Air france flight 296

Continue This setback came as France and much of the European Union were betting on Airbus and the company's promise of a safer plane. The so-called Airbus Philosophy was a design that would override many experimental inputs to prevent accidents. For example, computers do not allow a pilot to climb above 30 degrees (to prevent a derailment) or to go below 15 degrees (to prevent speeding). In addition, it will not allow the pilot to roll or roll over 67 degrees or do any maneuvers more than 2.5 times the gravity. All the transport categories of planes that came before Airbus were built on what some call the Philosophy of Boeing, which alerted the pilot when something was amiss but would always put off by the pilot. If, for example, a Boeing pilot had to pull the power back and bring the nose up, the plane warns the pilot until the pilot either recovers or falls. Airbus will override the pilot's power and step inputs to prevent the stall. (But not necessarily an accident.) This first Crash of the Airbus A320 will serve as a test of competing philosophies and can doom the European company forever. The captain of Air France was selected as the head of the National Bureau of Analysis and Analysis (BEA), which was very unusual. The accident report leaves no doubt that it was the pilot's fault; There is no cause for alarm, you can keep your orders for the new Airbus 320 with complete confidence. Or can you? There is evidence that points to a different path. It appears that although the pilot was flying too low and should have been able to tell the difference between a runway flying at 100 feet versus 30 feet, it was a plane that produced a slower than expected engine acceleration and cancelled the pilot's mid-air stick entrance with the nose down the team in an attempt to prevent the stall. There is also evidence that the flight voice recorder and flight recorder were tampered with, that the 4 seconds of the most important part of the onboard voice recorder were removed, and that audio analysis of the engine coil being all confirm the captain's assertion that the plane was flying itself into the woods despite its desperate throttle and lift inputs. France convicted the captain of manslaughter. He continues to this day trying to clear his name. You can decide for yourself, but I believe that both are to blame. The captain mis-flew past, getting the plane too low and slow, causing the engine to accelerate slowly. The plane cancelled its elevator entrances and prevented the stall, but the plane flew into Forrest. Please note that I also quote the investigative television series Mayday, also known as the Plane Crash Investigation. I've seen them misrepresent their reporting in other aviation accidents in favor of those who give them better access. In this case, this ill-fated flight gave them many interviews interview the program is sympathetic. I was trying to pick up more plausible lines. Like I said, you can decide. (For what it's worth, I think the point can be done that Airbus is a very safe aircraft, but it requires pilots to change their thought processes in many ways.) For more information on Airbus flight control laws, see Airbus Control Laws. Here's a chilling video of the crash: Air France 296 Crash. All here from the links shown below, with a few comments in an alternate color. Air France Flight 296An Air France Airbus A320, similar to the one involved in the crash26 June 1988 (1988-06-26)Summary Confused: Pilot Error (BEA) Computer error (Captain Asseline) SiteMulhouse-Habsheim Airport, Malhouse, France 47'44'58N 7'25'34e / 47.74944'N 7.42611'E / 47.74944; 7.42611Coordinates: 47'44'58N 7'25'34E / 47.74944'N 7.42611'E / 47.74944; 7.42611AircraftAircraft typeAirbus A320-11OperatorAir FranceRegistrationF-GFKCFlight OriginCharles de Gaulle AirportTopoverHabsheim AirfieldDestinationBasel-Mulhouse AirportOccupants1 33Passengers130Crew6Fatalities3Injuries50Survivors133 (136 originally) Air France Flight 296 was the charter flight of the new Airbus A320-111 operated by Air France for Air Charter. On 26 June 1988, it crashed during a low pass over Malhaus Habsheim Airport (ICAO LFGB Airport code) as part of the Habsheim Air Show. Much of the sequence of the accident, which occurred in front of several thousand spectators, was caught on video. The cause of the crash was a source of serious controversy. It was this flight that became the first passenger flight of the A320 (most of those on board were journalists and lottery winners). A low-speed overpass with a descent chassis was to pass at an altitude of 100 feet (30 