Air France Flight 296
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Air france flight 296 Continue This setback came as France and much of the European Union were betting on Airbus and the company's promise of a safer plane. The so-called Airbus Philosophy was a design that would override many experimental inputs to prevent accidents. For example, computers do not allow a pilot to climb above 30 degrees (to prevent a derailment) or to go below 15 degrees (to prevent speeding). In addition, it will not allow the pilot to roll or roll over 67 degrees or do any maneuvers more than 2.5 times the gravity. All the transport categories of planes that came before Airbus were built on what some call the Philosophy of Boeing, which alerted the pilot when something was amiss but would always put off by the pilot. If, for example, a Boeing pilot had to pull the power back and bring the nose up, the plane warns the pilot until the pilot either recovers or falls. Airbus will override the pilot's power and step inputs to prevent the stall. (But not necessarily an accident.) This first Crash of the Airbus A320 will serve as a test of competing philosophies and can doom the European company forever. The captain of Air France was selected as the head of the National Bureau of Analysis and Analysis (BEA), which was very unusual. The accident report leaves no doubt that it was the pilot's fault; There is no cause for alarm, you can keep your orders for the new Airbus 320 with complete confidence. Or can you? There is evidence that points to a different path. It appears that although the pilot was flying too low and should have been able to tell the difference between a runway flying at 100 feet versus 30 feet, it was a plane that produced a slower than expected engine acceleration and cancelled the pilot's mid-air stick entrance with the nose down the team in an attempt to prevent the stall. There is also evidence that the flight voice recorder and flight recorder were tampered with, that the 4 seconds of the most important part of the onboard voice recorder were removed, and that audio analysis of the engine coil being all confirm the captain's assertion that the plane was flying itself into the woods despite its desperate throttle and lift inputs. France convicted the captain of manslaughter. He continues to this day trying to clear his name. You can decide for yourself, but I believe that both are to blame. The captain mis-flew past, getting the plane too low and slow, causing the engine to accelerate slowly. The plane cancelled its elevator entrances and prevented the stall, but the plane flew into Forrest. Please note that I also quote the investigative television series Mayday, also known as the Plane Crash Investigation. I've seen them misrepresent their reporting in other aviation accidents in favor of those who give them better access. In this case, this ill-fated flight gave them many interviews interview the program is sympathetic. I was trying to pick up more plausible lines. Like I said, you can decide. (For what it's worth, I think the point can be done that Airbus is a very safe aircraft, but it requires pilots to change their thought processes in many ways.) For more information on Airbus flight control laws, see Airbus Control Laws. Here's a chilling video of the crash: Air France 296 Crash. All here from the links shown below, with a few comments in an alternate color. Air France Flight 296An Air France Airbus A320, similar to the one involved in the crash26 June 1988 (1988-06-26)Summary Confused: Pilot Error (BEA) Computer error (Captain Asseline) SiteMulhouse-Habsheim Airport, Malhouse, France 47'44'58N 7'25'34e / 47.74944'N 7.42611'E / 47.74944; 7.42611Coordinates: 47'44'58N 7'25'34E / 47.74944'N 7.42611'E / 47.74944; 7.42611AircraftAircraft typeAirbus A320-11OperatorAir FranceRegistrationF-GFKCFlight OriginCharles de Gaulle AirportTopoverHabsheim AirfieldDestinationBasel-Mulhouse AirportOccupants1 33Passengers130Crew6Fatalities3Injuries50Survivors133 (136 originally) Air France Flight 296 was the charter flight of the new Airbus A320-111 operated by Air France for Air Charter. On 26 June 1988, it crashed during a low pass over Malhaus Habsheim Airport (ICAO LFGB Airport code) as part of the Habsheim Air Show. Much of the sequence of the accident, which occurred in front of several thousand spectators, was caught on video. The cause of the crash was a source of serious controversy. It was this flight that became the first passenger flight of the A320 (most of those on board were journalists and lottery winners). A low-speed overpass with a descent chassis was to pass at an altitude of 