

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 212 group. In fact, most money is consumed by the mass assemblies themselves and several other public funds. This is a fair assignment to components: they commonly share lineage assets, or have the equal chance to exercises lineage entitlements if they decide to do. In practice, only a small portion of members do that. The funds for education or relief provide rigid evidences.

The equitable membership can be further examined in the disposal of lineage assets. Peasants directly call lineage assets as “gong chan” (common properties).

Normally, in terms of the immobile part, it is addressed in two ways: First, some are commonly shared or publicly utilized, such as the ancestral temple. Restored the original outlook, the chief ancestral temple of Wu lineage is modified as the entertainment center of elders. It was changed into the primary school of Yi village in Maoist time. When other collective assets are gradually privatized in the reform era, this building is retained for publicly use. Second, some are equally entitled to individuals for private use if entitlements are conducted. In Liu territory, many longan trees are planted by the lineage along two sides of the village river. They produce considerable fruits every year. In the summer, an open bidding for fruits is organized in the group. Given the equal chance of competition, every constituent can seize fruits of one tree or more by paying the community if he likes. Uncle Wen contracted a tree near his gate in 2011. He felt satisfied with respect to the fruitful tree and the proper price.

And in terms of the current assets of lineage, the use of lineage assets is still equitable. Temple funds loan some money to native constituents. It is widely seen that elites often occupy more common resources than normal members in the lineage(Potter & Potter, 1990).In Liu Lineage, the lineage commission also lent some money to pursue some interests in 2004. Nearly 240,000 yuan was supplied to

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 213 an indigenous entrepreneur who runs a factory. And in 2009 and 2010, another two local farmers respectively borrowed 30,000 and 40,000 yuan. The rate of above loans is moderate. It was set as 1% per month, which is lower than normal one of 1.5% in the market. Due to capital is also a kind of scarce resource in the countryside, the use of lineage loans seems causing some inequalities amid members. Nonetheless, this inequality is secondary. Rather dissimilar to the critical impact of land to rural livelihoods in the past, the influence of capital was always inferior. Since peasants turn to family labour instead of capital for livelihoods nowadays, the results of unequal utilization of lineage assets remains smaller.

3.5 Discussions

Focusing on the membership of lineage organs, this part illuminates the practice of equity by peasants. The substantial proofs root in devotional volunteers, wide supervision, effective mobilization and fair allocation. In contrast to pre- revolutionary lineage organs, money donations consist of corporate base now. The intra-lineage relations are fundamentally altered. In a long run, both elites and the popular counted on land (agriculture) for livelihoods. Even lineage coalition attempted to realize equity amid constituents, elites still expropriated more in land use and benefit allocation (Potter & Potter, 1990). As a comparison, the distinct economic basis lessens the dependence of peasants, no matter elites or the popular.

The common assets of lineage groups are rather finite in scale, and so does the benefits distributed. They secondarily help rural families, due to individual labour and the collective expenditures are more lighting. Nonetheless, reshaped lineage economy enables unprecedented aspirations on the equity regardless of its small magnitude. Since the minimal usurpation on lineage benefits by elites, the equitable membership is attainable. In practice, peasants indeed keep the common share of

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 214 some lineage assets like temples and dragon boats. Moreover, they also have the equal chance in privately using common properties or getting benefits distributed, in so far as pre-conditions are satisfied.

4. Implications of Lineage Corporate

Lineage corporate continues to serve the survival of ethnic groups in the reform period. They keep generating local public goods via lineage funds and assemblies in Yi village. Compared with old-style lineages before socialist revolution, lineage members no longer count on common land, but ethnic structure expressed in lineage corporate never declines. It is still the basis of social interactions of rural everyday life.

However, lineage assemblies hardly reveal they improve the public participation into formal village affairs or not. Religious assemblies may promote public participation by allying lineages, but ancestral associations explicitly hinder that by producing inter-lineage hostility. .

Instead, lineage membership indeed enhances rural public participation.

Reviving lineages uphold equity among members in various aspects, including selecting and supervising passionate volunteers, effective mobilization and fair benefit allocation. As a result, they at least realize the public participation into informal ethnic affairs. And they accomplish it in an equitable way.

Based on equity, lineage organs can further promote the participation into formal affairs. The key originates from routine programs of lineages. As it is noted at the beginning of this chapter, lineage organs focus on three kinds of assemblies

(dragon boat race, religious birthday, ancestral worship), which are held in fixed time and places every year. The annual repetition of such lineage programs actually

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 215 let peasants to get familiar with trusting and monitoring agents, mobilize and distribute peasants in the fair and reasonable mode.