m); Instead, the plane performed an overpass at an altitude of 30 feet (9.1 m), skimmed the tops of the forest at the end of the runway (which was not shown on the airport map given to the pilots), and crashed. All passengers survived the initial impact, but the woman and two children died from smoke inhalation before they managed to escape. According to official reports, the pilots flew too low, too slow, did not see the forest and accidentally flew into it. The captain, Michel Asselin, disputed the message and stated that an error in the wire of the computer prevented him from applying the thrust and tightening up. After the crash, allegations emerged that investigators had forged evidence, in particular the plane's flight recorders (black boxes). It was the first fatal A320 crash. The Airbus A320-111, registration F-GFKC, serial number 9, first took off on 6 January 1988 and was delivered to Air France on 23 June 1988, three days before its destruction. It was the third A320 delivered by Air France, Customers. Captain Michel Asseline, 44, had been an Air France pilot for nearly 20 years and had the following endorsements: the Caravelle, Boeing 707, 727 and 737, as well as the Airbus A300 and A310. He was an outstanding pilot with 10,463 flight hours. In 1979, he was appointed head of the company's A320 training division at the end of 1987. As an Air France technical pilot, he was active in A320 tests and performed manoeuvres beyond normal operational limits. He has full confidence in the plane's computer systems. First officer Pierre Maiziere, 45, has been flying with the company since 1969 and has been captain of training for six years. It was approved by the Caravelle, Boeing 707 and 737, and qualified as captain of the A320 three months before the crash. He had 10,853 hours of flight. Flight plan at the time of the incident, only three of the new type of aircraft were delivered by Air France, and the newest (in operation for two days) was selected for the flyover. The plane was due to take off from Charles de Gaulle Airport to Basel-Mulhouse airport for a press conference. Then, sightseeing charter passengers will board and the plane will fly a short distance from the small Habsheim airfield. The captain will do a low-level fly-pass over runway 02, climb and turn back, and repeat the fly-pass over the same runway in a reciprocal direction (Runway 20). This will be followed by a guided tour south on Mont Blanc before passengers are returned to Basel-Mulhouse Airport. Finally, the plane will return to Paris. The pilots had a busy weekend and did not receive a flight plan until the morning of the flight. They did not receive any verbal details about the overpass or the airfield itself. The Flyover Flight Plan was that as they approached the airfield, they expanded the third stage flap, lowered the landing gear and lined up for a flight at 100 feet (30 m). The captain will slow the plane down to a minimum flight speed with the maximum angle of attack, disable the alpha floor (a function that would otherwise automatically increase the engine's thrust when the angle of attack has reached 15) and rely on the first officer to adjust the engine thrust manually to maintain 100 feet. After the first pass, the first officer will apply TOGA (takeoff, circle) power and climb steeply before returning to the second pass. I've done it twenty times! The captain assured his first officer. The flyover was approved by Air France's Air Operations Authority and the Department of Flight Safety, and air traffic control and the Basel Tower were informed. The Habsheim airfield was too small to be listed in the aircraft's flight computer, thus requiring a visual approach; both pilots were unfamiliar with the airfield when they began their descent from 2,000 feet (610 m) just 6 nautical miles (11 km) from the field. This distance was too short for them to stabilize the altitude and speed of the aircraft for the flyover. In addition, the captain expected the flight plan to pass over the runway 02 (3,281 feet (1000 m) long, paved) and prepared for this alignment. But as the plane approached the field, the deck crew noticed that spectators had gathered near the runway 34R (2,100 feet (640 m) long, grass). This last-minute deviation in the approach further distracted the crew from stabilizing the plane's altitude, and they quickly fell to 40 feet (12 m). From the highest level the forest at the end of 34R was similar to another type of grass. But now that the plane was carrying its flyover at just 30 feet, the crew noticed that the plane was lower than the