Water Nepal Himalaya Ganga Vol. 4 No. 1.Jpg

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WATER NEPAL

Volume 4 Number 1, September, 1994

EDITOR Ajaya Dixit

ASSOCIATE EDITOR Bhoj Raj Regmi

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Dr. Binayak Bhadra Member, National Planning Commission

Dipak Gyawali Member, Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology

Dr. Guna Nidhi Paudyal Water Resources Engineer, Danish Hydraulic Institute, Dhaka

Dr. Kiran K. Bhattarai Professor, Environmental Engineer ENSIC/ADB, Asian Institute of Technology

Dr. Ram Manohar Shrestha Associate Professor, Asian Institute of Technology

PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT

Kumud Sharma Gopal Adhikary

PHOTOGRAPHS Cover Galeola Lindleyana, Barun Valley 3000 m Dense forest, growing on forest litter “Saprophytic”: Dr. Tirtha Bahadur Shrestha Deban/Nad Dihing Confluence, Namdapha Sanctury: Sanjay Acharya Rice Plantation in Kathmandu: Kanak Mani Dixit Barrage in Trisuli River: Bhoj Raj Regmi Inside Cover Braided Channel of I ndrawati, Sindhupalchok, Nepal: Huta Ram Baidya Social and Economic Challenges Farming in Jumla: Bikas Rauniyar Tarai Farming: International Irrigation Management Institute Technology and South Asia Penstock of Kulekhani I: Ajaya Dixit CAD system: K. Shakya Rehabilitated Canal in Chitwan: Kumud Sharma Deep Well Boring in Nepalgunj: A. Dixit Institutional Articulation Meetings: B. Rauniyar and IMMI Conflict and Cooperation Kosi Barrage: A. Dixit Artwork Design: Nirmal Sherchan Telephone 213916 Computer Setting: S Secreta rial Spot Ga 1 – 177, Maitidevi, Kathmandu Printed at: Jagadamba Press Patan Dhoka, Kathmandu Telephone 521393 Price: NRs. 350.00 India Irs. 400.00 (postage and handling Rs. 50.00 extra) SAARC Countries US$10 (postage and handling $ 2 extra) international US$ 20 (postage and handling $ 5 extra) For details write to: NEPAL WATER CONSERVATION FOUNDATION PO Box 2221, Kathmandu, Nepal Telephone PREFACE

This special issue of WATER NEPAL brings between two covers a wide range of South Asian perspectives on the challenges of developing the waters of the Himalaya-Ganga. The contributions come from the papers presented at the “Kathmandu Meeting on Cooperative Development of Himalayan Water Resources”, hosted by the Nepal Water Conservation Foundation on February 27-28, 1993. The papers were invited on the following themes relating to the Himalaya-Ganga waters: 1) Social and Economic Challenges, 2) Technology and South Asia, 3) Institutional Articulation, and 4) Conflict and Cooperation. In all, 28 papers were presented in the Meeting. Eight paper were received during the conference and circulated. All 36 papers are organized along the above themes, and contained in this volume. Many papers have been reviewed by the authors subsequent to the meeting, incorporating the comments and concerns expressed during the two-day gathering. As editors, we have retained controversial passages and opinions of experts across the international divide even though we may not necessarily subscribe to some of the more extreme views. As a result, the reader will find in ample measure conflicting perspectives and perceptions which have in the past hindered efforts at conflict resolution, and may do so again in the future. Though the editors have attempted to maintain consistency, disparate styles of scholars, diplomats, journalists and political scientists appear in the text. A consistent thread that runs through the submissions is that of data gaps and uncertainties. Scholars cite different sources and use very different numbers for the same event (basin area, siltation rates, etc.). The editors did make an attempt in the review process to correct and streamline data wherever possible. In fact almost a year and a half was spent doing so, and we came to realize that the problem is endemic across South Asian academic firament. Nothing short of a much more energetic effort and data standardization on a regional scale can make a dent on this vexing problem. Hopefully this will be a continuous process adopted by the independent academics of South Asia. At stake are issues of dissemination and availability of public domain information, especially that of a technical nature; scale, intensity and intent of regional discurse on the subject and whether it is dispassionate enough or biased towards promoting a particular geo-political agenda; and finally the very vibrancy of a future South Asian technological and economic renaissance, efforts towards which can only succeed if they are propelled by a confident and aggressive intellectual tradition. If they do not become serious about these matters, South Asians?especially those in the Himalaya-Ganga?are condemned to remain, as Josse laments in this volume, “like Sisyphus, never to succeed”. The four very broad themes were selected because we felt they embody within their phrasing the issues that will absorb the concern of this region well into the next century. The Kathmandu Meeting has only touched the surface of the problems in these theme areas. By juxtaposing the state of today’s knowledge with the concerns of tomorrow, it has attempted to serve as a stepping stone towards a more consistent and committed scholarship. As initiators of the Kathmandu Meeting and editors of the papers, we believe the volume will immensely benefit students, researchers, scholars and policy makers providing a window into the interdisciplinary challenges that confront those who would develop Himalayan water resources. What we as the organizers of the Kathmandu Meeting have gained from these papers are firstly, the sheer complexity of managing Himalaya- Ganga waters and secondly, the numerous questions that require answers. These are detailed in the epilogue. All this, we are convinced, calls for a South Asian Forum on water resources. The conference received support from the Economic Liberalization Project of USAID/Kathmandu, International Development Research Center (IDRC)/New Delhi and the International Academy of the Environment-Geneva. The Academy provided further support for publication of this special issue, as per its “signature theme” of building on research emanating from the South. We express our thanks to Prithvi Raj Ligal (Member, National Planning Commission of Nepal), Praveen Dixit and David Abraham (Economic liberalization Project, USAID), Aung Gyi (IDRC New Delhi), Michael Thompson (International Academy of the Environment-Geneva), Jayanta Bandyopadhyay (then with ICIMOD Kathmandu, now with IAE-Geneva), A. R. Ghanashyam (Indian Embassy, Kathmandu), B. K. Verma (Bihar Government, Kosi Liason Office), as well as Ambassadors Prof. Bimal Prasad (India, Julia Chang-Bloch (USA), Mohammed Nasser Mian (Pakistan). Special thanks are due to Kanak Mani Dixit (editor HIMAL). We would also like to thank the Department of Geography University of Berne, the representatives from the Swiss Confedration and the Embassy of Bangladesh, Kathmandu. Thanks are also due to Ms. Jill Umbach of CECI Kathmandu for her help in editing.

Ajaya Dixit Dipak Gyawali KATHMANDU NEPAL

MESSAGE

Timely and optimal utilisation of the waters of the Himalaya is one of the few options that would allow the people of this underdeveloped region to pull themselves out of the poverty trap that has been their endemic fate so far. This major Himalayan resource has been a bane in the form of floods and damage to life and property; but it also holds the promise of a boon if we were able to harness the waters with due sensitivity to the environment and the weakest sections of our society. In view of the complex and interlinked nature of the issues surrounding Himalayan waters and given the fact that governments of the region are often preoccupied with the difficult tasks of grappling with everyday poverty, it is extremely encouraging that non- governmental organisations of the region have begun to take initiatives to address the complex issues by themselves and thus draw the attention of Governments to matters that need their attention. I wish the participants to this meeting all success in furthering better knowledge of the complex issues of Himalayan water resources development and enhanced understanding of regional and international concerns.

Girija Prasad Koirala February 22, 1993 WATER NEPAL

Volume 4, Number 1, September 1994

Preface I Message iii

PROLOGUE The Himalaya-Ganga: Contending with Interlinkages in a Complex System Dipak Gyawali and Ajaya Dixit 1-7

VIEWPOINT Ecological and Political Aspects of Himalayan Water Resource Management Jayanta Bandyopadhyay and Dipak Gyawali 9-30

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGE Issue of Scale in Nepal’s Water Resources Development Rishi Shah 31-33 Preliminary Look at Arun III in light of Tehri Experience Vijay Paranjapye 35-41 Learning from the Mistakes of Large Scale Water Development Philip B. Williams 43-46 Smaller is Better S. B. Synghal 47-53 Why End-use Efficiency is Never Just A Technical Business Natascia Petringa and Michael Thompson 55-59 Environmental Impact Assessment in Water Resource Development in Nepal Tara N. Bhattarai 61-66 Environmental Issues in Water Resources Management in The Indo-Nepal Region A. K. Sinha and Santosh Kumar 67-73 Cultural and Water Bonds Santosh Kumar, A. K. Sinha and Nigam Prakash 75-79 Interface of Water, Religion and Development: Strains of Discord Sudhindra Sharma 81-88

Table of contents.pmd 61 2/8/2010, 4:25 PM Water Projects in Nepal: Lessons from Displacement and Rehabilitation Ajaya Dixit 89-103

TECHNOLOGY AND SOUTH ASIA Improving the Knowledge Base for Himalayan Water Development Richard Kattlemann 105-114 Hydrology Under Central Planning: Groundwater in India Marcus Moench 115-129 A Case Study of Western Gandak Canal Project in Uttar Pradesh K. C. Sarin 131-138 Conjunctive Irrigation Model in the Bagmati Basin Arun Prakash 139-150 Issues of Irrigation Management in Nepal Damodar Bhattarai 151-157 Socioeconomic Renaissance through Dynamic Indo-Nepal Cooperation in Water Resources Development U. K Verma 159-166 Water Resources: Nepal’s Economic Bonanza R. A. Mahto 167-172 Nepali Hydropower and Regional Energy Needs Rajendra D. Joshi 173-180 Sediment Management: A Cooperative Indo-Nepal Venture C. P. Sinha 181-186 Mathematical Modeling Tools for Planning and Management Of Large-scale Water Resources Development Guna N. Paudyal 187-196 On Choice of Chisapani Project; A case of Inadequate Planning Dinesh L. Shrestha and Guna N. Paudyal 197-205 Small Rather than Big: Case for Decentralised Power Development in Nepal Bikash Pandey 207-217 Huge Dams and Tiny Incomes Michael Thompson 219-227

Table of contents.pmd 62 2/8/2010, 4:25 PM INSTITUTIONAL ARTICULATION Issues and Policy Considerations in Sharing The Ganges Waters C. R. Abrar 229-234 A Preliminary Assessment of Water Resources in Tibet And Implications for Himalayan Region Sanjeev Prakash 235-238 Tapping Himalayan Water Resources: Problems, Opportunities and Prospects from a Bhutanese Perspective Bhim Subba 239-247 Priority and Institutional Development Kamala Prasad 249-259 Interstate Sharing of Water Rights: An Alps-Himalaya Comparison Dipak Gyawali and Othmar Schwank 261-270 Developmental Impact in Krishna River Basin: Conflicts and Alternaties Shomashekhara T. S. Reddy 271-283

CONFLICT AND COOPERATION Himalayan Water Resources Development: Bilateral Action, Regional Consideration and International Assistance T. Prasad 285-293 The Case for “New Thinking” M. R. Josse 295-303 Himalayan Waters: Need for a positive Indo-Nepal Cooperation Govind D. Shrestha 305-312 Water Resources of Nepal: Key to Indo-Nepalese Relations Pitambar D. Kaushik 313-319 Politics of Water Power in Nepal Rishikesh Shaha 321-329 Media: The Missing “Fourth Dimension” of Water Resource Development Binod Bhattarai and Rajendra Dahal 331-340 International Inland Waters Thom as Hofer 341-347

Table of contents.pmd 63 2/8/2010, 4:25 PM EPILOGUE Understanding the Himalaya-Ganga: Widening the Research Horizon and Deepening Cooperation Ajaya Dixit and Dipak Gyawali 349-368

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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EDITORIAL POLICY

Water Nepal is published two times a year by Nepal Water Conserva- tion Foundation. Water Nepal is a publication for planners, engineers, scientists, policy makers, and administrators engaged in water development and management. Its aim is to function as a forum for sharing experiences in different aspects of water resource development. Each issue of Water Nepal includes summaries of new techniques, reflections on current approaches in water development, management, research findings, and case studies of innovative practices including field experience. As a matter of policy Water Ne- pal publishes articles not published elsewhere. But pieces that are of policy relevance for Nepal, that serve educational purposes, will be included. Editorials, feature articles, and reports in Water Nepal will discuss water management problems, analysis of long term development needs and trends, dispute resolution, impact assessment and mitigation, overcoming weaknesses and ensuring institutional learning for sustainable water development; as well as balancing water development with social and environmental objectives at the micro, meso and macro levels by understanding the interdisciplinary relationship between water use and sustainability. Each issue of Water Nepal includes Editorial: Issue and Authors - an overview of the articles and authors in the issue. Viewpoint - a column that offers views on contemporary water development issues and provides a connecting thread to the views presented in the articles of the particular volume. Feature Articles - detailed presentations of theory and practices in water development. Members of Editorial Advisory Board and other peer reviewers review these. Reports on Gray Literature - summaries of account of past or current practice or field experience in Nepal and abroad. Book Review - books selected by the editorial board and reviewed by experts in the appropriate field. An Editorial Advisory Board of practitioners, scholars, and professionals involved in water development assists the editors in selecting materials included in Water Nepal . WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 1-7

PROLOGUE

THE HIMALAYA GANGA: CONTENDING WITH INTERLINKAGES IN A COMPLEX SYSTEM

DIPAK GYAWALI1 AND AJAYA DIXIT22

INTRODUCTION The Himalaya-Ganga System is the generic name given to the highland-lowland interactive complexity of South Asia. It consists of the highest mountain chain on this planet, and the diverse ecological zones together with the flora and fauna these mountains support. The rivers that originate here such as the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Indus are both a boon and a bane to an eighth of humankind living in the region who depend on them. The region encompasses a rich plurality of social systems incorporating within them hundreds of ethnic groups, scores of languages, half a dozen nation-states and virtually all the religions of the world. It is a system under the stress of change where the development needs of the people have to be defined and managed against the systemic capabilities of interlinked and changing parts of the complex biophysical environment. This system, and the dynamics of transformation of the whole and its parts, are a rich background for research by South Asian and international scholars to obtain an understanding of the challenges of managing within a complexity. The Himalaya-Ganga a System provides ample test cases of individual elements of ecological, social or developmental concerns that exhibit interlinkages between these elements. It is a region that provides some of the most extreme cases of environment-versus-development stresses. Therefore, insights gained here can lead to useful generalisations applicable to other parts of the world with less extreme contrast. The Himalaya-Ganga and its complex hydro-ecology can both learn and teach. By widening the research horizon and comparing it with other similar areas around the world, the region can benefit from the experiences of others as well as allow others to benefit from its natural ordeals.

1 Pragya, Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology (RONAST), Nepal. 2 Water Resources Engineer, Editor, Water Nepal.

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OVERVIEW OF A COMPLEXITY The H imalaya-Ganga System is a complex phenomen on undergoing dynamic transformation in all its elements. Broadly, the elements can be grouped under three interlinked and interacting systems: the living and non-living biophysical system, the human-built system consisting of the societal relations which express themselves in the civilisational layout of the region, and the symbolic system that encodes the hopes and aspirations, views and values of people who affect and are affected by what goes on in the other two systems. The apple can be sliced in many different ways, and each method of slicing can expose a cross-section that provides a different view of the one reality which is the whole apple. However, in dissecting a complexity of problems for policy purposes, one must consider whether a particular method of slicing will aid in exercising decisions or not. Distinguishing the overall environment as three interacting systems, as above, is important because the predicament of development and environment in the Himalaya-Ganga System has been perceived along very narrow disciplinary lines in the past, primarily as engineering or economic problems. The importance of ongoing transformations in the symbolic system and changes necessary in the social order for engineering or market economics to work before harmony among changing elements can ensure, have not been adequately appreciated. In order to regain harmony in the whole, the decision making process may have to tinker more creatively with the human-built and symbolic systems. Separating them out in broad cross-sections that allow for explicit analyses would be a necessary first step.

Biophysical Environment The living and non-living biophysical environment of the Himalaya-Ganga System is one of the most complex on this planet. Because of the tremendous verticality all the main ecological zones of the world-from tropical to arctic-are found here within a relatively short horizontal distance of a few hundred kilometres. This gradation allows a plethora of ecological niches within a relatively small area that support a rich diversity of life. Whether one talks of the number of geological strata, the species of butterflies, the hydrology of its groundwater or surface water sources or the diversity of fauna, the Himalaya-Ganga System is a collage of interdependent living and non-living biophysical plentitude. The myriad elements of the biophysical environment are fitting subjects for much reductionist research, which is urgently needed in the region. For example, it is said, the mapping of Himalaya soil fauna alone could absorb scores of PhD’s right now. The story repeats itself in geology, botany, hydrology, sedimentation, and every other discipline. From the perspectives of an holistic paradigm, what is also needed is a parallel process of synthesising research which is not being done at all or at least not being done

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intensely enough. At one level, the existing reductionist data base must be linked to other disciplines so that the implications can be distilled out for policy purposes. For example, the distinctive characteristics of some inhabitants of the soil fauna world must be matched with the requirements of certain crops of the region and with the economics of it all so that implications for agriculture as currently practiced, the agricultural policies pursued by governments which is mostly supplemented by large surface irrigation schemes, donor agencies and businesses (e.g. the use of subsidised chemical fertilisers and biocides) become clearer. At the other level, synthesising research must outstrip reductionist research and be in a position to pinpoint, in advance, where reductionist research may be most fruitful in contributing to useful policy dialogue and, therefore, should be pursued with vigorous financing. If, for example, the use of biocides and chemical fertilisers are running up against ‘limits to growth’ or the limits to national budgets (especially in poor developing countries), synthesising research must guide reductionist research in focusing limited resources for research on those characteristics of the soil fauna that may help address the larger questions.

Human-Built Environment As mentioned earlier, the Himalaya-Ganga System supports about an eighth of humankind in a variety of social systems. These social systems not only depend upon and interact with the biophysical environment but they are themselves undergoing a process of dynamic change, and at a fast pace. It is only natural to expect that these changes will reflect upon the biophysical environment too. Under the impact of modernisation, social systems of the Himalaya-Ganga region are undergoing more sisable and faster transmutations than ever in the past. While an important part of the change is in the symbolic environment discussed below, most of the indicators of change can be seen in the human-built environment of cities, villages, communication systems, movements of people, farming and livestock systems as well as in emerging trends towards an industrial civilisation. Kathmandu Valley, which is a political center surrounded by intense agriculture fields in former times, has in the last one decade of 1980-1990 added an extra third of its population to itself as it emerged as a major producer of garments and carpets for export. As a result, the waste absorptive capacity of the rivers of the valley has already been exhausted, urban encroachment on agriculture both in terms of land and labour has been rapid, shortages in existing water supply endemic and process of colonisation of ‘outside the valley water sources’ imminent. The search continues not just for water, but also for sites outside the valley for dumping its solid waste. All this while facing stiff bargaining by local community who have begun to demand price for dumping, much to the discomfort of the centralised operational mode. Similiar pictures

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can be drawn in Rawalpindi, Varanasi, Karachi or Dhaka. They can also be drawn from the perspectives of roads, trade, tourism or vegetable production. Much of what needs to be done in the social sciences research for the collage of diverse social systems within the Himalaya-Ganga region is as yet undone. The reasons lie in certain simplistic roadblocks to perceiving and analysing the human-built environment. One such roadblock is the ‘rabbit theory’ which sees population growth as the root of all evil and which prevents any further development of analytical thought beyond simply distribute family planning prophylactics. This theory has not been able to explain how a nuclear mountain family consisting of the brave, the squaw and the papoose can run the rural homestead when activities such as farming, livestock raising, trading, cooking, water and fuel-wood collecting are all full-time jobs. Nor does it explain the risk perception of the poor, brought about by high rate of infant mortality, where living children are the only insurance in sickness or old age. It also does not explain why overcrowded Hong Kong, or for that matter even Bombay, is prosperous compared to more sparsely populated areas or why people from such areas continue to flock to these overcrowded cities. Rural to urban migration continues, overall population continues to grow, and still the only things that limit population g rowth are wars, epidemics, d espotic g overnments and ‘bourgeoisification’. Much time and resources have been spent in the past decades only on distributing contraceptives, to little avail. Things that have an impact on population growth seem to lie in areas that are not within the ambit of conventional thinking. One such area is prosperity and its attendent ‘bourgeoisification’. The educated middle class in Asia has smaller families not because it is concerned about Malthusian limits and the future but because it has access to medicines that reduce changes of infant mortality, pension schemes that provide insurance in old age, and the opportunity to spend time in self-fulfilling hobbies and recreation that is not confined only to procreation, which is the case for the poor. Also important is that new evidence seems to indicate that the very primary data upon which the ‘rabbit theory’ is based is now increasingly being questioned and the large uncertainties in the numbers being exposed. Another roadblock is the culture of neoclassical economics. While many of its propositions are valid and have been substantiated, it is in the definition of their institutional boundary, and inbuilt mechanisms for filtering out countervailing views, that the problem arises. The conditions under which efficient solutions can be found under neoclassical economics do not exist in the institutional milieu of much of South Asia where many of the environmental problems are unfolding to be of serious proportions. Those conditions (perfect information, externalities small enough not to distort free exchange, money that is aggressive capital, organisations that function as needed etc.) will not exist within the foreseeable future. While demand will universally go down when prices rise, prices

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themselves need to be expressed in metrics other than government-printed money, whether it be the increasing number of hours an idle farmer may have to spend to collect firewood or in the weight of public censure he may have to face if he lets his animals grase in socially fenced off areas. Perhaps collapsing anthropology and sociology into one ‘social science’ and economics and political science under it and bringing in good science as process of continuous questioning will allow a fresh look at the South Asian societies and an understanding of what makes them tick, what makes those states ‘weak’ in Myrdalian sense but why other institutions within those ‘weak’ states are so strong and resilient as to survive wars, monsoon failures, earthquakes, and colonisation. These are only two of many examples of the various roadblocks of conventional thinking that need to be re-examined regarding perceptions of the human-built system if its impact on the biophysical system is to be properly assessed. What were previously components of the problem (population, institutional ‘weaknesses’ etc.) need to become important elements of the solution. But to achieve that fruitful transition, the North and the South must see each other as mutual, and not with one as an active solution giver to all problems and the other a passive and hapless recipient of help. And those in the South should seriously begin to think how they should change to fit in this new role.

Symbolic Environment A very significant uncharted territory is the symbolic system of the South and understanding of how it is reacting and interacting with that of the North. That the symbolic environment (sometimes also called the socio-cultural or spiritual environment) affects the human built as well as the natural biophysical systems perhaps does not have to be disputed. If the ancient Hindus who believed they were merely custodians of the land and not its masters were replaced by a population of western industrialists holding views exactly otherwise, the Himalaya would probably by now have seen a lot of high dams. A poor population cherishing religious beliefs denouncing birth control will probably grow faster than a similarly impoverished population without such a value system. A trekking expedition desperately in need of fuel-wood to heat a hot water bath would not mind scattering what would be princely sums in marginal areas even if it meant logging sacred groves protected by animistic taboos and grasing forests whose sanctity is maintained by kinship understandings. It is estimated that the world of market economies spends almost 200 billion dollars in advertising the good life. When a poor boy in the hills five walking days away from the nearest road-head sees this eldorado of the ‘good life’ day in and day out at the local shop, when radio programmes, satellite television and magazines constantly bombard gods of debatable utility, when a billion South Asians and another billion East Asians are finally convinced that they must all have flush toilets and two cars one cannot expect that the biophysical environment will not reach or even cross the limits of stress. The human-built

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environment will then be subject to battles or privilege assertion as scarce resources are parceled out to an ever more clamorous populace. This battle – the Huns battering at the gates of Rome – will not spare the elites either of the North or the South. One example of a set of beliefs that have shaped human behaviour in recent times is the almost messianic faith in the powers of technology, and technology alone, without its relation to society and its political economy, to come up with solutions. Nowhere is this belief more ingrained than in, again, neoclassical economics where the power of technology to find a substitute or replacement for any item of scarcity is unquestioned. The fact that technology, like many other things, too is subject to the laws of diminishing returns has not been pursued to greater depths. Easy substitution may be true for luxury and consumer items; it may even be true for some industrial parts, many of which are too energy inefficient to start with anyway. It is, however, doubtful if natural resources can be substituted indefinitely without transferring a large share of the costs to the environment. Jute and rubber were substituted by plastic to the detriment of Bangladeshi and Malaysian producers, and rice grow in the deltas of the Mississippi and the Chao Phrya are in the process of being substituted at least in international trade by that grown in the deserts of Southern California; but all this has been made possible ‘only by drawing on the expense account of the carbon bank in the petrochemical cycle’. The search for answers to questions that emerge from these policy regimes expose even bigger gaps in knowledge and understanding which cannot be filled easily or obtained in the near future. All that can be hoped for at this stage of development is to interject some amount of lateral thinking which will allow the hidden elements of the holistic picture to emerge and achieve salience.

REGAINING HARMONY The experience of past efforts an intervention into the regime of Himalayan water courses has many lessons that need to be understood and assimilated into our concept and practices of water resource development. The first is that water-related issues need to be addressed in broader terms. Single-mission bureaucracies focused on civil engineering construction have been unable to address the broader issues, thus relegating, the problems therein to ‘externalised costs’. Worse, single-mission outfits (see Thompson in this volume) have in-built institutional filters which prevent such concerns even from being acknowledged until they assume crisis proportions. The second major lesson is that water resource development must be approached with a ‘people first’ attitude rather than a ‘technological tools first’ thrust which has so far guided the planning and building of intervention structures. Technological tools come with their social carriers and unleashing a new technology onto an unprepared socio-system can mean the prosperity of the social carriers at the expense of massive marginalisation of the unprepared recipients.

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Harmonious is the change that is understood by social institutions which are able to prepare themselves for it. Disharmony, conflict, underdevelopment and marginalisation come from changes that the system is not braced for. The key here are institutions. Water, whether at the micro or macro-levels, is managed by institutions. They in turn, are sustained by their cosmologies. Preparing institutions for change needs tinkering with their views and, eventually, the way they do business. Technology and haute finance driven change does not tinker but blunders about with a heavy foot. Such changes in the past have not been sensitive enough to the larger picture. This search for the broader framework was what the Kathmandu Meeting was all about. As the first preliminary probing of its kind, the meeting attempted to get scholars, diplomats, journalists and political scientists from South Asia and the North together to search for the answers. The meeting hoped to generate a more aggressive and ‘open research agenda’ for the appropriate tools to measure environmental performance other than the efficiency of the cash economy. It has implications for the state, the business community and those concerned with environmental protection as well as trying to secure better distributive justice for the poor.

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VIEWPOINT

ECOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF HIMALAYAN WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

JAYANTA BANDYOPADHYAY1 AND DIPAK GYAWALI2

ABSTRACT

The Himalayan mountain system is the source of one of the world’s largest supplies of fresh water. Major rivers include the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Mekong, and Yangtse. In some years one or more of these rivers and their tributaries cause devastating floods, yet their waters are also the lifeblood of one of the greatest concentrations of population on earth. This paper reviews the ecological aspects of water management and discusses a wide range of socioeconomic and political issues. The enormous hydroelectric potential is partially offset by the hazardous factors of slope instability, high sediment discharge, extremes in flow, and vulnerability of structures to seismic activity. Ecological and hydrological data are unavailable and recent developments are biased in favour macro-projects for the benefits of industry and the economy of the plains. The complex of issues is exaggerated by political rivalries within the region, both international and intra-national. The conclusion emphasises the need for major institutional changes and for attention to micro-projects and the well-being of mountain communities, as well as for sharing and publicising ecological and hydrological data. Without substantial rethinking, the possibility for sustainable utilisation of this great natural resource is remote, and the prospects for dissipation of vast resources, and even irreparable damage, are considerable.

INTRODUCTION The Himalaya, considered in the broadest sense, include the Hindukush, Karakoram, Pamirs, Hengduan Mountains, and parts of the Tibetan Plateau, as well as the Himalaya proper. This vast complex of high mountains, intermontane valleys, and plateaus produce one of the world’s largest renewable supplies of fresh water. It is essential for the survival and well-being of almost one billion people, most of whom live on the surrounding plains. The interdependence of high density population centers, mountains, and rivers is as old as civilisation itself, since some of the earliest manifestations of complex human organisation

1 Visiting Professor (Research), International Academy of the Environment, 1231 Conches, Geneva, Switzerland. 2 Pragya, Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology (RONAST), Nepal.

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arose along rivers such as the Indus, Ganges, Mekong, and Yangtse. The extreme relief of the Himalaya, which rise from the plains to more than 6,000 m in a horizontal distance of a few lens of kilometers, imparts special qualities to the river system: enormous energy potential and numerous storage sites for the control of annual variability--important factors for large-scale irrigation, hydroelectricity, navigation, and flood control. By virtue of their importance to an extremely large geographical area which reaches far beyond the limits of the mountains. This paper identities the more significant aspects of human intervention, at the micro- level and macro-level, for maximising of economic advantages of the huge volume of water particularly in the Himalaya-Ganga region. Three facets of Himalaya water resource management are discussed: water quality, distribution, and variability; prospects for expansion of sustainable water resource management; and required institutional arrangements, both at micro-and macro-scales as well as governmental levels. Because of the wide range of scientific, technological, social, and political issues associated with Himalayan water management, only those central to broad policy development will be considered.

WATER RESOURCE VARIABILITY The pattern of runoff from the Himalaya, its timing and intensity, is governed by the quantity and distribution of precipitation and its form, whether solid or liquid, and seasonality. The heaviest rainfall of the summer monsoon occurs on the eastern foothills and produces the strongest effects on rivers such as the Mekong, Brahmaputra, and Ganges. In contrast, toward the northwest, the predominance of high-altitude winter snowfall increases; thus the flow of the Indus is mainly determined by snowmelt and by ablation of some of the world’s largest glaciers outside of the polar regions. While Cherrapunji in the east provides one of the world’s highest annual rainfall totals (11,615 mm), the valley floors of northern Pakistan depend absolutely on snowmelt and ice-melt irrigation. Thus, the first major characteristic of the rainfall pattern is that of decreasing amounts along the Himalayan arc from east to northwest; this is matched by a general decrease from south to north with each successively higher topographic alignment, from the Siwalik foothills to the Greater Himalaya, producing windward maxima and leeward rainshadows, climaxing in the high-altitude aridity of the Tibetan Plateau. The summer monsoon, therefore, is the major supplier of water to the overall Himalayan mountain system. No precise quantification of total volume is possible, although Bandyopadhyay (1992a) has compiled a preliminary assessment of the annual runoff of the major rivers. Table 1 presents the average annual runoff in excess of 1,400 billion m3 (billion cubic meters BCM). The region as a whole can be divided into five sectors in terms of water resources (1) the river basins of the Hengduan Mountains; (2) the Yarlungtsangpo Brahmaputra; (3) the Ganges; (4) the Indus; and (5) the zone of dispersed lakes north

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of the Himalayan crest line. This simple division must be accepted in conjunction with the immense variations, in both water volume and altitude, along the lengths of each of the primary rivers and their tributaries. For instance, as the Yarlungtsangpo enters India its name changes to the Dihang; when it exits the mountains onto the plains of Assam and until it joins the Ganges, it becomes the Brahmaputra; during this distance there is a five- fold increase in the volume of water carried. Within each major river basin division there are large variations so that generalisation across the entire Himalayan region is not possible.

TABLE 1 ANNUAL RUNOFF IN THE MAJOR HIMALAYAN RIVERS

River System Average Annual Runoff (BCM) Meghna 141.9 Yarlungtsangpo 139.5 Brahmaputra 606.8 Ganges 371.61 Indus 143..62

1. This figure does not include contribution of tributaries that do not originate in the Himalayan region 2. This flow approximates the total Himalayan output of the tributaries of the Indus

Source: Bandyopadhyay (1992a); Das Gupta (1994); and Shahjahan (1983).

It is the spatial and temporal variation in water flow, however, that has impeded the uniform and continuous growth in effective resource utilisation. The spatial variation is significant throughout the Himalaya region and the temporal variation imposes immense difficulty for year-round water utilisation in the densely populated plains. Thus, water scarcity may haunt some areas while elsewhere croplands are flooded and settlements inundated. Consequently, acquisition of an extensive data base of climatic and hydrologic parameters should be a major objective for all the countries that share access to Himalayan resources. Currently, however, the existing data base is woefully inadequate. Dut to relative inaccessibility of the mountain areas and their extreme complexity, no systematic recording station network has been possible. On the plains, the data base that exists, although appreciable, is of limited value because most information, especially the hydrologic data, is not made available internationally.

GROWTH OF PRESSURE ON WATER RESOURCES The traditional pattern of Himalayan water use has been dominated by irrigation and domestic requirements of the mountain societies. The supply of drinking water in the mountains, with some urban exceptions, still depends upon direct drawing of water from streams and springs; this is done primarily by women, who often have to walk considerable

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distance over difficult terrain. Gravity diversion and distribution of surface water by local village organisations is an ancient practice. In all parts of the Himalaya locally built irrigation systems are still functioning under the management of various types of village institutions. The scale of this level of utilisation, however, is insignificant when compared with the total annual water availability and large areas where agriculture depends upon direct rainfall. On the one hand, the primary mountain characteristic of verticality (Bandyopadhyay, 1992b) restricts the spatial limits of gravity irrigation on hillslopes. In many areas crops growing only 30 m above a stream may fail due to drought. This spatial distribution of abundance and scarcity is the factor that restricts the transformation and growth of agricultural throughout the Himalayan region. The pumping of water to alleviate this problem is costly and may require both technological and institutional innovation. On the other hand, the verticality has been exploited for centuries in the construction of water mills, still widely used for processing food grains and for local small-scale manufacturing. The increase in accessibility, particularly in recent decades, has attracted the attention of non-local interest groups. As roads and air transport have penetrated the Himalaya, scientists and engineers have obtained more precise estimate of the hydrological potential and have been able to determine the feasibility of water utilisation for industry and settlements on the plains. This has led to the beginning of pressure for greater utilisation of Himalayan water. Verghese (1990), for instance, makes a strong plea for human intervention as a basis for fighting poverty, undoubtedly the major socioeconomic characteristic of a large proportion of the present lowland population. Verghese’s plea is relevant, but it stresses the need for macro-level projects. Van der Velder (1992), in contradistinction, while discussing the uplands and fertile plains of the Indus basin, emphasises the needs of the mountain communities whose poverty is probably much greater than that of the lowland poor; this focuses on the need for small-scale interventions. The needs of the mountain communities and those of the plains represent a two-pronged demand; future management of the vast Himalayan water potential will have to face this apparent dichotomy. The need for flood control in the foothill areas to protect the lowland interests was the motivation for large-scale Himalayan water intervention. Demands for irrigation water and hydroelectricity accelerated with the transformation of the agricultural and industrial economies of the plains. The availability of irrigation water was the foundation for the Green Revolution on the plains. The rapid growth of urban-industrial areas has created enormous pressures for hydroelectricity development to complement the production of thermal power plants, especially during the peak demand period. More recently, water supplies for the major cities and for water transportation have become vital. All these pressures have combined to promote construction of large dams to ensure the necessary modulation of water flow.

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Dam-building activities have been most intensive on the Ganges, and Indus, river systems due to a variety of reason, including proximity of urban centers and fertile agricultural land and availability of water storage sites. In contrast, water development projects on the Brahmaputra and Meghna are in a preliminary stage only. Nevertheless, every government in the region has extensive plans for dams for both power production and flood control. In Nepal 89 power projects with an established potential capacity of 29,761 MW generating 145,050 GWh energy have been proposed (Gyawali, 1989) while the potential in Bhutan is estimated to be 40,400 GWh (Dhakal, 1990) and in Pakistan the power capacity is 20,777 MW (Marga Institute, 1981). In Bangladesh the 130 MW Kaptai project on the Karnaphuli in the Chittagong Hills is the only hydropower project in the country, yet its total potential is estimated at 1,500-2,000 MW (Shahjahan, 1993). For India the total hydropower potential has been projected at 65,600 MW at 60 per cent load factor. This comprises the Indus system (20,000 MW), the Ganges system (10,700 MW), and the Brahmaputra system (34,900 MW) (CWC, 1992). The upper part of the Brahmaputra, the Yarlungtsangpo, has an estimated potential of 110,000 MW (Guan and Chen, 1981). It is apparent that actual and potential hydropower development is of major significance to Himalayan water uses. The estimates of potential hydropower, however, should be taken only as an order of magnitude in view of the unreliability of the data base (Thompson, 1986). Nevertheless, the expansion of irrigation networks in the outer foothills and adjacent plains must also be considered. Over the past few decades the major trend for irrigation has been the simple extension over larger areas. Finally, there is the factor of flood control. When this is introduced as one of the multiple objectives of any new large dam project, it greatly enhances it political acceptability, even when technical feasibility remains unconfirmed. The flood flow volumes of many of the rivers are far greater than any possible storage capacity that could be provided by the proposed dams. Moreover, the causes of flooding on the plains and their relationship to the Himalaya remains an issue of great uncertainty (Hamilton, 1987; Ives, 1989; Ives and Messerli, 1989; Bruijnzeel and Bremmer, 1989; Rogers et al., 1989, Hofer, 1993). The growing pressure for greater utilisation of Himalayan waters derives largely, therefore, from the strong economic interests of the plains; this has influenced development investments in fundamental ways. Investments that are directly in the interests of the mountain communities, and which rapidly transform the Himalayan village economies, are far too marginal in a quantitative economic sense. Nevertheless, the possibilities for economic transformation, both within and adjacent to the Himalaya are enormous if only part of the water volume can be stored, or diverted, and distributed more uniformly in space and time. Any such process, however, must be integrated with an understanding of the regional environmental and social conditions.

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Unfortunately, many major decisions are being taken without either adequate ecological knowledge (Murthy, 1978) or understanding of the socioeconomic responses likely to follow. Engineering interests have dominated. Open discussion has been avoided. Whether this is due to consultants to the international financial institutions or to the tendency of environmentalists to oppose almost every proposed project, all appear to be guided by a reductionist understanding of the environment-development relationship. Despite increasing global concern over world economy and environment, data collection and analysis of the ecology of the Himalayan waters has remained minimal. Without extensive studies, a policy framework for sustainable water management will remain elusive.

PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE MANAGEMENT The positive aspects of Himalayan water resource management, as indicated above, have been emphasised by Verghese (1990). While this viewpoint is not necessarily unrealistic, the technological and institutional mechanisms necessary for realisation of the region’s enormous potential are in a state of great uncertainty, most aptly described as the Himalayan Dilemma by Ives and Messerli (1989). Ill-informed intervention, guided by short-term economic or political objectives, can generate negative externalities of damaging dimensions. The unfortunate history of recent large-scale interventions provides ample evidence of the dangers involved. Many human interventions, such as the construction of road and rail networks, efforts at river bank control, and large-scale dam construction, are now being identified as new and major factors that induce flooding. Referring to the widespread construction of river embankments in Bangladesh, in 1964 Thijsee, a Dutch hydrologist, wrote ‘the danger would be very real that an improvement of conditions in one place (due to embankments) would result in a catastrophe somewhere else.’ As an example, the River Indus delta, due to dams and barrages upstream, has experienced marine encroachment with reduction in land area from 3,000 to 250 km 2 (Hasan, 1992). It is proposed here that the challenge facing the sustainable management prospects for Himalayan water resources represents one of the biggest expressions of environment- development dichotomy in the world today. The social dislocation already caused by large- scale suffering from dam-related displacements of people and inadequate rehabilitation has extended the disasters from natural to human dimensions. It follows that a plains bias, built into the development policies of various nation states has given a great emphasis for macro-level development. Micro-level development options have received only limited attention. Thus, the negative human and socioeconomic aspects of macro-scale development, introduced above, have been accompanied by comparable neglect of the mountain inhabitants. Urban societies and industry have been the beneficiaries while remote mountain societies and subsistence farmers on the plains and foothills have had to bear

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much of the cost. Future management interventions need to be sensitive to balancing macro- level and micro-level requirements. Macro-level management is defined as diversion and storage of flood-flows in the main rivers and tributaries to achieve more effective flood- damage protection, hydroelectricity generation, irrigation, and urban-industrial water supply. This is predominantly the plains bias. Micro-level management, in contrast, involves making small but vital quantities of water available for domestic and agricultural purposes for the mountain villages. This should include soil conservation and protection from flash floods in micro-watersheds, small-scale hydropower utilisation at local levels, and irrigation.

MACRO-LEVEL STORAGE AND DIVERSION OF HIMALAYAN WATERS The protection of farmlands and human settlements from droughts and floods along the entire Himalayan foothill zone, form the Yangtse basin in the east to the Indus basin in the west, has become as major objective over the last few decades. The proposed multi- purpose high dam (270 m) at the Chisapani gorge on the Karnali River is planned to generate 10,800 MW and 20,843 GWh/yr of energy in addition to irrigation some 3.4 Mha of farmland upstream of the Ganges confluence. The Chisapani gorge site would interpose the major storage facility before the Karnali debouches onto the flat plains of the Tarai. Embankments along river courses have been the main protective device against flooding for centuries (Sain and Rao, 1955). The sustainability and efficiency of massive embankment construction as a permanent flood defense, however, especially where the rivers carry such heavy silt concentrations, has come under serious debate (Hui, 1955). Experience of large dam construction in temperate latitudes has enhanced the image of this alternative approach. When the additional purposes of hydropower development and irrigation are taken into consideration the construction of high dams becomes an attractive investment objective. Between the early 1950s and 1990 there has been an enormous amount of intervention, including embankments, barrages, and high dams. A more recent development has been planning for construction of high dams at higher altitudes and away from the foothill zone; the Arun River project in Nepal is one example. These large-scale approaches to Himalayan water resource management represent the plains bias (Bandyopadhyay, 1991). In this context the mountain people are largely ignored even though there is little conflict between the two options. Yet the macro-scale approach entails the application of increasingly larger magnitudes of civil engineering technology in more stable mountain areas of Western Europe an North America its utilisation for management of Himalayan rivers may entail serious problems for a variety of reasons. In the first place, the plains under consideration are highly fertile and hence densely populated. Nevertheless, a combination of extensive embankment construction, high dams, and large-scale water diversions has greatly enhanced water storage capacity

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(Hannan, 1989; Rogers et al., 1989). Almost all rivers prone to flash floods had been embanked as early as the eighteenth century (Saran Gazetteer, 1930). To date, embankments cover a substantial part of the entire length of the Ganges-Brahmaputra system extending to tens of thousands of kilometers. Nevertheless, this greatly enhanced storage capacity remains rather insignificant in comparison with the total annual flood flow. The arguments in favour of such interventions, however, are made on the basis of predicted reduction in peak flows and proportional argumentation of lean flows. The stored water also is increasingly used for peak-power production, irrigation, and urban usage. The magnitude of dam construction can be illustrated by the following breakdown according to major river basins: Indus in India, 59 dams; Ganges basin, 56 dams; Brahmaputra Basin, 37 dams either complete or planned (CWC, 1992). The greatest political pressure for these large dams is provided by the industrial sector. The mix of thermal power and hydropower in India is approaching a proportion of 60:40. It is only through large dam projects that otherwise unusable base power can be incorporated into pump storage schemes and for peak demand generation. From the Indian perspective, there is no doubt that the major engineering programme itemised above has made an important contribution to the country’s economic growth. Nevertheless, this has also incurred a variety of losses, and the very sustainability of this scale of human intervention is now under debate. Embankments and large dams have become focal points for conflict between developers and environmentalists in many of the foothill areas. The economic viability of the large-scale projects is also being challenged and future management policy will depend to a large extent on how these conflicts are understood and resolved. Analysis of the development environment entanglement is an essential starting point, for any attempt to entertain new policy departures. For instance, embankments on the Meghna have been blamed for enhanced flooding in Bangladesh (Huda, 1989). Similar construction in North Bihar and Nepal has raised questions, not only concerning long- term sustainability but about the basis of the technological interventions themselves. In addition, the big dam projects, such as China’s proposed Three Gorges Dam and India’s Tehri Dam on the Bhagirathi, have become matters of global concern. Part of the opposition to these projects by the so-called ‘no-dam’ lobbyists should be ignored because of their sensationalism. Nevertheless, there are many reasons why such large-scale engineering projects should not be unconditionally accepted as an economic panacea, as many engineers and financing institutions insist. A full understanding of the dimensions of these development environment conflicts would emerge from examinations of the rich experiences derived from the construction of embankments or dams. Obstacles exist that render such an approach extremely difficult: competent studies of the dozens of projects

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over a period of decades are rare; official secrecy or environmental sensationalism obstruct reliable ecological evaluations.

HIGH DAMS ON HIMALAYAN RIVERS From evidence to date, it is apparent that the concept of large dams on the Himalayan rivers originated in strategies for flood control. Later, such dams came to be perceived as feeders for irrigation water and for the generation of hydroelectricity, especially to satisfy peak power demand. The extent and rate of dam construction has paralleled that of embankment development in Bihar after 1954. These dams have been described as the panacea for the poor people of the Himalayan region. A Nepalese Prime Minister promised at a mass meeting that ‘Nepal would be developed like Singapore if we could implement the Pancheswor and Karnali hydroelectric projects’ (The Rising Nepal, 15 Nov. 1990). In many parts of the world big dams have been opposed on the basis of their perceived ecological unsustainability and the social problems of displacement and rehabilitation of the large numbers of people in their path. Who gains and who suffers from the big dams has become a global concern. The question of ecological sustainability and social justification cannot be answered without consideration of all the related issues. There are both general issues and specific issues that require investigation if a critical review of large dams is to be undertaken. Goodland, Juras, and Pachauri (1992) have raised questions about the general justification of hydropower dams which submerge tropical moist forests. A detailed study of Brazil’s Balbina Dam in Amazonia, showed that the power from Balbina Dam will largely benefit the international companies that have established factories at the Manaus Free Trade Superintendary Zone (SUFRAMA) at the expense of residential consumers throughout the country (Fearnside, 1989). The mammoth Three Gorges project on the Yangtse has been heavily criticised by many anti-dam groups in North America (Ryder, 1992), while an independent review of the Sardar Sarovar Dam in India exposed serious weaknesses in project implementation even at the level of the World Bank (Morse and Berger, 1992). This resulted in strict conditions being imposed by the Bank in terms of its financial agreement. The experience in India gained from the earlier embankment period has been interposed in the current discussion about the sustainability of the large dams. Within this overall context, the disputes surrounding the planned Tehri Dam Project (TDP) on the Bhagirathi River in the Garhwal Himalaya provides an excellent example which is detailed below. The debate on this project has attained such an unusual level of sophistication that it can serve as a vital contribution to understanding the broad issue of Himalayan water resource management. The Tehri Dam site was identified as one of many such sites during the post- independence era of rapid industrialisation. A proposal to construct a 260.5 m high rock-

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filled earthern dam one km downstream of the town of Tehri was approved by the Indian Planning Commission in 1972 with administrative clearance at the state level in 1976. Opposition was instigated in 1977 by the local Anti-Tehri Dam Committee, primarily because of the scale of human displacement; this included opposition to the potential submergence of village with extensive fertile land. From this beginning the opposition progressed through several stages leading up to a major environmental critique and a debate on the overall resource management policy (Bandyopadhyay, 1992). It is this evolution of the dispute that renders the Tehri Dam Projects as representative of most of the high dams of the Himalayan region. The critical environmental turning point in the antidam movement was reached in 1978 when a massive landslide dam-burst occurred on the Kanodiagad River in the upper Bhagirthi catchment. This produced a devastating flood after failure of the landslide dam, and provided the Anti-Tehri Dam Committee with a dramatic example to illustrate the potential threat of a possible future breach of the proposed man-made dam. The Kanodiagad landslide was identified as the result of deforestation in the upper Bhagirathi catchment. In contrast, the Forest Department blamed overgrasing, thus naming the local people as the apparent cause. The positive outcome of this relatively ill-informed debate was that the federal Department of Science and Technology established a Working Group on the Environmental Impact Assessment of the Tehri Dam in December 1979. The Working Group initiated studies on the ecological sustainability and environmental impact assessment of the proposed dam. Systematic cost-benefit analysis and ecological audit were prepared by Paranjpye (1988) and Bandyopadhyay (1990) respectively. These and other studies eventually became the background material for the rejection of the Tehri Dam Project by the Environmental Appraisal Committee (EAC) of the Environment Ministry of the federal government. The main elements of this negative opinion are concerns about rehabilitation of local people, siltation of reservoirs, and seismicity.

Rehabilitation The scale of large dam construction planned for the Himalayan region, and those already completed, is producing a flood of development refugees. The displaced people then either cause illegal forest damage and eke out a meagre living as squatters, or else add to the urban slums. This large-scale suffering is a basis for the government’s subsidy of cheap water and power for the economies of the plains. The debate on the Tehri Dam Project, therefore, has brought into sharp focus hidden costs that have emerged as a major human rights issue. This critically questions the social acceptability of such undertakings. The most important problem of the Tehri Dam Project is the prospective displacement of about 100,000 inhabitants of the projected submersion zone and the need for adequate compensation. National policy stipulates that the "living standards of those

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displaced should be maintained at least at the same level, if not improved, to what they were prior to their involuntary displacement" (EAC, 1990). In most foothills areas of the Himalaya, population pressure is extremely high and availability of land for relocation is severely limited. It has been customary to award cash compensation, but this is unsatisfactory for many reasons.

Siltation and Economic Life of Reservoirs A major factor in assessment of the economic life of large dams is sedimentation, both suspended material and bedload. The Himalayan rivers carry some of the highest sediment loads in the world. Furthermore, the sediment load of each river varies enormously from year to year. The manner of sediment of load calculation at the Tehri Dam site has completely ignored the basic dynamics of sediment discharge and deposition of the Himalayan rivers. The initial calculation on the economic life of the Tehri Dam was based upon the observed siltation rate behind the Bhakra Dam, which is located in a different topographical setting and experiences a different climate. The interim report of the Environmental Impact Assessment (Roy et al., 1980) had recommended systematic data collection on sediment load in several locations, yet the absence of hydro-ecological knowledge is apparent from the way the silt load calculations wee made. Data for silt load below the confluence were available for 1973-1987 (except 1979); however, the silt load that would eventually enter the planned reservoir should have been measured upstream and not downstream of the dam. The 1979 data were deliberately omitted because the silt load was ‘extraordinary’ (i.e., very high), caused by a massive landslide in August 1978 about 68 km upstream of the dam site. This of course, overlooks the fact that sediment production in Himalayan rivers is notoriously non-uniform; the so-called ‘extraordinary’ sediment pulses are a main element of the overall sediment load, and landslide disruption is characteristic. Because of this omission, calculated average sedimentation will be significantly underestimated. The heavy siltation of 1978-79 was preceded by a comparable, an heavier, siltation year (1968- 69) and followed by similar landslide-induced sedimentation in 1992. Thus, the rate of filling of the dead storage capacity cannot be estimated realistically. The useful life expectancy calculations, therefore, are highly inflated.

Seismicity and Dam Safety The most intense campaign against the large dams in the Himalaya has centered around the issue of seismicity and dam safety. The potential for earthquake disaster along the Himalayan plate boundary has been analysed by Khattri, (1987) and many others. Many of the Himalayan dams, completed, in progress, or planned, are in close proximity to areas of intense seismic activity. The Tehri Dam is being constructed close to the srinagar thrust

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fault, which has registered many small-magnitude quakes. Larger magnitude quakes (7.6 on the Richter scale) occurred in 1928 and more recently in 1991. The original design assumption of magnitude 6.6 in the Tehri have been strongly objected by dam oponents. Comparing the acceptance of the design of the Tehri dam in the U.S.A., Brune (1990) wrote, "I believe that there is no chance that a dam in similar circumstance as Tehri Dam could be licensed for 0.25 g in the U.S.A." Expressing similar concern about the Tehri Dam’s safety, Valdiya (1991) wrote that "the controversial 260.5 m high Tehri Dam will come up on a location about four km south of the active Shrinagar Thrust cutting through a region that is likely to be rocked by future earthquakes of magnitude eight or higher" (Gaur, 1984; Gupta, 1984). In a more recent study Iyenger, a research engineer at the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, has charged a Government appointed Tehri expert committee with choosing a value of the peak ground acceleration (PGA) less than half the actual PGA that might result after an earthquake (The Statesman, 1993). This account of the uncertainty associated with the safety of the proposed dam is being given only to emphasise the need to examine all related issues before finalising the design of the dam or to deciding on its construction. There are some more significant elements in the views expressed in favour of a very cautious approach to the decisions on large dams. All these point to the immediate need for more reliable hydro-ecological knowledge of the Himalayan rivers, as well as due safeguards for structures that can withstand earthquakes of magnitude 7.5-8.0 on the Richter scale. Alternatives to dam- stored monsoon run-of too need serious evaluation. One recent study (Jones, 1988) for example, recommends that monsoon flood waters could be stored in deep aquifers in the plains adjacent to the foothills that have storage potential of an equivalent order of magnitude as the some of proposed high dams in the Himalaya. This option has not been adequately examined. From the above discussion, it is apparent that there is an urgent need for development of a much firmer understanding of Himalayan hydro-ecology and its application to evaluation of high dam technologies prior to any major decision-making. The overriding conclusion must remain, however, that macro-level intervention is seriously handicapped by the gross lack of ecological and hydro-geomorphologic knowledge.

MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF HIMALAYAN WATERS All the large-scale water management interventions have been criticised on the grounds of economic viability, safety, and social acceptability. There is one remaining criticism that so far has received scarce attention: the situation from the perspective of the mountain societies themselves. For example, both the Karnali project in Nepal and the Three Gorges project on the Yangstse are designed to respond to the demands on the plains. If there is any justification for building large dams in Nepal it is because of the hope that the inflow

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of revenue from the sale of power and irrigation water to India will lead to economic growth in Nepal. If such a resource flow to the mountain communities is not forthcoming, then it becomes difficult to justify the displacement of mountain and foothill communities that construction on the Karnali and Kosi rivers would necessarily entail. Despite the fact that an estimated US$ 250 million has been spent in Nepalese water-related studies in the last decade (USAID, 1992), no macro-economic impact analysis has been undertaken. There is no firm understanding of the risks to be faced by a small, poor country should a major project, such as Karnali that will cost several times its entire GNP, be undertaken (Gyawali, 1991). This prompts the question: if Nepal had access to six billion dollars (estimated cost of the Karnali project), would it be more beneficial to spend that money on Karnali with a thirteen year construction schedule, or would it be better to develop a range of much smaller energy schemes and other projects to improve agriculture, education, and to alleviate poverty? In the mountain communities the major source of energy is human muscle power. Most of the daily necessities of life, such as grain, oil, salt, and cloth, are transported by means of back-breaking portage over several days duration. It is estimated that three million Nepali’s are on the move as porters at any one time during a non-monsoon day (Joshi and Chitrakar, 1989). The large amount of female labour devoted to carrying drinking water and fuel is frequently referred to in the literature. All this must be judged against a backdrop of prevalent malnutrition, diversion of time from more productive activities, and the sheer drudgery and risk to health and life involved. Water resource development in the foothills and mountains for the local communities would involve primarily a reduction in drudgery. This must become a criterion for judging proposed development projects. In terms of total quantity of water, the micro-level approach may not even account for one per cent of the total available water volume and so would have no significant impact on the needs for macro-level utilisation. Nevertheless, in terms of possible transformation of the economic, environmental, and sanitary standards of the mountain communities, its enormous role cannot be overestimated. Given the physical situation of most mountain communities the main challenge to micro-level water management is to develop ways to retain the water at higher altitudes. Conservation and storage of water in rain-scarce areas should be readily achievable (Srivastava, 1983). Similarly, in rain-rich areas terracing, check-dams, and bank reinforcements would reduce bank erosion and mass wasting as well as enhance torrent control, allowing higher aquifer recharge at the local level. Primary requirements of mountain communities are safe drinking water within the villages, and irrigation water for gently sloping land far above stream beds. The limiting factor is energy. It is estimated that there are about, 17,000 farmer-managed irrigation systems in Nepal, mainly in the mountains, many of them dating back for centuries (Pradhan,

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1989). Government involvement in irrigation emerged only after World War I and as a response to an external interest (British India). The process accelerated after World War II following the change of regimes in both countries and the influx of foreign aid. State-led development activities in Nepal demonstrate a bias in irrigation that ignores or bypasses village communities. Only 3.97 Mha of Nepal’s total area of 14.75 Mha are cultivated. Of this, 2.37 Mha is hill and mountain land and 1.6 Mha is situated in the Tarai. Only 0.3 Mha of the hill land is potentially irrigable and of this slightly more than 50 per cent benefits from some form of actual irrigation. Over 90 per cent of this has been developed by the farmers themselves without government assistance (Gyawali, 1989). The case of rural water supply is similar. Nepal’s official figures for coverage of water supply are: 84 per cent urban; 19 per cent rural; country average, 23 per cent (ERL, 1988). And for rural coverage, it can be assumed that most is available in the Tarai rather than in the hills. Additionally, of the many projects initiated with foreign donor participation during the Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade of the 1980’s very few continued to function after initial inauguration. In Gorkha District, for example, 48 of the 50 systems of a state-sponsored project ceased to function (Giri, 1992). The rapid proliferation of small-scale turbines and their growing popularity in recent decades in the mountains of Nepal is a testimony to micro-level water management. This involves use of direct power take-off for processing agricultural produce. A study was undertaken to determine how Nepali women used their extra leisure hours arising from this labor-saving in grain processing. It demonstrated that, while there was certainly a reduction in the level of drudgery, there was practically no saving in labour: the women would rather use the extra time so that they could get up 4:00 am rather than 2:00 am. They would also prefer to walk to the mill rather than monotonously pound grain in the home (East Consult, 1990). This highlights the fact that life in the hills, a continuous fight against verticality, must be judged in terms of the quality of labour and its impact on village lifestyle, and not simply the hours of actual labour. Energy needs in the hills must be judged against this background. Small decentralised energy systems, such as the micro-hydro schemes (700 installed by 1988), have demonstrated their ability to reduce drudgery. For oil expelling and rice hulling, this new technology is extremely attractive. These micro-hydro schemes have also provided electricity in about 20 per cent of the cases; the electricity fills mostly a social function in aiding night-time cottage industry, education, and in augmenting a general sense of well being. It may be argued that these types of benefits could be provided by extension of a central grid system at much lower cost. The apparently compelling logic of this must be tempered by the historical facts. The villages in the vicinity of the Trisuli hydro-plant in the Nuwakot District did not obtain electricity from a central grid until nearly two decades

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after the construction of the power plant. This situation was repeated in Sunkosi project in Sindhupalchok District. Following completion of the Kulekhani I project in Makwanpur District, it was only political agitation by foresighted local leaders of Makwanpur prior to inauguration that ensured relatively more rapid electrification of the surrounding villages. The lesson from these experiences is that grid-supplied electricity has been intended primarily for the interests of the urban and plains area. Local-level power production, therefore, should become an integral part of micro-level water management in the Himalaya.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE MANAGEMENT The two modes of future management of Himalayan waters, the macro-level and the micro- level, demonstrate the growing pressure for a higher degree of utilisation, as well as its possibilities. Once the need is established, however, an appropriate institutional framework must evolve. Nevertheless, water use not only integrates society, under conditions of scarcity it also causes disintegration (Priscoli, 1990). It is contended that any management approach must begin at the micro-level in the upper reaches of the rivers and extend downward through the length and breadh of the entire drainage basin. In this way, the micro-level and macro-level managements will be bound together ecologically and will be seen as interdependent. In the Himalaya this approach almost inevitably will cross international boundaries. Detailed account of conflicts and cooperation in relation to flooding in the Himalayan-Ganges region have been mentioned. There is solid precedent for mutually beneficial arrangements between India and Nepal regarding water resources in the agreements between India and Nepal regarding water resources in the agreements on the Kosi and Gandak rivers (Kattelmann, 1990). Piece-meal interventions at the national level will not suffice; interdependence is well recognised but will be difficult to promote (Gyawali, 1992). Nevertheless, the Indus Water Treaty can be taken as an example for optimism. The dispute between Pakistan and India over sharing the Indus canal system brought the two countries to the brink of war, yet protracted negotiations resulted in an effective treaty in 1960 (Khan, 1990). The Mekong River, originating in the Hengduan Mountains and passing through four riparian countries now has a famous record of coordinated management (Binson, 1983). The chances of any immediate results are remote because of the enormity of the problems and paucity of funds. However, even before organisational break-throughs are expected, the stark gaps in ecological information will have to be addressed by all the riparian countries. Following the Earth summit in Rio-de-Jeneiro, where the Heads of State of all the Himalayan region countries strongly urged ecologically sustainable development and pledged their individual commitment to fight poverty in South Asia, it is now time to take institutional organisational steps that are in tune with such commitments. The institutional framework for micro-level management is also in need of serious

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attention. Intricate social institutions have emerged in various parts of the mountains to manage the common water resources for irrigation. External interventions through foreign- founded projects are often ignorant of such institutions. As a result the new interventions often become counter-productive. What is most valuable about existing organisations is that they already have procedures for decision-making, patterns of communication, and means for building consensus and resolving conflicts (Uphoff, 1985). A similar example of cautious and sensitive intervention based on the recognition of indigenous institutions is found in the Meichuan Irrigation Project north of the Yangtse River. Here the state-owned reservoirs and canals have been linked with the local ponds owned by the village (Nickhum, 1982). There are many such experiences of institutional innovation for ecologically sustainable and socioeconomically acceptable management of water resources at the local level. The challenge involved in the ecological management of Himalayan water resources are as immense as are the positive prospects. Within the scope of this paper only a few indications can be given. Institutional strengthening, institutional flexibility, and institutional innovation all are needed. The main elements of the institutional question can be summarised in the following conclusions.

1. Institutional changes are needed for more intensive and extensive collection of hydrological an ecological information at national levels; open availability of project documents and new study of the performance of executed projects should be arranged. 2. A flexible and collaborative framework for project design and implementation is required at international levels. 3. Careful and sensitive collaboration between local and non-local institutions for micro- level management of water resources must be achieved. 4. Strengthening of national level expertise for project monitoring and environmental impact assessment based on extended benefit-cost analysis and broadly based ecological information will be essential. 5. Due importance must be given to the fact that the mountain communities have a greater right to benefit from mountain water. Appropriate legal institutions should be developed to protect the mountain people from the plains bias.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This is an abridged version of the paper by Bandyopadhyay and Gyawali ‘Himalayan Water Resources: Ecological and Political Aspects of Management’ published in Mountain Research and Development, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1994 pp. 1-24, by the University of California Press for United Nations University and International Mountain Society. This abridged version only

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picks up the management issues from a Hydroecological perspective that the authors propound and, for reasons of space, does not do justice to the case studies as well as the non-South Asian issues. WATER NEPAL thanks MRD and its editor Pauline Ives for the kind permission to use the material.

REFERENCES Bandyopadhyay, J., 1991: Mountain development: Plain’s bias, Himal, Vol. 4, No. 1, Kathmandu. ——, 1992a: The Himalaya: Prospects for and Constrains on Sustainable Development, In Stone, P. (ed.), The State of the World’s Mountains Zed Books, London. ——, 1992b: On the Perception of Mountain Characteristics, World Mountain Network Newsletter, 7 :5 -7 . ——, 1992c: One Flood Report and Some Muddy Reviews, Himal, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 39-40, Kathmandu. ——, 1992d: Sustainability and Survival in the Mountain Context, Ambio, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 297-302. Binson, B., 1983: The Lower Mek ong Basin Development, In zamman, M. (ed.), River Basin Development, Tycooly, Dublin, pp. 69-84. Bruinzeel, L. A. and Bremmer, C. N., 1989: Highland-Low lan d In teract ions in th e Ganges- Brahmaputra River Basin, Occasional Paper 11, ICIMOD, Kathmandu. Brune, J. N., 1990: Private Communication to V. Gaur, Department of Ocean Development, New Delhi. CWC (Central Water commission), 1992: Water Resources and Hydropower Potential in India, Government of India, New Delhi. Dasgupta, S. P. (ed.), 1984: The Ganga Basin: Parts I and II, Centre for the Study of Man and Environment, Calcutta. Dhakal, D. N. S., 1990: Hydropower in Bhutan, A Long-term Development Perspective, Mountain Research and Development, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 291-300. East-Consult, 1990: Socioeconomic Evaluation of the Impact of Micro-Hydro Schemes on Rural Communities of Nepal Kathmandu. EAC (Environmental Appraisal committee), 1990: Environmental Appraisal of the Multi-purpose Tehri dam Project, Ministry of Environment and Forests, New Delhi. ERL (Environmental Resources Limited), 1988: Natural Resource Management for Sustainable Development: A study of Feasible Policies, Institutions and Investment Activities in Nepal with Special Emphasis on th e Hills, In cooperation with HMG National Planning Commission, London. Feamside, P. M., 1989: Brazil’s Balbina Dam: Environment versus the legacy of Pharons in Amazonia. Environmental Management, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 401-423. Gaur, V. K., 1984: Report of the National Geophysical Research Institute, Hyderabad, Unpublished. Giri, B. B., 1992: Water, Environment and Management: Two Ends of the Decade, Presented at the 18th WEDC Conference organised by the Water Engineering and Development Center of Loughborough University of Technology, Leicestershire UK and Nepal Engineers’ Association, Kathmandu. Goodland, R., Juras, A. and Pachauri, R., 1992: Can Hydro-Reservoirs in Tropical Moist Forest be

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Made Environmentally Acceptable? Energy Policy, pp. 507-515. Guan, Zhi-hua and Chen Chuan-you, 1981: Hydrographic Features of the Yarlung Zangbo River, In Liu, D. S. (ed.), Geological Studies of the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau, Science Press, Beijing, No. 2, pp. 1693-1704. Gupta, S. K., 1984: Seismicity in the Vicinity of Dams in the Himalayan Rivers, Journal of the Geological Society of India, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 85. Gyawali, D. 1989: Water in Nepal, Occasional Paper No. 8, EAPI, East-West Center, Honolula. ——, 1991: Troubled policies of Himalayan waters, Himal, Vol. 4, No. 2. ——, 1992: Nepal-India Water Resources Relations: Negotiations Under Asymmetric Conditions, Paper presented to processes of International Negotiations Project of th e International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenborg, Forthcoming (1995) in J. Rubin (ed.) Power and Asymmetry in International Negotiations. Hamilton, L. S., 1987: What are the effects of Himalayan deforestation on the Ganges-Brahmaputra lowlands and delta? Mountain Research and Development, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 256-263. Hannan, A., 1989: Embankments for flood control in Bangladesh, In Ahmed, M. (ed.), Flood in Bangladesh, Community Development Library, Dhaka, pp. 159-171. Hasan, A., 1992: Death of the Indus delta, Down to Earth, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 25-28. Hofer, T., 1993: Deforestation, Changing River Discharge and Increasing Floods: Myth or Reality? Mountain Research and Development, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 213-233. Huda, N., 1989: Flood Control Proposals for Major River Systems in Bangladesh, In Ahmed, M. (ed.), Flood in Bangladesh, Community Development Library, Dhaka, pp. 116-131. Hui Teng Tse, 1955: Report on Multipurpose Plan for Permanently controlling the Yellow River and Exploiting its Water Resources. Foreign Language Press, Beijing. Ives, J. D., 1991: Floods in Bangladesh: Who is to blame? New Scientist, pp. 34-37, 13 April. Ives, J. D. and Messerli, B., 1989: The Himalayan Dilemma, Routledge, London. Jones, P. H., 1988: Consultant’s Report to the Eastern Waters Study, Harvard University, London. Joshi, P. C. and Chitrakar, A., 1989: How the Majority Travels, Himal, Vol. 2, No. 2. Kattelmann, R., 1990: Conflicts and Cooperation Over Floods in the Himalaya Ganges Region, Water International, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 195-199. Khattrai, K.N., 1987: Great Earthquake Seismicity Gaps and Potential for Earthquake Disaster along the Himalayan Plate Boundary, Technophysics, Vol. 138, pp. 79-92. Marga Institute, 1981: Study of the Development of Himalayan Resources: Pakistan Country Study, Sri Lanka Center for Development, Colombo. Morse, B. and Berger, T., 1992: Sardar Sarovar: The Report of the Independent Review, Resource future International, Ottawa. Murthy, V. K., 1978: Environmental Problems of Water Resource Development in the Himalayan Region. Proceedings of the National Seminar on Resources, Development and Environment in the Himalayan Region, Department of Science and Technology, New Delhi. Nickhum, J. E., 1982: Irrigation Management in China, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 545, Washington D. Cl. P. 7. Paranjapye, V., 1988: Evaluating the Tehri Dam, INTACH, New Delhi. Pradhan, P., 1989: In creasin g Agricultu re Prod uct ion in Nepal: Role of Low Cost Irrigation

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Development through Farmer Participation, Country paper – Nepal no. 2, International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI), Colombo. Priscoli, J. D. 1990: Epilogue, Water International, Vol. 15, No. 4. Rogers, P., Lydon, P. and Seckler, D., 1989: Eastern Waters Study, Irrigation Support Project for Asia and the Near East, Arlington, Virginia. Roy, S. K. et al., 1980: Assessment of the Environmental Impact of the Tehri Dam, Department of Science and Technology, New Delhi. Ryder, G. (ed.), 1992: Damming of the Three Gorges, Probe International Toronto. Sain, D. and Rao, K. L., 1955: Report on Recent River Valley Projects in China, Central Water and Power Commission, New Delhi. Shahjahan, M., 1983: Regional Cooperation in the Utilisation (ed.), River Basin Development Tycooly, Dublin. Srivastava, R. D., 1983: Providing Irrigation in Hills: A Right Approach, Indian Journal of Soil Conservation, Vol. 11, No. 2-3, pp. 31-38. The Statesman, 1993: Studies on Tehri Dam Safety Wrong: Says Scientist, , 26 September, Calcutta. Thompson, M., Warburton, M. and Hatley, T., 1986: Uncert ain ty on a Himalayan Scale Ethonographica, London. USAID (U. S. Agency for International Development), 1992: Nepal Hydro-Pow er-Strategy and Options, HMG, Nepal, Kathmandu. Uphoff, N. T., 1985: Getting the Process Right: Farmer Organisation and Participation in Water Management, Paper prepared for Water Management Synthesis II Project, Cornell University, Ithica (quoted in Dani and Siddiqui). Valdiya, K. S., 1989: Diminishing Discharge of Mountain Springs in a Part of Kumaon Himalaya, Current Science, Vol. 58, No. 8, pp. 417-426. Van der Velde, E. J., 1992: Farmer-Managed Irrigation System in the Mountain Areas of Pakistan, In Jodha, N. S., Banskota, M., and Partap T. (eds.), Sustainable Mountain Agriculture, Vol. 2, pp. 560-690. Verghese, B. G., 1990: Waters of Hope, Oxford and IBH, New Delhi. Can Himalayan waters induce a positive transformation in the poverty-ridden socioeconomic canvass of the Himalaya-Ganga? This concern-indeed the only reason why modern water resource development has to be attempted at all-has been under-researched. At the same time, the field has been overwhelmed these past decades by a techno-centric leadership/management whose assumptions are insufficiently challenged and whose track record in South Asia does not justify unqualified endorsement. The topics advanced for discussion at the Kathmandu Meeting were:

l Sharing of costs and benefits of water resource projects between Nepal and India. l Displacement and resettlement: management in the context of South Asian land hunger. l Environmental concerns: going beyond mitigation, to study of long-term economics. l Private versus public sector involvement in water resource development, and ensuring accountability in both.

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l International financing of large-scale water resource development investment: opportunities and pitfalls.

Financing of water projects and the institutional implications are functions of the scale of intervention. How is local capacity-building to occur so that it is able to assess the social implications of technology before it is introduced, is a major question (Shah). The planning process is often secretive and assumptions are not available for independent analysis. This often leads to unsustainable development, as experience indicates (Paranjpaye). Large scale, high dam technology, though easily available in the international market, is untested and is a risky experiment for this region (Williams). Smaller schemes are better suited as they will allow equitable benefit sharing to larger sections of society (Synghal). The choice of technology and responses of the society to these are critical. The technical approach to managing water scarcity should be replaced by an ethnoecological approach where institutional flexibility is used to complement technology to cope with a Nature which is never totally manageable (Thompson and Petringa). Although tools such as the environmental impact assessment exist, they are new to the region, suffer from an inadequate data base, and are difficult to institute (T Bhattarai). In the context of bilateral water development initiatives, a procedure for regional assessment as well as the institutional context needs to be formulated (Sinha and Kumar). Rivers and their confluences are sites of major shrines in Hindu religion which bind the people together across borders. Water development should be used to further cement this tie that the politics of nations seek to disrupt (Kumar et al.) Ignoring religious sentiments or down-playing their significance in water resource planning may lead to situations of severe conflict; even though seemingly anarchistic, existing institutions of organised Hinduism provide opportunities to do this (Sharma). Major social conflicts can erupt from improper and insensitive resettlement and rehabilitation measures, and the region’s record in poor. Cash compensation is wholly in inappropriate and, in the context of growing land hunger is South Asia, the land-for-land approach is impractical. Solutions must evolve through a democratic decision-making process that allows a compromise between conflicting goals (Dixit). The deliberations at the Meeting indicated that the Himalaya-Ganga region has barely begun to address the issues of economic and social concerns in water resource development. Many of the topics initially put forward for consideration were acknowledged as problems but without clear solutions or even identifiable researchers seeking these solutions. The vulnerability of impoverished economies in the peripheral region of the Himalaya-Ganga was recognised, but their interrelationship with the more prosperous industrial heartland of the plains market system, or their (in) ability to take advantage of the current spate of

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privatisation was not addressed critically. The following issues were not scientifically answered, except in terms of beliefs, hunches and gut political leanings: the implications of population displacement in growing land hunger scenario; role of the state in infrastructure provision; cost externalisation over time, or to the environment; power of funding sources, national or international, to set the agenda, over-riding local concerns; the equitable sharing of costs and benefits between nations, or regions, within nations as well as sub-national groupings; and the link between growing marginalisation of the poor and massive investments in large-scale ventures. The questions of why changes have not come about in the past to the required degree of satisfaction, their root causes, including how things can be done better, were only hinted at. The participants acknowledged that water management in the Himalaya-Ganga is challenging at the micro-level as well as the macro-level. Whether it is electricity generation, irrigation, flood control or fisheries and river transportation, addressing these issues at the micro-level management in both the hills and the plains at a sufficiently wide-scale with locally, nationally and regionally available resources would ameliorate macro-level problems.

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ISSUE OF SCALE IN NEPALíS WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

RISHI SHAH Pragya-Secretary Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology, Nepal

ABSTRACT

Tunnel vision focus only on import of capital and equipment is unlikely to put investment in the water resources sector on a sustainable footing. The scale of investment should take cognisance of the social context within which investment occurs.

Despite the heavy investments made in the power and irrigation sectors so far, Nepal is still unable to demonstrate a quality of development in these priority areas which stands on firm footing. While operational difficulties and unforeseen contingencies are the usual explanations brought out to explain insufficient performance of long-term engineering enterprises (which is what most water resources development are), one inadequately studied factor is scale of operation. It is the theme of this short paper that expanding the scale of water resources engineering is not a linear extrapolation: several non-linear effects come into play which ultimately lead to delay, cost-overruns and non-performance. For the last three decades, Nepal has been experimenting in the priority areas of development, viz. irrigation and hydropower. As it enters the 8th Five Year Plan (1992- 1997), the country envisages investing about four billion US dollars in various sectors including 0.29 billion in irrigation and 0.57 billion in hydropower development. In the last seven Five Year Plans from 1966 to 1989, Nepal has spent about 390 million US dollars in irrigation and 896 million in hydropower projects out of the total of approximately five billion US dollars of total aid so far. All this investment has to be examined against the end reality which is that Nepal is still struggling within a bracket of poor economic performers called Least Developed Countries (LDC’s). The explanations lie not only in poor planning and implementation; a fundamental reason has to do with the structural flaws that emerge when large-scale projects with equally large-scale financing are implemented. Many of the large-scale financing efforts are donor-driven in the sense that the conceptualisation, design etc. are worked out by the international consultants (all very qualified, no doubt) but with a limited understanding of local needs and conditions. Many local factors that ultimately cause projects to fail get ignored or down played at this stage. 32 SHAH, R.