Resurgent lineages exert the function of training, by which peasants learn the proper way to address public affairs. It produces two consequences: on the one hand, they educate peasants about ideas of imperativeness and rightness of mass participation. During lineage activities, peasants at least look after their common properties and benefits from that. They actually care more than that, as the scandal of bridge in Liu lineage shows. Lineage things like environmental outlook as well as smooth traffic also worry peasants. Thus, lineage organs cultivate the consciousness of participation. Meanwhile, peasants are taught the appropriate criteria of participation. In the exercise of equitable membership, they get aware of how to recruit volunteers, clearly divide work, widely supervise agents and mobilize constituents and people related. And they also understand the righteous distribution of common benefits. In short, they can apply these principals of equitable membership into village affairs if possible.

On the other hand, lineage organs also provide distinguishably effective organization resources to peasants for collective actions. Among all informal self- organizations, lineage uniquely represents the agnatic corporate. Based on the kinship fabric, there are some alternative organizations, such as the extended family.

Lineage seems the spontaneous outcome of inhabitants living together, but extended family essentially is the intentional alliance of families via ties of blood, geographical reasons or marriage. None of common ancestors or deities is offered there. As a comparison, lineage is a community built on common faiths, if extended family is regarded as an interest group. Yet lineage is a popular tradition lasting in a long history, as Faure (2007) elaborates, it can still render the public participation

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 216 better nowadays. The reason roots in the morality. Those recycling assemblies approximately exhibit the notion of ritual. As it is explicated before, ritual refers to the most robust morality regularly occurring. In other situations, the strength of morality is minor. Based on the familiarly moral organizations, peasants are capable of immediately addressing village affairs, if it is necessary. In brief, normally enclosed by village cadres, formal village organs as well as collective economic corporate can be replaced by lineage ones if formal ones are crippled.

In the stance of village cadres or above state authorities, they are clearly reminded by potential lineage strengths. To prevent the eruption of lineage, they prefer to cautiously treat with lineage force. The first example refers to the compromise of village cadres in building shareholding cooperative.. When land cooperative was initiated in Yi village, there were de facto nine in all, which separately belonged to nine villager teams. Since they still respected boundaries of lineage or lineage branches, they are often regarded as “fake” compared with the

“true” one at administrative village level (Tomba, 2012). Nonetheless, in my opinion, this stage justified that village cadres were incapable to integrate peasants together, which naturally prior emphasized their small group interests.

In 1996, the combination of nine shareholding cooperatives was smoothly finished on the grounds of trade-offs among cadres at two levels of administrative village and villager groups. However, this plan met discontents of the second and third lineages of Lius and Rurans. During that time, Uncle Chang, which hosted the program as the new village leader, had to pay a lot of time to conciliate Lius and

Ruans by offering some extra deals, as I heard. This situation again reminds the strengths of lineages in shaping village land cooperative.

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Another story of the turmoil of voltage transformer that elaborates the power of peasants in lineage further involves the state. The state enterprise of electricity at the township level has already planned to renew a transformer in Liu’s territory since

2008. But it is continuously disagreed in Liu people. In September of 2011, the enterprise enforced the construction, which again was impeded by local peasants. To tackle the open clash, the enterprise then looked for the help of village cadres. Many peasants were invited to cadres’ office to make a compromise. Peasants insisted that the new transformer should not be close to their religious temple. Otherwise, nearby families are seriously hurt in light of its excessive radiation. This principal was yet not accepted by the state unit as their too high cost. As a result, the transformer plan has to be infinitely postponed. During this process, the state enterprise impossibly counts on the compulsion in interacting with lineage members.

Lastly, I want to cite another village of Guangdong province, Wukan, as the evidence. It confirms the hidden power of marginal and dispersive lineage corporate and peasants’ rituals. Famous of the mass protest and armed confrontation in late

2011 (the Siege of Wukan)96, Wukan has plentiful similarities with Yi village: a large population (approximately 13,000 in Wukan), the developed collective and household economy97, large investments into public infrastructure, an “example” village in the local place, and top village leaders in charge for more than twenty years. Most importantly, Wukan also conducts large-scale non-agricultural conversion of farmland, which falls into the control of village heads. Being

96http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wukan_protests, last read on 2013/3/28 97The economic statistics of Wukan village: annually collective income of three million yuan from renting real properties, contracting intertidal zone, and high-profit agriculture. A large portion of peasants earns off-farm income, including logistics, clothing, and marine fishing. Over twenty million yuan in all have been invested into public infrastructure. http://baike.baidu.com/view/7094017.htm, last read in 2013/3/28

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 218 dissimilar to village cadres of Yi village, they excessively usurp benefits from land conversion, and arouse the enormous resentment of peasants. The most surprised phenomenon is peasants unite together across 47 lineages to clash with several village cadres, local government and riot police. Based on the inter-lineage coalition, thousands peasants, especially the youth of 1980s and 1990s, participated and finally won the resistance.

