A decade of financial crises, 1997-2007: Lessons from Thailand Pavida Pananond* and Thitinan Pongsudhirak** Presented at the Asia-Pacific Economic and Business History Conference (APEBH 2010), Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 17-19 February 2010 *Thammasat Business School, Thammasat University 2 Prachan Road, Bangkok 10200, Thailand Email:
[email protected] (corresponding author) **Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University Henri Dunant Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok 10330, Thailand Email:
[email protected] 1 Introduction Financial crises worldwide over time may be seen as fundamentally attributable to common roots, almost invariably characterised by cycles of boom and bust that have underpinned corresponding trajectories of economic expansion. To be sustained and stable, the mutually reinforcing expansions of credit and economic growth require adequate regulatory wherewithal. Prudential regulation and sound banking practices are designed to properly match risks and rewards in a moving, fluid equilibrium. When mismatches of risks and rewards occur, as when under-regulated credit growth leads to asset price inflation and a booming “bubble” economy, buttressed by speculation and greed, reforms and adjustments are inevitable. Such reforms and adjustments, in turn, compel asset price deflation and a painfully downward “bust” spiral until a new, workable balance of macroeconomic factors is achieved. Broadly put, this is how financial crises come and go.1 The Asian crisis of 1997-98 that led to a regional economic slump in East Asia and the United States banking crisis that has infected the broader world economy from 2007 can be traced to overexpansion and under-regulation. The main drivers and consequences of these two crises are similar, although their scales are different.