In the donor community, a fundamental and undeniable imperative is the need firstly to push a certain amount of capital through the reluctant system, in much the same spirit as medicine administered to an uncooperative patient, and only secondarily to worry about the consequences which are thought of as being amenable by taking ameliorative measures. As the scale of operations get much larger than what the overall systems of Third World countries can cope with, ameliorative measures that work well in the industrialised countries become hopelessly ineffective. Environmental mitigation measures and financial recovery packages planned to save the situation often fall in this category. When capital throughput become the prime objective of strategic planning, other worthy objectives become mere constraints susceptible to more capital throughput to rectify the mistakes. When planners are saddled with the need to implement large-scale ventures, the tools of planning preferred are the ones that favour large-scale capital investments. The advent of powerful mini computers has made the use of such tools much easier. An example is the tool called “Least Cost Generation Expansion Plan” or LCGEP. In-built assumptions within this computer simulation exercise systematically downgrade small and medium- scale ventures so as to make them appear costly or ineffective against large projects. Lack of capacity to critically assess underlying assumptions in LCGEP’s however, leaves their conclusions to suspect. A good example is the 60 MW Khimti hydroelectric project which has been found to be both financially and technically so attractive that the private sector is now committed to building it. This project never made it past the LCGEP hurdle to reach donor or Nepal government consideration. On the other hand, the subjective filtering process of the LCGEP also excludes very large projects. If the technically attractive 10,800 MW Karnali project were not a priori excluded from the list on grounds that no agreement existed with India for the purchase of this large amount of power, it seems quite probable that it could end up as the least cost solution supplemented by thermal for the next quarter of a century till it was built. This philosophy of giving prime importance to large-scale means that local and private sector capabilities are not encouraged. It is well-known that one of Nepal’s success areas is small-scale hydro development. The country has managed to design, manufacture, install and operate by itself hundreds of small turbines. Local resources have been used, national financial resources mobilised and local skills employed. The LCGEP exercise conducted at the levels of the Ministry of Water Resources, the National Planning Commission and the Nepal Electricity Authority have totally ignored this one success area of Nepal in their planning for Nepal’s power development well into the next century. A least developed country like Nepal can afford to implement large-scale ventures only after it has step-wise built up its capacity to plan, build, manufacture, repair and maintain hydro-technical structures. The process of birth and upkeep of these technical artifacts has ramifications in several sectors beyond technology such as financial ISSUE OF SCALE 33

management, skill development, revision of legal framework, public awareness etc. Only when all these other organs of the body social are working in harmony will a particular technology become an organic whole with the rest of society. Implementing large-scale ventures with a tunnel-vision focus on capital import and equipment import will generally ignore and inadequately address vital social areas of concern. Coming to terms with these social and economic realities after the decision to implement large-scale ventures is what cost over-runs and delays are really about. For real and harmonious development to occur, Nepal should set priorities for development on its own and not be carried away by the euphoria of the large-scale exercise. Institutions responsible for the different sectors must review past performance and assess their managerial skills and hardware capacities. The new democratic dispensation not only makes this task easier but mandatory. The participation of the affected people as well as the taking of opinion makers into confidence is indispensable. Nepal has to learn to mobilise and interact with local and foreign institutions to work out the common interface for its development in the areas of finance, access to technology etc. and to make them true partners in the development endeavour?which means sharing not only the benefits of equipment supply but also its malfunction and insufficient capacity utilisation. Projects planned with this objective must remain within a realistic time frame of 5 to 6 years where time and cost overruns should not be permitted. At the present, the technology as well as the algorithm of project formulation and its implementation, implicit analysis and evaluation have been changing so fast that a project with a very long time frame tends to be inconvenient, uneconomical and ultimately unable to meet stated objectives. Nepal has distinct advantages as common wisdom teaches us that we should learn from the success and failures in other parts of the world. The problems faced by large- scale projects can not be ignored. Many large projects such as Yacerita in Argentina (cost overruns and border dispute), Misicuni in Bolivia (cost overruns), most projects in Columbia and Peru (financial and technical difficulties), Lesotho (environmental issues), India’s Sardar Sarovar (resettlement) or Gabchikova on the Czech-Hungary border (border dispute and financial problems), have brought to the fore these questions. Nepal is on the threshold of a new century and needs a new vision of a future. As the wishes and aspirations of the Nepalese people have increased manifold, the rise in global communications at the grassroots horizontal level means that new ideas, theories and concerns are transmitted fast. Even the remotest corner of the now have access to this information. Nepal cannot afford to be left behind, but she must also learn to contribute her own thoughts and vision on new techniques to the global community who are partners in her development. For a sustainable and better future, the scale and pace of development must not be accelerated beyond what the social fabric’s stress level can bear. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 2005, 35-41

PRILIMINARY LOOK AT ARUN III IN LIGHT OF TEHRI EXPERIENCE

VIJAY PARANJAPYE Professor School of Environmental Studies University of Poona – 411007, India

ABSTRACT

Water development becomes sustainable when considered within the principle of basin management. Traditional practices respected such principles which have resulted in schemes that have been working since time memorial. Preliminary analysis shows that the Arun III project will not enhance development needs of the Arun basin.

FORGOTTEN WISDOM Harnessing of water resources is not new to the South Asian region. Rigveda which dates back to Circa 2500 BC mentions the need to construct artificial water channels for irrigation purposes; similarly elaborate descriptions are found in Kautilya’s Arthashasira, (Circa 400 BC), wherein construction of reservoirs, provision of perennial water supply, and granting ‘State subsidies’ to provide individuals who construct reservoir of their own accord etc. were considered important responsibilities of the kind. Later in the Maurya period (321 BC to 185 BC) the ancient systems of water management saw the most comprehensive development. And although the mythical Bhagirath is more popularly known for his efforts towards diverting the waters of Ganga, it was really the sage Kashyapa whose treatise on agriculture which gave an elaborate and comprehensive analysis of the principles of building reservoirs.1 A scrutiny of these documents and many such references leads to the five principles of basin-water management which till date stand unsurpassed in their simplicity and profound relevance. Briefly stated, the principles are as follows.

First Principle: Development at Origin Water resources development must begin at the origins (Udgamsthana) of a river. Symbolically a Shiva temple and a Gaomukha is found at practically every origin (e.g. Gangotri, Jamunotri, Krishna-Mahabaleshwar, Godavari-Tryambakeshwar, Narmada- Amarkantak etc.) of rivers in South Asia. Thus origins were protected and upper catchments developed first by diverting and guiding streams and rivulets, and then by building tanks and bandharas in the middle and lower regimes. In other words, ‘Projects’ 36 PARANJAPYE, V.

downstream should not proceed to development without utilisation upstream.

Second Principle: Least Interference in Natural Flows The second principle concentrates on least interference in natural flows, be they water, air or blood (Nyunatam Gati-avarodh). In the contemporised sense it means recognition of the need to maintain the hydrological cycle. Possibly it is the most important principle in ecological sense.

Third Principle: The Golden Mean or Suvarna Madhya The scales and sizes of structures, shapes and designs of tanks (Kundas) was determined by the existing needs of the farmers, other villagers, the economic, organisational and societal competence. In other words, the technical options were ‘traded-off’ with the societal and environmental capabilities and objectives. Thus appropriate, not maximum, quantities of water were impounded so as to match the needs and competence levels.

Fourth Principle: Interdependence The fourth principle emulates interdependence between land-water- forests-fauna. The concept has led to the establishment of Deobans’ or Deorais’ not only at the origins of rivers but also at confluences and middle regimes. These helped in preserving the sacred- diversity as wood-cutting and hunting were taboo. Thus the cascade of tanks and bunds, sacred groves and interspersed agricultural lands became an integral holistic system which sustained itself over long durations of time. It is obvious that ‘dispersed utilisation’ rather than impoundment per se was the objective.

Fifth Principle: Participation The final, the principle is that of participation and self determination. (Sahabhagh, Swabhava and Sanskara). This interactive and participatory nature made it necessary to keep the planning process open and transparent, albeit, hierarchical. The king was responsible for commissioning and financing the development process of the fixing and collecting of water rates etc. (Rajadanda). The sages and priests would be responsible for conceptualisation and supervisory advice. The peasants would physically construct and take ground level decision about sharing of responsibilities and benefits, Maintenance and operation was also a village responsibility. Interestingly the three epic volumes, Jala bindu, Jalawahana and Jaladeepika written during the early Buddhist Period in the Pali language, together represent the modern concepts of watershed or upper catchment, the reservoir and the command areas. Here, the elaborate details reveal their understanding of rights, duties and accountability of the various actors. The proof of sustainability of these ancient systems lies in the fact that they served PRILIMINARY LOOK AT ARUN III IN LIGHT OF TEHRI EXPERIENCE 37

and evolved over several centuries. Even today in certain pockets of Sri Lanka, Nepal, India and Pakistan, they have survived in spite of intrusion of modern technology. The extent of contravention or divergence from the five principles is correlated to the extent on on-sustainability of the structures which are technology-dominated and which follow an ‘exclusive-project approach’ rather than the ‘basin-approach’. The example selected is the Arun III Hydro Electric Project in Eastern Nepal. The question is: Is the Arun III Project rational and sustainable? The analogy draws heavily on observations and experiences on the Tehri Dam in the Bhagirathi basin in India.

CASE OF ARUN-BASIN About 80 per cent of the upper-catchment and the origin of the Arun river are in Tibet. The landscape in Tibet predates the period of uplifting and formation of the Himalaya. Inside Nepal, the river has cut a deep gorge and flows 155 km after which it confluences with Sun-Kosi and Tamur to be called Sapta-Kosi. In Nepal, the Arun flows first through the Sankhuwasabha District which is sparsely populated, has higher altitudes and relatively larger areas of cultivable lands. Lower down in Bhojpur and Dhankuta Districts, the situation is reversed with high human concentrations at low altitudes and relatively smaller areas of cultivable land. The population of about 451,000 (1981 Census) is growing at a moderate rate of 1.04 per cent per year, and 91.1 per cent of the economically active population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. An estimated 12.6 per cent of the population is literate. The land use pattern indicates that 44.3 per cent of land is under forests, 25 per cent under agriculture, 9.2 per cent shrub, 9.5 per cent under pastures and 12 per cent under snow and rocks. Curiously enough the cattle to human ratio is 1:1, which appears extraordinarily high considering the areas under pastures. Perhaps another disturbing feature is the net migration rate, which for Sankhuwasabha, Bhojpur and Dhankuta are 65.3, 19.3, and 20.3, and 20.1 respectively per 100 persons. Prime facie, the socioeconomic and environmental issues in the basin are as follows:

How to increase agricultural productivity? How to increase alternative gainful employment? How to reduce distress migration? How to harness water resources so that the above mentioned priorities are tackled? How to provide reliable and safe drinking water to the human and bovine population? How to maintain the bio-diversity? and reduce and erosion?

As of now the Kosi Hill areas Hill Development Programme (KHARDEP) purports to achieve integrated rural development with limited capital investment. Therefore the 38 PARANJAPYE, V.

crucial questions which needs to be answered is: Will the Arun III create benefits which will bring about development that solves the problems of the basin and its population on a sustainable basis? In the absence or at least non-availability for scrutiny of the detailed project report, feasibility studies, Environment Impact Assessment document, etc, the answer to the this critical question may be negative. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse in detail how these development principles have been contravened in the case of the Arun III. The review of the process followed however point that the initiative is unsustainable and contravenes the Basin Development Principles. On the basis of the data made public, it is clear that much of the information necessary for determining the basis technical parameters is not available. Hydro-electric projects require the annual-yield data on water run-off in the catchment for at least 50 years to be able to determine the yield and seasonality of the flow. Similarly time-series data is required for estimating the quantity of silt local carried by the stream for deciding the dead-storage capacity. Such duration data on suspended silt- and bed load silt is less likely to be available on the Arun. Moreover, the number of rain-gauge and flow-gauge stations in the Tibetan part and the Nepali catchment area are far too little. The present 520 km2/gauge and 400 km2/gauge precipitation and stream-flow gauge density respectively in the basin fall short of the minimum recommended by WHO which are 100 km2/gauge and 300 km2 gauge. The details in the Tibetan catchment are simply not known. Water yield, its monthly variations and silt load etc cannot be calculated to arrive at figures which have anywhere close to 90 per cent for even 75 per cent dependability. Consequently it would not be possible to calculate the economic life of the dam. The calculations would be, at best, guesstimate. Thus development has not begun either from the point of origin or in the upper catchment areas and tributaries. Arun III clearly violates the 1st principle on these grounds. The fact-finding pre-appraisal mission of the World Bank in their aidememoirs state, the height of the concrete dam is 68 m, which is significantly high for a run-of-river project. For comparison the Kulekhani dam is 114 m high. It is surprising that a run-of-river hydropower generation which generally require only a weir enough to divert the flows through the head race tunnels to operate the turbines has a diversion structure as high as 68 m which will also create a storage, albeit a smaller one. Thus instead of least interference in the river, the project has envisaged a complete stoppage of flow. The consequences will be in the form of major unanticipated shock releases of floods of different magnitude. This clearly contravenes the second principle. The energy production capacity of the project at 1558 GWh of energy per year is far too excess of the energy need of the people living in the Sankhuwasabha, Bhojpur or PRILIMINARY LOOK AT ARUN III IN LIGHT OF TEHRI EXPERIENCE 39

Dhankuta regions. In other works, there will be a transfer of benefits from the Arun basin to the Kathmandu valley via the substations at Duhabi through the 220 kV transmission lines. The energy needs or agricultural needs of 450,000 people of this region cannot be satisfied, because in the plan-design for power evacuation, it is simply not meant to do so. Though the number of household to be displaced, the lands to be acquired for resettling the population are estimated, the implementation of rehabilitation package, the continuing legal and institutional uncertainty are still unknown. The implication is that when they are finally assessed, they will require a major base-cost escalation. This will happen because there is bound to be resistance by the oustees who are not certain of getting adequate compensation, thereby leading to cost and time over-runs. Similar is the case with ‘Catchment Area Treatment Plan’. The status reports on the impact of the dam on the flora and fauna and the evaluation and economic quantification of non-market or external costs and benefits are also unknown entities. Last but not the least, there is no Disaster Management Plan (DMP) in the lower-regime in the Tarai and lower flood plains in the area to be inundated in case of a dam failure. Similarly there is no financial management plan as yet which anticipate donor withdrawal, base-cost-escalation, time – overruns etc. There are factors which increases risk of failure of non-physical type. In addition, the capacity of the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) to manage efficient revenue collection appears to be quite inadequate in the present scheme of things. The most disturbing feature of the project is probably the financial and economic risk. So far NEA has been unable to show a good recovery of revenue on the power sold so far. The NEA’s current provisional accounts shows a back log of Rs 554x106. In view of this situation, NEA would wind it very difficult to impose higher tariffs and then actually recover the dues. On the conservative side one can expect an increase in the total cost of the project from the present base-cost estimate of US$ 955.81 million to about US$ 1,500 million. The financial estimate of the World Bank (i. e. after assuming a price escalation) is US$ 1,187 million. This does not reflect the base-cost escalation which is bound to occur after the Environment Impact Assessment and its mitigation measures are finalised and costed. Similarly the resettlement and rehabilitation component will also increase the base cost. The present estimate of US$ 14 million will prove to be woefully inadequate and it is likely to be at least five times (US$ 60 million) if not more. Furthermore, there appears to be no study about the physical, economic financial ‘risk-sensitivity analaysis’. The time and cost over-runs pose the greatest risks to a project of this type. Without such analysis and without the details of the cost and benefit streams it would be practically impossible to work out the B/C ratio or the Internal Rate of Return?which are a must for establishing the financial viability of any project. The sum and substance of the argument is that Nepal might eventually get loaded with a white 40 PARANJAPYE, V.

elephant costing US $ 1.5 million with a high (capital) plus interest) annual instalment. And if the time delay in completion is anywhere near that experienced in India and Pakistan, then the ‘Debt-Trap’ situation is inevitable. On past experience, one can safely surmise that in case of 30 per cent time-over-run or an equal cost over-run, the returns to investment will be negative for the project as a whole. Several physical factors that exist in the region make the project significantly ‘high risk’ one. The question of natural lake bursts and associated processes is one such risk. The upper catchment of the Arun especially the portion of the basin that lies outside. Nepal has number of glaciers and natural lakes which have a tendency to burst. Glacial lakes burst usually causes exceptional increase not only in the flow but also in the rate of sedimentation, which may either damage the dam-structure, turbines or both. In addition, it fills up the dead-storage capacity and eats into the live-storage capacity. Given the high rate of siltation in most of the tributaries of the Ganga, it is doubtful whether project life would be more than 50 years or so. The question of international finance and its impact on democratic procedure, the normal process of law and public participant is also significant. If the history of Narmada project is an indicator then it is inevitable that the juggernaut will inevitably distort, undermine and pervert the process of planning, decision-making and democratic participation. Even at the present moment, the Eighth Plan of the Government of Nepal appears to have included the project well before the essential economic, social and environmental studies have been completed. The decision seems to have been taken a priori thereby making the conducting future studies meaningless. As usual it has been forgotten that the studies are of use only if they are conducted before the decision to execute the project is taken. What is even more dangerous is the fact that the overwhelming respondence of the World Bank, with its so called technological expertise, gives the Arun III an ‘air of legitimacy and scientificity.’ Consequently the average citisen (or the Nepali bureaucrat) seems to feel that "if the World Bank is involved?everything about the project must be right." The truth unfortunately is contrary to this belief.

NOTE 1 For a detailed treatment of this aspect see chapter 1 in ‘Evaluating the Tehri Dam’ – by Vijay Paranjpye, INTACH, 1988.

REFERENCES Work Bank, 1992: Aide-Memoirs of the Fact Finding Mission, 15th Dec., Kathmandu, Nepal. Arthashastra, .....: Ascribed to Kautilya, styled Chanakya, Minister of Chandragupta Maurya circa 4th century BC. Brothier, R. L., ----: Ancient Irrigation works in Ceylon. Bruinzeel, L. A. and Bremmer, H., 1989: Highland Law Land Interactions in the Ganges, PRILIMINARY LOOK AT ARUN III IN LIGHT OF TEHRI EXPERIENCE 41

Bramhaputra River Basin, ICIMOD Occasional paper No. 11, July, Kathmandu. Dunsmore, J., 1988. Mountain Environment, Man in the Arun River Basin of Nepal, ICIMOD, Occasional papers No. 9, Kathmandu. -----, 1992: International Journal of Water Resources Development, Biswas, A. K. (ed.), Vol. 8, No. 1 March. Ministry of Irrigation and Power GIO, 1973: Rise in the Costs of Irrigation and Multi-purpose Projects, New Delhi. Paranjpye, V., ----- : Narmada, Tehri, Mid-Vaitama, Bedthi, Dams are we damned. Vishva chakrapani; Vallabha, Vaishnava Matha, Nathaadwar Rajasthan, date unknown. Water Resources of India, 1978: Central Water Commission, GOI. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 43-46

LEARNING FROM THE MISTAKES OF LARGE-SCALE WATER DEVELOPMENT

PHILIP B. WILLIAMS President International Rivers Network 1947, Berkeley Way, Berkeley Ca 94703 USA

ABSTRACT

In many large-scale water resources development projects built in the past, major adverse impacts have occurred that were not considered in the design. Large-scale projects bring about manipulation of land and water on a large-scale. In order to ensure that decisions are correct, water resources planning needs fundamental changes that move it away from being apologists of untested and experimental technologies.

Large-scale water development is a relatively new phenomenon. The big dams, irrigation canals, and massive river training schemes that are now transforming many of the world’s rivers grew out of nineteenth century technological ideas that have only been applied on a massive scale in the last 40 years. Yet the impacts of large-scale water development on river systems, their environment, and the human societies that depend on them lasts for hundreds of years. Already, in almost every instance where large water projects have been constructed, major adverse effects that were not considered or discounted by project proponents, but which greatly affect the performance of the project, are experienced. Consequently, it is important to think of large-scale water development as massive experiments in the manipulation of the natural and human landscape. In a rational world proponents of new large water projects should be able to point to successful past experiments in which the construction of a water project has clearly proved achievement of the economic or societal goals set out for them. They cannot do so. However, project proponents and project critics share the same problem; very rarely are the water project goals clearly stated in a way that can be measured to objectively determine whether the project (the experiment) is a success or a failure. Usually the only basis for determining success of a project is by comparing projections of performance described in a feasibility report with reality. This is rarely done; in fact, these documents are usually kept secret to prevent this kind of accountability. In those instances where independent evaluations have been carried out a consistent pattern of underestimated costs and overestimated benefits is revealed. For example, the actual experience with large hydro projects, which have the easiest measurable net economic 44 WILLIAMS, P. B.

benefits, shows-that major planning, economic, and engineering mistakes occur that can negate the economic benefits even in the first ten years. Typical problems with large-scale water development are:

PLANNING MISTAKES Because many large projects are planned in secrecy, without independent review and often in a highly politicised atmosphere where large financial interests are involved, a logical planning process rarely occurs. Typical mistakes that happen as a result include:

Failure to establish goals and objectives. Failure to consider more cost effective alternatives to meeting goals and objectives. Omission of analysis of ‘no-action’ alternative. Failure to evaluate the performance of a project over its entire lifetime, including the feasibility of decommissioning. Project is defined in a way to externalise adverse effects, while internalising benefits. Environmental and social impacts are treated as adjuncts of the project instead of being integrated in project planning. Mitigation for adverse impacts, particularly environmental resettlement impacts are always assumed achievable in spite of contrary evidence. Ignoring the effect of uncertainty in project planning for example, changing watershed conditions, or hydrological effects of climate change. Ignoring the cumulative effects of changes in the river system.

ECONOMIC MISTAKES The economic analysis of large water projects is rarely subject to outside scrutiny. Even the World Bank’s own internal audits, which show about 40 per cent of its water projects now failing, is narrowly defined and not available to outsiders. When independent evaluations have been carried out they frequently show biases in economic analysis in favor of building large-scale capital intensive projects. Typical mistakes include:

Failure to include economic costs of environmental damage. Failure to take into account the probability of cost overruns based on actual performance of projects of similar type. Consistent underestimation of time required to complete project. Omission of costs of catastrophic failure. Omission of decommissioning costs. Underestimation of the cost of capital. Overestimation of operational reliability in calculating benefits. LEARNING FROM THE MISTAKES OF LARGE-SCAL E WATER DEVELOPMENT 45

Underestimation of resettlement costs. Favoring short term economic benefits over long term economic costs, (Even major economic costs that will occur after 50 years are ignored).

ENGINEERING MISTAKES Many of these projects are designed in secrecy by engineering firms or agencies whose own budgets may depend on successfully implementing large-scale projects. Civil engineers are often given responsibility in areas they have little expertise yet whose accurate analyses are vitally important to the success of a project. Examples are fluvial geomorphology, resettlement or riparian ecology. Technical review and accountability can be weak, as review panels of international experts often consist of uncritical academics and other consultants; and, as has been shown in the case of the Three Gorges Project in China, Western consultants are not necessarily bound by the same professional standards when operating in other countries. Typical engineering mistakes that occur under these circumstances include:

Inadequate assessment of dam safety, such as failure to design operational contingencies for all possible failure models. Underestimation of seismicity that affects the integrity of a levee or dam. Failure to analyse long term physical impacts on the river, estuary and coastline downstream. Underestimation of reservoir sedimentation. Underestimation of river migration. Failure to design for aging effects in dam structures. Miscalculation of river hydrology. Failure to design for water quality deterioration in reservoirs.

POLITICAL MISTAKES Ultimately large-scale water projects are implemented for political reasons that can override the attempt at economic rationale. Because large water projects can quickly transform both the landscape and the way of life of millions of people they have become particularly attractive to political leaders intent on transforming their societies. These political goals can range from colonial exploitation as in the case of early irrigation projects in British India; to colonisation, as in the case of water project in the Western U. S.; to the industrialisation of an agricultural economy, as with Stalin’s hydroelectric projects in the U.S.S.R. There are many instances, however, where the huge social and ecological destruction caused by large-scale water projects have prevented the realisation of even the most benign political goals. Relocation and dispossession of populations has led to impoverishment and even welfare inside the country of created international tensions with other countries that share the watershed. 46 WILLIAMS, P. B.

LESSONS Once a large-scale water project has been constructed it forecloses many opportunities for sustainable water resource management of a river basin. To ensure that wise decisions are made we have to address the issues described above. The way to accomplish this is to require the following changes in the way national and international institutions plan these projects:

Require clear statement of measurable project goals for which the project proponent will be held accountable. End the secrecy of the planning process by making all documents freely available. Give people affected by the project the power to determine their future. Provide a complete environmental and social assessment prepared by an independent organisation and distributed as a public disclosure document. Provide for an independent and open technical review. Require an internationally recognised code of conduct for all professionals engaged in the project. Require independent financial audits during and after the project. Carry out post project assessments at regular intervals to determine if the project is achieving its goals. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 47-53

SMALLER IS BETTER

S. B. SYNGHAL Professor and Former Head Civil Engineering Department M.M.M. Engineering College, Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh, India

ABSTRACT

Development of large-scale water resources projects in India has widened the gap between the rich and the poor. Instead of bringing about positive changes in the lives of all sections of society, these projects have benefited the rich more, and marginalised the poor. The consequences have caused decline in the well being of the society in general, leading to increased suffering and social stress. New strategy of development should aim of decentralised approach through smaller schemes that would bring long term benefits.

INTRODUCTION Management of water resource is a complex process. It should not only deal with storage, diversion and distribution of water, but also address the economic, political, social, technological and environmental issues associated with the use of resource. The aim should be to pursue the most appropriate course of action in the given circumstances. The approach should focus on the long term so that the needs of the present are met while ensuring that resource availability will not be jeopardised for the use of future generations. The ultimate objective should be to initiate a process that would create employment opportunities, stimulate income and eliminate poverty. The social needs in the context of South Asia are diverse. Agriculture, industry and commerce are generally recognised to be the major demands. Family, welfare, health, education, social justice, management of common resources and other needs of the community are considered to be secondary. Both these requirements are important and should get equal support. The approach should be to ensure that one is not over emphasised at the cost of the other. Meeting these demands requires the mobilisation of both the internal and external resources. In development efforts, however, health, family planning and skills improvement generally are given lesser priority. The level of neglect is even higher for the section of the population in the lower and marginal economic bracket. A balanced development approach should not only provide continued services to those who are already better-off but also attuned to meet the needs of poorer sections of the society. 48 SYNGHAL, S. B.

VESTED INTERESTS AND EXERCISE OF POWER In the political economy of water resources development, the influence of interest groups is unavoidable. Political parties, promoters of projects, construction agencies, business and industrial houses, mass media like newspapers and televisions, often favour a particular mode of development. The paradigm advocates major interventions through multi-purpose projects. Lobbying, media campaigns and other forms of coercions, which are easily available to the powerful, are used to tailor decisions favouring this mode of development. As a result political, economic and legal power tends to get concentrated in the hands of the few who already have power and control resource use. In South Asian societies where prevailing landholding is highly unbalanced in nature, concentration of political, legal and economic power has exacerbated the social stress. As a consequence more land is concentrated in the hands of a few which make the land holding pattern more unbalanced. Reduction in land owned by the poor, exacerbates the stress as they become landless and are pushed into further marginalisation and impoverishment.

OVER COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES Large-scale development approach requires massive financial commitment. Both national as well as international agencies tend to commit financial and other forms of resources to large projects. In spite of cost and time overruns that are endemic in such projects, the commitment continues to grow. As a result resources for smaller scale development works are disproportionately squeesed. Watershed management, efforts to minimise wastage and increase efficient water use, decentralised community managed small irrigation and power schemes and livestock development do not get adequate emphasis. That such efforts are labour intensive and take a long time to execute makes them unattractive and as such ineligible for inclusion in the priority lists. Fixes on large-scale development are being questioned these days. Environmentalists, public action groups and voluntary organisations have brought to the notice of the general public the other side of the development of large projects in terms of their undesirable impacts on the society and environment. The cause and effect relationships between green revolution and terrorism in Punjab, Naxalite movement in the forest areas of Madhya Pradesh and Andra Pradesh, Bodo movement in Assam, Chipko movement in Uttar Pradesh hills, Jharkhand movement in Bihar are being attributed to the problems of social inequity and destruction of natural habitat of the tribal people by large projects. The social costs in many cases are high because the affected population have little or no representation in the decision making process. Even if they are represented in some way, the voice is feeble, as their economic standing is low. Worthwhile resistance and questioning of the rationality of decision-making by these people are not effective. Many tend to accept misfortune fatalistically. SMALLER IS BETTER 49

EMPLOYMENT Large-scale projects generate fewer jobs. The sophisticated nature of the work is capital intensive and even the jobs that are created, during the construction phase, are of a temporary nature. When the construction activities cease, in many cases, the work force needs to be retrenched. In South Asian societies, this issue is of extreme importance as the level of unemployment is high in all countries. Small scale development projects, on the other hand, offer better alternatives. Such projects though they grow slowly, stimulate developmental activities at the grass-root, by generating employment opportunities of a permanent nature for larger sections of society. Unfortunately such schemes remain starved of political support, investment funds, and lack policy commitment.

ECO-DEGRADATION The impact of this dichotomy at the policy level perpetuates a downward spiral of declining quality of life. The poor are particularly affected, and are forced to meet their daily needs from whatever natural resource base that exists. People have no time to plan, let alone think, on a long term basis. In many communities, the distances and time needed to get fuel and fodder for the day are getting longer. Immediate economic compulsion keeps people away from preservation of the eco-system on which life ultimately depends. The tendency is to grab whatever is obtainable from the surroundings, leading to adverse consequences in the long term. Resources available are exploited as if nature were a reserve of infinite ocean. The process which initiates the chain, is triggered by the paradigm of excessive resource use and consumption by those who already have enough and more.

ENVIRONMENT OF POVERTY Inadequate and unstable incomes are often responsible for creating an environment of poverty. The other forms of effects associated with poverty are high population growth rate, encroachment on forests and marginal lands, depletion of coastal and inland fisheries, migration to cities and urban centers, slums and deteriorating housing, inadequate water supply and sanitation. All these factors act together and create a situation that leads to the spread of diseases. The impacts are further expounded by the prevailing situation of malnutrition which leads to deterioration of the economic condition of the people. Once entrapped in such a cycle, communities find it difficult to get out of this viscious spiral. Development intervention, meant to bring prosperity, ends up trapping larger sections of the society in situation of deprivation and destitution.

A CASE FOR SMALL RESERVOIRS The argument for smaller and decentralised approach to water resources development is not a fundamentalist notion but a reality, particularly in South Asia. Table 1 compares 50 SYNGHAL, S. B.

plans prepared independently by different agencies for the same region of two reservoir systems.

TABLE 1 RESERVOIR PLANS COMPARISON

Particular Main Reservoir Multiple Head Waters Reservoir Number of Reservoirs 1 34 Drainage Area Km2 500 490 Flood Storage hectare meter 20,000 22,800 Surface water area for recreation (ha) 780 840 Flood Pool (ha) 1,460 2,040 Bottoms inundated (ha) 740 640 Bottoms Protected (ha) 1,348 3,232 Total Cost at (1952 price level in $) 6*106 2*106

The comparison shows that for the same benefits in terms of water availability, water supply or flood mitigation, decentralised systems consisting of multiple reservoirs cost as little as one third of a project with a single large reservoir system. Recreational, fishing and most other uses are better served by small reservoirs. The only positive point for the larger reservoir option is its high power production capacity, though technical and geological factors govern location hence the production capacity.

HUMAN BEHAVIOUR Flow charts A and B show the sequence of events and change in human behaviour when large-scale multi-purpose river valley project and small projects are implemented respectively. Experiences in India show that the second approach has greater advantages. Creation and management of small artificial lakes, management of watershed, distribution and use of water, fixing of rates and collection of revenue for water use, etc. by the community for employment generation, have been successfully tried at several places (more than 70) along the foothills of Punjab and Harayana. These projects offer potent demonstration sites for learning, sharing and even replicationg experience. Farmers, and development workers from other communities through field visits could get first hand assessment of what is being done. Interaction at this level could also lead to replication of the small intervention approach which would help bring about development that is on a more firm social footing and hence sustainable.

CONCLUSION Smaller scale projects have advantages, in the context of poverty, in South Asian society. In addition to conforming to indigenous sensitivity, small projects also enhance the local SMALLER IS BETTER 51

A. Human Behavioral Change Large Multipurpose River Valley Projects (Sequence of Events)

Massive Funds Allocation

Large contractors for supply of expertise and consultancy supply of equipment machinery Building Materials and Construction Activities.

Bigger opportunities for kick backs commissions, gratifications both legal as well as illegal are opened up.

Greed becoming insatiable, forging of new linkages for mutual benefits between politician, administrators, engineers, experts, contractors, suppliers, large business and industrial houses multinations.

Concentration of power and wealth and other assets, including mass media, into the hands of fewer and fewer people and widespread misuse of authority

Smuggling Drug Trade Mafiaism Gangsterism

Criminalisation of Politics

Destruction of

Established norms Moral and Ethical Established and traditions values institutions

CORRUPTION

Mal Administration Injustice Conflicts Tension Skepticism about State Functions and Functioning

VIOLENCE 52 SYNGHAL, S. B.

B. Community Owned Small Reservoir System Human Behavioral Change (Sequence of Events)

Low cost decentralised, Local community controlled and Managed small reservoir system

Community managed system ensures optimum utilisation of water elimination

Community feels encouraged to manage its watershed by planting grasses, trees and other useful plants

Assured water suupply, ensures increased agricultural production, grasses and trees provide abundant fodder, fuel and timber to meet the needs of the community

Increased family and community income

Property to t he community through inceased income income from commons i.e. water, fishery, etc. used for creating educational, health, recreational infrastructures like roads, water supply

Strengthening the system of common resources management taking the maximum advantage of knowledge of the needs, preferences opportunities and managerial capabilities of the local community

The local man has say in Gainful employment The community is the management of affairs becomes available in saved from corruption concerning him and enjoys his own locally, he does conflicts and violence dignity and self respect not migrate to the city SMALLER IS BETTER 53

capacity to achieve a higher state of confidence. This is what development is all about, and should eventually lead to. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 55-59

WHY END-USE EFFICIENCY IS NEVER JUST A TECHNICAL BUSINESS

NATASCIA PETRINGA1 AND MICHAEL THOMPSON2

ABSTRACT

Water resources in the Himalayan region is already managed and local institutions are active. New interventions should focus on an ethno-ecological approach which is more exploratory and is capable of building upon home-made resilience. Technical fixation on end-use-efficiency leads to rigid planning that ignores people and decontextualises techniques.

INTRODUCTION Water, at the global level, is an endlessly renewable resource. It is also plentiful. The trouble is that most of it, being salty, is unusable. Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner nicely anticipated the water resources manager’s predicament with his lament: ‘Water, water everywhere and not a drop to drink’. Indeed, only 2.8 per cent of the earth’s water is drinkable, and nearly all of that is locked up in glaciers and ice-caps. Only 0.0088 per cent is stored in freshwater lakes, and a minuscule 0.00006 per cent in rivers and streams (Balchin, 1991). Hence the incentive to come up with ways of making the best possible use of this tiny trickle that is available to us. At the supply end, we can improve the capture of water, even out fluctuations in its availability, improve or restore, and devise all sorts of ways of delivering it to the places where it is needed. And then, when it has got to where it is needed, we can direct out ingenuity to ensuring that we make most of every precious drop. This latter objective is called end-use efficiency. When people think of water end-use efficiency they generally have in mind technologies and engineering solutions (Kalbermatten et al., 1980; Rogers, 1987, 1992) that will minimise water uses (air-cooled engines, for instance) or promote a safe sequence of re-use (clothes washing then irrigation, for instance, or the repeated cleaning that enables the River Thames to pass through several humans on its way from source to sea.) This linear framework in which the effort is directed at getting the most from the water between the time it falls from the sky and the moment it flows into the sea, has now

1 International Academy of the Environment, Geneva. 2 International Academy of the Environment, Geneva and Musgrave Institute, London. 56 PETRINGA, N. AND THOMPSON, M.

been complemented by a more comprehensive ecological approach. The argument is that water has to be seen as a system (Thanh and Biswas, 1990; Frederick, 1992). Since it is the hydrological cycle that governs the amount of water that is available for use any alteration (global warming, deforestation, extreme natural hazards and so on) will be likely to have grave systemic impacts (changes in the movement of the jet stream, for instance, could result in the disappearance of the monsoon). Management, therefore, has to extend from making the most of the flow to safeguarding all the natural patterns which make that flow available. Water resource management, whether in the linear or the whole system form, assumes two things: managers (experts who take on the task of managing something that otherwise would be unmanaged) and manageability (a system whose properties can be sufficiently well known for us to take control of it in its entirety) (OECD, 1972; 1989). In the Himalaya (and perhaps everywhere) these assumptions are not valid. Every farmer is managing water, and every village has evolved some institutional arrangements for coping with the disputes that inevitably occur between these individual managers. And landslips with a volume of several cubic kilometers, or vast rivers that change course overnight or migrate hundreds of miles across their own alluvial fans, will likely cause a few surprises to those who believe they have got all these watery things taped. We all know this, of course, but notions such as end-use efficiency and water resource management somehow result in forgetting, or deliberately suppressing, this wider awareness. That is why the need is move beyond the efficiency idea. The aim in this paper is to encourage this desirable move by identifying some of the shortcomings of the end- use efficiency approach. These shortcomings, as will be argued, provides us with a way of moving from the technical fixation of the end-use efficiency approach, through the excessive managerialism of the ecological approach, to what can be called the ethno- ecological approach: one that aims to complement the management that is already in place, all the while respecting Mother Nature’s habit of not always revealing all her cards.

SHORTCOMINGS OF END-USE EFFICIENCY APPROACH The literature on water end-use efficiency makes rather disappointing reading. It consists largely of lists of ingenious devices (such as lavatory cisterns with two flushes: a long one for solid matter and a short one for liquid body wastes), the idea being that, if only people could be persuaded to install them, end-use efficiency would be assured. The public, however, are seldom just passive receivers of nifty solutions. Many Americans, for instance, are now eager to conserve water and, to the extent that the message ‘If it’s brown flush it down; if it’s yellow let it mellow’ catches on, the two-flush cistern will have been rendered obsolete by this simple shift in user behavior. This, then, is the first serious shortcoming of the end-use efficiency approach: it treats people as if they were ‘dumb molecules’, rather WHY END-USE EFFICIENCY IS NEVER JUST A TECHNICAL BUSINESS 57

than active, cognising, strategising, and often cooperating agents. Another striking feature of these lists of technical fixes is the way they are detached from real situations. Water-saving techniques for irrigation, for instance, are presure sprinklers, low energy precision applications (LEPA), drip systems and trickle methods, and pitcher irrigation (buried terracotta pots) (Poste, 1985; 1986). But take any real situation – the vast plains of the Punjab, or the Middle Ranges of Nepal, or the near desert of Rajasthan – and it will be observed find that these are not alternatives at all. The center- pivot apparatuses that we see merrily rotating in the French countryside are non- starters if your fields are only a few yards wide and the nearest road is 50 miles away! In other instances, techniques that are presented as alternative turn out to be mutually supportive components in a long-established repertoire. Himalayan farmers, faced with an efficiency expert who wants them to choose between irrigated terraces, rainfed farming, conservation tillage, and micro-catchment arboriculture, (Postel, 1985) will politely point out that they already employ all these cropping practices and that it is the managing of their mix, not the selection of one and the rejection of the others, that is their central concern (Ives and Messerli, 1989). Just how central this concern is, and the way in which the farmer’s tacit knowledge of how the natural system works provides him with a highly effective basis for assessing and managing the risks he faces, has been nicely revealed by the ethno-ecological studies of Johnson et.al., (1982) and Gurung, (1988). This, then, is the second shortcoming of the efficiency approach: its decontextualisation of techniques. These two shortcomings reveals us that the efficiency and managerial approaches are perpetuating reductionism. They reduce people to ‘empty vessels’, and they reduce the heterogenous multitude of use situations to a single homogenised global abstraction. And if reductionism is the problem (as it certainly is here) then an anti-reductionist approach is the solution. Let us therefore conclude by going all the way back to the beginning: to the ideas of scarcity (‘Water, water everywhere etc’) that is the justification for the pursuit of both end-use efficiency and total system management.

CONCLUSION Though fresh water is undoubtedly scarce in global terms, there are plenty of parts of the world (the Himalaya among them) where the problem, much of the time, is too much water. Some sort of geographical distinction between water-rich and water-poor regions is, therefore, a sensible first step away from this globalised conception of ‘the problem’. But even when water is scarce (as it is at times and in places in the Himalaya), that scarcity is not, in itself, an evil. Scarcity, provided it is perceived and acted upon, is an efficiency-inducting measure: perhaps the efficiency-inducting measure. People and their technologies are likely to react positively to scarcity - stimulating resource conservation, technological innovation, behavioral 58 PETRINGA, N. AND THOMPSON, M.

change at the individual level, and institutional rearrangement at a more collective level. All of these efficiency promoting measures, as Adam Smith pointed out long ago, are carried out by the ‘invisible hand’. Each actor, in pursuing his or her selfish ends, unwittingly adds to the welfare of the whole. Markets, in this very braod sense, can end up conferring an impressive resilience on a local population: promoting cooperation (commons managing institutions) in those situations where people perceive it to be to their advantage to cooperate, and avoiding cooperation (or dismantling) in those situations where no such advantages are discerned (Uphoff, 1986). Since large-scale management structures (and indeed any externally imposed controls) can seriously inhibit all this self-organisation, there is always the danger that approaches that set off by assuming that the peole they aim to help are ‘dumb molecules’ will end up depriving them of their hard-won resilience (Chambers, 1983). This is not an argument against deliberate and planned intervention; it is a plea that intervention always be a tentative and exploratory business: a gentle probe aimed at finding out what is already in place by way of home-made resilience. The task is not to provide development but to negotiate your proposals into what, largerly unknown to you, is already there. And the test of a successful negotiation is that, at the end of it, the overall level of resilience is enhaned. Hence the need to add the prefix ethno-to the ecological approach.

REFERENCES Balchin, W. G., 1991: Water and Environment, Rose, J. (ed.), Vol. III, Gordon and Breach Science, Philadephia. Chambers, R., 1983: Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Longman, London. Frederick, K. D., 1992: Managing Water for Economic, Environmental, and Human Health, Resources, Vol. 10, pp. 22-25. Gurung, S. M., 1988: Beyond the Myth of Eco-Crisis in Nepal: Local Response to Pressure on Land in the Middle Hills, Phd. Thesis presented to the University of Hawaii, Honolulu. Ives, J. D., and Messerli, B., 1989: The Himalayan Dilemma: Reconciling Development and Conservation, Routledge, London. Johnson, K., Olson, E. A. and Manandhar, S., 1982: Environmental Knowledge and Response to Natural Hazards in Mountainous Nepal, Mountain Research and Development, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 175-88. Kalbermatten, J. M., Julius, D. S. and Gunnerson, C. G., 1980: Appropriate Technology for Water Supply and Sanitation: Technical and Economic Options, World Bank, Washington, D. C. OECD, 1972: Water Management: Basic Issues, OECD, Paris. OECD, 1989: Water Resources Management: Integrated Policies, OECD, Paris. Postel, S., 1985: Water Conservation, Worldwatch Institute, Washington D. C. Postel, S., 1986: Increasing Water Efficiency, in State of the World, pp. 4061, Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D. C. Rogers, P., 1987: Assessment of Water Resources: Technology for Supply, McLaren, D. L. and Skinner, WHY END-USE EFFICIENCY IS NEVER JUST A TECHNICAL BUSINESS 59

B. J. (eds.), Resources and World Development, pp. 611-623, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester. Rogers, P., 1992: Integrated Urban Water Resources Management, ch. 7 in International Conference on Water and the Environment: Development Issues for the 21st century, 26-31 January, Dublin, Ireland. Thanh, N. C. and Biswas, A. K., 1990: Environmentally Sound Water Management, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Uphoff, N., 1986: Local Institutional Development: An Analytical Source book with Cases, Kumarian Press, West Hartford. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 61-66

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL

TARA N. BHATTARAI Environmental Consultant Sewa Sadan, Kaldhara, Cha 3 - 153, Kathmandu

ABSTRACT

Adverse impact brought about by water resources development can be mitigated by undertaking Environmental Impact Assessment. Its administering in Nepal is new and to meet challenges of management more committed efforts are needed.

INTRODUCTION Land and water, the two basic elements of the landscape, are essential for sustaining all forms of lives. Water is needed to bring about qualitative changes in human living condition as well as for the protection of the natural ecosystem. Interventions for water use and development through construction of hydro-technical structures (dams/weirs) bring about direct and indirect changes, within the local environment of the area where interventions are made. Often the impacts become evident regionally, and may even have transnational effects. Energy, flood control, agro-industrial developments, land use changes and improved access are the visible positive outcomes of water development. Such changes in the land- water regime have their effect in the bio-physical and socioeconomic systems. In many cases, the interventions bring consequences which are adverse and affect the socioeconomy, settlement, public health, nutrition, recreation and aesthetics of the area within the influence of projects. Development of water resources should be seen as more than a simple physical exercise. Changes are introduced mainly by alterations in the hydrologic regime of the river courses where interventions are made. The interventions also lead to modification of geology, leading to accelerated erosion and increased sedimentation. Access routes opened during construction tend to accelerate encroachment on surrounding forest, with adverse impact on flora and fauna. Such impacts ultimately lead to deterioration in the social environment, more visibly in the traditional farming economy and affect human well being. The consequent social and economic impacts and the society’s capacity to assimilate impacts are the emerging debates. Potential impacts of significance must be critically analysed and weighted in project 62 BHATTARAI, T. N.

formulation. The interaction of social and environmental factors however, are complex and it is not always possible to predict the results (Biswas, 1980). All the factors of social and environmental dimensions including their values to the society must be analysed and incorporated while assessing project costs/benefits. Quantification is a complex exercise, which requires extensive information and data-base. In many cases during project planning, judgments have to be used while assessing associated socioeconomic impacts in order to over come the constraints imposed by data gap. While promoting economic growth through water resources development it should be imperative to minimise all significant adverse effects that are likely to originate from the interventions. Therefore, environment and development should be simultaneously considered to enhance certain environmental values (Anderson, 1992). Meeting the social and environmental considerations are positive goals and not the constraints to be overcome while pursuing development schemes (Hungs Preng, 1992). The strategy must take advantage of the positive links between economic efficiency, income growth, and the environment. At the same time negative trends triggered should be broken. The process should aim for a development that enhances the complementarity of economic well being and environment conservation. To facilitate such changes, a shift in the manner of project planning is needed. In the past, the planning process has failed to take into account the effects of water projects on aquatic lives, terrestrial wildlife and forests. Effects on people including problems of relocation and alterations in socioeconomic patterns have also received little attentions. Adverse impacts have been significant, primarily because they were not considered essential elements compared to the power, food production, flood control and water supply benefits. Declining water quality–due to pollution–is an emerging problem which is creating unusable water pockets with increasing cost implication for treatment. While these concerns have emerged, efforts have been also made to rectify the damages. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972 was the milestone, as it articulated and brought environmental questions as one of the agenda of contemporary development approach. The initiative of Stockholm was followed by several other initiatives around the globe that culminated in 1987, after submission of the report ‘Our Common Future’ by the World Commission on Environment and Development, and adopted at the United Nations (HMG, 1992a). Following this, the UN Conference on Environment and development (UNCED) was held in 1992, in Rio de Janeiro which brought out two more global conventions (i.e. bio-diversity and climate change conventions), the forest principals, Rio declaration and Agenda 21 to integrate environment and development. While these developments at the intergovernmental levels have been taking place internationally, several country level actions are also being made to tackle environmental challenges. EIA IN WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 63

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT Through the use of scientific approaches it is possible to predict impacts, mitigate/avoid adverse environmental damages and enhance benefit from water resources development. It requires understanding of the structure, function and management of nature and a pursuit of information. Further, the political and economic systems must support in implementing the identified solutions or the impact mitigation measures recommended by IEE or EIA of new development proposals. Both IEE and EIA are part of the environmental assessment process which identifies, predicts, interprets impacts and suggests necessary mitigative measures for adverse impacts of significance. Adverse impacts in many cases, can be minimised by incorporating provisions for offsetting such losses and even for enhancement of environmental values (UN, 1990). The impacts can be minimised through adequate provision of mitigation measures during project planning, which also enhances the benefits. Assessment of impacts beforehand with the intention of preventing degradations and maximisation of economic benefits may be carried out through the process of Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) or Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) depending upon the nature and scale of the project. The capacity to predict impacts and plan their mitigation depends on understanding of the relationship between the biomes and the ecosystems, including the social and economic context within which the project is being planned and implemented. EIA also includes functions such as monitoring of impacts of action during construction, and during project operation, at the policy level, programme implementation, and legislative proposal. The process provides a systematic means of gathering data needed to find solutions that have minimum impact on the environment and are acceptable in terms of cost and manpower requirements. Developed by Environment Protection Agency of US (EPA) in the early seventies, several other donors, development aid agencies have incorporated the process of environmental assessment in their project planning cycle. In Nepal, the forestry, transport and water resources are the key sectors that have developed their sector specific draft EIA guidelines. However, the validity and appropriateness of these prescribed strategies remain clouded in uncertainty as the implementation is a major problem. It was only in the Sixth Plan (1980-85), that EIA was made mandatory in all development programmes. Earlier, projects were exempted from EIA in their respective donor governments/agencies. A system for post project environmental monitoring (or environmental audit) still does not exist. Only social impact due to some water projects, i.e. Kulekhani, have been documented (Pokharel, 1988). Earlier efforts have concentrated on construction of run-of-river hydropower schemes and irrigation projects. While hydropower projects were built in the hills, irrigation projects were built largely in the Tarai. Most of the irrigation projects were of diversion types. The social and environmental concerns were given little importance. Only recently 64 BHATTARAI, T. N.

attention is being paid to analyse impacts but these have been concentrated for mostly externally funded projects.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT To increase the contribution of water resources sector in the national income, the Government’s energy sector policy in the Eighth Plan (1992-97) prescribes an export- oriented strategy using large-scale hydro projects; integration of energy intensive industries with higher comparative advantages for medium scale projects; and mini-hydropower projects for rural areas that are not connected to national grid. The policy has also opened the possibility of attracting investment from the public, private and external sources in hydropower development. Broadly, the policy stipulates environmental sensitivity and sustainable resources usages, by following a strategy that prioritises sustainable economic growth, poverty alleviation, and reduction of regional imbalances as the three principal objectives (HMG, 1992b). The nature of the environmental problems and their understanding through the 1980s have led to acceptance of the necessity for development processes to be more sensitive to the issues identified to be crucial importance. The thinking emanates not only from consideration of environment but also due to the emerging stress in the food production system, and decline in the human well being including further marginalisation of poor. The understanding has led to conceptualisation and incorporation of environmental issues in national development strategies, culminating in guidelines for environmental assessment and management (IUCN, 1992a), (WECs, 1992), HMG/ILO, 1993). Nepal has also developed and enacted a national Environmental Impact Assessment guidelines for incorporating in its planning process. Management and implementation of mitigation are weak and replete with technical, financial and institutional constraints. Mechanisms for implementing management plans generally do not exist, and where it does, is only at an infancy stage. The Environment Protection Council (EPC) under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, has been mandated with wide ranging responsibilities to formulate and coordinate implementation of environmental policies. Capacity enhancement at operational level is the major challenge of institution building. For each and every water resources project, its impacts on the physical and ecological resources, and on human use and quality of life values of the resources, several questions remain unanswered i.e. have earlier projects been economically productive in terms of promoting economic growth as intended? Have they been meeting social needs and values? etc. Unfortunately, in absence of post project audit experience these questions are unanswered. Poor institutions are the major limitations to offset even the visible and negative impacts of lesser magnitudes. EIA IN WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 65

The poor capacity of the existing institutions to accommodate EIA requires that the guidelines be integrated within the existing administrative system without spending too much time in reforms (IUCN, 1992b). The approach should be to institutionalise and undertake EIA in the current working situations. The nature and extent of institutional reforms which may be required should be clarified through practical experience as they become available. Though monitoring and Post Project Audit stages of EIA are closely linked, monitoring is the most problematic function of the EIA process all through the planning, construction as well as operational phases of a project. The major challenge is the proper implementation of recommended mitigative measures due to lack of adequate provision of technical capability and economic support. Data is a major problem, and the country’s efforts of managing data is ad-hoc and facing severe resource scarcity. Lack of coordination, inability to provide adequate justification for a monitoring programme, cost, and the need for a consistent commitment of staff and other resources over a long period are the other impediments (IUCN, 1992b). How to achieve a balance between economic viability and environmental feasibility of the project is the crucial question every development sector is facing today. In the absence of a environmental monitoring system, provisions at the planning phase of the project will have limited chances of getting incorporated during project implementation. Considering the physical context of the region, environmental management should be integral components of all water resources development activities. Environmental protection and management pertain mainly to tacking into immediate consideration, factors such as deforestation, soil erosion and grazing which impact the catchment areas which affect the project. Secondly the approach must be to mitigate impact that project placement would bring.

CONCLUSION Assessment of both positive and adverse impacts of water resources development is essential. Experiences from other countries, and identification of social and environmental parameters are essential in project planning. Commitment to and leadership on environmental matters are needed mostly at the implementation stages. For environmental policies to be translated into practice, the mandate and execution capacity of the responsible sectoral agencies must be strengthened. It is important to ensure mechanisms for effective coordination between sectors during project execution. Post project monitoring is crucial and should be designed and institutionalised for all water resources projects. With such steps, the potential adverse impacts on the physical, biological and the social environment may be mitigated to positively contribute to national well being. 66 BHATTARAI, T. N.

REFERENCES Anderson, D., 1992: Economic Growth and the Environment, Background paper prepared for the World Development Report, The World Bank, Washington, D. C. Biswas, A. K., 1980: Environment and Water Development in Third World, Journal of the Water Resources Planning and Management Division, WR 1. HMG, 1992a: National Report Nepal, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal. HMG, 1992b: The Eighth Plan (1992-97), National Planning Commission, Kathmandu, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal. HMG/MWR/ILO/UNDP, 1993: Environmental Protection Measures For Hill Irrigation Schemes in Nepal. A participatory Approach, Kathmandu. Hungs Preng. N. 1992: Application of EIA to Water Resources Development Projects. Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok. IUCN, 1992b: Guidelines for a National System of Environmental Planning in Nepal (draft), National Planning Commission/IUCN. NPC/IUCN, 1992a: National Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines, National Planning Commission/IUCN. Pokharel, J. C., 1988: Population Displacement by the Kulekhani Hydroelectric Project Some Lessons for Compensation Planning, Prashasan, year 19, No. 2, 51st, Issues, Kathmandu. United Nations 1990: Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for Water Resources Development. ESCAP-Environment and Development Series, New York. WECS 1992: Guidelines for the Environmental Assessment of Water and Energy Policies, Programmes and Projects (draft), Social and Environmental Directorate, Water and Energy and Energy Commission Secretariat, March. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 67-73

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE INDO-NEPAL REGION

A. K. SINHA1 AND SANTOSH KUMAR2

ABSTRACT

Development of Indo-Nepal Water resources should have avenues to address the adverse environmental impacts that the interventions are likely to bring about. Through corrective measures the extent of impact can be minimised. Regional impact assessment guidelines must be developed by the two countries for this purpose.

INTRODUCTION Water occurs continuously in nature. The occurrence and distribution of water is governed by the principles of hydrology. All life forms as well as economic activities in the agricultural and the industrial sector depend on timely and adequate availability of water. Though India in richly endowed with water resources, its occurrence and distribution in the State of Bihar is highly imbalanced. The state is frequently ravaged by both floods and draught bringing wide spread miseries. While flood brings misery during monsoon, in other seasons drought is frequent. The State of Bihar is situated in the eastern region of the Ganga basin. The Ganga basin covers 26 per cent of India’s total area. From the view point of flood and associated problems, the State of Bihar can be divided into two main regions as:

i. North Bihar plains traversed by rivers like Gandak, Burhi Gandaki, Bagmati, Kamala, Kosi and Mahananda. The rivers originate in Nepal and Tibet. ii. South Bihar plains and Chotanagpur plateau which are traversed by the Vindhya rivers.

North Bihar today needs attention because the region remains a periphery in the Indian economy and continues to be enmeshed in poverty. The Himalayan rivers bring flood and exacerbate the scenario of poverty. The salient features of the Indo-Nepal rivers are shown in Table 1. As the river originates in the Himalaya, they are characterised by steep slopes. During the rainy season the discharge exceeds carrying capacity of the rivers.

1 Professor, Patna University. 2 Professor, Civil Engineering, Bihar College of Engineering, Patna. 68 SINHA, A. K. AND KUMAR, S.

Deforestation, erosion and landslides in the upper catchments contribute large quantities of sediment to these rivers. The sediment carrying characteristic of the rivers are shown in Table 2. At the plains, as the slope flattens, flow velocity is reduced and so is the sediment carrying capacity of the rivers. Deposition is wide spread in flood plain and channels. As the channels are choked due to sedimentation, the flood carrying capacity of the rivers are further reduced. Banks are overtopped inundating adjoining land areas. Many times, rivers cause bank erosion and change courses, opening-up new channels. As the frequency of flooding is high, damages to agriculture, roads, embankments and industries are substantial. The Ganga functions as the master drainage of all these rivers and when it is in high stage, flood effects become even more pronounced. In such a situation the tributary rivers become incapable of draining excess water that is available to them.

TABLE 1 SALIENT FEATURES OF NORTH BIHAR RIVERS

Names of Rivers Catchment Area Length Run-off (mm/yr) N. Bihar Nepal N. Bihar Nepal Monsoon Non- Km2 % Km2 % Km2 % Km2 % monsoon Mahananda 6299 25 4500 8 185 49 - - 11606 1960 Kosi 11070 15 63430 85 248 53 - - 67530 10752 Kamala 3600 65 1963 35 256 78 72 22 2009 147 Bagmati 5995 44 7695 56 398 67 195 33 5204 467 Burhi Gandaki 10150 81 2350 19 500 100 - - 6015 1044 Gandak 11152 24 34790 76 250 40 380 60 43988 9233 Ghagra 2926 2 70303 50 104 18 480 44 82686 15752

Source: Prasad and Vardhan, 1992.

Though in-exhaustible and renewable use of water for human benefit in a sustainable manner requires that its management be rational and correct. In the context of prevailing poverty, poor agriculture capacity and energy crisis in the region, water resource development and management acquire critical dimensions. Water resource development is essential to meet the pressing needs. Multipurpose development of river valleys remains a viable concept that allows electricity generation, provides water for irrigation, domestic and industrial needs, and provides flood mitigation benefits. Development of water resources and implementation of these projects requires cooperation between India and Nepal. Corporative development will establish an unique, stable and symbiotic relationship between the two countries. Cooperative development offers opportunities for heralding economic resurgence of the suffering population and sets an example for the world. Both ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 69

TABLE 2 SUSPENDED SEDIMENT LOAD IN INDO-NEPAL RIVERS

River Site Sediment Conc. (gm/l) Kosi (D/S) Baltara 1.05 Kamala (M/S) Jhanjharpur 1.722 Bagmati (M/S) Hayaghat 0.938 B. Gandaki (M/S) Sikandarpur 1.194 B. Gandaki (D/S) Rosera 7.157 Gandak (U/S) Triveni 1.901

Source: (Prasad and Vardhan, 1993). countries stand substantially to gain from such cooperative ventures. River valley development or any other type of water resources development bring environmental disruptions. The scale of impact is of a wider and serious nature when reservoirs are built. The impacts thus caused are inter-linked and of varying nature. The impacts may be of primary, secondary, tertiary nature and also affect each other. Assessment of the impacts are prerequisites and needs to be done through an interdisciplinary approach. The environmental issues of water development when reservoirs are built can be outlined as follows.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Health Implication In a tropical climate, creation of a reservoir can have adverse consequences on human health. The eventual substitution of a flowing river by a large stretch of static water in the reservoir alters the nature of the water regime and may lead to hosts of diseases. The principal water borne parasitic diseases thus caused are malaria, filariasis and onchocerciasis blindness. The infected water spreads such diseases fast and over a wide area particularly when the water is used for irrigation. Concentration of the large labor force required to build the projects, generally creates favorable condition for the spread of communicable diseases during the construction stages.

Aquatic Plant Growth Both microscopic algae and large microphytic weeds may lead to plant growth in the created like behind the dam leading to impacts at micro level. Weed growth can interfere with setting and lifting of fishermen’s net, affect fishing activities, interfere with inland water services, and also affect power generation when the weeds enter turbines. Algae growth can impart an unpleasant taste and odor to water. Toxins released from algae which bloom in the reservoir can lead to outbreak of gastroenteritis diseases. It can also kill fish in the 70 SINHA, A. K. AND KUMAR, S.

reservoir and poison domestic animals which use the reservoir water.

Impact on fisheries Erection of dam and impoundment affects migratory fishes. On the other hand a reservoir provides opportunities for the development of fisheries by rearing species of fishes which thrive and flourish in still water. Fish farming on a commercial scale can prove to be a source of income for the local population. Fishing can also be developed as a recreational activity.

Flora and Fauna Inundating a river valley affects the habitat of the local flora and fauna of the region. Rare and endangered species may be permanently lost if the habitation lies within the inundated area. Creation of impoundment may also bring about micro climatic changes in the local eco-system.

Agriculture Generally more fertile land is located along the banks of the river in the valley floor. Reservoirs inundate such land. submergence of land represents economic as well as food production loss. Dams also interfere with the prevailing agricultural practices in the lower river reaches, which are based on seasonal flooding. Silt deposited by seasonal flood improves fertility of the lower areas in the plains. After the dam is built and reservoir is created, the silt is deposited in the reservoir and downstream reaches are devoid of fine silt. Lack of fine silt which has a high nutrient value may lower agricultural productivity. Excess irrigation water application from reservoirs in command areas may cause drainage problems leading to waterlogging and salinisation. The fluctuations in water level of the reservoir, however, may provide opportunities for seasonal cultivation particularly in drawdown sections.

Impact on Human Settlement Construction activities during project implementation encourage both in and out migration of population. Settlements within the submergence areas have to be rehabilitated else where. Increased activities around the project and reservoir may attract people from outside.

Socioeconomic and Cultural Impact The immigration and emigration have both socio-economic and cultural consequences such as changes in livelihood pattern of the region as well as of the rehabilitated population introduced by such process. Though the opportunities can be used to improve the quality of life, far reaching policy reforms and commitment are needed for mitigation and ensuring ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 71

that the rehabilitation measures do not lead to social hardship. Displacement of population leads to socio-psychological stress in addition to causing economic hardship. Attachments with one’s community and ancestral property are sentimental in nature and hard to be compensated, while dislocation brings more hardship to the life of the affected people. In the rehabilitated site, people will encounter

TABLE 3 COST AND BENEFITS OF WATER RESOURCES PROJECTS

PRIMARY COST (1) PRIMARY BENEFITS (3) Cost of dam and appurtenant works Generation of electricity Resettlement of population Utilisation of excess flow in river for irrigation in lean Compensation for submergence season. Flood control by containing excess flood water behind dams. Domestic and industrial water supply. SECONDARY COST (2) SECONDARY BENEFITS (4) Loss of services and amenities. Potential for development of lake fisheries. Loss of sites of conservational interest. Potential for tourism development. Disruption of the ecological balance of the region. Potential for water transport development. Loss of river fisheries. Possibility of seasonal cultivation of alternative Adverse effect of channel environment on inundated areas in reservoir river. health and productivity of both man and his New economic opportunities created in the dam domestic animals. area due to increase in human activities. Socio-psychological stress of people ousted from ancestral property into the uncertain future. Disruption of livelihood pattern and lifestyle of the reservoir affected people. Loss of food production due to submergence of cultivation land. Impact on human resources of the region. Loss of sites in structures of cultural interest. Reduced fertility of downstream flood plains. Loss of fertility of soil in catchment area due to increased potential for soil erosion and landslide. Loss of life and property in catchment areas due to increased potential of earthquake and landslide. Loss of aesthetic quality. Risk of dam failure due to impounding of large quantity of water and earthquake. 72 SINHA, A. K. AND KUMAR, S.

a completely new environment and it could lead to traumatic experience of readjustment. In the new environment, both human productivity as well as that of the domestic animals will be affected.

Geology, Hydrology and Climate Creation of a reservoir often initiates seismicity. Until recently it was thought that only small earthquakes could be associated with artificial lakes. The earthquakes are reported to be triggered by sagging of the reservoir bottom due to the load of the water and consequent crustal adjustments. Some of these concerns raised by ecologist against large dams have been proved correct in some cases in the adjoining Himalayan region of Uttar Pradesh. The rate of evaporation of water from reservoirs is faster than that from a flowing river. While water is lost to the atmosphere and cannot be used productively for power and irrigation benefits, evaporation also increases salt concentration in water. Another major problem of reservoir development is that of siltation. The silt carried by the river gets trapped behind the dams, resulting in loss of storage and reduces its useful life. Removal of the forest cover, clearing of sites, quarrying and blasting activities related to construction also lead to increased erosion and landslides. The problem related with siltation further accentuated hampers soil fertility and hence productivity.

Cost-Benefit Relationship A brief enumeration of the Cost Benefit relation for the economic and ecological appraisal of projects that are likely to be built in the region are given in Table 3.

CONCLUSION Development of river valley projects can have wide ranging impacts on the environment. The extent and magnitude of these impacts are far more than what normally have been anticipated in several projects built earlier. Adverse impacts can be minimised with small cost and effort, if preventive/protective measures are taken in advance. Such efforts will preserve the habitat and maintain the quality of the environment. Detailed assessment of the possible impacts on the environment including mitigation measures are needed in project designs. The assessment must take an interdisciplinary and objective view of the issue to be supported by timely actions. In developing countries like India and Nepal, the environmental considerations are more crucial because the resources available for development and conservation are limited compared to the enormity of the needs. Available resources should be utilised in a most efficient manner supporting both the developmental and environmental needs. The present planning processes do not allow for such provisions, and tend to regard development and conservation being against one another. Such an ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 73

attitude needs to be changed. In the Ganga basin, changes have to be brought about through developmental efforts at a much faster rate. It is essential that efforts are undertaken not for the immediate gains, but with a long term vision, fully understanding the consequences. The Government of India has initiated planning and evaluation of developmental activities with this perspective in focus. The approach formulates rationale for decision making in matters of environmental importance, spelling out criteria for various types of projects that affect the environment, before they are cleared for implementation. These are positive development trends and allow a fair degree of optimism. Both Nepal and India must come together for formulating guidelines for environmental impact assessment at a regional level, which can be applicable for cooperative Indo-Nepal water resources development.

REFERENCES Prasad, T. and Vardhan, A., 1992: Proceedings International Symposium on Erosion and Sediment Transfer Monitoring Programmed in River Basins, Oslo, Norway. Prasad, T. and Vardan, A., 1993: Sediment Transport Measurement in North Bihar Rivers Indicating Erosion from Indo-Nepal Basin, CWSR Paper. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 75-79

CULTURAL AND WATER BONDS

SANTOSH KUMAR1, A. K. SINHA2 AND NIGAM PRAKASH3

ABSTRACT

Cultural ties between Nepal and India are the most enduring element of the relation between the two countries. Hydrological ties further binds the people together. The ties should be further cemented by cooperative development of the Indo-Nepal water resources for the benefit of the regions.

INTRODUCTION Nepal enjoys a position of vital interest in the region. On the geographical map of Asia, Nepal does not occupy much space. However, the importance of any country cannot be measured in terms of its geographical expansion. The present political boundary of Nepal extends much farther than what it used to be in earlier times. The word, ‘Nepal’ then meant only the valley of Kathmandu surrounded on all sides by inaccessible mountains and forest belt. The valley of Nepal is accessible from the south through the Sub-Himalayan chains of hills about 100 km north of the Indo-Gangetic plain. The valley is a flat surface of wide dimensions, has fertile soil and receives sufficient rainfall. It is the only one of its kind in the entire central Himalaya. The geological formation of the valley points to a stage of its existence totally submerged under water, except for the hillocks. This accounts for the rich fertility of the soil, which nurtures several crops throughout the year. The Nepalese culture evolved and advanced mainly through the topography and soil formation. The ‘cut’ provided by the river Bagmati brought the valley under superior cultural influences. The valley reached an advanced stage of urban cultural civilisation during early times. Its base, like any other oriental culture, was ‘peasant economy’ and which in some way impeded the progress by social conflict and feudal forces resisting changes. Richly endowed by nature, the Kathmandu valley was also free from floods, and droughts. Consequently, the valley could enjoy a surplus in agriculture production. Taking advantage from the socio-cultural milieus, a culture of aristocracy resembling that of the Ganga basin was born in the valley.

1 Professor, Civil Engineering, Bihar College of Engineering, Patna. 2 Professor, Civil Enginering, Bihar College of Engineering, Patna. 3 Research Associate, Center for Water Resources Studies, Patna University.

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The Nepalese culture has been influenced by ancient Indian culture with some variations. While assimilating all race/influences during its evolution, Nepal seems to have yielded to many aspects of the Indian culture. At a later period of history, the culture of the Nepal valley had come to resemble, to a certain extent, partly the Tibetan and partly the Indian tradition of the early age, though essentially it was the latter which had greater influence. The Kathmandu valley however, was never regarded to be outside of India’s sphere of influence both in the political and cultural context. Geographically and economically the valley was inseparable from the Indo-Gangetic plain. Relations between Kathmandu and India had remained cordial. Besides cultural ties, trade between the Indian plains and hills had been brisk and flourishing. Centrally located in the Himalaya, Kathmandu has been the main route of trade between Indian, Tibet and China since ancient times.

BRIEF HISTORY OF INDO-NEPALESE RELATIONS The earliest authentic evidence of contact between India and Nepal is found in the 6th century BC. After Gautam Buddha attained enlightenment at Bodh Gaya in India, he returned to Kapilvastu in Nepal, his birth place. His return marked the advent of Buddhism in Nepal which was further enhanced after emperor Ashoka the Great, visited Lumbini. Besides religious contacts, there were numerous attacks on Nepal from the south. It has been recorded that the great conqueror of Gupta dynasty conquered Nepal and later his son Vikramaditya visited Nepal and introduced the Vikram Samvat. Harsh Vardhan also made incursions into Nepal. Several times the valley was attacked by the Rajputs. With the advent of Muslim rule in India, Nepal acquired a special importance, as it became shelter to many families and tribes of India. In 1303 AD when Allauddin Khilji attacked Chittor (Rajasthan, India), many Rajputs refused to remain in slavery and moved into the Himalayan hills. They settled in Palpa and gradually organised their principalities in mountains. With the rise of Bhim Sen Thapa, a new era in the history of the Indo-Nepali relations began. The expansion of the Nepalese Kingdom started in 1968. By 1803, the Gorkhas had conquered the region up to Sutlej in the west. On the east, they subdued the state of Sikkim and annexed the region up to the river Teesta. In the north their advance was checked by Chinese intervention. Unable to move on these fronts, the Gorkhas moved to the Tarai, the southern frontier. The tract of rich fertile land offered opportunities and it was natural for the Gorkhas to establish control over this land. While Bhim Sen Thapa followed a policy of martial expansion, he was also apprehensive of the British Imperial power. He adopted a policy of slow but steady encroachment along the Indian border to keep soldiers busy and yet avoided provoking hostilities with the East India Company. For several years, systematic expansion of the

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Nepalese territory continued towards the south. Parts of Tirhut, Bareilly, Moradabad, Saran and Gorakhpur were annexed. The aggressive expansion of Gorkha colliding with the search for markets by the East India Company finally led to the Anglo-British war in 1814 A. D. The emergence of The East India Company in India and its desire to search the unexplored hilly states brought tremendous turmoil in Nepal. The popular opinion in Nepal was against any closer relations with the British which was primarily regarded as an action akin to loss of independence. Lord Hastings the then Governor General of India had his own ideas about the growing power of Nepal in Himalaya. His aim was to cripple the Gorkhas and expel them permanently from the ‘Indian territory’. The Nepalese could not push on with their military success and went on the defensive. The gains of the company were the rich mines of iron, lead, copper and hemp in Kumaon and timber and herbs in the forests of Tarai. The 1814- 1816 Anglo-Nepalese war was mainly due to the aggressive character of Gorkha and search for market of the British. The Gorkhas, had a continuous history of fighting ever since their advent in the Himalaya in the 14th century. Military service became their profession and a cherished social value. It therefore became obligatory to every ruler to appease them in order to stay in power. The Nepalese rulers lived under the constant fear that it should suit the political interest of the British they would not abstain from making a bid to subjugate the country. However, the end of the Second World War marked the beginning of an era of freedom and equality among nations. The withdrawal of the British from India in 1947 created a new situation to which the Himalayan Kingdom had to readjust. The democratic government in independent India had a natural dislike for the anachronistic system in Nepal and a soft corner for the movement that the Nepalese in India had started to establish democracy in their country. This attitude of the Government of India constituted a serious challenge to the continuance of the Rana regime in Nepal. Under the circumstances, Nepal’s India policy from 1947 to 1950 was exclusively aimed at winning over the Indian Government’s sympathy for the Rana rule. The year 1951was a watershed in Nepal’s history, when in the wake of armed insurrection, King Tribhuvan took refuge in India. He was subsequently put on the throne with the help of Indian Government. Between 1951-53, the Nepal Government called in the Indian army three times to help it maintain law and order. It also took assistance from the Indian Civil Service and planning experts for modernizing its civil service. Indian army experts were called in to modernise the Nepali army. Nepal’s dependence on India however, invited criticisms in the Kingdom, which gave rise to anti-Indian sentiment and propaganda. King Tribhuvan’s successor King Mahendra during 1955-59 took a number of steps to lessen the country’s dependence on India in various fields. His steps marred the element of cordiality in Indo-Nepal relations.

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With the emergence of democratic Government of Nepali Congress, under B. P. Koirala as the Prime Minister in 1959, Indo-Nepal relations were restored to a great extent. During this period the Gandak Project Agreement was signed. Also the Treaty on Trade and Transit was signed whereby Nepal secured the desired facility for its trade with third countries through Indian territory. The Indo-Nepal relation took a new turn when King Mahendra dissolved the parliament and imprisoned the elected Prime Minister. The act received severe criticism in India. A spate of anti-Indian campaigns began to the extent that King Mahendra started Hobnobbing with India’s adversaries-China and Pakistan. India also took a tough stand and refused to renew the Trade and Transit treaty after it lapsed in 1970. This compelled Nepal to come to terms with India. A new treaty was signed in 1971. The death of King Mahendra and accession of young King Birendra to the throne came as a welcome relief to democratic forces who were paralysed under late King Mahendra’s suthoritarianism. The new King declared, ‘Our system has room for necessary reforms’. Subsequently Panchayat elections were held in Nepal. India was happy over some of these developments. Democracy finally seemed to have found its entry into Nepal.

WATER RELATIONS Water is the most important single resource for sustenance of life. In South Asia, it occurs in the form of snow, streams, rivers and lakes. The spatial and temporal availability of water in the region is governed by the geographical, geological and meteorological factors. The rivers that flow from Nepal into India account for a large volume of water resources in the region. Political boundaries carved during the evolution have led to the division of the resources. Due to many reasons the political factors have not serve the interest of the two countries inspite of the cultural closeness and similarities. Co-ordinated action between the two countries has not been forth coming. Trust and understanding have been eroded which are major impediments to cooperative development. The first water relations between India and Nepal came in the form of the Kosi Agreement in 1954, followed by the Gandak agreement in 1959. Work on the Kosi Project started in 1956 and by 1963 the construction of Bhimnagar barrage in Nepal was completed under the Agreement. The Gandak Project is located at the trijunction of Nepal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The benefits of both these projects were to be shared in accordance with concluded Agreements. However, serious demonstrations erupted in Nepal, which held the view that the Agreement was a sell out to India which was going to enjoy the lion’s share of benefits from a Nepalese river. The opposition was even greater in the case of the Gandak project. In 1954 India sought to compensate Nepal by offering to build the Trisuli hydel project as a ‘gift’ for permitting the construction of Kosi headworks in Nepalese territory. In 1963, Nepal demanded sweeping amendments to both the agreements. Finally in 1964

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certain provisions in the Gandak agreement and in 1966 in Kosi agreement were altered to suit Nepal. However, bickering between the two countries continued and it was only in 1972 that the western canal of the Kosi Project was cleared for construction. Continued bickering over the Karnali project which is beneficial to both countries has cast a shadow on its clearance and implementation. Though the need to develop water resources is continuously felt by both India and Nepal on a co-operative basis, cooperative development has not materialised due to lack of political vision and will to bring about change.

CONCLUSION The socio-cultural relation between Nepal and India goes back to time immemorial. The ties are shaped by the rivers which arise in Nepal and flow to join the Ganga in India. Both countries are victims of mutual distrust. The situation has reached a stage of almost ‘no-return’ more than once. Whilst Nepal is suffering from ‘big brother syndrome’ and India has some kind of ‘superiority complex’, opportunities have been lost. Fortunately a new era of friendship has emerged with the advent of democracy in Nepal. Co-operative water resources development should be kept as top priority. It would be criminal to lose any opportunity to convert the role of Indo-Nepal cultural ties for economic emancipation of the region through water ties. Failing this there may be a danger of insurgency in the region against both the governments like Palestine, Kashmir and other places in the world. Vested interest should give way to new thinking and it is time to bring about positive changes.

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INTERFACE OF WATER, RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT: STRAINS OF DISCORD

SUDHINDRA SHARMA Sociologist 1/115 Kopundole, Lalitpur, Nepal

ABSTRACT

This paper provides a short discussion of the role of water in Hinduism and how water has been utilised by the Hindu polity historically. It juxtaposes this with the paradigm in which development is based. Then case studies of temples that could be hypothetically submerged are provided along with the reaction of the concerned priests. By focusing on some case studies and discussing the dynamics of a traditional Hindu polity the paper tries to understand the conditions and circumstance in which relocation is accepted along with the mechanism through which this is done and where it is rejected outright.

THE ISSUE In terms of technical and economic parameters, the confluence of two or more rivers make excellent reservoir sites. Other ideal hydro sites are places with narrow gorge and upstream storage potential (Gyawali, 1987). The confluence of two or more rivers, and rivers passing through a gorge are precisely the holy sites of Hinduism and for this reason have one or the other important temple in such a location. If Sankhamul, Devghat and Barahachetra are examples of the first type, Gokarneshwor, Pashupati and Chobhar Ganesh are examples of the second type. The apparently unprovocative enterprise of building reservoirs, could in fact give rise to unprecedented resistance from certain dislocation of its holy sites. Given the recent turn of events in Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid, we can only imagine the magnitude of hostility that could come from organised Hinduism, were the submergence or dislocation of temples and holy sites, to become a real possibility.