The Wukan event indicates the instance of peasants conflicting with cadres occupying village organs and abusing positional power. Peasants can establish autonomous union across lineage borders. As I find in this chapter, peasants just respectively get trained in their own lineage corporate in the usual. They learn to equitably deal with public benefits there, which looks irrelative to land issues or village administrative power in most of the time. So far as village cadres reach an extremely low grade in the accountability, collective movement of peasants may be triggered to protect equal allocation through lineage alliance.

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Chapter Seven - Discussions and Conclusions

Continuous Collective Egalitarianism and Its Embeddedness

1. Consistent Collective Egalitarianism

My work focuses on the question of why collective egalitarianism continues in the shareholding cooperative era. Two variables have been revealed important before my research: rural livelihood with insufficient non-agricultural employment, and household land use replacing the past collective one. However, egalitarianism continues in the new period of shareholding cooperative, which involves advanced off-farm opportunities, and the shrinking population in farming. Thus my study examines why equivalence in collective corporate endures regardless of extensive variances in peasant livelihood or land property rights.

The approach of social relations can fix my suspect, as it is noted in Section 2 of chapter two. Alternatives to economic efficiency are prepared by the far-reaching dimension of social relations. It surpasses the mechanical vision on human economic actions, no matter utilitarian or over-socialized one. All economic performance has its embeddedness at three levels: goals of social actors, on-going social relations and social interactions underlying economic institutions. Led by this distinct approach, the sustainability of collective egalitarianism is available for falsification, because former two variables exactly match with the first two levels of embeddedness. What

I need to do is much simpler: compare the two in a historical continuum. Further, social interactions beneath shareholding cooperative system are my research priority.

In the HRS era, collective egalitarianism is exercised through periodical land readjustment. As it is noted in section 1 of chapter two, village cadres can conduct land reallocation when peasants are faced with too much demographical pressure. In

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Yi village, cadres extra implement bidding in the land redistribution. Anyway, it is peasants rather than village cadres directing land disposal. In shareholding cooperative era, cadres capture the discretion on land issues. Thus it is intriguing that how ordinary peasants maintain equalities of land benefits regardless of cadres’ discretion. As some studies reveal (Sheng & Wang, 2005), collective equality needs the mass bolster against diverse challenges. For me, the explicit factor of village cadre-peasant relations is imperative in crystallizing the latest maintenance of collective egalitarianism. Hence, the concept of public participation is introduced.

Here I simplifies the public participation into (the mass) “express ideas and get influential”. If the participation of peasants is ineffective, egalitarianism runs problematic, as I believe.

2. Changeable Embeddedness

Based on the case of Yi village, the embededness of collective egalitarianism is successfully corroborated. In Yi village, collective egalitarianism indeed continues.

Identical with the general image of shareholding cooperatives in equal allocation, the

Yi village one also equally distributes corporate benefits among peasants, such as equal dividend. However, collective egalitarianism of shareholding cooperatives has renewed its embeddedness, as I show in three analytical chapters:

Firstly, the dependence of peasants on collective corporate has changed. The former dependence on land use has declined, due to peasants leave off farming.

Peasants gradually establish new livelihood out of agriculture. In a long term of traditional agriculture, peasants live on it for basic subsistence. Thus in Maoist time, they extremely need food grains allocated by village corporate. But during the market-orient reform, peasants chase non-agricultural opportunities, based on their devotion to improve livelihood. Peasants becoming workers merely took about two

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 221 decades in Yi village and its neighbors. The new economic optimality of labour overuse has been established: on the one hand, the significance is explicit to peasants in non-agricultural department; on the other hand, they prefer to exhaust it for most rewards. Obviously, the proceeding non-agricultural department unstably renders payments yet.

Irrespective of the fragile performance, the diversification of peasant economy is unstoppable. Its three-decade evolution is robust enough to help to clarify the falling dependence of peasants on collective corporate. Contrast with past dependence of food grains or land use (as section 1 of chapter two notes), the new one adapts to the renovated peasant livelihood, which is the labour use. Peasants need to alleviate their insecurity of labour use. Rural employers little afford their duty here, so does the state in public insurances. But the developed corporate of Yi village gives rise to effective programs of social security, if not sufficient. Pension, medical insurances and subsidies are covered.