now-determined danger that they were fast approaching. The voice recorder of the cockpit recorded the call of the first officer: First officer: ToGA power! Take care of the track! Then: Cockpit area microphone (CAM): Increasing engine speed Captain: O sh...... ! CAM: End OF TAPE Crew's Tree Impact Noises applied full power and the pilot tried to climb. However, the elevators did not react to the pilot's commands, as the A320 computer system entered alpha-protection mode (designed to prevent the aircraft from entering the stall). Less than five seconds later, the turbines began to leak leaves and branches as the plane skimmed the treetops. The combustion chambers were clogged and the engines were out of order. The plane crashed to the ground. Traditionally, pilots respect the inherent dangers of flying at low speeds at low altitude, and usually the pilot will not attempt to fly an aircraft so close to stall with engines idling (minimum thrust setting in flight), but in this case, pilots participating will not hesitate to fly an aircraft below their usual minimum flight speed because the purpose of the flyover was to demonstrate that the aircraft's computer systems would guarantee that lift will ensure that the climb will always be available no matter how the pilots are handled by the controls. The captain's experience of flying a type aircraft on the outer edges of his flight performance envelope may have led to self-confidence and complacency. Accident and evacuation During impact, the right wing was torn off, and the fuel spill ignited immediately. Two fire engines at the airshow set off and an ambulance followed. Local emergency services were informed by radio. On the plane, many passengers were stunned by the blows to the back of the seats in front of them. Some passengers found it difficult to unbuckle their seat belts because they were not familiar with the mechanism (it differs type used in car seat belts). The wallet went to announce instructions for passengers, but the phone system of the public address was torn off. He then tried to open the left fast forward, which was blocked by trees. The door opened halfway, and the emergency rescue slide began to inflate, while it got stuck partially inside the fuselage. The wallet, passenger and flight attendant (a guest of another airline) managed to push the door completely open. At the same time, the wallet and the passenger were thrown from the fuselage, and a slide landed on them. The flight attendant then began evacuating the passengers, but they soon began to pile up at the bottom of the slide as their route was blocked by trees and branches. Passengers were temporarily stopped, while the wallet and another flight attendant began clearing branches. As the evacuation continued, the flight attendant stayed at the door, helping passengers until she began to suffer from smoke inhalation. By this time the fire had entered the right side of the fuselage through the damaged section of the floor between the rows of seats 10 and 15. The passenger tried to open the left arroganting exit. It didn't open, which fortunately was by then a fire on the left wing. In a panic, passengers now began to jostle towards the front of the cockpit. The flight attendant, standing in the middle of the cabin on seat 12D, was pushed into the aisle by a badly burned 12F passenger. After the influx of people left, and the interior quickly became toxic, she got up at the front door and was transferred to the cabin. There was no response, and thick black smoke made visual checks impossible, so it came out of the fuselage. The evacuation from the back door was quick and smooth thanks to the instructions of the flight attendants at the back of the plane. The medical team arrived from the air show and began to examine the passengers. Ten minutes after the accident, the first of the fire engines arrived. But because of the forest, only small vehicles were able to reach the wreckage. In addition to the tail section, the plane was destroyed by fire. Of the 136 people on board, three did not escape. One of them was a disabled boy in a 4F chair who could not move. The other was a girl in an 8C seat who was unable to take off his seat belt (her younger brother took off his seat belt but got carried away by the tide of people before he could help his sister). The third was a woman who reached the front door and then returned to help the girl. Thirty-four passengers were hospitalized with injuries and burns. Both pilots suffered minor head injuries and were also suffering from smoke inhalation and shock. Accident investigation the official investigation was conducted by the Air Accidents Investigation Bureau (BEA), the French Bureau of Air Accidents Investigation, in conjunction with the airline and aircraft manufacturer. Although the official investigation was written in French, the Bureau of Aviation Affairs (BEA) released the English version on 29 November 1989. A translational version of the report can be found in the air accident database. Flight recorders Flight Recorders were found still attached in the unburned tail part. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) continued to run for about 1.5 seconds after the initial impact. The Digital Flight Recorder (DFDR) continued to work for about one second and then recorded the meaningless data for another two seconds. Power outages occurred in front of the tail section, most likely in the wheeled well area, which was badly damaged. CVR was read on the night of June 26 at the BEA. The transcript was later clarified with the help of the participating pilots. The speed tape was set using a frequency of 400 Hz of electric power of the aircraft, and then synchronized with air traffic control records, which included the track of time. The DFDR was read on the same night by the Br'tigny sur Orge Flight Test Centre: 12:43:44 - the aircraft begins its descent from 2,000 feet (610 m), initially at a speed of 300 feet (91 m) per minute with 'Flaps 1'. 12:44:14 - Engine power comes down to downtime. After three seconds, the chassis is extended. In another 10 seconds, 'Flaps 2' is selected. 12:44:45 - 'Flaps 3' is selected as the plane descends through 500 feet (150 m) at a speed of 177 knots. 12:45:06 - The plane descends through 200 feet (61 m) at a speed of 155 knots. 12:45:15 - The aircraft, currently at 90 feet (27 m), begins to deviate to the right (maximum bank angle: 30 ) in line with grass strip 34R. 12:45:23 - the aircraft completes the deviation at an altitude of 46 feet (14 m) and flight speed 141 knots. During this maneuver, the vibrations of the high-altitude radio camera correspond to the aircraft passing over the tree area (while before and after the oscillations of the altimener radio and the readings of the barometric altimeler are perfectly identical). Three seconds later, the plane descends through 40 feet (12 m) at a speed of 132 knots. The captain begins to flash the plane (he raises his nose 4 to level his flight. The plane takes off at an altitude of 30 feet (9.1 m). 12:45:30 - the nose-up ratio increases to 7 . 12:45:35 - The nose-up ratio is now 15 and the speed of 122 knots. lethality that its weight and center of gravity were within, and that there was no evidence of failure of mechanical or electronic systems. The flight deck crew believed that the engines could not respond to the full power application. With CFM56-5 engines, it takes four seconds to go from 29% N1'a (idling flight) to 67%. It then takes one second longer to go from 67 to 83% N1. From the engine parameters recorded on the DFDR and the spectral analysis of the engine sounds on the CVR, it was found that five seconds after the TOGA power was applied, the N1 engine speed No.1 was 83%, while the engine No2 had 84%. Spectral analysis of the engine's sounds showed that after 0.6 seconds both engines reached 91% (by this stage they began to eat vegetation). This reaction of the engines was in line with their certification data. The official report of the official BEA report concluded that the probable cause of the accident was a combination of the following: Very low altitude of the flyover, lower than the surrounding obstacles; The speed is very slow and decreasing to reach the maximum possible angle of attack; Engine speed when easy in-flight; and later use of power. In addition, the bureau concluded that if the descent below 100 feet was not intentional, it may have been the result of the crew's inability to properly account for the visual and auditory information available to them regarding the altitude of the above ground (AGL) aircraft. The report also recommends that: Passengers should be banned from all demonstration flights Flight crews must be provided - and ensure - proper air airfield reconnaissance airline procedures should be reviewed to make sure that they comply with official rules regarding high-altitude pursuit of Captain Asseline, first officer of Mazi're, two Air France officials and the president of the airshow sponsors have been charged with unintentional manslaughter. All five were found guilty. Asselin was initially sentenced to six months in prison and twelve months of probation. The