WATER AND HINDUISM The Atharva Veda regards water as one of the five constituent elements which make up the universe. Water as a particular element with associated characteristics and related symbolism forms the basis of Jyotish Shastra and Ayurveda. The Shiva Purana elaborates at great length the importance of bathing in different rivers during certain planetary configurations such as bathing in Prayag when the Sun and Jupiter are in Aquarius. Dipping in sacred rivers during such periods have the potential of washing away past sins and 82 SHARMA, S.

accumulating religious merit. Long and arduous pilgrimages are undertaken just to take a dip in sacred rivers at those configurations. Although the Hindu civilisation of South Asia was not hydraulic civilisation per se, notions of harnessing water for irrigation did exist. The scale of intervention was substantial though it would be imprudent to compare it with the harnessing of the Nile in ancient Egypt or the Hwang Ho in ancient China. The irrigation schemes during the Gupta era in the fourth century, the Rastrakuta Empire during the ninth century and Pala dynasty during the eleventh century are a testimony to this fact (Inden, 1988). In Nepal during the medieval and early modern period, certain canals (Kulo) were constructed through royal directives. These canals were called Raj Kulo. Aside from royal directives religious trust, individual initiative and community efforts also led to the construction of kulos (Pradhan, 1988). More often than not, however, it was the royal directive impelled by humanitarian motives (such as during times of famine) or religious ones (income for the maintenance of temples) that led to the construction of kulos. One of the better known farmer managed irrigation systems, the Thulo Kulo in Argheli in western Nepal, is an example of this type. This Raj Kulo was constructed during the eighteenth century through a grant subsidy provided by the King of Palpa, Mukunda Sen, for the upkeep of a Rishikesh temple at Ridi. Another use of water in traditional Nepal has been in the form of pani-ghatta or water mills. Pani-ghattas use running water as a source of energy to grind maize, wheat and other cereal. Though modern attempts at improving pani-ghattas to generate hydroelectricity has not really succeeded, its persistent use speaks for its continued usefulness for the local population (Thappa, 1989). The elaborate structure and design of dhunge dhara or stone taps in the three cities of Kathmandu valley is yet another example of the uses of water prevalent in ancient Nepal (Tiwari, 1988). Although the notion of harnessing water was there in Hindu polity, intervention was on a much limited scale compared to the present. Technology had a limited role to play in society and the social carriers of technology i.e., the artisan class/caste, had a relatively low position in the Hindu social order. This is in stark contrast to the present, where the scale of intervention is such that it could dramatically alter the surrounding landscape and environment. Scientific technology is all pervasive and informs virtually all branches of knowledge. The social carriers of modern technology, the technocrats, constitute the elite, and make up, so to speak the new priesthood - the guardians of the development dharma (Gyawali, 1987).

GENESIS OF DEVELOPMENT DHARMA We educated Nepalese wear different hats, or as a Sociologist would put it, we enact different roles. One of the roles of a technocrat involves a particular way of looking at the INTERFACE OF WATER, RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT 83

world and going about one’s business. The worldview of a technocrat, needless to say, is different from the Hindu worldview. Living in society we are constrained to changes roles frequently - a technocrat now, a bureaucrat next, a Hindu Brahmin now, a Congresite next and so on. This frequent changing of roles often becomes a source of anomaly in our personal lives. The magnitude of tension we encounter in our daily lives is but the tip of the iceberg. Fundamental sources of conflict arise from the incompatibility of different paradigms. Our worldviews as technocrats, as upholders of the development dharma, are essentially based on the secular/material/humanist (SMH) paradigm. Notions of usage and utility differ between different paradigms. To take the case of water, the SMH paradigm views it as a resource that is to be harnessed for hydroelectricity and irrigation, the purpose of which is to improve the living conditions of the majority of people. The Hindu paradigm views water as a life giving substance and a purifying agent. It is because water purifies, that rivers are considered sacred. Dipping in rivers purify a man or a woman spiritually and this activity is considered to be a religious merit in itself. The genesis of SMH paradigm can be traced to ancient Greece, though as a new ism, it began would ascendance only in the seventeenth century with the decline of Judeo- Christian theology in western Europe. It began by replacing the Biblical image of man, nature and the World with pagan Greek notions. As a new world ordering rationality, SMH has been largely conterminous with capitalism. Although capitalism’s value orientation was originally derived from Calvinism, a puritan Protestant sect (Weber, 1958), so intricately has this paradigm been linked with the expansion of the world economy, that it can be regarded as a part and parcel of global capitalism. Today, in Nepal, development has become a new cosmology and technocrats, the modern pundits. Seminars, workshops and training have become new religious rites, while what ‘experts’ have to say during such occasions, latest versions of prabachan. This new dharma that engineers, doctors and scientists embody is rapidly marginalising the traditional religion. The big dams ‘the temples of the modern era’ (to use Nehru’s phrase), have all the likelihood of submerging or displacing the traditional temples that Hindus and Buddhists of the land have been worshipping for centuries. Following case studies highlight this.

CASE I Gokarneshwor Mahadev, a temple dedicated to Shiva, lies about 6 km. North-east of Kathmandu city. Situated en route to Sundarijal, the temple lies on the banks of Bagmati River. The place where Gokarneshwor Mahadev is located is an ideal site for a reservoir. The Bagmati which comes meandering down from Sundarijal narrows into a 10 ft. wide, 40 ft. high gorge right after passing the temple bank. The surrounding topography 84 SHARMA, S.

makes for a natural reservoir. On the south, the ground elevates to about 50 ft. while on the north and west also the level rises steeply. In the east, however, since the terrain is flat for some distance, some cultivated land would probably be submerged. If a reservoir were to be constructed in the site, it would approximately cover an area of 50 hectares (Figure 1a). Among others things that would be submerged, is the Gokarneshwor temple which lies barely 20 ft. above the river surface. A dike could be constructed to save it from submergence, but the cost involved would not justify the construction of the reservoir in the first place. When questioned about his response to the hypothetical submergence of the Gokarneshwor temple, the reply of the Mool Bhatta, Badri Nath Dhakal was curt, “You can change the location of a temple because temples are man-made, but you cannot uproot and transfer idols because they are self-manifested (swayam prakat)”. He even complained of the fact that since a small dam had been constructed downstream, it had already given rise to sedimentation problem. A local well besides the river, in fact, had been filled up with sand. According to a story in Swasthani Lord Shiva at one took the form of a deer. When Brahma and Vishnu tried to catch the deer by horn, the portion that Brahma had in his hand fell down on the very spot that the temple of Gokarneshwor temple is now located. In the fourteenth day of the dark half of the month of Bhadra (Bhadra Krishna Chaturdasi), a festival takes place there. The next day in Kuse Ausi, when people come to pay homage to their deceased ancestors. At the time when the research was undertaken, Shakya families from Gabahal in Patan were celebrating bhoj at the temple premises. What were Buddhists doing in a Shaivist shrine? A young man in his twenties who was a participant in the ceremony told the researcher that the diety they worship in the shrine is Lokeshwor. Could it be that the shrine was originally a Buddhist temple that was converted into Hinduism at the time of Shaiva-Hindu revival? An alloy sculpture engraved with Buddhist ichnography at the corner of the inner sanctuary tended to point in this direction. John Locke, a Jesuit anthropologist who has been studying Newar Buddhism for the past decade however, opines that from the evidence at hand it is difficult to decide whether the shrine was originally Buddhist or Hindu. According to him, the site was in all probability associated with animism in the beginning. The Hindus, by accounting for its presence in the Puran and by associating it with a Hindu high god, had in course of time Hinduised it while the Buddhists had done the same.

CASE II Surya ghat lies at the bank of Bagmati after it passes Gaurighat and before it reaches Pashupati. In this section, the Bagmati passes through a gorge which is about 40 ft. wide INTERFACE OF WATER, RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT 85

and 80 ft. high. Since there is room for a reservoir upstream, the site is ideal for a hydro dam technically. However, were a dam to be constructed at that site, besides a colony of recently built houses, the Gujeshwori temple, an ancient Tantric Pith and one of the popular temples in Nepal, would be submerged (Figure 1b). When asked about the hypothetical submergence of the Gujeshwori temple and the possibility of its relocation, the son of the temple pujari (the father was not available), Surendra Karmachary, rejected the possibility outright. “The relocation of Gujeshwori is not possible, not even with Shanti-swosthi and kshyma puja”. (the terms refers to a ritual to appease God/gods, asking pardon for past transgressions and seeking their protection in the future).

CASE III A temple that has actually been relocated through Shanti-swosthi is the Shakti Ganesh temple (known as the Sora Hate Ganesh in popular parlance) at Ratna Park in the heart of the city (Figure 2).

0 0 14 1600

0 140 N

MAHADEV 2 TEMPLE Gokarna

Bauddha Jorpati Chabahil 1 Bagmati 1. GUHESWORI TEMPLE 2. GOKARNA RESERVOIR Pashupatinath GUHESWORI TEMPLE Tribhuban International Airport

Minbhawan

012 3km SCALE:

FIGURE 1 A, B CASE OF HYPOTHETICAL RESERVOIRS

This temple was previously located at the other side of the road going to Assan. Since the road had to be expanded in that portion (during the state visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Nepal in 1961), the temple was transferred to the present site. Asked how this was 86 SHARMA, S.

Kamaladi Pani Pokhari Bhotahity 1 1 Original site 2 2 Relocated site

MAHABAUDDHA Bagh Bazar Indra Chok Hospital Ratna Park

FIGURE 2 RELOCATED GANESH TEMPLE done, Jagannath Prasad Sharma Gautam, the current pujari at the temple says, ‘The king’s Raj Guru and Mul Purohit deal with events such as the relocation of a temple or a religious site. They consult the astrologers and if found permissible they relocate it during an auspicious time (sahit herera). Shanti-swosthi and kshyma-puja are also undertaken during such events. If relocation of shrines have to take place within one’s compound, then the head of the household has that authority. The temples and shrines that lie outside one’s personal property are the property of the king and the king through consultations with Raj Guru and Mul Purohit has the authority to relocate it.’

DYNAMICS OF A HINDU POLITY The above case goes to illustrate the role of a monarch in a Hindu polity. Monarchy, in fact, represents one of the most organised institutions of Hinduism. This may need a little clarification. We all know that Hinduism does not have a central church to enforce any particular interpretation of its religious scriptures. Nor can we speak of the church being separate from the state in Hinduism. All we have as the corollary of the church and state is the caste based distinction between Brahmin gurus and advisers and Kshetriya Kingship - Smarta Brahmins and religious heads of Shiva, vaishnav and Shakta denominations, who interpret the Dharmashastras according to their own Mat (belief system) on the one hand and the monarch who enforces the Dharmashastras on the other. Since Hinduism is not an organised religion, there is no consensus among Brahmins and heads of different INTERFACE OF WATER, RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT 87

denominations as to what constitutes valid interpretation of the Dharmashastras. As a result, the reigning monarch has a certain amount of leverage in choosing and enforcing one among different and often conflicting interpretations. Needless to say, monarchs tend to support those interpretations that serve their interests best. States in India and Nepal have patronised different variants of Hinduism (including Buddhism) in different epochs. In India, if Ashoka patronised Buddhism, the Guptas sponsored Vaishnavism, while the cholas, in turn, patronised Shaivism. In Nepal, the Lichhavies, with some notable exceptions patronised vaishnavism while the Mallas, more or less sponsored Shaktism (Regmi, 1989). The Shah dynasty patronises Tantric Shaivism while retaining a symbiotic relationship with Sanatana Hinduism. The disruption of the symbiotic relationship between Sanatana Hinduism and Monarchy in northern India from the thirteenth century onwards while its continued and revitalised relationship in Nepal along with its self-imposed isolation has led to the evolution of Hinduism in Nepal along different lines than India. In Nepal, Tantrism, particularly Shaivist Tantrism, remains the dominant form of Hinduism while the same would not be true in the case of India.

CONCLUSION The current political regime patronises the development dharma. As discussed earlier, the development dharma is based on the secular/material/humanist paradigm. Activities such as the construction of dams and reservoirs, undertaken based on this paradigm, have the possibility of submerging temples and holy sites that Hindus (including Buddhists) have been worshiping for centuries. What if there is a strong resistance, or more threatening, what if there is a backlash from organised Hinduism? Where is the point of dialogue between secular minded technocrats who are at the held of state apparatus and traditional thinking which could knowingly or unknowingly obstruct development? The paper by focusing on some case studies and discussing the dynamics of a traditional Hindu polity tries to understand the conditions and circumstances in which relocation is accepted (though grudgingly) along with the mechanism through which this is done and where it is rejected outright. First, it has been understood that temples of minor importance can be relocated through the help of Shanti-swasthi and Kshyama-puja. Second, it is very difficult to uproot temples and shrines of major importance and if prospective reservoirs happen to be located in those sites, it is better to drop the idea altogether. Third, if we still want to forge ahead with such projects, a dialogue should be initiated with the monarch along with his Mul Purohit and Raj Guru. They should be taken into confidence before venturing on to such schemes because they constitute the most organised aspects of Hinduism within the country and if they agree, there is a reduced threat of a Hindu backlash resulting from the submergence of temples and holy sites. 88 SHARMA, S.

REFERENCES Gyawali, D., 1987: Development Dharma, Himal, Vol. 1, No. 1. Gyawali, D., 1989: Water in Nepal, East-West Center, University of Hawaii, Honolulu. Inden, R., 1990: Imagining India, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Joshi, A. and Sharma, S., 1987: The State of Religion in Nepal – A Study of Urban Brahmins, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Kathmandu. Pradhan, U., 1988: Local Resource Mobilisation and Government Intervention in Hill Irrigation Systems in Nepal, Water Management Synthesis Report, USAID. Regmi, J. C., 1989: Religion in Nepal – Perspectives on Continuity and Change, Kamal P. Malla (ed.) Center for Nepal and Asian Studies, Kathmandu. Tiwari, S. R., 1988: Water in Licchavi Period Nepal, Water Nepal, Vol. 1, No. 2, Kathmandu. Thappa, I. J., 1988: Study on Socio-economic and Cultural Aspects in Science and Technology in Endogenous Capacity Building in Science and Technology Development in Nepal, RONAST. Weber, M., 1958: Religion of India: Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism, Gerth, H. H. and Martindale, D. (eds.) The Free Press, Illinois. Weber, M., 1958: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Charles Scribes and Sons, Oxford. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 89-103

WATER PROJECTS IN NEPAL: LESSONS FROM DISPLACEMENT AND REHABILITATION

AJAYA DIXIT Water Resource Engineer Editor, Water Nepal

ABSTRACT

Resettlement and rehabilitation of population affected by water projects have been generally unsatisfactory the world over. In Nepal too, though the affected population has been small, resettlement and rehabilitation of the population affected by water projects have been poorly managed. Reforms in planning and management of programmes to resettle and rehabilitate displaced population are essential to avoid conflict and consequential high social stress.

INTRODUCTION Human ingenuity in marshalling technology to regulate water in nature has, sadly, failed to foresee the negative influence of such efforts on human life, particularly the poor. Past efforts have been guided mainly towards achieving hydraulic and economic efficiency. The insensitivity with which evacuation of settlements affected by water projects, including resettlement and rehabilitation works, have been handled shows the arrogant form of power exercise by the State. Rehabilitation of population displaced by large-scale water projects around the world have a high rate of failure. South Asia, generally, and India in particular is no exception. In the contemporary development approach, since the gain was ‘economic growth’ for the whole society, ‘displacement’ is regarded as a natural trade-off, a price that had to be paid. Those who have paid are the illiterate, unskilled, socially weak, ethnic and minority caste groups, who are made more destitute in the aftermath of a water project. The rehabilitation process is looked upon as constraint that affects schedule of a project, and hence a factor that had to be overcome. This paper attempts to recount Nepali experience of involuntary resettlement related to water projects and draw some lessons for management of displacement that would be caused by the proposed dams, both large and small. Involuntary displacement is going to be one of the most critical issues facing Nepal in the new century as the growing energy and water needs substantially increase the pressure for exploiting the country’s water resources. Unless far-reaching reforms are instituted, rehabilitation would be inadequate which could lead to conflict of such magnitude as to even threaten socio-political equilibrium 90 DIXIT, A.

of the country. The magnitude of the task is evident from formulation reports of some of the projects contemplated to the undertaken. The 10,800 MW Karnali Chisapani Project is estimated to displace about 60,000 people, and those affected are proposed to be rehabilitated on degraded forest land and government lands in the lower Karnali basin abutting the Tarai. Some non-farm occupations are also proposed to be provided. The cost of the resettlement is estimated at US$ 108 million inclusive of infrastructure, housing and irrigation and farm development (HPC, 1989). Recently concerns have been raised in Nepal over the enormity of the challenges that relocation of population of this size would entail. Resettlement and relocation of population displaced by projects is proposed as one of the criterion to be used to decide whether any agreement involving the sharing of the country’s water resources would require ratification by two third majority of the Nepali parliament (ERC, 1993). Also the Human Rights Organisation of Nepal in a 1992 workshop passed a resolution emphasising that displacement by a project development was a human right issue (HURON, 1992).

WATER DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL IMPACT Harnessing the waters flowing from the Himalaya is Nepal’s development agenda for increasing its national wealth. Altogether 114 projects having 45,610 MW capacity have been identified (WECS, 1994). The country hopes to bring about development through three strategic considerations which include building large-scale storage projects envisaged primarily for exporting energy, medium scale projects for meeting national needs, and small scale projects for serving local communities (MWR, 1980; WECS, 1994). As such four major storage projects are proposed as Indo-Nepal cooperative initiatives. These are the Chisapani Karnali (10,800 MW), the Pancheswor (7,200 MW), Burhi Gandaki (600 MW) and Sapta Kosi high dam (3,600 MW) which in total, would provide 22,200 MW installed capacity. Recent policy promotes external and domestic private sector initiatives for hydropower development. In the past, diversion barrage projects with the objectives to provide irrigation, flood control and hydro generation were built as bilateral co-operative ventures. These projects neither provided dependable nor adequate supply of water (Chaturbedi, 1992) to Nepal or India and have also been unable to improve agriculture productivity. In the Kosi Barrage Project, for example, waterlogging, and siltation have led to adverse environmental effects (Post Fact, 1979), while productivity in the command area has gone down in absolute terms. High dams have been viewed as the panacea since the 1940s for addressing the pervasive poverty in the Himalaya-Ganga. Prosperity is expected to come from the monsoon water stored behind dams, its regulation and wide applications for irrigation, flood LESSONS FROM DISPLACEMENT AND REHABILITATION 91

mitigation, hydropower generation etc. Thirty projects providing a gross capacity of 144, 142 m3 have been proposed. Most of the projects are located in Nepali mid-hills, as the region has ideal storage sites due to the river valley profile (Shrestha and Pradhan, 1992). Because of their location in the mid-hills, reservoir projects would inundate populated valleys disrupting local social and environmental systems. The population that is likely to be displaced by these projects and the land that would be submerged are shown in Table 1. The actual numbers would be known once the flood levels and reservoir contour are finalised.1 In the skewed land/man ratio in the hills, it is likely that majority of those getting affected would be with small or no land holding. Even run-of-river projects can lead to environmental disruptions and bring social dislocation. Project ancillaries and placement of components like headworks, settling tank, offices and switchyard require space. Acquisition would lead to displacement, though the extent is lesser than that in a storage project. The population likely to be affected by run- of-river projects is site specific, and the total estimate is not available. Submergence and large-scale involuntary displacement would trigger a social and economic trauma, and possible unrest. Iniquitous and unsustainable, these consequences brought about by multi-purpose water projects are under scrutiny, and such projects as option for development are under severe criticism, elsewhere in South Asia. The case of the Sardar Sarovar Project in Narmada and the Tehri high dam in the Garhwal Himalaya, are instances of the growing opposition to high dams. Those who propose building high dams in Nepal do not yet seem to have heeded these emerging concerns. What are the prospects that resettlement and rehabilitation in the proposed projects would be sensitive and will not cause hardships? Are the assumptions on resettlement and rehabilitation in these projects achievable? As Nepal has not yet seen large-scale relocation from involuntary displacement by a water project, inference may be drawn from the planned resettlement programmes that have been undertaken in other spheres.

PLANNED RESETTLEMENT IN NEPAL Though encouraged by the State since the middle of the last century, movement to the Tarai and large-scale settlement, started with the eradication of malaria. The initiative for planned resettlement actually started after the floods of 1954, which brought wide spread devastation in the country. The affected families were resettled in Chitwan Valley under the Rapti Valley Development Programme. Subsequently, political sufferers, repatriates (from Burma and north-east India), ex-service men, and Sukumvasis were resettled, mostly in forest land. Organised resettlement programme was launched in the early 1960s. The resettlement activities were administered by the Nepal Resettlement Department (established 1968) and Nepal Resettlement Company (established 1963). Though the programmes implemented by the agencies about 72,283 families were 92 DIXIT, A.

TABLE 1 PROPOSED STORAGE PROJECTS AND POPULATION LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED. Project Reservoir Capacity Installed Energy Populatin Land Submerged x 106m3 Capacity MW GWh Affected ha Gross Live Kosi Basin Sapta Kosi 13450 9370 3600 15732 75000 19500 Tamur - 1 1890 760 696 2750 NA 3200 Sun Kosi - 1 1500 40 1357 4640 NA 3100 Sun Kosi - 2 4330 3040 1110 4760 NA 6300 Sun Kosi - 3 1220 550 536 2070 NA 2500 Gandaki Basin Andhi Khola 940 800 180 788 NA 3000 Kali Gandaki - 1 6900 5200 1600 7010 NA 7600 Kali Gandaki - 2 5100 3400 660 3470 40000 10800 Seti (Central) 4000 1900 320 1402 NA 5200 Marsyangdi 6000 3600 740 3241 NA 10000 Burhi Gandaki 3200 2520 600 2500 17000 5000 Sapta Gandaki 342 120 225 1609 6000 1800 Langtang 180 100 175 767 NA NA Uttar Ganga 250 190 270 118 NA NA Karnali Basin Chisapani 28200 16210 10800 20842 60000 33900 Bheri ñ 3 16500 6920 1003 3781 NA NA Bheri ñ 4 15800 5900 2925 5957 NA NA Karnali 1C 7000 4061 2000 10500 NA NA West Seti 1560 1290 360 2437 NA NA Seti 6 west 3100 1590 1080 3618 NA NA Mahakali Basin Pancheswor 11267 3219 7200 10256 14500* 12100 Poornagiri 3400 1240 1000 4800 NA 6500 Southern River Basin Bhalubang (Rapti) 1390 970 62+45 663 NA 3800 Naumure (Rapti) 1380 800 306+160 1410 2000 5400 Sarada 260 220 49 215 NA NA Bagmati 3000 2100 180 837 10000 10500 Kamala 713 493 32 121 NA NA Kankai 1130 730 60 200 2000 4400 Mailoop 55 35 30 55 NA 300 Kulekhani ñ 1 85 73 60 211 3000 220 (Existing)

* Mahakali is a border river. The number indicates population likely to be displaced in Nepal. Sources: HMG, 1992; GOI, 1981; Joint Flood Report, 1990; JICA, 1993; SOGREH, 1991. LESSONS FROM DISPLACEMENT AND REHABILITATION 93

resettled in Jhapa, Nawalparasi, Banke and Bardia districts till 1985. Even though comprehensive agricultural support and non-farm activities were provided in the resettlement package, the programmes had several shortcomings. On the basis of the analysis by Basnyat (1982) the failing of the planned resettlement programme in Nepal are discussed below. Procedural Limitation: The resettlement programme was highly influenced by nepotism and favoritism and corrupt practices abounded. Political clout and influence was indiscriminately used to register land in the name of the undeserving persons. More than one family was assigned the same plot and genuine settlers were deprived of support. Settlers were provided with inadequate time to look into land registration and other matters of administrative nature. Lack of Opportunity Outside Land: Majority of the families, more than 90 per cent, in all resettlement programmes had to rely on agriculture for occupation. Agriculture was the only employment avenue as job opportunities in the non-agriculture sector was limited. Inadequate Land Size: When the programme started each family received 2.7 ha plot of land which was later reduced to 1 to 1.5 ha for a family of four and more than four members respectively. The fixed price of land including differing payment modalities followed by resettlement agencies became the major irritant between settlers and the agencies. Land fragmentation was a major problem. Low Productivity: Due to unavailability of irrigation facilities and inadequate agricultural inputs, agricultural output of all types of crops was low. Usurious Debt: A debilitating factor was unforeseen costs arising out of failed monsoon, crop failure, floods, illness as well as legal fees. A majority had to depend on money lenders for land preparation and maintaining livestock. The result was piling of debt on pre-existing deprivation and mortgaging of properties including crops in advance at distress prices. Poor Infrastructures: Providing infrastructure services was a major problem. Shelter was considered the settler’s responsibility. The settlers often used forest products to build rudimentary homes. Lack of drinking water, sanitation facilities, schools and poor health hygiene added to the misery. The net result of the state sponsored resettlement was pauperisation, and a conflict between settlers and government officials, settlers and indigenous populations, and settlers and resettlement officials. Violence leading to even death was the end result in some cases. These as well as the subsequent experience of rehabilitation of population affected by projects, point to the inevitable traps in large-scale relocation. The skepticism of government assurance regarding resettlement and rehabilitation therefore, is high. 94 DIXIT, A.

INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT: WATER PROJECTS Displacement due to acquisition of land/property has been a regular feature of the infrastructure development process in Nepal. Roads, irrigation schemes, hydropower projects, airports, promulgation of national parks, and watershed management projects have led to population dislocation. The extent and history of those alienated due to earlier acquisition are, however, mostly forgotten. In some of the earlier projects, like the Trisuli Hydropower Project which was built in early 1960s, land was acquired as and when needed without any coherent acquisition plan (CIWEC, 1991). In many districts, land cadastral maps were prepared long after projects were built, which meant that systematic records of how much land was acquired, who were compensated and how much compensation was paid, do not exist in many earlier projects. Compared to India, where dams built after its independence have displaced almost twenty million people (Maloney, 1990), in Nepal, population displaced by water projects thus far is relatively small. The two major water projects built so far–Kulekhani I and Marsyangdi–have affected 722 families with a population of 4772 (Table 2). The approach for rehabilitation in the two projects ranged from compensating land for land, land or cash compensation, to only cash compensation. The implementing agencies were different in each case. In both the projects, the approach to rehabilitation was unsatisfactory and the social cost has been found to be high. In the case of Kulekhani project, influx of cash after compensation led to up to five fold increase in the price at Hetauda, where a majority of the affected families hoped to get settled. Some lost the entire compensated amount in gambling (Pokharel, 1988). In the case of the Marsyangdi project, among the displaced families, only the richer were better-off after compensation. Majority of those losing all their land belonged to the occupational caste (Gurung, 1990). The management of resettlement and rehabilitation in the Marsyangdi hydropower, which is a run-of-river project, shows that institutions in Nepal are still unable to respond to the needs of even a small group of displaced populace. Financed by an international consortium including the World Bank, and initiated in 1985, the construction of the project evolved with formulation of the World Bank directives. The guideline specifies measures to ensure that dislocated households are supported to establish themselves at income levels to those prior to dislocation whether on new land or through alternative economic opportunities (Cernea, 1988). It was not applied. The formulation report of the project also included embryonic rehabilitation plans, (SMC, 1982) but they were not implemented. Towards completion stages of the project, a packages consisting of policy recommendations including action plans for rehabilitation of the affected families as well as the acquired sites was proposed (New Era, 1989). Recommendations were also made to support the families who, economically were seriously affected. Even today, none of the LESSONS FROM DISPLACEMENT AND REHABILITATION 95

TABLE 2 LAND ACQUISITION AND RESETTLEMENT IN KULEKHANI AND MARSYANGDI PROJECTS Particulars Kulekhani Marsyangdi 1. Type of Project Storage Run-of-river 2. Years of acquisition 1977-82 1979-88 /resettlement 3. Compensation option: Land or cash Cash only 4. Property acquired: a. Land (ha) 175 60.5 b. Houses 450 29 c. Others Water mill (50) Fruit trees 5. Compensation rate (Rs) 1200 to 3000/ropani (1979) 400 to 5500/ropani (1981) a. Cost per family (US $) 2900 (1979) 7000 (1981) 6. Affected: a. Households 500 222 b. Population 3000 1776 7. Implementation agency Electricity Department Marsyangdi Hydro Development Board

Source: Gurung, 1989. recommendations have been implemented. The affected families have neither been provided employment support nor have there been any efforts to facilitate them in increasing income. In absence of support, the members of the affected families make a living as daily-wage workers.2

POLICY ASPECTS Rehabilitation approaches of the population displaced by water projects should be analysed within the framework of present land-use policy. For the population likely to be displaced by the Chisapani Karnali project, for example, the contemplated approach for rehabilitation is land for land. Such approach of rehabilitation is however, preempted by the present land-use policy which has no provision for land-based resettlement. The shift in resettlement policy was evident in the Sixth Plan (1980-85) whose target for families to be resettled and land to be distributed were cutback by 38.3 and 50 per cent respectively compared to the earlier plan (Gurung, 1990). In the Seventh Plan period (1985-1990), policy of land based resettlement was abandoned. The Eighth Plan (1992-1997) is silent on resettlement while making provisions for leasing to landless groups degraded lands with the objective of rehabilitating them. These policy changes have also been associated with constant reorganisations of the resettlement agencies. When the programme started, the two agencies were under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. In 1977, the agencies were transferred to the Ministry of Forest. Again in 1988, both the Resettlement Company and the Resettlement Department 96 DIXIT, A.

were transferred to the newly formed Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning (MHPP). The Resettlement Department since has been dissolved while the capacity of the Resettlement Company to resettle people as well as the quality of its schemes has rapidly deteriorated (Ghimire, 1992). The policy changes on land-based resettlement have aggravated the squatter problems with serious political implications in the future (Gurung, 1990). On the other hand, constant tampering of the agencies responsible for resettlement, has meant that there is no agency that is today mandated or with a capability to supervise population relocation in a large-scale, although the Seventh Plan has entrusted resettlement/ rehabilitation responsibility to the concerned government agencies whose activities lead to displacement. The policy of moratorium on land based resettlement contravenes the 1977 Land Acquisition Act which refers that land compensation would be given only if the government land is available for compensation. Resettlement and rehabilitation have to be looked in the context of how the needs of the local economy around project location would be met while developing water projects. Large sections of the population, even those not directly evicted, continue to be impoverished, are indirectly affected, and unable to benefit from the opportunities created. Stimulating the local economy through employment generation, therefore, should be one of the objectives of water development. Local population also expects to gain from the opportunities created by project constructions. Promises of benefits that would accrue from a project are conveyed to the host population greatly raising expectations. In water projects built earlier, local level objectives were however, largely unmet. In the Kulekhani Hydro Project, support for electrification of local villages came only after agitation by the locals. In the Marsyangdi scheme, opportunities were created not due to deliberate measures by the project but due to new opportunities along the already existing road facility (Gurung, 1990). The Trisuli project, which was built in the earlu 1960s with the objective of augmenting energy supply in Nepal’s expanding central grid, is a case in point when we discuss local needs. The single objective focus on energy augmentation in its development led to disregard of local expectations, and brought about serious environmental impacts. Indiscriminate felling of the forest resources from tupche to Mandre Dhunga in the Trisuli Valley was allowed for meeting the fuel-needs of the project’s 50000 strong work-force (over the project construction period) brought from India, and for project construction. Since a hydropower project was being built at their doorstep, the assumption of the local populace was that electricity would readily be available, and would compensate the forest loss. Supply came, but two decades later, while depletion of forest had led to severe scarcity of fuel-wood, building materials and declining water sources in the valley (New Era, 1989). Focus on meeting energy production objective also brought social disorder and LESSONS FROM DISPLACEMENT AND REHABILITATION 97

economic distortions at the community level. Heavy inflow of cash (NRs 110 x 106) distorted subsistence agricultural economy in the Trisuli valley. Increased contact with external actors led to disruption of the social systems and values. The poverty stricken district and the adjoining hills today have the distinction of being highest exporter of Tamang girls to brothels in Bomaby and Calcutta (Adhikary, 1990). As the present focus of water resources development appears to be exclusively on generating energy, it is unlikely that the upcoming projects would address local unemployment and generate equitable access to the benefits at micro levels.

LESSONS The inferences that can be drawn from these experiences serve as lessons for the future. Urban bias continues to dominate water resources development at the cost of the affected population and the rural communities. ‘Project centric’ attitude is prevalent while social issues continue to be regarded a secondary. Instead of creating a process of learning to improve rehabilitation management, ‘amnesia’ during the transition from project implementation to operation stages leads to erosion of institution-building. The paradigm that would lead to destitution by displacement in project development is still far from being changed at the operational level, notwithstanding the new Environmental Impact Assessment guidelines of HMG, which was enacted in 1992. Though the guideline also emphasises ‘economic rehabilitation’, it is yet to become an agenda in water development. That the societal and government mechanisms in South Asia have been unsuccessful in redressing the pain caused by displacement also holds lessons for all future projects in the Himalaya-Ganga region. Given the economic prowess of the dominant social groups and the limitations of production capabilities of the population that would be affected, it is unlikely that expectations of large section of the rural population generally and the displaced population particularly will be fulfilled. The implications both in national as well as proposed bilateral ventures are serious for the Nepali state. Involuntary displacement in joint Nepal-India projects would exacerbate the conflict due to the added factor of geopolitics and nationalism. While bulk of the benefits would be transferred to the plains, Nepalis in the valleys in the hills are bound to face social trauma due to inadequate rehabilitation. The revenue generated from exporting the benefits is also not likely to make the population of the project area rich, though it may add to the coffers of the state. The resulting conflict may be violent and the resilience of the state severely tested. Even the social and political fabric of the region and the whole nation may be threatened. While the debate on large versus small and the ethics of displacement would continue, the planning process in Nepal must institute policy reforms to sensitively mange resettlement and rehabilitation, even in on-going smaller water projects. These require 98 DIXIT, A.

resource to a path with an understanding of the linkages between technical, legal, social, anthropological and institutional issues. Some of the issues that need to be reformed are discussed below. The first issue is related with the process of property acquisition and compensation. The Land Acquisition Act of 1977 empowers government to acquire land for public purposes. The Act states that it is not mandatory to compensate according to market price for the land acquired for HMG projects/institutions. This provision disregards the very concept of common property resources and human rights. The Act needs to be reformulated or even amended. These are matters for legal analysis. The procedural mechanism of how the affected group would be brought in as partners in the decision-making process is the second major issue. The question is related to appraising the families that would be affected of their rights as guaranteed by the Constitution. Also to be considered is the question, what voice will they have in the rehabilitation activities that are contemplated. Involuntary resettlement needs to be viewed in the context of how the poor and the disadvantaged are brought into the policy-framing as partners not just in projects, but development in general. The third issue is related to perceptions. Even today professionals put themselves on a pedestal where they feel above ordinary people (Pickford, 1985). The tendency is to mystify the practices of professional skill and exclude them from the people. The management procedure of the South Asian bureaucracy, suffers from redtapism, and separates managers from the people. The resulting patron-client relationship is a major hurdle in responding to the need of the poor, which needs to be changed. Fourth is the mechanism for conflict resolution. The conflict would emanate from perceptional differences among the involved actors; affected groups, decision makers, consultants, contractors, financing bodies, development merchants and politicians as well as the limitations of law. Conflict can be minimised, if not resolved, only through a process that is transparent, and which encourages participation of social and professional groups. Conflict resolution also becomes crucial in the context of the privatisation policy in hydropower within whose regime compensation planning is going to acquire an even more critical dimension. Management of rehabilitation is the fifth important aspect. Engineering of a water project has its own norms, priorities and the need for meticulous execution. While the engineering details are defined by science, the ethereal human factor in resettlement and rehabilitation is hard to define or quantify. The need for sensitivity is paramount when dealing with human lives, especially when a few urban professionals decide upon the lives of the thousands of the rural peasants. Economic rehabilitation requires missionary zeal which is less likely to be achieved within bureaucratic formats followed by South Asian governments. Rehabilitation occurs in the margins of the society, both spatially and socially, LESSONS FROM DISPLACEMENT AND REHABILITATION 99

among the poorer and disadvantaged population who have so far received little or no recognition and support when it comes to displacement. Support is required for programmes on poverty alleviation, micro enterprise, informal education, health care including resource utilisation that are environmentally sustainable. Such programmes require empowerment to break passivity of the poor, building on what locally is already known and exists, and patience. A variety of grassroot support organisations in Nepal have developed analytical tools, methodologies and institutional base that have helped to enhance human capacity to adapt to changes even among the most impoverished ones (Neupane, 1989; Baidya, 1990; Adhikary, 1990). These must be internalised in the prevailing working approaches, for economic rehabilitation. The sixth question is that of equity and access to benefits. If manipulation of rivers is necessary to meet the growing needs of the economy, what measures would ensure that benefit sharing would be equitable? How can the affected families as well those around project locations earn livelihood on a sustained basis are important questions. Legal and institutional safeguards for the affected families are needed to use opportunities created by development more productively and equitably.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS In the Himalaya-Ganga region, regulating the monsoon flow is one of the options to meet the growing food and energy needs while minimising the hardship brought about by the sequence of flood and drought that affect lives of almost half a billion people. While the context necessitate manipulative measures, a pure technological pursuit would be inappropriate as past experience has shown. Water resources development needs to be seen beyond the creation of hydro-technical structures, as a process which enhances human capacity to respond to changes within a framework that allows the dimension of poverty to be addressed. And it is within such a framework that involuntary resettlement and rehabilitation should be tackled. The key lies in consolidating the links between development, environment and social well being by pursuing interrelated goals. The lack of scientific culture in South Asia has much to do with the current inabilities of the science and technology to promote use of water resources of the region. The issues advanced for discussion were:

Data requirement for extensive water resource development. Availability and reliability of data within the context of South Asian scientific and technical culture. Debates on ‘large versus small’, ‘appropriate versus high-tech’, from the perspectives of need for rapid development and the risks to a capital poor economy of taking either path. Irrigation management: issues of declining productivity and land degradation. Cost 100 DIXIT, A.

externalisation in irrigation development and its consequences. Seismicity, sedimentation and Himalayan river morphology in water resource development Groundwater/surface water; conjunctive use in the northern Ganga plain.

Deriving benefits from the contemplated interventions would need commensurate changes in the region’s scientific and cultural outlook and in its capability to much the demands that newer and large-scale technologies will impose. A fundamental question is the hydrological uncertainty associated with Himalayan waters and associated natural processes. There is need for an approach that builds on what is known, internalises and synthesises knowledge from ongoing studies, which presently exist on a piecemeal basis, and concentrates research on the many sub-processes that remain unknown (Kattelmann). Data management is more than information collection and access to numbers. A major hurdle in the Himalaya-Ganga is developing capacity for critical analysis that is able to go beneath the numbers and analyse untested assumptions. Analysis of groundwater management problems in Gujrat adequately highlights this (Moench). The regional Hydro-geology is highly variable and the Himalaya-Ganga is not uniformly water-rich. Merely having large-scale irrigation schemes and surface water application does not enhance food security since surface canal systems in areas of high groundwater table areas create more problems than they solve (Sarin). Conjunctive surface and groundwater irrigation practices will ensure more optimal use of water resources in the Ganga plain, minimising land degradation through waterlogging or soil salinisation (A. Parkash). Hills have their own development imperatives and land degradation sequence. In many cases, degradation has been accentuated by irrigation development approached and plains-biased technology illsuited to hill conditions (D Bhattarai). South Asian does have the capacity to adopt the most sophisticated technologies, including the engineering of high dams. The promising experiences must be internalised in the new initiatives to bring about socioeconomic resurgence (Verma). Himalayan waters offer immense prospects (Mahato) which offer attractive options of meeting the growing demand for peaking energy of the region’s power systems for the coming several decades (Joshi). A characteristic feature of the region is the uncertainty imposed by high sedimentation. South Asia’s technological capacity–in planning, design/implementation and operation–is severely tested by its inability to confront challenge posed by high sedimentation (C.P. Sinha). Tools such as mathematical modeling offer insights into the variable elements of planning and execution of both large and small scale water development schemes and help fine-tune decision making (Paudyal, Shrestha and Paudyal). Policy and programmes are skewed against the building of indigenous technical capability in the region. In the hydropower development approach in vogue in Nepal, for example, local capacity building does not receive overt state support, which is directed LESSONS FROM DISPLACEMENT AND REHABILITATION 101 102 DIXIT, A.

instead towards donor-funded, international contractor-led large scale projects. As a result, local capability to manufacture, install and operate mini, small and medium hydropower plants is stunted (Pandey). The solutions to the myriad issues of Himalayan water resources development should be sought in institutions that are resilient through risk resilience assessment techniques as opposed to those that more rigid (Thompson). At the Kathmandu Meeting, the earth sciences disciplines–seismology, sedimentology, etc–were not present strongly enough to play their part in assessing the dynamics and implications of water resources development. Himalayan hydrology and its inter-linkages with subjects dealing more directly with water development were not addressed to the desired degree. Waterlogging in the Ganga plain and land degradation are matters for further research and discussion. The participant eased towards a less technocratic approach to technology assessment in the region, and increased participation from the informal sector such as ethnic groups, women, regional and international scholars outside of the state machinery, etc. It was felt that the choice of technology should not be donor-driven but should be done so as to encourage building local capability, and that the intended beneficiaries should have a say in its management. The meeting recommended that information-sharing among the countries of the region could start with the establishment of a data bank for regional use, which could help to properly design projects and operationalise effective flood mitigation. Scholars should persuade government to be less protective and to make positive use of available data.

NOTES 1 The estimate of the population that would be affected and land submerged should be considered as preliminary only. Various available documents show different figures. The numbers of installed capacity, energy generation as well as storage volume also show differences. 2 Enquiry at Anboo Khaireni where Marsyangdi Hydel Plant is located (1993).

REFERENCES Adhikary, C. K., 1990: Garib Tira Farkaun in Nepali: let us Tum to the Poor, Small Farmers Development: An experience, Human Resource Development Center (HRDC), Kathmandu. Baidya, H. R., 1990: Villagers of Majhigaon Rise to Prosperity, Himal, November/December Kathmandu. Basnyat, N. B., 1981: An Appraisal of Settlement in Regional Rural Planning in Nepal, MA Thesis Institute of Development Studies, The Hague December. Cemea, M. M., 1988: Involuntary Resettlement in Development Projects, Policy Guidelines in World Bank-Financed Projects, World Bank Technical Paper No. 80, Washington. Chaturbedi, M. C., 1992: Water Resources Engineering Consideration, in The Ganges Brahmaputra Basin Water Resources Cooperation between Nepal, India and Bangladesh, Eaton, D. J. , Lyndon, B. (ed.), Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas, Austin. LESSONS FROM DISPLACEMENT AND REHABILITATION 103

CIWEC, 1990: Trishuli Devighat Hydropower Upgrading Project: Environmental and Socio-Cultural Impact Assessment in association with New Era, Kathmandu, Vancouver December. ERC, 1993: Report by the Evaluation and Recommendation Committee on the impact of Tanakpur Barrage Project, February 14, Kathmandu. (Unpublished) Ghimire, K., 1992: Forest or Farm The Politics of Poverty and Land Hunger in Nepal, Oxford University Press. GOI, 1981: Feasibility Report on Kosi High Dam Project, Central Water Commission Government of India. Gurung, H., 1989: Policy Review and Experience of Project Related Resettlement in Nepal, Water Napal, Water Development Bulletin Vol. 1, No. 4. HMG, 1992: Profiles of Medium Scale Hydro-electric Projects, Ministry of Water Resources Water and Energy Commission Secretariat Nepal. HPC, 1989: The Karnali Chisapani Multi-purpose Project Feasibility Study Report Submitted to HMG/Nepal. JICA, 1993: Master Plan Study for Water Resources Development of Upper Karnali and Mahakali River Basins, August, JICA, Kathmandu. Maloney, C., 1990: Environmental and Project Displacement of Population in India: Development and Deracination, Field Staff Reports Universities Field Staff International and Natural Heritage Institute, California. Nepal-Bangladesh Joint Study Team, 1989: Report on Flood Mitigation Measures and Multi- purpose Use of Water Resources. Neupane, D. N., 1992: Gramin Swabalamban Vikas Karyakram – Ek Anubav ( in Nepali) (Rural Self Reliance Development Program – An experience) Bikas, Atmanirvar Bikas Manch, Kathmandu. New Era, 1989: Effect of Policy and Programs in Renewable Resource Use, A Comparative Study of Nuwakot and Lamjung Districts. New Ear, 1989: Report on Socioeconomic Condition of Affected Households and Recommended Action Plan for Marsyangdi Hydro-electric Project. Pickford, J., 1985: More Than Technology for Water and Sanitation in Asia and Africa, Loughborough University of Technology, U. K. Pokharel, J. C., 1988: Population Displacement by the Kulekhani Hydro Electric Project, Some lessons for Compensation Planning Prashashan 51st issue, pp 7-13, March Post Fact, 1979: International Workshop on Post Fact Evaluation of a Water Resources Project, The Case of the Kosi Project, Bihar College of Engineering Patna. Pradhan, B. K. and Shrestha, H. M., 1992: A Nepalese Perspective on Himalayan Water Resource Development in The Ganges Brahmaputra Basin Water Resource Cooperation between Nepal, India and Bangladesh Eaton, D. J. and Lyndon B. (ed.), Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas, Austin. Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporation, 1981: Marsyangdi Hydropower Project: Environmental and Ecological Study, Vol. 6. SOGREH, 1991: West Seti Hydro Electric Project, Detail Feasibility Study Final Report. WECS, 1994: Proceeding 40th Meting of Water and Energy Commission (in Nepali) Kathmandu. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 105-114

IMPROVING THE KNOWLWDGE BASE FOR HIMALAYAN WATER DEVELOPMENT

RICHARD KATTELMANN Sierra Nevada Aquatic Research Laboratory Star Route, 1, Box 198, Mommoth Lakes, CA 93546 USA.

If ‘sustainable development’ is to mean anything, such development must be based on an appropriate understanding of the environment, an environment where knowledge of water resources is basic to all of man’s endeavours. - WMO/UNESCO 1991

ABSTRACT

Sound decisions about water resources projects in the Himalaya require a better understanding of the hydrology of the region. Expansion of the data-collection network and improvements in processing, archiving, and dissemination are necessary investments in future water development. A variety of research initiatives are needed to improve the scientific basis of water resources management in the Himalaya. Greater knowledge about run-off generation, flood hazards, and flow regimes of small streams would be particularly useful. While the knowledge base improves, planners must carefully evaluate the uncertainty in existing information and base decisions and designs on what if not known as well as what is known.

Water is widely regarded as the critical resource in economic development, international cooperation, public safety, and environmental conservation throughout the Himalayan region. Sate and reliable drinking water, dependable irrigation supplies, hydroelectricity, flood hazard mitigation, transportation, and reduction of land degradation and sedimentation depend on careful development of water resources. However, do we know enough about Himalayan hydrology to permit efficient use of these water resources with minimum risk of environmental degradation and project failure ? This paper examines the knowledge base for development of Himalayan waters. It focuses on Nepal, hydroelectricity, and flood hazards as examples. The overwhelming nature of seasonal rainfall and runoff in the Himalaya and their impact on society establish the primacy of water among natural resources. Enhancement of productivity of Himalayan water began with the first terrace construction and creek diversion and has continued with water mills for grinding grain and recent hydropower schemes. The potential of water resources to rapidly accelerate economic development throughout the Himalayan region has been widely heralded (e.g. Hagen, 1961: Ministry 106 KATTELMANN, R.

of Water Resources, 1981: Murthy, 1981: Sharma, 1985; Verghese, 1990). However, the vast potential is being realised only slowly for a variety of social, political and economic reasons (Gyawali; 1989 and 1991; Verghese, 1990). The potential is not about to go away, and continued development seems to be only matters of time and social will. Water resources development obviously requires some knowledge about the resource. Basically, a thorough evaluation of the availability of water is needed before planning and design of a project. The World Meteorological Organisation defines water resources assessment as "the determination of the sources, extent, dependability, and quality of water resources, on which is based an evaluation of the possibilities, for their utilisation and control" (WHO, 1991). To his matching questions of what is there ? Where and when is it there ? In what form is it there ?, Gyawali (1989) adds: how do we know what we think is there ? This question of uncertainty in our knowledge is critical to decision-making about development projects. Only through objective assessment of the uncertainty in our information and related risk-analysis, can subjective decision have a sound basis.

WATER DATA AND INFORMATION Hydrologic data has been recognised by the region’s governments as a critical prerequisite to water development (e.g. Rao, 1975; Ministry of Water Resources, 1981; Dhakal, 1990). However, many alarms have been sounded recently about the continuing lack of adequate data (e.g. Kattelmann, 1987; Verghese, 1990; Aitken, et al., 1991; Shankar, 1991; Alford, 1992, Shrestha and Paudyal, 1992). The WMO (1991) listed the following needs that hydrologic information serves:

Quantity, quality, and distribution in time and space of water Potential for water development and ability of supply to meet demand Planning, designing, and operating projects Assessing environmental, economic, and social impacts of water resources management and planning sound management strategies Assessing response of water resources to other activities such as urbanisation and vegetation modification Providing security for people and property against water related hazards

International cooperation in water resources development also depends on a solid and accepted data base (Verghese, 1990). The value of hydrologic data in more cost- effective planning and design is generally 5 to 10 times greater than its cost of collection (WMO, 1990). The goal of making hydrologic data useful involves collection, transfer processing, error checking archiving dissemination, and analysis. Acquisition of data in remote, IMPROVING THE KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR HIMALAYAN WATER DEVELOPMENT 107

mountainous terrain is obviously difficult. However, this reality should be viewed as a challenge and a constraint, but not as an excuse. More error can be expected in measurements from mountainous areas than in the lowlands (Shankar, 1991), but we must strive for physically meaningful measurements. As a counter-example, runoff-as- measured exceeds rainfall-as-measured in some parts of the Kosi basin (Kattelmann, 1991). Although it is easy to say that more meteorological and hydrometric stations in the hills are necessary, we must be creative in their location, financing and logistical support. In terrain such as the Middle Hills, representative sites for rain gages may be a meaningless concept, but interpretation of rainfall records requires consideration of physical influences on the gage catch at these sites (Alford, 1992). A couple of dense clusters of rain gages in different areas would provide much more information about mountain precipitation patterns than simply expanding the gage network uniformly. Duplicating a couple of independently measured stream gages within a hundred meter reach would allow some evaluation of error and increase the changes of data continuity at those sites. Once sites are established in stable, useful locations, a commitment must be made to continue their operation for the long run. Evaluation of extremes, trends, and variability require long- term records. The highest priority for new stream gages would seem to be in small catchments similar in size to those being develop for micro-hydropower (Aitken, et al., 1991). There is virtually no information about run-off characteristics in basins less than 100 km2 in area. Data from small stream would also help studies of hydrologic processes. Operators of small- hydro projects should be supplied with staff gages and encouraged to monitor stream stage at their facilities. Hydrologic monitoring could be a condition of subsidy, although care must be exercised about undue regulation of entrepreneurial hydropower. Ideally, operators would want to know more about the flow regime and help their successors in other areas. A secondary gage network could be established opportunistically at riparian sites where someone already lives (e.g., village adjacent to bridge) to provide a record of stage-timing even if the records were not converted to discharge or concerted to only to an order of magnitude. More attention is required in the maintenance of equipment, transfer of data from field to office, and temporary storage before final processing. Lapses in these details have resulted in long record-gaps and reduced overall quality. Conversion of raw hydrometeorological data into a higher level of data, such as streamflow averaged over a day, appears to have improved substantially in recent years as automated data processing has become routine. However, the agencies involved must remain vigilant of error generation through the same computerised means. Beyond automated error checking programmes, hydrologists must examine the generated information and ask whether it makes physical sense. Care must also be given to archiving of the raw data and processed 108 KATTELMANN, R.

information. Besides being readily accessible to a variety of users, archiving must be redundant in a decentralised manner. The dissemination of hydrologic data and information unfortunately remain controversial in the Himalayan region. The concept that knowledge (about water in this case) is power must be put aside to encourage sound water-resource development. Publication and distribution of hydrologic data helps to ensure its reliability and promotes independent scientific analyses. WMO (1991) warns of the opportunity of ‘corruption’ of data with restricted access. The WMO (1991) also recognises the political and economic challenges inherent in making data freely available, but encourages concerted efforts toward open access to data. Regional cooperation in water resources management depends strongly in sharing hydrologic data and scientific information. Lack of reliable data had been a persistent barrier to settling water disputes between states in India (Gautam, 1976) and delayed approval of the 1977 Ganges Waters Agreement (Abbas, 1982). In more recent negotiations with Nepal, the Indian government remains reluctant to share water data (Gyawali, 1991). Data collection, processing, and dissemination depend heavily on the personnel involved. Training has become a high priority for Nepal’s Department of Hydrology and Meteorology. In particular, there is a focus on education for working in mountainous terrain by the new Regional Working Group on Mountain Hydrology (Shankar, 1991). Improvements in employment opportunities, compensation, and working conditions are also needed throughout the water-related agencies. Grants by donors funding hydrotechnical construction directed at improving technical and administrative situations could be a worthwhile investment. There is a growing cadre of disaffected, technically competent engineers and earth-science professionals who are marginally-employed but eager to work in water resource projects. Rural technicians actually collecting data also need improved condition to ensure data quality. Field personnel must be carefully selected, trained, compensated, and encouraged to perform a nationally important task. When the right individual is found and cultivated, reliability should improve. Sometimes, technicians just need to feel they are doing something important. The enthusiasm of one observer met by chance in the Arun Valley was remarkable. In addition to routinely-collected hydrometeorological data, we should also take advantage of short-term project data and indigenous knowledge. Special hydrologic studies have been undertaken in the Himalaya for a wide array of purposes. Reports of such studies usually have limited distribution and quickly disappear from view. Occasionally, the data methods, or results of such work, have broad relevance or, at least, are applicable to another similar project. However, learning of the existence of these projects, let alone obtaining a copy of the reports, is usually difficult. The WMO (1991) recommends that agencies attempt to ‘rescue’ such data, at least cataloging its existence IMPROVING THE KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR HIMALAYAN WATER DEVELOPMENT 109

an location and preferably compiling them in a central library. The University of California’s Water Resources Center Archives at Berkeley and Loss Angeles are internationally renowned storehouses of ‘gray literature’ and could serve as a model for a document center in the Himalaya. Catalouging of project failures is also very important, so that we many learn from past experience. Documentation and compilation of indigenous knowledge are much more problematic, but potentially useful. At the very least, extensive interviews with long-term residents of a project area may supplement short-term measurements with long-term residents of a project area may supplement short-term measurements of weather and streamflow conditions. Local knowledge of practical hydrology and geomorphology can often help in the siting and design of small projects. For example, s village water mill may be located in a particular place for good reason. Analyses of hydrologic data in the Himalaya have largely confined to project-level studies with particular applications in mind, and few scientific studies have been designed to make inferences about the Himalayan hydrologic system (Alford, 1992). These few existing investigations provide information about the characteristics of Himalayan rivers (e.g. Sharma, 1977 and 1985; Karmacharya, 1982; Chyurlia, 1983; Alford 1992). A recent project developed methods for estimating low flows, flood peaks and long-term water availability at ungauged locations (Water and Energy Commission Secretariat 1990). While knowledge of Himalaya, where they may have little applicability (Kattelmann, 1990; Shankar, 1991; Sharma, 1991; Alford, 1992). Although avoidance of redundancy is generally desirable, some duplication of effort in hydrologic studies is not necessarily inefficient. Multiple investigations of similar topics will help to verify and confirm key concepts about Himalayan hydrology and advance scientific knowledge. Reliable hydrologic data and information also provide critical inputs for models of alternative development strategies 9Shrestha and Paudyal, 1992).

HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT The lack of hydrologic data is generally a constraint on hydroelectric development (Meier, 1981), and it is one factor that crippled Nepal’s Small Hydro Development Board Programme. Nevertheless, many projects have been built in Nepal with little information about hydrology, often with unfortunate consequences (Sharma, 1991). Hydroelectric projects have been planned with unreliable support information leading to serious levels of under or over-design and frequent cost-overruns. Operational problems with unanticipated water and sediment regimes, destruction of intakes, and damage to canals and penstocks have plagued Himalayan hydroelectric facilities (Aitken, et al., 1991). Some micro-hydroelectric operators failed to plan for variability in dry-season flow and have been without water for months (Pfaff Czarnecks, 1991). Failure to predict the amounts 110 KATTELMANN, R.

and consequences of sedimentation has impacted the operations of many hydrotechnical structures in India (Verghese, 1990). Improved knowledge of sediment transport would permit better design of intake structures, desilting basin, canals and dams. Greater understanding of the sediment regime of rivers would allow sound evaluation of reservoir life expectancy and consequences of removing the sediment load downstream of a dam. Problems with recent projects illustrate the importance of cautious planning where hydrologic information is limited. The Kulekhani project that supplies electricity to Kathmandu and the national grid turned out to have insufficient storage capacity for dry years and larger-than-expected demand. Failure of this project to provide continuous electricity only a few years after completion diminished public hopes for hydropower. The now-famous destruction of the Thame/Namche generating station by a glacial-lake outburst flood illustrates the need to evaluated upstream conditions. Misuse of limited data to push the Arun III project, which paralysed planning of better projects (Shrestha, 1991), is an extreme example of touting unreliable data to support a political position (Verghese, 1990). Additional investments in large-scale projects are in progress or planned, regardless of the lack of sufficient knowledge about local hydrology or impacts of this development (Shankar, 1991). Larger projects particularly those involving storage, require greater knowledge about the hydrologic regime because of their enormous costs (environmental, social and economic), potential consequences of failure and potential benefits. Large projects simply need the best possible designs that are based on sound information about the local environment. Although hydrologic information can never be considered complete, several years of recorded streamflow and precipitation can allow estimation of a probability distribution of water availability. With increasing record length, reliability of estimates of means and extremes improves. However, planners must recognise the limits of short-term hydrologic data and associated inferences and consider physically possible through unexperienced extremes. Uncertainty about hydrology and natural hazards requires careful evaluation of the various risks inherent in building hydrotechnical structures in the Himalaya. In some cases, what we don’t know may be sufficient cause to delay a project until there us a more objective basis for decisions-the risks of proceeding blindly may simply be too great.

FLOOD HAZARDS Collection of data for flood studies involves some special problems. However, because Himalayan flooding presents a great hazard to large populations and is a contentious international issue, special efforts are required. The basic problem is that extreme events, by definition, do not happen very often; otherwise, we would know a lot more about them. Our limited experience with floods makes it easy to be surprised. The magnitude of the 1987 flood in Bangladesh seemed so unusual that the larger 1988 flood was hard for IMPROVING THE KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR HIMALAYAN WATER DEVELOPMENT 111

people to comprehend. The occurrence of sustained, intense rainfall high in the Karakorum in September 1992 was beyond the experience of most living Pakistanis, as were the water levels in the Indus resulting from an unusually large contributing area. In evaluating flood hazards in the Himalayan region, we must estimate how much water can be generated from different scenarios and then how likely are the various combinations of conditions. Compilation of flood histories and associated meteorological conditions and other contributing factors will be a valuable first step. Because flood levels of the big rivers of the plains are mainly a result of combining water from their tributaries, existing (though not necessarily available) data on flood discharge could be used in routing models to determine possible flood flows in the main rivers. Assessment of the glacial-lake outburst-flood risk requires reconnaissance with satellite imagery and aerial photography and detailed filed investigations of suspicious lakes (Liu and Sharma, 1988). When a lake is deemed a serious hazard, such as Imja Glacier Lake in the Khumbu region (Yamada and Sharma, 1993), engineering measures to reduce the hazard should be implemented (Grabs and Hanisch, 1993). If the threat of a flood from Imja Glacier Lake is verified in early 1993, an international campaign should be mounted to reduce the risk of catastrophe. Flood forecasting and warning systems require hydrometeorological data on a near- real-rime basis. Tributary water levels must be monitored continually. Reliable communications under adverse conditions become much more important than precise data in an active flood situation. Coordination and cooperation must be extraordinary in the current transboundary context (Kattelmann, 1990). River routing studies could determine the optimum locations for monitoring stations.

RESEARCH NEEDS In addition to sustained hydrologic monitoring, an active research programme is needed to improve the scientific basis of water resources development and management in the Himalaya. More detailed knowledge of hydrologic processes in the region could improve water resources assessment in general, improve estimates of flow in ungaged catchments in particular, facilitate flood forecasting and hazard assessment, demonstrate potential environmental impacts from water projects, quantify the potential response of run-off generation and streamflow to changes in vegetative cover, and improve soil conservation techniques. The following list of general research questions in Himalayan hydrology was complied from the literature (e.g. Kattelmann, 1987; Bruijnzeel and Bremmer, 1989; Rogers, et al., 1989; Shankar, 1991; Alford, 1992):

How is runoff generated under various Himalayan conditions ? How does the water balance vary under different conditions in the region ? 112 KATTELMANN, R.

What areas generate the most runoff and sediment ? What are the characteristics of streamflow under different physiographic, climate and vegetative conditions ? How do hydraulic properties of soils vary geographically and with land use ? How are peak flows affected by changes in land use ? What are the hydrologic roles of vegetation and soils on Himalayan hillslopes ? How are sediment balances influenced by vegetation and channel conditions ? What is the role of snow in the hydrologic cycle of different basins ? How do terraces alter the generation of runoff and sediment ? What is the relative role of extreme events in mobilising sediment ?

A myriad of attainable research projects can be framed within these broad topics. Approaches to these and other questions should consider the strategies and philosopies of Ives and Messerli (1989) and Gyawali (1989). Substantive progress on these matters requires establishment of a series of research basins of different sizes in different environments, including some that can be treated experimentally. A new project under UNESCO’s International Hydrological Programme and coordinated by ICIMOD has begun and will include a network of research basins (His Majesty’s Government Nepal/ UNESCO/ICIMOD, 1992).

RECOMMENDATIONS In seeking to improve the knowledge base for careful development of the waters of the Himalaya, there are many worthwhile paths. Until the hydrologic network and length of record increase, we must accept the limitations of existing data, largely through common sense. Major donors towards water resource projects should invest in improved hydrologic collection and scientific research. Planning, design, and operation of future hydrotechnical projects would greatly benefit from better understanding of the region’s hydrology. More hydrometric stations need to be established on small stream in the hilly area (Aitken, et al., 1991). In addition to new stations located for their information potential, at least a staff gage should be monitored at most micro-hydro stations with the NEA or DHM coordinating and compiling the data. The NEA could also serve as a reference center for sharing the hydrologic experience of the more than 90 (Sharma, 1991) private hydroelectric projects. The new IHP project on mountain hydrology deserves full support. Existing water- related institutions need to be strengthened with respect to gaining information about the mountain environment. A network of experimental catchments would offer great potential for learning more about hydrologic processes in the Himalayan context. The new Regional Working Group on Mountain Hydrology can hopefully catalyse activities within the member IMPROVING THE KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR HIMALAYAN WATER DEVELOPMENT 113

countries and coordinate international sharing of hydrologic information for the benefit of the people of the Himalayan region.

REFERENCES Abbas A. T., B. M., 1982: The Ganges Water Dispute, pp.157, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, Aitken, J. M., Cromwell, G. and Wishart, G., 1991: Mini and Micro-hydropower in Nepal, Occasional Paper No. 16, International Center for Integrated Mountain Development, 83 pp., Kathmandu. Alford, D., 1992: Hydrological Aspects of the Himalayan Region, Occasional Paper No. 18, International Center for Integrated Mountain Development, 68 pp., Kathmandu. Chyurlia, J. P., 1983: Water Resources Report, Nepal Land Resources Mapping Project, Kenting Earth Sciences Limited, Ottawa. Dhakal, D. N. S., 1990: Hydropower in Bhutan: A long-term Development Perspective, Mountain Research and Development, Vol.10, No. 4, pp. 294-300. Gautam, S., 1976: Interstate Water disputes: A case study of India, Vol. 12, No. 5, pp. 1016-1069. Grabs, W. E. and Hanisch, J., 1993: in press. Objectives and Preventive Methods for Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOF), In: Snow and Glacier Hydrology, International Association of Hydrological Sciences. Gyawali, D., 1989: Water In Nepal, Occasional Paper No. 8, East-West Environment and Policy Institute, pp. 126, East-West Center, Honolulu. Gyawali, D., 1991: Troubled Politics of Himalayan Waters, Himal, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 5-10. Hagen, T., 1961: Nepal and the Kingdom in the Himalayas Kummerly and Frey, Bern. His Majesty’s Government Nepal/UNESCO/ICIMOD, 1992: Report of the Second Consultative Meeting of the Regional Working Group on Mountain Hydrology, 23 pp., ICIMOD, Kathmandu. Ives, J. D. and Messerli, B., 1989: The Himalayan Dilemma: Reconciling Development and Conservation, 295 pp., Routledge, London, Karmacharya, J. L., 1982: Hydrological Studies of Nepal, Water and Energy Commission, HMG, Kathmandu. Kattelmann, R., 1987: Uncertainty in Assessing Himalayan Water Resources, Mountain Research and Development, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 279-286. Kattelmann, R., 1988: Mountain Hazards and Hydroelectric Development in the Nepal Himalaya In: Water for World Development, International Water Resources Association, Urbana IL, pp. 135-143. Kattelmann, R., 1990: Conflicts and Cooperation over Floods in the Himalaya-Ganges Region, Water International, Vol. 15, No. 189-194. Kattelmann, R., 1991: Hydrologic Regime of the Sapta Kosi Basin, In: Hydrology for the Water Management of Large River Basins, F.van der Ven, D. Gutknecht, D. Loucks, and K. Salewicz, (eds.),------Liu, C. and Sharma, C.K. (chief editors), 1988: Report on First Expedition to Glacier Lakes in the Pumqu (Arun) and Poiqu (Bhote-Sun Kosi) River Basins, 192 pp., Xizang (Tibet), China, Science Press, Beijing, 114 KATTELMANN, R.

Meier, U., 1981: Local Experience with Micro-hydro Technology, Swiss Centre for Appropriate Technology, St. Gallen, pp. 169. HMG, 1981: Water: The Key to Nepal’s Development, Ministry of Water Resources, Kathmandu. Murthy, Y. K., 1981: Water resources potential of the Himalaya. In: The Himalaya: Aspects of change, Lall, J.S. (ed.), pp. 152-171, Oxford University Press, Delhi. Pfaff-Czamecka, J., 1991: Bad Business in Bajhang, Himal, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 16. Rao, K. L., 1975: India’s Water Wealth, Orient-Longman, New Delhi. Shankar, K., 1991: Status and Role of Mountain Hydrology in the Hindu Kush-Himalaya Region, MEN Series No. 10, International Center for Integrated Mountain Development, 34, pp., Kathmandu. Sharma, C. K., 1977: River Systems of Nepal, Sharma, S. (ed.), 214 pp., Kathmandu. Sharma, C. K., 1985: Water and Energy Resources of the Himalayan Block, Sharma, S. (ed.), pp. 477, Kathmandu, Sharma, C. K., 1991: Engineering Challenges in Nepal Himalaya, Sharma, S. (ed.), Kathmandu. Shrestha, A.P., 1991: Hydropower in Nepal: Issues and Concepts of Development, Resources Nepal, pp. 191, Kathmandu. Shrestha, D. L. and Paudyal, G. N., 1992: Water Resources Development Planning in the Karnali River Basin, Water Resources Development, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 195-203, Nepal. Water and Energy Commission Secretariat/Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, 1990: Methodologies for estimating hydrologic characteristics of ungauged locations in Nepal, Vol. 2, Report 4/4240990/1/1 SEQ No. 331, Ministry of Water Resources, Kathmandu. World Meteorological Organisation, 1990: Economic and Social Benefits of Meteorological and Hydrological Services, WMO 733. World Meteorological Organisation/UNESCO, 1991: Water Resources, Assessment, pp. 64, Geneva. Verghese, B. G., 1990: Water of Hope, pp. 446, Oxford and IBH publishing Co., Pvt. Ltd., New Deli. Yamada, T. and Sharma, C. K., 1993: In press, Glacial Lake Outburst Floods in the Nepal Himalaya, In: Snow and Glacier Hydrology, International Association of Hydrological Sciences. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 115-129

HYDROLOGY UNDER CENTRAL PLANNING: GROUNDWATER IN INDIA

MARCUS MOENCH The Pacific Institute, 1681 Shattuck Avenue Berkeley CA 94709, USA

ABSTRACT

Overdeveloment of groundwater resources is occurring in many parts of India. Official recharge and extraction estimates, developed to guide financial allocations for well drilling, are based on hydrologically meaningless administrative units. Their purpose as guides for centrally allocated development financing tends to generate pressure for assessments to remain optimistic. Scientific uncertainties in the data base and the large number of assumptions required for arriving at resource estimates makes them easily subject to manipulation. Delinking fund allocation from resource assessments and basing them on direct measurements, rather than calculated estimates, could make them much less subject to institutional manipulation than they currently are.

INTRODUCTION Groundwater is an important resource for drinking, industrial, and agricultural uses in India. It serves a critical buffering role in drought years. Even in normal years, nearly half of the net irrigated area and over 40 per cent of the irrigation potential–a total of 35 million hectares (Mha)–is supplied from groundwater sources (Saksena, 1989, Dhawan, 1990b). Official estimates paint a rosy picture of groundwater availability. According to them, over 80 Mha of irrigation potential could be created from groundwater sources (GOI, 1989). Roughly 37 per cent of this has been developed so far.1 Despite availability estimates, overdevelopment is emerging as an issue in numerous areas. Water tables are falling in many hard rock and low rainfall zones and saline intrusion is common in coastal aquifers. Groundwater quality is also declining in some region as fertiliser rich return flows re- infiltrate and increasingly saline aquifers are tapped (High Level Committee, 1991). Isolated problem areas such as Mehsana District (Gujrat), Coimbatore (Tamil Nadu), and Chandigarh (Haryana) are well known. The true extent of overdevelopment is, however, lost in a mist of optimistic official resource assessments and increasingly frequent site specific reports of overdevelopment problems. Aside from the groundwater rich eastern Gangetic Basin, little unanimity exists concerning resource availability or the significance of emerging overdevelopment indications. Difficulties in evaluating groundwater availability estimates and, to some extent, the 116 MOENCH, M.

emerging overdevelopmet problems themselves are rooted in governmental structures designed to encourage groundwater development. This paper examines groundwater development under central planning in India. The context in which groundwater development has and is occurring is discussed first. Contradictions between emerging over development problems and official estimates of resource availability are examined next using the case of Gujrat. Following this, issue in resource estimation and data collection along with their links to overall development and planning approaches are described. Possible solutions are discussed in the final section.

CONTEXT Since Independence, groundwater development patterns in India have been influenced by five central factors. First, well ownership is dominantly private–rights to groundwater accompany land and land owners have the right to develop and use well water as they see fit. Second, there has been an explosion in the ability to exploit groundwater. Nationwide the number of pump sets jumped from 87,000 in 1950 to over 12 million in 1990 (Dadlani, 1990). Electricity to agriculture is provided at highly subsidised rates (in some cases free). Farmers can now pump from much deeper depths and pay little to do so. Third, India has had a strong focus on self sufficiency and agricultural development has been geared to providing the inputs necessary for massive increases in food, particularly grain production. Fourth, development has been centrally planned. Most development programmes have involved a hierarchical system of financial resource allocation from te center down to the states, districts, and taluks.2 Finally, India is a democracy. Votes count and, therefore, the factors that sway voters count. Financial resource allocation for groundwater development has major political implications. Irrigation development has been heavily funded as part of the government’s drive for self-sufficiency in grain production. Since groundwater rights are linked to land ownership, this has been done primarily through rural electrification and the provision of credit to individuals. NABARD, the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, provides refinancing guarantees to local lenders for well and pump loans. Under the current central planning system, finances for development are allocated to administrative units– states, district, and taluks/blocks. Decisions on how much credit should be allocated to each unit for groundwater development are based on estimates of how many wells or pumps the area can sustainably support. To do this, groundwater availability, well yield crop water duty, and well census estimates are made and then transformed into an estimate of the ‘ultimate’ number of wells and pumps that can be supported. This estimate, minus the number of wells and pumps already present within the administrative unit, then becomes the primary basis for financial resource allocation. The entire structure of groundwater resource estimation and data collection is geared to meeting the needs of HYDROLOGY UNDER CENTRAL PLANNING: GROUNDWATER IN INDIA 117

this planning and fund allocation process. The importance of this process is indicated by the number of wells and investment involved. Working group proposals for groundwater development during the VIIIth plan focused almost exclusively on the number of wells and pump sets that can be funded (GOI, 1989). The total number of wells and pumps targeted for development along with projected costs are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1 MONIR IRRIGATION STRUCTURES PROPOSED FOR VIIITH PLAN

Type of Pump Number (105) Cost (107 Rupees) Dugwells (w/o pumps) 17.11 3010 Private Tubewells (w/o pumps) 16.89 1084 Electrical pumps 30.00 2401 Diesel pumps 6.22 503 Other Ö . . 1000 Total 8659

From GOI, 1989, Table 6.4

At the Rs. 18/$ rate prevailing in 1989, the total proposed investment of 8,659 x 107 rupees was equivalent to roughly $ 4.8 billion. Of this, 1,400 x 107 rupees ($ 777 million) was intended to be mobilised from private investment and the remainder from various government controlled sources. Even though planned investment targets may have changed since 1989 and the rupee has been substantially devalued relative to the dollar, investment amounts remain large. Although the central planning process is intended to allocate finances and encourage development based primarily on quantitative estimate of groundwater availability, two factors frustrate this objective. First, the process of estimating how many pumps of wells an area can support is highly subjective. Data availability, the limitations of existing analytical techniques, and the incompatibility of hydrology and any administrative method of allocating large-scale financing to benefit individual recipients is going to come under tremendous pressure. The impartiality of estimates containing numerous subjective elements is difficult to maintain when directly linked to major funding flows. As a result, the accuracy of current estimates is open to question (Dhawan, 1990a; Moench, 1991). Estimates of recharge have increased with each evaluation. Calculations in the 1960s put recharge at 20.27 x 106 ham. This was increased first to 26.5 x 106 ham by the ‘Task Force’ in 1971, then to 31 x 106 ham by the ‘Over Exploitation Committee of 1979’, and again to 42 x 106 ham in 1982 (Raju, 1987). Current estimates are on the order of 45.23 x 106 ham (GOI, 1989). Officially the ‘ultimate’ area that can be irrigated from groundwater is 80 Mha, double the 40 Mha ‘ultimate potential’ estimate accepted until 1989 (GOI, 1989). 118 MOENCH, M.

Despite the large estimate potential, overdevelopment is a clear and growing problem in many areas.

ESTIMATES VERSUS OBSERVATIONS The situation in Gujrat provides insight into the contradictions between official resource estimates and other observations of resource condition. According to estimates accepted as a basis for development until September, 1992, only 31 per cent of utilisable recharge to unconfined aquifers in Gujrat was extracted and a further 3.2 Mha could be sustainably irrigated from groundwater (GOG, 1986) Extraction exceeded recharge to unconfined aquifers in only 5 out of 182 Taluks and was greater than 65 per cent of recharge in a further 14 Taluks. Although levels of development were estimated to be low in unconfined aquifers, groundwater in confined aquifers was calculated to be approaching full development throughout much of north Gujrat. Extraction exceeded 70 per cent of recharge to confined aquifers in Ahmedabad, Gandhinagar, Sabarkatha, Mehsana, and Surendranagar district and was over 40 per cent in Banaskatha (Table 2, Figure 1).

TABLE 2 ESTIMATED EXTRACTION OF GROUNDWATER District Estimated % Development Water Table Decline in m Uncof. Conf. 79-87 78-90 78-90 Ahmedabad 23 97 2->4 4-8 to 20 Gandhinagar 30 97 2-4 4-8 to 20 Banaskatha 33 40 2->4 4-8 to 20 Sabarkatha 43 97 0->4 4-8 to 30 Surendranagar 37 72 0->4 NA NA Mehsana 66 88 2->4 4-8 to 40

Column 1 and 2, Government of Gujrat (1986)., Column 3 from Maps prepared by the CGWB. Column 4 and 5 from High Level Committee (1991) text and maps.