The public welfare in collective corporate of Yi village indicates a new kind of collective egalitarianism. As a collective pattern of non-agricultural land conversion, shareholding cooperative concentrates land disposal by stripping peasants of it. Though the central government endows such a right to individual peasants, grass-roots cadres make their jurisdiction exceptional in the implementation. Therefore, cooperatives can get income for the assignment via security programs, etc.

In addition, market effects are needed to be mentioned. It indeed augments the prices of labour and land. It stimulates peasants to enter into non-agricultural sector, and also render profitable land use occupied by the rich. In the market environment, most ordinary peasants who already become workers hardly access to reframed land

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 222 use any more. Even the fragile non-development section in remuneration, or the unfair treatment to workers in labour security, is not newly seen. The uniqueness of such market-led economic development is the mediation of collective corporate.

Based on collective ownership, peasants’ actions differentiate from the one of atomized individuals. They have collective corporate to rely for economic reliefs, albeit they need to constrain their agents (village cadres) first.

Secondly, in contrast to advantages of village cadres, the public participation of peasants into village organs is deficient, especially in shareholding cooperative. In terms of regular village organs like the party branch and villager’s committee, village cadres gain top-down political and administrative power. Though village is the grass-roots unit for self-governance, the state still controls political power there, and delegate village cadres to conduct policies. Further, even in the place of self- governance, such as villager’s election, public voting or party members’ assembly, peasants’ strength also seems vague. Their amount of public assemblies is quite limited, and the agenda of such mass activities is also blurred. At last, peasants contribute secondarily in terms of the economic basis for village administration.

Village cadres can strive for funds appropriated from above, or take use of collective assets like TVEs. Based on the usage of collective economic resources, or the entitlements of collective welfare, fees charged by village cadres keeps waning with respect to peasants give up farming for free non-agricultural employment in the market.

Cadres controlling village organs survived in grass-roots political reform.

And the worse is they often use their positional power to plunder public interests.

Their political and administrative power stems from relations between the central government and grass-roots cadres. As the meditation between the state and peasants,

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 223 political power and administrative duties of village cadres are guaranteed.

Simultaneously, due to collective ownership, their control of collective economic corporate also abides. In general, public economic corporate should constrain the privatization of public assets by agents, in which positional power is easily abused.

But just like the widespread privatization conducted in other villages, collective corporate in Yi village also suffers from the misuse of cadre’s positional power.

TVEs and shareholding cooperative have corroborated that village cadres deliberately enclose collective corporate for private interests. Peasants are excluded from such corporate, no matter in decision-makings, income and allocation, or surveillance. As a result, equal allocation seems frustrated in the place of unaccountable village cadres.

To supplement my previous findings on cadre-peasant relations in chapter five, some new evidence is added here to demonstrate social interactions of the two.

Generally, the outrage of peasants stems from unfair land appropriation or a heavy tax burden (before it was entirely cancelled in 2006) (Guo, 2001). In particular, peasants are often insulted by their disadvantages in the farmland development, which is they cannot share the benefits. In Yi village, equal distribution is a top concern of peasants in assessing the performance of village cadres. As many of informal chats with groups of peasants show, Tandong people were keenly dissatisfied about unaccountability of village cadres. Public opinions on the private income of village cadres are so sensitive that some village cadres have to stay very cautious. As the successor of the party secretary, Brother Long always parked his black Toyota behind the village courtyard to let it inconspicuous. As he explained, he just took public opinions into account. In practice, the car at least cost over than

100 thousands yuan, which seemed unaffordable for a young cadre who was merely

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 224 in position for five years. If the car was stopped in front of the gate of village office, peasants may backbite how much he corrupted, contrast to the face-to-face closeness.

Though cadres of Yi village specially endeavor to establish trust among peasants, their efforts seem ineffective. To mitigate the rage of members, village cadres made a brochure to publicize the achievements last year and the personnel change after a newly villagers’ election. I read it in a banquet of a local family. It was devised like a newspaper, and beautifully printed. Its title named “bridge” immediately caught my interests. As I estimate, it displays an intention to lessen the gap between village cadres and peasants. And the host also agreed with my speculation. Besides, village cadres also informed peasants through open financial statements. There are notice-boards around the office courtyard, in which monthly or seasonal financial statements are posted. These statements refer to rather detailed information about the income and expense of village organs, including the shareholding cooperative. Those scattering financial statements are often compiled together and submit to individual household in the end of a year. However, such efforts hardly offset they purposively preventing peasants from participating into village organs (including shareholding cooperatives), as it is clarified in section 4 of chapter five.

