The Nature of Science in the Next Generation Science Standards
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The Behavioral Sciences: Essays in Honor of GEORGE A. LUNDBERG
The Behavioral Sciences: Essays in Honor of George A. Lundberg The Behavioral Sciences: Essays in Honor of GEORGE A. LUNDBERG edited by ALFRED DE GRAZIA RoLLoHANDY E. C. HARWOOD PAUL KURTZ published by The Behavioral Research Council Great Barrington, Massachusetts Copyright © 1968 by Behavioral Research Council Preface This volume of collected essays is dedicated to the memory of George A. Lundberg. It is fitting that this volume is published under the auspices of the Behavioral Research Council. George Lundberg, as its first President, and one of its founding members, was dedicated to the goals of the Behavioral Research Council: namely, the encouragement and development of behavioral science research and its application to the problems of men in society. He has been a constant inspiration to behavioral research not only in sociology, where he was considered to be a classic figure and a major influence but in the behavioral sciences in general. Part One of this volume includes papers on George Lundberg and his scientific work, particularly in the field of sociology. Orig inally read at a special conference of the Pacific Sociological Association (March 30-April 1, 1967), the papers are here pub lished by permission of the Society. Part Two contains papers not directly on George Lundberg but on themes and topics close to his interest. They are written by members of the Behavioral Research Council. We hope that this volume is a token, however small, of the pro found contribution that George Lundberg has made to the de velopment of the behavioral sciences. We especially wish to thank the contributors of the George A. -
STEM Education for the Future
STEM 1 STEM STEM 3 STEM SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS Dr. Margaret Honey (Chair) | Dr. Bruce Alberts Dr. Hyman Bass | Dr. Carlos Castillo | Dr. Okhee Lee Dr. Marilyn M. Strutchens | Dr. Laurel Vermillion Dr. Francisco Rodriguez (Ex-Officio Member) NSF LIAISON Dr. Robin Wright (Division Director, Undergraduate Education) EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Dr. Alexandra Medina-Borja (NSF EHR/DUE) 4 STEM “All citizens can contribute to our nation’s progress and vibrancy. To be prepared for the STEM careers of the future, all learners must have an equitable opportunity to acquire foundational STEM knowledge. The STEM Education of the Future brings together our advanced understanding of how people learn with modern technology to create more personalized learning experiences, to inspire learning, and to foster creativity from an early age. It will unleash and harness the curiosity of young people and adult learners across the United States, cultivating a culture of innovation and inquiry, and ensuring our nation remains the global leader in science and technology discovery and competitiveness.” A VISION STATEMENT FOR STEM EDUCATION OF THE FUTURE 5 6 PREFACE Rapid technological advancements and societal changes are our daily reality. While the future of work, the economy, and society is uncertain, one thing is not: To maintain the nation’s leadership in science and technology discovery, we must create an approach to science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) education that prepares and advances the U.S. for this future. Experts agree that science, technology, engineering and math will drive new innovations across disciplines, making use of computational power to accelerate discoveries and finding creative ways to work across disciplinary silos to solve big challenges. -
Would ''Direct Realism'' Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction?