Officially estimated levels of groundwater development in unconfined aquifers were at odds with high levels of development in deeper aquifers. Why farmers would develop deep aquifers if substantial resources were available near the surface is unclear. Physical indicators also suggested that overdevelopment was a problem in surface aquifers. Groundwater maps prepared by the Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) for the period April 1979 to May, 1987 show drops of > 2 m throughout most of Gujrat excluding canal command area. In large areas the decline was > 4 m and water levels in the unconfined aquifers were > 20 m in depth. Water quality in most areas with shallow water tables was poor with TDS > 1000 mg/l (often >3000 mg/l) and bicarbonate > 500 ppm. Although HYDROLOGY UNDER CENTRAL PLANNING: GROUNDWATER IN INDIA 119

FIGURE 1. MAP OF GUJRAT SHOWING DISTRICTS

May 1987 was a drought period, the decline was long-term over extensive areas. For example, depth of the water table declined from 4-16 m in May 1987 to 8-28 m in May 1990 in Ahmedabad, Sabarkatha, Mehsana, and Banaskatha districts (High Level Committee, 1991). One well known groundwater expert commented: ‘we’ve lost the water table in Mehsana’.3 In sum, over-development was well-known to be widespread despite rosy estimates of availability in unconfined aquifers. Recently the Government of Gujrat constituted a committee to re-estimate groundwater resource and irrigation potential throughout the state. This committee produced its report in September 1992 (GOG; 1992). The report presented a dramatically different picture from that produced in the earlier 1986 estimate. Utilisable annual recharge to groundwater aquifers dropped 36 per cent from an estimate of 19,169.12 MCM in 1986 to 12,277.64 in 1992 (GOG, 1986, 1992).4 Reflecting the drop in recharge, the ‘ultimate’ irrigation potential dropped from 4,56 Mha to 2.93 Mha. At the same time the estimated net annual draft from groundwater source jumped from 5,335.6 MCM in 1986 to 7,170.3 MCM in 1992 (GOG, 1986, 1992). As a result of these changes the total number of taluks where extraction was estimated to exceed utilisable recharge jumped from five in 1986 to twenty four in 1992. Taluks in different warning classifications, dark 120 MOENCH, M.

(extraction> 85 per cent of recharge) and grey (extraction 65-85 per cent of recharge) increased from one to ten and thirteen to twenty six, respectively. The direction of change was not uniform for all taluks. In some cases the percentage of recharge estimated as extracted in 1992 was lower than in 1986. Figure two and three show the categories of different taluks during each assessment. The dramatic shift in groundwater recharge and extraction assessments did not stem from changes in the basic data available. Rather it reflects changes in analytical assumptions and the data selected as accurate (GOG, 1992). This is discussed further in the section on estimation procedures.

FIGURE 2: GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENT STATUS GUJRAT STATE, 1986.

The contradictions in Gujrat are far from unique. Detailed examination of sites as diverse as Rajasthan, Haryana, Kamataka, and Tamil Nadu consistently turns up similar tensions between official resource availability estimates and other observation of groundwater condition (Moench, 1991 a,b). These contradictions are directly linked to the methodologies used for estimating resource availability and the ultimate purpose of estimation.

Estimation Procedures Groundwater availability is currently estimated using methods approved by the Groundwater Committee (GEC) in 1984 (GOI, 1984). Recharge and extraction are HYDROLOGY UNDER CENTRAL PLANNING: GROUNDWATER IN INDIA 121

FIGURE 3. GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENT STATUS, GUJRAT STATE, 1992. estimated for each taluk or block. The ratio of extraction to recharge extraction is termed as the ‘percentage development’. Areas where extraction is less than 65 per cent of recharge are classified as ‘white’ and loans for well construction and pumps through NABARD are readily available. Where the percentage development is between 65 per cent and 85 per cent, access to credit is limited and above 85 per cent it is closed. Recharge estimates are also used for determining the amount of funding to allocate to each taluk. The number of wells that can be funded is defined by subtracting the current draft from the available recharge and dividing the resulting figure by the ‘average’ draft for different well types.

Recharge Recharge estimates are based primarily on water table fluctuations. Each state maintains a network of wells in which water levels are monitored at minimum twice a year. The rise in water level over the monsoon period multiplied by the specific yield of the aquifer and the area of the administrative unit for which the estimate is being done is assumed to represent monsoon recharge for the year. A certain percentage of non-monsoon rainfall (based solely on bedrock lithology) is also assumed to contribute to total recharge. In addition, seepage from canals and agricultural return flows are estimated and included in 122 MOENCH, M.

the total recharge figure. Finally, in the 1986 Gujrat estimate, recharge to confined aquifers due to lateral inflow was estimated and added to the gross recharge figure (GOG, 1986). Total recharge was then adjusted using a normalisations factor to reflect long-term rainfall patterns. Seventy per cent of the gross recharge as calculated in the above manner is assumed to be recoverable. After setting aside fifteen per cent of this for municipal and industrial uses, the remainder is considered to be available for agriculture. Monsoon recharge estimates produced using the above method have a high degree of inherent uncertainty. Most estimates are made on the basis of administrative units– blocks of taluks. Administrative boundaries rarely match hydrologic boundaries. Furthermore, relatively few (2-20 generally less than 10) wells are monitored in each block and the period of record is often short. As a result, confidence limits on average water table fluctuations, if calculated, would be very wide. Aside from accuracy, it is not clear what the measured water table fluctuations mean. Some of the monitoring wells have pumps. In general, neither the presence of pumps nor the pumping history are recorded. How much of the measured fluctuation is a response to pumping is unknown and has nothing to do with recharge. In some cases, the basic measurements of water levels recorded in the well record books are altered to represent what scientists in the head office think is correct. In Gujrat, for example, original measurements have been changed to reflect a water table rise over the monsoon in virtually all instances where pre-monsoon water levels in open wells were originally recorded as higher than post-monsoon water levels.5 According to government scientists, the data are ‘corrected’ because water levels ‘can’t’ fall over the monsoon period. Well levels do not, however, always respond predictably in natural systems. There are, in addition, logical reasons for measured water levels to fall over the monsoon. In numerous areas, for example, crops are only grown during the monsoon due to lack of water in other seasons. Even during the monsoon they require supplemental irrigation. As a result, wells are pumped during the monsoon and not during the dry season. The net effect could be a drop in measured water levels over the monsoon period. Specific yield estimates, the other critical component in estimating monsoon recharge using water table fluctuations, are also highly uncertain. They vary greatly from site to site and are often based on pump tests from a few tubewells or the ‘ad-hoc norms’ recommended by the GEC for different lithologies. In addition, yield in hard rock areas typically declines with depth (UNESCO, 1984). Regional water table declines will, as a result, invalidate the use of older, near surface, specific yield estimates when calculating recharge.6 Overall, confidence limits on specific yield estimates, if they could be calculated, would probably be wider than those for water table fluctuation. The approach to estimating non monsoon recharge is as uncertain as that used for monsoon recharge and contains inherent biases (Moench, 1991a). Basing recharge HYDROLOGY UNDER CENTRAL PLANNING: GROUNDWATER IN INDIA 123

estimates from non-monsoon rainfall on lithology alone ignores antecedent moisture conditions, soil types, and precipitation characteristics. This can result in situations, such as that in Bikaner Block of Rajasthan, where 26 per cent of the rainfall during the dry season is officially calculated to contribute 69 per cent of the recharge (Moench, 1991a). Bikaner block is a desert area and most of the rainfall in the non-monsoon period probably evaporates. This effect probably leads to overestimation of non-monsoon recharge in most arid areas. Finally, aside from issues in calculating recharge volumes, quality considerations are often ignored. Recharge to saline groundwater area is theoretically deducted from the total availability estimate. It is not clear what criteria are used to define saline water. Furthermore, quality problems (such as high bicarbonate or a high SAR) can make groundwater unsuitable for agricultural uses even if the TDS is within theoretically acceptable limits. Lack of consideration of quality problems may be a major factor in the low estimated levels of development shown in the 1986 assessment for north Gujrat (Table 2). Much of the area in north Gujrat is underlain by marine sediments and, in addition to overall salinity, has relatively high levels of bicarbonate (Phadtare, 1988). In sum, recharge estimates are derived by combining a variety of factors each of highly uncertain accuracy and often doubtful interpretation. What assumptions are made regarding each of the factors and their applicability can result in large differences in the final estimates. Once again the Gujrat case provides a prime example. The dramatic shift between 1986 and 1992 recharge assessments resulted from changes in three critical assumptions. In the later assessment, recharge was not normalised to reflect historical rainfall patterns, recharge from irrigation in areas where the water table is greater than 25 m below ground was omitted, and nothing was added to reflect lateral inflow to confined aquifers (GOG, 1992). While the 1992 estimate coincide more closely with observed problems than the 1986 report, the methodology used is not inherently any more accurate.

Extraction Groundwater extraction is estimated using a combination of well census figures, average well commands, crop area and water duties, well yields, and pumping hours. The GEC recommended calculating draft by multiplying the average area irrigated by each well by the average annual irrigation depth (GOI, 1984). In practice, the precise method used to calculate extraction varies in different states and localities. Regardless of the precise method used, there is substantial uncertainty in the basic data underlying extraction estimates. In Gujrat, the 1986-87 census of minor irrigation was conducted in a drought year when many wells were dry. It is the only comprehensive source on well numbers. If one takes the number of wells counted as functioning in 1987 as the base for estimating extraction (as was done in the 1992 assessment) than the state’s 124 MOENCH, M.

net area irrigated from groundwater is roughly 1.7 Mha. The total number of wells at present is, however, much higher than the number functioning during the 1987 drought. If all wells are included when estimating irrigated area then the total would be roughly 3.5 Mha.7 Since the total area that can potentially be irrigated from groundwater is officially estimated in the 1992 report as 2.9 Mha, the different between the two well counts is a difference between 59 per cent and 121 per cent development. Similar problems are also present with crop water duties. These are generally estimated using data from experimental farms. The number of irrigations used on experimental farms and in actual farmer’s field can vary by a factor of three or more (Goldman, 1988). Given problems in the available data, most groundwater experts working in government departments consider extraction estimate even less reliable than recharge estimates.8 Accurate estimation of each of the components used for calculating draft would require substantial surveys and resources.9 As a result, hydrologist working for state and central organisations often state that they adjust extraction figures to represent what they think is happening.

Consequences The approach to estimating recharge and extraction results in figures with little relevance to the physical situation. The process does, however, produce the type of figure required for central planning. By comparing figures on ‘irrigation potential created’ against a theoretical ‘ultimate irrigation potential’ plan progress can be measured. Figures on the number of wells feasible in a block of district combined with well construction costs allow central planners to allocate financial resources for well development. The structure of the estimates is designed to meet these needs. By linking recharge and extraction estimates with funding follows has an important consequence: it provides the local groundwater departments with an element of power. As one official commented: "I know what is going on with the data so I can present a correct view to the funding agencies and planning authorities."10 I myself have been in the office of hydrologists when politicians called and said: "My district has been declared dark, make it white."11 Given the inherent uncertainties in the estimates, there is little scientific basis for recommending closure of financing until sharply dropping water tables make overdevelopment obvious. Furthermore, since a wide range of ‘reasonable’ values could be assumed for many parameters in the estimated resource availability, with little change of detection. Reliance on methodologies that depend for their accuracy on assumptions leaves large scope for manipulation.

NEEDS Overdevelopment of groundwater resources is emerging as a major problem in many areas. HYDROLOGY UNDER CENTRAL PLANNING: GROUNDWATER IN INDIA 125

In other areas, water table is rising and waterlogging threatens agricultural production. The current approach to groundwater monitoring and estimation does not, however, provide a strong basis for monitoring these problems. Extraction and recharge estimates– the only figures published regularly–provide, at best, vague indications of groundwater availability. Other indicators, such as water table maps and well hydrographs, are not regularly published. In Karnataka, well hydrographs are not even plotted by the state organisation until the estimated level of development exceeds 65 per cent.12 This may also be the case in other states. None of the available indicators integrates quality considerations with volumetric availability. The net result levels is highly unreliable. The development of some reliable method for monitoring groundwater condition is essential if emerging problems are to be addressed. The methodology for estimating groundwater resource availability is currently being revised.13 Unless the underlying approach and reason for estimation are changed, it is unlikely that the revisions will alter the fundamental level of understanding regarding groundwater availability. Central Planning requirements to estimate the number of wells that can be funded in a given administrative area warp the overall approach to groundwater monitoring. Accurate estimates are difficult to achieve both physically and socially. On the physical end, administrative units are fundamentally inappropriate for estimating groundwater availability. Although this problem could be overcome through micro-planning, it would require large increases in the amount of data to reduce statistical uncertainties in the recharge/extraction ratio to acceptable levels for allocating funds. A crude ‘90 per cent confidence interval’ calculated for the ratio in a taluk in Karnataka shows, for example that extraction there is with a fair degree of certainty, somewhere between 14 per cent and 358 per cent of available recharge (Moench, 1991a). Furthermore, uncertainties concerning that is being measured (recent pumping effects or recharge related water table changes?) and how accurate the measurements are, (head office corrections) would leave estimates open to question regardless of the amount of data collected. Social concerns in the resource estimation approach are as fundamental as physical ones. As long as fund allocation is directly linked to resource estimates, political pressures will exist for outcomes that maintain funding flows. Fund allocation links also create incentives for the concerned bureaucracy to ‘manage’ the data and its analysis in ways that reflect internal interest or external pressure. Control over data used to allocate funding, giving the bureaucracy an element of political and economic power. This has come out particularly strongly in the case of recent disputes over surface waters. In Gujrat, experts outside the state government privately allege that the difference between 1986 and 1992 groundwater resource estimates is a result of the state attempting to strengthen its case for the controversial Narmada Project.14 In Karnataka, the state government has 126 MOENCH, M.

complained over the use of data that it provided to the tribunal allocating waters in the Cauvery Basin ‘in ways counter to the state’s interest.’15 Given what some authors have called ‘the eroded state of ethics’ in India (Dhawan, 1989), there is little likelihood that simple improvements in the technical aspects of resource estimation will create reliable and uninflated estimates. In many ways the fundamental problems warping the resource estimation process can be traced to requirements inherent in the current central planning structure. As organised, the planning process is dominated by policy-makers who demand figures, such as the number of wells that can be development, that provide an easy basis for allocating funds. Acknowledging that no solid basis exists for creating such figures would undermine the power of groundwater departments and remove a primary reasons for their existence within the planning structure.

WAYS FORWARD Effective resource management requires an accurate base of information that is accessible to policy-makers and the public. There are at least two steps that might help move the currently inadequate system for monitoring groundwater condition in this direction. First, developing monitoring systems that are based on direct measurements rather than estimates could reduce uncertainties and the possibility of data manipulation. Second, reducing direct linkages between fund allocation and resource estimates could reduce incentives for that manipulation to occur. The condition of groundwater resources can be monitored using changes in water levels, water quality, well failure rates and other direct measures as the primary ‘first cut’ indicators. These measures would be much less subject to uncertainty or manipulation than recharge or extraction estimates since their accuracy does not depend on intricate calculations and a wide variety of assumptions. In addition, they are readily public. A farm group may not be able to dispute the recharge or extraction estimates produced by a technical organisation but it will be able to collect information regarding water level changes in its member’s wells. Reliance on direct measures could, thus make the policy debate much more transparent and accessible. The above shift would not eliminate the necessity for more sophisticated hydrologic analyses. Water balance studies using more advanced modelling techniques than those understanding resource dynamics. As a result, they are often essential for identifying appropriate solutions to specific problems. Hydrologic modelling has, however, fundamental drawbacks as a primary basis for monitoring groundwater conditions under the situation prevailing in India. First, it requires lots of high quality data (if garbage goes in, then garbage comes out). Second, even with the best of data, modelling is a subjective process. This makes it easily subject to manipulation. Third, and perhaps most importantly, model HYDROLOGY UNDER CENTRAL PLANNING: GROUNDWATER IN INDIA 127

functioning and the assumptions on which results rest are not easily understood by the average policy-makers to say nothing of ordinary citizens. Thus, reliance on model results creates a situation where control and interpretation of resource information remains in the hands of small group of experts. Modification of result due to political or other pressures is difficult to observe or counteract effectively. The use, therefore, of hydrologic model results as a key guide for water policy should be restricted to situations where more direct, objective, and easily interpreted measures are unavailable. Delinking funding flows from resource estimates could be another important shift to reduce incentives for manipulation. One way in which this might be done is to provide uniform funding for water resource related activities at the taluk level with few restrictions on how it is used. This would effectively reduce the need for the type of centralised resource estimates now complied. If farmers want to improve water availability they could be given loans for well development, water conservation (drip, etc…), dam construction, or groundwater recharge activities depending on their evaluation of the most viable approach. Since the loans would not be tied to a specific activity, individuals would have an incentive to make the best choice possible based on the range of economic and resource availability factors affecting investment decisions. Moving in the directions suggested above would have substantial implications for the roles groundwater departments play. Two roles appear critical: (1) monitoring and dissemination of information on basic groundwater parameters (water levels, quality, etc.); and (2) undertaking high quality scientific studies related to specific area of concern. Regularly published information on those groundwater parameters–it is possible to measure directly–would provide a sufficient basis for most policy and fund allocation decisions. Where these parameters indicate emerging problems, high quality scientific work would be the best routine toward identification of solutions. Efforts currently expended on producing broad-based and inherently uncertain estimates of extraction and recharge could be eliminated. To fulfill the above roles, groundwater departments would need to be separated more firmly from development implementation and fund allocation decisions than they currently are. As suggested above, reducing the direct role of resource estimates in funding decisions is one way to do this. Another way would be to move resource analysis responsibilities out of range of those potentially interested in their manipulation. Since water is a state subject under the Indian constitution, most development decisions are made at the state level. Increasing the Central Government’s role in data collection, analysis, and publication could, therefore, separate these activities from a portion of the pressures inherent in local development decision. An inherent risk in this approach is the tendency to both Central and State Governments toward secrecy. The publication component would, therefore, need to be emphasised and freed from the requirement of obtaining high-level 128 MOENCH, M.

approvals. Adequate funding would also need to be provided for data dissemination to the general public as well as other governmental organisations. Overall, regular publication and dissemination of basic data would need to become a regular on-going activity of the departments involved in its collation. Although the changes discussed above could from a basis for impartial approaches to groundwater monitoring and information dissemination, they would probably have little immediate effect on emerging problems. Ready availability of accurate information is, however, an important prerequisite for the emergence of management system. An informed debate over possible management alternatives can not develop unless information on resource condition and alternative uses is freely available. Local support is critical if management is to occur. Wells are individually owned and government in democratic societies have limited ability to enforce unpopular management regimes. Creating conditions under which accurate information on resource condition is available to users in a form they can understand is the first step necessary for management systems to emerge.

NOTES 1 Figures provided by B.P. Sinha, Chief Hydrologist, Central Ground Water Board. 2 Taluks are administrative units generally containing 100-200 villages. 3 Dr. Rushton, University of Bimingham, comment on March 1, 1992. 4 Figure for 1986 is combination of recharge to unconfined and confined aquifers (GOG, 1986). 5 Data from original GWRDC well monitoring log books. 6 Personal communication. A.M. Gajapathy, Chief Engineer, PWD (Groundwater), Madras. 7 Personal communication, S.C. Sharma, Chief Hydrologist, Gujrat Water Resources Development Corporation. 8 Discussions with officials in the CGWB and State Groundwater Departments in Gujrat, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. 9 Personal communication, S.C. Sharma, Chief Hydrologist, Gujrat Water Resources Development Corporation. 10 Interview, March 24, 1992. 11 Incident on 9/3/92. 12 Personal communication, R.L. Gaikad, Dy. Director, Groundwater Cell, Bureau of Mines and Geology, Karnataka. 13 Personal communication, S.C. Sharma, Chief hydrologist, Gujrat Water Resources Development Corporation. 14 This has been a common comment in informal conversations with individuals from NABARD, CGWB and private consulting groups. 15 ‘All Party Ultimatum to Karnataka Government’, Hindustan Times. April 20, 1992.

REFERENCE Dadlani, G. K., 1990: Status of Energisation of Irrigation Pump Sets, Bhu-Jal News, Vol. 5, No. HYDROLOGY UNDER CENTRAL PLANNING: GROUNDWATER IN INDIA 129

3), pp. 12-22. Dhawan, B. D., 1990a: How Reliable are Groundwater Estimates?, Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 1073-1076, May 19. GOI, 1984: Groundwater Estimation Methodology, Report of the Ground Water Estimation Committee, Ministry of Irrigation, pp. 53, Government of India, New Delhi. GOG, 1992: Report of the Committee on Estimation of Groundwater Recharge and Irrigation Potential in Gujrat State, Narmada and Water Resources Department, pp. 57+appendices, Government of Gujrat. GOG, 1986: Report of the Group of the Estimation of Groundwater Resource and Irrigation Potential from Groundwater in Gujrat State, Government of Gujrat, pp. 15 + Annexures. Goldman, M. R., 1988: The Mirch-Masala of Chili Cultivation, The Political Economy of Groundwater Extraction in Rural Rajasthan, paper presented at the National Conference on Development Strategies for the Desert, pp.21, Nov. 19-21, Jodhpur, India. High Level Committee, 1991: Report of High Level Committee on Augmenting Surface Water Recharge in Over Exploited of North Gujrat, Vols. I and II, Narmada and Water Resources Department, Gandhinagar, Gurjat. Moench, M., 1991a: Sustainability, Efficiency and Equity in Ground Water Development: Issues in the western U.S. and India, pp. 45, Pacific Institute monograph. Moench, M., 1991b: Drawing Down the Buffer: Upcoming Ground Water Management Issues in India, pp. 18, Pacific Institute monograph. Phadtare, P. N., 1988: Geo-hydrology of Gujrat State Technical Series, No. SR 1, West Central Regional Central Ground Water Board, Government of India, Ahmedabad. Raju, K.C.B., 1987: Ground water – Assessment and Monitoring, paper presented at the All India Seminar on Water Resources of India, New Delhi. Saksena, R. S., 1989: Present Status of Ground Water Management in India and Perspective for Future paper presented at the Workshop on Efficiency and Equity in Groundwater Use and Management, Institute of Rural Management, 1 Anand. UNESCO, 1984: Ground Water in Hard Rocks, Studies and Reports in Hydrology 33, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation, Paris. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 131-138

A CASE STUDY OF WESTERN GANDAK CANAL PROJECT IN UTTAR PRADESH

K. C. SARIN Ex. Professor and Superintendent Engineer Irrigation Department (Uttar Pradesh)

ABSTRACT

In the Western Gandak Canal Project (WGCP) executed by the Irrigation Department of the Uttar Pradesh Government under the Gandak Project, conjunctive water management approach has been successfully used. The project has improved agriculture productivity in the region. It was the first high discharge, non-seepage lined canal constructed in the state and remains a pioneer for solving problems caused by waterlogging.

THE RIVER GANDAK The Gandak Rriver and its major tributaries rise in the Himalaya in Nepal. The river has a total cathment area of 46,300 km2 out of which 7,620 km2 lies in India in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. In Uttar Pradesh, the river has a catchment area of 968 km2. After debouching onto the plains at Vilkiminagar on the Nepal-Bihar border, it formed a delta like condition and threw itself into several channels, eroding and marooning large areas during high flow conditions. Downstream of Valmikinagar, the river fanned itself into several branches like little Gandak and other streams known as Bansi and Jharais. The area was full of lakes, ponds and marshes formed by the changing course of the river. The main river section at Vilmikinagar was wide, unbraided and showed shifting tendency towards the left. The generally higher slopes in the mountainous sections are reduced once the river reaches the plains showing three categories of slopes. In the upstream gorge section, the slope average 5.7 m/km. The river thereafter runs for a length of 260 km and confluences with the Ganga near Patna. In the upper reaches in the Tarai the slope reduced to 0.57 m/km while in the lower reaches before its confluence with Ganga the slope becomes 0.23 m/km.

GANDAK COMMAND BEFORE PROJECT The Gandak command consists of areas in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh where Bhojpuri dialect is spoken. Mahatma Gandhi started his satyagraha movement against the British in Champaran district in western Bihar which is presently the command of the Gandak. The 132 SARIN, K. C.

district in Uttar Pradesh occupied by the command, are Deoria and Gorakhpur. Between 1901 and 1951, the population of Deoria increased from 15 lakh to 21 lakh showing an increase of six lakh in a 50 year period. The region was poor, economically backward and emigration was high. People were kept as bonded labourers. Between 1951 and 1991 the population increased by over 23 lakh, from 1901. The population density in the region is very high compared to the state as a whole. Uttar Pradesh has a population density of 471 per km2 whereas the density in the region is 923 per km2. The possibility of diverting the Gandak for irrigation existed only in the northern most section of the river towards the western bank. The Gandak used to be diverted by temporary obstruction at Patherwaghat. As conditions were favourable due to the higher slope of the river and boulder bed, elaborate foundation work was not required. Narayani Canal System, an inundation canal of 168 km length, was built in the early days. The supply of water into the canal however, was governed by the river’s stages which varied from season to season and from year to year. The operation was hence unstable and intermittent. The climate in the region is warm and humid. Rainfall occurs during the monsoon showing a variation of 1183 mm to 1208 mm. The maximum 24 hours recorded rainfall is 280 mm. The average summer temperature reaches 40.5 degree Celsius to 44.5 degree Celsius while the winter temperatures average 10 degree Celsius. The groundwater level in spite of pumping as reported by the Irrigation Department of Uttar Pradesh Government were: May 2.75 m to 4.57 m Pre-monsoon October 1.22 m to 3.05 m Post-monsoon

Rice, sugarcane and maize are the major crops. As a result of the rainfall pattern, groundwater condition and available irrigation, the prevailing cropping pattern in terms of the cultivated area is

Types of Crop Percentage a) Early Paddy 7.30 b) Late Paddy 15.77 c) Other Kharif 11.70 i.e. Kharif 34.77 d) Sugarcane 11.40 e) Rabi 16.80 Total 63.00

The climate, pattern of rainfall, and frequent flooding greatly affected agriculture in the region which was consistently deficient. The existing irrigation facility was insufficient to support the needs of the growing population and the region remained economically backward. A CASE STUDY OF WESTERN GANDAK CANAL PROJECT 133

Efforts for improvement were started in 1947 by Dr. Rajendar Prasad, India’s first President. The activities included the building of embankments along rivers to provide flood protection, developing roads and raising the abady of marooned villages. Irrigation water was also made available to Gorakhpur and Deoria District through tubewells. A steam power house was built at Gorakhpur to provide electricity, which was also supplied for tubewell operations. The tubewells were expected to boost sugarcane yield and meet the needs of the factories, while providing the farmers cash incomes. There were as many as 14 sugar mills in Deoria and 12 in Gorakhpur District. A fertiliser factory was also built to support agriculture. However, farmers who were economically poor could not afford the cost of pumped water from the tubewells and protection provided against flooding was of a temporary nature. In 1964, the Government of Nepal and India signed the agreement for the building of the Gandak barrage at Valmikinagar (then known as Bhainsalotan). A barrage has been built for irrigation and power production. The barrage feeds the Gandak Canals which serve the command areas in the river’s western bank and the Triveni Canals system which serve the command area in the eastern bank.

WESTERN GANDAK CANAL PROJECT The Western Gandak Canal was built to irrigate the command area in Rapti Gandak doab in Uttar Pradesh, and the lower reaches of Gopalganj and Chapra in Bihar. On the left bank, the Tribeni Canal was built to irrigate Motihari District in Bihar. The canal has a maximum head discharge capacity if 447.41 cumec out of which Uttar Pradesh is allowed to use up to 226.72 cumec. In 1973, the cost of the Western Canal System was estimated to be 50.38 crore rupees. In 1978 the estimate was revised to 85.54 crore rupees. Since then it has been further revised to 151.2 crore rupees due to escalating material and labour charges. The gross command area of the Western Gandak Canal project in Gorakhpur and Deoria is 0.539 Mha. The proposed irrigation per year which is 75 per cent of the command area is 0.332 Mha per year. The proposed crop wise annual irrigation potential of the canal is: a) Kharif 40 per cent i.e. 0.177 Mha with duty of 857.5 and discharge required is 206.65 cumec. b) Rabi 20 per cent i.e. 0.0886 Mha with duty of 1,272 and discharge required is 64.53 cumec. c) Sugarcane 15 per cent i.e. 0.0665 Mha with duty of 771 and discharge required is 36.11 cumec. 134 SARIN, K. C.

The length of the irrigation canal is 3,299 km which includes the existing 168.17 km canals of the Narayani Canal System. The old canal has since been remodelled to meet the requirement of the new canal network. The revised project cost in 1978 was 85.54 crore rupees which provided for quick drainage from the rainfall in the irrigated areas as well as for evacuating the surplus if demand were to fall due to climatic vagaries. The drains were estimated to cost 17 crore rupees while benefiting about 1 Mha. land i.e. both irrigated as well as for other use.

CONSTRUCTION OF MAIN WESTERN GANDAK CANAL In 1972, the Western Gandak Canal (having a capacity of 447.4 cumec) was completed. The canal was prepared as a cut and fill balance earth section. A wide strip of land was acquired for constructing the canal. The proposal, however, received serious objective from the farmer due to a number of reasons. A campaign against the canal project was launched in the local papers. The dispute between the engineers engaged in canal construction and local political leaders was high on many occasions. The resentment arose due to following factors which were evident in other gravity canals and surface irrigation development projects. a) Banks along the canal would be waterlogged due to seepage and drains would render vast stretches of land along canals un-cultivable. Waterlogging would result in a number of adverse impacts such as

Arresting circulation of air resulting in putrefaction of roots Lower soil temperature retarding crop development Affects ground bacterial activity Makes shallow salts rise Delays ploughing and sowing and Encourages weed growth. b) The conditions during the Rabi crop would be worse as the water table during the rainy season were observed to be high, about 1.2 m to 3.05 m. c) The nature of land holdings in the area is highly skewed and fragmented with waterlogging, exacerbating, social tension. d) Loss of production due to waterlogging would be wide spread, as seepage from the canal would persist for a long time.

In the Gandak command area a particular soil locally called ‘Bhar’ is present which by nature tends to absorbs moisture from air and retains it for a longer period, further adding to waterlogging. The challenge was to convince the farmer and avoid waterlogging. A CASE STUDY OF WESTERN GANDAK CANAL PROJECT 135

The problem was successfully tackled by providing a lined canal which was placed below the normal ground level. Lined construction was proposed because it has the advantages of isolating groundwater from surface flows as well as conform to conjunctive uses. Also seepage loss from the canal was expected to reduced by providing the lined canal. In the case of the Gandak Canal the extent of the seepage loss was 18 per cent, which has been prevented. The saved water is available for irrigating additional areas. Placement of the canal below ground level was not straight forward. It necessitated work to be done below spring water level which added to the difficulty in digging and lining of the canal bed and sides. Even in the leanest season, the month of May, the spring level in the area did not go below 2.75 m to 4.75 m before the project was executed. A lined canal in wholly cut section has to tackle the following constraints. a) Operation of the canal is complex and it has to be kept either always full or partially full up to the bank spring level to save the bank and bottom lining from caving. Differential water pressure in canal and spring necessitates that the level be maintained. The water level has to be raised or lowered gradually to avoid caving. b) The water level has to be raised for discharging into off taking distribution systems, by building dwarf regulators’ across canals. c) Repairs and maintenance of canals is possible only when the spring level is manageable to empty the canal.

In the canal project, as an additional safeguard, vertical drainage was provided in the adjoining spoil bank. In the borrow area and canal banks, trees (eucalyptus) were planted, which has now grown into a lush vegetation belt. The forest has

protected the canal and appurtenant works from encroachment, controlled the groundwater table by increased evapo-transpiration, delayed seepage by litter from leaf fall, and thereby improved drainage underground and lastly, improved the aesthetics along the canal.

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM In the distribution system, however, a lined canal was economically not possible. In any case, there was little necessity for lining, as the use of distributary canals depend on demand. The problems to be encountered in the distributary canal and the solutions were as follows: 1. The rate of seepage in a new canal and allied distribution network is always high. After 136 SARIN, K. C.

running for a year or two, deposits from silt laden flow closes the pores in the canal bed and sides. The rate is then reduced, and lining is not required. 2. If in the field, distribution is not completed expeditiously. Wastage of water due to uneven application is further allowed to remain stagnant in un-cropped fields, the roads, pools, and sloshes. The construction of katcha guls in the years 76-77 was expected. The execution required considerable effort at the level of the identified micro watersheds. The saved surface water was used for utilisation in irrigating additional area. Moreover, there is a 25 per cent loss in katcha guls all over India, and is considered normal (in Rabi season). 3. Canal operation needs careful attention regarding weather conditions. Water should not be supplied unless there is a demand for water in the fields.

Table 1 shows the progress made in the development of the command area by completing the distribution system including the percentage of irrigation achieved against the project’s targets. a) Kharif irrigation varied between 17 to 32 per cent (average 23 per cent) against 40 per cent envisaged in the project. Pre-project cropped area was 34 per cent and 11 per cent. Reduction in Kharif irrigation seemed to have occurred due to the withdrawal of Kharif crops from areas to be utilised for Rabi crops. b) The sugarcane irrigation varied between 2 to 6 per cent 9average 4 per cent) against 15 per cent targeted in the project. 11.4 per cent area was cropped before the project. The reasons probably were due to the fact that the cropped area is in a saturated condition needs no irrigation. Crop area did not increase after the introduction of canal irrigation probably due to poor incentives by the sugar mills such as delayed payments etc. c) The Rabi irrigation recorded a marked increase, between 19 to 42 per cent (average 30 per cent) against the 20 per cent proposed in the project. Cropped area increased considerably from the pre-project coverage of 16.8 per cent due to the availability of water without deterrence to sub soil water table. d) The intensity of irrigation varied between 46 to 75 per cent (average 57 per cent) against the target of 75 per cent.

The difference in the percentages envisaged and achieved from year to year may be attributed to the following reasons.

1. During the initial years i.e. between 1972 and 1977, farmers were demoralised by the local leaders, by unfavourable propaganda by the press and also the initial hitch as they A CASE STUDY OF WESTERN GANDAK CANAL PROJECT 137

TABLE 1 PERFORMANCE OF WESTERN GANDAK CANAL

S.No. Year C.C.A. Covered with Percentage of Irrigation Achieved Total distribution system in ha x 104 Kharif Sugar Cane Rabi 1. 72-73 1.46 16 2 16 34 2. 73-74 1.48 19 5 35 59 3. 74-75 1.96 17 6 41 64 4. 75-76 2.25 26 6 42 74 5. 76-77 2.61 30 4.5 40.5 75 6. 77-78 3.00 26 4 35 65 7. 78-79 3.43 17 2 29 48 8. 79-80 3.54 32 4 32 68 9. 80-81 3.68 22 3 32 57 10. 81-82 3.79 17 4.5 31.5 53 11. 82-83 3.85 23 5 28 26 12. 83-84 3.99 23 3 25 51 13. 84-85 4.00 20 2 27 49 14. 85-86 4.15 26 3 87 56 15. 86-87 4.25 22.5 4.5 19 49 16. 87-88 4.38 23 4.5 25.5 53

were ignorant of the rules. This was suitably taken care of by the department. It was also reported that due to irrigation by canals, the groundwater table in the project area had generally risen by 0.2 m and 80 per cent of the area had a water table ranging between 0.5 m. below ground level as compared to 1.22 m to 3.05 m below the ground level as observed in 1973, when canal irrigation was not introduced. The reasons were investigated and the causes were found to be as follow:

i. Between 1968 and 1978 the average rainfall was 1,250 mm to 1,268 mm against the adopted rainfall of 1,183 mm to 1,208 mm based on existing observations. The rainfall was higher. ii. The arrangement for drainage was inadequate. Hence drains running for a length of 2,575 km were added in the revised project, along the distribution system. The cost was 17 crore rupees. iii. It was also felt that some more tubewells apart from existing state tubewells along the distribution system would have to be installed to take care of the balance in seepage water not taken care of by the surface drainage. So far, this necessity has 138 SARIN, K. C.

not been felt. 2. The project target for irrigation was achieved in the year 1979-1977. During 1978- 1988, the target could not be achieved. The reasons probably were: i. The Gandak Authority delegated the responsibility of gull construction to inexperienced hands. ii. Along with the construction in order to consolidate the land holdings the chakbandi operations weve also started which took a long time to complete due to legal tangles and affected whatever system was made. The gull system could not be user friendly for some time. The distribution canal system has, however, met the expectation of the users without causing any danger to the groundwater condition. This is due to the fact that the development of the command area and irrigation continued unabated during this period. The criticism is less now.

FUTURE PLANS FOR DEVELOPMENT UNDER CONJUNCTIVE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE Like other surface water irrigation canal projects, the output is expected to reach the target stipulated in the project. The preventive steps that need to be taken are critical. As far as Kharif is concerned, 17 per cent additional potential would not make a difference with the infrastructure already laid, and the same is with the sugarcane crop. But in Rabi, the envisaged potential of 20 per cent has already exceeded to 30 per cent and is likely to go up to 40 per cent or more. The challenge is therefore in finding extra water to augment the available supply and, at the same time, preventing water table rise and waterlogging. Shallow tubewells were installed in the tail end reaches of the canals and in areas where the water table was found to be high. While providing vertical drainage, shallow tubewells also augment the supply needed for additional irrigation needs. As the Gandak Command has sandy subsoil up to 2.5 m to 3 m below the surface, deep tubewells were not required. More than two hundred tubewells have been provided. An additional 100 tubewells have been installed and can be commissioned whenever the need arises. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 139-150

CONJUNCTIVE IRRIGATION MODEL IN THE BAGMATI BASIN

ARUN PRAKASH Professor Civil Engineering M.I.T., Muzaffarpur, Bihar

ABSTRACT

The Tarai region of the Bagmati Basin extends from Nepal to north Bihar. Though endowed with fertile land, favourable climate as well as ample surface and groundwater resources, the regions is economically backward. Agricultural production is consistently deficient due to uneven distribution of rainfall. The region also faces recurrent floods, waterlogging and drought. Rational and judicious use of surface and groundwater can improve the regionís economy. In order to understand how this could be achieved, a study was undertaken in a 75 km2 area of this basin in India. The objective of the study was to recommend optimal use of groundwater and surface water to maximise net-benefit of agricultural production. A multi-cell model was used for groundwater simulation and a Conjunctive Irrigation A model was developed which was solved by quadratic programming. Model results provided optimal use of groundwater and surface water to maximise net benefit from agricultural production for a given cropping intensity and pattern for a period of one year. Present cropping intensity is 100 per cent and water table fluctuates between 2.5 m to 3.5 m due to the high waterlogging problem. The cropping intensity can be optimally increased to 175 per cent by conjunctive irrigation applications. Ground-water use would also increase water table fluctuations up to 8.5 m thus reducing the waterlogging problem. The number of tube wells should be increased for higher groundwater withdrawal as per the model results. The recommended cropping pattern consists of wheat, gram, pulses and oil-seeds and vegetable in Rabi season, paddy and maize in both Garma and Kharif season and sugarcane as perennial crops.

INTRODUCTION The Bagmati is a perennial river which originates in Nepal, and flows through Bihar to join the Ganga. Of the total area of the basin, 54 per cent lies in Nepal while the rest lies in Bihar. People in the Tarai region of the basin depend on agriculture for their livelihood and subsistence. About 80 per cent area of the basin is culturable; having a high degree of fertility, with congenial agro-climate for year round cropping. Water is adequate in an aggregate sense, but its temporal distribution is skewed and mismatched with agricultural requirements. Due to high variation in the amount as well as occurrence of rainfall, agricultural production has been consistently deficient. As a result the region is economically backward. 140 PRAKASH, A.

The economy of the region can be improved by maximising agricultural production for which irrigation remains an essential input. In this region, surface water application only is an inappropriate strategy for irrigation development due to the following reasons. First, surface application raises the water table in the command area leading to waterlogging particularly when the command is in low lying regions. In the long-term, irrigation becomes counter-productive. Also, surface water application is incapable of achieving cropping intensity greater than 140 per cent. Furthermore, patches of land in the high sections of the canal command cannot be irrigated by gravity flow surface applications due to adverse gradient. Keeping in view the availability of surface and groundwater in the region, utilisation of groundwater for irrigation in conjunction with surface water will not only overcome the limitation of the latter, but will also provide an antidote for the ill effects created by surface water application. Conjunctive water use is highly prospective in view of the adequate availability of good quality groundwater at relatively low lifts and sufficient natural recharge to the aquifers. Conjunctive irrigation will maintain the water table within acceptable range as well as offer greater flexibility and control to the farmers in water supply and applications. With the aim to maximise agricultural production in the basin, groundwater simulation model and conjunctive irrigation model were developed for a case study area of 75 km2. As input data for the whole of the basin area was not available a smaller area was chosen. The model result is expected to be applicable to other parts of the basin in the Tarai on account of the similarity of relevant conditions.

CASE STUDY AREA The Bagmati Basin is comprised of several connected aquifers having large areas. Input data such as pumping rate, recharge, discharge in the river etc. are not available for the whole basin. Traditional groundwater simulation technique is not appropriate for those cases where the input data is only partly available. The lower end of the doab of the Bagmati and its tributary Lakhandei were selected as the case study area as shown in Figure 1. The selection of the case study area was based on the following considerations. a) The area should not be so large that the primary and secondary data required for the purpose cannot be obtained reliably within the time frame and other constraints. b) The area, however, should be large enough to be representative of the hydrologic, hydraulic, geo-hydrologic, soil and agricultural features of the basin.

The study area was further sub divided into a number of cells, as required for the groundwater simulation model adopted in this study as shown in Figure 1. The aquifer CONJUCTIVE IRRIGATION MODEL IN THE BAGMATI BASIN 141

(Scale - 1 CM = 1 KM)

v i

R i t a 14 Kathmandu Bagmai River m a g a 15 Lakhandai B r Lalbakeya River e iv River R i e d Indo-Nepal n a h Boundary Cell - 1 k a Cell - 2 L 10 STUDY AREA

6 BAGAMATI BASIN

Index map 11

Cell - 3

Legend 7 Aquifer Cell - 1 to 5 12 Constant Head Boundary Cell - 6 to 13 Cell - 4 Arbitrary Bounary Cell 14 to 15 8 River Boundary Cell

13 Cell - 5

FIGURE 1: DETAILS OF CASE STUDY AREAS AND CELL DECISIONS 142 PRAKASH, A.

cell numbers 1,2,3,4 and 5 have an area of 1,507.72 ha. 2,293.76 ha, 983.04 ha, 1,638.40 ha and 1,114.11 ha respectively.

GROUNDWATER SIMULATION MODEL The idea of a multi-cell model as presented by Bear et al. (1968) was used in the model’s hierarchy for determining boundary conditions for a particular cell where points of interest are located. Multi-cell model was used on the basic principle of water balance equation for a particular cell. The balance equation for a single cell area within an aquifer and surrounded by impervious boundaries is given by (Bear, 1972):

Q. t = [h(t + t)] A. S ...... (1)

Where, t = time period Q = Net inflow into the cell A = Area of cell h(t) = Average water level elevation in cell at time t. S = Average aquifer storativity of the cell

When the water balance principle is applied to multi-cell system, taking the inter- flow between adjacent cells into consideration, the following deference equation for the cell and m+1 period may be used (Yu and Haimes, 1974).

2 2 {Rl, r [h(l, i) - h(r, i) + Ul, r [h(l, i) - (h(r, i) ]}

= Vr [h(r, i + l) - h(r, i)] + Q(r, i) ..... (2)

W C W , K Where R = l, r l, r , l, r l, r l, r Ul, r = Ll, r 2Ll, r

Ar Sr , C = Kl, r (El, r - Fl, r) V = t l, r Where h(1, i) = Water table elevation at the 1th cell during the ith time step. Q(r, i) = Net outflow from the rth cell during the ith time step.

Wl, r = Length of the perpendicular sector associated with the segment between cells 1 and r.

Ll, r = Distance between center of nodes 1 and r.

Kl, r = Hydraulic conductivity averaged between cells 1 and r.

El, r = Effective aquifer depth average between cells 1 and r.

Fl, r = Elevation at the top of the aquifer averaged between cells 1 and r. th Ar = Area of the r cell th Sr = Storage coefficient averaged over the r cell CONJUCTIVE IRRIGATION MODEL IN THE BAGMATI BASIN 143

The multi-cell model provides approximate inflows and outflows for each cell as well as water level in the cell during different crop seasons.

APPLICATION OF SIMULATION MODEL TO CASE STUDY AREA The multi-cell model discussed was applied to the case study area for predicting drawdown in different cells after each crop season based on pumping data obtained by field survey of the area. Recharge to aquifers were estimated by use of a formula based on vertical leakage through deposits (Walton, 1962) and the value of S and T were obtained by pumping test data in the study area. Reliability of the model was tested by comparing the observed pre-monsoon/post monsoon differences in water table obtained from a research project of Center for Water Resources Studies, (CWRS) Bihar College of Engineering, Patna. The results from the simulation model are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1 COMPARISON OF WATER T ABLE FLUCTUATION

Cell No. 1985 1986 1987 Observed Simulation Observed Simulation Observed Simulation value (m) model (m) value (m) model (m) value (m) model (m) 1 3.08 2.82 3,25 2.84 2.80 2,85 2 3.24 4.01 3.33 4.05 3.45 4.05 3 2.93 3.13 3.21 3.21 3.17 3.24 4 3.20 3.46 3.12 3.50 3.47 3.53 5 - 4.80 2.81 4.77 2.95 4.79

Except in some cases, model results were closely comparable to the observed values. The existing difference may be due to error in estimating, pumping and recharge rates. This model was helpful in the formulation of conjunctive irrigation model in respect of draw-down corresponding to the unit pumping and the value was determined corresponding to one ham pumping during a crop season for different cell areas which is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 DRAWDOWN VALUE FOR UNIT PUMPING

Cell No. 1 2 3 4 5 Vallue of d* in meter .0598 .0590 .100 0.082 0.177

* d is draw-down corresponding to one ham pumping during a crop season in the different cell areas. 144 PRAKASH, A.

CONJUNCTIVE IRRIGATION MODEL The study area was subdivided into five aquifer cells. Each cell had a number of shallow tube wells and stream reaches for irrigation water application. Users in a cell may irrigate by operating the tube well, by direct pumping from the river to the field or by diverting water through temporary inundation canals. The objective function was aimed at maximising the net benefit. The gross benefit in terms of agriculture output was due to the quantity of water consumed for irrigation for a given cropping intensity and cropping pattern over a period of one year both from groundwater and surface water. The cost associated with water supply was incurred on account of the tube well operation in the case of groundwater use, direct pumping or diverting water from river in the case of surface water uses. The objective function is formulated as:

JJJ Net Benefit Z = KJ AJ (XJ + YJ)CJ - PJ XJ (HJ + DJ) - SJ YJ ..... (3) J = l = J = l Where, th KJ = Coefficient relating yield or J crop to irrigation requirement. th AJ = Area assigned for J crop th XJ = Quantity of water in ham pumped from tubewell for J crop th YJ = Quantity of water in ham supplied from streams for J crop th CJ = Price of crop in Rs. Per tonne for J crop. th PJ = Pumping cost of water in Rs. Per ham per metre lift of water for J crop th HJ = Initial lift in m under steady state condition for J crop

DJ = Drawdown in meter for crop dXJ

SJ = Cost of water supply in Rs. Per ham from steam for crop season with nominal lift and without lead

Value of XJ and YJ are to be calculated, such that net benefit is maximised subject to the following constraints.

1) Minimum water requirement to met

XJ + YJ > RJ….. (4) th Where RJ is the minimum water requirement for J crop. 2) Pumping capacity restrictions J XJ < Qmax ..... (5) J = l Where Q is the maximum quantity of water in ham that can be pumped in a year as per safe yield concept. CONJUCTIVE IRRIGATION MODEL IN THE BAGMATI BASIN 145

3) Surface water supply limit of the different crop season

a) JR YJ

Where W1 = Maximum water supply available from stream in Rabi Season JR = Number of crops in Rabi season.

b) JG YG < W2 ...... (7) J = l

Where W2 = Maximum water supply available from stream in Garma Season JG = Number of crops in Garma Season.

JK c) YJ < W3 ...... (8) J = l

Where W3 = Maximum water supply available from stream in Kharif Season JK = Number of crops in Kharif Season.

d) J Y < D ...... (9) J = l J max

Where Dmax = Maximum drawdown permissible in the area.

The objective function as given by equation (3) subject to constraint equations (4)- (9) is solved by quadratic programming model for different cropping patterns A, B and C and for different cropping intensities varying from 100 per cent to 200 per cent. The cropping patterns are as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3 CROPPING PATTERN

Cropping pattern Types of Crop A Wheat in Garma and Potato in Rabi Season, Paddy and Maize in both Garma and Kharif season and Sugarcane as perennial crop. B Pulses and Oilseeds in Rabi season in addition to all crops of cropping pattern A. C Vegetable in Rabi season in addition to all crops of cropping pattern B and pattern A.

Crop water requirement (in cm) was used in the model analysis as per usual practice in north Bihar which is shown in Table 4. 146 PRAKASH, A.

TABLE 4 CROP WATER REQUIREMENT IN CMS

Month Rabi Season Nov. ñ Feb. Nov-oct Garma Season Kharif Season Mar-June July-Oct Wheat Gram Oilseeds Vegetables Potato Sugarcane Paddy Maize Paddy Maize Nov. 12 10 12.5 15 25 10 Dec. 11 8 5 8 15 10 Jan. 12 6 10 7 20 - Feb. 12 6 12.5 10 15 20 Mar. 20 10 10 Apr. 30 20 15 May 25 20 20 June 25 65 15 July 25 20 Aug. 15 10 Sept. 15 05 Oct 10 20 Total5030404075150115607535

Cost analysis of pumping groundwater and surface water supply was done and found to be Rs. 150.00 per ham meter lift and Rs. 700.00 per ha, in Rabi and Kharif season and Rs. 1,300.00 per ham in Garma season respectively. Similarly, cost analysis of different crops was done taking crop water requirement as shown in Table – 3 and assuming a suitable price of different crops. Net value of crop per ham supply of water was calculated. Objective function as stated by equation 3 was transformed to quadratic form. J Z = J J (XJ +YJ(VJ- PJXJ(Hk +dXJ) - SJYJ ...... (10) J = l J = l J = l

th Where VJ = Net value of J crop in Rs per ham supply of water.

Hk = Initial lift for different seasons k = 1,3 represents for Rabi, Garma and Kharif Seasons respectively.

Quadratic programme of equation (10) subject to constraint equations (4) to (9) was run for three cropping patterns A, B and C for cropping intensity varying from 100 per cent to 200 per cent. The model results for cropping pattern A, Cell no. 1, cropping intensity 150.4 per cent is given in Table 5.

INTERPRETATION OF RESULT Based on the model results the following graphs were drawn for cell no.1. 1. Cropping intensity – GW use shown in Figure 2. CONJUCTIVE IRRIGATION MODEL IN THE BAGMATI BASIN 147

TABLE 5 MODEL RESULT OF QUADRATIC PROGRAMME FOR CROPPING PATTERN A AND 150.4 PER CENT CROPPING INTENSITY

Crop Area in ha Total Water Groundwater Surface water requirement in ham allocation in ham allocation in ham Wheat 500 250.00 22.296 227.703 Gram 25 7.5 7.5 Potato 75 56.25 22.296 33.953 Sugarcane 70 105.00 5.574 99.425 Paddy (G) 40 46.00 24.916 21.083 Maize (G) 40 24.00 24.000 - Paddy (K) 1250 937.00 22.296 915.203 Maize (K) 40 14.00 5.574 8.425

Maximum net benefit Z = Rs. 8,948,843

2. Cropping intensity – SW use shown in Figure 3. 3. Cropping intensity – Net benefit shown in Figure 4.

The following observations can be made from the above graphs. a. Groundwater withdrawal increases with higher values of cropping intensity byt it becomes constant beyond 175 per cent cropping intensity. Groundwater withdrawal beyond 175 per cent cropping intensity is uneconomical as the cost of pumping groundwater increases with increase in lift. b. Groundwater withdrawal in the cases of cropping patterns B and C for the same

250

225

200

175

150 Legend

125 Cropping Pattern A Cropping Pattern B

Ground Water Sithdrawal in Ham Ground Water Cropping Pattern C 100 100 120 140 160180 200 220 % Crop Intensity

FIGURE 2. CROP INTENSITY ñ SW USE OF CELL NO. 1 148 PRAKASH, A.

FIGURE 3. CROP INTENSITY ñ GW USE OF CELL NO. 1

FIGURE 4. CROP INTENSITY ñ NET BENEFIT OF CELL NO. 1

cropping intensity increases in comparison to cropping pattern A, due to the Pulses and Oil-seeds in cropping pattern B. Pulses and Oilseeds and Vegetables in cropping pattern C are additional crops grown in Rabi Season when lift irrigation is dominant. c. Surface water supply increases with the increase in cropping intensities but its value decreases in case of cropping pattern B and C in comparison to cropping pattern A for the same cropping intensity. In cropping pattern B and C additional crops are grown in Rabi season when groundwater is more dependable compared to surface water. d. The present groundwater withdrawal in the different cell areas for one year period compared with model result for 100 per cent cropping intensity for different cropping patterns is shown in Table 6. CONJUCTIVE IRRIGATION MODEL IN THE BAGMATI BASIN 149

It is observed that present groundwater use in different cells was small in comparison to the model results for the same cropping intensity. This value will be still higher for other cropping intensities.

TABLE 6 COMPARISON OF GROUNDWATER USE FOR 100 PERCENT CROPPING INTENSITY

Cell No. Present use Model result in ham in ham Cropping Pattern AB C 1. 67.770 123.352 129.252 165.474 2. 106.366 134.346 144.346 179.890 3. 45.457 70.198 76.198 94.864 4. 83.207 97.726 98.386 113.441 5. 56.660 71.052 78.572 99.138 e. At present the groundwater table in the observation wells located at different places in the cell areas fluctuates between 2.5 to 3.5 meters. If the optimal policies obtained by model result for use of groundwater are followed in the basin, then the fluctuation may go up to 8.5 meters. This will reduce waterlogging problems to a great extent. f. Net benefits increase as cropping intensity increases but the rate of increase of net benefit was somewhat lower, beyond 175 per cent cropping intensity. g. As per optimal policy of conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water, there was no increase in groundwater use with increase in cropping intensity beyond 175 per cent indicating that there will be an increase only in surface water. The rate of change of net benefit decreased beyond 175 per cent cropping intensity which indicates that operation cost of only surface water is higher than conjunctive use, hence it is concluded that 175 per cent cropping intensity is optimal. h. Net benefit from cropping pattern C was higher in comparison to cropping patterns B and A, hence cropping pattern C is recommended for the basin area.

CONCLUSION Conjunctive Irrigation model was developed and applied to a case study area in the Bagmati basin for optimal use of groundwater and surface water to maximise agricultural production. One hundred seventy five per cent cropping intensity is recommended to be practised against the existing intensity of about 100 per cent. A comparative study to obtain optimal cropping pattern indicates that wheat, gram, pulses and oilseeds, vegetable in Rabi season, paddy and maize in both Garma and Kharif season and sugarcane as perennial crop should be used. However, further studies are required. In any case, multi-cell model for groundwater simulation can be applied on a large-scale, to complex water resources systems in which input data are not available for the whole basin. 150 PRAKASH, A.

REFERENCES Bear, J. 1972: Dynamics of Fluids in Porus Medium, American Elsevier, New York. Bear, J. D. Zaslavsuy and S. Irmay 1968: Physical Principles of Water, Percolation and Seepage, UNESCO, Paris 465 pp. Government of Bihar, Bagmati Project Report Irrigation Department Haimes, Y.Y. Hierarchial Analysis of Water Resources System, MC. Graw Hill International Book Company. James, L. Kuestar, MIZE. Optimisation Technique with Fortran. Prakash, A. 1990: Optimal Strategy for Irrigation Development in Bagmati Basin Ph. D. Thesis of Bihar University. Walton, W.C. 1962: Selected Analytical Methods for Well and Aquifer Evaluation. Illinois State Water Serv. Bulletin. 49,81 pp. Yosef, C.C. 1975: Application of the Superposition Approach to the modelling and management of ground and surface water resources Ph. D. Thesis Western University, USA. Yu, W. and Haimes Y.Y. 1974: Multilevel optimisation for Conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water. Water Resources Res, 10, pp. 625-636. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 151-157

ISSUES OF IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT IN NEPAL

DAMODAR BHATTARAI Senior Division Engineer Water and Energy Commission Secretariat

ABSTRACT

Irrigation practices in Nepal have ceased to be productive under the stress of state-led development initiative which has emphasised on expansion of cultivated area as its yardstick of achievement. Resource conservation strategy that focuses on integrated treatment of land, water and forest essential.

INTRODUCTION Supporting food production by capturing water and applying it through canals has ancient history in Nepal. Water management has been an important element in the evolution of the traditional society which has occurred in a social context emerging out of a given institutional framework defined by the physical, socioeconomic and political factors. Using indigenous technology perfected through generations, these irrigation schemes maintained a balance between food production and the existing natural resource base. Many of these schemes are operational even today. As the demand for food has increased with the growth in population, systems applying techniques of modern hydraulics have been built. Irrigation development has also received attentions for generating additional revenue from land. In the three and half decades of planned efforts, the country has put in an equivalent of US $ 3 billion in irrigation and agricultural expansion 9Pudel, 1994). Between 1984/85 to 1990, substantial investments, to the tune of 1.5-1.7 per cent of the Gross Domestic Products (GDP), have been made in developing large scale irrigation (IMP, 1990). At the least, in a physical sense, the efforts have produced results. From 6,228 ha in 1957, the area under irrigation has expanded to 179,337 ha in 1990 mainly through state interventions. As of mid 1988, total irrigated area in the Tarai was 725,000 ha of which agency-assisted Farmer Managed Irrigation System consisted of 161,00 ha and other FMIS 314,000 ha. In the hill and mountains, the total area under irrigation was 208,000 ha of which 25,000 ha was agency assisted farmer built schemes. The area irrigated by farmer built schemes was 168,000 ha (IMP, 1990) The expansion however, has been without visible success. The country, which till 1980 was a net food exporter has become deficit in food production. In aggregate sense, 152 BHATTARAI, D.

over the last two decades, the food production growth has averaged 2.3 per cent. The successive economic surveys attribute this growth mainly to expansion of the cultivated area. Growth in productivity has not been forthcoming, which also shows erratic symptoms of sluggish increase, and even decline depending upon the capriciousness of the rains. The monsoon, even today, remains the dominant factor that determines agricultural output. Even though the sector accounts for three fifths of the country’s GDP and engages ninety per cent of its population, the declining trend continues. The investments made in the agricultural/irrigation sector in the successive plan periods have not yielded due returns. A thorough analysis is needed to identify the causes and prescribe implementable policy instruments for rectifying the trend, and changes are required. These must be applicable at the farm level.

IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT

Policy Environment The programme for developing irrigation in Nepal has focussed on construction of large new irrigation projects in the Tarai, small and medium irrigation projects in the Hill and Mountain Districts, and assistance to FMIS in all regions of the country (PDSP, 1990). Over the years, however, there has been a gradual shift away from the ‘construction’ approach. ‘Software’ sides of development has been recognised to be important component. The shift reflect the realisation that provision of ‘hardware’ alone will not generate the desired level of benefits from investment in irrigation. Participation of beneficiaries in all phases of irrigation development, from planning to operation has been recognised to be crucial. Greater emphasis is now being accorded to management and agricultural support programmes, on demand-driven low cost assistance to FMIS, and on development of shallow tubewells in the Tarai. These elements have been included in the new government policy (MWR, 1992) which states some of its objective as :

To increase agricultural production in keeping with the perspectives of technical, economic, institutional and environmental sustainability of irrigation projects thereby meeting the water requirements of the farmers’ fields. To continue to promote increased users’ participation in the construction, maintenance and operation of irrigation projects thereby decreasing government responsibility for the same. To make sustainable and extensive the tradition of construction and management of projects built by farmers. ISSUES OF IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT IN NEPAL 153

In spite these policy prescription, problems exists, mostly at implementation levels. Engineers and overseer posted to the district offices functions merely as accountants and site-foremen pre-condition to meet the demands of HMG/N’s financial regulations. The outputs are measured in terms of schemes completed, hectares temporarily irrigated and on the rupees spent, but not the processes instituted and sustained. Little gestation period is provided for interaction with the farmers and the beneficiary community. Though participatory approach is endorsed by the government, its implementation remains only on paper. The Irrigation Line of Credit (ILC), for example, has found implementation difficulties with the participatory process, and is using the terminology in name only, having reverted back to traditional practices of using contractors to build and meet the targets. The programme was originally designed as a comprehensive package of assistance comprising of social, physical, environmental, legal procedural and organisational aspects rather than a narrow set of design and construction activities for irrigation works (Reidinger and Gautam, 1992). The Sector Programme today shows no signs of being institutionalised in the major irrigation investment initiatives. More worrying is that the donors, though aware of this entrenched reluctance, are unable to bring about change as the pressure increases to spend the allocated money before the fiscal year ends by rapidly completing the schemes. The result has been devising subterfuges to get the farmers’ contributing portion of the development work to be executed by contractors.

Constraints Past efforts have brought to light severe systemic deficiencies due to physical factors as well as institutional shortcomings. The natural processes which arise out of the physical context of the region bring high uncertainty. Due to the topography, spatial and temporal variation in precipitation and run-off is high. The geo-physical setting and geomorphological characteristics of the rivers introduce additional complexities. Erosion, land degradation and productivity loss there of are increasing. In many cases, schemes have triggered environmental disruptions rather than bring about positive changes. Landslides by poorly aligned canal and high seepage rate lead to more adverse impacts than enhance the food production system. Excessive sediment load, bank caving, and shifting river courses continue to affect schemes in both the hills and Tarai. Most of the schemes are unable to maintain assured water supply to the intended command are due to improper management and poor infrastructure. Inadequate extension services, limited farmers support, and poor co-ordination between irrigation and other agencies are factors that further lower performances. Technological fixes ill-suited to the environment, and a development approach that disregards the anthropological, social and culture factors of the community have further led to unsustainability. Technological fixes also emanate from the nature of training. Most of Nepal’s civil engineers, trained as they 154 BHATTARAI, D.

are in Indian or Russian Universities, are accustomed to plains technology and find it difficult to adapt to the challenges of the hills. Unfortunately, the concept and theories developed in the plains have little relevance in the hills and mountainous regions. For example, the Lacey’s equations for the design of stable regime canal may not be applicable in the conditions of the hills. Replicating lowland techniques in the hills has also resulted in a situation that is generally one of financial and environmental ruin. Indiscriminate use of explosives, over-cutting of benches to meet the ‘lowland’ requirement of a box-section and the over-use of cement and steel to the neglect of local skills and materials has meant that irrigation schemes normally fail after one or two monsoons, either due to flooding or landslide (Baker, 1992). The biggest mis-judgement in the development efforts perhaps has been the disregard for the role of traditional and social organisations. Lack of farmers’ involvement in the construction continues in many ongoing projects. Insensitive outside assistance, in many cases, has eroded local management and resource mobilisation capability while perpetuating dependency on external support. Allocation and distribution of water has been inequitable and systemic maintenance differed, resulting in generally poor performance of schemes. The consequences have been lowered productivity. Poor institutional capacity have further added to the complexity while lack of social consideration has meant that farmers have little or no opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. The consequent operational and managerial challenges as a result appear to be insurmountable. Lack of resources, and poor level of skills introduce additional limitations. Tackling these need recourse to an interdisciplinary approach internalising the local strength that has sustained communities in the harsh environment of the region over the millennia. In recent times, the balance has been further disturbed aggravating the drudgery of daily survival. The resulting pressure has led to encroachment of more forest and marginal lands as farmer abandon a new land brought under cultivation after few seasons. Declining productivity in the hills is exacerbated by fuel-wood depletion, lack of fodder for livestock which also provide manure for agriculture. As a result, distress migration is widespread, and the hills are being drained of its active population and leadership affecting development both in terms of resources and skills. The Tarai plains, on the other hand, have been subject to high population pressure. Between 1971-81, the Tarai experiences an average addition of 70 persons on each square kilometre of land (Shrestha, 1993) putting further demand on irrigation infrastructure and additional food production. The recent Irrigation Policy shows some understanding of the criticality of the issues by stressing on technical, economic, institutional and environmental sustainability of irrigation projects, but the prescriptions provide appear to be rather too idealistic. Until more detailed guidelines are developed and applied, organisations both at the governmental ISSUES OF IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT IN NEPAL 155

and farmers level are weak and do not exhibit complementarity and synchronicity that would be expected to them. Inter line-agency co-ordination, agricultural support and extension systems have yet to form part of an integrated package as the ministries responsible for agricultural development and irrigation development have separate mandate and often-conflicting targets.

AGRICULTURAL-ENVIRONMENT: INTERLINKAGES Irrigation development is equated with project construction emanating from the ‘traditionalist’ engineering notion. On the other hand, there are the ‘anthropologists’ who emphasise the need for the farmers to become involved in the development and ownership of the scheme. Irrigation management in Nepal is striking a balance between the two. The management also requires tackling two complementary issues that emanate from the exogenous and the indigenous factors. The first is the impact that the exogenous factor have on the project, while the second refers the impacts brought about by the schemes. The linkages between Agriculture, Forestry and Irrigation are recognised to be crucial. The link or lack thereof between accelerated erosion in the hills and mountains, deforestation and forest degradation in some areas are now better understood (Ives and Masserli, 1989). While accelerated erosion can and does occur as a result of deforestation, the effects are probably localised. Sediment load in Nepal’s rivers if attributed to the geological processes, independent of forest cover. The impact of forest degradation relates mainly to the interaction of livestock and agriculture. Long-term viability of agriculture in the hills is threatened by ignoring forest, because forests play important part in traditional farming. This understanding essentially comes from the lessons of traditional farmer managed irrigation systems (FMIS) including their contribution to agricultural production. Intensification of irrigated agriculture through rehabilitation and improvements to FMIS has been well established as examples of various traditional Rajkulos and others have shown. The strength of an irrigation system with scarce resources that performs well is its management, and selected interventions to improve the physical system (Yoder and Upadhyaya, 1987). Government agencies usually consider physical improvements of a system more important and ignore the ‘non-structural’ issues. FMIS have proved that even weak physical structures can be compensated for by strong and disciplined irrigation organisations (Pradhan, 1989). How can the declining trend in agriculture and the irrigation sub-sector be reversed is the major questions which, left unattended, may have disastrous consequences. Fundamental shift is needed in the way the problem is approached. These require changes in the political, institutional, technical and planning outlook. Newer approaches such as water harvesting, compost, use of bacteria culture, terrace improvement of micro 156 BHATTARAI, D.

hydropower and ropeways need to be taken up to support such initiatives. Irrigation management should e also integrated with the use of vegetative techniques/bio-engineering measures for slope protection, landslide stabilisation and river bank protection.

CONCLUSION For the dominantly agriculture based population of Nepal, irrigation development and management remain critical. This is because employment opportunities outside of agriculture have remained more or less stagnant over the years in spite of the thrust on industrial development. Continued reliance on improving the agriculture sector is hence unavoidable. As agriculture is still subject to the vagaries of the monsoon, challenges to meet the food security of an increasing population is important. The challenges are further accentuated due to the degradation of the natural resource base. Emphasis on irrigation development only will neither be sustainable nor reduce degradations. Mere focus on increased water application, slope protection or bed and bank stabilisation, is unlikely to be productive. Clearly, the need is for an approach that integrates irrigation development with livestock management, including regulated fodder and forest resource uses. The approach must build on what the farmers already know, and do. The changes need policy level interventions that ascribe a facilitating role of the government as opposed to an interventionist one. For a country 70 per cent of whose development budget come from external assistance the specter of debt-trap has started to loom large with the external debt approaching the annual GDP. While paucity of funds may be a major factor, institutional weaknesses and lack of will to bring about changes are major stumbling blocks. Lack of political empowerment at the community and beneficiary levels impedes what Nepal could productively harness; manpower and water. To bring about the transition from the state of ‘dependency development’ to a ‘resources conservation approach’ far reaching improvements would be needed at operational levels. A resolute expression of social will power is required.

REFERENCES Baker, C., 1992: Why cannot Farmers Build Their Own Irrigation Schemes? An unpublished paper presented in part at a U.N. Development Forum Session. Ives, J. D. and Masserli, B., 1989: The Himalayan Dilemma: Reconciling Development and conservation. MWR, 1992: Irrigation Policy 2049, Ministry of Water Resources, HMG/Nepal. NPC, 1991: Approach to the Eighth Plan, 1992-97, National Planning Commission, Nepal. Ong, S. E., 1981: Nepal’s Experience in Hill Agricultural Development - A Seminar Survey; Ministry of Food and Agriculture. PDSP, 1990: Master Plan for Irrigation Development in Nepal, Cycle II, Main Report, Planning ISSUES OF IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT IN NEPAL 157

and Design Strengthening Project, UNDP (NEP/85/013) World Bank, CIWEC/East Consult (P.) Ltd. Poudel, S. N., 1994: Sustainability of Irrigation Infrastructure Development in Nepal, 4th National Convention of Engineers, 15-16 May, Kathmandu. Pradhan, P., 1989: Patterns of Irrigation Organisation in Nepal, IIMI. Reidinger, R. and Gautam, U., 1992: Promoting Private Irrigation Development: The Irrigation Sector Programme Experience in Nepal, Proceedings Water Forum 1992, Irrigation and Drainage Session, EE, HY, IR, WRDW/ASCE. Shrestha, D. P., 1993: Population Growth Patterns in Nepal 1971-1981, A District Level Analysis Bal Kumar K. C. (ed.) , Population Dynamics in Nepal and Related Issues of Sustainable Development, Kathmandu. Yoder, R. and Upadhyaya, S. B., 1987: Irrigation Management in Nepal, Research Papers from a National Seminar, Bharatpur, Nepal. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 159-166

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RENISSANCE THROUGH DYNAMIC INDO-NEPAL CO-OPERATION IN WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

U.K. VERMA1 Engineer-in-chief and Special Secretary (Retd) Government of Bihar, Patna

ABSTRACT

Physical, hydrological and Political constraints have led to slow utilisation of water resources in north Bihar and Nepal. Morphological factors and high silt content have affected performance of the Kosi and Gandak projects, the two major Indo-Nepal co-operative efforts. These factors need to be understood better and managed effectively in future Indo-Nepali co-operative effort. This paper recounts the authorís experience in planning, design, execution, operation and maintenance of water resources projects in India. They are presented in the context of the need for sharing scientific and technical experiences to enhance mutual trust and confidence. The economy of the northern Ganga basin, which has a high population pressure, will not be able to support itself without harnessing the regionís water wealth. The paper urges for a dynamic co-operation at all levels to extricate the regionís economy from its present state of poverty.

INTRODUCTION India possesses vast water resources. From the Himalaya in the north to the tropical regions of the central plain and south, the availability of resources is highly diverse both in space and time. While some regions are rich in one form of resource such as coal, others are rich in water resources. Where other forms of energy do in exist, hydropower has been developed as the source of energy. The Deccan region in south India is one such region. Devoid of any coal filed, the region is traversed by several rivers that drain the ranges of the western and eastern ghats offering immense hydropower potential. The reflection of the potential available in the region is evident from late Sir Visweswaraya’s comment "what a tremendous waste of water power" during his visit to the Jog Falls in the Cauvery basin in the 1880s. In the years since, several hydropower projects have been built in the region. In several other regions of India where water is available, the resources has been harnessed to varying extent. Rivers like the Damodar, Subarnarekha, Chambal, and Sone have developed for energy production and deriving other benefits like irrigation an flood mitigation. In Bihar, however, the situation is different. The state does not constitute a 160 VERMA, U. K.

homogenous entity and has two distinct regions divided by the Ganga as south and north Bihar. Many rivers of the south Bihar have been harnessed. One such river, the Damodar which flows through the coal belt of south Bihar, brought recurrent flood to the plains in West Bengal. To mitigate the problem, a multi-purpose development plan was prepared for the Damodar basin, following the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Model in the United States. Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC), a decentralised public agency, was enacted by the Indian Parliament in July 1948. The objective of the plan was for improving water supply and drainage, generation and transmission of hydro and thermal power, flood control, improvement of flow in the Hoogly River for navigation, afforestation and control of soil erosion, promotion of public health and agro-industrial economy of the basin. The Governments of India, Bihar and West Bengal were the three participants of the DVC initiative. Under the initiative, two major dam/reservoir projects have been built at Maithon and Panchet. The reservoirs provide flood mitigation and irrigation benefits in West Bengal. The region north of the Ganga continues to be mired in poverty and destitution. Contiguous regions in Nepal as well as eastern Uttar Pradesh, also continue to be impoverished. The Bihar plains have no coal deposits, hence opportunities of developing thermal stations do not exist. Due to flat topography, development of hydropower is also not feasible even though the region is amply endowed with surface water. Lack of energy do not permit widespread use of groundwater which is available in abundance in the region. Potential for generating hydropower from the Himalayan tributaries of the Ganga exist. Irrigation and flood control are the other benefits that would result from such development initiatives. These benefits can bring about positive changes in the economy of the entire region. Without harnessing the Himalayan waters for optimising agriculture production and agro-industries, the economic recovery in Gangetic plain would be infeasible. Only limited development of hydropower has taken place, mostly to meet domestic requirements of the countries in the region. Only a small fraction of the potential hydel power has been developed in the Himalayan catchments of Nepal and Uttar Pradesh. Nepal has continued the policy of building smaller hydropower projects with international assistance to meet its internal energy requirements. That the Himalayan water resources can bring economic emancipation in the hills and plains, however, has received attention in the past. But efforts to ensure co-operation between India and her neighbours have not been productive. Though India has made a beginning in hydropower development in co-operation with Bhutan, co-operation with Nepal has not been fruitful. Even implementation of systems such as flood forecasting and warning systems which were agreed to be installed in the 1980s as a co-operative measure have been delayed. SOCIOECONOMIC RENISSANCE THROUGH DYNAMIC INDO-NEPAL COOPERATION 161

CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT To develop the region, by harnessing the Himalayan water resources, co-operation with Nepal is a pre-requisite. All the rivers originate in Nepal, where the major project sites are located. Since the co-operation of Nepal is important, so it the need to understand its perception. To understand its views in the context of future co-operative efforts, some discussion on the three water sharing agreements between two countries is relevant. The first agreement between British India and Nepal was to implement the Sarada barrage, the Mahakali (Sarada) river located in Nepal-India border. The Agreement was signed in 1921. The project was built to provide irrigation water to command areas in Uttar Pradesh with some provision for irrigating land in Nepal. In the 1950s, the command area on Nepalese side was mostly under forest cover and irrigation development could be done only later. The Sarada barrage was damaged in 1956 and had to be reconstructed. The author had an opportunity to visit the barrage site in 1957. The first co-operative effort between Independent India and Nepal was the Kosi barrage project. Initially, the proposal was to build a multipurpose high dam in the Kosi to provide flood benefit, irrigation and generate 1,800 MW power. The proposal was floated since 1940s and investigated by the CWPC. Only after the devastating floods in Kosi plain, when people were forced to spend several days on tree tops, were the plans for Kosi barrage expedited, culminating in the 1954 Kosi Agreement between the two governments. The high dam project had to be deferred in view of the uncertainties about the stability of a high dam in one of the active seismic zones in the world. In the early fifties, stability of rock fill dams in high seismic regions was a major unknown issue and the technology was not developed. Even after consulting with American experts the proposal could not be taken further. Efforts for building a dam in the Kosi has, however, continued even after the 1954 Agreement was made. In 1956, a team of engineers from the Kosi project initiated reconnaissance of the Sun Kosi River from Tribeni where the tributary meets Arun and Tamur. Inaccessibility and difficult terrain, however, did not allow explorations. Nevertheless, in the 1950s co-operation in some additional areas was continued. A seismological observatory was established at Barahakshetra by the Indian Government. Also a pilot research project was set up at Chatara by the Government of India to initiate research activities for undertaking soil conservation measures in the Kosi hills. The proposal for the Kosi high dam project has again been revised. The Kosi project aimed to control the river spill moderating flood gradient from 3.5 feet per mile at Chatara where river comes to the plain to a slope of 2.5 feet per mile by the barrage. The design and construction of the barrage was a tremendous challenge in the fifties. The nature of the river and the silt that it carried greatly complicated the design. Detailed model studies of the Kosi stretch from Chatara to Badlaghat were undertaken to understand river behaviour. The objective of the model study was also to fix the barrage 162 VERMA, U. K.

site, its axis such that an adequate length of straight approach of flow from the curve at Belka Hill to the barrage was provided. The study was undertaken at CWPRS Poona. The river bed condition, nearest to the size of Kosi was produced by using sands obtained from Guregaon. In the barrage design, provision was also made for diverting about 40,000 cusec in the old channels of the Kosi. The option was rejected due to lack of adequate silt control measures in the barrage. Without proper control of sediment, it was felt, the old channels also would develop oscillating tendencies like the main channel, lead to bank erosion and affect human habitat. A solution was sought by providing drainage, drainage cum anti-flood sluices in the embankments. Waterlogging was meant to be arrested by pumping, which also was expected to optimise agricultural production through conjunctive water use. Embankment in the Kosi project however, was intended to provide only a short- term flood control measure. The barrage had no effective mechanism for silt regulation, and control of river morphology within the embankments. The river, even today, oscillates between the embankment. The river has caused erosion of the embankments, and banks between Belka Hill and the end of western afflux bund. In spite of control measure, that are annually implemented, breaches in the embankments are frequent, damaging habitats and fertile agricultural lands. People outside the embankments live in constant fear while the maintenance cost continues to rise. Erosion by the river both within and outside the embankment continues to pose a threat and its control is a challenge. Though an ejector has been provided in the main canal of the Kosi, ingress of silt has lowered the capacity. As a result performance of the Kataiya power house has been significantly lowered. Sedimentation has also affected performance of the Chatara canal in Nepal, ever since it was built. Irrigation application in the command area of the canal has been unstable. The drainage sluices in the embankments also get choked on the river side every year due to silt deposits. Waterlogging in the command area as a result has increased affecting the overall ecology of the region. Though north Bihar has a good aquifer, groundwater use has not been possible due to lack of energy for pumping. As such groundwater use is not possible to make-up for the short fall in surface irrigation. The benefits accruing from flood relief and irrigation in the Kosi and Gandak projects have not matched the population growth in the region. Also benefits have been lowered by sedimentation and unforeseen ecological consequences in the river reaches and the command areas. Resentment against the Kosi project has grown not only in Nepal, but also in India. The major factors that have led to this situation are

i) High sedimentation, geographical limitations and political differences. ii) Lack of energy sources for optimal development of agro-industrial economy. The second co-operative effort between India and Nepal was the Gandak project. SOCIOECONOMIC RENISSANCE THROUGH DYNAMIC INDO-NEPAL COOPERATION 163

Even the Gandak project has suffered from the effects of sediment as its canal get choked frequently. Irrigation benefits to both India and Nepal continue to suffer. Shifting nature of the streams that cross the Don canal, for example, creates frequent breaches in the canal and seriously affects irrigation performance. High inflow of sediment has led to closure of long duration of the canal system in the Sarada project. In Sarada coarse silt has been dumped outside the canal banks, but has deteriorated soils of command area. While performance of the projects has been greatly affected by operational difficulties due to silt, co-operative efforts to understand the physical factors have been absent. In the revised agreement of the Kosi in 1966, scientific data were mentioned. However, an exchange did not occur but rather came to a stand still. In the early fifties, lack of data on natural processes of the region was a major constraint. Though the topographical maps of Survey by India provided a basis to work, the findings had to be supported by detailed fieldwork. Duration of hydrological data was also short. Despite close links between the two countries, the constraints imposed by data have not been overcome, and even today remains a major impediment.