Thirdly, regardless of the frustrated formal village avenues, peasants have their participation flourishing in lineage organs. Through such traditional routes, the public participation may supplement the one in the formal locus. In Yi village, reviving lineage allies promote the participation of peasants by matching with the moral nature of peasants: they are moral practitioners. Based on paternal kinship, this self-organized corporate enable peasants to practice beliefs about ancestors or deities, despite material pursuits of the survival of ethnic group.

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Instead of the spiritual or material goals of lineage activities, their procedures engender the effective public participation of peasants. Peasants seek to live native ethnic group by holding dragon boat races, ancestral or religious temples. In terms of inter-lineage or lineage-state relations, one may conciliate with another group (or the state) in the religious festivals, and simultaneously clash with it in ancestral offerings.

In practice, these three elements of lineage union respectively take their own duties, and concurrently take effect. In this sense, they hardly suggest whether lineage organs orient the mass participation, irrespective of the target at ethnic interests signed by group territory.

Nonetheless, lineage definitely improves the public participation in light of its equitable membership. It is a long-term tradition that lineage corporate equitably allocates the use of common properties and other benefits to members, in comparison with the accurate equal distribution in post-revolution collective corporate. Literally, it refers to a fair and reasonable treatment to each follower. And in the practice, it means every member has the chance to access to lineage entitlements, based on some qualifications like age. Eligible members could exercise their share, though most give up. After all, lineage programs are often meager in capital, which is almost consumed up by several regular lineage assemblies. The rest is assigned to repair lineage real properties and bolster elders.

As my study reveals, equitable membership is indeed respected in resurgent lineage organs. Peasants of Yi village prudently address lineage activities, which involves human resources, financial accounts, decision-makings, implementations and supervision. The skillful delegates for the management, the transparent account, effective mobilization, and fair allocation among peasants all unfold the principal of equity.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 226

Though traditional associations are small in the scale of common goods, or the magnitude of common assets, they realize far-reaching achievements in mass participation. The periodic cycle of crucial lineage assemblies, which can be termed as rituals, is a process of education. Believers are repeatedly trained to cope with public affairs in an equitable style. As one of the training effects, peasants get familiar with the consciousness of equity on public interests. Moreover, peasants also establish their organizational resources in terms of public assemblies. Despite traditional values on ancestors or local deities, and restricted times of popular assemblies in a year, the volunteerism lineage organs still provide alternative routes to peasants to participate into public matters.

Based on findings of chapter six about lineage allies, the maintenance of collective egalitarianism in the shareholding cooperative seems less ambiguous to me. Through the channel of lineage organs, peasants jointly frame shareholding cooperative regardless of the impact of the state and village cadres. Along with some fresh proofs as following, the influence of peasants living in patrilineal kinship is clear. At the beginning of shareholding cooperative in 1994, four units sat in accordance with territory divisions of three main lineages and their sub-branches, though geographical convenience was also counted. Later in 1997, the cooperative combination encountered the discontent of two minor lineages of Liu and Ruan, due to the reallocation of ration land hampering their welfare.

Furthermore, peasants also collaboratively impact decision-makings of village organs, including the economic distribution in the shareholding cooperative.

Significant village affairs, such as arrangement of leading cadres, still call for the assemblies of villager representatives or party members, although routine agendas more fall into the discretion of village cadres. For example, to deal with top-down

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 227 administrative tasks like birth control, village cadres need to transmit state decrees to peasants first, and collect public opinions from them later. Heads of nine villager’s team consist of the mediator between ordinary peasants and top village cadres.

In addition, in terms of benefit distribution, village cadres need to take peasants into account. In Yi village, cadres endeavor to produce public goods like public insurances and poverty reliefs. The basic subsistence of the old, disabled, sick or poor villagers hence is better secured. These cadres are explicitly aware of the importance of those collective projects. They depicted it as “min xin gong cheng”

(programs to win the popular support). Both the incumbent leader Uncle Wu, and his future successor Brother Long, devote themselves to this mission.