NOU^S 38:2 (2004) 197–232 Would ‘‘Direct Realism’’ Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction? MARC LANGE University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill I Recently, there has been a modest resurgence of interest in the ‘‘Humean’’ problem of induction. For several decades following the recognized failure of Strawsonian ‘‘ordinary-language’’ dissolutions and of Wesley Salmon’s elaboration of Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication of induction, work on the problem of induction languished. Attention turned instead toward con- firmation theory, as philosophers sensibly tried to understand precisely what it is that a justification of induction should aim to justify. Now, however, in light of Bayesian confirmation theory and other developments in epistemology, several philosophers have begun to reconsider the classical problem of induction. In section 2, I shall review a few of these developments. Though some of them will turn out to be unilluminating, others will profitably suggest that we not meet inductive scepticism by trying to justify some alleged general principle of ampliative reasoning. Accordingly, in section 3, I shall examine how the problem of induction arises in the context of one particular ‘‘inductive leap’’: the confirmation, most famously by Henrietta Leavitt and Harlow Shapley about a century ago, that a period-luminosity relation governs all Cepheid variable stars. This is a good example for the inductive sceptic’s purposes, since it is difficult to see how the sparse background knowledge available at the time could have entitled stellar astronomers to regard their observations as justifying this grand inductive generalization. I shall argue that the observation reports that confirmed the Cepheid period- luminosity law were themselves ‘‘thick’’ with expectations regarding as yet unknown laws of nature. -
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning 1. Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Reasons Empiricism may be defined as the view there is no a priori justification for any synthetic claim. Critics object that empiricism cannot account for all the kinds of knowledge we seem to possess, such as moral knowledge, metaphysical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, and modal knowledge.1 In some cases, empiricists try to account for these types of knowledge; in other cases, they shrug off the objections, happily concluding, for example, that there is no moral knowledge, or that there is no metaphysical knowledge.2 But empiricism cannot shrug off just any type of knowledge; to be minimally plausible, empiricism must, for example, at least be able to account for paradigm instances of empirical knowledge, including especially scientific knowledge. Empirical knowledge can be divided into three categories: (a) knowledge by direct observation; (b) knowledge that is deductively inferred from observations; and (c) knowledge that is non-deductively inferred from observations, including knowledge arrived at by induction and inference to the best explanation. Category (c) includes all scientific knowledge. This category is of particular import to empiricists, many of whom take scientific knowledge as a sort of paradigm for knowledge in general; indeed, this forms a central source of motivation for empiricism.3 Thus, if there is any kind of knowledge that empiricists need to be able to account for, it is knowledge of type (c). I use the term “empirical reasoning” to refer to the reasoning involved in acquiring this type of knowledge – that is, to any instance of reasoning in which (i) the premises are justified directly by observation, (ii) the reasoning is non- deductive, and (iii) the reasoning provides adequate justification for the conclusion. -
Theory of Change and Organizational Development Strategy INTRODUCTION Dear Reader
Theory of Change and Organizational Development Strategy INTRODUCTION Dear Reader: The Fetzer Institute was founded in 1986 by John E. Fetzer with a vision of a transformed world, powered by love, in which all people can flourish. Our current mission, adopted in 2016, is to help build the spiritual foundation for a loving world. Over the past several years, we have been identifying and exploring new ways to make our vision of a loving world a reality. One aspect of this work has been the development of a new conceptual frame resulting in a comprehensive Theory of Change. This document aspires to ground our work for the next 25 years. Further, this in-depth articulation of our vision allows us to invite thought leaders across disciplines to help sharpen our thinking. This document represents a moment when many strands of work and planning by the Institute board and staff came together in a very powerful way that enabled us to articulate our Theory of Change. However, this is a dynamic, living document, and we encourage you to read it as such. For example, we are actively developing detailed goals and action plans, and we continue to examine our conceptual frame, even as we make common cause with all who are working toward a shared and transformative sacred story for humanity in the 21st century. We continue to use our Theory of Change to focus our work, inspire and grow our partnerships, and identify the most pressing needs in our world. I look forward to your feedback and invite you to learn about how our work is coming alive in the world through our program strategies, initiatives, and stories at Fetzer.org. -
Mothers in Science