LESSONS AND CHALLENGES In the Himalayan region, water resources development is made complicated by several factors. One is the natural context of the region which experiences high rainfall, has undulating terrain composed of friable rock, and is subjected to high seismicity. As a result generation of sediment from the hill slope is high. In recent times, shifting cultivation on slopes, deforestation, and grasing have further compounded the processes of sediment movement and associated problems. The resulting growing poverty in the hills has led to human erosion in the form of migration, as hill men from Nepal as well as Indian hills move to the plain seeking employment opportunities for subsistence. The experiences in Kosi and Gandak projects clearly show that irrigation and flood moderation benefits cannot be achieved with practicability, unless silt is efficiently controlled and handled. The future course of action hence poses great challenge to engineers and scientists to formulate appropriate ways by which to address the problems created by sediment in the rivers. These are matters for continuing research and analysis. Continuing focus understanding the natural processes should be supported by activities to improve operational aspects of projects. Operation of reservoir, for example, is a major issue that needs to be kept in mind in the proposed projects. Many times in the operation of multi-purpose reservoirs, energy and irrigation requirements tend to override the consideration of flood control. And generally it is the flood control aspects which get secondary priority. The experience in the Domodar valley clearly demonstrates how this can happen. In order to lessen submergence and resettlement problems, without affecting flood moderation benefits, the design recommended that the operating High Flood Level 164 VERMA, U. K.

(HFL) of the Maithon and Panchet reservoirs be kept between 5 to 10 ft below the Mean Water Level (MWL). It was also suggested that at no time should the flood absorption capacity be encroached on by filling the reservoir for power generation benefits. In the operating phase of the projects, the recommendations were not adhered to. To meet the increasing demand for power and irrigation water, West Bengal started to press for additional storage in the two reservoirs. The temptations for revenue also seemed to override the earlier expert advice. The flood absorption volume between the stated levels was consistently encroached upon and the reservoirs were kept full. In 1977 during a reservoir filled condition, a major flood occurred in West Bengal because the reservoirs could not absorb the incoming flood caused by high precipitation in the catchment. In addition, to the hydro-morphological, socioeconomic and political factors, major constraints to water resources development in the region are imposed by seismicity and population displacement. Seismicity today is the major concern in high dam development in the Himalaya. The suspension of construction of a 250.7 metre high Tehri dam after an expenditure of more than hundred cores shows the sensitive nature of this concern. The effect of seismicity is felt even in smaller structures which are prone to damages. In the Tehri region in 1991, an earthquake between 7 to 8 richer scale was felt. The event caused damages even in smaller dams. But there are experience of 103 m high concrete dams that were exposed to earthquake of plus six richer, which have not failed and no damage occurred to the non-overflow section. In the case of the proposed high dams in the Himalaya, geological and engineering investigations need to be meticulous and detailed. The expertise and experience for analysing the problems exist in the sub-continent. Another major factor of consideration in the high dam projects is the issue related with population displacement. In all the high dam projects, displacement of habitat due to submergence, resettlement and rehabilitation of the population has emerged to be another major issue. It has lengthened the period of execution, led to cost over-runs, and delay in deriving of benefits. Detailed planning for rehabilitation has to be, therefore, done in advance. Resettlement can be done around the project periphery with the same environment. Drinking water, schooling and medical facilities should be provided at the sites agreed by the displaced persons, who should also be given employment opportunities. Rehabilitation works needs to be completed before the actual project work is started. Through better relations between the two countries, the economy of the region can be improved to a substantial degree. The changing global scenario also makes co-operative efforts an imperative.

CONCLUSION Harnessing of water resources of the Indo-Nepal rivers need dynamic co-operation at scientific, technical, execution, policy making and at the people levels. The immediate objective SOCIOECONOMIC RENISSANCE THROUGH DYNAMIC INDO-NEPAL COOPERATION 165

would be to agree on the project designs, estimates, financing arrangements including sharing of the benefits and costs under a time bound frame work. This is an urgent requirement. Agreement for execution of the projects should be done so that the people can immediately receive the benefits. Only then, posterity will not blame present generation. The level of understanding of some of natural processes is improved while availability of data is better than what it was. River morphology and its behaviour are better understood than in the 1950s. Satellite imagery and remote sensing offer newer techniques and opportunities of better understanding the processes. The technology of dam building has improved to an extent that stability of high rock fill dams can be analysed with much greater confidence. The understanding has also come as result of the scientific studies of the problems by academic communities outside India and Nepal. These studies have greatly helped to improve the understanding of the geophysical, hydrological and morphological factors. Co- operation between the actual partners in both the countries has not meaningfully materialised yet. Mutual trust and understanding have given way to suspicion. Several projects that were agreed to be taken up including the second phase in Kosi Agreement, the multi-purpose dam, have not been taken up seriously. With restoration of democracy in Nepal, the understanding between the two neighbours has improved, and an agreement has been made to take up the study of projects like Kosi high dam, Burhi Gandaki, Pancheswor and Karnali hydropower schemes for preparation of the project reports. Construction of embankments, installation of flood forecasting and warning system, exchange modality for power have also been agreed. The crucial questions is, how long should the people of the region have to wait ? One might be forced to lament, when time and cost have out run the mutual financial resources. Nepal and India should come together to restore confidence through the philosophy of inter-dependence. Co-operative models that exist between different countries should be investigated in terms of their relevance. In the context of the outstanding geophysical and hydrological characteristics of the Himalayan rivers, it may be worthwhile to consider the relevance of say, the Columbia River Basin agreement between Canada and the United States. Difficulties, however, will emerge and controversy will continue to arise in the future. It would be impractical to expect that things will be perfect. Political and technical leadership of the two countries must have long term vision and make efforts and resolve conflict that may come in the way of co-operative development. Co-operative ventures must have an inbuilt mechanism for contacts from the highest political level to the grassroots. The workshop on co-operative development on Indo-Nepal Water Resources organised by the Centre for Water Resources Studies, Bihar College of Engineering, made a good beginning in bringing together academicians, scientists, professionals and journalists and others from all walks of life. The representation from Nepal was small but of quality. 166 VERMA, U. K.

The workshop discussed social, techno-economic and environmental issues of development of Indo-Nepal water resources. The interaction has helped appreciation of the natural, scientific, technological, economic and political constraints that have led to continued inaction in co-operative development which is partly responsible for perpetuating poverty in the region. The Kathmandu Meeting has made attempts to discuss the issues further by tackling specific questions of development. The representation from Nepal is larger and also from all walks of life. Such efforts help to generate trust and take actions to prevent further loss of opportunity. Only through co-operative actions can the wheel of development for socioeconomic renaissance in the region be set to motion.

NOTE 1 U. K. Verma’s passed away subsequent to this presentation in Kathmandu. Water Nepal salutes this indefatigable Indian water expert who, till his last days, was engaged in improving cooperation with Nepal in water resource development. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 167-172

WATER RESOURCES: NEPALíS ECONOMIC BONANZA

R. A. MAHTO Professor and Head Department of Geology, Patna University, India.

ABSTRACT

The Himalayan water resources is an outcome of its geological, structural and climatic evolution affecting the hydrological regimes. The available resources offer prospects of emancipating the region from its poverty. For development, a holistic approach should be pursued which allows for better understanding of the river system.

INTRODUCTION In spite of being land locked, Nepal occupies a unique position in the Himalaya Located in the center of its curvature, the country has 147,180 km2 land area covered by hills– mountains with only a small plain. Almost 52 per cent of its 18 million population live in the hills which occupies 83 per cent of the country’s area, while 48 per cent live in the Tarai. The landscape is characterised by vicissitudes of geological, geo-morphological and climatic conditions. Forest, agricultural, soil and mineral resources are limited and beyond the limits of sustenance. Opportunities for irrigation are limited even though the economy is agricultural based and will remain so even in future. Agriculture still depends on the vagaries of the monsoon and suffers frequently from flood and drought. Nepal offers tremendous promises in the energy front, particularly through hydropower development. Of the estimated 83,000 MW potential, 27,000 MW is considered to be economically viable. Presently only 0.5 per cent of this potential has been harnessed. Financial technological and socio-political constraints have affected harnessing of water resources. Lack of development has led to socio-economic and industrial backwardness and perpetuates poverty in the region. Increasing population requires widespread use of both surface and groundwater which Nepal has in abundance for development of the region. Almost all the major rivers traversing through eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar Karnali, Gandak and Kosi, originate in Nepal and posses immense water resources which if exploited can bring prosperity to the region. Nepal alone does not possess the technical capability to utilise the rivers. Co-operation between Nepal and India based on mutuality of interest should be the guiding principle for water resources development.

TECTO-GEOMORPHIC DIVISIONS OF NEPAL A brief synopsis of the physiography of Nepal is essential for understanding the geologic 168 MAHTO, R. A.

and structural evolution, drainage pattern, climatic variation hydrological regimes which are related to the country’s water resources. The topography has developed as a result of tectonic upheaval during the tertiary period. The major linear divisions from north to south are shown in Table 1.

Surface Water Resources Nepal’s drainage system is complex consisting of rivers, glaciers and lakes which together comprise the water resources. Rivers: The rivers/streams of Nepal flow through the entire mountain chain of Himalaya. Some 6,000 rivers and streams constituting the major river basins like Kosi and Mahananda in the east; Gandak, Bagmati, Kamala, Burhi Gandaki in the middle and Ghaghra (Karnali) Sarju, Rapti, Gomati and Mahakali in the west join the Ganga river system draining the southern slope of Himalaya. The rivers pass through the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and west Bengal. Precipitation during monsoon is drained through these river basins which also cause land degradation and bring recurrent floods to the millions of people living in the watershed. The fluvial terrains are characterised by V-shaped valleys, gorges, cascades, rapids, steep gradients channels and water falls. The micro-relief features include gullies, terraces (under cultivation), rills, and debris slope. The gravity action is reflected in debris slope, rock slides and land slides. The rivers carry heavy loads of debris and silt, which are derived from swift mountain torrents. It has been observed that all big rivers flow through structural dislocations and oblique lineaments (tensional joints). It is also possible to delineate the zones of neo-seismic activities by curved morphological features, shifting and off-setting of river courses as observed in aerial photographs and landstate images. Most of the major perennial rivers and some of their tributaries originate in high altitudes in snow and glaciers while others have springs as their source of origin. The latter form part of the network of one or the other river basins. The stream valleys lying above the water table in any region discharge only rain water and otherwise remain dry. Some of the rivers are antecedent and have cut deep gorges as their catchment areas lie on the northern slope of the central Himalaya i.e. Satluj, Gandak, Kosi, Karnali, and Mahakali. Several rivers originate in the Mahabharat and Churia hills. They are either consequent or subsequent in nature as they pass through the Tarai. These rivers have been harnessed by building regulators for supplementary irrigation. The hydrological data of these rivers do not exist and are of uncertain nature. The uncertainty also emerges due to the complex hydro morphological nature of these rivers. Glaciers: The glaciers are natural storehouse of water and act as buffers particularly augmenting summer stream flows of several perennial river and act as balancing reservoirs. WATER RESOURCES: NEPALíS ECONOMIC BONANZA 169

TABLE 1 PHYSIOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF NEPAL

Zones Av. Height Av. Width Geological Drainage Climate Vegetation (km) Formation Trans-Himalayan 3000-4000 m. 40 Marine fossili Antecedent Alpine type Sparsed /Tibetan Plateau ferous rocks temperate from Cambrian to Ecocene Higher/or Central > 3000m snow 40 Granitic gneisses Antecedent Alpine type Pine trees Himalaya -clad peaks and consequent and grass above 5000m. upto 4500 m. and barren above Midlands 2000 m low 30 Precambrian to Consequent Temperate Heavily (Tectonic lying hills and Lr. Tertiary and forested valleys) flat lands subsequent meandering rivers flowing E-W Lesser/Middle 3500 m steep 20 Precambrian to Consequent Temperate Heavily Himalaya rugged Lr. Tertiary subsequent forested (Mahabharat topography (Nappe zone) Sr. and dendritic range) of horizontal thrusts towards north Siwalik range 1000 m rugged 20 Middle and upper Consequent Subtropical Dense wood /Churia hills topography tertiary rocks subconsequ forest, soil steep slope ent and unfertile towards south dendritic and gentle towards north Tarai 60-150 m 30 River borne Network of Subtropical Fertile soil (Indogangetic sediment rivers/ plain) a) Bhabhar 9-12 Alluvial fan Subtropical (Discontinuous) deposits coarse streams b) Middle Tarai 10 gravels and sands c) Southern Tarai 10-15 Marshy land alluvial soil Alluvial soil

* Mahabharat range superimposed on Churia hills along Main Boundary Fault (MB+) obliterating at places Dun types valley of other parts, of Himalaya. 170 MAHTO, R. A.

The glacial terrains are characterised by amphitheaters, cirques craqs, U-shaped valleys, hanging valleys and depressions. The valley floors are often striated and grooved. The surfaces near the snouts are very irregular, rugged and undulating. The melt water flows in braided channels. The glacial valley floors contain extensive gravels, moraines and fluvio- glacial sediments which are prolific and excellent aquifers. Large part of the sediment of the rivers derive from glacial and moraine actions. Lakes: Number of glacial and tectonic lakes lie in the upper reaches of Nepal Himalaya. Natural dam and lakes formed by blockage of stream by landslides or when moraines give way lead to flash floods which bring devastating consequences.

Groundwater Resource In the Tarai groundwater is available in abundance. Earlier groundwater was used mainly for drinking purpose. Now it has become possible to utilise groundwater for irrigation development and the meeting of water needs of industries. Occurrence of groundwater is site specific depending upon rock formation and other hydro-geological factors. Most prolific aquifers occur in certain types of sediment specially in stream laid and glacial laid sands and gravels as well as cavernous limestones. The younger sediments are more prolific than older ones of the same environment due to properties like porosity, permeability and transmmissivity etc. Physical and geological condition of Nepal not only will reveal occurrence and recovery of groundwater but the imperative of its advantageous use in meeting the domestic, irrigation and growing industrial and urban requirements over surface water. Watershed management and improving river/channel morphology needs a multi- disciplinary approach, which is a significant aspect of modern geomorphology and terrain evaluation. Regulatory and diversion structures have manifold effects on channel degradation throughout a river system. The problems of river control can be appreciated with accurate appraisal of the physical conditions like topography, lithology, structure, hydrology and vegetation on the basis of landsat images, aerial photographs and remote sense data. River morphology is one important aspect to be considered in the harnessing of the water resources of the common rivers Karnali, Gandak, and Kosi. Cooperative efforts based on mutuality of interests should be the guiding factors. Both countries have created an era of goodwill by undertaking joint ventures projects like Kosi (1954), Gandak (1959), Trishuli (1963), and Devighat (1978) for hydropower generation, irrigation and flood control benefits. The Kosi high dam and Karnali projects are on the agenda of co-operation though agreements have yet to be made. For positive co-operation, public opinion and awareness has to be improved in both countries, beyond the smoke screens created by political misunderstanding and misconceptions. Only then the available non-renewable natural water resource can be used for all round economic WATER RESOURCES: NEPALíS ECONOMIC BONANZA 171

growth of the region. For example, in the hilly tracts of Nepal, the scope of surface water irrigation from major rivers is limited as the rivers flow in deeper valleys than the adjoining land. Also the minor rivers remain dry during off seasons. These also lead to drinking water problems in many cases. In such cases, stream diversion, artificial pond, spring, dug well tube-well and lakes can be utilised for supplementary irrigation to improve agricultural productivity. Such approaches have been practised in many countries with similar physiographic situation. In the Tarai region, surface water diversion/regulatory irrigation both of minor and major scales have problems due to siltation, flood hazard, infertility, waterlogging, land wastage in canal construction and high cost. As an alternative, scope exists for round the year irrigation by groundwater development due to abundant rainfall and high recharge. Groundwater use, however, requires energy for pumping except in artisan conditions. Hydropower development hence is crucial for providing the energy required.

CONCLUSION Indo-Nepal water resources offers opportunities for development of hydropower, irrigation development and flood moderation. Physical conditions also favour development of fishery, animal rearing and horticulture to support agriculture development. For balanced and sustained economic growth, removal of regional disparity of the entire Indo-Nepal region, a holistic approach emphasising conjunctive use of surface and groundwater resources is essential. Generation of hydropower can meet the round development of the region. The vast potential for surfacewater resources development by building multi-purpose storage reservoirs for power, irrigation and flood control. Pollution-free hydropower can be used for development of groundwater resource in the Tarai.

REFERENCES Bharktia, D. K. and Gupta, R. P., 1984: Lineament-Tectonic Interpretation from landsat Images in Garhwal-Kumaun Himalaya Geology, Vol. 12, WIHG, Dehra Dun. Gansser, A., 1964: Geology of Himalaya, Inter Service Publisher, London. Krishna, M. S., 1968: Geology of India and Burma Higgin bothams (P.) Ltd. Madras. Negi, S. S., 1991: Himalayan Rivers, Lakes and Glaciers, Indus Publishing Company, New Delhi. Prasad, T., 1982: Potential for Economic Transformation of POOR Region through Water Resources Development, Water International, Vol. 7, Journal of IWRA. Shandilya, A.K. and Prasad, C., 1984: Geomorphic Studies of Lineament, Jones in Garhwal Himalaya Himalayan Geology, Vol. WHIHG, Dehra Dun. Sharma, C. K., 1980: Geology of Nepal Himalaya and Adjacent Countries, Printing Support Pvt. Ltd. Kathmandu, Nepal. Sharma, C. K., 1987: Groundwater Resources of Nepal, Vabana Printing Works Pvt. Ltd, Calcutta. 172 MAHTO, R. A.

Sharma, C. K., 1991: Engineering Challenges in Nepal Himalaya, Printing Support Pvt. Ltd, Kathmandu, Nepal. Thorbury, W. D., 1969: Principles o Geomorphology, John Wiley and Sons Inc. (Reprint), New Delhi. Wadia, D. N., 1975: Geology of India, Tata McGraw Hill, New Delhi. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 173-180

NEPALI HYDROPOWER AND REGIONAL ENERGY NEEDS

RAJENDRA D. JOSHI Reader Department of Electrical Engineering Institute of Engineering, Nepal

ABSTRACT

Nepali Hydropower while providing continued supply of electricity to the region, can also generate wealth for the country. Hydropower export depends on the energy use scenario in the regional countries, and the options that are available in each country for meeting the demand. This paper reviews the role of Nepalís hydropower in meeting energy requirements of the region. Based on an assumed demand and supply, the countryís capability to export energy is analysed. The scenario obtained provides guidelines for future planning.

INTRODUCTION Nepal’s present installed hydropower capacity is 250 MW which is less than one per cent of the economic potential. Its water resources continue to remain the repository of tremendous renewable energy which is yet unharnessed. Hydropower generation on a large-scale, and its export for revenue generation to usher-in development of the country has been Nepal’s dream. Due to several reasons, the resources have not been productively harnessed. Among others, lack of finances, which is too large to be borne by Nepal alone, have led to slow utilisation and generation of hydro energy from Nepali rivers. What prospects do Nepali hydropower have in meeting the energy needs of the region? The nature if electricity consumption, trends in its growth and energy resource availability in regional countries indicate that the prospects are positive. This paper reviews energy needs in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and makes preliminary analysis of a frame work for hydropower development in Nepal for meeting this need. The objectives are two fold; (a) to workout a basis for regional co-operation, and (b) to fully assess both the possibilities and limitations of the hydropower potential. A time span of 60-70 year is considered in the analysis. Such scenario analysis is important as it can provide insight into policy directions for hydropower development. The export of hydropower from Nepal would depend on the energy requirements in the national grids, and the alternatives that each country have for meeting the demand. The nature of demand determines how generation expansion needs to be planned and system capacity augmented. Development to the perceived scale, however, is not possible without collaborative efforts of the regional countries. 174 JOSHI, R. D.

NEPALíS HYDROPOWER POTENTIAL AND DEMAND Predicting long-term energy requirements is a complex process as demands are dynamic and change with living style and several other factors. In the case of the fast changing South Asian societies, estimating energy demands for the coming fifty years and predicting a scenario for hydropower development is even more complex. Population growth, demands for energy policy in each country and modalities of cooperation between the countries need to be known accurately. On the basis of installed capacity of projects that have been identified and studied so far, Nepal’s technical and economic hydropower potentials are estimated to be 42,133 MW and 45,824 MW respectively (WECS, 1992). If, on the average, the plant factor is assumed to be 50 per cent, electrical energy generation corresponding to the technical potential will be 200,709 GWh. This is about 28 per cent of the country’s theoretical potential which is 83,000 MW. In the present analysis a potential of 218,124 GWh is used. This is equivalent to 30 per cent of the theoretical potential. Because of constraints such as inaccessibility and remoteness of the hydropower sites, the figure however, would be closer to the upper limit of the economic potential available. Between 1976 to 1991, the annual electrical energy demand in Nepal grew at a rate of 13.1 per cent (NEA, 1992). The increase between 1992/93 to 2010/11 has been estimated to be slightly lesser at 10.2 per cent per annum (World Bank, 1992). This growth rate which is characteristic of a relatively small power system, is likely to slow down as the system expands. By 2040 AD, the electrical energy demand growth rate in Nepal is assumed to drop to seven per cent which is almost equal to the growth rate expected in the northern Indian Power System, by 2005 AD (GOI, 1992). The per capita annual electricity and energy demand in the country is expected to reach 5,660 kWh and 17,359 kWh (62.5 GJ) respectively by 2070 AD. The electricity demand scenario for Nepal is shown in Table 1, which is based on the energy demand and population growths presented in Table 2. The per capita demand of electricity thus projected compares with the demand in other countries. For example, in 1990, the per capita per annum energy consumption in the United States and Japan was 324 GJ and 135 GJ respectively (WRI, 1992-93), while their per capita annual electricity consumption in the same year was 11,313 kWh and 6,059 kWh (WRI, 1992-93). In 2070 AD at the end of the period considered in the analysis, electricity will account for 34 per cent of Nepal’s energy balance. Electricity accounts for 20 per cent share in the energy balance in Japan and the United States. Since Nepal has no fuel deposits, higher percentage of electricity in the total energy balance is a likely scenario. In 1991, furthermore 97 per cent of the energy generated in Nepal was from hydropower plants (UN, 1989). Consequently the assumption that hydropower would meet bulk of the electricity demand till 2050-60 AD appears to be plausible. NEPALI HYDROPOWER AND REGIONAL ENERGY NEEDS 175

TABLE 1 ELECTRICITY DEMAND FORECAST FOR NEPAL

Year Growth Rate (%) Demand, GWh 2010 10 5,923 2020 9 15,363 2030 8 36,369 2040 7 78,518 2050 6 154, 457 2060 5 276,609 2070 450,565

TABLE 2 ENERGY DEMAND AND POPULATION GROWTH FORECAST FOR NEPAL

Year Energy Demand Energy Demand Population Population 106 Growth Rate, % GWh Growth Rate % 1990 4.0 74,699 2.2 18.1 2000 3.9 110,572 2.1 22.5 2010 3.8 162,102 2.0 27.7 2020 3.7 235,383 1.9 33.8 2030 3.6 338,501 1.8 40.8 2040 3.5 482,124 1.7 48.7 2050 3.4 680,084 1.65 57.7 2060 3.3 950,098 1.6 67.9 2070 1,314,536 79.6

ENERGY ABSORPTION CAPACITY OF REGIONAL COUNTTRIES Technically, electricity from Nepal can be supplied to India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The quantum of power that can be supplied depends on factors such as energy requirements, the power system characteristics, and electricity generating options that each country have. The most fundamental factor is agreement between the countries to cooperate for power exchange including hydropower development. The power system characteristic of each country is shown in Table 3 (UN, 1989). The percentage of hydropower potential already exploited and the total hydropower generation as percentage of potential that could be harnessed in each country are shown in Table 4. For analysing the future contribution of hydropower in energy balance of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, growths of electricity generation in each country is assumed to follow Table 5. 176 JOSHI, R. D.

TABLE 3 POWER SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS OF REGIONAL COUNTRIES

Country Power (Energy) Generation* Hydro Plant Steam Internal Gas Turbine Nuclear Total Harnessable % MW, (GWh) Plant % Combustion Plant %, MW Plant, % Generation Hydropower MW, Plant, % (GWh) MW, GWh/year Potential (GWh) MW (GWh) (GWh) Thousand GWh/Year India 301 (28)2 61 (67) 5(1) 2(1) 2(3) 184 3653 15,7504 (51,002)5------Bangladesh 9(9) 39(56) 22(15) 30(20) - 6 7 130(450 ------Pakistan 48(53) 31(30) - 21(17) - 26 27 2,897(13,804) ------

Source: Electrical Power in Asia and Pacific 1985/1986, United Nations 1989 and World Resources 1990/91, World Resource Institute, UNDP, 1991. 1 and 2 Weightage of installed capacity and energy generated in percentage 3 Hamessable potential calculated from technical potential, 4 and 5 Installed capacity in MW and energy generated in GWh, 1986 figures.

TABLE 4 HYDRO POTENTIAL HARNESSED AND TOTAL ELECTRICITY GENERATION AS PERCENTAGE OF HARNESSABLE POTENTIAL

Country India Bangladesh Pakistan % of hydropower potential harnessed 14 7 52 Total generation as % of harnessable potential 50 80 96

ELECTRICITY EXPORT CAPABILITY Several hydroelectric projects have been studied to be economically viable in Nepal. The possibilities of exporting power from these plants depend on how fast the projects are brought on line. The sooner projects are built the greater the prospects. For determining export capability, hydropower development scenario in Nepal is assumed as shown in Table 6 which can be considered to be optimistic since only 250 MW electricity have been produced in the country in its forty years of development efforts. If all projects are built, the quantum of electricity that can be exported by 2055 AD, on the basis of above assumption would be 2000 billion kWh, which is hundred times more than the annual capacity of Karnali Chisapani Project estimated at 20 billion kWh/ yr. On an average, selling this energy could generate hundreds of millions US $ of revenue NEPALI HYDROPOWER AND REGIONAL ENERGY NEEDS 177

per year at present price level. Probably, this is the highest dividends, Nepal can get from its hydropower export. The period of total reliance on hydropower is finite and the period is comparable to the human lift span. The conclusion is of profound importance for long term planning of hydropower generation as it clearly limits the time frame within which Nepal’s energy export capability needs to be developed. Regional cooperation in development of hydropower needs to take this limitation into account.

NEPALI HYDROPOWER FOR MEETING PEAKING ENERGY A minimum of 10 per cent of electricity demand will have to be met by hydropower in order to meet peaking requirements. Nepali hydropower offers attractive opportunity to meet the peaking energy requirements in India and the region. Presently, India is meeting its peaking energy from hydropower stations, whereas Bangladesh and Pakistan use gas turbine plants. In Bangladesh 35 per cent energy is produced by these plants (refer Table 3) while in Pakistan 17 per cent is produced. The relatively high operating cost, dependence on imported fuel and resulting price fluctuations would affect sustained operation of these plants, which would also perpetuate dependency on fossil fuel. Furthermore, environmental pollution costs are high for thermal plants. Some hydropower potential still exist in all the three countries and its development would be logical. Bangladesh will not be able to meet its peaking energy through in-country hydro electricity generation beyond 2010-2020 AD even if all its hydropower potential is developed. Beyond 2020 AD the logical strategy for Bangladesh would be to use Nepali hydropower for meeting its peaking energy. In case development of in-country hydropower appears not to be feasible, the strategy will have to be adopted earlier. Pakistan’s peaking requirement could be met by hydropower generation up to 2010. The country could significantly gain from import of Nepali power beyond 2010 AD. The systems of northern India already has a peak power deficit of around 3,000 MW. (GOI, 1992), which is likely to reach 7,000 MW by 2009/10 AD. India still posses hydropower capacity which can be developed. If the in-country option is chosen, India may be able to meet all its peaking demand by hydropower generation up to 2030 AD after which use of peaking power from Nepal appears attractive. As the fossil fuel reserves in all the three countries are limited, they may have to rely on other options for meeting future energy requirements. India’s known fossil fuel deposit is likely to be exhausted by 2020-2025 AD. As a result beyond 2025 AD India will have to rely on nuclear or thermal plants to meet its energy requirement. A situation similar to that in India will arise in Bangladesh by 2040 AD. The hydropower potential of Nepal will assume critical importance for regional co-operation beyond 2020-2025 AD. It may not be difficult to visualise use of pump storage plants in Nepal to meet the regional peaking needs. At such a stage, regional co-operation will include export of Nepali 178 JOSHI, R. D.

energy to meet the peak energy in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. By 2050-60 AD when Nepal would have no power to export, regional co-operation may be achieved through exchange of Nepali peak energy to support base energy generated by nuclear plants in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The hydropower potential of Bhutan can also play an important role in this respect.

TABLE 5 ELECTRICITY GENERATION GROWTH PROJECTION IN INDIA, BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN

Year India Bangladesh Pakistan Growth Generation Growth Generation Growth Gneration Rate % GWh 103 Rate % GWh 103 Rate % GWh 103 1987 218 6 34 8.2 11.8 11.9 1990 276 8 48 7.3 11.0 10.0 2000 559 24 124 6.7 10.1 9.0 2010 1069 62 293 6.2 9.0 7.0 2020 1950 146 575 5.8 8.0 6.0 2030 3427 316 1031 5.5 7.0 5.5 2040 5853 621 1760 5.1 6.0 5.1 2050 9626 1112 2895 4.8 5.0 4.8 2060 15383 1811 4626 4.5 4.5 4.5 2070 23890 2813 7184

PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL CO-OPERATION Poor reserves of fossil fuel in the region mean that the major impediment in the development of the region would be the difficulties of meeting the energy demand, particularly electricity. Nepal’s hydropower can meet the regional energy needs in a number of ways as the scope for developing hydropower in some of the countries is limited. In the short term, Nepal’s hydropower would be a cheaper source of electricity for meeting peaking needs of each country and it may meet part of the base load. In the long term, it may meet peak load of the integrated regional power grid involving Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. NEPALI HYDROPOWER AND REGIONAL ENERGY NEEDS 179

India has shown interest in projects like Karnali Chisapani (10,800 MW), Pancheswor (7,000 MW) and Kosi High Dam (3,490 MW) for meeting energy needs. These projects are of interests also because of improved irrigation and flood mitigating benefits. Bangladesh has proposed for several dams in Nepal with the objective of mitigating and regulating the monsoon flood. Energy thus generated are also proposed to be exchanged. Due to several reasons, execution of these projects have been delayed. Disagreement between Nepal and India on Sharing/evaluating the benefits is one of the several reasons.

TABLE 6 ASSUMED ACCELERATED HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL Year Capacity Commissioned, GWh 2010 12,000 2020 20,000 2025 30,000 2030 30,000 2035 30,000 2040 30,000 2050 30,000 Total 212,000

CONCLUSION All electricity requirement of Nepal for the coming 60-70 years can be met by hydropower, which may also be exported to generate revenue. The significance of hydropower increases in the context of limited hydrocarbon deposits in the region. To maximise the revenue from power export, the pace of hydropower development should be fast with an objective of bringing projects to line before 2050-60 AD. As per the current trend, India can rely on fossil fuels for about 40 years, Bangladesh for about 30 years and Pakistan for about 20 years. Energy generation is going to be a constraining factor once the deposits runout. In that case, the region will have to embark on nuclear generation within a couple of decades to meet the growing energy needs. Nepal’s hydropower potential will be a valuable asset for supplementing the energy generated from nuclear/thermal plants for peak loads as well as meeting some base load. Hydropower development in Nepal hence remains in the best interest of the region. Both from technical and financial considerations generation of hydropower from Nepali rivers is a major challenge. The scale of projects and the regional dimension of development calls for collaborative approaches. Only collective mobilisation of financial resources and manpower of the region can meet these challenges. Co-operation should 180 JOSHI, R. D.

begin by studies and research, which should focus on issues such as joint planning, financing, implementation and project operation. The price the countries of the region are going to pay due to the delay would be very high. The opportunities needs to be seized for development through positive collaborative efforts.

REFERENCES GOI, 1992: Government of India, Fourteenth Power Survey of India. NEA, 1992: Reviewed Local Forecaste, Nepal Electricity Authority, Kathmandu. United Nations, 1989: Electric Power in Asia and the pacific 1985 and 1986. WECS, 1992: Energy Sector Synopsis Report 1990/91 Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, HMG, Nepal World Bank, 1992: Nepal Power Sector Efficiency Project, Nepal Staff Appraisal report. World Resource Institute, 1990-91: World Resources, UNEP, UNDP. World Resource Institute, 1992-93: World Resource, UNEP, UNDP. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1,1994, 181-186

SEDIMENT MANAGEMENT: A CO-OPERATIVE INDO-NEPAL VENTURE

C. P. SINHA Director North Eastern Regional Institute of Land and Water Management Dolbari, Kaliabhomora, Tejpur, 784027 India.

ABSTRACT

One of the serious factors that has to be tackled in development efforts regarding optimal and balanced development of Himalayan rivers is the high silt content of the rivers and the problems caused by sedimentation. Sediment management is a necessary and important component of development initiatives and may be a vehicle for developing confidence between the two countries.

INTRODUCTION The Himalayan rivers are active and are more dynamic in nature than any other river of the world. Flowing through the steep slopes of the geologically young Himalayan mountain system, the rivers possess high eroding capacity and carry a heavy sediment load. Sediment is derived from both natural and man-made sources. Disintegration of rocks due to weathering, production of screed due to frost, glacial action in the higher altitude, loosening due to seismic tremors and landslides are some of the natural sources of sediment. Soil losses from agriculture and degraded land are the human induced erosion sources. From the point of view of sediment, the most notorious of all these rivers is the Kosi. The annual flow contributions by its three major tributaries, the Sun Kosi, the Arun and the Tamur are 44 per cent, 37 per cent and 19 per cent respectively. On an average, the rivers transport 95 million m3 of sediment in a year. The river’s discharge is constituted of 0.337 per cent sediment by weight compared to 0.446 per cent of the Huang Ho of China which is considered to be the highest silt laden river in the world (Anonymous, 1992). A large part of the sediment of the Kosi is derived from the Tamur, which drains one of the steepest mountain slopes. The total catchment area of Kosi is 74,500 km2 out of which only 11,000 km2 (14.2 per cent) lies in India.

CONSEQUENCE OF SEDIMENT Sedimentation has several adverse consequences on the land and river systems. Broadly they can be categorised into two types as in situ and downstream effects. Land erosion 182 SINHA, C. P.

and top soil loss lead to land degradation by lowering agricultural productivity. Sediment affects water resources development, particularly multi-purpose projects by depletion in the storage capacity of reservoirs and lowering economic performance. Ecological impact on the upstream as well as downstream reaches are other problems. Top soil erosion leads to the depletion of vegetation and undergrowth in the upper catchment. The downstream impact is due to changes in silt water regime of the river below impoundment resulting in changes in the river’s characteristics. Construction of water projects may also accelerate erosion but the effect will only be of a localised nature and may not have a significant impact on a regional scale. Sediment is the greatest non-point source of pollution. It leads to morphological changes while adding to flooding and associated problems. Sediment also affects the processes of aggradation and degradation of the river bed and the land building activity on the flood plain. The effects may be harmful or beneficial depending on the local conditions. High sediment content of the rivers also leads to instability of the river courses. These may also lead to shifting of the river courses causing havoc in the flood- affected areas. Damages caused by sedimentation and flooding in India are valued at millions of rupees. Several channels of the Indo-Nepal rivers show instability to varying degrees. The Kosi has shifted hundreds of metres in one flood resulting from a single storm affecting the lives of the people in its flood plain and bringing misery. In the last 230 years (1730- 1960) the river has moved westward for about 110 km and has caused wide spread damage. While the apex of the river at Chatara and its confluence with Ganga have remained almost fixed, the river channel in between the two ends has continually shifted westward (Figure 1) due to inland delta building (Gole and Chitale, 1966). The Kamala has also changed its course three times in the present century. The recent westward shift of the Bagmati river is another notable example of shifting Indo-Nepal rivers. Efforts to manage flooding and develop the water resources of the Kosi for multipurpose uses have been attempted ever since India became independent in 1947. An high dam at Barahakshetra was proposed, but the project could not be built due to lack- co-operation between the two countries. In 1954, a 1,131 m long barrage at Hanuman Nagar was built along with flood embankments for mitigating the problem of flood brought on by Kosi. Embankments were built on both sides of the river. On the western bank 144 km long and on the eastern side 125 km long, embankments were built spaced at 5 to 18 km. Though the river has remained confined, it now changes course even within the embankments. The spurs places as river control measures are repeatedly attacked by the Kosi. Prevention of breaches and protection of the embankment to safe guard lives incur huge expenditure every year. On an average, between 15 to 30 crores, are spent on flood protection and strengthening of embankments. SEDIMENT MANAGEMENT: COOPERATIVE INDO-NEPAL VENTURE 183

The annual damages to crops, houses and public utilities during the period of 1968-81 by the Kosi amounted to Rs 10.15 crores. Due to the high sediment deposition, the Kosi bed within the embankment has continued to rise. The embankments have also interfered with the natural drainage and deprived land building activities in the flood protected areas. The rise in the bed has led to encroachment in the free board necessitating regular heightening and strengthening of embankments. These costs have become a necessary evil. Sediment problem has perpetuated the vicious circle of poverty in the region which is one of the most impoverished parts of the world having an high population density and low agricultural productivity. Lasting solutions lie only in proper management of sediment (Sinha, 1992). Effective soil water management is necessary for the enhancement of agricultural performance and development of the region (Brandt, 1980). Reducing generation transportation and deposition of sediment is implied in the objectives of sediment management.

SEDIMENT MANAGEMENT A catchment or drainage basin is defined as a land area, determined by topographic features, where both surface and groundwater drain to its lowest level (Monkhouse and Small, 1978). Catchments are separated from each other topographically by hill slopes or ridges. The divide or boundary is known as the watershed. Sometimes catchment and watershed are used as synonymous. For groundwater, the catchment may be larger or smaller than is apparent from the surface relief. Catchments are naturally occurring units of landscape, which houses a complex array of inter-linked and interdependent resources, and where several activities simultaneously occur. A catchment is a dynamic system and integrates social, economic and physical system containing people, infrastructure water, agriculture, vegetation, industry, communications, including many other entities and facilities. A typical catchment generally includes forests and trees, storage dams, erosion control measures, flood management structures, natural parks, towns, industry etc (Figure 2). The natural processes and activities occur irrespective of the political boundaries. The activities in the watershed affect each other and also have downstream consequences. Intervention in watershed needs to be planned and managed for quality and sustained availability of resources on total basis and not is isolation (Irwin an Williams, 1986).

CO-OPERATIVE VENTURE The upper catchments of Indo-Nepal rivers were once under cover of dense forest. With increasing pressure of population and livestock, the situation has changed in recent years. The forest area in Nepal is reported to have been reduced by 570 thousand ha in 20 years (1964-1985). Before more harm is done, improved watershed management of the catchment should be adopted on a priority basis. Soil conservation and afforestation 184 SINHA, C. P.

FIGURE 1. LATERAL MIGRATION OF THE KOSI RIVER

FIGURE 2. THE INTEGRATED RESOURCES OF A TYPICAL CATCHMENT SEDIMENT MANAGEMENT: COOPERATIVE INDO-NEPAL VENTURE 185

measures are the essential components of watershed management. These activities also remain pre-requisites for water resource development in view of the fragility and the degradation of the basin’s ecosystem. Soil, water and vegetation are interdependent elements of the land surface and any changes in the system of one affects the other. Resource use should be balanced without resulting in any significant disturbance to the ecosystem. One way balanced development can occur is by catchment treatment in a total manner through sediment management. Such an approach will also enhance and sustain agriculture productivity. To a certain extent, it may also help in mitigating the fury of flood. Management can succeed with co-operation, co-ordination of policies and programmes. The approach requires endorsement of governments, community organisations, individuals and land usres. Sediment management should aim for right and co-operative efforts of individuals and organisations for carrying out legitimate land use and development. Sediment management should form part of the holistic watershed management plan with the objectives of increased productivity, water conservation, and minimise sediment generation and downstream flood mitigation. In the Himalayan region however, several factors that govern sediment movement need to be considered. Mass erosion contribution from slopes with vegetation and without vegetation contributes substantial sediment and dominantly affects the process. While small landslide tend to occur on slopes without vegetation, larger and deeper slides occur independent of vegetation cover. Forest cover may increase the period between occurrence of slides, but in the long run may not prevent slides if the terrain is inherently unstable. Over a sufficiently long period, the net contribution of sediment may not be different, when a large river basin is considered. This is a matter for further study and research which may be initiated as a collaborative initiative by the two co-basin countries. An initiative such as this would pave a way for building confidence. Sediment management arouses less passion and is less controversial than other form of development such as building dams. This is all the more reason to use sediment management as a means of confidence building and working together for the common good. India has proposed an ambitious watershed management programme for the Kosi catchment with financial assistance from its end. Assistance such as this should be unconditional and have no bearing on Nepal’s consent for the Kosi high dam. India should be cautious now and should not throw away the opportunity as it did for a similar programme in the 1960s (Verghese, 1990). India’s long and proud association with Nepal should provide a strong bond and a vast reservoir of good will to bring about commensurate co-operation on the part of Nepal. Co-operation sediment management efforts may be a forerunner for many fruitful co-operation between the two countries. 186 SINHA, C. P.

CONCLUSION Sediment management is imperative for the catchments of Indo-Nepal rivers in view of large-scale land degradation, erosion and consequent downstream problems. Management should be taken up on total catchment basis for which co-operation of both the countries is crucial. While solving part of the ecological problems, such approach will also provide avenues to work together and build mutual confidence. With the enhanced confidence, co-operation can be extended to other beneficial aspects of water resources development.

REFERENCES Anonymous, 1992: Theme Paper, Proceeding Workshop on Co-operative Development of Indo-Nepal Water Resources, Patna, May 29-30. Brandt, W., 1980: North-Soouth, A Programmed of Survival, Pan Books, London and Sydney. Gole, C.V. and Chitale, S. V., 1966: Inland Delta Building of Kosi River, Journal of Hydraulic Division Proceeding ASCE, 92, HY2. Irwin, F. and Williams, R., 1986: Catchments as Planning Unit, Journal of Soil Conservation. Monkhouse, F. J. and Smaal, J., 1978: A Dictionary of the Natural Environment, Edward Amold, London. Sinha, C. P., 1992: The Kosi River – A Challenge, Proceeding International Conference on Protection and Development of the Nile and Other Major Rivers, February 3-5, Cairo (Egypt). Verghese, B.G. 1990: Waters of Hope Integrated Water Resources Development and Regional Co- operation within the Himalaya-Ganga Brahmaputra-Barak Basin, Oxford and IBH Publishing Co. Ltd. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1,1994, 181-186

MATHEMATICAL MODELING TOOLS FOR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF LARGE-SCALE WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

GUNA N. PAUDYAL Team Leader Danish Hydraulic Institute, Dhaka, Bangladesh

ABSTRACT

The conservation and allocation of water resources pose continuing challenges to policy makers and agencies responsible for their management. Computer based modeling techniques have successfully amplified management skills owing to the availability of mathematical models. This paper presents an overview of ëmathematical model makingí and some of the latest modeling tools being applied to solve complex ëhydraulicí problems of mathematical model applications in Bangladesh under the auspices of the Flood Action Plan.

INTRODUCTION With rapid advancements of numerical solution methods and computing technology, large water resources systems, including flows and sediment transport phenomena in complex river networks are being investigated and managed by using mathematical tools. Due to the wide acceptance of the mathematical models by research scientists and practising engineers in recent years, many new computational models have been developed. Some of them are generalised and simplified in a so-called ‘user-friendly’ format that they are capable of solving a large variety of problems.

OVERVIEW OF MATHEMATICAL MODELING Behaviour of a large-scale water system (river basin) is complex. Such problems cannot be solved by a direct procedure or by physical modeling. The behaviour of any complex system, however, can be simulated using a computational – mathematical model. The development of a computational model to simulate a physical phenomenon is carried out in the following steps: (1) defining a physical system by isolating a region of consideration with specified boundaries and neglecting all physical processes non-essential to the phenomenon being studied (simplifying assumptions and approximations); (2) representing the idealised and simplified physical system by a mathematical model including governing differential equations and boundary/initial conditions; (3) converting the mathematical model into a numerical model using one of the numerical methodologies 188 PAUDYAL, G. N.

most appropriate to the problem; (4) writing a computer code based on the selected computational algorithm to obtain numerical results and applying some post-processing packages to display the results in still graphic or animated form. Sometimes, some preprocessing packages are also needed to approximate the continuous region by a discreticised computational domain and to prepare an input data base. In short, before a computational model is developed, numerous idealisations, simplifications, approximations, and discreticisation have to be made. During the complicated and lengthy mathematical manipulations and computational codes programming, unintentional human errors may not be avoidable. Therefore, the verification and validation of computational codes programming, unintentional human errors may not be avoidable. Therefore, the verification and validation of computational models have always been an issue ever since their initial development few decades ago.

FIGURE 1. SCHEMATIC OF MODELING.

The basic principles to simulate the large-scale complicated behaviours of a real hydraulic system are deduced from the hydrodynamic principles, which express the instantaneous motion of an idealised water at a point. Both the classical approach, as well as the modern analysis methods using numerical techniques usually start from the mathematical models of hydrodynamic principles. Hydraulic practices as well as other technological objectives are not seeking for such detailed flow behaviours but for a bulk solution averaged in some equivalent domains with homogeneous physical properties. The simulation models must be solved as the initial and boundary values problem through the numerical analysis. At present typical methods of numerical analysis are the MATHEMATICAL MODELING TOOLS FOR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 189

finite difference, the finite element, the boundary element and the characteristics method. All of them are characterised by various merits and demerits are selected to use in the numerical analysis, depending on the research objective, the scale and magnitude of significance and importance and other influential factors. The finite difference method is most popular in the hydraulic analysis of open channel flows. Its advantage is provided by logical reduction of simulation models and effective use of the same procedures to all dimensional problems, whereas the complicated boundary conditions frequently occurred in the real world are not easily treated. The two and three dimensional flow bahaviours are, however, calculated by use of this method.

APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICAL MODELING IN BANGLADESH

Situation Bangladesh through its complex network of rivers drains an area of about 2 million km2 of which only about 8 per-cent lies within its territorial boundaries. This physical setting (Figure 2) severely limits the degree of control and management that can be applied to the inflow of water both in the monsoon season and during the dry period.

FIGURE 2. LOCATION MAP OF BANGLADESH

Owing to its geographical location, Bangladesh is exposed to a wide range of extreme natural phenomena; it is located on a fragile portion of land in the world’s largest delta which comprised three of the world’s most unstable rivers. The rivers flowing into Bangladesh drain some of the wettest catchment areas on earth with average yearly rainfall as high as 11,000 mm like Assam. In addition, Bangladesh is one of the most fertile regions 190 PAUDYAL, G. N.

in the world. Life in Bangladesh is pervasively influenced by the rivers. From their origin in the Himalaya, the rivers carry huge quantities of mud, silt and sand. The delta is continuously being built up from these deposits and the present supply of water and sediment maintains their fertility. However, the rivers also cause vast damage when they sweep over the country during massive floods. Approximately 40 per-cent of the country is subject to regular flooding causing death as well as extensive damage, not least to the agricultural crops. Apart from river floods, Bangladesh suffers severely from storm surges generated in the Bay of Bengal. The surge waves are induced by tropical cyclones and can reach heights of 7 m as they approach the cost. The consequences are often disastrous and have cost hundreds of thousands of human lives in the coastal regions.

Approach Controlling the waters is vital to Bangladesh. The sharing of water with the neighbouring countries, India, Bhutan and China, is subject to frequent disputes. Within the country, numerous schemes for flood protection, drainage and irrigation are implemented every year. Despite these efforts, it is neither possible nor desirable to entirely prevent floods in Bangladesh. The need for control of water varies within the country. In rural areas, floods when not too extreme provide a livelihood and the rural population has, over the centuries, perfected its ability to cope with the water. In many such regions it is desirable to maintain the beneficial aspects of floods, eg. for the water demanding rice and jute and crops and for inland fisheries. Under these circumstances, control rather than elimination of floods is required. In some parts of the country, water management is achieved by use of polders which are isolated by ring dikes form the surrounding areas and are drained by a combination of gravity and pumps. However, these structures are not feasible in all regions. In most flood prone regions full flood protection can only be given to particularly vulnerable land such as the main cities and important components of the country’s infrastructures. The management of water has to be optimised on a seasonal basis with due consideration for the sometimes conflicting interests of flood control, irrigation drainage and other agricultural requirements. Thus, the planning and design of water management projects in Bangladesh requires a delicate and difficult balance. It requires both an overall and detailed understanding of the complicated physical and sociological processes which are interlinked by the water. These interrelationships make many of the problems too complex for the traditional project-to-project type of planning. Management tools, capable of integrating all relevant processes and connecting easily with other important disciplines, are needed. MATHEMATICAL MODELING TOOLS FOR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 191

Flood Action Plan (FAP) and Flood Management The floods of 1987 and 1988 focused attention on the need to develop a long-term strategy to cope with the complexity of flood impact. A characteristic difference between the 1987 and 1988 floods was that in the former, high river levels were associated with very high internal rainfall, while in the latter, the flood peaks of the Ganges and Brahmaputra, swollen by heavy rainfall and snow melt in their upper catchment areas, coincided at their junction in Bangladesh. The extent and complexity of these flood underlines the fact that total elimination of flooding is neither feasible nor it is desirable from the agro-ecological perspective. However, the protection of people lives and their places of habitation is absolutely essential as are the commercial and industrial centers. With these thoughts in minds, the government prepared a National Flood Protection Programme and, with the assistance of UNDP specialists carried out a Flood Policy Study. In addition, teams of specialists from Japan, USA, China and France undertook studies of flood impact and mitigation. As a direct result of these studies, the government established a list of ‘Eleven Guiding Principles’ which are summarised as follows:

Phased implementation of a comprehensive Flood Plan aimed at: protecting rural infrastructure; and controlling flooding to meet the needs of agriculture, fisheries, navigation urban flushing and annual recharge of surface and ground water resources. Effective land and water management in protected and unprotected areas. Measures to strengthen flood preparedness and disaster management. Improvement of flood forecasting and early warning. Safe conveyance of the large cross border flows to the Bay of Bengal by channelling it through the major river with the help of embankments on both sides. River training to protect embankments and urban centres. Reduction of flood flows in the major rivers by diversion into major distributors and flood relief channels. Channel improvements and structures to ensure efficient drainage and to promote conservation and regulation. Floodplain zoning where feasible and appropriate. Coordinated planning and construction of all rural roads, highways and railway embankments with provision for unimpeded drainage.

The Flood Action Plan (FAP) has been focused on the identification planning and possible construction of technically, economically, environmentally and socially feasible high priority project. FAP follows a staged approach through which regional and supporting studies will provide input into the planning and design of the main components of this 192 PAUDYAL, G. N.

and subsequent Action Plans. This work investigates the feasibility of embankments on both sides of the major rivers, river training, channel improvement and protective infrastructure for major towns and studies the issues of watershed management, coastal afforestation and sustainable development of agriculture and fisheries.

Surface Water Simulation Modeling Programme (SWSMP) The Brahmaputra, the Ganges and the Meghna form the backbone of the water system in Bangladesh; with lesser rivers and khals these form a complex drainage pattern. Through equations and data, the computer-based mathematical model represents this complex drainage pattern. The model can simulate the passage of floods through the rivers as they are at present. They may then be altered on the computer to test the effect of design proposals, e.g. embankments and barrages. Such a powerful tool is vital for flood control and drainage planning in Bangladesh. The Surface Water Modeling Centre (SWMC) was established because of the widespread recognition that the effective control and utilisation of water resources in Bangladesh is vital to the economic and social development of the country. Mathematical models of the complex river system are in this respect indispensable tools for an integrated approach to planning and design. The objectives of the first phase (SWSMP-I) were i) to develop the local capability in surface water simulation modeling including a sustainable institutional set-up within a permanent Master Plan Organisation (MPO), now the Water Resources Planning Organisation (WARPO), and ii) to develop a structured approach to modeling with a General Model covering the whole country and regional models for the six regions. The Surface Water Modeling Centre (SWMC) under WARPO is implementing the programme with technical assistance from the Danish Hydraulic Institute (DHI), and with financial support from DANIDA. The first phase of the programme completed at the end of 1988. The ongoing second phase (SSWSMP-II) with a duration of four years will be completed by November 1993. The GOB has requested support for a third phase, which is presently being considered by DANIDA.

SIMULATION MODELS The Danish Hydraulic Institute (DHI) has in recent years assisted in improving the planning and management of water resources in Bangladesh by means of the provision, further development and application of such management tools. A dosen engineers work permanently in the country in close collaboration with local professionals. DHI’s services cover a range of specialised fields within hydraulics and hydrology from the planning and management of extensive field survey programmes to the transfer and application of MATHEMATICAL MODELING TOOLS FOR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 193

advanced mathematical modeling systems and laboratory equipment. DHI’s models and expert advice are contributing to the extremely difficult and challenging problem of managing the world’s largest river delta.

Modeling System for Rivers and Channels The main modeling tools being used in Bangladesh is the MIKE 11 package develped at the Danish Hydraulic Institute. MIKE 11 is a professional engineering software for the simulation of flows, water quality and sediment transport in estuaries, rivers, irrigation systems, channels and other water bodies. It is a dynamic, user-friendly, one-dimensional modeling tool for the detailed design, management and operation of both simple and complex river and channel systems. Due to its exceptional flexibility and speed, MIKE 11 provides a complete and effective design environment for engineering, water resource, water quality management and planning applications. MIKE 11 has been designed for efficient application on relatively low-cost high performance microcomputers under MS-DOS or UNIX. It owes its exceptional power to advanced programming techniques (eg. dynamic memory allocations and data structures) and mathematical model formulations which have been tested, developed and proven in a great many applications since the 1960s. The modeling strategy has been to develop detailed regional models of the six separate regions of Bangladesh. The General Model covers the main rivers of almost the entire country and can thus provide the hydraulic linkages among the regional models. The SWSMP aims at developing a suite of mathematical river models 9the SWMC models) at two different scales based on the generalised MIKE 11 software package. The models are:

The General Model (GM) covering the entire area of Bangladesh with the exception of Chittagong and the Hill Tracts. It includes the main rivers of the country, totalling 2,410 km in length. The GM serves as a planning and design tool for large-scale flood control, drainage and irrigation projects. It is also the basis for an upgrading of flood forecasting facilities. The GM also provides boundary conditions for:

Six Regional Models including: (Figure 3) South East Regional Model (SERM) bounded by Meghna to the west, the Bhairab Bazaar to Comilla Railway line to the north. South Cnetral Regional Model (SCRM) the Padma to the north, the Lower Meghna to the east and the Gorai/Madhumati to the west. 194 PAUDYAL, G. N.

South West Regional Model (SWRM) bounded by the Ganges to the north, and Gorai/Madhumati to the east. North West Regional Model (NWRM) bounded by the Jamuna to the east and the Ganges to the south. The North Central Regional Model (NCRM) bounded by Old Brahmaputra to the north and north-east, Jamuna to the west, Padma to the south and Meghna in the east. North East Regional Model (NERM) covering the Upper Meghna basin down to Bhairab Bazaar.

The regional models provide a finer resolution of the regional river and drainage network than does the GM. They are used as planning and design tool within the particular region allowing to describe effects of embankments along minor rivers, polders, regulators, pump stations, dredging etc. They may provide boundary conditions for local, sub-regional models which may be required for detailed analysis of specific projects. Each of the models contains a rainfall run-off component to simulate the catchment run-off and a hydrodynamic component with emphasis on simulating water levels and flows in rivers and khals. Two additional modules enhance the applicability of the MIKE 11 software package, namely i) a salinity module for simulation of salinity intrusion in rivers and ii) a sediment transport module which allows simulation of cohesive and non- cohesive sediment transport rates. Tailored sediment transport models are being developed for each of the regional models as well as the GM. Tailored salinity models are being developed for the GM, the SCRM and the SWRM. The model development takes place in three stages from pilot stage through full model stage to verified stage, applicable in broad terms to planning and pre-feasibility studies; feasibility studies and outline design, and detailed studies respectively.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER A primary objective of many of the projects in which DHI is participating in Bangladesh, is the enhancement and consolidation of the local expertise in advanced modeling techniques. Part of the scope of many projects is therefore the transfer of hydraulic and mathematical modeling technology. However, the transfer alone is not sufficient. The educational aspect of the transfer process is of paramount importance to ensure an integrated technology transfer. Only through such an approach can future users achieve a thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the techniques, whether a hydrodynamic computer code or hydraulic laboratory testing equipment. From participation in technology transfer for more than two decades, DHI fully appreciates the importance of the integrated technology transfer. MATHEMATICAL MODELING TOOLS FOR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 195

FIGURE 3. REGIONAL MODELS

TRAINING STRATEGY For one of the ongoing projects, the Surface Water Simulation Modeling Programmes (SWSMP), the training is accomplished through parallel steps:

new members of the Surface Modeling Centre (SWMC) team receive training in basic open channel hydraulics, hydrology, computer systems and mathematical modeling through courses offered in co-operation with the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology. short courses are given by the DHI staff at SWMC on special topics, such as morphology, water quality and flood forecasting. Key staffs receive in-depth training through workshops held at DHI in Denmark; the workshops are designed to impart theoretical knowledge, to acquaint the participants 196 PAUDYAL, G. N.

with new developments and to extend the scope of modeling work through taning in advanced modeling. on the-job-training of all staffs involved is provided at SWMC. The SWMC staff carry out nearly all the model developments and applications with the DHI staff mainly instructing and supervising. At least three years of modeling experience is recommended to ensure that the experience gained is consolidated.

REFERENCES Danish Hydraulic Institute Mike, 11 – A Micro-computer Based Modeling System for Rivers and Channels. Danish Hydraulic Institute. 1992: Management of a River Delta Environment, Danish Hydraulics, No. 11., Bangladesh. The Government of Bangladesh and the World Bank, 1992: Proceedings of the second Flood Action Plan Conference, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Water Resources Planning Organisation, 1992: Surface Water Modeling Center, SWSMP II, Interim Report II. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 197-205

ON CHOICE OF CHISAPANI PROJECTS: A CASE OF INADEQUATE PLANNING

DINESH L.SHRESTHA1 AND GUNA N. PAUDYAL2

ABSTRACT

Multi-criteria analysis technique is useful in planning water resources development. This paper discuses the use of this technique in selection of the best alternative plan in a river basin. The Karnali basin in Nepal is taken as a case study.

INTRODUCTION Water resources projects are required for meeting water, energy and food security needs of a society. Meeting these needs can have conflicting objectives which complicate decision- makings. The process of planning, deciding and implementing water development projects should be comprehensive. Decisions should be based on thorough investigation of several options which are analysed holistically. In Nepal, in the planning process of water resources development projects, such an approach has been missing. The process has been ‘project’ focused rather than development oriented. In many cases, a project is perceived as the solution and pursued. Comprehensive assessment and evaluation of several options in the planning process is necessitated due to several factors. While stimulating development, water projects also bring about economic, social and environmental impacts that may be adverse. In some cases, the adverse impacts may be more than the projected gains. Optimum utilisation of water resources should consider first the basin as the unit followed by careful and articulate planning that considers all consequences. Any project might be optimum if the evaluation and selection are based only on benefit cost criterion. The challenge is to identify and select an optimal option from several alternatives. The planning approach using such a concept however, is complex. It involves several activities. These consist of estimating future needs, defining goals and objectives, formulating planning alternatives and future operational policies, quantifying and analysing potential benefits and adverse consequences. Projects like Pancheswor, Chisapani and Kosi High Dam need to be evaluated under multi-criteria perspective and assessed if they are really

1 Water Resource Engineer, Cowl Int’l (P_ Ltd., Kathmandu. 2 Team Leader, Danish Hydraulic Institute, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 198 SHRESTHA, D. L. AND PAUDYAL, G. N.

the best options in the respective basins. The best plan may be selected several alternatives, thus identified. One aspect of complexity arising in he analysis of the Water Resources Systems (WRS) can be attributed generally to the inherited multi-criteria and purpose that a system is required to meet. Consequently, the application of mathematical modelling techniques in WRS becomes increasingly difficult when the criteria and purpose are large in number. Further complications are introduced if the nature of different criteria are competing or conflicting. The Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) technique has been developed to deal with such situations. In fact, the objective of employing a MCDM approach is to help the decision makers, who are usually not technically trained, to make better decisions. The method may be also used for resolving the debate on ‘large versus small’.

GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF MCDM TECHNIQUES In its simplest form, the main features of an approach using multiple criteria are (Roy, 1989):

(a) a well-defined set ‘A’ of alternatives ‘aj’

(b) a model of prefernces tationally structured from a set of criteria ‘gi’ and (c) a well-formulated mathematical problem/aggregation technique.

As opposed to a mono-criterion model, in a MCDM (problem) the concept of optimality must be dropped because a solution which maximises one objective will not, in general, maximise any of the other objectives. As a result the notion of a non-inferior (non- dominated or Parieto optimal) solution is introduced, where any improvement in one objective can be achieved only at the expense of degrading another. Therefore, set, ‘A’ of alternatives ‘aj’ constitutes only those alternatives which are non-dominated.

In other words the admissible set ‘A’ constitutes alternatives ‘aj’ which are the sub- set of all feasible alternatives (solutions) and possess the property such that as one moves from one non-dominated alternative to another non-dominated alternative and one objective function improves, then one or more of the other objective functions must decrease in value (Goicoechea et al., 1982).

A set of criteria ‘gi’ has to be identified by the actors of the decisions analysis. A criteria is used to ‘sum-up’ evaluation of consequences related to a same point of view. These for example, would be cost, safety, environment, etc. A criterion can be defined as a function associating a real number g(a) to each alternative ‘a’. In order to facilitate multicriteria analysis, a decision matrix for evaluation is often prepared depicting an array of alternatives versus criteria. The alternatives are then evaluated with the help of appropriate mathematical models which aggregate the criteria values. This is the most difficult stage of MCDM analysis, and can never be purely ON CHOICE OF CHISAPANI PROJECTíS A CASE OF INADEQUATE PLANNING 199

mathematical exercise. To varying degrees, it reflects the economic, social, cultural or even moral values accorded to individuals objectives by those charged with decision making responsibilities (Kindler, 1988). A decision thus reached is inevitably the result of a compromise between several conflicting criteria. Effectiveness of any MCDM approach in practice will depend on how easy it is to understand, how well it addresses the appropriate issues or problems, and how adaptive it is to various dynamic institutional setting (Loucks and Somlyody, 1986).

RESERVOIR SYSTEMS PLANNING IN KARNALI BASIN By virtue of its potential, the Chisapani Multi-purpose Project, the largest single project in the Karnali basin, has been the subject of interest to both Nepal and India since the early 1960s. The investigation of the project was started in 1962-63 by Nippon Koei of Japan, then in 1968 by Snowy Mountains hydroelectric Authority, followed again in 1975-77 by Norconsult/Electrowatt. More recently (1986-90) Himalayan Power Consultants (HPC) prepared the detailed feasibility study under the loan assistance from the IDA (US $ 12.5 million) and local costs provided by the Government of Nepal. The new proposal envisages to construct 270 m high rock-fill dam with 28,000 million m3 storage reservoir to generate 10,800 MW installed capacity from an underground power-houses. Despite effort and resources put for the investigations of the project, the prospects for water resources development in the basin is still fuzzy. The planning activities never seems to end, while Nepal and India, the two benefiting nations, have to yet resolve technical issues recommended by HPC in 1990. The Indian stand on benefit evaluation, and sharing has emerged as a major hurdle in the process. The mode of projects financing which is yet to materialise and construction management aspects are other important factors yet to be discussed. And above all, the political commitment of the two countries has not yet been forthcoming. None of these studies have led to rational utilisation of water resources of the Karnali basin. It is particularly important to understand that the hydraulically interconnected reservoir systems, as in the case of the Karnali Basin impose overriding influence of each other in their operational behviours and, in turn, affect the potential benefits. As such, failure to select a best configuration of a system of reservoirs in the basin would preclude the optimal utilisation of water resource in the Karnali Basin. In this respect, the Chisapani Project should not be viewed in isolation but with other feasible reservoir projects in the basin. There are several prospective reservoir systems that can be developed in the upper reaches of the basin which have received little attention. Moreover, the social and environmental considerations in the planning of large-scale water resources development projects have received less attention. The focus and emphasis for Chisapani has failed to 200 SHRESTHA, D. L. AND PAUDYAL, G. N.

look for alternative development plans within the basin which might come out to be better alternatives. The study so far has been biased towards Chisapani Project only. On the basis of earlier studies, and its own reconnaissance investigation, HPC has identified six large-scale hydro projects–KRIB and KRO7 (run-of-river)–in main stem of the Karnali, BRO4 and BRO3 on the Bheri river, and SRO1 and SRO6 on the Seti river. Identification of these projects, relatively small in size to the Chisapani, has prompted comparison of other alternatives consisting of different combinations of those smaller projects with the Chisapani Project. Alternative development plans (a set of alternatives constructed from the combinations of smaller reservoirs) are designed such that each alternatives is capable of generating firm energy in the range of ±20 per cent that of the Chisapani. Operational studies of the Chisapani and other alternative plans are undertaken for evaluating energy generation capabilities and water supply for irrigation employing deterministic as well as stochastic techniques supplemented by simulation (Paudyal et al., 1990). The sketch of prospective alternative reservoir system plans is shown in Figure 1. In addition, to firm energy capability (primary benefit indicator), other three criteria, capital construction cost (HPC, 1989), environmental impact indicator and social impact indicator are also considered. Environmental impact indicator includes aggregated values of potential reservoir induced mass erosion and estimated losses of forest and agricultural lands. As the social impacts emanate from the disturbances caused to the historically established human habitats in the area, only the estimated size of displaced population due to submergence has been assumed to represent the social impact indicator. Obviously, Decision Makers (DM) may wish to include several other criteria in the analysis. Regional development, flood control benefits, downstream environmental degradation, disturbances to aquatic lives, seismic hazards, dam-break hazards and so on could be included as other criteria. In the present analysis these are not considered explicitly. At the first place, most of these criteria are expected to be less discriminatory unlike those considered in this work, and hence, will not influence much in the multicriteria analysis. Secondly, the present exercise is just an academic pursuit where no real decision makers are involved. And most importantly, the quantification of these criteria is extremely difficult at the moment due to the data-base gap. The decision matrix for the problem is shown in Table 1. Altogether four criteria have been considered to evaluate eleven feasible alternative reservoir system plans. It can be noted that the eleventh alternative plan is dominated by alternatives 1,2,3,4 and 5 with respect to all the four criteria. Thus alternative BRSR can be excluded in the MCDM analysis to be followed.

MCDM MODLES AND ANALYSIS In this study, three MCDM models have been developed. The first model follows the ON CHOICE OF CHISAPANI PROJECTíS A CASE OF INADEQUATE PLANNING 201

conventional compromise programming approach (Zeleny, 1982) in which the available information and decision situations are assumed to be precise. The second model is the modification of the first model, which enables the concept of ‘fuzzy goals’ to be incorporated in the analysis (Shrestha, 1991). The third model is based on the work of Bellman and Zadeh (1970), known as decision making in a fuzzy environment. For brevity, the methodological aspects of these models are not presented here.

Alternative Constituting Reservoirs 1. CHPN Single Large Reservoir 2. KRB4 KR17 and BR04 3. KRB3 KR17 and RB03 4. KRS1 KR17 and SR01 5. KRS6 KR17 and SR06 6. KR41 KR17, BR04 and SR01 7. KR46 KR17, BR04 and SR06 8. KR31 KR17, BR03 and SR01 9. KR36 KR17, BR03 and SR06 10. KR16 KR17, BR03 and SR06 11. BRSR BR04, SR01, BR03 and SR06

FIGURE 1. ALTERNATIVE RESERVOIR SYSTEM PLANS 202 SHRESTHA, D. L. AND PAUDYAL, G. N.

TABLE 1 DECISION MATRIX FOR THE MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS Criteria Alternative Cost Ind. Benefit Ind. Inviron. Ind. Social Ind. CCCa, M$ FECb, MWc EIIc, Index NPAd, Nos. 1. CHNP 3869 1860 0.990 10,000 2. KRB4 4361 1910 0.460 47,512 3. KRB3 4566 2003 0.719 75,234 4. KRS1 3698 1620 0.232 16,603 5. KRS6 3907 1664 0.290 26,170 6. KR41 5014 2079 0.524 52,889 7. KR46 5243 2124 0.582 62,456 8. KR31 5245 2173 0.783 80,667 9. KR36 5447 2214 0.841 90,178 10. KR16 4688 1908 0.348 31,547 11. BRSR 4606 1548 1.007 1,20,618

Note: a – Capital Construction Cost; b – Firm Energy Capability; b – Environmental Impact Index; d – Population to be Affected (Number)

Decision analysis is performed to choose from among available alternative the ‘best’ alternative plans. In fact, this part of the planning process requires a good deal of information from DMs. Since it is not practical at the moment to have the preference information from the real DMs, they are simulated through a selected group of ten ad-hoc DMs. The information have been used to estimate the criterion weights. A decision analysis like one in this always involves multiple DMs. As such, the analysis must take into account different preference relationships expressed by individual DMs. Since the criterion weights calculated for each DM are normally different from one another, the solutions reached need not necessarily be the same for all of them; in most of the cases they would differ. In order to comprehend this situation, two approaches to ‘collective’ decision are considered: prior aggregation and posterior aggregation. Solutions are obtained for three different modes in each MCDM model. Three solution modes of the first two MCDM models are designed such that the preference parameter ‘p’ in the model assumes a value of 1,2 and , respectively. Similarly, the third MCDM model has been solved for three definitions of fuzzy decisions using an additive function, a multiplicative function and min-aggregator, respectively. In principle, the solution modes for p = 1 and that using an additive functions in the third MCDM model are somewhat similar. Similarly is the case for p = and that using min-aggregator. In the latter case, the criteria are assumed to be competitive and noncompensatory (the solution mode for p = in compromise programming can be considered exactly the case of competitive criteria if the criterion weights are equal for all criteria). ON CHOICE OF CHISAPANI PROJECTíS A CASE OF INADEQUATE PLANNING 203

TABLE 2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM T HREE MCDM MODELS: PRIOR AGGREGATION

Alternative Systems MCDM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Model CHPN KRB4 KRB3 KRSI KRS6 KR41 KR46 KR31 KR36 KR16 Compromise Programming: Lp = 1 8* 4 7 1** 2** 5 6 9* 10** 3** Lp = 2 9* 22** 7 4 3** 5 6 8 10** 1** Lp = 00 10* 1** 6 7 4 3** 5 8* 9* 2** Enhanced Compromise Programming: Lp = 1 7 4 6 1** 2** 5 8* 9* 10* 3** Lp = 2 8* 4 6 3** 2** 5 7 9* 10* 1** Lp = 00 10* 2** 7 5 3** 4 6 8* 9* 1** Fuzzy Decision Model: Def. - 1 7 4 6 1** 2** 5 8 9 10 3** Def. - 2 8* 2** 5 8* 3** 4 6 7 8* 1** Def. - 3 8* 2** 6 8* 4 3** 5 7 8 1**

Note: ** the group of ‘best’ plans; *: the group of ‘bad’ plans

TABLE 3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM THREE MCDM MODELS: POSTERIOR AGGREGATION

MCDM Alternative Systems Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 CHPN KRB4 KRB3 KRS1 KRS6 KR41 KR46 KR31 KR36 KR16 Lp = 1 29* 64 29* 78** 77** 48 37* 15* 3* 70** Lp = 2 27* 70** 45 57 61 53 41 19* 7* 70** Lp = oo 23* 72** 51 43 57 57 43 25* 10* 69** Enhanced Compromise Programming: Lp = 1 30* 66** 34* 85** 73** 46 30* 12* 2* 72** Lp = 2 27* 71** 42 61 65** 51 36* 18* 4* 75** Lp = oo 21* 73** 50 47 60 53 41 23* 7* 75** Fuzzy Decision Model: Def. - 1 30* 66** 34* 85** 73** 46 30* 12* 2* 72** Def. - 2 0 78** 50 0* 71** 61 46* 30* 0* 84** Def. - 3 0 80** 54 0* 57 62 50 33* 0* 84**

Note: **: the group of ‘best’ plans; *: the group of ‘bad’ plans

The results obtained from two approaches of collective decision, prior and posterior aggregation are presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. 204 SHRESTHA, D. L. AND PAUDYAL, G. N.

CONCLUSION This study confirms that the Chisapani project is not a superior alternative given that the present decision is inadequate. In fact, among ten alternative systems, the Chisapani Project has been placed under the group of ‘bad’ alternatives in most of the solution modes considered in this study. It is evident from the analysis that, in addition to the economic criteria, environmental and social impacts are equally important in the decision analysis of such a large-scale system. The often illusive benefits that would be gained if big projects were launched should not be the only criteria. The latter two criteria also allow a wider discrimination among the alternatives, which is essential for a ‘good’ decision making. Clearly, the alternatives consisting of smaller reservoirs have stood best. This implies that an extensive investigation should be carried out further with detailed feasibility studies of all prospective hydropower systems in the basin. All important criteria should be considered before final conclusion is drawn and decisions are made. The present analysis however, is limited in its scope, and is an attempt to illustrate and stress the need to consider water resources development goals in a broader perspective. The construction costs and the number of population that would be affected by construction of the reservoirs have been grossly estimated in this analysis. A refined estimate is needed in the future studies. Comprehensive investigations are required to assess the possible losses of impounded water (in the reservoir) through seepage. This is particularly important in the case of the proposed Chisapani reservoir. Attempts should be made to quantify additional environmental parameters such as impact on aquatic ecosystems, water quality and associated hazards due to dam-break. These require efforts to strengthen environmental data-base.

REFERENCES Bellman, R. E. and Zadeh, L. A., 1970: Decision-Making in a Fuzzy Environment, Management Science, Vol. 17, pp. 141-164. Goicoechea, A., Hansen, D. R. and Duckstein, L., 1982: Multi-objective Decision Analysis with Engineering and Business Applications, Wiley, J. (ed.), New York. HPC, 1989: Karnali (Chisapani) Multi-purpose, Draft report (Annexes A-R), Himalayan Power Consultants Ministry of Water Resources, HMG/Nepal, Kathmandu. Kindler, J. 1988: On the Multi-objective Framework of Environmentally Sound and Sustainable Water Resources Management, International Journal of Water Resources Development, Vol. 4 No.2, pp. 117-123. Loucks, D.P. and Somlyody, L., 1986: Multi-objective Assessment of Multi-purpose Water Resources Projects for Developing Countries, Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 10, No. 1. Paudyal, G. N. Shrestha, D. L. and Bogardi, J. J., 1990: Optimal Hydropower Configuration Based on Operational Analysis, Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, ASCE, Vol. 116, No. 2, pp. 233-246. ON CHOICE OF CHISAPANI PROJECTíS A CASE OF INADEQUATE PLANNING 205

Roy, B., 1988: Decision aid and Decision-making, Paper presented at EURO IX –TIMS XXVIII, Paris. Shrestha, D. L., 1991: Multi-criteria Decision-making in Reservoir System Planning, Dissertation No. WA-91-3, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok. Zeleny, M., 1982: Multiple-criteria Decision-making, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, USA. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 207-217

SMALL RATHER THAN BIG: CASE FOR DECENTRALISED POWER DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL

BIKASH PANDEY Programme Manager Intermediate Technology Development Group, Nepal

ABSTRACT

Power generation is an important use of Himalayan waters. The crucial question is the appropriateness of the approach best suited to Nepal to develop its hydropower resources. Enhancing local capacity to design, manufacture and implement hydropower development is an approach which may also be suitable for adoption in the Indian Himalaya.