100 feet (30 m); Instead, the plane performed an overpass at an altitude of 30 feet (9.1 m), skimmed the tops of the forest at the end of the runway (which was not shown on the airport map given to the pilots), and crashed. All passengers survived the initial impact, but the woman and two children died from smoke inhalation before they managed to escape. According to official reports, the pilots flew too low, too slow, did not see the forest and accidentally flew into it. The captain, Michel Asselin, disputed the message and stated that an error in the wire of the computer prevented him from applying the thrust and tightening up. After the crash, allegations emerged that investigators had forged evidence, in particular the plane's flight recorders (black boxes). It was the first fatal A320 crash. The Airbus A320-111, registration F-GFKC, serial number 9, first took off on 6 January 1988 and was delivered to Air France on 23 June 1988, three days before its destruction. It was the third A320 delivered by Air France, Customers. Captain Michel Asseline, 44, had been an Air France pilot for nearly 20 years and had the following endorsements: the Caravelle, Boeing 707, 727 and 737, as well as the Airbus A300 and A310. He was an outstanding pilot with 10,463 flight hours. In 1979, he was appointed head of the company's A320 training division at the end of 1987. As an Air France technical pilot, he was active in A320 tests and performed manoeuvres beyond normal operational limits. He has full confidence in the plane's computer systems. First officer Pierre Maiziere, 45, has been flying with the company since 1969 and has been captain of training for six years. It was approved by the Caravelle, Boeing 707 and 737, and qualified as captain of the A320 three months before the crash. He had 10,853 hours of flight. Flight plan at the time of the incident, only three of the new type of aircraft were delivered by Air France, and the newest (in operation for two days) was selected for the flyover. The plane was due to take off from Charles de Gaulle Airport to Basel-Mulhouse airport for a press conference. Then, sightseeing charter passengers will board and the plane will fly a short distance from the small Habsheim airfield. The captain will do a low-level fly-pass over runway 02, climb and turn back, and repeat the fly-pass over the same runway in a reciprocal direction (Runway 20). This will be followed by a guided tour south on Mont Blanc before passengers are returned to Basel-Mulhouse Airport. Finally, the plane will return to Paris. The pilots had a busy weekend and did not receive a flight plan until the morning of the flight. They did not receive any verbal details about the overpass or the airfield itself. The Flyover Flight Plan was that as they approached the airfield, they expanded the third stage flap, lowered the landing gear and lined up for a flight at 100 feet (30 m). The captain will slow the plane down to a minimum flight speed with the maximum angle of attack, disable the alpha floor (a function that would otherwise automatically increase the engine's thrust when the angle of attack has reached 15) and rely on the first officer to adjust the engine thrust manually to maintain 100 feet. After the first pass, the first officer will apply TOGA (takeoff, circle) power and climb steeply before returning to the second pass. I've done it twenty times! The captain assured his first officer. The flyover was approved by Air France's Air Operations Authority and the Department of Flight Safety, and air traffic control and the Basel Tower were informed. The Habsheim airfield was too small to be listed in the aircraft's flight computer, thus requiring a visual approach; both pilots were unfamiliar with the airfield when they began their descent from 2,000 feet (610 m) just 6 nautical miles (11 km) from the field. This distance was too short for them to stabilize the altitude and speed of the aircraft for the flyover. In addition, the captain expected the flight plan to pass over the runway 02 (3,281 feet (1000 m) long, paved) and prepared for this alignment. But as the plane approached the field, the deck crew noticed that spectators had gathered near the runway 34R (2,100 feet (640 m) long, grass). This last-minute deviation in the approach further distracted the crew from stabilizing the plane's altitude, and they quickly fell to 40 feet (12 m). From the highest level the forest at the end of 34R was similar to another type of grass. But now that the plane was carrying its flyover at just 30 feet, the crew noticed that the plane was lower than the now-determined danger that they were fast approaching.