3. Theoretical Implications of Yi Village-Based Case Study

The case of Yi village has demonstrated that collective egalitarianism evolves in the coordination with economic efficiency. It helps clarify ambiguous collective ownership in organizing land conversion by ensuing equal share of all members. As pointed in Tomba’s study (2012) in Guangdong province: to effectively transfer land in the market for the vast profit, peasants need to set up collective organizations on the basis of collective ownership. In this organization process, equal allocation is exactly one of the de facto pre-requisites of effective land conversion. In my findings, this organizational change more depends on top-down administrative power, which is opposite to the perception of Tomba (2012). The central government, local authorities, and village cadres reinforce land shareholding cooperative from the beginning to now. But I also agree with Tomba’s research (2012) that peasants shape the new land corporate by negotiating with the state in details of implementation.

They firstly asked for independent land shareholding cooperatives, which were realized during 1994-1996. And in the combination of those cooperatives forced by

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 228 village cadres, many peasants of secondary lineages also showed discontent. In fact, peasants not only configure the contour of land corporate, but also determine the principal of equal distribution. Any inequalities, no matter caused by upper state authorities, village cadres, hamlets or individual members, would definitely be stroke by peasants together (Tomba, 2012). This also has been supported my findings that discussed in chapter five and six. In this functional perspective that collective land conversion needs equal allocation to settle organizational problem, collective egalitarianism indeed goes in accordance with economic efficiency, at least in rural land market with an industrialized environment.

Collective egalitarianism in land shareholding cooperative is deeply embedded into a long cultural tradition of rural South China. Since 14th century, lineage corporate actually constructs long-term common assets and interests in some certain territory by believing in common ancestors with ritual complex of temple, genealogy, tomb, public feast, etc (Faure and Siu, 2006). Rituals instead of contracts basically support this common property institution. Equal allocation is intrinsically pursued in such traditional corporate (Faure and Siu, 2006). My case study on how lineage corporate impacts the formal collective one thus modifies theories of state-peasant relations by probing into the cultural dimension of peasant’s power. Normally, the state is emphasized while the power of peasants is rarely considered in social sciences. Against the dominant state, peasants sometimes arealso capable to amend state expectations according to their own visions and interests at the grass-roots level

(Kelliher, 1992). This view about peasants’ power agrees with neither totalitarianism nor pluralism in state-society relations (Perry, 1994),. Interactive relations between state apparatuses and the society are more worth exploring in social inquiries than any single force (either statist or societal). Led by this perspective, the power

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 229 ofpeasants are better elaborated, e.g. the dynamical interactions between state and society in rural China (Shue, 1990), the cultural perspective regardless of ordinarily economic- or political- dimensions (Siu, 1990); popular resistance of post-reform

China (Perry & Selden, 2003), or grass-roots political reform (Perry & Goldman,

2007).

Agreeing with this theoretical mode, nonetheless, my study concrete unfolds how lineage corporate improves peasants’ power. In Yi village, traditional lineage organs seem fragile and peripheral at the first glance. They never access to land resources any longer after the collectivization in 1950s. However, as the self- organized economic corporate based on patrilineal kinship, they unite peasants for ethnic interests. And more important, equitable membership of traditional alliances can improve the participation of peasants. Based on the cycling lineage assemblies, peasants get aware of the criteria of proper participation, and learn how to participate.

This characteristic of traditional allies is valuable with respect to the frustrated participation in formal village organs.

Stimulating peasants to participate into public affairs, lineage corporate and its norm of equity also complement the discussions of peasants’ resistance: in particular, the finding that merely some individuals (informal leaders and radical followers) endeavor to fight against unfair land appropriation by local governments

(Guo, 2001) is supplemented here. The coordination of individual peasants is proved attainable in some circumstance like Pearl River Delta. And in general, the universal resistance mode also gets more evidences. In regard to thresholds of popular union transcending boarders of gender, ethnicity and so on towards intra-region or intra- category collective movements (Perry & Selden, 2003), lineage assemblies exemplify that peasants possibly coordinate with each other in the basis of ancestral

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 230 beliefs. Unlike any open collective resistance, this is a quiet one. No matter normal collective resistance defying laws, nor the rightful resistance in line with laws, they all open actions with explicit goals of resistance. However, restoring lineage corporately directly orients resistance. Usually, peasants merely deter any factors harming ethnic survival through many rituals like dragon boat competition.

And, in terms of dynamics underlying grass-roots democracy (such as village election), interactions of diverse political participants is usually concerned(Oi &

Rozelle, 2000). My study uniquely finds lineage corporate enhance it too. Peasants can augment their power in public affairs via the cultural route of lineage; the more intense lineage allies, the more rigidly deterring village cadres.