INTRODUCTION The energy planning approach taken so far in Nepal has not met the promise of “inexpensive and plentiful hydropower to all in the country”. The additional promise of ‘lucrative export of hydropower to neighbouring countries’ and ushering in development through the hydro money appears to be another ‘castle in the air’. The unequivocal message of centralised planning has been “Electricity is the responsibility of government and as many will get it as government has resources enough for.” Unfortunately, government has only had enough resources to provided electricity to 10 per cent of the population in over 30 years of national planning. The policy of government to monopolise hydropower development has meant, first of all, that no investment has been made in the sector by local entrepreneurs or users. Secondly, a short sighted belief on the part of planners that “Hydropower development in the country is simply an increase of the MW’s on the grid” has stymied growth of local capability to develop hydropower. Schemes have become prohibitively expensive as government has chosen to build them using international contractors. In none of the large hydro schemes constructed by government to date has there any significant involvement of local industry or skilled man power in the design or construction of the schemes. The end result has been limited power generated at very high unit costs and lost opportunities for capability building within the country for sustained hydropower development. As the annual increment in power demand grows, larger and larger projects are being proposed, thereby completely by-passing local industry and making it increasingly impossible for the local industry to ever play and role in hydro development. If the option 208 PANDEY, B.

of developing hydropower through local industry is lost, it condemns the Nepali consumers in urban centers to escalating electricity prices on the one hand and periodic power shortages on the grid on the other. Ultimately it will deny rural Nepalis access to electric power ever. The approach that needs to be followed to make hydropower widely available, in sufficient quantities and at reasonable prices is two pronged.

First, the responsibility of power generation needs to be decentralised and handed to the consumer and local entrepreneurship (the so-called private sector). Second, local industry needs to be heavily involved in hydropower development and steps should be taken to build its capability.

Already significant, proven capability for the construction of economic Micro, Mini and Small Hydropower plants exists in Nepal. It is realistic to extrapolate that the in- country capability can be built up within a reasonable time to meet the bulk of the growing power needs. Enhancing local capacity is a natural way to develop hydropower and international experience shows that it is well possible to achieve the required level of growth. A strategy of pursuing two levels of hydropower development approach will help meet the objective. The approaches are:

1. Small Hydro for meeting the demands of the grid and large economic centres. 2. Micro and Mini Hydro for decentralised load centres and rural electrification in the hills and mountains.

Larger plants should be built once the capability of national industries to construct them has been developed in the course of the proliferation of the Small, Mini and Micro hydropower development. The range of the hydropower schemes are defined in Table 1. Micro and Mini Hydro are considered to be ‘Stand Alone Installations’ not connected to the national grid. Small Hydro are those connected to the grid, though undoubtedly there will be exceptions.

TABLE 1 RANGE OF HYDROPOWER SCHEMES Type of Hydro Range in kW Micro Up to 100 Mini 01 to 000 Small 100 to 15000 DECENTRALISED POWER DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL 209

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES-INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES What is the international experience of hydropower development? It is instructive to note how extensive hydropower resources development in some European countries took place. Switzerland and Norway, the two countries considered to be rich in hydropower are taken as examples. Development in both the countries started with small scale but widely scattered power plants. Each plan was often used to supply power to one industry or to electrify one community. The countries used the opportunity and the plants as a base to build up the inhouse capability to later twentieth century when Switzerland was predominantly (65 per cent) rural and not connected to a central grid, over 99 per cent of its power plants were below 1,000 HP (746 kW) capacity (Meier, 1985) as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 HYDROPOWER STATIONS IN SWITZERLAND (1914) Power (HP) Number of % of total Total Power (HP) % of total Stations 0-20 6,005 88.3 38425 7.4 21-100 52 7.7 35049 6.8 101-1000 214 3.2 90507 17.5 >1,000 57 0.8 353360 68.3 Total 6,799 100.0% 517341 100.0%

The situation in Norway was almost identical, with over 1,800 stations operating with a capacity of less than, 1,000 kW each by 1944. The experience which can be drawn from the history of electrification of Norway demonstrate the efficiency of placing responsibility for the electricity supply on local undertakings (Vinjar, 1980) Closer to home, in China the development of small scale hydropower started later, only in 1956. However, progress was brisk and by 1979, more than 90,000 stations were built. In 27 years, China was able to achieve a 3000 fold increase in its Small Hydro Capacity. The development of small hydropower in China in different period is shown in Table . The development of hydropower in Norway, Switzerland and China is characterised by a decentralised approach. The plants were invested in and developed for the most part by the users themselves. This is strikingly so even in the centrally planned economy of China. By following a policy of “self-construction, self-management, and self- consumption,” the Chinese government handed over the responsibility for small hydro development to the communes and the countries them selves and provided only modest subsidies from the Central and Provincial level. A second common feature of the hydro development in the three countries is their strong emphasis on local manufacture and local construction. Local participation has most 210 PANDEY, B.

TABLE 3 DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL HYDRO PLANTS IN CHINA Year Progress 1956 2.8 MW installed; 300 plants 1959 350 MW added 1973 Total of 1,800 MW installed; 50,000 plants 1975 Total of 2,900 MW installed; 60,00 plants 1979 Total of 6,300 MW installed; 90,000 plants 198 Total of 8,500 MW installed easily been utilised in the civil works of hydro schemes. In addition, all three countries have a strong base for turbines manufacture. Small Hydro development lends itself naturally to the participation of the local industry. Use of local industry on one hand keeps the cost of hydropower low, and on the other hand the hydro industry contributes greatly to improve the local economy.

SMALL HYDRO DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL-PUBLIC SECTOR That Small Hydro is not by its very nature superior to the larger-scale units and that the process by which it is developed is the main determining factor in its success is demonstrated by the development of Small Hydropower in Nepal-first by the Small Hydel Development Board (SHDB) and now by the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA). Since the early 1970’s, 29 Small Hydro plants of total capacity 4,600 kW have been commissioned by these two organisations. The construction cost per kW of these plants have been very high-at 1992 costs they average US $ 8,000 per kW installed. These schemes are clearly uneconomic to run for the NEA. The Water and Energy Commission Secretariate (WECS) has estimated that the NEA’s Small Hydro projects receive an average revenue of US$ 30 per installed KW per year over the lifetime of the project when depreciation is included (though interest on capital is presumable not) This amounts to a continual subsidy of about US$ 100 per consumer. Study of these schemes points that they are plagued by poor planning, unclear objectives, wide variation in costs, poor load factor, and inappropriate management structures among others (East Consult and IDS, 1988). SHDB and NEA installed Small Hydro Schemes have not been able to expand at any appreciable rate. These schemes are not seen to be the vehicle for rapid electrification though to some extent they have assisted the local hydro industry. However, their limited growth and frequent use of imported equipment even when local equipment has been available has stunted the growth of local capability.

HYDRO DEVELOPMENT-PRIVATE SECTOR

Small Hydropower The Butwal Power Company (BPC) is the only private Sector Company involved in DECENTRALISED POWER DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL 211

developing Small Hydropower in Nepal. Table 4 gives costs for the projects that it has developed. Full use of local companies for construction and high use of labour have reflected in the very reasonable unit cost for generation. Capability building has been evident within the organisation as evidenced by its progress from building a one MW scheme in 1980 to its bid to build the 60 MW Khimti hydropower plant, in 1992. What is especially encouraging is that the company proposes to build the Khimti plant at US$ 1,667 per KW, a cost level similar to its earlier plants.

Mini and Micro Hydro There is a very healthy decentralised development of Micro and Mini Hydro in the country. Rural entrepreneurs and organised rural communities have put in their own resources, taken loans from the Agricultural Development Bank, and sometimes received government grants to build Mini and Micro Hydro schemes. Local manufactures have fabricated the equipment and done the actual installations. Local and international NGO’s have been involved in organising communities and estimated that over 800 small turbines have been installed. At an average of 10 kW each, these turbine unites are producing around 8,000 kW of power. The majority of these installations are used for direct drive mechanical milling and are not used to produce electricity at all. Some of the milling units have add on alternators that are powered by the turbines in the evening for village lighting. About a hundred units that produce electricity only are now installed. It is estimated that around 1,000 m kW of electricity is produced from the stand alone and the ‘add-on’ schemes together.

TABLE 4 COST OF SOME PRIVATELY CONSTRUCTED SMALL HYDRO SCHEMES

Name of Project Total Cost in Capacity (kW) Cost per kW US$ x106 (kW) in $ Tinau 0.76 1000 760 Andhi Khola 5.42 5100 1062 Jhimruk (ongoing) 20.00 12000 1667 Khimti (proposed) 100 60000 1667

(Records of Butwal Power Company)

ECONOMIC COSTS OF ELECTRIC POWER-LARGE VS SMALL If we assume commercial international interest rates at 10 per cent for hydropower development, a quick comparison can be made between the economics of larger schemes compared to Small Hydro and to Mini/Micro Hydro. The comparison made is on the 212 PANDEY, B.

basis of the cost to the customer served by the different options. The assumptions made are as follows: a. The economic life of the Small Hydro scheme is taken to be 40 years compared to 50 years of the large hydros. Mini and Micro Hydro have been given a life of 20 years. This is reflected in the different rates of depreciation. b. The load factor of grid connected units is assumed to be 60 per cent. Stand Alone Mini and Micro Hydro are assumed to have a load factor of 50 per cent. The 50 per cent load factor has been achieved in Micro Hydro schemes by:

Using a flat traiff. The flat tariff charges consumers by subscription of wattage rather than by energy. The tariff encourage the consumer to utilised his subscribed power 24 hours a day rather than just at the peak hours. Making available storage cooking devices. The cookers can store electric energy as heat during off-peak hours. Storing heat in this way allows cooking for a normal size family to be done with as little as 250 W to 300 W of power. c. The operation cost of Mini/Micro is high, partly because it includes the cost of selling the power to consumers as well. d. For grid connected hydros a constant rate of US cents 2.5 per kWh for transmission on the grid and distribution to consumers is assumed. The cost per kW for Mini/Micro includes the cost of transmission and distribution at approximately 30 per cent of total cost. The comparative costs are given in Table 5.

TABLE 5 COMPARATIVE ANNUAL RUNNING COSTS (IN US$ OF HYDRO PER KW Expense Large Small Mini/Micro Interest rate (%) 10 10 10 Depreciation (%) 2 2.5 5 Operation ($) 5 5 40 Maintenance (%) 1 2 3 Total 135 150 220

The totals listed are given for the annual expenses for a scheme constructed at US$ 1,000 per kW. This rate refers to the cost of generation for Large and Small Hydro whereas for Mini/Micro Hydro it includes the cost of distribution as well.

Income from one kilowatt production would be, At 60 per cent load factor = 0.6 x 8,760 units x rate (US$) DECENTRALISED POWER DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL 213

at 50 per cent load factor = 0.5 x 8,760 units x rate Cost of generation for a Large Hydro build at US$ 1,000 per kW

135 = $ = US cents 2.6 (8,760X0.6)

Adding US cents 2.5 per kWh for transmission and distribution, Selling rate + Generation rate +Rate for transmission and distribution = US 2.6 cents+US2.5 cents = 5.1 cents The cost of generation and the required selling rate per kWh has been listed for a range of installed costs kW for Large, Small and Mini/Micro Hydro in Table 6. At 1992 costs, the Large Hydropower schemes built by the government average out at US$. 3,456 per kW. The list of the costs are shown in Table 7.

Repeating the calculations of Table 5, the rate that needs to be charged to the customers of NEA for the electricity produced by the large hydro schemes above including the cost for transmission and distribution is:

TABLE 6 GENERATION COSTS AND SELLING RATES (US CENTS) FOR HYDRO

Cost per kW Large Small Mini/Micro (in US$) gen Sell gen sell gen 1000 2.5 5.1 2.9 5.4 5.0 1,500 3.8 6.3 4.2 6.7 7.1 2,000 5.0 7.5 5.6 8.1 9.1 3,000 7.5 10.0 8.4 10.9 13.2 4,000 10.0 12.5 11.1 13.6 17.4 8,000 22.2 24.7 33.8

The bold refers to the Cost per kWh that is closest to actual cost.

TABLE 7 COST OF LARGE HYDRO CONSTRUCTED BY HMG/N Name of Project Total Cost Capacity Cost per kW In US$ X106 (MW) in $ Kulekhani 100 (1981) 60 1,667 Marsyangdi 276 (1989) 69 4,000 Kali Gandaki (proposed) 290 (1992) 100 2,900 Arun III (proposed) 1400 (1992) 402 3,483 214 PANDEY, B.

Large Hydro US cents 11.1 per kWh At 1992 costs, schemes built in the private sector average out at US$ 1,575 per kW. The cost of these schemes are listed in table 4. It would give the customer a rate based on the above calculations including the cost of transmission and distribution of electricity. Small hydro US cents 6.9 per kWh For the four micro-hydro schemes listed in table 8 at 1992 prices, the cost in US$ is 1570 per kW. This implies the cost to the customer of. The argument being made here is that the approach to the development of hydropower determines the cost to the customer. The above analysis clearly shows that energy from large hydropower schemes constructed by HMG/N using international contractors with minimal involvement of local industry and man power is over 50 per cent more expensive than Small Hydro and Mini/Micro Hydro which use local industry extensively for construction.

TABLE 8 REPORTED COST OF SOME PRIVATELY CONSTRUCTED MICRO HYDRO SCHEMES IN NEPAL Name of Project Total Cos In US$ Capacity (kW) Cost kW in $ Jharkot (1989) 46430 36 1290 Barpak (1991) 65728 50 1315 Ghandruk (199) 84507 50 1690 Sikles (199) 173913 100 1739

CAPABILITY AND CAPABILITY BUILDING A number of local entrepreneurs and manufacturers are engaged in the hydropower industry in Nepal. Some of the local industries deal mostly in turbine and accessories. The capability of the turbine industry for Small, Mini and Micro Hydro at present is given in Table 9.

Small Hydro In the Small Hydro range, which the first two companies in table 9 can supply, the industry can fabricate about 5 MW of turbines and accessories per year with their existing equipment and manpower. With further investment and possible addition of a few companies, it is estimated that the industry can achieve a growth of 15 per cent a year. Within five years, this would double capacity to 10 MW and in 15 years the industry would be capable of fabricating 40 MW of turbine and associated equipment per year. In the same 15 years, equipment will have been installed to generate close to 240 MW of power. This kind of rate of growth has been seen to be clearly possible from the example of China. The capability to fabricate equipment at the rate of 40 MW per year and an added capacity of 240 MW on the grid in 15 years will put Nepal well on the path to DECENTRALISED POWER DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL 215

TABLE 9 TURBINES AND ACCESSORIES Company/Address Types of Turbine Capacity of individual unit (kW) 1. Nepal Hydro and Electric Butwal Francis 0.10-2 MW Pelton 0.03-2 MW Repair capability upto 10 MW 2. Balaju Yantra Shala (Kathmandu) Cross Flow 3-250 3. Kathmandu Metal Industries (Kathmandu) Pelton 0.5-200 Cross Flow 0.5-40 Propellor 0.5-20 MPPU (Turbo) 1-10 4. Thapa Engineering Industries (Butwal) Cross Flow 12-125 5. Nepal Machine and Steel Structures Cross Flow 2-80 (Butwal) 6. Butwal Engineering Works (Butwal) Cross Flow 1-75 7. Nepal Yantra Shala (Patna) Pelton 1-60 Cross Flow 1-40 8. Agro Engineering (Butwal) Cross Flow 5-25 9. National Structure and Engg. (Patan) Cross Flow 3-15 MPPU 2-15 10. Nepal Power Producers (Bhanktapur) Electrical and Control Equipment 11. Development and Consulting Services Installation of Equipment (Butwal) Research and Development self-reliance in hydropower development. The addition of 240 MW on the grid in 15 years or an average of 16 MW each year means an average investment in a local hydro industry of US$ 24 million each year. This will mean an investment of around US$ 10 million year in electromechanical equipment. The effect of injecting close to US$ 10 million into the specialised hydro electro-mechanical engineering industry every year for 15 years will have a multiplying effect in terms of the man-power development and training, and development of other accessory (metal fabrication, casting, machine tooling) industries of a magnitude not seen in Nepal before. It is only this kind of investment into the future that will enable the Nepali hydro industry to build the Medium and Large Hydro Plants that will be needed to fulfill demand on the grid in the country in the next century.

Micro Hydro Companies involved in installation and equipment fabrication of Micro Hydro have a capability at present of about 1.5 MW per year. With sustained 15 per cent growth every 216 PANDEY, B.

year, this industry could be fabricating and installing a total of 12 MW per year within a 15 year period. Under this scenario, the industry will in turn have made a total installation of 70 MW. To put this in perspective, 70 MW will be enough to provide electric lighting to one third of the entire rural population living in the hills and mountains of Nepal by the year 2008.

Civil Works More than 50 per cent of the cost of Small Hydro goes for civil constructions. It is also less specialised than the electro-mechanical portion and thus the part that lends itself most easily to the involvement of local companies. The main Civil Works company in Small Hydro in Nepal at present is Himal Hydro. Its capability alone at present is about 3 MW per year and the organisation is gearing up to do about 12 MW per year in the next few years. Himal Hydro is a specialist in tunneling, an important capability considering Nepal’s topography. However, there about five other ‘A’ class contractors in Nepal of a similar capability level as Himal Hydro which could be involved in the Civil Works of Small Hydro. With investment in training and equipment they will also be able to undertake the tunneling activities. The growth potential of the civil works capability is clearly higher than 15 per cent per year.

Feasibility of Small, Mini and Micro Hydro The Task Force report (WECS, 1991) identifies a total of 300 MW of projects in the 1 MW to 15 MW range, and 1000 MW in the 16 MW to 50 MW range. The list is not comprehensive, and more installations will be investigated by the private investors themselves once government regulations regarding private sector development become clear. In the Mini and Micro Hydro range, it is estimated that each of the mountain and most of the rural hill districts in Nepal have the hydropower sites to built project to supply the lighting needs as well as some industrial needs of the district. Though comprehensive survey of Micro and Mini Hydro sites for all the districts in Nepal have not been done, the inventory studies carried out by WECS in a number of districts and the author’s own surveys support the observation.

CONCLUSION Hydroelectricity in Nepal can be a major asset to the country’s overall development if it is developed correctly. The way it has been developed to date, however, as a monopoly by government, and with little strengthening of local capability, has made electric power out of reach for the vast majority of the population. For those who do have access, it is prohibitively expensive, For developing hydropower the present approach should be radically changed so that capability for the construction of hydro projects in the country is DECENTRALISED POWER DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL 217

developed first. With the approach advocated in this paper, the 15 years scenario would be as follows.

1. Engineering and construction capability in the country could be increased to build 40 MW Small Hydro and 12 MW of Micro and Mini Hydro per year. 2. A total of 240 MW could be added to the grid from Small Hydro and 70 MW of Micro/ Mini Hydro could be developed to electrify rural areas. These schemes would be owned by private entrepreneurs or by user communities. Privately owned Small Hydro schemes would sell energy to the National Grid. 3. This 310 MW of power could be produced at a cost of US$ 500 million. Most of the investment would come from the private sector. The cost works out to less than half the cost per kw produced by schemes such as Arun III that are being proposed by government at present and at full government investment. 4. The cost to produce and sell electricity could be reduced to about US 7 cents from existing costs today of US 12 cents.

Developing hydropower starting from Micro, Mini and Small Hydro and slowly increasing capability to build larger hydro plants will provide reasonably priced hydropower to both the rural and urban population in Nepal. With private companies investing in the industry, dependence on international aid for hydropower will diminish. A local hydro industry will help develop the engineering and manufacturing base of the country . The approach would create jobs and employment.

REFERENCES East Consult and IDS, 1987: A Study of Small Hydropower Projects-Problem and Prospects, Kathmandu, National Council for Science and Technology. WECS, 1991: Identification of One MW to 50 MW Range Hydroelectric Projects for private Investment. Meier, U., 1985: Local Experience with Micro-Hydro Technology, St. Gallen. Vinjar, A. G., 1980: Electrification of Rural Areas Based on Small Scale Hydro-electricity Plants, 11th World Energy Conference, Munich. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 219-227

HUGE DAMS AND TINY INCOMES

MICHAEL THOMPSON International Academy of the Environment, Geneva and the Musgrave Institute, London.

ABSTRACT

Sustainability of water development initiatives is greatly affected by technical choices. These in tum, depend upon the cosmologies inbuilt in the make-up of institution. Grater the technological inflexibility of institutions the lesser the level of resilience to accommodate changes forced by the interventions.

A few years ago, a vigorous debate erupted between the two hydro-electric projects that were being built, almost side-by-side, in Khumbu, One was a ‘mini-hydel’ project, funded by the Austrian government, which involved building a concrete dam in the V-shaped valley of a tributary of the Dudh Kosi (the river that drains the southern flank of Mount Everest). The other was a ‘micro-hydel’ project, funded by an NGO, in which the water from a village spring was fed into a tube on the hillside below the village so as to drive a small turbine. The first scheme was designed to provide lighting and power for at least two villages and a monastery; the second was designed to provide just lighting for the village whose spring it harnessed (and, during the day, power for the kitchens of its two trekkers lodges). The proponents of the smaller scheme argued that the larger scheme was inappropriate, both physically (on the grounds that its sitting was not sound) and socially (on the grounds that the people it was intended to serve would never be able to take control of it). The proponents of the larger scheme denied all this, and pooh-poohed the smaller scheme as romantic and ineffectual. The debate rumbled on, with neither side emerging as the clear winner, until one day when Mother Nature herself joined in. A break- out from an ice-dimmed lake swept away the Austrian dam, just a week or so before its ceremonial opening. Break-outs such as this are quite common, and this particular one had been predicted, vociferously, by Western experts. The local people, too, have long been aware of these sudden and violent events, and their villages are seated well clear of them (and of other natural hazards, such as avalanches). As well as destroying the Austrian project, the break-out swept away several bridges immediately downstream of its wake. Within less than a week these bridges had been replaced, but not the Austrian dam. (Ives and Messerli, 1989). 220 THOMPSON, M.

Replacing a bridge is quite an undertaking, and yet it is something that happens all the time in Nepal. Moreover, it happens without any government or aid providers’ involvement (usually, indeed, without their even knowing it is happening). It is done by local community action, and it is the local commons managing institutions that make that action possible. Men are mobilised, large trees that have been reserved against this sort of contingency are felled, dry stone abutments are built and, in an astonishingly short period of time, communications are restored. In other words, there is tremendous resilience within the local population, its physical resources, its skill, its knowledge and its institutional arrangements. That the bridges were rebuilt, just like that, and the Austrian dam was not, I would argue, is the most significant feature of this story. People with tiny incomes can look after themselves extra-ordinarily well, but there are some things–huge dams, for instance–that they can not look after. And, to the extent that they come to depend these things that they cannot look after, their resilience is inevitably depleted. If we then advance the hypothesis that sustainable development and resilience enhancement are one and the same, then this little story about the rival hydroelectric schemes takes on an almost paradigmatic importance.

TOP-DOWN CONTROL BOTTOM-UP RESILIENCE:CAN THEY BECOME COMPLEMENTARY? Since most policy assessment ignores that of which it knows nothing, this hypothesis, if valid, has serious implications. Policy makers, however, tend not to warm to this hypothesis, because they so often themselves on its receiving end. Ministry of Agriculture officials in Indonesia, for instance, did not even know of the existence of the Balinese system of water temples (and water priests) that, in mediating between the interests of all the villages on the island, provides the key to the whole complex of irrigation regimes, cropping sequences, pest control strategies and so on. Now that they do know, however, these government officers are able to develop policies that enhance, rather then destroy, that local resilience. But would it be possible to design policies that enhanced resilience even in those inevitable situations were the policy makers have no knowledge of how the local resilience is being secured? My argument is that this can be done and, indeed, that it is already operational in terms of a recent critique of the method by which projects such as the Khumbu hydroelectric schemes are conventionally evaluated. That method goes by the name of Technology Assessment (TA).

INDICATORS OF RESILIENCE DEPLETION Technology Assessment (as originally conceived by US Congressman Emilio Dadario and consequently institutionalised in the Office of Technology Assessment and a host of similar HUGE DAMS AND TINY INCOMES 221

outfits across the developed world) sets out to anticipate the social and environmental consequences of technology. Many of these consequences, unfortunately, are not just unanticipated; they are unanticipable. No one, for instance, could have foreseen the effects CFCs would have on the ozone layer, nor could the inventors of the vacuum - cleaner have realised that their labour-saving device would have the added advantage of pretty well ridding the temperate industrialised countries of the human flea. It is this serious and ineradicable shortfall between what Technology Assessment promises and what it can (at best) deliver that is the source of what David Collingridge (1980) has called ‘the control dilemma’: at the early stage of a technology’s development we do not know enough about it, and by the time we do know enough about it it’s too late! The result, Collingridge has shown, is entrenchment: after just a few step along the development road we find ourselves more and more locked into that particular line and less and less able to switch to other possible lines. Long before the Austrian dam was swept away, much of its human support had vanished. Indeed, it was almost impossible to find anyone, in Nepal or Austria, who was still in favour of it. Yet, even after representations had been made at the highest levels, and the Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, was personally convinced of its inappropriateness, the dam was unstoppable. So unstoppable, in fact, that it is now being rebuilt in a slightly different place! All of this suggests that technological entrenchment equates with resilience depletion, and technological flexibility with resilience enhancement. Everything, therefore, hinges on whether we can detach Technology Assessment from its impossible commitment to anticipating everything and redirect it towards the more modest goal of avoiding entrenchment (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990). In other words, is there anything in the little we do know at the earliest stage of a technology’s development (or, in this case, transfer) that would tell us whether it is headed for entrenchment of flexibility: resilience depletion or enhancement? Collingridge’s answer is ‘Yes, there is’ and he was worked up these little early warning signals into four technical indicators of inflexibility:

Large scale Long lead time Capital intensity Major infrastructure needs early on.

These technical indicators have now been complemented by four organisational indicators of inflexibility:

‘Single mission’ outfits. 222 THOMPSON, M.

Closure to criticism Hype (as in ‘If we don’t cover the Himalaya with trees Bangladesh will sink for even beneath the waves’) Hubris (often in the form of over-confidence as to what the future holds, or categorical certainty that ‘There is no alternative’).

The idea is that if all these little red lights come on (as they do, for instance, with the European Fusion Energy Program) then you should start worrying. Conversely, if none of them light up (as, for instance, is the case with solar collectors on house roofs) you can relax. The method works best as a way of comparing alternatives, which, of course is precisely what the debate over the Khumbu hydro-electric schemes was about. It is also what all the looming debates over the harnessing of the Himalaya’s prodigious water resources are about!

SPEARATING THE INFLEXIBLE SHEEP FROM THE RESILIENT GOATS Himalayan villagers, despite their tiny incomes, are capable or carrying out and managing some large-scale engineering projects. Their terraced hillsides, with their millions of gallons of impounded water, testify to that! But they create these projects step by modest step, and if one part should fail (as a result of land-slip, for instance) the rest is not affected. Often the damage is repairable; when it is not, then the affected fields can be down-graded to rainfed terraces (bari) and perhaps new, irrigated terraces (khet) can be added elsewhere. This is a process that is going on is every village and on every hillside throughout the Himalaya, and the challenge for those who wish to promote sustainable development is, not to destroy this self-managing and highly adaptive system, but to get their technological innovations caught up by it. Bridge-building, of course, is already caught up in it, micro-hydel (if it turns out to work) could be caught up in it, and mini-hydel (on present showing) probably cannot become caught up in it. Scale, clearly, is an important factor. A bridge is a much smaller undertaking than a concrete dam together with its power house and distribution network. Putting a spring into a tube, fitting a generator and cabling up a few houses, on the other hand, is (novelty apart) on a par with building a bridge. Of course, the stones and the timber for the bridge are immediately to hand, whilst the generators have to come from halfway round the world. But they do not cost too much, broken ones are easily replaced and, once every village has got such an electrical system, the rival generator companies, we may be sure, will see to it that their agents are out there on the ground, together with financing arrangements, servicing contracts and so on. Consumer sovereignty, with the consumers in this case being all the village level commons managing institutions, will ensure that the grassroots control the technology and not vice versa. Lead times too are important, because you have to wait until the thing is finished HUGE DAMS AND TINY INCOMES 223

before you can learn whether it will work (and whether you can work it). New irrigation channels are tested within a year (and bridges even quicker) and, since each is a fairly small scale undertaking, it is not the end of the world if they do not work. But 5 or 10 years, which is what it takes for a mini-hydel scheme to go from conception to switch-on, is probably more than the system can stand. It is this over-slow learning curve that is responsible for so many aid projects ending up as embarrassing, rusted-up relics. In much the same way, capital intensity is not easily coped with. Activities like bridge building and terrace construction certainly involved scarce resources-timber, land, labour and so on – but they hardly involved money at all. If these undertakings fail then those who have initiated then will have wasted a lot of sweat, but they will not be locked into crippling debt repayments for years to come. In something like the micro-hydel scheme the capital is contributed by the NGO, but eventually (if the scheme is a success) there comes the moment when the whole thing is handed over to those who use it. The crucial calculation for them is how much it will cost them if the worst that could go wrong goes wrong. A few lengths of pipe and a new generator (with the old one taken in part-exchange) add up to a tidy sum, but it is orders of magnitude less than what they would let themselves in for if they took over the Austrian project the day before the next break out! Finally, and most telling of all, there is the question of infrastructure needs. Concrete dams, unlike drystone walls, need cement, and cement needs cement works. Cement works need electricity, and trucks, and roads, and people qualified in engineering... on and on. Such ramifying requirements, of course, need to be planned, integrated, financed and managed, which is where all the organisational indicators of inflexibility come into the picture. Bridge-replacement does not require there to be a commons managing institution specifically dedicated to bridge-replacement; the one that handles the grasing land and the village forest can readily cope with that. And if the NGOs finally come up with a viable micro-hydel system then it will cope with that too. But what is there for a National Cement Authority to do apart form banging on about the need to replace every brick-built hut with a modern concrete frame house, all the while refusing to listen to those who question the wisdom of a massive rearrangement of the infrastructure that will, among other things, destroy the indigenous and agreeably small-scale brick industry?

CONCLUSION I have argued that resilience enhancement, technological flexibility and sustainable development are so closely associated that you will not achieve any one in the absence of the other two. The 8 indicators of technological inflexibility provide a simple and effective method for ensuring that specific development projects do not violate this general threefold requirement. These indicators work best as a way of assessing alternatives which, of course, are always being generated in a democratic and pluralised society. 224 THOMPSON, M.

In the example I have used, the resilience that has to be enhanced is that of the typical Himalayan village. In other settings, where the incomes are not quite so tiny, and where there are other institutions (private limited companies, for instance, and various utilities with their customers and their regulators), projects that would deplete a village’s resilience can be coped with quite easily (Thompson, Warburton and Hatley, 1986). The people of Kathmandu, for instance, can enhance their resilience by adopting water supply projects, or transport systems, that would be disastrous in Khumbu. But, whatever the setting, these indicators can be relied on to sort out the less flexible from the more flexible. The articulation of institutional requirements in developing and sharing the Himalayan river water was sought thorough the following themes:

Legal dimensions of co-operation in trans-boundary water resource development within a changing global environment. Comparison of legal frameworks of water-related organisations in the basin countries. Technical education in South Asia and its ability to meet the challenges posed by envisaged development intervention into the natural regimes of Himalaya -Ganga. Institutional dimensions of power exchange arrangements between neighboring countries, including private sector involvement. Lessons from the past. Problems of water-sharing, especially in water-poor basins such as the Bagmati, West Rapti, Kankai, Ram Ganga, etc. Flood mitigation measures, including flood warning systems and their management. Development of navigation system: institutional preconditions for sustained operation.

The confusion and conflict arising out of upstream diversions and the related political implications were articulated in the Bangladesh perspective on sharing of Ganga waters between India and Bangladesh (Abrar). On the other hand, the prospects for extending regional co-operation to include Himalayan rivers flowing into the southern aspect of the Himalaya from glacial origins in the trans-Himalaya was brought froth in the case study on Tibetan water resources (S. Prakash). New institutional thrusts are needed to discard the present situation, dominated as it by is secrecy and suspicion. Development of hydro-electric projects on Bhutan’s rivers demonstrate the primacy of politics over economics, and the use of the bargaining strength of the larger neighbour at the expense of long-term cordiality (Subba). The first step in this direction is expected from the largest country of the region, India, which also has the required high competence in the related fields of science and technology. Specific modalities on how these could be achieved are proposed (K. Prasad). This need for greater societal awareness of the various managerial dimensions of new or planned interventions on shared river systems was sought to be established HUGE DAMS AND TINY INCOMES 225 226 THOMPSON, M.

through a comparative case study two international rivers–in the Swiss–German border in the Alps and the India-Nepal border in the Himalya (Gyawali and Schwank).That the starting point of such an understanding of the managerial dimensions of water resource exploitation would have to be the micro-level use in a water scarce basin is a view articulated in a study of the water resources development including the tank systems in the Krishna basin (Reddy). As with the first theme, the Meeting was only able to initiate the rudimentary discussion towards an institutional articulation of the demand for, and use of, water in the Himalaya-Ganga. The educational and training issues, and their role in bringing about professional growth to create the basin to meet the emerging challenges, have not been addressed. Flood forecasting and uncertainties associated with the phenomenon, including the influence of land use changes, are not discussed. Navigation as a part of the transportation system that is inter-linked, legal compacts, power exchange arrangements including grid discipline, pilferage and energy pricing, are other issues that did not receive required attention. In the Kathmandu deliberations, the focus was often on the need to strengthen regional co-operation at the state level, but arguments were also made for collaboration at the non-state levels. This reflected the nature of existing institutional mechanisms and pointed to the need for evaluating modalities of collaboration at various non-governmental levels among larger South Asian commonweal of water professional, media persons, voluntary organisation and the public at large. Data sharing surfaced as the common woe within this theme as well. Easy access to scientific information, open public hearings on development projects, and a more accommodative and understanding approach in the negotiations, were felt to be essential to change the existing situation. The Meeting recommended that India, which is the biggest user of the waters of the Himalaya-Ganga, should take the lead by adopting a flexible and understanding approach towards its neighbours in order to transform the present institutional framework, dominated as it is by bilateralism, capacity and suspicion. The onus for such a fundamental change, however, should not be left with the governments alone, in New Delhi or elsewhere. In a period characterised by non-governmental participation in policy innovations and regional collaboration at all levels, professional and social organisations should come out to share this responsibility. The Meeting also recommended that a start could be made towards mutual understanding in the Himalaya-Ganga by the establishment of a common information and data base for the various river basins of the region-covering social, anthropological, cultural and ecological information. At the local and micro-water levels, where real development or underdevelopment is ultimately going to manifest, public opinion articulated through local institutions should be given prime consideration in decisions related to water resource HUGE DAMS AND TINY INCOMES 227

management. Acceptable adequate compensation, and not forced evictions should be the basis for approval of river valley projects involving submersion.

REFERENCES Collingridge, D., 1980: The Social Control of Technology Milton Keynes, Open University Press. Ives, J. D. and Messerli, B.,1989: The Himalayan Dilemma: Reconciling Development and Conservation, Routledge, London and New York. Schwarz, M. and Thompson, M., 1999: Divided We Stand: Redefining Politics, Technology and Social Choice London, Harvester Wheatsheaf and Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press. Thompson, M. Warburton, M. and Hatley, T., 1986: Uncertainty on a Himalayan Scale London, Ethnographica. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 229-234

ISSUE AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN SHARING THE GANGES WATERS

C. R. ABRAR Assistant Professor International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh

ABSTRACT

State-centric power politics remains the main constraint leading to the current stalemate in resolving problems of sharing Gangas water between Bangladesh and India. Equitable sharing of Ganges water between India and Bangladesh could be made sustainable, if ëhigh politicsí is replaced by ëlow politicsí. Greater linkages between non-governmental bodies and dialogue can lead to resolution of the dispute.

INTRODUCTION The issues and constraint leading to the current stalemate in resolving problems of sharing the Gangas water between Bangladesh and India is essentially the result of traditional state-centric power politics where pursuit of ‘national interest’ reigns supreme. Such a paradigm presupposes bifurcation of the domestic and international spheres each subject of its own characteristic traits and laws (Mansbach and Vasquez, 1998). Under such condition there is a constant and ceaseless competition for power perceived in military terms, amongst the nation states. Such competition leads to aggressive pursuit of short- term national interests leading to stalemates in negotiations and conflict resolution. In such a scenario, decision-makers’ manoeuvering capacity is limited as they are constantly motivated to cater to their own domestic constituencies.

SHIFTING PARADIGMS Over the last half a century, foreign policy of South Asian states, as in other regions, has been conducted within this dominant paradigm, resulting in occasional outbreak of hostility and non-resolution of outstanding bilateral and multilateral problems. Needless to say, such a situation has given rise to significant bolstering of the armed forces at the cost of welfare of the people as well as strengthening of the state vis-a vis the civil society. Given the inadequacy of the dominant paradigm to resolve outstanding disputes, including that of sharing of vital common resources, such as the waters of the Ganges in the last fourty years, time has come to take a fresh look at the problem. This involves discarding the old power-centric paradigm and developing a new approach, which would 230 ABRAR, C. R.

view "nations as organised human populations coping with physical laws and resource requirements similar to those confronting other species" (Pirages, 1989). In the new paradigm, issues which have been hitherto categorised as ‘low politics’, economics, ethics and ecology replace ‘high politics’ issues involving political use of military force. The increasing role of non-military technologies and control of natural resources are recognised as important sources of power. National security is perceived in terms of economic well- being, steady economic growth, a competitive effort in civilian research and development of, the and access to, required national resources (Pirages, 1989). An important element of the new paradigm is the erosion of the state’s authority and the assertion of civil society. The move to a new paradigm of this kind is all the more necessary as concerns are expressed about the adequacy of the world’s resource-base in the face of rising demands due to increased population and technological development.1 One study (Global, 2000) suggests that degradation and impoverishment of the earth’s natural resource base is gradually eroding its ‘carrying capacity’- the ability of the biological systems to provide adequate resources for its human needs.

WATER RESOURCES IN SOUTH ASAIN CONTEXT This setting may be used to address the issue of sharing of a vital common resource, water, a resource over which about a tenth of world’s population is struggling to survive, facing alternate seasons of water surplus and deficiency. It may be pertinent to mention here that in the South Asia region, population is growing at the rate of 2.2 per cent per annum and one half of the half a billion people live below the poverty line (USAID, 1989). The magnitude of the problem of the region may perhaps be best appreciated by focusing on Bangladesh. Over 110 million people2 live on a flat deltaic mass of 5000 square miles with per capita annual income of less than 150 dollars. There is a heavy dependence on and resultant over-exploitation of, basic natural resources such as land water and forests. With declining soil fertility and rapidly disappearing forests, prospects for a better future appears bleak. Added to these are the occasional havoc of nature–floods, tropical storms and tidal surges–which have dealt severe blows to the national economy. For example, the flood of 1988 alone wiped out two-thirds of one year’s GDP in crop and livestock losses and infrastructural demages. According to one survey, some villager lost over half their annual income in just fourteen days. In the sub-Himalayan region, efforts at development on an individual country basis within the official framework has yielded little in the way of desired results. Furthermore, some of the environmental as well as developmental problems are regional in nature with respect to their causes and consequences. A feasible solution of the twin problems of poverty and environmental degradation in any particular country of the region calls for regional approaches. ISSUE AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN SHARING THE GANGES WATERS 231

Hopes were raised with the formation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). But subsequent developments confirmed yet again the severe limitations of official approached in addressing the twin problems of poverty and environment. A strong case therefore exists for taking fresh initiatives based on people’s participation and strengthening of civil society across national boundaries.

SHARING WATER OF GANGES: ISSUES AND CONSTRAINTS At this point our attention could be focussed on the issue of the sharing of Gangas water, a problem which has caused considerable tension between the upper riparian state, India, and the lower riparian Bangladesh. This problem has been inherited from Pakistani times and is a problem with little hope for resolution in the foreseeable future. Given the state of the information gap, it is worthwhile to put on record some pertinent facts, that may not be known or may be known only in a somewhat distorted manner. The problem began when uninterrupted flow of the Ganges into Bangladesh was hampered by the Indian withdrawal of large volumes of water after commissioning of the Farakka Barrage. This resulted in the reduction of the flow of water in the downstream reaches of Bangladesh. The quantum of water at the Harding Bridge during the pre-and post diversion periods are given below:

TABLE 1 QUANTUM OF WATER AT HARDINGE BRIDGE Period Years Availability in m3/s A. pre Diversion 1824 B. Post Diversion 1985 624 1989 438 1992 382 Source: Khan, 1993.

Until fourty years ago, all the rivers from upstream used to flow into the region without any structural interruptions. But currently India is withdrawing from the Ganges, Teesta, Khowai, Monu and Muhuri. Such interruption in the natural flow of water has caused severe detrimental effects on the economy and ecology of the lower riparian, Bangladesh. The issue has been dealt with at length by others (Khan, 1976; GOB, 1976; Abbas, 1982; Islam, 1984 and Khan, 1993) and here the multidimensional effects of the withdrawal of water are briefly presented. 232 ABRAR, C. R.

ENVIRONMEMTAL IMPACT

Hydro-morphology The diversion of silt-free water from the Gangas into the Hooghli meant corresponding increase of silt in the water that enters into Bangladesh, raising the river bed and causing huge shoal formation (Islam, 1984). It also meant reduction in the hydraulic efficiency of drainage channels. Heavy siltation has led to drying up and reduction of the off-take of river Gorai, the main distributory of the Gangas.

Salinity Decreasing upstream flow has led to increased saline intrusion in the coastal area. Studies suggest that surface water salinity in the southern district of Khulna has gone up to 28000 µ mhos/cm in April, 1989, from the pre-diversion figure of 1800 µ mhos/cm. This has also resulted in the concomitant advancement northwards of the 500 µ mhos/cm salinity front by 280 km (Khan, 1993). The decreased level of soil moisture and the increased salinity levels have led to decertification in the region. The lack of surface water after the cessation of monsoon rains, experts believe, may turn a significant expanse into a arid land. Salinity has also caused irreparable damage to trees and vegetation cover and other local flora.

ECONOMIC IMPACT The economy of Bangladesh is critically dependent on the river system. Consequently, it has also been severely affected by the processes of siltation, soil erosion, decreased level of surface water and increased salinity resulting for the decreased flow of the Ganges.

Agriculture Studies suggest that 22.92 per cent of the net cropped area of 6.85 million acres has been either partially or fully affected (Hannan, 1980) The changes in river condition has decreased the capacity to irrigate since irrigation pumps and projects in the area became inoperative during the dry season (Islam, 1984). For example the Ganga-Kabadak pump project at Bheramara operated at 60 per cent of its potential capacity.

Fisheries Low flow of water and increased salinity have led to severe curtailment of landing of fish and disruptions in the food chain and the life cycle of the fish population. Decline in fish catch in the Ganges and its tributaries has also adversely affected millions of fishermen and reduced the supply of cheap protein (Islam, 1984). ISSUE AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN SHARING THE GANGES WATERS 233

Industry Wood from the Sundarbans has been sustaining newsprint and paper mills, as well as match and furniture factories. But increased salinity has caused damages to these industries. Reduced water flow and increased salinity have also affected thermal power plants. Their running costs have become much higher since sweet water has to be brought in from distant areas.

Navigation Important sections of the riverine navigation routes have also been affected due to upstream withdrawal, leading to disruptions, or even occasional closure, of ferry services.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS Details of the impact mentioned are perhaps not fully known and not viewed in the spirit of constructive regional cooperation. This appears to be the major cause leading to failure of innumerable meetings, technical sessions, ministerial and summit talks, all of which were undertaken within the framework of nation-centered dominant paradigm. Given this situation, a possible way out of the impasse might be to activate the processes of regional exchange which are based on the alternative paradigm of promoting greater linkages between non-governmental bodies and initiatives. Such an approach merits attention from all those who are concerned with resolving the issue of sharing the Ganges water between the riparian countries rationally and equitably. Possible option include greater exchange of information at non-governmental and non-official level and periodic meetings between professionals and organisations from all riparian countries. In this way, it may be possible to build an informed public opinion and initiate a constructive dialogue between the civil societies of the countries of the region, rather than only their governments. This may well enable the preoccupation with national interest alone to be replaced by a realisation that no country can ultimately benefit by itself. It is hoped that, once initiated, such constructive dialogues will lead to a more sympathetic understanding of the mutual problems by public opinion in all the riparian countries. Such a process might eventually succeed in influencing the respective policy- makers of each country. This would also serve to undermine the preexisting paradigm based on narrow national interests, which has so far failed to generate meaningful cooperative development of water resources in the sub-Himalayan region.

NOTES 1 For a detail account see Findlay and Findlay, 1987; Global 2000; Pirages, 1989. 2 According to World Bank projection, the population of Bangladesh is likely to increase to 170 234 ABRAR, C. R.

million in 2010 and 205 million in 2025.

REFERENCES Abbas, B. M., 1982: Ganges Water Dispute, University Press Limited Dhaka. Findlay, A. and Findlay, A., 1987: Population and Development in the Third World, Methuen, Nuw Yourk. Government of Bangladesh, 1976: White Paper on the Ganges Water Dispute, September. Hannan, A., 1980: Impact of reduced low flow of the Ganges, paper presented at a seminar of the Department of Water Resources, BUET, 23rd August. Islam, M. R., 1984; Effects of the Farakka Barrage on Bangladesh and International Law, BIISS Journal, Vol.5., No.3, Dhaka. Islam, N., 1991: The Ganges Water Dispute: Environmental and Related Impacts on Bangladesh, BIISS Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3 Dhaka. Khan, A. H., 1993: Water: Challenge of the 21st Century: Bangladesh Perspective, Paper presented at the national seminar on Development Challenges of the 21st Century: Bangladesh Perspective, organised by the Institution of Engineers, Bangladesh on 24th January at Rajashahi. Khan, H. R., 1976: Effects of Farakka Barrage on Bangladesh, The Bangladesh Times, April. Mansbach, R. and Vasquez, J., 1981: In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics, Columbia University Press, New York. Pirages, D., 1989: Global Techno-politics, The International Politics of Technology and Resources, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, California. The Global 2000 Report to the President, US Government Printing Office, 1980. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 235-238

A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF WATER RESOURCES IN TIBET AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HIMALAYAN REGION

SANJEEV PRAKASH Mountain Ecologist and Economist EcoTibet.

ABSTRACT

Fresh water and hydropower are the major resource endowment of Tibet. Only a small percentage of the potential remains utilised at present. Development has been beset with problems of inadequate technology and poor maintenance. Further utilisation of water resource in Tibet requires identification of ways of raising local capabilities, assessments of possible impact of development on the beliefs and religion of the Tibetan people, understanding of hydrological and geomorphic factors including glaciology, resource regimes and atmospheric conditions.

INTRODUCTION Tibet has among the highest freshwater resources per capita of any region in the world. A preliminary desk-top analysis in 1992 (CTA, 1992) calculated and annual average of 3 104,500 m of freshwater per capita, exceeded only by Iceland, New Zealand and Canada (WRI, 1988). Despite the vast arid area and generally sparse precipitation over most of the trans-Himalayan region, Tibet’s hydrology is varied and by no means negligible. It forms an interesting and complementary contrast to the better studied hydrological systems south of the main Himalayan ridge, to which it is linked through the major ‘antecedent’ Himalayan rivers. The principal rivers that rise in Tibet include the Indus, Sutlej, Karnali, Arun, Subaransiri, Tsangpo, Lohit, Salween and Mekong. Together they account for an annual freshwater budget of 625 km3. At rough estimate, about 90 per cent of this goes into transboundary flows, i.e. to countries in South and South-East Asia (CTA, 1992). As may be expected given the low precipitation pattern over most of Tibet, a large proportion of this budget is comprised of table or base flows: perhaps as much as 70 per cent (CTA, 1992), which is twice the figure for the Indian Himalaya, or for Asia as a whole (WRI, 1990). The combination of stable hydrology and steep gradients has significant implications for hydropower. The Himalaya is generally conceded to have 200-250 Gigawatts1 of hydropower potential (Verghese, 1990). This may be matched by the Trans-Himalaya: Tibet’s hydropower potential is estimated at 250-300 Gigawatts, more than half of it 236 PRAKASH, S.

concentrated in the Tsangpo basin (SYC,1984). Less than one per cent of Tibet’s freshwater and hydropower potential is utilised at present (CTA, 1992; UNDP, 1986). The principle obstacles to balanced water resource development include low local demand, the great distance from load centers and hurdles of accessibility, altitude and technology. China’s principal load centers are many thousands of kilometres from Tibet, while South Asia’s though closer, present problems of transnational cooperation as well as the formidable physical obstacle of the Himalaya itself. The development of small hydropower potential in Tibet has a mixed record. In 1984, 80 per cent of total electric generation capacity representing 91 MW of electric power came from Small hydropower SHP (under 10 MW per unit). Annual electricity generation from such sources was just over 200 million kWh in 1984, while annual consumption per capita was a mere 127 kWh, which is low even by South Asian standards (UNDP, 1986). Contrary to general belief, the development of SHP in Tibet has been beset with problems of inadequate technology and maintenance. Latest figures show that 40 per cent of 816 SHP stations built have had to be scrapped or are unproductive, while the rest have performed well below expectations (Wang and Bai, 1991). Perhaps the only area with significant scope for collaborative hydropower development is the eastern Tsangpo/Siang basin. Here, across the great loop of the Tsangpo north of Arunachal Pradesh, the river drops 2,000 m over a course of just over 200 km. The Himalayan Hydropower project, conceived by a Japanese technical consortium in the 1970s, envisions an array of power stations yielding a total of 70,000 MW over this stretch. Preliminary studies have shown that a single project across this great bend, with its inlet in Tibet and the powerhouse in India, would be capable of generating 40,000 MW2. However, such a project might interfere with India’s own medium term plans to build large hydropower and flood control project on the lower Siang (Verghese, 1990). The development of the Siang/Brahmaputra’s gigantic potential is in turn being delayed by the remoteness of India’s principal load centers from the region, and the paucity of funds required for overhauling the Indian transmission grid and implementing 765/800 kV transmission schemes. Many of the factors outlined here are changing. For instance, Chinese load centers are bound to shift gradually closer to Tibet. In addition, the Chinese Government has announced its intent to create an industrial processing zone around Lhasa. Thus the economics of exploiting Tibet’s hydropower is bound to become more attractive in the future, though it will a long time before it is as attractive as in India or Nepal. It should be mentioned here that the only current attempt to develop a medium or large-scale hydropower project in Tibet has met with severe obstacles. The Yamdrok Tso Pumped Storage Scheme was intended to generate 90 MW by utilising a 850 m A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF WATER RESOURCES IN TIBET AND IMPLICATIONS 237

drop between Yamdrok Lake in Central Tibet and the Tsangpo River (CHI, 1990). This power was intended to serve the steadily growing (and mostly Chinese) population of the Lhasa area. However, the Yamdrok Lake is sacred to Tibetans and the project was stoutly opposed by senior Tibetan officials in the government, including the Panchan Lama, from its inception. Work on it could only begin under heavy armed guard in 1991, after the Panchan Lama has passed away (TIN, 1991). The project’s fate has been compounded by the fact that no credible environmental and social cost assessment seem to have been made, and many of the bilateral donors approached have been hesitant to be involved (CTA, 1992). Such social and cultural factors are an important aspect to consider in the development of hydropower and water resources in any inhabited mountain system or region. Particularly so in Tibet.

CONCLUSION Hydrological and geomorphic conditions endow Tibet with vast water resources, and the highest hydropower potential of any region in the world. There are economic and institutional obstacle impeding the effective utilisation of this hydropower in the near future. Man made condition change faster than natural regimes, however, and Tibet will retain its potential as long as the Himalaya stands in its present from. Further research must seek to take forward the work already done in physical geography, glaciology, resource regimes and atmospheric chemistry, among others. Research in hydropower must be accompanied by anthropological research on the impact of development on the subsistence, economy, beliefs and religion of the Tibetan people. The experience of small hydropower development in the region suggests that there is a concurrent need to raise the capabilities of the local people, who are the supposed end-users, beneficiaries, and often, the maintenance crew for this technology.

NOTES 1 This estimate, and presumably the preceding figure from Verghese, refers to theoretical potential. By this is meant the energy available in a region’s or country’s rivers if all of them are turbined to the border. Later figures refer to exploitable or technical potential, which offer better indicators of the hydropower that can practically be generated in a basin or country, now and in the foreseeable future. 2 This over three times the size of the largest hydropower projects being built at present such as the Three Gorges Dam proposed over the Yangtze, or the ltaipu Dam over the Parana river in Brazil/Paraguay.

REFERENES CHI, 1990: Chengdu Hydroelectric Investigation and Design Institute: Yangzhouyong Lake Pumped Storage Project, Ministries of Energy and Water Resources, Government of the People’s 238 PRAKASH, S.

Republic of China. CRA, 1992: Central Tibetan Administration of HH the Dailai Lama, Dharamsala: Tibet: Environment and Development Issues. TIN, 1991: Tibet Information Network, London: Reports from Tibet, March to August, Parts 1 and 2. SYS, 1984: Economic and Information Agency, State Statistical Bureau of the PRC, Hong Kong: Statistical Yearbook of China. Verghese, B.G., 1990: Waters of Hope, OXFORD IBH, New Delhi. UNDP, 1986: United Nations Development Programme, Beijing: Report on Tibet (Mimeo) . WRI, 1988: World Resource Institute: World Resources 1988-89, New York: Basic Books. WRI, 1990: World Resource Institute: World Resources 1990, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 239-247

TAPPING HIMALAYAN WATER RESOURCES: PROBLEMS, OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS FROM A BHUTANESE PERSPECTIVE

BHIM SUBBA Former Director General Department of Power, Bhutan

ABSTRACT

Except for the Chukha Hydroelectric Project in Bhutan there has been no meaningful cooperation between India and her neighbours in the exploitation of the tremendous water resources in the Himalayan region. The implementation of the Chukha project highlights both the opportunities and problems that lie ahead in the area of co-operation in water resources development. The prevailing perceptions and policies based on water resources as a political tool must change and direct economic issues brought to focus if mutually beneficial cooperative efforts are to succeed. Political will, sincerity of purpose and a spirit of compromise can be indicated by acknowledging some basic premises that are essential to mutual trust and healthy dialogues. These include differing perceptions regarding energy value, basic pricing principles, operational constraints, institutional arrangements etc. which have a bearing on negotiations. Given the present trend wherein the economic agenda of nations is exerting increasingly greater influence in government decision making, the prospects for a change in prevailing concepts with regard to co-operation in the area of water resources are bright. India, as the largest partner, must take a lead role in introducing the necessary attitudinal change.

INTRODUCTION: CURRENT RECORD OF CO-OPERATION It is a dismal reflection on the oft repeated statements of ‘goodwill, mutual trust, friendship and co-operation’ supposedly existing between India and her two small Himalayan neighbours that the tremendous water resources potential remains virtually untapped even as power shortages slows the growth of the region’s economy. Efforts to reach accords to develop the water resources in the Himalaya for the mutual benefit of participating countries have never ceased and discussions on numerous schemes continue. It is telling, however, that despite the severe energy shortage in the region only one project, the 336 MW Chukha Hydroelectric project in Bhutan, has come to fruition, a clear indication that ‘mutual trust’ has been in short supply. The scope and level of co-operation in different spheres which has enabled governments and leaders in the region to emphasise their ‘friendly relations’ only serves, unfortunately, to further accentuate their failure to remove 240 SUBBA, B.

obstacles in the way of co-operative efforts for development of water resources. Without a redefinition in the perceptions and principles now prevailing in the region on the issue of water resources development, given this poor past record, any optimism that the required degree of ‘co-operation’ will be achieved would be misplaced. While water resources have been the bone of contention between nations, often resulting in political disputes and conflict, there have also been accords that have enabled nations to mutually benefit from development of available potential. In the case of the Himalayan region there is no apparent cause for conflict, and instead, it is evidently clear that each nation stands to gain from development of these resources. Yet differences clearly persist. The present trend, therefore, where in political considerations set the tone of negotiations between India and her neighours must be reversed if agreements are to be reached. The complexity in the problems that continue to plague discussions between India and her neighbours on the utilisation of water resources are generated primarily by an approach that considers techno-economic parametres as subservient to the larger political issue. The prevailing strategy which seeks to arrive at accords on water resources based on political linkages and dependencies has clearly failed. Instead of prodding them towards agreement these factors have further distanced the nations as the smaller countries, ever careful not to be seen as selling out under political pressure, take an over-cautious view. Thus the political clout and economic power of India, in the context of water accords, have become its weaknesses rather than its strength. Till date the only symbol of meaningful cooperation in the development of hydro resources of the Himalayan region is the 336 MW run-of-river plant located at Chukha in Bhutan. The Chukha Hydroelectric Project, hailed as a shining example of Indo-Bhutan friendship and co-operation, has contributed s significantly to Bhutan’s revenues while providing the eastern region of India with sorely needed additional capacity. However, the immediate benefits notwithstanding, and politeness and diplomatic niceties apart, the project has generated its fair share of controversies and differences between Bhutan and India. The implementation of this project, which constitutes only a small fraction of the over 20,000 MW theoretical potential in Bhutan, provides lessons for all three countries in the region.

CHUKHA EXPERIENCE: PROBLEMS The accord which enabled the implementation of the Chukha project was signed between India and Bhutan in 1974. The simple accord defining broad parametres, project ownership, funding and implementation modalities, tariff and repayment terms, was drafted during a period when Bhutan lacked technical personnel and India funded almost all of Bhutan’s development programmes. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that India was not only permitted to undertake such a scheme in Bhutan, but was able to TAPPING HIMALAYAN WATER RESOURCES: BHUTANESE PERSPECTIVE 241

do so under her own terms. Since then, however, not only has Bhutan developed necessary technical skills to defend her position, but she has also diversified extensively in terms of fund mobilisation, substantially reducing India’s role both as donor and technical skills to defend her position, but she has also diversified extensively in terms of fund mobilisation, substantially reducing India’s role both as donor and technical advisor. Dissatisfaction with the tariff stipulated in the 1974 accord was expressed by Bhutan even before the start of power production from Chukha. The accord, framed at a time when Bhutan had no technical expertise, and when Bhutan was solely dependent on Indian assistance for her entire development, was clearly disadvantageous to Bhutan. Serious negotiations to revise the tariff and to formalise a Commercial Agreement for sale of Chukha power began in 1986. Six years later, although the tariff has twice been revised, electricity sales from Chukha are still conducted on an ad-hoc basis since a final agreement has yet to be reached. The difficulties in concluding a simple sales agreement for a project already completed is an indicator of the hurdles that the two countries are likely to face in trying to reach fresh accords for further exploitation of the resources in Bhutan. In the absence of detailed discussions prior to talking up the project, ambiguities and inequities in the 1974 accord featured prominently in the tariff negotiations and other related issues also received attention. In the process, substantive differences emerged- differences which were highlighted when essentially technical or commercial matters were coloured by other considerations. Indo-Bhutan techno-economic negotiations have tended to be either politico-economic or politic-technical where political considerations and decision have overshadowed commercial and technical aspects. Consequently, at the level of technocrats, while India may have some cause to believe that she has been held to ransom once the project was commissioned, Bhutan cannot be faulted for believing that she had to unnecessarily struggle for just and fair compensation. The prevailing shortcomings in accords on water resources in the region is best highlighted by the fact that formal Indo-Bhutan negotiations for an agreement on sale of Chukha energy began subsequent to a tariff being agreed upon at the political level between the two heads of government. That this tariff offer and its acceptance and little techno-economic basis is evident from the negotiations that still continue six years later. To further complicate matters, even as effort to arrive at an acceptable technical and commercial agreement continued, political level understandings introduced new dimensions during the period. The difficulties in reaching agreement on the modalities, terms and conditions for the transfer of Chukha power stem from the tenacious refusal by India to recognise and accept the unique conditions, technical, economic and geographic, that prevail in the Bhutanese context. There is no doubt, of course, in the minds of Bhutanese negotiators that this tenacity in the Indian position results not due to lack of perception and 242 SUBBA, B.

understanding, but rather from a clear knowledge of the peculiar and difficult conditions faced by Bhutan. In the process, the element of trust so necessary to good neighborliness and healthy accords has suffered. At the political level India has always appeared to give due recognition to Bhutanese concerns but this acknowledgement has not readily translated itself to the more important level where the actual agreement is being formulated. This, where she was expected to commit herself in a written agreement, India steadfastly chose not to acknowledge (1) India as the only market for Bhutanese energy (2) Bhutan’s limited power demand and non-existent thermal base, and her consequent inability to absorb excess energy production, (3) the autonomy of the regional grid in India receiving Bhutan power and its less than healthy state accentuated by poor grid discipline, (4) the run-of-river design of Chukha, (5) that capacity design at Chukha was dictated by Indian system requirements, and (6) that Chukha could not be equated, especially in terms of pricing, with plants in Indian utilities. The initial premise on the part of India that pricing and other terms of Chukha should be in keeping with Indian utility norms as the basis for discussions naturally gave rise to vastly differing positions. Bhutan, for its part, considered the acceptance of three principles as vital to the formulation of an adequately safe agreement; (1) India must guarantee withdrawal of all excess energy, (2) any energy drawn by Bhutan from India must be considered as re-import of Chukha energy with compensation to India by way of wheeling charges for such energy, and (3) Chukha energy is an export commodity that justifies industrial rates of return on investment. The Indian position, along with being seen as an attempt to force an unreasonable tariff on Bhutan, along with being seen as an attempt to force an unreasonable tariff on Bhutan, was viewed more seriously in terms of its implication on guarantees in the agreement for withdrawal of excess power from Chukha. Saddled with a run-of-river plant with no internal means for energy absorption, acceptance of such a position was clearly out of the question for Bhutan. Indian’s assurances that, in view of the critical power shortage in the eastern region, all production from Chukha would, in any case, be consumed by India did nothing to change Bhutan’s position that suitable guarantee clauses must from a part of the agreement. India’s position that any power drawn by Bhutan from the Indian state electricity boards should be paid for by Bhutan according to the tariff applicable to other Indian consumers was both illogical and unfair, especially in view of prevailing rates which were in excess of six times the cost of Chukha energy supplied to India. Reluctantly Indian negotiators, prodded once again by political forces, eventually conceded that the transfer of such energy would be considered s re-import of Chukha energy, Bhutan agreeing to compensate India for the cost of transmission and distribution through Indian networks. However, this political concession appeared to have little value when India proposed wheeling charges so exorbitant that the overall tariff payable by Bhutan for such re-imports TAPPING HIMALAYAN WATER RESOURCES: BHUTANESE PERSPECTIVE 243

were comparable to the prevailing state electricity board rates. The most serious difference, however, arose from Indian insistence that the energy account for sales to India would be on the basis of actual Indian consumption deemed to be metered at the Indo-Bhutan border. Although Bhutanese energy is purchased on behalf of India by the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), Chukha is supplied to India through the West Bengal grid controlled by the autonomous state electricity board. There is no sales outler to a third country. Under such conditions India's insistence on a tariff agreement devoid of withdrawal guarantees and payment terms covering only actual energy consumed was both unrealistic and unfair. It was evidently fraught with danger where the monopoly buyer could at any time create a financial crisis by refusing, for other than technical reasons, to draw power from Chukha. Furthermore, in view of poor grid discipline in the eastern region of India, Bhutan rightly feared inadequate thermal back down by agencies not answerable to the main purchaser for accommodation of Chukha production. For a run-of-river scheme with neither second buyer nor opportunity for local absorption a ‘pay by the metre’ agreement could have disastrous consequences. The Indian stand, reflected in the 1974 accord and reiterated in subsequent negotiations, with regard to the valuation of seasonal energy as meriting only half the rate of firm energy had little basis. The argument that capacity available for only part of the year is of less value to India because it does not contribute to reduction in her investment costs cannot be held valid. The issue needs to be approached, instead, from the Bhutanese viewpoint. For Bhutan, if only half-rate were to apply for seasonal energy, the determination of optimal capacity would be a function of incremental gains and incremental investment alone without taking into consideration Indian system requirements. On this basis, the installed capacity at Chukha would have been substantially lower. The excess investment required because of the buyer’s needs, in fact, merits a premium price to justify additional costs that yield output for only part of the year. Over the years attempts have continued to arrive at a technical level understanding that would take into account the unique condition that prevail and which are a cause for serious concern on the part of Bhutan. Political level interjections that have been made during the course of negotiations, while ensuring higher returns to Bhutan, have not resulted in any perceptible change in the mood of discussions. India, while appearing to appease her smaller neighbour at the political level to extract commitments for further development of hydro-potential, is clearly cautious regarding her own commitment. There is no doubt that Chukha has turned out to be a good investment for Bhutan but, given India’s stance in detailed tariff negotiations and her resolute attempts to ward-off-formal commitments, there is no guarantee that further development will also yield similar benefits. The political leadership in Bhutan is undoubtedly aware of such pitfalls even as a spate of Memoranda of Understanding on water resources are being signed between the two 244 SUBBA, B.

countries lately. But these are obviously more the result of a politically beleaguered King providing concessions in exchanged for political support than decision of a government impressed by the Chukha experience seeking to capitalise on opportunities.

MEANINGFUL CO-OPERATION: OPPORTUNITIES India, with her political and economic clout generated by her greater resource base, larger economy and massive population, pulls the economies of the other nations in the Indian sub-continent in her own direction. Consequently, the people in this region will continue to share a common fate dictated by an inextricably linked regional economy. In view of this reality a vibrant economy for India, also the engine for economic growth in the other nations, should understandably be the objective of all the nations enmeshed in this geopolitical and economic network. India, on her part, must recognised her leadership role and acknowledge both the needs and aspirations of her smaller neighbours. A key input for a healthy economy is energy. Despite the priority accorded to the energy sector in all development plans by Indian planners, parts of the country continue to suffer from critical power shortages that retard the growth of her economy. While considerable progress was possible, and continues to be made, in all spheres despite this severe constraint, the technologies of the twenty-first century will be far more demanding. The level and pace of progress is already set and measured by informatics, communications, computers and automation – areas which require both reliable and quality energy supplies. In the quest to attain the standard and quality of life that exists in the developed nations, India and her immediate neighbours must, therefore, as a prerequisite, ensure the availability of adequate and reliable energy, the key ingredient for both economic growth and quality of life. Nepal and Bhutan are fortunately placed to contribute to, and profit from, the large energy needs of India. As the extraction and conversion of hydrocarbons becomes increasingly more difficult and expensive, the tapping of energy from the rivers flowing in the Himalaya is the most viable option for meeting the growing energy requirements of the sub-continent. The harnessing of this vast renewable and non-polluting potential, however, calls for a high degree of mutual trust and co-operation between the participating countries. A prerequisite to any healthy partnership in the development of the water resources in the Himalayan region calls for purposeful dialogue in an environment that facilitates unfettered information exchange and frank discussions. This is only feasible if all the countries involved commit themselves to politically desensitising water related issues so that the prevailing shroud of secrecy can be lifted. This is, of course, easier said than done in the current environment where political considerations over-ride all other aspects. However, in the changing global scenario where the economic agenda increasingly exerts greater influence on the politics of nations, the chances of proper economic partnerships, TAPPING HIMALAYAN WATER RESOURCES: BHUTANESE PERSPECTIVE 245

even between unequal neighbours, are bright. There is, therefore, hope that the necessary political will to alter the tone of discussions from a primarily political one to one based on techno-economic considerations will be forthcoming in future.

MUTUAL TRUST: BASIC REQUIREMENTS Foremost, in the efforts to realise the full potential of the water resources in the region, it is essential that there is a change in the mind-set of Indian planners who, either intentionally or inadvertently. Continue to see the potential outside of India’s borders as resources that can be developed on the same basis as resources within India. It must be recognised that, while imported energy is, for India, only an input that enhances the value of her industrial products, for her smaller neighboours, water resource itself serves as the base for an export industry. The same electrical energy, therefore, is valued differently by the potential producer and consumer. The tendency of Indian planners to incorrectly equate the two perceptions is a major stumbling block to healthy negotiations and partnerships. As a first step, therefore, India must desist from adopting project parametres, appraisal techniques and evaluation criteria for hydropower projects in Nepal and Bhutan as if they were being planned by India as routine additions to her own utilities. There is also critical need to reconsider the prevailing approach for the development of water resources in the region. The current practice of initiating dialogues on project by project basis between governments has inherent drawbacks. In addition to creating situations where one party may unnecessarily be called upon to pay a higher than affordable price for future considerations, it can also result in protracted delays in reaching a settlement as each country tries to protect its uncertain and undefined future prospects. Differences in opinions and perceptions that stall negotiations are caused not so much by parametres of the project under discussion, but by future implications which remain undetermined in the case of both parties. There is, therefore, an urgent need to begin treating the issue of water resources development in a holistic manner where negotiations are undertaken covering a comprehensive plan for optimal use of available resources. Discord and conflict emanating from uncertainties of the future can be mitigated by adopting, at the minimum, a basin approach and, if possible, a regional energy plan encompassing the entire Himalayan region. Another factor that influences discussions and decisions regarding the harnessing of hydro-energy in the Himalaya concerns the prevailing institutional arrangements in India, the importing country. Unlike the situation in the potential producer sates, a central authority under the omnipresent ministry of External Affairs conducts discussions with the neighbours although there are a number of independent authorities that actually receive the end-product. The central authority seemingly exercises little control over these state controlled electric utilities a lack of control which the former takes pains to emphasise 246 SUBBA, B.

when it has no desire to concede on a particular issue. This apparent lack of authority is underscored by the absence, still, of a truly operational national grid in India coupled with the poor condition of utilities in those Indian states which would be the first importers of energy from the north. The problem is compounded still further because unhealthy grids are also associated with poor grid discipline. These conditions call for appropriate measures and guarantees to take these realities into account. There are other realities and peculiarities in the region that must be duly recognised. Foremost among these is the fact that both the possible exporters of energy. Nepal and Bhutan, have resources far in excess of their own internal demand. In addition to the small demand base, neither of the two countries requires, or it likely to ever have, significant hydrocarbon based generation. Export based run-of-river plants in the two countries will thus have little operational flexibility necessitating development, utilisation and terrifying plans that take this difficulty into account. As issue of special concern for Bhutan, and perhaps to a lesser extent Nepal, is the matter of choice of technology in both project construction and operation stages. Shortage of skilled manpower in the country necessitates the recruitment of expatriates for all categories of tasks. The current hesitant approach by Bhutan in the development of her resources can be attributed in significant measure to the justifiable fear of problems associated with large-scale import of labour. Along with the direct social problems associated with a large influx of foreigners in a society ill-equipped to handle or absorb them, the greater fear lies in the perpetual dependence that the situation would create. Unfortunately, India, clearly alive to the advantages of a predominantly Indian presence in the projects, is reluctant to share her neighbour’s concerns and, instead, continues to propose manpower intensive technologies that are clearly unacceptable. For their part Nepal and Bhutan must give due consideration to India’s specific needs and her immediate economic constraints. The development of the resources in such a business environment must fit the requirements of the consumer, both in terms of the manner of production and in terms of the capacity of the user to pay reasonable compensation. While consideration of the economics of thermal based alternatives in India cannot be discarded altogether, any attempts to force direct shadow pricing principles on a consumer unable to bear the cost may be meaningless. Instead both producers and consumer must take into account the indirect impact of reasonable whole. It would be economically suicidal for the smaller nations to stubbornly sit on their resources because of perceptions of being short-changed.

MUTUAL BENEFITS THROUGH CO-OPERATION: PROSPECTS There is no doubt that even in the absence of changes in current perceptions some of the hydro-potential in the region will be harnessed in the coming years. However, as against TAPPING HIMALAYAN WATER RESOURCES: BHUTANESE PERSPECTIVE 247

optimally planned exploitation, these will come in the from of specific projects that are agreed to between nations according to the political will, strengths and weaknesses prevailing at different points in time. Meaningful accords that will transform the economies and lives of the people in the sub-continent, on the other hand, will require a dramatic turnaround of policies and principles on the part of all three nations. The inhibitions that forestall mutually satisfactory plans between India and her neighbours for development of resources, as also the reasons for these constraints, are clearly recognised. Unfortunately, even as these constraints and difficulties are acknowledged, in a situation where water resources have been given more than its fair share of political connotations, an immediate reversal of principles and attitudes remains a problem. While the value of water as a political tool cannot be underestimated, the overbearing political presence in any discussions between potential producer and consumer can only result in further wasteful flow of resources down the Ganges. At least on the surface, in the light of events to date, the major share of the blame for the inability of the nations to reach satisfactory accords must be apportioned to India. While this conclusion may not be fair, given the nature and direction of efforts to date where the more powerful protagonist dictates the terms, India must therefore be credited with either success or failure. And the current level of co-operation can in no measure be deemed a success. Thus, if the resources in the region are to be gainfully utilised, India must necessarily take the lead in providing a new impetus with an attitudinal change and injection of fresh political will. Yet increasing influence of economic factors in the decision making process of governments, coupled with the abject failure of the prevailing strategies, raises the hope that in the years ahead the leadership in the region will recognise the need for a fresh approach in the matter of co-operative efforts for the development of resources in the Himalaya. If this results in the current perceptions giving way to the overriding economic considerations, political maneuvers taking on only a secondary role, the prospects for the future are good. However, even in these changed circumstances India must not only take the pains to be fair, but must exercise even greater care to be fair in her dealings with her smaller neighbours. Only then can the tremendous potential of water resources in the Himalaya be exploited and utilised in an optimal manner for the mutual benefit of participation countries and their peoples. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 249-259

PRIORITY AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

KAMALA PRASAD Distinguished Visiting Fellow Institute of Rural Management, Gujrat, India

ABSTRACT

The major challenge in water resources development between Nepal and India is to put behind the era of mistrust and seek new avenues for co-operation. A long term agenda of institutional building is the forerunner for such initiative.

INTRODUCTION The Patna workshop held on May 1992 on co-operative development of Indo-Nepal water resources made a promising beginning. It emphasised, in particular, the need to focus on identifying newer institutional arrangements for creating the necessary environment for collaborative water resource development. The Himalayan water resources are a common asset of Nepal and India. That Nepal presently is drawing only two per cent of its total water resources shows that more economic use of this vital resource needs to be made. But there has been unfortunate delay in the collaborative efforts and, as a result, both the countries have suffered. The loss to Nepal, however, perhaps is even more severe than India. While the delay has continued development cost has escalated, and made securing finance for future investments more difficult. Positive steps, as matters of urgency are needed as the opportunity cost of delay is rising. The north Gangetic Basin encompassing Nepal and northern Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal in India continues to remain a belt of poverty and deprivation. In spite of the water resources, fertile land and favorable agro-climatec conditions, the region continues to be impoverished and the people in the region have been deprived of a decent standard of living. The development indices between India and Nepal appear to be different (annex) but conceal the similarity of poverty in the basin. Nepal is in a disadvantageous position due to its landlocked physiography. However, all countries in the developing world with access to the sea have not necessarily progressed fast, Burma being the closest example in Asia. The scenario of peace and stability between Nepal and India is a further positive factor for optimism in ushering in cooperation. Except for a brief period in the 1980’s during the trade and transit impasse, the relations between the two countries have been cordial, and Nepal has not been put to inconvenience. India, in fact offers a large market for agricultural and industrial products which today are being sought by foreign investors. 250 PRASAD, K.

The market is an incentive for Nepal also. Nepal should therefore, immediately seek this market and India should support such initiatives from her neighbor. Economic differences between Nepal and India are natural. Its natural resource base and size provides India with a broad-based and a more diversified economy. In India, the contribution of agriculture to GDP has already come down to approximately 30 per cent, while the Nepali economy largely depends on agriculture which contributes almost 60 per cent to the GDP. While urbanisation rate in India is high, in Nepal 90 per cent of the population still live in rural areas. Poverty in rural Nepal is 60 per cent, substantially higher than that in India. Nepal has rightly set the target of 2000 AD as the year by which the Nepalese people would attain a standard of living ‘commensurate to lead a life with human dignity by Asian standards.’ Translating the target in physical terms will require that natural endowments of the country that give it comparative advantage in development should be identified and benefits drawn from them to the maximum extent possible. The present pattern of Nepal’s revenues can be enhanced by concentrating on three major sectors. These are tourism, irrigation, and power. The revenue generated from development of road communication, transport, marketing and manufacturing, and into sunrise industries. An approach such as this may lead to a more diversified, but stable economic growth path, which does not clash with Indian interests. In fact, India should invest in the development of the identified sectors, since it has a demand for power, and has an interest in irrigation.