rest were sentenced to probation. During the appeals process, Asselin's sentence was increased to 10 months' imprisonment, as well as 10 months of probation. Asselin left the court and said he would appeal to the French Supreme Court, Cour de Cassation. Under French law, Asselin had to comply with the prison system before his case could be heard by the Supreme Court. An alternative explanation for the Mayday television series also reports claims in Season 9 of Episode 3 that the flight recorder may have been tampered with and indicated that four seconds were cut from the tape; it was shown by taking out the tower control tape and comparing it to the remaining Pilot claims he tried to apply thrust earlier are listed in the flight recorder's data. When he increased the throttle to level 100 feet, the engines did not respond. The pilot claims that this indicates a problem with the plane's wire-to-wire system, not the pilot's fault. After a few seconds he became concerned and thought there might have been something like a short circuit in a fully computerized throttle control and responded by pulling the throttle all the way back then forward again. By then, the plane had touched trees. The show also looks at the theory that it was a computer fault, not a pilot. Because the altitude of the flight fell below 100 feet, the aircraft's computers were programmed to believe that it had landed, and therefore they would not allow any sharp maneuvers from any of the pilots. When the crew suddenly asked the plane for more energy and lift, he simply ignored them. The Institute of Forensic Evidence and Criminology of the Police, based in Lausanne, Switzerland, also claimed that the flight recorders may have been switched off and were not original on the plane. Airbus made a detailed refutation of these allegations in a document published in 1991. Airbus alleges that an independent investigator hired by the filmmakers erred in synchronizing the recordings based on a misunderstanding of how the Radio Transmission was operating on the flight recorder. The dramatization of the episode The Charge pilot from the TV series Survival in the Sky featured an accident. Discovery Channel Canada/National Geographic series Mayday featured an accident and subsequent investigation into a season 9 episode titled Pilot vs. Airplane. The episode Disastrous Descents from the Aircrash Confidential series produced by WMR Productions and IMG Entertainment included an interview with Captain Michel Asselin. See also the France Portal Aviation Portal 1980s portal List of Accidents and Incidents Related to Commercial Aircraft List of Airshow Accidents and Incident Notes - Speed Stage 1 fan turbofan engine, expressed as a percentage of normal maximum Footnotes - b c Commission D'Enqu't (Investigative Committee) (PDF) (In French). April 24, 1990. Archive from the original (PDF) dated November 12, 2013. (French) - Airbus A320-111 F-GFKC Mulhouse-Habsheim Airport. Aviation safety network. Received on May 9, 2019. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p r r s t u v w x y z Job, Macarthur (1998). Plane Crash Volume 3. Australia: Aerospace Publications. page 155. ISBN 1 875671 34 X. Air France flight AF296 English official report. April 2020. Description of accidents on the Aviation Safety Network. Received on February 3, 2007. Commission d'Encutte sur l'accident survenu le 26 de juin de 1988 - Mulhaus-Habsheim (68) - l'Airbus A 320, impatrice F-GFC - The final Commission of Inquiry into the accident of 26 June 1988 in Malhaus Habsheim (68) on the Airbus A 320, registered F-GFKC - Final Report( PDF) (in French). 1990. Archive (PDF) from the original on November 12, 2013. () a b AirDisaster.Com: Research: Air France 296. airdisaster.com. Archive from the original on August 5, 2005. Roger, Christian (June 26, 1998). The crash of the Airbus A320 in Hubsheim, France on June 26, 1988 (PDF). crashdehabsheim.net. - Accident A320 Habsheim (PDF). March 1991. Pilot vs. plane. Mayday. Season 9. 2010. Discovery Channel Canada / National Geographic Channel. External Relations (in French) Commission of Inquiry of the accident on 26 June 1988 in Malhaus-Habsheim (archive) French: Commission on enquete sur l'accident le 26 Juin 1988 Mulhouse-Habsheim extracted from the air france flight 296 video. air france flight 296 crash. air france flight 296 survivors. air france flight 296 mayday. air france flight 296 air crash investigation. air france flight 296 cvr. air france flight 296 crash animation. air france flight 296 documentary

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