Finally, this study also contributes to the sweeping opinions about national democracy: national democracy should match with private ownership, atomized individuals, universally civil and political entitlements, etc. According to these pervasive assumptions, lineage corporate is inappropriately to promote democracy with regards to their patriarchal kinship structure. However, as I discussed in chapter six, peasants probably adapt to the national democracy by accustoming to the principal of equity. They potentially could surpass different ethnic boarders to establish the cross-lineage agreement. In an environment of authoritarian party state, lineages can remedy the limited national democracy by encouraging rural public participation in an equitable style.

4. Achievements and Limitations of This Single Case Study

This case study has verified why collective egalitarianism sustains in the shareholding cooperative period. Other than the theoretical contributions, based on the same findings, some methodological achievements are revealed in the following section. In the end, some shortcomings of my research are also discussed.

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4.1 The accomplishment of causality

First, my research deductively extends theories of the embeddedness of collective equal allocation to the distinct case of Yi village. The causal relations linking three independent variables of peasants’ livelihood, land property rights, and social interactions between village cadres and peasants in the public participation to the targeted variable of embeddedness are clear. The fundamental causality among them has already been laid down in the theoretical discussions of social relations by

Granovetter, as it is noted in section 2.2 of chapter two.

Second, my study follows the key point of historical comparison by tracing the evolution of embeddedness of collective egalitarianism. Variances of peasants’ economic goals, varying social relations, and social interactions underlying the embeddedness are focused upon. Since causality in qualitative research refers to complicated non-linear effects and sophisticated mechanisms, this historical analysis actually involves a lasting dialogue between theory and data. In another word, data analysis is conducted with theoretical guidance, and later, the empirical proofs reversely falsify existed theories.

The first variable of livelihood implies to peasants income, in which land use occupies the major portion in a long run. Since the non-agricultural income turns to be the priority, peasants also renew their economic strategies towards labour use.

Accompanying with the transformation of peasants’ livelihood, the market-led redistribution of land use also occurs. In the latter situation, the adjustments of land disposal right also take effect. Collective corporate, and actually village cadres, control land conversion now. In terms of the third level of the embededness of collective egalitarianism, the public participation of peasants also transits over time.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 232

They confront the political and administrative power of village cadres and its transition, their control on collective corporate, and their inhibition to popular participation. It seems these obstacles from village cadres sustain regardless of rural political-economic reforms. However, peasants have their vehicles for resistance.

The revitalizing lineage traditions, which represent another historical phenomenon, help peasants to exercise the participation into public interests. The equitable membership matters most. It fosters their inclinations to cope with public affairs in an equitable way.

4.2 The accomplishment of generalization

My research also achieves generalization. Since inference is the core pursuit of all case studies, the speculation of the embeddedness of collective egalitarianism is indeed accomplished for the falsification. The first inference is about peasants’ new livelihood. The scarce off-farm employment has let peasants bound to agricultural land use. Since HRS endows an open access to current and future constituents, frequent land adjustments are caused, which hurt the efficiency of land use. Yi village and its rural economic diversification expressed through shareholding cooperative give rise to abundant data for further falsification.

The second inference about land property rights refers to its new system of shareholding cooperative. At the beginning of my field work, Yi village intrigues me by its outstanding performance on shareholding cooperative. It is regarded as a model of this aspect by the township government and neighborhood villages. The changed distribution of land use as well as the concentration of land disposal right is observed. These updated changes indicate another variance of the embeddedness of shareholding cooperative.

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My last inference about social interactions between peasants and village cadres focus on the public participation of peasants. In comparison with peasants realizing collective egalitarianism by controlling most land disposals and dominating periodic land reallocation in the past, they faced with harsher situation in shareholding cooperative era. The comparison between formal village corporate and the traditional lineage one sufficiently test peasants’ participation.

In these falsifications in three aspects, I uniquely emphasize the third one of peasants’ participation. The generalization of this case study also relies on the third factor of cadre-peasant relations. Village organs are compared with the traditional lineage corporate to point out the failure of Yi village in the public participation in formal village land corporate. Unlike Lily Tsai (2002, 2011) emphasizes how informal associations of peasants supplement the formal one in producing public goods, this study instead focuses on how the two impact peasants’ power. Through examining peasants’ participation in collective organs and lineage corporate, peasants’ power is disclosed.