PAST EXPERIENCE IN WATER DEVELOPMENT India over the years has gained vast experience in dealing with the issues of water allocation and development in river basins, both at domestic and international levels. In the domestic arena initially a project approach was pursued. The projects were centrally approved so that withdrawal of water for consumptive as well as non-consumptive uses could be regulated. However, it was found that most of the rivers involved did not originate from the perennial snow of the Himalaya. Their supply was limited and expectations of use far exceeded resource availability. A large backlog of water allocation controversies emerged in these cases which, however, were resolved during the Seventies. Principles of the area of catchment as well as that of equity were freely invoked. Both the lower as well as the upper riparian were pleased to regularise the preemptive use of water to the extent of not agreeing to change water use. Ultimately, political will and the prospect of benefits prevailed. Agreements were hammered out in the majority of the cases and several development projects were initiated. A few of the controversies remain to be resolved. India’s domestic experience has exhausted the use of all principles of water allocations that are still a matter of debate internationally. This experience will recommend that the countries muster up political PRIORITY AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 251

will to arrive at agreements on rivers that do not suffer from shortage of supplies. The main problem may come up in the Bagmati, Kamala, Kankai and Mahabharat range rivers for which a more accommodative approach would be called for. Once a will to minimise disagreements has been demonstrated an understanding for cooperation in the large context is bound to emerge. With regard to international rivers, India has managed to work with all her three neighbors Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The agreement on Kosi in 1954 was the first between Nepal and India, which was followed by the Gandak Project agreement of 1966. The implementation in both agreements may have been tardy but the benefit that flows to both the countries is substantial. Both the projects were built without any outside help and completed with mutual understanding, with India financing the construction of the project. India’s agreement to finance the project was understandable. Subsequently loans from the World Bank have been made, following the initial investment in these rivers. The 1960 Indus agreement concluded with Pakistan has been commended in the World Development Report 1992 as "one of the most successful agreements on an international watercourse." As a part of this agreement, India contributed to the investments in Pakistan so that benefit flows could be secured as per schedules. An interim agreement has been made with Bangladesh on the sharing of dry-season flows of the Ganga at Farraka barrage. Though analysis of the reason for settlement in these cases in beyond the scope of this paper; conclusions can be drawn. Bilateral negotiations have yielded results during periods of crisis. An objective assessment of past efforts would indicate that a project by project approach has yielded dividends; that potentials for alternative development should be examined with an open mind to make accommodation; and to the extent possible, bilateral approach may be more rewarding except for mobilising finances for water development as a consequence of the agreements. In all cases, the agreements come out of the political will to agree whatever may be the hurdles. We have a very rich experience of resolving bilateral water development disputes. We are the sufferers in a situation of discord. We alone can suffer the harm being caused from the lack of agreements. A third party, on the other hand, can extend the area of debate and the process can open up newer areas of disagreement. Therefore, the two countries must resolve that reaching an agreement is the objective and engage in dialogue with that end in view.

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION Before taking stock of the situation in South Asia, it might be worth while to discuss development in shared river basins. There are more than 200 river basins with over half the World’s land area and 40 per cent of the World’s population which are shared by 252 PRASAD, K.

more than one country. So far more than 200 treaties have been signed between countries on water issues. The agreements have been made without establishing clear international law on the subject. Majority of the treaties cover rivers in the developed countries. Where the demand for water is greater than the supply available, the bulk of the disputes still remain to be resolved. There are by now general principles that have found acceptance in dealing with common rivers. The first principle is gradually crystallising to accept equitable sharing of water between the countries. The second principle is to avoid action that may be injurious to others. However, in individual treaties, countries have gone beyond into other modalities of sharing. The Columbia River Basin Treaty between Canada and USA introduces the principle of equal apportionment in terms of cost and benefit sharing so that Canadian gains are more from flood moderation for USA and a share in hydropower generation. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project on the Senqu river between South Africa and Lesotho provides for projects in Lesotho to supply water to South Africa. Apart from underwriting and servicing the debt incurred for the project, South Africa is also paying water royalties to Lesotho as a benefit. The International Law Commission will take a long time to put across principles and guidelines that may constitute law for water sharing in the future between countries. India and Nepal therefore, should not waste time in finding support for their respective claims in settled international law. It is necessary to reiterate the call given in Patna in 1992, that India and Nepal should try to find newer ways of making productive and remunerative use of the common waters. And the bigger partner must be ready to find new and innovative compromises.

TERRITORIAL VS TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACH It will be easier to come to terms with this matter creatively if confusion regarding basin approach is cleared first. The International Law Commission has been engaged in defining ‘international watercourse’ rather than river basins, which can change depending on whether one takes the watercourse flow or the drainage channel. Ganga, for instance, has its northern and southern tributaries, which are sufficiently massive individually as well as complex. The Ghagra-Rapti system in the north Gangetic plans has, in fact, larger discharge than the Ganga before the two rivers meet. Ganga is essentially a drainage channel which becomes evident during the monsoon. Irrigation is merely supplemental. For agriculture development, drinking and industrial purposes, groundwater is becoming increasingly important. However, there are serious problems in its integration in river water allocation agreements. End-use determines, to some extent, the efficiency of water utilisation and concern for conservation may encourage external interference in opening up basin development as the basis for allocation. PRIORITY AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 253

This has happened in case of inter-state river water agreements in India. For these and other considerations, it will be practical to limit the water allocation to watercourse flows on rivers common at international borders. The borders of basin for development should also be limited to manage efficiently micro and medium watersheds for multiple purposes. A wider concept is relevant for conservation of natural resources in the fragile Himalayan ecosystem but that is already being built into project designs. A basin from this context is a limited concept and only good for agricultural development purposes, and should be used only as such. For other forms of development, a territorial concept can be managed better. And the fewer the partners, the easier it is to handle development. Thus that ‘watercourse’, common to Nepal and India, should be treated individually along with streams that influence flows at the border, and the most economic use of water should be conceived. Since Nepal, because of its topography, can use only limited quantities of water for irrigation, drinking and industrial purposes, the same must be guaranteed by India. India’s requirements of water are large but she is prepared to pay the price for it. The considerations that guided the allocation of 100 per cent withdrawal in the Nepal Eastern Canal (NEC) of the Gandak Project should be extended to other projects wherever feasible. India should manage irrigation in the contiguous areas through alternative means, largely through conjunctive development of groundwater. The prime requirement for conjunctive mode of irrigation development is electricity. The north Gangetic plain is deficient in hydelpower sources. Thermal power supply offers a solution, but its efficiency for peak load operation is low. Hydelpower is more environment friendly than the thermal plant which is polluting. Submergence from storage projects and rehabilitation of population is crucial and should be properly managed. Nepal and India should enter into collaborative arrangements for flood moderation and power generation on the perennial rivers as in the Colombia River agreement model. Storage projects can also provide additional irrigation opportunities in Nepal through inter-basin transfer to water scarce basins. Principal gains would be in India from flood moderation and power, with irrigation remaining a largely consequential byproduct. At the same time the gains to Nepal would be substantial. A World Bank review concludes that Nepal with a theoretical hydroelectric potentials of 83,000 MW has tapped less than 200 MW and has one of the lowest per capita use of electricity . Per capita energy use needs to be augmented which may perhaps materialise with the coming of the Arun III on line by the years 1996-2003. Availability of more energy will also change the current energy exchange scenario into bulk export arrangements. ‘Although the bulk of competitively priced hydropower to India represents Nepal’s attractive medium and long-term foreign exchange earning option, HMG does not yet have a detailed strategy to achieve this goal. The prospects for a hydropower led export strategy are particularly good in view of India’s estimates of load growth and its stated desire to import 254 PRASAD, K.

any available quantities of power over the medium term’. The viability of any concerned project would depend on its multifarious objectives. The strategy should be to augment irrigation facilities for Nepal’s productive land to the maximum extent possible, to secure flood moderation to the maximum extent feasible for contiguous Indian territories, and to export in bulk, the generated power to India. Availability of energy can also allow conjunctive groundwater exploitation. For all this, the approach should be to adopt a ‘common water course’ supplemented by a basin approach within national boundaries for watershed management and agricultural development. Experience of negotiations so far, on inter-state rivers in India and with Nepal and other neighbours, demonstrate that any alternative approach of broader basin-drainage basin-development will only further cause delay towards agreement, resource protection and development. New negotiations must take these realities into account and formulate appropriate institutional mechanism. This is an area in which private sector and NGOs, along with consultancies are ahead of government organisation. They must take a more active role in future collaboration efforts.

ERA OF ECONOMIC PRIORITIES For the developing world, the post cold war scenario does not offer promising prospects. Disintegration of the clout of the communist world seems to lead to dominance of the economic agenda of the north. Trade in an unequal market and political direction of aid to help such trade should spur the developing countries to identify commodities of comparative advantage in international trade and in fact expand the common market within the developing world. Countries in South Asia have no option but to realise the new context and collaborate. The losses unintentionally made so far may yield benefits in the long run. The potential for private investments in water and power development are substantial. This area may not be attractive enough within the domestic context but can be attractive financially with bilateral marketing arrangement. However, agreement between countries must precede such arrangements. The domestic experts, specialised groups, socially oriented interest groups and business interests must constitute a compact to bring about changes. Politics have had an adverse impact on collaborative arrangements in water and power development between Nepal and India. Expert opinion must be brought in to bring about change. The research agenda on socioeconomic and natural studies should be progressively improved in both countries to correct past biases in water management problems in the field. Nepal has long considered irrigation benefits in Kosi through the Chatra canal and Nepal Eastern Canal in Gandak to be inefficient. World Bank/IDA has assisted in improving and modernising both systems. Since 1978, with the World Bank loan, the Chatara canal in the Sunsari Morang Irrigation phase II project is being modernised. PRIORITY AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 255

The results even now seem to be unsatisfactory due to high siltation which even international experts have not been successful in rectifying. ‘The siltation problem exacerbated by the continued westward migration migration of the Kosi river, has proved extremely difficult to solve technically’. The operational problems are equally serious in the case of the Gandak project. Fulfilling the riparian obligations to supply a guaranteed quantity of water on demand at the end of a canal 100 km long were not correctly assessed when the agreements were made. The completion report on the Narayani Zone Irrigation Development Stage II comes to the conclusion that operational plans should be specified and agreed upon before system design, provide the basis for system design concepts and criteria and be consistent with the physical and institutional capacity to implement them. There is a clear indication, thus, for re-evaluating our experience on the joint projects in the framework of projects undertaken since. My examination of the World Bank assisted projects in Kosi and Gandak leads to the conclusion that the technological and organisational problems combined with users’ response quality for irrigation is such that impatience would not pay. Newer series of foreign collaboration have hardly seen any better results. The problems faced by Nepal farmers are similar to those faced by the Bihar (India) farmers in these projects. The problems, thus, is not as much of lack of fulfillment as of perceived benefits desired and even that has not been quantified. During implementation there were long delays and perhaps insufficient involvement of the Nepales administration and technical manpower. However, the expertise gained and manpower trained in Nepal on account of these ventures cannot be denied. The need in collaborative projects evidently is to make balanced assessment of economic and technological gains for future action and to underline human failures for future action and to underline human failures for improved interaction. Newer technologies are now available for improving the efficiency of water use. Nepal can, for instance, increase natural storage by more than 10 per cent through glaciology behavior and an additional 10 per cent through aquifer recharge in the Bhabar zones. The process can also moderate floods in India and Nepal as well as increase dry weather river flows. Water-crops for water deficient and water abundant zones. Soil improvement studies and programmes can further augment crop potentials. Thus, a technological route to irrigation efficiency can help solve myriads of water management challenges. The physical conditions prevailing along Indo-Nepal borders and the character of rivers demands studies on silt load management, river training, treatment or alternative uses of waterlogged areas, watershed management, and water crop relation studies. Besides, the utilisation prospects from rivers of the Mahabharat range recommend storage and augmentation studies, popularisation of the use of groundwater techniques, composite diversion, tank and open well schemes for raising crops of short duration and low water 256 PRASAD, K.

needs. A large part of these studies call for farmers’ perceptions to be fully utilised and past experience availed of. Nepal and India need these studies equally. The study area can be expanded, but the clear need is to move ahead. The socioeconomic research agenda should look into water requirements in a regime of multiplicity of demand. Tourism, fisheries, drinking, improving efficiency of water use, crop planning and varietal changed studies and agricultural adjustment and crop diversification studies are of the few issues to be investigated. Post-harvest technology and marketing in particular, need to be looked at and improved so that the agriculture products get good returns. Cross border trade in agriculture produce has tremendous potential. Incentives packages need to be provided both in Nepal and India to facilitate such growth. Indo-Nepal water development programme should proceed along the lines of reforms through a long-term agenda of institution building. The objective is to lay the foundation for thinking to proceed on lines that bear results. It is also pleaded that newer techno-economic regimes should have precedence over purely political considerations in water development and utilisation field. Such an approach is needed in the changing world scenario of economic relations. While agreement between governments remain the long-term target, the immediate need is to promote non-governmental efforts. Governments themselves, however, would benefit by participating in such endeavors. Private consulting organisations and specialist groups should be supported to participate in the new research agenda. NGO groups will be effective in interacting with farmers and water users in organising and educating them to extract and use water economically. Because groundwater development has not been a success so far should not deter further work in groundwater use and management. Ultimately, through networking efforts, basin development plan can set an accepted from with need-based equitable water sharing rather than sterile insistence on water rights. There is difference in the economic benefits reaped by Indian farmers compared to those in Nepal. This should be seen in the background of organisation for agriculture as well as for water development. India has assembled an organisation and a programme for irrigated agriculture that Nepal can evaluate with profit for adoption. The elements of a modified strategy could include-

1) water development through · individual wells, borings, tanks; · group tubewells for utilising groundwater; · minor and small surface water schemes such as water harvesting tanks, check dams on streams, etc. to make large canal irrigation more productive; 2) to establish land and water management teams to encourage soils conservation, reduce PRIORITY AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 257

soil degradation, help mixed farming and assist in foundation for sustainable agriculture. 3) to organise an extension machinery to look after delivery of knowledge and inputs; 4) to ensure coordination between agriculture and water development machinery; and 5) to have a unified command of agriculture and irrigation extension at the provincial level.

The phase of construction engineering once completed must yield place to water utilisation engineering; in fact the engineering staff must get under the discipline of agriculture planning. The irrigation benefit of water development has not become as dominant in Nepal as it is across the border. Excessive criticism of the joint project’s performance has merely diverted attention from making these administrative and organisational decisions. The time has come to resolve past controversies in light of the new economic realities. Flexibility has to be the new key word. Nepal’s potential for much faster growth rate can be accelerated through collaborating with India in water, power, tourism, and agricultural trade. A complex scenario of development is called for to address the challenges. To start with, a basin approach to development should be started. Watercourse approach should be pursued for international sharing. Technological approach is needed for water and power conservation while an organisational approach is needed to involve private sector in all stages of development. Since the process is complex, it is necessary to build bridges of understanding between the various interest groups. Such an approach will bring good dividends in the long run.

PEOPLESí, ORGANISATION The new economic agenda calls for extensive involvement of NGOs in the tasks that have so far been performed by government, in exclusion. There is a new realisation of the positive impact that the experience and informed opinion of these organisations can make on public policies. For these policies to change on right lines, the NGOs need to organise on a more sustained basis and arrange to have a framework of interaction amongst experts and specialists within governments and outside it. It may be appropriate, therefore, to consider the outlines of the following elements to emerge as catalytic force of joint NGO initiatives.

1) Identification of agencies for preparing micro-level projects. 2) Identification of sources of funding, local bilateral, multi-lateral, external NGO, and governmental as also financial institution. 3) Networking of organisations for exchange of research and operation related information. 4) Documentation. 5) A joint Water Development Fund as a regular source for collaborative work based on recommendations of the collaborative meetings and workshops. 258 PRASAD, K.

It is necessary that thinking along these lines should start. A firm framework can emerge only by positive interaction. NGOs are doing significant and pioneering work in water development, land and water management, crop planning and development and they have viable collaborative arrangements with government organisations. A new NGO mobilisation will be in furtherance of that cause and in the cause of the rural community.

FUTURE TASKS The first major task for the future is to put behind the era of politics in water diplomacy and relations between India and Nepal. Both the neighbors have suffered. It is necessary to bring pressure from interest groups, experts and public opinion to achieve this aim. The second major task should be the initiation of studies to demonstrate the potential of economic exploitation of water resources consistent with emerging environmental concerns. The regime of benefits foregone as well as benefits to be achieved can yet persuade governments to engage in serious dialogue. Academic groups, research organisations, business and trading houses and enlightened specialists should be brought together for such tasks. Third, for regions like these, the cost incurred in sustaining agriculture to feed the growing population remains yet unknown. Though resources can be mobilised for the purpose, the point to note would be whether present institution can match technological innovations consistent with farmers’ capacity. Under the new marketing and private sector oriented approach, the role of agriculture sector institution would be even more important. An integrative regime of water development, crop husbandry, mixed farming, making of farm produce ad processing would demand newer approached to institution building. Fourth, though in overall terms both Nepal and India have surplus water in major basins, droughts are not unknown. The value of water for multiple uses must become a common concern and agreements to articulate this concern must emerge. Movement towards agreements should be enlightened with pricing and allocation formula that emphasise this concern. Incentives for applying new technologies of water assessment, development and utilisation should be assembled and evaluated. Fifth, there are centuries of history behind the present level of interaction between the farming and other populations on the two sides of the international border. Their interests must predominate over every other consideration. Control of floods, saving of soils, water for irrigation, electricity for economic and domestic use are the needs. People must be supported so that their needs are met. Finally, the challenges of a new global development compact should be understood. Can Nepal and India come together to contribute better to the global compact? Should not the failures of the past be an inspiration for the future, so that people are given primacy in national and international politics, including bilateral, development co-operation? PRIORITY AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 259

As the World Development Report 92 notes: "With international political tensions reduced and with near unanimity on the central importance of markets and human resources investments for successful development, the coming decades offer great prospects for progress." The agenda provided herein may seem large, but is realistic. Will the two countries rise to the challenge is a question still to be answered.

ANENEX INDIA NEPAL ECONOMIC DISPARITIES Item Nepal India 1. Population Growth ñ Annual (1960-90) 2.4 2.2 2. Population Density (Per 1000 ha) 1399 2870 3. Percentage of Labour Force in Agriculture 93 62.6 4 Percentage of Rural Population below Poverty Line 61 51 5. Internal Renewal Water Resource Per Capita 8.9 2.2 (1000m3/year) 6. Commercial Energy Consumption Per Capita 24 226 (Kg of Oil Equivalent) 7. Share of Agriculture in GDP 60 31 8. Average Annual Growth Rate of Agriculture (80-90) 4.8 3.1 9. Annual Rate of Deforestation 4 2.3 10. Literacy Rate 26 48 11. Access to Drinking Water in Rural Areas (percent) 34 74 12. Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000) 123 94

Sources: World Bank, World Development Report 1992, UNDP, Human Development Report 1992. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 261-270

INTERSTATE SHARING OF WA TER RIGTHS: AN ALPS- HIMALAYA COMPARISON

DIPAK GYAWALI1 AND OTHMAR SCHWANK2

ABSTRACT

Water sharing agreements that flow from a good scientific understanding by both riparian of river systems will lead to agreement that last, while those with scientific uncertainties will always provide opportunities for strife and dispute. This paper compares water resources development interventions on two border rivers ñ the Rhine between Germany and Switzerland in the Alps and the Mahakali (Sarada) between Nepal and India in the Himalaya. It examines two similar power plants, Schaffhausen (Switzerland) and Tanakpur (India) and explores the evolution of institutions and the choice of the technology.

Both the Alps and the Himalaya are the places of origin of many of the rivers of their surrounding plains, the waters of which affect the destiny of millions. This fact should allow a cross comparison of water resources development interventions between these two regions of the world which could provide valuable insights into a range of issues from the dynamics of highland-lowland interactions to the modalities of international water sharing. Since large-scale transformation of river regimes through the application of modern hydro-technical means has occurred earlier in the case of the Alps, the Hindukush-Himalaya region could benefit from comparing their current water sharing problems with similar events in the Alps. This paper attempts one such comparison between two border rivers -- the Rhine between Germany and Switzerland, and the Mahakali between Nepal and India -- by examining two similar power plants in these rivers located near the towns of Schaffhausen (Switzerland) and Tanakpur (India). The Rhine emerges from the Alps and flows from the Lake of Constance at its foot forming the boundary between Switzerland and Germany for most of its length till the city of Basel. From there it turns north forming the border between France and Germany before flowing into Germany, the Netherlands and the North Sea. The Makakali (called Sarada in India) emerges from the glaciers of the western Nepal Himalaya and flows south forming the border between Nepal and India till it emerges from the hills into the Tarai plains. From then on it becomes an Indian River, a Nepali

1 Pragya, Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology, Nepal. 2 Managing Director, INFRAS, 8002 Zurich, Switzerland. 262 GYAWALI, D. AND SCHWANK, O.

River and finally an Indian River meeting the Ganga which flows into Bangladesh and ultimately into the Bay of Bengal (Figure 1). Between Lake Constance and Basel, the Rhine is not wholly a border river. While Switzerland is on the left bank and Germany on the right, the Swiss canton of Schaffhausen protrudes to the north on the right bank. Within this wholly Swiss territory lies the Schaffhausen run-of-river hydroelectric power plant. Similarly, shortly after debauching onto Tarai plains, the Mahakali enters a stretch of Indian territory protruding into the opposite bank before entering Nepal again. The Tanakpur hydroelectric project, the subject of current controversy between Nepal and India, is located on this stretch. This paper makes a brief comparison of two power plants and strives to understand how history determines the evolution of institutions and the choice of technology. It is not an exhaustive survey in both cases. In Switzerland, the matter was long settled amicably with Germany and the negotiation jousts, which must have been colourful in their days, are century-old vintage buried in archives and of little interest to present denizens. In Nepal, on the other hand, Tanakpur is present-day jousting. Despite all the palpable heat, much of the light is still invisible, cloaked within bureaucratic secrecy of both India and Nepal as are probably all negotiations which have not yet come to final maturity.

Details of technical features of Schaffhausen Tanakpur 1. Type of plant run-of-river run-of-river 2. Barrage length (m) 150 548 3. Head m (m3/s) 6.5 (500)1 20 (100) 6.0 (600) 24 (566) 4. River Discharge i) Annual average (m3/s) 350 645 ii) Lowest monthly average (m3/s) 240 106 iii) Highest monthly average (m3/s) 575 1579 iv) 25 year max (1959-90) (m3/s) 1000 11000 v) 25 year min (m3/s) 100 vi) Design flood (m3/s) 20000 5. Turbines 2 Kaplan 3 Kaplan 6. Installed capacity MW 25.2 (2x12.6)2 120 (3x30) 7. Average annual energy GWh 168 444 8. Construction period 1960-1967 1984-1990

SCHAFFHAUSEN

History The hydropower station Schaffhausen is located on the first of a series of rapids preceding the famous Rhine Falls where the Rhine River makes a spectacular 21 m drop. During the INTERSTATE SHARING OF WATER RIGHTS 263 EVELOPMENT D IVER R ORDER B NDIA -I EPAL N AND

ERMAN -G WISS S OF

AYOUT L CHEMATIC 1. S 1. IGURE F 264 GYAWALI, D. AND SCHWANK, O.

Middle Ages, when river navigation was the important artery of commerce, these rapids forced martinets to unload their boats and transport their goods by land to skirt the Rhine Falls. Such a strategic location led to the establishment of an urban market and the town of Schaffhausen. This vital town and its contonal area has been the object of avarice of different empire- builders in history. From the 11th Century onward this town has seen the collision of interests between the Papacy and the emerging imperial authority. At that time local dukes, counts, and the Bishop of Constance tried to resume jurisdiction within walled empire- free Swiss cities. The rise of the Habsburg empire to the east and its close linkages with German princes forced Schaffhausen to enter into protective agreement with Zurich, Berne and the original Alpine forest cantons forming the first Swiss Confederation. During the reign of the Habsburg emperor Maxmillian I of Austria in 1499 AD, the resistance of the Alpine communities to external domination was strong enough to conclude the peace of Basel, after which Schaffhausen was admitted to the Swiss Confederation in 1501 AD. Because of the nature of feudalism in Europe, water rights have remained decentralised with Germen ‘Laender’ and Swiss ‘Cantons’ and not so much with the centralised state. A monastery, and later the town of Schaffhausen, held fishing rights over the entire stretch of the Rhine in this part. As a consequence, the border between the canton of Schaffhausen and the neighbouring canton of Zurich is on the left bank of the Rhine and not in the middle of the river as usual. The full length of the 150 m barrage lies wholly within Switzerland as also within the territory of the town of Schaffhausen. When the first power plant was constructed at this site in 1866 AD in course of early industrialisation, there was no German nation-state yet, because it came into being only in 1871 AD. The territorial rights on the German side were at that time with ‘Grossherzogtum Baden’ today united with the former ‘Kingdom of Wuerttemberg’ into the federal state of ‘Baden-Wuerttemberg.’ The modern plant, constructed in 1967, succeeds this early station and carries its history.

Institutional Arrangements The 25 MW power station is a run-of-river plant wholly within Schaffhausen (Swiss) territory that makes no consumptive use of water and stores none. The electricity generated is allocated on a share basis among Swiss shareholders after deducting the German share set according to the inter-state water use arrangements (concessions) between Baden-Wuertemberg (FRG) and the Swiss Confederation representing the cantons of Schaffhausen, Zurich and Thurgau dated 1 September 1960. The concession is based on an agreement between the Grossherzogtum Baden and the Swiss Confederation on river navigation dated 28 February 1867 and the agreement on river control between Germany and Switzerland dated 18 March 1929 which stipulates sharing of power generated on the border river acknowledging capital INTERSTATE SHARING OF WATER RIGHTS 265

investment and water rights within the barrage impact zone. According to this inter-state agreement, 9 per cent of the electricity produced by the Schaffhausen plant is supplied to Badenwerke in Karlruhe, Baden-Wuertumberg (FRG) against their water using rights. This energy is not free of cost to the Germans. They have to pay for the production costs (including capital depreciation), which is SFr 0.04-0.05 per kWh. Even then this energy is still cheaper compared to coal or nuclear, and the Badenwerke makes a profit when selling this energy to consumers at current market rates. The trading is managed by the North-Eastern Switzerland Power Company via the international trading point Laufenburg between Basel and Schaffhausen. The traded energy volume between Badenwerke and North-Eastern Switzerland Power Company is many times larger than the Schaffhausen share. The remaining 91 per cent are shared among the shareholders as follows:

Per cent Shareholders 50 Town of Schaffhausen 30 Canton of Schaffhausen 20 North-Eastern Switzerland Power Ltd. (NOK)

Baden-Wurttemberg is not represented at the level of the board of shareholders but delegates one commissioner to the technical commission in charge of plant operation and river control measures. About 25 to 30 per cent of the riverbanks within the utilised section of the river lies on the territory of Baden-Wuerttemberg. The size of the barrage impact zone, which is about 13.6 km and fluctuates by about 2 km, is shorter in the summer when the value of electricity generated is low, and longer in the winter when the value is high. Schaffhausen Power Station Ltd. Itself does not make a profit. It supplies the power to its shareholders at average production cost. The shareholders are represented by their public power corporations who generate a profit from the cheap hydropower produced at approximately SFr 0.04 to 0.05 per kWh and sold at SFr 0.10 to 0.22 depending upon the season and tariff class. The Electricity Corporation of the town of Schffhausen delivers an annual profit of two million SFr to the town council. The town’s demand is more than what can be met from this power plant alone. The balance is drawn from the national grid operated by the North-Easter Switzerland Power Ltd. This grid is supplied by a mix of nuclear power and storage hydro-electricity from stations in the Alps. However, both sources of supply are more expensive than the hydropower generated locally at Schaffhausen.

TANAKPUR

History The stretch of the Mahakali, on which the 120 MW Tanakpur hydroelectric project finds 266 GYAWALI, D. AND SCHWANK, O.

itself, became part of India during the British Raj in 1920 AD when the British successfully concluded a treaty with the ruling Rana Shogunate in Nepal. In exchange for 4,000 acres of forest land in areas to the east as well as fifty thousand rupees, the Nepali rulers agreed to transfer 4,000 acres of the eastern bank of the Mahakali to India so that the British could build the Sarada barrage and divert water to the Sarada irrigation canal. To the ve ry primitive Nepali state then, the objects of value were agricultural land and timber, but not water; and the state did not then consider irrigation as one of its welfare functions. Indeed, it is only after the experience with Sarada that Rana rulers Chandra Shumshere and his successor Juddha began to experiment in a small way with irrigation development in eastern and central Nepal, more a case of Toynbeean mimesis than that of a confidently perceived master plan. The process of negotiations of the Sarada Treaty was begun in 1910 AD with a request for survey by the British, and a study of British maps of those days shows ‘ancient Nepal boundary’ as the probable eastern bankline of the Mahakali river (Russell, 1936) . Before the land swap of 1920 that has resulted in present day border positions, a border settlement was made in 1913 between the Nepal Durbar and the government of the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh in India) that took into account the shifting nature of the river, replacing the previous border that followed the river’s center line with reference pillars on either sides. After the land swap, British India began the construction of the Sarada barrage and associated irrigation works. At this point, one can inductively speculate that the barrage was constructed on or close to the left bank by isolating the construction portion with a coffer dam. After the construction of the barrage and the left afflux bund on swapped land, the river, which must have been flowing farther to the right, was closed with the right afflux bund and the Mahakali waters channeled through the Sarada barrage. This indication comes from the visible filling on a perched portion of the Sarada canal to the west which was probably the main course of the river before it was diverted to the present channel. This sequence of events may also explain why Nepali villages of Chandani and Dudhaura (which have always been part of Nepal and were not part of the swapped territory as is often believed) find themselves on the opposite bank. The 1920 Sarada Treaty allows Nepal to withdraw 4.25 cumec of water in the dry season and 13 cumec in the wet season, which could be increased to 28.34 cumec if water were available. What India can withdraw is, however, only limited by the size of its Sarada Canal, which has a capacity of 326 cumec. Nepal began to use part of this allocated water only from 1980 with the help of a World Bank loan for its Mahakali Irrigation Project Stage I which serves 4,800 ha. Currently a Stage II project is underway which would make full use of the water allocated under the 1920 Treaty by bringing a further 6,800 ha of land further south of the Royal Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve under command (World Bank, 1988). INTERSTATE SHARING OF WATER RIGHTS 267

In 1983 India completed the technical study of a 120 MW hydroelectric project on the Mahakali to be built upstream of the Sarada barrage (NHPC, 1983). It planned building a diversion barrage on what has always been Indian territory but envisaged the left afflux bund to end in that portion of its territory which was swapped with Nepal in 1920. It also planned to drop the tailrace water (566 cumec) from the hydroelectric plant straight into the Sarada canal (with a capacity of 26 cumec only) bypassing the old Sarada barrage. These plans, and immediate construction activity on what seemed like a war-footing, raised Nepali fears in two ways: sending the tailrace water directly into the Sarada canal would deprive, or at least seriously affect, the Mahakali Irrigation Project; and left afflux bund tied to the high ground on Indian territory would submerge Nepali land. A series of negotiations, begun in April 1983 and culminating in the October 1992 Joint Communique between Prime Minister Rao of India and Prime Minister Koirala of Nepal, allowed the Tanakpur tairace waters to be discharged upstream of the Mahakali barrage so as not to affect the Mahakali Irrigation Project and the Sarada Treaty upon which it is based, and the left afflux bund to be tied to the high ground in Nepali territory submerging only bagar (or flood plain river bed) land. Nepal was to enjoy some flood protection benefits, to receive 20 million units of electricity (about 10 per cent of the nine-month dry season generation but about 4.5 per cent of the total annual including seasonal energy) as well as 4.25 cumec of water on a perennial basis for irrigation, all free of cost (without any Nepali financial investment), and to have the possibility of connecting Nepal’s East-West highway to the bridge on the Tanakpur barrage that would allow an additional heavy-vehicle transit point to land-locked Nepal in its Far Western Region. These agreements are still a matter f dispute within Nepal, being subject to parliamentary approval and possible further challenge in the Supreme Court. Much of the heat stems from inter – and intra-party conflicts revolving around personalities and differing perspectives on the 1920 Treaty and its implications. Prior to the democratic changes of 1990, Nepal’s position on the Tanakpur barrage was that it was an Indian project (as India maintained) and that all Nepal required was that the project not harm Nepal. Accordingly, the tailrace waters of the Taanakpur power plant were re-channeled above the Sarada barrage, the afflux bund re-designed and some flood protection measures undertaken by India. From 1991 onwards, with the advent of democracy and a more open polity, Nepal felt that its contribution of a physical feature of the river enhanced the benefits ensuing from the hydro project and began to demand a share from it. Whether this share is adequate or not is the current debate.

Institutional Arrangements Assessing benefits is a difficult exercise even in the best of scientific conditions. Given the state of scientific data in Nepal, this exercise gets riddled with uncertainties, leading to 268 GYAWALI, D. AND SCHWANK, O.

debates and distrust. Nepal has only recently begun to maintain hydrological records on the Mahakali at the proposed upstream 7,200 MW storage site at Pancheshwor. Otherwise, the figures on the Mahakali flow come from Indian measurements at Sarada barrage which are not systematically shared with Nepal. Indeed, the Nepali measurements at upstream Pancheshwor indicate a mean annual flow of 654 cumec when the Indian measurements at downstream Sarada barrage indicate only cumec (ERC), a discrepancy that could be explained possibly from short and long hydrological series considerations, from calibration mistakes, from Bhabar zone seepage etc. But the extent of uncertainty has not been studied and addressed ao far, leading to wholly unnecessary doubts in a South Asian society that is not scientifically open. Lack of Nepali technical knowledge is highlighted by the current debate on Tanakpur. While Nepal’s making available to India 577 m of its territory to complete the Tanakpur afflux bund has been hotly debated as infringing on Nepali territorial sovereign rights, none of the protagonist parties visiting Tanakpur off and on during the last two years have even observed, let alone questioned, the extension of the left afflux bund of to Sarada barrage a few hundred meters into Nepali territory beyond border pillar BP 6A between 1954 and 1958 after a major flood circa 1953. Similarly, exact knowledge of the land eroded in Nepal due to the diversion of water during Tanakpur barrage construction by Nepal due to the diversion of water during Tanakpur barrage construction by India and the exact ownership of this land by affected Nepali families is still missing. While state level agreements have the features described above, their project level execution is still evolving. A perennial complaint by Nepal has been that the waters allocated in similar agreements on the Kosi and the Gandak have not been flowing to Nepal due to operational difficulties and lack of effective coordinating mechanism at the field level. In this current agreement too, the day-to-day releases of water and electricity to Nepal yet to receive a proper institutional basis.

LESSONS FOR CO-OPERATION Water sharing agreements that flow from a good scientific understanding by both the riparians of the river system of its behaviour and capabilities will lead to peace and understanding that last, while those with scientific uncertainties will always provide opportunities for strife dispute. In the case of the Alps, both Germany and Switzerland negotiated a river resource sharing agreement from the firm footing of good national scientific database of their respective countries. Both parties were in a position to understand what they were giving to the other party, how valuable it was to the other side as well as what was the worth of what they were receiving. In the case of Nepal and India, while India had a better scientific understanding of what it was attempting, Nepal’s poor state of technological preparedness has meant that INTERSTATE SHARING OF WATER RIGHTS 269

its value reaction is always post facto, as if the American Indians realised after the deal what Manhattan was really worth or Czarist Russia what Alaska could develop into. This poor state of science has meant, on the one hand, that science does not lead decision- making but events lead to scientific evaluation after the fact, a sure recipe for having a perpetually disgruntled neighbour to live with. On the other hand, a historical backlog of a series of unscientific post facto evaluations leads to inane expectations of what one’s contribution is really worth. The demand for fifty-fifty sharing of benefits from Tanakpur from a section of the Nepali political spectrum without considering the fact that Nepal has not made a fifty per cent investment in cash or kind in the project is a case in point. Good science would have also had an impact on the choice of technology. A better basin planning and a mutual understanding between two neighbours of each other’s requirements would probably have dictated that the current Tanakpur barrage be located few kilometers upstream where the Mahakali debouches onto the plains. This would have provided India several meters more of head for their power plant as well as better irrigation command possibilities and Nepal too could avail itself of the possibility of irrigating more land in the narrow strip of its Tarai. It would then have provided the inbuilt impetus to both parties to expedite the development of the upstream Pancheshwor storage project for the mutual benefit of both. Good science is also good management science. The Swiss-German example provides for a German commissioner to sit on the management committee of the Swiss plant to ensure a proper functioning of the power station and correct allocation of the mutually agreed benefits. The broad, state-level Tanakpur agreement has not yet come to addressing these down-to-earth operational issues. The most significant conclusion one can draw from the two cases is that a history of decentralised power sharing between the center and the cantons or laenders resulted in a better assessment of the actual contribution of either parties at the local level in the European case but not in the South Asian one, even though a similar hills-plaains situation prevails between Switzerland and Germany. For example, in the Alpine case, locally held fishing rights were an important aspect determining the allocation of benefits to ensue from the new technological intervention in the form of a hydroelectric power plant. In the Himalayan case, even though a fish ladder has been incorporated almost mechanically into the design of the Tanakpur power plant (even though the downstream Sarada does not have one and the stretch of the river between Tanakpur and Sarada is dry most of the year after diversion into the power channel), fishing rights of the local communities have never figured as an element of negotiations at the state level. On the Indian side, the power generated from the plant is stepped up to 220 kV and transmitted to Bareilly 110 km away in the Ganga plains heartland. The Indian project profile (NHPC, 1983) justifies this because Tanakpur town at the piedmont of Nainital District “being in a 270 GYAWALI, D. AND SCHWANK, O.

remote hilly area, there is no industry nearby”. A plains bias, therefore, silently works to the detriment of the highland areas whose resources are planned for exploitation by the plain establishment for perceived benefits in the plains.

NOTES 1 Lower head at higher discharge is due to gates being kept open during floods to allow ships to pass under certain bridges. 2 For 500 m3/s discharge, the rated capacity is 27 MW

REFERENCES ERC, 1993: Report by the Evaluation and Recommendation Committee (ERC) on the Impact of Treaty on Tanakpur Barrage Project, Kathmandu. (Also referred to as the “Baral Commission” Report on Tanakpur) NHPC, 1983: Tanakpur Hydroelectric Project National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), Nainital. Russell, J. W., 1936: Map of Sarada Canal Headworks, Certified by the Divisional Forest Officer of Haldwani P. Bhola and Superintendent of Tarai and Bhobar Government States F.H. Hutchinson for the Executive Engineer of the Headworks Division of Sarada Canal. World Bank, 1988: Staff Appraisal Report: Nepal Mahakali Irrigation II Project, Asia Country Department I, Washington D.C. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 271-283

DEVELOMPMENTAL IMPACT IN KRISHNA RIVER BASIN: CONFLICTS AND ALTERNATIVES

SHOMASHEKHARA T. S. REDDY Research Fellow Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore

ABSTRACT

The Krishna river basin in South India demonstrates how the western development model ravaged traditional management practices and led to a severe conflict in resources uses. This paper discusses the history of the development in the basin and highlights the emergence of a peoplesí strategy which offers alternative sustainable management approaches. The paper is based on the report ëEcological Study of River Krishna Basiní by J. Bandyopadhyay and S.T.S Reddy, Research Foundation for Science and Ecology, Dehra Dun, 1987.

INTRODUCTION The Krishna is the second largest river of India. Originating in the Western Ghats in the hills of Mahabaleshwar at an altitude of 1337 metres, the river travels a distance of about 1400 km through the most arid and drought prone regions in South India to joint the bay of Bangal. In its journey, the river assimilates nearly a dozen major and minor tributaries, draining and area of 258,000 km2. The Krishna basin is shared by three riparain states; Maharashtra (28.8 per cent), Karntaka (43.8 per cent) and Andhra Pradesh (29.4 per cent). On the western fringe of the basin, lies hills of the Western Ghat. On the east of the hills lies a relatively smaller but rocky landscape after which the river enters the arid deccan plateau. The annual rainfall in the basin ranges from 3,000 mm at the Western Ghats to 450 mm in the Deccan plateau. The hydrology of Krishna is influenced by the monsoon rainfall. In spite of being largely arid, the Krishna basin like all major rivers, has been the cradle of a rich cultural heritage in India. Stone-age tools have been discovered especially in middle Krishna, Ghataprabha and Malaprabha basins. Nagarjunakunda, now an island in the Nagarjunsagar reservoir, is reported by historians to be a famous center of Buddhist learning. The great Basava of the Veerrasaiva movement expounded his thoughts against mainstream Hinduism at the confluence of Bhima and Krishna. Purandarasa of Bhakthi cult, Shankaracharya of Advaitha school, and Raghavendra of Madhawa cult, have all tried to reform Hinduism, by establishing centers of learning in the basin. Despite the low rainfall, the rich black cotton soil in the deccan has helped in the production of innumerable varieties of cotton. These varieties have helped in sustaining 272 REDDY, S. T. S.

the basin’s economy and led to the emergence of particular textile patterns, like muslin of Machalipatnam, which were internationally known. Even today, centers such as Dharmavaram and Gadwal, are famous for silk sarees, while Sholapur and Mangalgiri are known for cotton textiles. Dharwad is famous for its local woollen blankets. The Western Ghats of the basin, which receive heavy rainfall, are also known for its evergreen forests and spices, ranging from cardamom pepper to arecanut.

PEOPLESí TECHNOLOGY: PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD Historically, the inhabitants of the Deccan region have shown great ingenuity in tapping and transporting water over long distances through the diversions and network of channels. In Maharasthra, such systems are called bandharas and phads in Karnataka region (Patil, 1984), and kaluva in Andhra Prasesh. Where the river could not be diverted, ‘tank’ technology was adopted. The tanks were locally designed and were built to hold back runoff to meet irrigation water requirements. Tanks of different sizes were built which helped in transporting surplus water from high rainfall regions to those in the arid regions. In Karnataka, these tanks had in-built structures, called katte and kunte which were provided to prevent entry of silt into tanks, and enhance in-situ water conservation (Reddy, 1989). Tanks were built by great kingdoms in the past, that had administered the basin. In Nasik district, Muslim rulers were responsible for building innumerable phads, bhandaras which irrigated almost 40,000 acres of land. The Bhimani kings, apart from tapping Bhima, a tributary of the Krishna, to extend piped water supply to the fort at Ahmednagar, also built many bhandaras in Bijapur and adjoining districts. The Vijayanagar kings, have built seven bhandaras which irrigated 14,000 acres land in Biliary district, and hold the record in building tanks of massive sizes in various parts of the basin. The physical maintenance of these irrigation systems were done through annual grants provided by royal dynasties (Reddy, 1991). Building tanks was considered to be the act of achieving moksha (liberation). Common men and woman also built tanks. Of these, it is worthy to mention the massive tank built by a woman, who practised prostitution, which today goes by her name. Even the poorer people contributed to the building of several structures, like kunte and katte in the basin (Dikshit, 1990).

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD Traditional approaches to managing resources in the basin were based on the understanding of the arid ecology of the deccan. The problems caused by the erratic nature of the monsoon were addressed, by building tanks and following a cropping pattern, whose dominant principle was conservation of water and soil. Semi-wet crops of ragi or sorghum were planted to conserve water. These crops needed practically no irrigation, and during the monsoon catching rains and in helping accumulation of the entire run-off in the tanks. KRISHNA BASIN: CONFLICTS AND ALTERNATIVES 273

Only in the later monsoon were irrigated crops planted in the command areas. The crops were succeeded by a totally dry crop for green manure, to help restore fertility. The sequence of three successive crop planting was helpful in the conservation of water. This practice also conserved soil, prevented waterlogging and salinity. Where rainfall was high, the seepage from the tanks was used to grow arecanut gardens, which housed innumerable varieties of tubers, fruit and tree spices of high commercial value. The biotic resources also helped in exhaustion of excessive soil moisture, minimised waterlogging and checked salinity. In the deltaic regions with black cotton soils, a form of pudding, called dammu was practiced. Domestic animals, especially buffaloes were allowed to trample the field several times to acquire the required tilth. Under rainfed conditions, mixed crops were always grown. The purpose of mixed cropping was to conserve the varied moisture levels. In the expansive black cotton soil, during the monsoon, a mixture of pearl millet and sorghum, was cultivated. In the late monsoon, the cropping pattern was sorghum with safflower which can survive on a good quantum of dew, but little soil moisture. All these crops were grown as mixed crops with three to four pulses, cotton, castor and safflower. Each one of these contributed to restore soil fertility and conserved soil moisture. Mixed cropping was helpful in meeting the needs of individual family.

SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS In all the command areas of tanks, farmers had a panchayat constituted by the beneficiaries. In Andhra Pradesh, river diversion was managed by Pannapeddandarlu, a system which organised labour for the maintenance and upkeep of the entire system. Under the management approach, youths were allowed to play the role of village elders in managing the affairs of the diversions. In the delta region, the same group was responsible for desilting the drainage. Prescription of the cropping pattern, obligations for the physical upkeep of the system and micro-network were made by the social organisations. Similar organisations also existed in Maharastra. Only those farmers who fulfilled the prescribed obligations were given the right to irrigate. The share of each individual farmer was allocated on the basis of either area or quantum of water. The strategy was to provide opportunity to every member of the community to harvest a coop. In the Western Ghats, the Panchayat, also supervised the use of green manure. Extraction of manure was allowed only from a demarcated region. The Panchayats maintained expansive dry pastures called kavals, which provided grasing facilities to stocks of cattle and sheep while maintaining the supply of much needed manure for rainfed agriculture (Bandyopadhyay et al., 1988).

COLONIAL PERIOD: DESTRUCTIVE PHASE During the pre-colonial period, the aim was to meet the subsistence needs without 274 REDDY, S. T. S.

destroying the ecological balance. With the arrival of the British and the colonial rule, changes began to appear as the nature of demand altered. The aim was to meet distance market requirements in the name of development, which gradually led to the ecological destruction of the basin. The new approach viewed water as a major technological input, which led to commoditisation of the crops. Cambodian cotton was introduced in the basin, to avoid dependency of British textile industries on the cotton from the United States, which was more expensive. The new variety required additional irrigation water as cotton is a high water demanding crop, which was not forth coming from the community, managed indigenous irrigation schemes. As a result, large-scale irrigation schemes were planned and executed in the basin. These developments started towards the middle of the nineteenth century. Across the Krishna, a barrage was built, at Vijayawada. The left bank canal of Nira was planned in 1885 in the plains of Maharashtra while KC Canal was planned in the plains of Anhra Pradesh. The objective of these irrigation projects was also to enhance government revenue through higher land tax (Cotton, 1885). Command areas which were under the local management of farmers then came to be managed by engineers and administrators. The result of these interventions was the extensive expansion of area under cotton in the districts of Bombay and Madras presidencies. In a period of fourty years from 1900, in the two presidencies the area under irrigation expanded by 93.16 per cent and 60 per cent respectively. The details are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1 AREA UNDER CAMBODIAN COTTON District in the Presidency of Irrigated Area in Acres % Increases 1900 1940 Bombay1 2369000 4576000 93.16 Madras2 1373000 2199000 60.16

1. The present Maharastra state, Belgauni, Bijapur and Dharwan distric of Karnataka. 2. The present districts of Ananthapur, Kurnool, Cuddeph Prakshan and Krishna of Andra Pradesh and Raichaur and Billary districts of Karnataka.

Not only did it led to the expansion of area under cotton cultivation, but also led to the introduction and expansion of other commercial crops in the basin. Of these, the most notable was groundnut. By 1951-16, 1,136,000 acres of land in the Madras presidency was under groundnut cultivation while in Bombay presidency, the areas was 2,13,000 acres. In Bombay presidency however, there was a large-scale shift to sugarcane cultivation especially after the introduction of the block system, under the Nira and Mutha Canals. From 11.6 per cent of the command area of Nira canal during 1910-1902, the area under KRISHNA BASIN: CONFLICTS AND ALTERNATIVES 275

sugarcane increased to almost 40 per cent by the end of the First World War in 1917. During this period as and incentive to expand the area under sugarcane, eleven sugar factories were established. By 1917, in the command of the Nira Canal, only 29 per cent of the area remained under food grain agriculture while the remaining 71 per cent was under sugarcane cultivation. The impact of sugarcane cultivation in the dry land has been summarised as follows (Mann, 1958). "Another agricultural result has followed in these deccan canals (Nira and Mutha) in the draining of the manorial resources of the surrounding dry country,...... the dry crops..... have been to that extent, starved of the manures which they might have had." To compensate the poor yields in the absence of manures, at the insistence of the government, pasture lands were brought under cultivation. The new cultivated lands were poor in soil fertility, and highly prone to soil erosion (Keatings, 1912). As a consequence famines occurred at regular intervals. In the absence of royal patronage, and a supportive administrative systems which was gradually declining, physical upkeep of the indigenous irrigation system was affected as funding became more and more scarce. The consequence was a gradual reduction in area irrigated by indigenous schemes which also became unstable. To overcome the instability of community managed tanks, the Colonial Government encouraged individual farmers to exploit groundwater. Liberal loans, especially in the famine prone areas, were provided for purpose.

POST COLONIAL The post independence period up to 1964, was marked by the continuation of the trend and pattern of changes introduced during the colonial era. Several major and medium dams were built, and the area under irrigation in the basin was expanded (Table 2) to overcome the problem of food deficit due to drought.* In the early seventies, about 4,420 thousand acres of land was irrigated through large-scale irrigation projects. By the early 1980s, 8,500 thousand acres were irrigated showing an increase of almost 97 per cent over the ten year period. The expansion of irrigated area within the basin, was also due to the conflict over riparin rights in the sharing of the Krishna’s waters between the three states in the basin. Such conflicts utilised the reelection shown in the benefit cost ratio of projects constructed in the drought prone area (Rath, 1976). As a result, the riparian states, on one hand neglected the ecological aspects, and on the other, the role of the social organisations in water management. Almost all projects in the basin today suffer from poor water management practices. 1,114,963 acres of irrigated lands the basin today is waterlogged and affected by salinisation. With greater attention focused on development of large-scale irrigation projects, the maintenance of tanks was neglected and they were allowed to be ruined. In the worst 276 REDDY, S. T. S.

drought affected district of Anantapur, for example, during a period of about two and half decades the number of tanks was reduced by almost 50 per cent and as such the area irrigated. Reduction in the number of tanks and area thus irrigated occurred in other drought prone regions also. To compensate the loss, wells owned privately by the rich, have appeared on a large-scale. In Anantapur district alone, the number of wells in the same period increased tremendously by 1,045 per cent. In the same period, the area irrigated by wells increased by 150 per cent. The details are shown in Table 3. In the absence of tanks, and over exploitation of groundwater, a higher incidence of droughts is

TABLE 2 IRRIGATION FACILITIES CREATED IN THE BASIN (000 Hectares) Year Maharashtra Karnataka Andhra Pradesh Total 1969-70 491 591 687 1768 1980-81 629 1129 1666 3424 Increase 138 535 983 1656 % of Increase 28 90 144 97

TABLE 3 TANK DEPLETION VERSUS WELL DEVELOPMENT IN ANANTAPURA Year Tanks Groundwater wells Number Area Irrigated in Acres Number Area Irrigated in Acres 1954-1955 2237 194010 5593 63890 1980-1981 1137 32015 64080 159730 Reduction % 50 83.5 Increase % 1045 150

experienced in the basin, both in frequency, and in its expansion to areas which earlier were not prone to drought (Bandyopadhya, 1 987).

GREEN REVOLUTION PHASE In the spread of drought in the basin, the green revolution phase had its own contribution. The green revolution package introduced new crop varieties. Its impact was greater on crops such as cotton. To overcome the consequent loss of natural fertility in the soils, the green revolution package is widely practiced. Such practices, have replaced the pulse production in summer by irrigated paddy. The pre-green revolution practices of pinnapendaralu in desiliting drainage and dammu have been given up, as the time available between two crops of paddy, is not sufficient to practice such managerial systems. As a consequence, salinity is increasing every year, and the yields have gone down (Subba Rao, KRISHNA BASIN: CONFLICTS AND ALTERNATIVES 277

1986). With the release of DCH hybrid varieties, in the command areas of Nagarjunsagar, competition between the traditional. Medium staple cotton and extr-long staple cotton (DCH) set in. Upstream districts, such as Ananthapur and Kurnool, where medium staple cotton was cultivated in dry lands, could not compete with farmers in the downstream command area. The search for alternative commercial crops, on the one hand, has resulted in a large number of wells and, the other, expansion of area under groundnut. Today, Ananthapur district, the second worst drought affected district in the country, is also the second biggest producer of groundnut. The area under food grain agriculture is less than ten per cent. This has further enhanced the occurrence of droughts. With intensification of DCH cotton in Nagrajunasagar, the profits that were made by the cotton growers before 1984, could not be maintained due to widespread pest attack, such as white-fly. Even the spraying of high dosages of synthetic pyrothroids, almost daily, could not contain the pests. Continued loss in profit led to severe social disorder. In 1986, due to heavy losses, suicide cases were reported in 23 families. The delta region has become highly susceptible to floods, due to clogged drains. Only the rich farmers are able to shift from paddy cultivation to prawn and fish production. The shift, however, has been ecologically destructive in the delta, as large quantum of water is held in ponds for a long period. In some cases, the water is held for more than one year. Such storage has further increased water demands. The poorer and small farmers living closer to the fish or prawn ponds are unable to make the shift and are gradually losing land productivity due to waterlogging and salinity.

CONFLICTS WITHIN BASIN Water flow in space and time has an interconnectedness within a basin. Interventions for water uses, irrespective of scale, leads to changes. Development in the case of the Krishna basin, has become the source of major conflicts. Mining of iron at Kudremukh and Manganese in Sander, in the upper catchments of Tungabhadra, has seriously affected the stability of the catchment and increased the erosion rate. Large-scale building of dams and reservoirs have also led to the inundation and displacement of the local population. The displaced people were resettled in forests, which has reduced the forest coverage by 8.50 per cent, in the 1980,s. The erosion rate has increased to 1,140 tonnes/year. As a consequence, the storage capacity of reservoirs has been reduced by one to two per cent, every year. In monetary terms, loss due to silation amounts to Rs. 400 crores per year. The silting of the Tungabhadra reservoir, has incurred conflicts in use both in terms of the spatial and temporal characteristics of water storage and distribution. The conflict is extremely pronounced between hydroelectric power generation, irrigation and industrial uses. Construction of large-scale dams on the upstream catchment, have also affected the sequence of annual floods in the delta as flood water is retained in reservoirs. 278 REDDY, S. T. S.

The pulp based industries at Tungabhadra have also led to the pollution of the river and destroyed its fishing economy up to 20 km downstream. Moreover, large-scale cultivation of pulp wood species like eucalyptus in this part of the basin has impaired groundwater recharge potential. The cultivation of fish and prawn has further created a conflict between the rich and the poor farmers. Many poor people have sought judicial help, seeking statutory interventions, to prevent salinisation of their lands. The basic flaws in the approach to water development and management of projects in Maharastra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh has also led to disputes relating to the sharing of the Krishna’s water. The states of Maharashtra and Karataka had demanded 828.3 TMC ft. and 1,42.42 TMC ft. respectively for their existing and contemplated projects. Andhra Pradesh had put forth a total demand of 2,008.1 TMC ft. Thus the total demend on the basin was 4,269.3 TMC ft. which is two times more than the total dependable yield of the river. Mismatch between the demand and availability of water has been one of the causes of the inter-state conflicts. The inter-state conflicts over the Krishna waters was referred to the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal for adjudication in April 1969 under the chairmanship of Justice Bachawat. The Tribunal allowed for privatisation and over exploitation of groundwater resources in the basin, further opening the way for the exploitation of groundwater resources in the basin, further opening the way for the emergence of new conflict. If an holistic view of water resources management had been taken, the conflicts could have been avoided. Left uncontrolled, acute groundwater depletion has been experienced in almost all parts of the basin adding to scarcity and increase in frequency of drought.

PEOPLESí ALTERNATIVE The western model of development in the basin has led to ecological deterioration, siltation of reservoir, decline in groundwater levels, increased frequency of droughts and growing riparian conflicts. The inhabitants of the basin today are evolving alternatives. The basic objectives of these alternatives are, firstly, to bring about equity through effective social organisation and thereby effective and rational use of water. Secondly, rainwater being harvested for in-situ percolation is utilised on the basis of the need of a family, than the external market. Like in the past, these approaches show an understanding of the interdependence of catchments, cultivated area and social needs. Of such experiments, Pani-Panchayat initiated by Villas Salunke, was the first one to make a name in Naigaon Village. Today, it is practiced, in many villages of Pune, Sholapur and Satara district of Maharashtra. People also are involved in catchment rehabilitation in the districts of Mehboobnagar. Another attempt for drought alleviation, is being made at Raleghan Siddhi in Maharashtra. The basic philosophy of tackling drought, according to the architect of the KRISHNA BASIN: CONFLICTS AND ALTERNATIVES 279

programme, Anna Hazare, is "If we can stop every drop of water from running off, there will be no drought in any village in our country" (Ganesh and Pangare, 1992). The methodology adopted is mocro-watershed development; where activities such as nala - bounding, contour-bounding, landscaping, afforestation and pasture development are undertaken. Even though water is drafted through wells, the focus is on rational use emphasising the objective of meeting, once again, the needs of a family. Manavlok is an NGO involved in similar type of activities in Satara district of Maharashtra. Of late, inspired by the successes of Salunke and Hazare, Baliraja’s dam has been built by raising funds from selling sand deposits of the river. This notable act is the determination of the villagers in laying claim to the resource within their jurisdiction and asserting their right even at the risk of defying authority. Alternative irrigation programmers are also being undertaken to check recurring droughts in the Krishna basin by volunteers of Sholapur. While the western model of development, concentrates on large dams, farmers in a village called Hiparagi in Bijapur district of Karnataka have pooled their own resources to build a barrage across Bhima, a tributary of Krishna. In Benkikere, a village at the foot hills of the Western Ghat, a group of yong people concerned with the decline in the capacity of the tank in their village have decided to close down the sluices and recommended every farmer to tap seepage and groundwater. They have also stopped transporting beyond the command area. As a consequence, several gardens that were dying, have stated to rejuvenate in the village. Farmers of Talaku village, in Chitradurga district of Karnatake, have desalted a diversion canal of three kilometres, to bring in water to their tank. Plans are underway to rehabilitate tanks in Karnataka. A religious organisation at Taralabalu is involved in rehabilitating catchment area, as a prelude to tank rehabilitation. At Mehboobnagar district of Andhra Pradesh, Youth for Action, a voluntary organisation, is involved in the rehabilitation of micro watershed. The key objective is to rehabilitate traditional structures–katte and kunte– and provide an equitable share to every family. The afforestation of catchment area is done also with equity principle, wherein the poor and landless, who have planted saplings and nurtured them, will have rights to 50 per cent of the yield. Since 1984, in the southern region of the Western Ghats, apart from preventing the logging of forest, Appiko (Chipko) is involved in spreading ecologically sustainable farming. Several such movements, taking initiatives from Appiko, have questioned the validity of large dams. The groups are involved in conservation of common lands. Many villages are involved in protection of evergreen forests and afforestation programme are being undertaken. Such activities are being supported by private and non- governmental groups. 280 REDDY, S. T. S.

CONCLUSION The approach of using water following ecologically suitable cropping pattern managed by social organisations, for subsistence requirements, in the krishna basin were succeeded by market oriented cropping pattern and centrally managed irrigation systems. Being the products of growth oriented developmental model pursued sectorally, the approaches have not only ravaged the eco-system of the basin, but also led to conflicts, on all fronts. From almost a hopeless situation, alternatives have evolved. People’s solutions regard water not only as an essential technological input but also as a life saving resource and the property of the community, which should be shared on an equity basis by all the inhabitants of the basin.

REFERENCES Bandyopadhyay, J., 1987: Ecology of Drought and Water- Scarcity, Need for an Ecological Water Resource - Policy, Research Foundation for Science and Ecology, Dehra Dun. Bandyopadhyay, J. , Reddy, S.T.S. and Shiva ,V., 1988: Amrith Mahal Kaval: An Approach to Conservation and- Development, Research Foundation for Science and Ecology, Dehra Dum. Cotton, Sir Aruthur, 1885: Public Works in India Superintendent, Government Publishing House, Madras. Dikshit, G. S., 1990: Tank Management Practices in- Earlier Periods in Karnataka, Sundar, A.(ed.), Promoting Peoples Praticipation in the Rehabilitation of Tanks in Karnataka, Wamana Consultants Private Limited, Hyderabad. Genesh and Pangarel, V., 1992: From Poverty to Plenty: The Story of Siddhi, INTACH Serial 5, Studies in Ecology and Sustainable Development. Keatings, G., 1912: Rural Economy in the Bombay - Deccan Longman, Madras. Mann S. H., 1958: The Economic Results of Possibilities of Irrigation, Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. X, No.2. Patil, R. K., 1989: Ensuring Equity in Irrigation Systems: A Case Study of a Farmer Group Managed System in N. part (ed.), Productivity and Equity in Irrigation Systems. Subba Rao, I. V., 1986: National Agricultural Research Project, Andhra Pradesh, Krishna- Godavari Zone, APAU, Hydrabad. Rath, N., 1976: The Correct Methods of Choosing Irrigation Projects in India in A Review Seminar on Role of Irrigation in the Development of India’s Agriculture, Indian Society of Agricultural Economists and Institute for Socio-Economic Change, Banglore. Reddy, S.T.S., 1989: Declining Groudwater Levels in India, International Joournal for Water Resources Development Vol. V, No. 3, September. Reddy, S.T.S., 1991: Forfeited Treasure: A Study on the Status of Irrigation Tanks in Karnataka Prarambha, Bangalore. KRISHNA BASIN: CONFLICTS AND ALTERNATIVES 281 282 REDDY, S. T. S.

The fourth theme sought to address the following issues:

The ‘basin approach’ and implications for bilateral or multilateral cooperation, including involvement of non-regional financiers. Challenges before diplomacy. Dissemination of scientific knowledge and management of mass opinion. Challenges before journalism. Establishing cooperation at academic and non-governmental levels. Domestic compulsions in water politics and their impact on mutual co-operation. Historical legacies and conflicting priorities.

The basin as the basis for future planning of water resources development is recognised to be the rational apporach (T Prasad). Within this ‘new thinking’, the largest country of the region should move away from its obsessive concern with security. If necessary, China should be brought in as a new partner in future basin initiatives (Josse). The basin approach has its own complexity and limitations, and the project-by-project approach has yielded good dividends in bilateral negotiations in the past (Kamala Prasad, previous them). The needs of the smaller countries have been neglected by the larger partner in the past which, in a new cooperative spirit, should be more magnanimous in negotiations (GD Shrestha). Water resource agreements, however, are not concluded for the sake of charity. Rather, nations should be able to define their interests and negotiate a mutual give-and-take instead of perpetually complaining of being short-changed (Kaushik). Past resource sharing negotiations with India have underlined the political sensitivity in Nepal and conflicts do not seem to go away despite good political understandings (Shaha). The role of media in reflecting and shaping public opinion is crucial. The need is to be more open and better informed. Better dialogue can remove the prevalent distrust and suspicions. The state of reporting in the media is affected not only by lack of interest but also lack of information and poor accessibility, both in Nepal and in India. Even what is available tends to be distorted by vested interests, both commercial and professional (B Bhattarai and R Dahal). South Asians are not the only ones to have disputes in resource sharing. Conflict on sharing international inland waters exist between many other countries too; and an agenda base on pursuit of better eco-systemic understanding of the Himalayan water may open the avenue for more productive co-operative research at the micro, meso and macro scales, and thus towards better co-operation among riparian countries (Hofer). Given the diverse perceptions regarding the utilisation of the shared resource, it will be naive to expect one meeting to resolve conflicting issues of water sharing between states, or even regions with in states. The Kathmandu Meeting sought to sensitise basin KRISHNA BASIN: CONFLICTS AND ALTERNATIVES 283

partners to the perceptions prevailing across the international divides. It was not the objective of the Meeting to sit in judgement over the who is right and who is wrong. In this regard, the meeting managed to pull together the views from Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Bhutan at one gathering in the presence of a larger international community of scholars. It brought to salience the complex dynamics of domestic compulsions and the political economy of water resources development in Himalaya-Ganga. The Meeting recommended that, in order to initiate a new form of co-operation, there is a need for new thinking and approaches: a fresh look at conflict resolution on a basin-wide and region-wide basis; the introduction of intensified co-operation at the scientific and media levels; and exploring the new paradigm of environmental security, both within and between nations. Such a move towards an open technical community embracing all the nations and the people of the region, would need to be led by a polity that draws on an expanding bade of scientific information generated by a co-operative process that builds confidence of all regional actors. In the Kathmandu Meeting the existing diplomatic and academic impasse and conflicting perceptions on the utilisation of the Himalaya-Ganga water resources were clearly evident. While new proposals were put forth, the participants were not at all sure of the next set of steps to be taken. For example, though the facilitating role of professional, academic and non-governmental groups was recognised as the desired institutional mode, the operational aspects remained unclear. Issues such as the definition of priorities, articulation of interest and how the political will to co-operate could not be discussed in depth. The process of foreign policy formulation and the role of professional diplomats in conflict resolution in the Himalaya-Ganga, strategic considerations and the political economic context of negotiations that are dominated by posturing for domestic constituencies, are the other issues that will have to wait for the next meeting.

* The Word ‘famine’ was replaced by ‘drought’ in post-independent phase. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 285-293

HIMALAN WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT: BILATERAL ACTION, REGIONAL CONSIDERATION AND INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

TRIYUGI PRASAD Director Centre for Water Resources Studies, Bihar College of Engineering, Patna University

ABSTRACT

People in the Ganga basin continue to suffer from a paradox of poverty in plenty as the vast bounty of water resources is left unutilised. Changes require bilateral actions for water resources development by Nepal and India whose philosophy espouses regional consideration and international assistance.

INTRODUCTION The Himalaya constitutes the most significant factor that determines occurrence of both the surface water and groundwater resources of the north Indian subcontinent. Life and living conditions in five countries Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh are dominated by and critically depend on the Himalayan rivers. These rivers have given rise to rich civilisation in the past, and have contributed to their rise and fall in history. The rivers dominate the contemporary social, economic, political activities and aspirations of the peoples of the region. The Himalaya gives rise to and sustains three major river systems: the Indus, the Ganga and the Brahmaputra. All three rive rs originate close to each other in the vicinity of Mount Kailash, but flow in different directions, and traverse through various countries. The Indus from its origin follows in a westerly direction along the southern slope of the Himalaya, assimilates the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej which are its major tributaries. The catchment area of the Indus lies in India and Pakistan. The Ganga flows in the southern and south-eastern directions from its origin on the southern slope of the Himalaya at Gangotri. Its important tributaries are Ramganga, Ghaghra, Gandak and Kosi which join it from the north, while Yamuna and Sone join it from the south. The southern tributaries of the Ganga drain the Vindhya, Kaimur and other hilly ranges in central India. The catchment of the Ganga lies principally in India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Tibet. The Brahmaputra follows an easterly direction in Tibet for a considerable distance after its origin before it enters India and finally flow into Bangladesh. Most of its 286 PRASAD, T.

tributaries originate on the north in India, Bhutan and Bangladesh. The catchment areas of the three Himalayan river systems in the co-basin nations are given in Table 1.

TABLE 1 CATCHMENT AREAS OF CO-BASIN NATION IN THE HIMALAYAN RIVER SYSTEMS River System Catchment In Cobasin Nations Main River (major Tributaries) Nation Catchment Area, Km2 (%) Indus India 321290 (27.6%) (Jhelum, Chenab, Rivi, Beas and Sutlej) Pakistan 843710 (72.4%) (Including parts of Afghanistan and Tibet) Total 1.165x105(100%) Ganga India 880000 (83%) (Ramganga, Ghaghra, Gandak, Kosi on Nepal 170000 (16%) left bank and Yamuna, Sone on right Bangladesh 9000 (0.85%) bank) Tibet Total 1.059x108 (100%) Brahmaputra Tibet 292670 (49%) (Subansiri, Kameng, Manas, Teesta on India 180480 (30)%) on the right bank and Dibang, Luhit, Bangladesh 72520 (12%) Dhansiri onthe left) Total 0.6x108 (100%)

BASIN APPROACH Basin has been universally recognised to be the logical and rational unit for the optimum development and management of water resources of any region. A basin is a closed, self contained boundary for the hydrological processes occurring within it. Also a basin provides the scientific basis for quantitative analysis as well as for analysing the side effects and long-term consequences of any engineering interventions. Water resources planning on the concept of basin has been accepted to be a cardinal principal of development. It has been incorporated and enshrined in national policies of many countries. The national water resources policy of India also recognises basin as the unit for planning. The hydrological reality of a basin is a worthwhile concept to examine the development option in any intervention plan. There are two aspects to it. First, the extent of any basin needs to be defined. The area of a basin depends on the location of the point considered as the outlet of the basin. For example, if the outlet point on the river Padma in Bangladesh below the confluence of Ganga and Brahmaputra at Goalundo is considered, the two Himalayan river systems, the Ganga and Brahmaputra, will constitute a single basin. The two will be separate river basins when the outlet points located upstream of their confluence on their respective river course is considered. The second aspect is the HIMALAYAN WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 287

concept of sub-basin versus basin. The combined Ganga-Brahmaputra basin will constitute two sub-basins. For the Ganga basin, with its outlet at a point upstream of Goalundo on the Ganga river, all its major tributaries will from the sub-basins. The basins of tributaries to each of these tributaries will be sub-sub-basins with reference to the Ganga basin, and will be sub-basins with reference to the major tributaries. A sub-basin or a sub-sub-basin also, has the same validity and rationality as the unit for water resources planning. The planning and development in a tributary sub-basin, however, will have effects on the development, utilisation and management of water resources in the rest of the basin to the extent that the downstream flows in the river would be modified by the incoming flows of the tributary at the confluence. The adoption of a basin or a sub-basin in its hydrological context as the unit of water resources planning should also consider a few other practical factors. The hydrological boundary of a basin or a sub-basin seldom rarely follows, respects or coincides with political, administrative or other man-made territorial divisions and jurisdictions. Generally, a planning unit based on a basin, compared to a sub-basin, will be larger in size, and consequently will have more diversity of physical and socio-economic situation, conflict of interests, diffused objectives, differentials and hence divergent priorities in development. The political and administrative issues are more complex. Consideration of sub-basin, on the other hand, may provide too limiting a scope for evaluating options and alternative development measures; engineering and other wise. Such an approach may lead to sub- optimal development, inefficient utilisation and less than effective management. Water resources plans, implementation of the projects and operation of the facilities have to be formulated with this perspective.

NEPAL HIMALAYA: WATER RESOURCES All the rivers originating in the Nepali Himalaya are tributaries of the Ganga. From east to west, these are the Mahananda, the Kosi, Kamala Balan, Bagmati, Burhi Gandaki, Gandak and Ghaghra, Thus, all of Nepal and its dense network of rivers form part of the Ganga basin. The aggregate basin area of these rivers 317,847 km2 constitutes 30 per cent of the entire Ganga basin. Of this area, 58 per cent lies in Nepal, 40 per cent in India, less than one per cent in Bangladesh while about one per cent lies in Tibet. For all practical purposes, the rivers may be termed as Indo-Nepal rivers. The hydrological features of these rivers are given in Table 2.

BI-LATERAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS The bilateral, regional and international aspects involved in the development of Himalayan water resources must be considered in the light of the hydrological realities and the rationality of the basin approach. Five countries, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bangladesh and 288 PRASAD, T. nkai Masan Sugarwe Adhwara Group Trijugn Bhutahi Dhauri, Lakhande Sarda, Rapti Parman Mechi Nagar Tributaries at Baghi, Harha Taibpur gm/litre atRosera Tiar Sikta, 0.924 9.24 Bhabsa, tonnes at Jhanijharpur tonnes atDheng Lalbakeya Triveni ham at 264.6 ham Ka 9495 ham at 10.4 million Barahkshetra 12075.8 Avg. Silt Important Load 3 9233 53201 15752 98438 Non- Total Annual Runoff, mm Monsoon RIVERS

/s Monsoon 3 NEPAL - INDO (at Siandar pur) 21850 43988 (at Triveni) gm/litre (at Jainagar) throusand Soni, kshetra) (at Dheng) (at Turtipar) Highest (at Bagdob)25880 67530 10752 68282 at (at Barah Flow m

1 OF

ABLE T (100%) 500 3787 6015(100%) 1044 7059 1080 25764 82686 (100%) FEATURES

length in Includes 630 (6.7%) Turtipar - 593 3033 5204 467 5671 length in (15%) Includes 468 Others Total Peak 8%) (Tibet) (100%) Length Km (%) HYDROLOGICAL (39.7%) (60.3%) (78%) (22%) (100%) (55.5%) (37. India Nepal (100%) 45942 250 380-> (100%) (53%) (47%) 140606 600 408 72 (100%) 74500 248 220-> parts in Includes Tibet Tibet Tibet Tibet Tibet parts in Includes parts in ladesh)(12.4%) Includes adesh Others Total ) (100%) 34790-> 2350 - 12500 500 - - (18%) (Bang (100%) (85%) (Bangl (100%) 1070 63430> Catchment Area, Sq. km. (%) (24%) (76%) 10150 3600(64.7%) 1963 (35.3% -5995 5563 7695 256 - 72 13690 - 398 195 328 2208 2009 147 2156 5683 (14.8%) (85.2%) (44%) (56%) (100%) (67%) (33%) (100%) (50%) (50%) (69.6%) India Nepal GandakGandak 11152 (100%) Burhi Kamala Balan Bagmati Ghaghra 70303 70303-> Name of Kosi 1 Mahananda 17440 4500 3103 25043 320 - 56 376 6427 11606 1960 13566 Rover HIMALAYAN WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 289

Bhutan are affected to a various extent or likely to benefit by the Himalayan water resources, both with or without interventions in their natural regimes. However, keeping the basin approach in view, the logic and imperativeness of bilateral or regional responsibility for actions are clear. In the case of the Indus river system, only two counties, India and Pakistan, have the responsibility of the optimum development and equitable utilisation through mutual co-operation and co-ordination. In the case of the Ganga river system, that part of the optimum unit for water resources development planning is the basin of each of its major northern tributaries or the basin of each of the major tributaries to the river Yamuna. While action plans have to be formulated on the basis of basin wise plans decided as above, the Ganga basin water resources plan must also be drawn up by integrating the basin plans of the tributaries. Such and integrated Ganga basin plan will be useful to assess the effects of basin development options and action on the lower riparian. Co-operation and co-ordination among or between all the concerned states and nations has to be called for in this context. The concept outlined above should be the strategy of India and Nepal, who will have to take up the responsibility of developing the Himalayan water resources related to the Indo-Nepal rivers. Plans for optimum multi-purpose development and effective management of the water resources of the shared river basin must be formulated by the two countries. They owe this not only for the benefit of about 100 million poverty-afflicted people living in these basins but also for improving the temporal pattern of downstream flows of the Ganga for the benefit of the lower riparian country Bangladesh, whose 100 million people partly depend on these flows for their livelihood and economic activities. An indicative plan of the Ganga basin, hierarchically based on the integration of the basin plans of the tributaries of Ganga and the Yamuna is required and will be useful to assess the effect of the developments in these basins on the flows of the master drainage channel, the Ganga. Also the effects of any modifications to the basin plans, within the limits of acceptability of the co-basin nations, may also be studied on the basis of such an indicative plan in order to achieve improved flow pattern for the benefit of the lower riparian. Apart from the benefits that the lower riparian may derive from improved flow pattern in terms of flood control, irrigation, salinity control and maintenance of navigable depths in downstream channels, they may benefit, through suitable economic and other linkages, from the opportunities created by optimum basin development. Increased availability of electricity and introduction of inland navigation are some of the benefits thus derived. The strategy of bilateral actions with regional consideration and perspective appears to be hydrologically rational, practically feasible and economically desirable, and must be promoted. An important dimension to this strategy, is that of international assistance and involvement which would be both necessary and desirable from the considerations of 290 PRASAD, T.

technological expertise and financial support. Technology is supra-national and can not be ascribed to any one country. The complexities of technological issues and tasks to be performed in development of Himalayan water resources calls for the application of science and technology, at the highest level. International community are the storehouse from which such input should be obtained. There is no reason to shy away from it and to settle for anything less on any extraneous consideration. The magnitude of tasks involved also entails large finances for construction. While the expenditure would be amply justified on economic criteria in view of the benefits that would be derived initial investments in the venture are beyond the capacities of the two co-basin nations from their internal resources. International support through several inter-governmental financing or through various consortia is a viable proposition. In the global economic order prevailing today such a proposition can well be accepted. The critical factor that would determine the success of this strategy, i.e. bilateral actions in the regional context and consideration of international assistance for development of the Ganga basin is the agreement for co-operative development between Nepal and India. If mutuality of interests are the motivation and basis for the required bi-lateral action, the prospects for such co-operative development are indeed high. In fact, due to the nature of the available resources, an overwhelming complementarily of benefits from basin-wise development to both the co-basin nations exists. The hydrologic ties that bind the two nations can be most rewarding and potent in their common pursuit of economic emancipation and prosperity, and can even provide a basis and motivation for co-operative actions in other spheres. Unfortunately, in the past the nature and magnitude of the significance of these ties were perhaps not adequately appreciated. The mutuality and complementarily of interests seem to have been ignored in the immediacy of actions. The result has been unnecessary erosion of confidence between the two nations. Recent developments, however, indicate that the matter has now caught the attention of both the nations in the spirit and urgency of earnestness that it deserves. Commensurate endeavor and actions should follow without further loss of opportunities. The issue of co-operative development of Indo-Nepal water resources was discussed in a workshop organised by the Centre for Water Resources Studies (Patna University) in May 1992 at Patna. The hydrological basis, multi-purpose benefits of co-operative development, including the various constraints in such development were discussed. While the technical feasibility, economic viability and above all the socio-economic impressiveness and urgency of co-operative development of indo- Nepal water resources were highlighted, inhibiting factors were also mentioned with openness. Some important suggestions to overcome these inhibitions and bring about required co-operation are contained in the conclusions and recommendations of the workshop:* HIMALAYAN WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 291

CONCLUSIONS Indo-Nepal water resources development directly concerns the region comprising eastern Uttar Pradesh, North Bihar and all of Nepal, inhabited by about 100 million people, majority of whom live below poverty line. Predominantly, people of the region are rural and their economy agrarian. They are faced with a population explosion, ecological degradation, unemployment (leading to migration) and high dependence on non- commercial energy. Inspite of high agro-potential of this region, agriculture productivity and production of this region remains low, leading to low income from agricultural sector and low level of employment. This is the prime reason for endemic poverty of the region. For economic emancipation of this region, its agricultural performance has to be enhanced to its feasible potentiality, which is high. For this, proper land-water relationship has to be maintained, both over space as well as over time. This can be done by effective regulation and management of the water resources, watershed management and appropriate agricultural measures. Both for effective management as well as for optimum realisation of immense benefits, the water resources of the region can best be developed on the basin-wise rather than project- wise basis. As all the major river basins of this region are shared by both India and Nepal, this calls for co-operative development of their water resources in a holistic manner.