The aim of this book is to illustrate, graphically, that it is perfectly possible to combine a successful and fulfilling career in research science with motherhood, and that there are no rules about how to do this. On each page you will find a timeline showing on one side, the career path of a research group leader in academic science, and on the other side, important events in her family life. Each contributor has also provided a brief text about their research and about how they have combined their career and family commitments. This project was funded by a Rosalind Franklin Award from the Royal Society 1 Foreword It is well known that women are under-represented in careers in These rules are part of a much wider mythology among scientists of science. In academia, considerable attention has been focused on the both genders at the PhD and post-doctoral stages in their careers. paucity of women at lecturer level, and the even more lamentable The myths bubble up from the combination of two aspects of the state of affairs at more senior levels. The academic career path has academic science environment. First, a quick look at the numbers a long apprenticeship. Typically there is an undergraduate degree, immediately shows that there are far fewer lectureship positions followed by a PhD, then some post-doctoral research contracts and than qualified candidates to fill them. Second, the mentors of early research fellowships, and then finally a more stable lectureship or career researchers are academic scientists who have successfully permanent research leader position, with promotion on up the made the transition to lectureships and beyond. -
The Role of Social Context in the Production of Scientific Knowledge
University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Supervised Undergraduate Student Research Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects and Creative Work 5-2015 The Role of Social Context in the Production of Scientific Knowledge Kristen Lynn Beard [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj Part of the Philosophy of Science Commons Recommended Citation Beard, Kristen Lynn, "The Role of Social Context in the Production of Scientific nowledgeK " (2015). Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/1852 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Supervised Undergraduate Student Research and Creative Work at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Role of Social Context in the Production of Scientific Knowledge Kristen Lynn Beard The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Chancellor’s Honors Program Department of Philosophy Undergraduate Thesis Submitted December 8, 2014 Thesis Advisor: Dr. Nora Berenstain Beard 1 Model 1: The Influence of Social Context on the Scientific Method Beard 2 Introduction: Scientific Knowledge as Both Social and Rational A person may believe that a certain theory is true and explain that he does so, for instance, because it is the best explanation he has of the facts or because it gives him the most satisfying world picture. This does not make him irrational, but I take it to be part of empiricism to disdain such reasons. -
A Scientific Enterprise That Is Open by Default and Equitable by Design: the Time Is
A Scientific Enterprise that is Open by Default and Equitable by Design: The Time is Now research without delay or cost to the public. Open Lessons from COVID-19 Science is a collection of policies, practices, and The pandemic brought researchers from across the norms that empower scientists to do just that, by country and the world together to build open making research AI-ready and available under an systems for scientific collaboration - like the open license to accelerate discovery and improve CORD-19 database to quickly share research lives. Without open systems of knowledge sharing articles and data - that have been key to our and collaboration, federally-funded research falls pandemic response including the fastest short of its promise to leverage investments in development of a vaccine in human history. Prior science for public benefit. to the pandemic, federally-funded research was Open Science: A National Strategy only required to be made public one year after publication, prompting the White House Office of to Meet Pressing Challenges Science & Technology Policy to ask publishers to A “status quo” approach to scientific publishing lift 12-month embargoes on COVID-related science impedes the United States’ ability to address current in March 2020. Waiting an entire year to make and future national challenges such as climate change, COVID-related research public would have cost economic competitiveness, public health, and racial more lives, and the continuation of any embargo equity. The impact of open science on COVID-19 period on taxpayer-funded research creates a provides the federal government with an opportunity to dangerous precedent we cannot afford. -
Google Scholar, Web of Science, and Scopus
Journal of Informetrics, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 1160-1177, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JOI.2018.09.002 Google Scholar, Web of Science, and Scopus: a systematic comparison of citations in 252 subject categories Alberto Martín-Martín1 , Enrique Orduna-Malea2 , Mike 3 1 Thelwall , Emilio Delgado López-Cózar Version 1.6 March 12, 2019 Abstract Despite citation counts from Google Scholar (GS), Web of Science (WoS), and Scopus being widely consulted by researchers and sometimes used in research evaluations, there is no recent or systematic evidence about the differences between them. In response, this paper investigates 2,448,055 citations to 2,299 English-language highly-cited documents from 252 GS subject categories published in 2006, comparing GS, the WoS Core Collection, and Scopus. GS consistently found the largest percentage of citations across all areas (93%-96%), far ahead of Scopus (35%-77%) and WoS (27%-73%). GS found nearly all the WoS (95%) and Scopus (92%) citations. Most citations found only by GS were from non-journal sources (48%-65%), including theses, books, conference papers, and unpublished materials. Many were non-English (19%- 38%), and they tended to be much less cited than citing sources that were also in Scopus or WoS. Despite the many unique GS citing sources, Spearman correlations between citation counts in GS and WoS or Scopus are high (0.78-0.99). They are lower in the Humanities, and lower between GS and WoS than between GS and Scopus. The results suggest that in all areas GS citation data is essentially a superset of WoS and Scopus, with substantial extra coverage. -