However, this study agrees with Lily Tsai (2002, 2011) that informal lineage corporate is far to be sufficient, no matter in providing public goods or augmenting peasants’ power. Since in Yi village cadres give an extraordinary performance in producing land interests and peasants actively restore their lineage corporate, collective egalitarianism seems most likely implemented there. But actually, Yi village still frustrates in peasants’ participation in formal village organs. Thus I make such a generalization:

In any industrialized or rich village similar to Yi village, peasants still need more channels to participate and balance cadre’s power to better maintain

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 234 egalitarianism, though they may attain some power like they do in Yi village through lineage corporate.

In a nutshell, I don’t think lineage associations enable peasants effectively to balance village cadres’ power, not to mention the one of the state. To better protect collective egalitarianism, peasants need to increase their power in more ways.

4.3 Possible improvements of my research in the future

Since this is a single-case study focusing on Yi village, the first limitation is the number of cases. As the discussion about inferences notes, the research would be more completed if other like Wukan were added. The more critical shortcoming of the quantity of cases refers to regional factors, however. Pearl River Delta is unique in China. Its social and economic context is even unique to other parts of Guangdong province. In terms of updated land use and the importance of collective corporate, the method of typology can be used to formulate a prospect at least covering four extremes (see Table 14)

Table 14: The possible patterns of collective egalitarianism

Non-agricultural land use

Developed Underdeveloped

Importance of High Pearl River Delta, like North China villages Collective Yi village Corporate Low Yangtze River Delta Rest villages

As Table 14 suggests: First, despite land is still used for traditional agriculture, the shareholding cooperative is adopted in North China, as Po (2008) has revealed.

Whereas such land use is thin in profit, the combined manipulation of shareholding

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 235 cooperative generates income small in magnitude. Since peasants have rich off-farm employment, shareholding cooperative and egalitarian allocation matters little.

Second, non-agricultural land conversion is prosperous, but village cadres are either incapable of or dislike taking the shareholding cooperative. Thus, they let private businessmen conduct land conversion and earn the profits through shareholding cooperative, which actually is private shareholding enterprise. As a result, collective corporate and its egalitarianism no longer work in the Yangtze

River Delta (Po, 2008).

Third, despite the pattern in Pearl River Delta, the last one implies to villages with insufficient off-farm opportunities, and their arable land is rarely put in market.

In this circumstance, peasants continue to depend on household farming for subsistence without underdeveloped collective corporate. If collective land is about to be appropriated by the state, or converted by village cadres, peasants may lose their main means of making a living.

Moreover, with regard to the variable of rural mass participation, lineage traditions also vary across regions. There are at least three types of kinship fabric in

China: First, the vigorously recurring lineage, which entirely restores elements like temples and public rituals. Yi village in Pearl River Delta is an example. Second, one village accommodates one dominant group with the same surname, but takes frail lineage association. The outlier symbols of lineage were uprooted, and lineage assemblies are also given up since Maoist decades. Thus, peasants scantly harness lineage organs, though they live in the same kinship group. At last, one village accommodates a variety of groups with distinct surnames, none of which handles the top-ranking position. Since they match each other in strength, the coalition or competition among ethnic groups is definitely complicated.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 236

Another limitation of my inquiry is the lack of statistical data. In chapter four, concrete data on rural livelihood was missed in the field work. There should be some families building accounts to record their economic activities over a long term, but the data is not easily to obtain. Otherwise, the transformation of peasant’s livelihood would have been better illustrated. Further, some fresh data on socio-demographic aspects of the village, or consecutive documents about collective economy and village administration are concealed by village cadres. After all, I am a total outsider to them. Therefore, in chapter five, the explication about the annual village income and expenditure is based on my estimation with diverse data sources. Lastly, as regards to lineage activities, the collection of relevant data is incomplete yet. My preparations before the field work and the length of time spent in this topic are quite limited. Lineage and its economic influence are worth of a particular study in the future.

In the end, my study about collective egalitarianism would be more convincing and insightful, if longer history period was provided. The three pre- reform decades are omitted, which is already out of my knowledge accumulation.

However, this socialist phase left legacies to both HRS and shareholding cooperative system today. Further, one special informant was missed, which can supply crucial historical information. As the last Party secretary of Yi village, he was in charge from 1970 to 1994. His personal experiences went over both Maoist and reform period. I would expect the dramatic changes of his individual and family life can definitely help me elaborate collective egalitarianism. In addition, records of Yi village kept in prefectural Archives also contain enormous details about collective economy and other village affairs since the 1950s. It only has a small part from

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1993-1997 applied here. It should be concerned in future research about collective egalitarianism or Pearl River Delta villages.

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 238

Appendices

Above is the original photo of Figure 5

Above is the original photo of Table 10

Rural Participation for Equal Allocation and Economic Efficiency 239

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