Pragmatism Is As Pragmatism Does: of Posner, Public Policy, and Empirical Reality
Volume 31 Issue 3 Summer 2001 Summer 2001 Pragmatism Is as Pragmatism Does: Of Posner, Public Policy, and Empirical Reality Linda E. Fisher Recommended Citation Linda E. Fisher, Pragmatism Is as Pragmatism Does: Of Posner, Public Policy, and Empirical Reality, 31 N.M. L. Rev. 455 (2001). Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol31/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr PRAGMATISM IS AS PRAGMATISM DOES: OF POSNER, PUBLIC POLICY, AND EMPIRICAL REALITY LINDA E. FISHER* Stanley Fish believes that my judicial practice could not possibly be influenced by my pragmatic jurisprudence. Pragmatism is purely a method of description, so I am guilty of the "mistake of thinking that a description of a practice has cash value in a game other than the game of description." But he gives no indication that he has tested this assertion by reading my judicial opinions.' I. INTRODUCTION Richard Posner, until recently the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has been much studied; he is frequently controversial, hugely prolific, candid, and often entertaining.2 Judge Posner is repeatedly in the news, most recently as a mediator in the Microsoft antitrust litigation3 and as a critic of President Clinton.4 Posner's shift over time, from a wealth-maximizing economist to a legal pragmatist (with wealth maximization as a prominent pragmatic goal), is by now well documented.' This shift has been set forth most clearly in The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory,6 as well as Overcoming Law7 and The Problems of Jurisprudence.8 The main features of his pragmatism include a Holmesian emphasis on law as a prediction of how a judge will rule.9 An important feature of law, then, is its ability to provide clear, stable guidance to those affected by it. -
Special Issue Proposal: Replicability in Cognitive Science Editors: Brent
Special Issue proposal: Replicability in Cognitive Science Editors: Brent Strickland and Helen De Cruz Invited authors: Edouard Machery, Deborah Mayo Open Call for papers We are inviting submissions to a special issue on the issue of replicability and systematic error in cognitive science in the Review of Philosophy and Psychology (deadline November 1st, 2017). One of the primary missions of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology is to provide philosophically and theoretically insightful analyses of issues related to the fields of cognitive science and experimental psychology. Currently, authors in these areas are doing some thorough soul searching as they attempt to understand why the published results of psychology studies fail to replicate as often as they should (OSF, 2015). In particular, the OSF (2015) provided evidence that roughly 60% of all studies published in top psychology journals fail to replicate perfectly and 30% fail to replicate even approximately. These and related findings have led to a number of publications, news articles, and blog posts that attempt to (i) assess the extent to which there actually are systematic problems in how psychological science is being carried out (ii) understand the root causes of such problems and (iii) offer practical solutions for systematically improving scientific output. Philosophers have been notably absent in these discussions. This is a missed opportunity, as philosophers of science, mind, or even economics can offer a valuable perspective on these issues, as well as philosophers versed into experimental methods more broadly. To encourage philosophical engagement with the questions of replicability and systematic in cognitive science, we are inviting contributions to this special issue. -
A WIN-WIN SOLUTION the Empirical Evidence on School Choice FOURTH EDITION Greg Forster, Ph.D
A WIN-WIN SOLUTION The Empirical Evidence on School Choice FOURTH EDITION Greg Forster, Ph.D. MAY 2016 About the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice The Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit and nonpartisan organization, solely dedicated to advancing Milton and Rose Friedman’s vision of school choice for all children. First established as the Milton and Rose D. Friedman Foundation in 1996, the Foundation promotes school choice as the most effective and equitable way to improve the quality of K–12 education in America. The Friedman Foundation is dedicated to research, education, and outreach on the vital issues and implications related to school choice. A WIN-WIN SOLUTION The Empirical Evidence on School Choice FOURTH EDITION Greg Forster, Ph.D. MAY 2016 Table of Contents Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................3 Choice in Education .................................................................................................................3 Why Science Matters—the “Gold Standard” and Other Methods ....................................4 The Method of This Report .....................................................................................................6 Criteria for Study Inclusion or Exclusion .......................................................................6