Recommendations Co-operative development of the Indo-Nepal water resources should be based on the mutuality of interests on the two nations, recognising both the identity as well as complementarity of benefits to accrue to both. Planning for development should be done for comprehensive uses for the water resources of the shared river basins, recognising the interaction and integration of the surface as well as groundwater resources. Planning and design of projects for such development must take due consideration of the following factors: - Environment and ecology of the Himalayan, Sub-Himalayan and the plains area - High seismicity of the region - Generation, transportation and deposition of silt - Flood and drainage congestion in the plains - Immense energy potential - Long-term techno-economic feasibility of navigation.

The theory of community of interest seems to provide the most appropriate framework for basin-wise development of the Indo-Nepal water resources and may be adopted with 292 PRASAD, T.

any modifications or adaptations that the two nations may consider appropriate in view of their historical and cultural ties and the commonality of socio-economic conditions and aspirations. The issue of development of Indo-Nepal water resources is, distinctly and dominantly, bilateral and should primarily be addressed as such keeping in view the interest of the lowest riparian, Bangladesh, subject to hydrologic, hydraulic and techno-economic feasibility. If there are distinct benefits that will accrue to Bangladesh from upstream interventions in the river regimes in the basins shared by the two nations, they may approach Bangladesh to contribute to the intervention costs commensurate with the benefits that will accrue to it. The two co-basin nations may also consider any mutual beneficial tradeoffs that may be distinctly feasible in the context of a larger basin and may take appropriate initiatives for this. It is of utmost importance that an openness in discussions as well as transparency of plans and actions in matters of water resources development be maintained and promoted, both within as well as between the two nations. It is essential for overall development that both Nepal and India move towards the creation of a healthy open technical society. Recognising that Uttar pradesh and Bihar are two states of India which have a direct and high stake in the development of the Indo-Nepal water resources, they should take commensurate interest, initiatives and actions, subjects to the overall national responsibility and the requirements of protocol between two sovereign nations. The universities, research organisations and nongovernment institutions of the two countries have to play vital and critical roles in water resources development of the shared basins. While the governments concerned must recognise and promote this, these institutions must prepare and equip themselves for the purpose. It must be recognised that the task is stupendous and challenging as well as imperative and urgent. The opportunity cost of delay is extremely high. Commensurate actions must be taken by the governments, institutions and persons from all concerned walks of life such as politicians, administrators, diplomats, water resources professionals, scientists, journalists, academics and researchers in their respective roles and responsibilities. Data collection, technical investigations, socio-economic analysis and environmental impact studies should be vigorously pursued and information freely shared. This will ensure optimum solutions after consideration of all options and their associated costs as well as benefits over space and time. An important aspect of institutional development is confidence building and this workshop has contributed immensely to a better mutual understanding of each other’s concerns. Dialogues such as this should be encouraged at all levels to promote confidence and HIMALAYAN WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 293

mutual trust, thereby creating a climate of co-operation. Water resources co-operation entailing large investments and long gestation periods is best promoted within a stable political framework based on mutual benefits and positive inter-dependence. Tasks that can begin immediately and with the resources available between Nepal and India themselves should be undertaken in order that institution building experience and confidence building take place with joint actions at the field level as well as in areas of research. Large ventures for which reliance on international financial markets is essential can only be undertaken on such a confident institutional foundation.

In order to ensure that regional consideration is duly taken into account in any bilateral action by the co-basin nations, the process of Indo-Nepalese interaction and decision making in the matter must itself be transparent and dialogue with Bangladesh must be maintained at all stages to keep it in confidence. The region is characterised by Willy Brandt’s commission on the development issues as the ‘poverty belt’. The opportunity cost of further delay in cooperative development of the Indo-Nepal water resources, by the two co-basin nations, is extremely high. The people in the region have suffered from the paradox of ‘poverty in plenty’ for long due to inaction, inappropriate action or inadequate action. It is incumbent on both the nations to move into a new era of cooperative action.

Prepared by I. N. Shiha, Valedictory Session chairman and T. Prasad, Valedictory Session Reporter and Workshop Convenor. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 295-303

THE CASE FOR 'NEW THINKING'

M. R. JOSSE Former Deuputy Permanent Representative of Nepal to UN

ABSTRACT

Mind set attuned to the old fashioned nation of spheres of influences has dominated the paradigm of co-operative water resources development in South Asia. For developing the Himalayan water resource, a fresh strategy is needed where international river basin forms the new corner stone for co-operation. This is the central challenge before diplomacy.

THE PROPOSITION The central challenge before diplomacy as far as mobilising support for co-operative development of Himalayan water resources is concerned is, in my submission, to make concerned governments accept what ought to have been crystal clear long ago: that optimal utilisation of Himalayan water resources can best be achieved by adopting a broad hydrological or river basin–rather than narrowly political–approach. It is my contention, too, that the seeds of conflict lie implanted precisely in outmoded, neo-colonial perspectives against the river basin being considered as natural hydrological unit in the planning of such co-operative endeavors. It is also my argument that a window of opportunity has been opened in this region via the establishment in 1985 of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). However, this instrument has not, to date been utilised in this respect as it could, or should. As China is an important, though hitherto virtually unacknowledged upper riparian state, recent improvements in Sino-Indian relations should be utilised to probe the possibility of and, if possible, secure China’s association in the co-operative development of the abundant water resources of the Himalayas for shared benefit. What such a prescription really boils down to, then, is for all concerned–governments as well as peoples–to begin to inculcate the virtues of what former Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev so fervently championed: ‘new thinking’. Such a recommended course, of action, of course, suggests the availability of neutral technical information, if need be from appropriate international organisetions, to define the fullest possibilities for development and the most efficient means to achieve the maximum use of a basin’s potential. Clearly, application of ‘new thinking’ should spur multi-disciplinary research in areas 296 JOSSE, M. R.

such as economics, law, international relations, institutional studies and the natural sciences not merely for people to comprehend more fully international agreement problems but also for them to come up with solutions to them as and when they occur. Finally, to facilitate the creation of a public opinion climate conducive for such bold co-operative leaps in the future, as well to keep things in a rational rather than emotive perspective in times of stress, efforts to build a core of water resources specialists in the media must be actively promoted.

APPLICATION OF ëNEW THINKINGí In my view, all countries within the Himalayan water resources–sharing region could do with an injection of ‘new thinking’. However, the onus for initiating such a breakthrough clearly lies with India, as the most important and biggest utiliser of those natural bounties.

India Where a departure from ‘old thinking’ is most urgently and fundamentally called for is in jettisoning the vintage Indian concept that co-operative development of Himalayan water resources must proceed strictly on a bilateral basis. That is to say dealing with Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan on a one-on-one basis and not at all with China. Given India’s geographic, demographic and military predominance over her Himalayan water resources sharing neighbours, her consistent preference for the bilateral, as against the international river basin, approach has constricted co-operation possibilities. Even more importantly, it has generated suspicion and bitterness. This is the case, one understands, even in India-friendly Bhutan where dissenting views cannot be aired democratically. Reference to the unfortunate ‘India has cheated us’ perception obtaining in this country, following the Kosi (1954) and Gandak (1959) agreements, for example, are cases in point. So too, the ongoing hue and cry against the Tanakpur accord signed in December 1991 during Prime Minister Koirala’s official visit to India. The long festering disagreements between India and Bangladesh over the sharing of the Ganges flow during the dry season, for their part, can, in large measure, also be similarly attributed. Indeed, it is germane to note that, despite rare and brief departures–such agreeing to Nepal’s inclusion in Bangladesh’ proposal for studies on the latter’s proposal for storage dams in the Himalaya-the philosophy of bilaterism has acquired the mystique of a gospel. It will, as such be educative to try to understand why. While some Indian scholars justify the bilateral approach because it "seeks to reduce, and wherever possible, to eliminate harmful influence of Super Powers in regional affairs". Others maintain that it is the ‘only worthwhile’ option for India. THE CASE FOR 'NEW THINKING' 297

Similarly revealing are Indian assessments either limiting the role of SAARC to ‘water related studies’ as also their exaggerated sense of alarm that "water resources development also entered in the agenda of the SAARC programme" in 1988 in Islamabad even if only in the constricted from of discussing the need to take "effective measures against natural disaster such as floods, earthquakes, droughts and a rational utilisation of natural resources particularly water resources". Outside India, however, Delhi’s insistence on a bilateral, over a river basin or multilateral, approach is largely viewed as a legacy from the British Raj from which she "inherited a body of British strategic doctrine, developed for the defence of the British Indian Empire, as the basis of its own strategic theory". From the perspective of Kathmandu, it would appear to very many that Delhi’s Himalayan water resources policy is an integral component of her overall foreign policy which, in turn, is largely based on the absolute ‘forward-defence’ British security doctrine, vis-à-vis the Himalayan states. Several factors have helped shape such a Nepalese perception. One important consideration here is Delhi’s refusal to support Nepal’s 1975 Zone of Peace proposal which, by early 1990, had garnered the endorsement of 116 U.N. member states. In this context, it has also been noted that Delhi chose to ignore King Birendra’s offer on Nepal’s water resources thus articulated at the 26th Colombo Plan Consultative Committee meeting in Kathmandu on December 5, 1977 and attended among others by Indian officials. "If water constitutes one of the portent sources for Nepalese economic growth, we do not intend to look upon them from the standpoint of national interests alone. It is our conviction that if co-operation can be called for, especially, co-operation of Asian countries, such as, Nepal, India, China, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and all other regional countries, a vast resource of bountiful nature can be tapped for the benefit of man in this region". Similarly, India’s conspicuous lack of interest in U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s and British Prime Minister James Callaghan’s separate statements in Delhi in January 1978 offering their "countries’ technical and financial support to any regional water development project that India, Nepal and Bangladesh may put up" has not escaped notice here. What must be pointed out however is that Delhi’s bilateralism-at-all costs attitude and her reluctance since the 1960s to countenance any external involvement in the exploitation of Himalayan water resources is directly at odds with the one outstandingly successful example of co-operation and conflict resolution in this region in this respect: the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 formalised between India and Pakistan through the good offices of the World Bank. To recall: the World Bank’s commitment to generate major aid funds for development 298 JOSSE, M. R.

of the Indus Basin was the major incentive for India and Pakistan to reach agreement to apportion the river’s waters’.

Nepal Coming, now, to the application of ‘new thinking’ in Nepal’s own case, it is necessary at the very outset to recall the vital change that has been instituted in her water resources policy of long standing: a switch from what may be termed a two-tier one of the Panchayat period to what basically a unidimensional deal-only-with-India policy. For long, Nepal’s stance on Himalayan water resources as reflected in practice was based on seeking the "active co-operation either bilaterally or multi-laterally of other countries of the Ganges river basin." Thus, while she entered into a number of major agreements with India in this regard, she also successfully sought out Chinese assistance for hydroelectric and irrigation schemes in Nepal, e.g. the Sunkoshi Hydroelectric and Seti Irrigation Projects. Keeping Indian sensitivities in mind, however, Nepalese officials even then kept parroting "if jointly approached by India and Bangladesh" Nepal would consider any regional co-operation proposal for water resources exploitation for common benefit. Nepal, however, made no secret that she greatly desired Bangladesh’s participation in such a scheme of things. As much is clearly reflected, for example, in King Birendra’s banquet speech in Dhaka on January 12, 1978 declaring: "As I flew down to Dhaka this time I was somehow reminded of the journey which the rivers in Nepal have been making perennially since the time our lands were created. These rivers carry waters from the high Himalaya and flow endlessly through the checkered terrain until they merge into the Ganges and flow again to Bangladesh thus proclaiming Nepal’s link with Bangladesh through India." Less well known perhaps in Nepal’s interest, also articulated in the Panchayat period, of attracting Western assistance in this regard. Indeed, Nepal’s vastly different approach from India’s to the possibility–even imperative–of extra–regional involvement is amply reflected in the following statement by King Birendra at a banquet held in his honor during a state visit to the United States on December 9, 1983–possibly recollecting U.S. President Carter’s 1978 offer in Delhi. Given India’s inflexible adherence to bilateralism, however, the possibilities of regional co-operation in water resources conjured up by King Birendra were no more than pie in the sky. Yet, as events have amply proven since the Jana Andolan of April 1990 in Nepal, the ruling Nepali Congress’ deal-only-with-India policy–which nicely dovetails with Delhi’s predilection for bilateralism–has hardly been more successful. For, while such a change of gears in Kathmandu may have pleased Delhi the uproar THE CASE FOR 'NEW THINKING' 299

in this country over the ‘common rivers’ and Tanakpur accord associated with Prime Ministers Bhattarai (1990) and Koirala (1991) respectively, has not only resurrected the old Kosi and Gandak ‘Nepal-has-been-cheated’ phantom but, possibly, even threatens the viability of the Nepali Congress (or any successor) government. In Such a somber setting I would venture to argue that the Nepali congress government remove her deal-only-with-India blinkers and, inculcating a dash of Gorbachevian ‘new thinking’ opt for an overarching river basin approach to the priority issue of harnessing the bounties of Himalayan water resources. While doing so, Kathmandu should indicate that if such a basin procedure is backed by India, China and Bangladesh or by India and Bangladesh (with regard to the Ganges river basin, that is), she would have no cause to seek extra-regional intervention in whatever form, as strongly hinted in King Birendra’s Washington speech, quoted above.

Bangladesh Bangladesh’s interest in bringing Nepal into the Ganges water sharing drama is too well known to deserve elaboration here. However, as part of her contribution to ‘new thinking’ in this sphere, it might be a sound proposition for Dhaka to come up with ideas other than those concerning building a series of storage dams in the Himalaya, the majority in Nepal. For as many believe, the Himalaya, already reeling from intense pressure of intrusive development and over population, best be left in their ‘nature state’ particularly since "building of large dams is also questionable owing to the excessive silting of the rivers and high seismically of the region." Since India refuses to concede to Bangladesh’s demand for substantially larger dry season Ganges flows at Farakka, and as she is equally adamant not to accede to India’s ambitious scheme for linking the Brahmaputra with the Ganges, through a link canal cutting across Bangladesh territory, clearly another solution must be attempted. Perhaps a quid pro quo between Bangladesh and India could be worked out to see how far the former’s need for more dry season Ganges flows at Farakka and India’s road/ rail/natural gas import requirements from Bangladesh could be reconciled. In any case, if water resources comes under the ambit of SAARC as it must one day, it could facilitate a slew of other mutually advantageous trade-offs between members states, including that in the sharing of benefits of Himalayan water resources. This thus suggests another important challenge/opportunity for South Asian diplomacy in the future.

Pakistan With the knotty problem of Indus water sharing happily resolved between India and Pakistan there does not seem much further scope for direct co-operation as far as Himalayan water resources sharing is concerned specially now that Pakistan finds herself 300 JOSSE, M. R.

with new strategic and economic openings in Central Asia. Yet, at some yet undetermined point in the future, there could be benefits for Pakistan, too, from such co-operative schemes given complete normalisation of Indo-Pikistan relations. The challenge for diplomacy in this respect would be to work for such a happy state of affairs.

Bhutan Through Bhutan is an important basin state of the Brahmaputra, she has not openly spoken out in favour of the regional approach to Himalayan water resources sharing, preferring the India–only option. Given the realities of Indo-Bhutan relations she can hardly do otherwise. However, in view of the current turmoil there, nothing should be taken for granted in the Dragon Kingdom. Recent advances in Sino-Bhutanese relations should also be factored in diplomatic calculations for the future.

China From the Nepalese perspective apart from India’s attitude, the next most important determinant in future Himalayan water resources sharing issues is China. Indeed, one of the most crucial questions in that context pertains to exploring China’s interest and/or concerns in a basin approach to benefit sharing of Himalayan water resources. Though Nepal’s 1977 proposal has come in for heavy flak, in fact China’s participation is difficult to fault for her Tibetan region is not only a significant basin state of the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra but, as far as Nepal is directly concerned, also because "the possibility of diverting some Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) flows south into the upper Gandak or Arun by tunneling through the modest ridge that divides these rivers in Tibet deserves study." Although only the future will tell whether or not China can or will be associated with any co-operative endeavour in regard to the Ganges or the Brahmaputra (and, arguably, the Indus) basins, Nepal’s consistent efforts during the Panchayat past to draw China in is notable. In India, many dismiss or minimise the China connection altogether by claiming that ‘geographically it is not beneficial to enter into any water resource development because in that part of China there are not enough waters in the rivers.’ It may be salutary to note, however, that Chinese leaders invariably refer, even today, to the fact that Nepal and China are ‘linked by mountains and rivers’–a matter of fact statement o the face of it but one which hardly suggests total Chinese disinterest in sharing the benefits of common Himalayan water resources. What also bears recollection is that China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, during his visit to Nepal in 1978 stated that China would ‘study’ Nepal’s 1977 proposal after acknowledging that it had ‘many aspects’. THE CASE FOR 'NEW THINKING' 301

A Few other factors need to be taken into account in assessing China’s possible interest. One is that China has not rejected Nepal’s 1977 proposal. Another is that with rapid economic development in China, including Tibet and its vicinity, it might be overly presumptuous to assume Beijing’s disinterest for all time to come. In fact, as Sino-Indian relations improve, as they have considerably in recent times, China’s interest could emerge openly while India’s past objections to China’s association could also change. A word about China’s non-inclusion in the Mekong Committee many be in order now. As explained by the Secretariat of the Interim Committee for Co-ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin: "Although part of the territories of Burma and China were (sec) located within the Mekong upper basin, political reasons prevented both nations from being included in the new co-operative venture in 1957. China at the time was not a member of the United Nations community and provided the main reason for not creating a Mekong Committee made up of the six riparian countries of the Mekong. Burma, for its part, did not exhibit any particular interest in membership for political or geographical reasons." It is certainly notable that China’s interest in Mekong basin issues has apparently changed lately, as reflected, for example, in her participation in a 10 day workshop on ‘Water Law and Management of the Mekong River Basin’ in Bangkok, June, 2-11, 1992. Two further points indicative of China’s interest in Himalayan water resources/ mountain development issues may also be considered: one relates to China’s active participation in the Kathmandu-based International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and the other to successful Chinese bidding in contracts for work on water resources projects in Nepal and elsewhere in the region. Finally, apart from Nepal’s past interest in drawing China into an ambitious Himalayan water resources sharing game-plan, it may be mentioned that Bangladesh, "has also advocated inclusion of China" in regional co-operation in South Asia.

SAARC Water resources has thus far been considered too contentious a subject to be included in SAARC’s regular agenda although, as noted, it did figure at the Islamabad summit in the context of natural disasters. Yet, given the protean transformations that have taken place on the world scene in recent years, including the shift in the international donor community’s attention to eastern Europe, such rigidity hardly makes sense any more. Considering the powerful fillip that regionalism has received in recent times, clearly regional co-operation is no longer of merely academic interest; in the post-Cold War world now upon us, states can ignore that imperative only at their peril. 302 JOSSE, M. R.

SAARC must therefore get its act together (when of course, it recovers from the Ayodhya shocks) and excise itself of that particular taboo of the past. In practical terms, it means here India must take the lead since it is she that has been most insistent that water resources not be included in the SAARC agenda in the past. If China is desirous of joining hands in any mutually beneficial scheme to share in the Himalayan water resources largesse, she must be encouraged to do so. Here, too, India’s role will be crucial as Delhi’s policy of bilateralism and her suspicion of Chinese intentions South of the Himalaya has, in the past, been the main stumbling in block in that regard. However, even in case China is not, SAARC member states can still co-operate meaningfully-Mekong committee fashion–in translating the immense potential of Himalayan water resources into manifold benefits for the peoples of their region.

INFORMATION, RESEARCH AND PUBLIC OPINION If meaningful progress is to be made in advancing co-operation in sharing the benefits of Himalayan water resources, it is necessary, first, to fully comprehend the conditions that promote effective agreements and to identify how problems that hinder the same may be tackled. Even riparians acknowledge the value of co-operation and availability of relevant technical information can greatly facilitate progress by providing for the special needs of decision making and negotiation concerning such co-operation. It goes without saying, therefore, that all means for enlarging the pool of technical information available be tapped, particularly for the least developed among would-be partners. Apart from information sharing among one another, relevant international organisations may be approached for necessary co-operation. As international co-operation in water resources involves knowledge of and research in many different disciplines, the importance of such multi-disciplinary research in field such as hydrology, economics, international law, international relations, environment, ecology and so forth cannot be over-emphasised. Another goal could be the establishment of water resources institutes in the region if need be through the good offices of international donors or agencies keen to promote such regional development. As the media play a vital role in shaping public perceptions regarding costs and benefits of such co-operative schemes, experts should either be encouraged to perform media roles periodically or media persons with a demonstrated interest in the field should be provided opportunities to enhance their knowledge of the relevant issues at hand so that public opinion which is conducive to the promotion of such worthy goals as Himalayan water resources is created.

CONCLUSION To come back to where we started: if a breakthrough in achieving truly meaningful co- THE CASE FOR 'NEW THINKING' 303

operative development in Himalayan water resources is desired, a completely fresh strategy has to be fashioned. Such an approach must conform not only to the dictates of the present world order favoring regionalism; it must also take due note that with the end of the Cold War the competition to win the hearts and minds of the Third World has evaporated. The potential for pulling the region out of its morass of poverty and underdevelopment is there in the shape of bountiful Himalayan water resources. The key obstacle is the old fashioned balance-of-power, spheres-of-influence mind-set that dictates that bilateralism, not the international river basin or regional methodology, be considered the cornerstone of the edifice of such co-operation. The sooner that reality is grasped the better. If it means China must come into the picture, so be it, if not, South Asian countries can themselves co-operate to make regional co-operation in South Asia a going concern. What is required is the political will to break out of the prejudices and illusions of an era long past. Are we ready for it? Or, are we cursed, like Sisyphus, never to succeed?

REFERENCES 1978 Proclamations, Speeches and Message HMG Ministry of Communications, Kathmandu. 1978 Proclamations, Speeches and Message HMG Ministry of Communications, Kathmandu. 1981 Water, The Key to Nepal’s Development, HMG, Kathmandu. 1984 Proclamations, Speeches and Message HMG Ministry of Communications, Kathmandu. Abbas, B. M., 1987: Water Resources and South Asian Regional Co-operation Seminar, CEDA, Kathmandu. Gurung, H., 1982: The Himalaya: Perspective On Change, New Era, Kathmandu. Josse, M. R., 1978: The Rising Nepal, February 10, Kathmandu. Kodikara, S., 1984: Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia; Heritage, Delhi. Kumar, A., 1988: Asian Survey. Le Marquand and David, G., 1977: International Rivers: The Politics of Co-operation, University of British Colombia. Mekong News, 1992: Vol.11, No. 1, August. The Mekong Committee: A Historical Account (1957-89), 1989: Mekong Secretariat, Bangkok. Upreti, B. C., 1993: Politics of Himalayan River Waters, Nirala, Delhi. Upreti, B. C., 1988: Quoting Lok Raj Baral’s, The Politics of Balance Interdependence: Nepal and Bangladesh, Delhi. Verghese, B. G., 1990: Waters of Hope, Oxford, Delhi. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 305-312

HIMALAYAN WATERS: NEED FOR A POSITIVE INDO- NEPAL COOPERATION

GOVIND D. SHRESTHA Water Resources Planning and Management Consultant P.O. Box 5627, Kathmandu, Nepal

ABSTRACT

Despite the vast water resources available, Indo-Nepal water resource has not been harnessed for the benefit of the common people. Cooperative efforts in the past have been guided by narrow nation-centric views. This paper suggests options for more meaningful cooperation in the future.

OVERVIEW Water may be proven resource available in Nepal but its availability in abundance alone, does not ensure its exploitation. An effective utilisation of this resource presupposes a corresponding match of economic resources and technical capability which Nepal cannot muster on its own. Furthermore, Nepal’s internal market for power is insignificant compared to its potentials; and a large-scale irrigation development also becomes redundant given of the limited area that needs this water. Thus Nepal is gripped with a paradoxical situation of limited domestic need amidst availability in abundance. This is aggravated further by a tendency of India to look upon this situation, a strange creation of geography and politics, as a weakness of Nepal rather than a blessing for half a billion people in the Ganga-Brahmaputra basin characterised by probably a highest density of poverty anywhere in the would. Nepal’s average annual runoff alone is said to be sufficient for irrigating 6 Mha of land against the availability of irrigable land which is less than 2 Mha. Moreover, Nepal’s consumption of power is likely to remain below one per cent of its economic potential till the end of the second millennium. The low internal demand has made it a compulsion for Nepal to look beyond its borders for the market that can consume the extra power. One the other hand, India’s need for irrigation water and power is so large that it can easily absorb whatever surplus will be available from development works in Nepal. Despite these realities, the development of this resource has largely been guided by a partial appreciation of the possibilities based on narrow national perspectives on both sides. The time has come for both Nepal and India to work to develop a just and trusting relationship by full 306 SHRESTHA, G. D.

appreciation of each other’s needs, interests, priorities and development goals. This paper attempts to discuss the relevant issues and suggest options for developing a more meaningful and positive relationship between the two close neighbours.

HISTORY OF WATER RELATIONS In 1911, when Kathmandu saw for the first time the modern means of lighting from a hydro power house built at Pharping, British India was quietly Planning an irrigation system to utilise waters from the Mahakali river. During the preparation of this project, the river showed sings of swinging over towards the Nepal bank below Tanakpur until the whole dry season flow of the river flowed along the Nepal side necessitating a change in the site of the headwork. Instead of going for a joint development, India went for a option of acquiring Nepalese territory which would secure for herself a controlling authority over a section of the river. A naïve Nepal readily agreed for an exchange of lands bestowed India what geography had denied it, an upstream position vis-à-vis Nepal. This created a new riparian equation between the two countries. This is more evident from development works undertaken in this basin like Tanakpur Hydroelectric Project taken up more than half a century later. The very first step towards the exploitation of Himalayan waters which began with this agreement was influenced by a consideration of independent development rather than a joint development. Nepal’s involvement in development and/or management of this common resource was over with the transfer of its sovereign rights. Since the Sharada barrage project was financed and implemented by India on her own, the primary beneficiary from the project was also India, and Nepal was to receive 150 to 460 cusec of water and up to 1,000 cusec provided the surplus was available, free of charge. On the right bank of the river, a canal with a capacity of 14,000 cusec fed water to the Sharada canal for irrigation in India. The process started in Mahakali did not end with it. The agreements on Kosi 1954 and the Gandak 1959, both have diversion structures built on the international border and inundated vast tracts of land in Nepal. Taken together the projects’ gross command area of 2.4 Mha (Rao, 1975) of land in India against irrigation benefits in Nepal under 70,000 ha. To compensate the skewed benefits, India took up the Chatara irrigation project with a gross command area of 66,00 ha which proved a liability to Nepal because of some faults in the design. Today, Nepal is still spending millions of dollars under World Bank loan just to keep the project alive with a considerably reduced command area. The early cooperation between the two countries thus was not based on equitable sharing of the benefits from the shared resource of an international river. The slow pace of implementation of the project also contributed to the feeling of unfair deal in the minds of Nepalese. The barrage and Eastern Canal which supplied irrigation water for India was HIMALAYAN WATERS: NEED FOR A POSITIVE INDO-NEPAL COOPERATION 307

completed in 1965. But works on the Western Canal that was emant to supply water for the pump canal in Nepal, although started in 1965 as well, was not completed until 1989, nearly a quarter of a century after the barrage was operational. Work on Chatra canal which draws water from the same river at a site upstream was started in 1964 as part of a bilateral aid programme. After completion, the project was handed over to Nepal in 1975. Nepal, then did not have the necessary expertise to appraise the long term effect of such development projects. Nepal thus has been a silent spectator in the development that has been carried out in three out of her four major rivers. Nepal’s role was limited to facilitating the implementation of the projects. India’s unilateral initiatives in the two projects have also hurt the sentiment of Nepalese giving them more reasons to be suspicions in the years following the Kosi and Gandak Agreements. During this period several projects on large as well as medium rivers were discussed but prospects for cooperative development hardly crossed the narrow confines of self-interest. The agreements concluded in the fifties on Kosi and Gandak rivers not only have cast a shadow on all subsequent negotiations for cooperative projects, but also have given way, gradually, to tendency of making staking claims through unilateral diversions to protect itself from the other riparian claims. The Kosi carries a large quantity of silt with its flood waters and a single barrage cannot contain the problem during the monsoon. The Kosi Project Agreement of 1954 along with the revised agreement of 1966 had emphasised the need for storage dams ‘for a complete solution of the Kosi problem in the future’. The barrage was only a first step. Other suitable projects upstream of the present barrage were necessary to harness the river for mutual benefit which would have also brought direct benefits to Nepal. But the sense of past ‘wrong’ imparted the atmosphere of cooperation between two neighobors following the agreement of 1954. As a result, the past wrong was allowed to continue of its own choice, more than anything else, when Nepal should have been prompt in seising the opportunity to initiate other beneficial projects that would have made up the past losses. But, instead, Nepal unwittingly chose to be evasive about starting new projects at a tremendous cost to its own development. On the other hand, shortsightedness on the part of India is equally to be blamed which was largely responsible for creating an atmosphere of distrust, suspicion and misunderstanding between two neighbours. Self- interest pushed the Kosi barrage to be built at international boundary which did not serve Nepal’s interest commensurate with the potential and its legitimate expectations. They became symbols of unenlightened cooperation, for they brought little benefit to Nepal and actually increased inundation (Mehta, 1982). As a result of mounting public opinion against the Kosi Agreement, article 16 was dropped while revising the agreement in 1966. Since article 16 required Nepal ‘to grant their consent to them (construction of storage dams) 308 SHRESTHA, G. D.

on conditions similar to those mentioned herein’, it was feared that a replay of Kosi barrage- type bilateral cooperation would have followed. Since water is considered a vital element in the socioeconomic development of a country, all the countries through which a river passes naturally have an interest in its utilisations and management. Cooperative efforts among the neighbors can enhance the positive aspects of the resources. But how to ensure cooperation between the countries is the crux of the problem. Even where there are definite benefits from cooperation, the perception of advantage can be clouded by a number of mutual grievances between the countries including different development priorities and political interests. On analysis of the cooperative efforts for utilisation of the resources in the past, India’s stance seems to have been influenced by a desire to acquire a controlling interest over the major rivers for economic reasons.

COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT After a phase of independent or ‘going alone’ instead of a joint development, the Himalayan waters, now, is on for a new phase of cooperative development. A beginning has been made but the road ahead is difficult and tortuous. Water relation between the two countries can be very sensitive has been amply shown by the issue of ‘common river’. It is believed to have cost the former Prime Minister K.P. Bhattarai’s ambition to continue in office when he was defeated in the general election by his communist opponent cashing in partly on a slogan against the motion of ‘common river’, a phrase used for the first time in a joint communiqué in June 1990. The December 1991 agreement between Nepal and India opens a flood gate of water projects after a long gap of cautious, halting and sometimes stalling bouts of bilateral discussions. Never before have the two governments reached an agreement o this scale covering a wide area of diverse projects. This has, on the one hand, opened a new vista of cooperative development and, on the other, has also exposed Nepal to the uncertainties and risks associated with large-scale development of the resource. It is doubtful that Nepal is ready and capable enough to withstand the onslaught of such a course of development. Nepal is yet to decide on a strategy of national water resources development. It could be harmful if the country drifts piecemeal into international water agreements without clear understanding of its ultimate development goal. There is a need, first of all, to make an assessment of demand in various sectors including domestic use, irrigation, fisheries, hydropower, navigation and industries. After matching availability, it will then be possible to identify area of surplus and areas that are short which are to be made up by inter- basin transfers, building storage or through use of groundwater. This in turn, will help Nepal to identify the area and the quantum of surplus which can be released for downstream uses. HIMALAYAN WATERS: NEED FOR A POSITIVE INDO-NEPAL COOPERATION 309

DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS Mahakali is the only significant boundary river between India and Nepal. India has diversion structures within its territory to utilise the average flow of the Mahakali. But demand for irrigation water in India is substantial and hence the need for storage in the upper reaches of the river. Through optimum development on a basin wide basis, Nepal and India can realise greater economic gain based on equitable sharing of the benefits. Boundary rivers generally are shared equally by the concerned states. There is a 50/50 interest in the common resource of a boundary river. But there are examples in other parts of the world where 50/50 percentage basis of dividing the water have not been employed because of the need and geographical characteristics of the river. Nepal and India can workout any number of alternative plans and choose a course of development that suit their needs. Nepal can also trade off her 50 per cent interest of Mahakali waters for other benefits elsewhere. Besides sharing the cost and benefit equally, they could also decide to temporarily share the energy in unequal amounts, and the costs will be borne in proportion to the use during that period as in the Salto Grande Project, where Argentina and Uruguay agreed in 1973 that Uruguay’s share of the energy was fixed at 16.66 per cent initially for few years and would increase gradually to its full share of 50 per cent by 1995. The 1946 agreement between Argentina and Uruguay presents several noteworthy characteristics. First, it provides for the sharing of gross benefits (units of electricity) and not net benefits favoring an administrative viability over economic efficiency, Second, the cost to be imputed to the common works designed to produce energy at a cost no higher than that of a conventional power plant (thermal) of the same output in the vicinity of Salto Grande. Third, the agreement contains no provisions for the performance of detailed benefit cost analysis. It appears that the parties wanted to develop Salto Grande with the purpose of fostering economic, institutional and social development. Nepal’s present state of industrial development does not allow her energy consumption to grow substantially in the foreseeable future. It will take some time to develop the energy intensive industries so that it will be possible to enhance the benefit from cheap power made available form a large project. In view of the above limitations certain provisions of Itaipu and Yacyreta projects merit consideration. The treaties provide that the pricing of electricity must equal the financial costs, and not he economic costs of power. Thus, depreciation is completely excluded from the costing and pricing of electricity. After the loans used to finance construction of the project is fully amortised, the financial cost would drop drastically. At this time the cost of power would become extremely attractive for Nepal to consider the introduction of power-intensive industries. Another important factor to be considered is irrigation benefit. In the context of both Nepal and India, the importance of irrigation can not be exaggerated. Since Nepal’s requirement is considerably less than India’s, a mutually satisfactory formula for sharing 310 SHRESTHA, G. D.

the cost according to the benefit can easily be worked out as in Rio Grande between Mexico and the United States. After meeting Nepal’s limited demand for irrigation water in Kanchanpur and Kailali districts, the surplus from Nepal’s share, for example of Mahakali waters, could be used by India. Yet another formula under an agreement between Mexico and the United States provides for a system where the volume of water per year that each government could use for irrigation would be relative to the water supplied to the main water course by each riparian. Similarly, in a project related to flood damage reduction, the total cost of construction, for example, of the Amistad dam was also divided in accordance with the proportion of conservation capacity between the two governments- 56.2 per cent for the United States and 43.8 per cent for Mexico.

ëPRIOR USEí CLAIMS All the rivers that flow from Nepal to India have structures for withdrawing water tapping the average flow of these rivers. Together these structures are believed to have the capacity to irrigate some 4 million hectares of land in India. Nepal has lagged far behind to make use of these rivers within its territory. Now that almost all the possible sites in India for developing irrigation have been exhausted, the growing demand for irrigation water in India must find a solution in large-scale inter-basin transfers and developing storage in Nepal. Pushing a claim over a common resource on the basis of ‘prior use or appropriation’ will be harmful to both Nepal and India and does not also go with the concept of equitable share in the beneficial use of the waters of an international river. India must develop its groundwater to replace part of its irrigation systems dependent upon surface waters and encourage and help Nepal to do the same. This is where Nepal can help India given the atmosphere of mutual trust and an understanding for sharing the benefits equitably. For, it will not be in the long term interest of Nepal to adopt a strong territorial posture taking advantage of its upstream position. A sense of realism and pragmatism on the part of Nepal will bring benefits to both the countries. For this, India has to bring about a change in her past stance of water relation with Nepal and pushing Nepal further to adopt a posture of resignation will only result in ‘mutual self-impoverishment.’

DOWNSTREAM BENEFITS Storage in Nepal creates significant downstream benefits in India. Not only big projects like Karnali (Chisapani) or Kosi High Dam but intermediate projects on medium and small rivers also will confer significant benefits downstream. Cooperation with India on such projects may well prove to be in Nepal’s best interest. Similarly, India’s commitment to compensate Nepal for conferred benefits downstream will motivate Nepal to undertake joint projects within its territory. The proposals of mega developments in an otherwise non-modern and rural-society HIMALAYAN WATERS: NEED FOR A POSITIVE INDO-NEPAL COOPERATION 311

of Nepal are capable of bringing about large social changes. Apart from the large technical issues of funding, and the impact upon the total fiscal structure of government (Karnali, Chisapani would also one cost US $ 5 billion to build, about 12 times the annual budget), there are social impacts which, in the end, pose the gravest of issues for a country facing an important and complex development future. Nepal has been pushing this project with an installed capacity of 10,800 MW. For nearly there decades without strengthening its capacity to build even a small project of 10 MW. There is less realisation on the part of Nepal that there is a need, on the one hand, to strengthen the ability of Nepal and, on the other, to prevent too-rapid impact on a society that should be encouraged to adapt at its won pace. The concept of planning for the development of water resources in Nepal involves some recognition that one or more uses of water may have a higher priority than others. The objectives of sustainable development and poverty alleviation require Nepal to give an immediate priority to consumptive uses like irrigation and fisheries. Its overall economic priority is storage and generation of power for internal use and for export. Finally, Nepal’s interest for navigation and an access to the sea must find a place in its long term planning perspective. Viewed in this context, the December 1991 agreement does not serve more than as an uncoordinated development initiative. The priority given to Pancheswor is understandable but the priority given to Burhi Gandaki does not seem to hold a test of reason. Since Burhi Gandaki is a storage project and the river is a tributary of the Gandak, it is essential that the project should be viewed in a wider context. The storage potential, however modest it may be, has a direct bearing on irrigation benefits from the Gandak barrage because of the regulated flow. Other downstream benefits include mitigation of floods. Nepal should be careful and try to avoid replay of the Gandak ‘imbroglio’ of the pat. It is also necessary that Nepal has to look at this basin with an interest of navigation too.

CONCLUSION In the final analysis the Nepal /India water relationship is one that suggests the need for determining the best uses of the waters in the interests of both Nepal and India. This requires one to appreciate that in several situations there is the fact of too much water or too little as a local hydrological reality. This compels anyone looking at Nepal/India relations to consider what is best for both Nepal and India in the long run while protecting Nepal’s immediate and long-term interests. These interests, however, must be seen within the political realities of the Nepal /India power asymmetry that exists as a fact. In any endeavor towards the development and management of water resources in Nepal, the role and cooperation of India is crucial and, unless India’s point of view is included in all calculations, is does not stand a chance of success. This is more than clear form the slow rate of progress made in the past in negotiations with India on various 312 SHRESTHA, G. D.

projects and issues of cooperative development. One such project fell victim of an ‘unenlightened’ planning initiative which pushed Nepal to negotiate a power deal amidst all kinds of uncertainties and, as a result people are now forced to live without electricity for several hours every day. Because of this Arun III could not get off the ground. Nepal could not make India agree to buy even 200 MW of power at a time when her industries and cities are starved of power in the range of thousands of megawatts. Now after so many wasted years of inconclusive negotiations Nepal has been forced to a position of building a project to cater to its domestic demand which has meant scaling down the size of Arun III. Because of its inherent weakness as a landlocked country which has minimum elbow room for independent action to harness the resource, there is an apprehension among Nepalese that her southern neighbor is aware of this weakness and would not be very forthcoming in sharing benefits equitably. Many people in Nepal still fear that India may take advantage of a weaker Nepal explains the inhibitions on the part of Nepal engaging in an open and frank negotiations. Tanakpur is a case in point. The project was planned and implemented by India without consulting Nepal against its own word for prior consultation (Shrestha; 1992). Later, when Nepal expressed its reservation about the possible submergence of Nepali land and adverse effect on its water use downstream, it is reliably learnt that India gave in writing that Nepali territory would not be submerged. But the fact is, it did, and part of the structure of the barrage was also to be constructed in Nepali territory. Since Mahakali is a common river, it is in the interest of both Nepal and India that the resource needs to be shared equitably (Gawali and Dixit, 1991) between the two countries, is now increasingly being realised by all concerned. It is hoped that the wrong done with Mahakali waters more than 70 years ago will now be corrected and a new Nepal-India cooperation relation stating again with the same river will usher in an age of beneficial cooperation in other rivers. It will generate the kind of confidence and trust required for future cooperation on more important and larger projects.

REFERENCES Gyawali, D. and Dixit, A. 1991: Righting a British Wrong, Himal, Kathmandu. Mehta, J. 1992: The Annual Floods, The Statesman. Rao, K.L. 1975: India’s Water Wealth, p. 70 Shrestha, G.D. 1992: Nepal-India Riparain Relations, The Independent, Kathmandu. Treaty fo Itaipu between Brazil and Paraguay, April 26 1973. Treaty of Salto Grande between Argentina and Uruguay, December 30, 1946. Treaty of yacyreta between Argentina and Paraguay, December 3, 1973. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 313-319

WATER RESOURCES OF NEPAL: KEY TO INDO-NEPALESE RELATIONS

PITAMABAR D. KAUSHIK

Director Center for the Study of Nepal and Head Department of Political Science, Benaras Hindu University, India

ABSTRACT

Water remains the major resource of Nepal. Co-operative development of this resource with India can bring immence benefits. The prospects of development have been stymied by lack of political understanding between Nepal and India. The two countries must come together to negotiate the sharing of the resources on the basis of mutual national interest.

INTRODUCTION In Nepal water resources occur in three major forms. These are precipitation–snow and rainfall–rivers and groundwater. The average annual run off from Nepal including Tibetan catchment is estimated to be about 200 billion cubic metres, 70 per cent of which occurs as instantaneous flow. The rest is conserved as snow and groundwater (Nepal News, 1991). Groundwater is available in the Tarai in both artisan and nonartisan conditions, which may be sufficient to cover the needs of about 16 to 20 per cent of the area (Sharma, 1983) for meeting drinking, irrigation and industrial requirements. Due to its hydrology and topography, Nepal offers several ideal sites for building multi-purpose river valley projects to generate electricity and to derive irrigation and flood control benefits. These projects can bring prosperity not only to Nepal but to the South Asian region in general, and India and Bangladesh in particular. Electricity generated from these project can be supplied to India and Bangladesh which can reduce their dependency on fossil fuels. Regulated flow from the reservoirs would increase agricultural production by irrigating an additional 3 millions ha land in Nepal. The regulated flow would improve irrigation performance in the command area as water would be available all year round in other SAARC countries as well. Availability of electricity will permit groundwater pumping and supplement irrigation applications. The projects also provide benefits in the form of flood mitigation in the plains of Nepal and India. The regional ecology would be enhanced as the dependence on the use of fuel-wood would be minimised through the substitution of electricity thus reducing deforestation. The extent of the erosion problem would be reduced while the hazards of floods would be mitigated heralding a new era of prosperity in the region. 314 KAUSHIK, P. D.

NEPALíS WATER RESOURCES: AS A FACTOR IN INDO-NEPALESE RELATIONS Through the available potential matches the combined hydropower production capacity of Canada, the USA and Mexico, (Malla, 1985/86) Nepal today produced only a small fraction of its potential. But, Nepal’s internal market can not absorb the energy even if the country is able to generate hydropower on a large-scale. The excess power will have to be exported. India and Bangladesh, provide potent markets as the demand for electricity in both countries are high. Nepal’s capacity to develop this resource on a large-scale is further constrained by “lack of funds, technology and manpower” (Malla 1985/86). India’s cooperation is therefore, vital for meaningful development and utilisation of hydropower resources in Nepal. The two neighbours, in spite of this mutual interest, have found it difficult to co-operate with each other in developing the Himalayan water resource. Famine and floods are the two evils which occur in India and Nepal every other year. To tackle the problems caused by drought in the region, the construction of large surface irrigation projects were initiated during the colonial period. The Ganges, Sarada and Yamuna Canals were some of the projects built to irrigate command areas in Uttar Prades. Nepal, also took the cue from these effort and built surface water irrigation projects adapting the technology developed in India. Chandra Canal and Juddha Canal were built in the Tarai towards the early part of the century. In 1911, the first hydroelectric plant (Sharma, 1983) at Pharping in Kathmandu was built using British know-how, technology and manpower. In its modern history, the assistance provided to Nepal by India has been substantial. The support comes in the wake of the 1950 Treaty of Friendship between Nepal and India which stands as an important landmark in the relation between the two countries. The treaty embodies the concerns of security and peace in South Asia and stipulates that “neither governments shall tolerate threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with such threats the governments shall consult with each other and devise effective counter measures.” Significantly, the treaty has provided India the confidence in its security matters and the outcome has been more willingness on the part of India to assist Nepal in improving its economy. Over the year, India has assisted Nepal in agriculture development, communication, industries, power sector, irrigation and community development. The first effort of cooperation with Indian assistance was the temporary airstrip at Gauchar in Kathmandu, built in 1951. The airport was further expanded in 1954. The 116 km long Tribhuban Rajpath, connecting Kathmandu to Hetauda was another project executed with Indian assistance. In 1956, Indian Aid Mission (later Indian Co-operation Mission) was established at Kathmandu, and through this mission, over IRS. 375 crores in technical assistance and grants have been provided for implementing several projects (Dharmadasani, 1982). The WATER RESOURCES OF NEPAL: KEY TO INDO-NEPALESE RELATIONS 315

objectives of this assistance programme among others, was to consolidate political stability in Nepal and to minimise the influence of external powers. Implicitly, the intention was to keep Nepal under India’s security orbit. The earliest water resource project built with bilateral co-operation between the two countries was the Sarada Project. The Government of Nepal and Allahabad Presidency under the British rule signed the agreement for building the Sarada barrage in 1920. The project was primarily built for irrigation with hydropower remaining as the secondary benefit. Nepal was to receive limited water for irrigation but no electricity from the project. For constructing the barrage, land was exchanged by the two governments. The second major water development initiative was the Kosi Project which was taken up after India became independent. The Governments of India and Nepal signed the agreement for the construction of the Kosi Project in 1954 to be built at Bhimanagar (Bharda) in Nepal, close to the Nepal-India border. After completion, the project was expected to irrigate about 500 sq. miles of Kosi Delta in Purnea and Katihar districts of Bihar, and produce 20 MW power. A major portion of the project was completed in 1960. But political differences led to delays in implementations of other components of the project. Nepal played the aggrieved party. As a goodwill gesture, India agreed to revise the agreement, and signed a new agreement in 1966, which provided additional advantages to Nepal. The second major project jointly undertaken by the Governments of India and Nepal was the Gandak project. The agreement for the project was signed in December 4, 1959. The Gandak project provided irrigation as well as hydropower benefits to Nepal. In addition to the three projects mentioned above, the two governments have also co-operated on the development of other water and power projects. The Trisuli Hydel is one of the major hydroelectric project, built with Indian co-operation. Diverting the Trisuli river to a power house at Trisuli Bazaar through a power channel, the project has an installed capacity of 21 MW (TRN, 1971). The project was completed in 1971 and the power was supplied to Kathmandu and other parts of central Nepal. Devighat Hydropower Project utilising the tail race water of Trisuli project was the second major Indian-assisted hydropower project which was completed in 1984. The 1,000 Kw hydropower project in Pokhara is another project built with Indian assistance. The project was built to improve the power situation in the Central Grid and was completed in 1966. In addition to these, India has assisted Nepal in the development of a transmission line also. The 33 kV transmission line from Kataiya station in Kosi canal to Rajbiraj and Bratnagar in Nepal has been constructed as per the agreement.

THIRTY YEARS OF STARINED RELATION (1960-1990) Between 1960, when the royal coup ousted Nepal’s first democratically elected government, 316 KAUSHIK, P. D.

and 1990, Indo-Nepalese relations in more meaningful development of water resources has remained at a virtual standstrill. No meaningful co-operation in water resources development has taken place between the two countries. In Nepal, there seem to be a general feeling that all three projects that the country entered into agreement with India, Sarada (1920), Kosi project (1954) and Gandak (1959) have not been beneficial to Nepal. Almost from the beginning Nepal has been obsessed with a feeling that she has been a looser in the joint ventures. At times, almost orchestrated attempts have been made to denounce India. Absence of press freedom in Nepal during this period has led to further perpetuation of the myth that was Nepal being cheated. The voicing of concern in Nepal has failed to take cognisance of the basic norm of international negotiation. Two states enter into any agreement only when both recognise that the agreement will be beneficial to both. Even officials have towed the line of ‘being cheated’ and have written: “A gesture for friendship for the well being of the people of India, even though Nepal received less benefit from the projects constructed under these agreements” (Sharma, 1983). In the Gandak Project, major benefits went to serve India while Nepal received benefits in terms of a small power house and some irrigation facilities (Sharma, 1983). In the case of the Kosi, it was decided to utilise the water for the maximum benefit to India. In exchange, an inundation canal at Chtara was built to irrigate areas in Sunsari and Morang District in Nepal. The costs of the construction of the Kosi Western Canal to irrigate land” area in Saptari district was borne by India (Sharma, 1983). Other Nepali scholars have also articulated such sentiments. “So far, Nepal’s experience with India in this field (of water resources) has not been satisfactory…. The Kosi agreement in particular has been considered at most an ‘unequal’ and ‘unfavourable’ agreement signed by Nepal with India” (Malla, 1985/86). Although a lot of improvement has been made in Nepal’s favour in the Gandak agreement, by the Nepali Congress Government-which had concluded the agreement in 1960- the Indian Government has been accused of ignoring Nepal’s interest: There is enough apprehension that the same might be the case with the Karnali, too” (Malla, 1985/ 86). The Karnali project shows the tortuous nature of the path of water resource negotiation between Nepal and India. Negotiations for the project have been going on since 1972, when Nepali Prime Minister, Kirti Nidhi Bista visited New Delhi and asked for assistance in hydropower development. India proposed to built a multi-purpose project on the Karnali (called Ghaghra in India) and agreed to buy the surplus electricity generated from the project at commercial rates. The project then was expected to generate 3,600 MW power. In the present proposal, the project would have a 270 metre high rock filled dam and an underground power station having an installed capacity of 10,800 MW. Estimated to cost about 8,500 crores rupees at 1988 prices, the project is to take about 18 years to complete WATER RESOURCES OF NEPAL: KEY TO INDO-NEPALESE RELATIONS 317

with five years slated as the pre-construction period. Over the years no agreements have taken place due to differences in sharing the cost and benefits from the project. Nepali demand has been that India should share the costs of the project, pay for the benefits of flood moderation in India and irrigation including navigational benefits. However, such a scenario was not in India’s interests as the possibility of using excess water in the Sarada and Saryu command areas which can possibly be irrigated (two of its tributaries are in India) do not exists due to prevailing waterlogging. The feasibility report of the project in the draft form prepared by Himalayan Power Consultants (HPC) which was acceptable to both countries was sent to Nepal with India’s comments in 1989. The final draft report was returned by Nepal in February, but without incorporating India’s comments and views which have perpetuated the stalemate. The Karnali Project is only one example of Nepali intransigence. Several other proposals for co-operative projects have also been stalled by Nepal raising minor objections at different stages. The strained relations notwithstanding, India has continued its assistance programme in Nepal. By 1984-85, five projects were completed and handed over to the Nepali Government. These were the Devight Power Project, Mahendra Rajmarg, a Police Hospital in Kathmandu and including one hundred drinking water schemes in rural areas. India has also helped Nepal to overcome its land-locked limitation and encouraged diversification of the country’s trade in all possible ways. The sincerity becomes evident when the trade relation between the two countries is analysed. However, even sincere Indian economic aid is perceived suspiciously in Nepal. Indian strategic interests are seen by Nepal’s as the guiding factor in the assistance programme thus provided. Nepal has generally down played the support India has provided in the country’s advancement (Nayak, 1987).

NEW UNDERSTANDING The strained relations between Nepal and India particularly in water resources development between 1960 and 1990 has been more due to political than techno-economic factors. In the unfavorable political climate of the past, efforts to harness the water resources of Nepal through joint ventures were pushed to the back seat. Nepal did not encourage ventures aimed at making full use of the potential to the mutual benefit of both the countries. With the restoration of democracy in Nepal in 1990, the understanding between the two countries has improved. The 1991 election in Nepal, held under the 1990 democratic constitution, brought the Nepali congress to power while the Communist Party (UML) emerged as the main opposition. Coming as it did after the trade and transit impasse, improvement of the relationship with India became one of the top agenda for the new government. In order to bring relations back on track the two governments arranged regular meetings of officials 318 KAUSHIK, P. D.

with the objective of sorting out several outstanding issues. In 1990, the Prime Minister of Nepal visited India. During the visit, an agreement on trade and transit between the two countries was signed. Among several others, understanding was also reached to set a time frame for investigation, preparation of project reports, etc. for the Karnali, Pancheswor, Sapta Kosi, Budhi Gandaki, Kamala and Bagmati projects. Installation of flood forecasting and warning systems, construction of embankments for flood control and modalities of power exchanges were also agreed upon. Both the governments agreed to undertake the Pancheswor and Budhi Gandaki Projects on a priority basis (TRN, 1992). During the visit, a second round of meetings of the Indo-Nepal high level Commission was held and recommended a number of measures for the Tanakpur barrage project built by India in the Mahakali river. The meeting decided that “the left afflux bund of the Tanakpur barrage was to be extended 577 metres into Nepali territory, occupying 2.9 hectares of land. Without, it large parts of Nepali land would be inundated” (Frontline, 1993). It was also decided that India would provide water from the barrage to irrigate between 4,000-5,000 ha of land on the Nepali side. As well, 10 million units of electricity from the project would be supplied to Nepal annually, free of cost as a gesture of goodwill. Though appearing to be beneficial to both the countries, the Tanakpur accord got enmeshed in the vortex of internal politics in Nepal. The Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) and the Rashtraiya Prajatantra Party (RPP) led a campaign against the agreement as a sell out to India. A petition was filed in Nepal’s Supreme Court questioning the validity of the agreement. The petitioner contended that contrary to what the government maintained, the agreement on Tanakpur was a treaty ad therefore it should be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Nepali Parliament under the Article 126 (2d) of the country’s new constitution (Sunday, 1993). The Supreme Court on 15 December, 1992, ruled that the agreement was indeed a treaty and must be ratified by the parliament. But the court left the government to decide whether it fell within Article 126 (2) or not (Frontline, 1993). In October 1992, the Indian Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, visited Kathmandu to discuss several outstanding bi-lateral issues including the Tanakpur project. The Joint communiqué issued after his visit stated ‘five clarifications were agreed upon’ regarding the accord on Tanakpur project. These were, the Nepali land lying on the west of the afflux bund up to the border would” remain under the continued sovereignty and control of Nepal, and Nepal is free to exercise all attendant rights there to “. Secondly, the barrage Project ‘does not make any consumptive use of water.’ Neither, side was deprived of ‘its share in the storage projects’ envisaged elsewhere. Thirdly, “the supply of up to 150 cusec of water from the Tanakpur barrage to irrigate between 4,000-5,000 hectare of land on the Nepalese side shall be made on a perennial round-the-year basis as requested by WATER RESOURCES OF NEPAL: KEY TO INDO-NEPALESE RELATIONS 319

Nepal”. Fourthly, 20 mullion units of electric power would be supplied to Nepal annually, free of cost from the barrage. Fifthly, missing or dilapidated pillars on the Nepal-India border in the Tanakpur barrage area would be put in place or renovated (TRN, 1992). These agreements, if implemented properly have the potential of bringing prosperity and modernisation to large parts of India and Nepal.

CONCLUSION The water relations between Nepal and India and the negotiating position of Nepal from 1960 to 1990 merits closer analysis. The position of Nepal has been for more magnanimous support and considerations from India. The position at times could be equated to the behaviour of a nagging wife. The fact of the matter is that international relations are neither conducted on the basis of magnanimity nor treachery, but on the basis of national interest. Two countries wanting to negotiate any deal will have to accommodate each other’s interests in the agreement. The argument is equally true between Nepal and India as the countries can ill afford to maintain a hostile posture towards each other. Nepali Prime Minister Koirala in an interview has rightly echoed this sentiment “Neither India nor Nepal can afford to maintain an aggressive attitude towards the other “(Frontline, 1993).

REFERENCES Dharamdasani, M. D., 1982: India’s Aid to Nepal, Center for the Study of Nepal, pp.I-32, BHU, Varanasi. Front Line (Madras), January 15 1993. Front Line (Madras), January 15, 1993. Front Line January 15, 1993. Malla, G. L., 1985/86: Regional Co-operation in South Asia: A Nepalese Perspective in Strategic Studies Series, No. 6 and 7, pp. 114, Kathmandu. Nayak, S. C., 1987: Indian Aid Diplomacy in Nepal in Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, July- September, Netaji Institute, Calcutta. Nepal News (Kathmandu), Vol-XXIX No. 22, January 1, 1991. Sharma, C. K., 1993: Water and Energy Resources of the Himalayan Block, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and India, Kathmandu. Sunday (Calcutta), 17-23 January 1993. The Rising Nepal, November 18, 1971. The Rising Nepal, October 22, 1992. The Rising Nepal, October 22, 1992. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 321-329

POLITICS OF WATER POWER IN NEPAL

RISHIKESH SHAHA Former Foreign Minister, HMG President, Human Rights Organisation of Nepal (HURON)

ABSTRACT

The stakes involved the Tanakpur barrage project per se are not high. But the controversy about it certainly represents the tip of an iceberg of the conflict. Its final outcome may make or mar the prospects for the more ambitious water sharing arrangements on which welfare of a vast number of poverty-stricken people in both Nepal and India depends. The time and effort the Tanakpur controversy has entailed will not have gone in vain if, in the end, a lasting understanding is reached on basic policy guidelines for effecting future water sharing arrangements between the two countries.

TANAKPUR PROJECT During the visit of the Prime Minister of Nepal, Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala, to India from 5 to 10 December 1991, it was decided to make available to India by 19 December 1991 a site at Mahendranagar municipal area in the Jimuwa village for tying up the Left Afflux Bund, about 577 meters in length (with an area of 2.9 hectares), to the high ground on the Nepal side for the Tanakpur barrage project. The barrage itself and the power station had already been built inside Indian territory between 1985 and 1989 during the Pancchyat regime. The Prime Minister, the head of the newly elected government of Nepal, was more or less presented with a fait accompli and had no option other than to yield to India’s desire to make the Tanakpur plant operational of the plea of preventing agricultural land on the Nepal side from being submerged if not for anything else. The Nepali negotiators on behalf of the democratic government also pretended a convenient lapse of memory by failing to point out that a pillar said to have been located in the pondage area of what is now the Left Afflux Bund of Tanakpur barrage was missing. India had in turn undertake to construct a head regulator of 1,000 cusec capacity near the left undersluice of the barrage and also provide up to 150 cusec of water to irrigate between 4,000 and 5,000 hectares of land in Nepal. It was further agreed that the release from head regulator would be increased as and when the substantial upstream storage at Pancheshwar was developed on the Mahakail River. India also agreed to undertake investigation of the road connecting the Tanakpur barrage to the East-West Highway at Mahendranagar. 322 SHAHA, R.

Moreover, ‘in response to request from the Nepalese side’ made during the region of the interim government under the premiership of the Nepali Congress Leader, Krishna Prasad Bhattrai, India, ‘as a goodwill gesture’, agreed to provide 10 million kwh ‘free of cost to Nepal in spite of the fact that this would cause a further loss in the availability of power to India from Tanakpur Power Station’. During the visit of Indian Minister, Sri Narasimha Rao, to Nepal from 19 to 21 October 1992, it was, agreed to clarify some of the points of criticism raised by the opposition. It was made clear that Nepal would retain its sovereignty over the land made available to India to the west of the site of the bund up to border, and also that the reference to additional release of water from the yet-to-be-constructed Pancheshwor project would be omitted to show that neither side was deprived of its share in storage projects. In a further move to modify Nepali public criticism of the Tanakpur deal, the quantum of energy to be provided to Nepal was doubled to 20 million kwh and the supply of up to 150 cusec of water was to be made on a round-the-year basis from the Tanakpur barrage, which itself does not make any consumptive use of water as far as India is concerned.

WHAT IS THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT? In international negotiations, there is an art of giving and there is an art of receiving. These acts involve graciousness. The essential ingredient of graciousness is that the donor does not brag about his gift and the receiver does not brag about what he has managed to get. On this account, Nepal and India have been at fault as they had been at the time of the Kosi and the Gandak projects previously. Apart from this, the Tanakpur project does not center around the contents of the actual package as envisaged by Nepal’s decision on the project so much as around the non-observance of the formal procedure provided for such transactions in the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. The promulgation of this new constitution marked, with a good deal of fanfare, a transition from the traditional monarchial order to a new constitutional order of parliamentary monarchy. According to Article 126 of the constitution, any security or resource sharing agreement or treaty by Nepal with another government requires ‘ratification by a majority of two-thirds of the members present at a joint sitting of both Houses of parliament’. However, ‘if any treaty or agreement is of an ordinary nature which does not affect the nation extensively, seriously or in the long term the ratification of, accession to, acceptance of, or approval of such treaty or agreement may be done at a meeting of the house of Representative by a simple majority of the members present’. This constitutional provision is but a concrete manifestation of a long harbored grudge of the Nepalese people against India. It is deeply rooted in their consciousness and is based on the general impression that Nepal had not had a fair deal from India in water sharing arrangements in the Kosi and Gandak Agreements. Article 126 is also POLITICS OF WATER IN NEPAL 323

intended by the constitution makers as a safeguard to prevent the successive governments in Nepal from succumbing too easily to external pressure in matters of vital interest. Others who take a different view of this article are of the opinion that it may prove to be an unnecessary encumbrance by making it difficult for a popularly elected government to transact business with other states in modernising the country and accelerating the pace of development. The efficacy of this constitutional device is being subjected to a severe practical test at present. The December 1991 decision on water resources development during prime minister Koirala’s visit, including the Tanakpur barrage, was initially made out by the government to be a minute or record of a preliminary understanding with India on water resources development in general, which did not merit any consideration by parliament at this stage. But the decision on the Tanakpur barrage project involving the use or sharing of natural resources was also included in the text of the second meeting of the Indo-Nepal Joint Commission just below the paragraph under the subheading ‘Water Resource Development’ indicating acceptance of the recommendations of the High Level Task Force on Karnali (Chisapani) Multipurpose Project, Pancheshwor Multi-purpose Project, Budhi Gandaki Project, Kamala and Bagmati Schemes, Flood Forecasting and Warning System and Flood Protection Embankments.

ROLE OF PARLIAMENT During the 1992 spring session of Nepal’s Lower House of Parliament, there was furor on the floor of the House which lasted for several hours with the Speaker confined to his chair for the entire duration and the opposition raising anti-government slogans after seising control of the microphone. The Opposition was insisting that the government table all the papers signed during the Prime Minister’s visit to Delhi and was accusing the Prime Minister of selling out Nepal’s national interests. The Speaker at long last adjourned the meeting at the suggestion of an Opposition Member of Parliament. Subsequently a meeting of representatives of the government and the opposition was held by the Speaker in his chamber to try to break the deadlock. After the meeting, the government agreed to submit to the Speaker the text of the Agreed Minutes on Water Resources Development for perusal by the members in camera. Thereafter a Special Committee of Parliament reflecting the proportional strength of the parties in parliament was formed under the chairmanship of the Deputy Speaker. It was assigned the responsibility of scrutinising the minutes and conducting an on the spot study of the Tanakpur Barrage, the site for the Afflux Bund and the Tanakpur Power Station before submitting its final report to the summer session of parliament. The Special Parliament Committee’s report was submitted to the Lower House 324 SHAHA, R.

towards the end of the 1992 summer session. But before it could be debated, parliament was suddenly prorogued by the King on the advice of the Speaker. This move caused further dismay on the part of the opposition and also perhaps on the part of the Prime Minister.

SUPREME COURT COMES INTO PICTURE Meanwhile, a lawyer had petitioned the Supreme Court to bar the government from taking action with regard to the Delhi decision on water resources development on the plea that parliamentary ratification had not been sought. After several month’s deliberations, in December 1992 the Supreme Court decided not to find fault with the government’s action with regard to other matters except for the government’s decision on the tanakpur project. Regarding the Tanakpur Barrage, the court stated in its unanimous judgement that what the government had decided involved the use or the sharing of natural resources and therefore amounted to being a treaty irrespective of whatever name it was given. The court instructed the government to take the necessary steps to have the agreement on the Tanakpur barrage duly ratified. However, it did not rule, as requested by the plaintiff and his lawyers, on whether two thirds of both. Houses or only a simple majority of the Lower House would be required for the purpose of ratification. The judgement asked the government to follow either of the ratification procedures it deemed proper, but chose to point out that the ratification in the present case was not only a matter of legality or constitutionality but had also to be viewed in the light of practical, technological, economic, diplomatic and geo-political considerations. Strangely enough, both the opposition and the government welcomed the court’s verdict as a victory for themselves. The government at once announced that it would take the necessary steps to seek parliamentary ratification. But the opposition, while welcoming the court’s decision, clamored for the Prime Minister’s resignation on moral grounds. The opposition’s plea has been that the court reflected the Prim Minister’s contention that no parliamentary ratification was needed and the court’s decision supported that he had lied to the House. Even the Supreme Leader of the Nepali Congress itself had previously stated again and again that the Prime Minister must resign if the court rejected his contention that it was not a treaty because that would mean that the Prime Minister had misled parliament and betrayed the trust of the nation. But the Prime Minister’s stand has been that he is not going to oblige the opposition by resigning on the so-called moral ground as long as he enjoys the support of his party and parliament. The combined opposition has expressed their resolve to remove the Prime Minister by peaceful action both inside and outside the Parliament.

WHATíS AT STAKE ? But no matter how the present crisis will be resolved, the fact remains that the stakes POLITICS OF WATER IN NEPAL 325

involved in the sharing of water resources are high for both Nepal and India. The latest assessment of the available data shows that 30 out of 89 initially identified sites for hydroelectric projects will provide Nepal with live storage of 61 billion cubic meters, yielding about 30,000 MW of power and 145,000 of GWh of energy. Nepal’s present requirement consists of 215 MW, and will not reach even a fraction of the potential in 20 years. The cities in the north Indian industrial belt would always be able to draw on an abundant supply of power from Nepal. Again, Nepal is not in a position to use all the regulated water that may be available from the water storage because of its limited agricultural area. Much of it would be able to enhance agricultural production in the farm lands of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

HANG-UP OF THE PAST, A MAJOR OBSTACLE The hang-up of the past has prevented the two countries from exploiting the water power potential to their mutual advantage. Nepal’s overly deep concern for national security made it follow a policy isolation and exclusion of contact with foreigners throughout its history. The country continued to suffer from this hangover from the past even after the country opened up in the early 1950s mainly as a result of the impact of external events beyond its control. India, on the other hand, has not been able to give up its perception of security inherited as a legacy from the British Raj (Gyawali, 1992). It was security consideration along with the compulsions of its internal politics resulting from the competition between Bihar and Punjab in claiming resources available for a major hydroelectric project, that made India in the 1950s plan to build a dam on the kosi river at Barahachhetra in Nepal. Ever since then India’s obsession with security has prevented it from thinking of building dams and power stations higher up in the mountain gorges of Nepal. India has been afraid that these costly installations will not be safe in the hands of another country however closely it might have been linked with Nepal in matters of security and development through a formal exchange of letters in 1950. That Nepal’s present economic plight of an acute power shortage do not reflect well on independent India’s past policy towards Nepal is presently acknowledged by some of the more enlightened among India’s own policy and decision makers.

KARNALI PROJECT: CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF TRADINESS The non-implementation of Karnali (Chisapani) high dam project furnishes a classical example of how inherent weakness of a poor developing country renders it helpless in the end against the interplay of various forces represented by vested interests among the donor countries and international agencies for financing. Nepal’s much vaunted Karnali project remains still unimplemented in spite of four favorable feasibility reports by internationally reputed consulting agencies over a period of more than two decades. The 326 SHAHA, R.

first report was submitted by Japan’s Nippon Koei consultant in 1966, followed in succession by Snowy Mountainous Hydroelectric Authority of Australia in 1968, by Norconsult (Norway) and Electrowatt (Swiss) consulting consortium in 1977, and finally in 1989 by a consortium of US and Canadian consulting firms calling themselves Himalayan Power Consultants and financed through a World Bank loan. Over the extended period of time taken by these feasibility studies, the Indian power system for which the power had to be optimised and grown and with it the project’s installed capacity also grew from 1,800 MW to 3,600 MW to finally 10,800 MW. There had been a major flaw in preparing the terms of reference for these studies in so far as no provision was made in them for a macro-economic assessment. Nepal has been hesitant to negotiate with India without being fully aware of financial stakes and socioeconomic risks involved in the project.

VIEW POINT OF NEPLíS TECHNICAL CADRES There has of late been a growth of trained Nepali technical cadres who also tend to think that India’s policy has been to ensure for itself a price for electric power as close as possible to the cost price, and to treat extra benefits from the regulated waters from the storage dams in the shape of irrigation, flood control and navigation as free gifts. Nepali technical experts would like to relate the cost of electricity sold to the cost of alternative thermal generation in India so as to maximise the profit for Nepal. Bargaining positions apart, water sharing arrangements, however ambitious, will have to affect in a spirit of give-and-take on a mutually advantageous basis an in view of the entire gamut of relationship between Nepal and India Which is Intricate and unique. The prevailing atmosphere of fear and suspicion between the two close neighbors has deprived them both of the immense benefits of irrigation, electricity, flood control and many other mutually advantageous economic projects. The consequences of all these are all the more serious in the case of Nepal. For even bankable projects, such as irrigation schemes, cannot be undertaken for lack of funds as potential investors do not want to have anything to do with projects that may incur the displeasure of a bigger country. The high cost economy of landlocked Nepal manifests itself in industrial as in other sectors making Nepal’s unit cost higher than in India and India could follow a more liberal policy with regard no Nepal’s manufactures into the India market. Paragraph 3 of the letters exchanged at the time of the signing of the 1950 treaty categorically states that ‘in regard to Article 6 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship which provided for national treatment, the government of India recognises that it may be necessary for sometime to come to afford the Nepali nationals in Nepal protection from unrestricted competition. The nature and extent of the protection will be determined as and when required by mutual agreement between the two governments’. However, nothing has been done so far to protect the interests of Nepalese as nationals of a relatively less POLITICS OF WATER IN NEPAL 327

developed country. Rightly did Mr. Muchkund Dubey, as the Indian Foreign Secretary, pointed out in the course of his intervention in the Indo-Nepali colloquium held in New Delhi on 1-2 July 1990. ‘The more developed country took an obligation to help the less developed country in industry and in generating the surpluses needed to make preferences meaningful. If industrialisation in Nepal was so low despite the special relationship, part of blame was with India, which had not taken the necessary responsibility’.

PLEA FOR REORIENTATION OF BILATERALECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP The economic relationship between Nepal and India in the past was mostly the result of negotiation with the sole purpose of minimising losses and maximising gains for each on an ad-hoc. basis without regard for ensuring the long term benefits for both sides. The resultant resultant deficiencies of those scattered measures of economic policy- strengthening ties towards expanded economic cooperation and partnership must, however, take into consideration the disparity between the tow countries in their size and general level of economic development. The search for a lasting and equitable basis of the optimum development of water resources will demand on both sides statesmanship of the highest order and an enlightened leadership based on courage and vision. Had such leadership and a different kind of outlook on the part of the people prevailed in the Nepal and India in the past, there would have been dams and power stations higher up in the hills of Nepal to generate hydroelectric power in abundance to provide water storage during the peak rainy season for use during the rest of the year, not only to irrigate agricultural land but also to develop cheap river transport between the two countries. There must be a radical change in the outlook of the policy and decision makers of both countries if the benefits of power, irrigation, flood control and river navigation rendered feasible by developments in science and technology are to be brought to the people. In the changed circumstances of today’s world, water must be viewed as a gift of nature that transcends boundaries rather than as a ‘strategic resource’ possessed by one sovereign country and coveted by another.

RELATIVE BANGAINING STRENGTH India is stronger than Nepal economically, militarily and in every other respect. But that does not mean that India can compel Nepal to accept water sharing arrangement. Nepal can choose not to enter into any such agreements. This choice would mean that Nepal would not receive their benefits, and this might appear to be a highly negative or even suicidal attitude, but Nepal may be said to have had recourse to it by stalling on the Karnali (Chisapani) multipurpose project and other similar high profile projects ever since its early experience with the Kosi and Gandak projects in the 1950s. India’s response has been to divert those rivers flowing from Nepal to India on Indian territory itself for flood protection 328 SHAHA, R.

and irrigation purposes, giving grounds for complaint by Nepal during the rainy season that land on the Nepalese side was adversely affected by Indian action. ‘Both players are showing signs of structural failure in their internal dynamics. The stalemate has forced micro level players to asset themselves. The Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, who need the high dams in Nepal, have begun to question the past strategy of New Delhi which has alienated Nepal and to make direct contact through academics and other opinion leaders, and environmental activist in the flood plains concerned with the interests of the poor, who are opposed to high dams in Nepal for physical and economic security reasons, have begun building horizontal linkages with Nepali activists and trying to directly influence thinking in Kathmandu without having to route their views through Delhi’ (Gyawali, 1992). The micro level players initiatives and efforts will not have gone in vain if Kathmandu can be alerted to the dangers of these macro hydel projects when there is still time and made to concentrate on small and medium hydroelectric projects with little or no damage to the human and natural environment thereby ensuring an ecologically sound and sustainable development.

OBTAINING ASSISTANCE BEYOND INDIA Nepal has at times sought to protect its interest by bringing third country advisors and overseas multinational construction companies. But that has not also prevented Nepal from going in for such a hydroelectric project as the Marsyangdi project producing electricity at the cost of US $ 4,000 per kW, which is seven times costlier than a similar project in Bhutan with Indian assistance and four times costlier than the projects in the Indian Himalaya. When confronted with these facts expatriate experts and funding agencies blame it all on excessive demand and greed for commission or graft on the part of Nepali politicians, bureaucrats and the ‘commission agents’ who enjoy their protection and patronage. Again, from the relentless manner in which the Arun III project is being pursued, it has become clear that there is little or no chance for rational and scientific considerations to prevail when the prestige of a foreign donor agency like the World bank is involved.

TIMING OF THE INDO-NEPAL RIVER PROJECT AGREEMENTS It appears to be more than a coincidence that all these water and power sharing agreements have been finalised at a time when successive governments in power in Nepal had strong reasons to show their obligation to India for its support in some way or the other. Just as the Kosi agreement had been signed in 1954 and the Gandak agreement in 1959 under these circumstances, so also the Tanakpur agreement was signed. The Nepali negotiators on behalf of the newly elected government of Nepal landed the country in the midst of controversy and debate about the Tanakpur agreement just as in the case of the Kosi and the Gandak. POLITICS OF WATER IN NEPAL 329

NEED FOR A CHANGE IN THE OUTLOOK The imperatives of development and modernisation, with the growing opportunity of open access to technology in every field, are bound to assert themselves in the end and change the outlook of leaders in both Nepal and India. Now that Nepal has a duly elected Nepali Congress government with clear majority and the main parliamentary opposition represented by the unified Marxist- Leninist Communist Party of Nepal, which was also very much part of the interim coalition government and a party to the 1990 constitution of Nepal, there should be no insurmountable difficulty in developing economic relationship between the two countries along the lines advocated in a joint communiqué issued on 10 June 1990 by the Nepali Prime Minister, K.P. Bhattarai and his Indian counterpart, V.P. Singh. This communiqué embodies the quintessential spirit of understanding between Nepal and India on security and economic development and envisages a close and continuous cooperation between the two governments in coordinating their policies and actions in these matters on a mutually advantageous basis. In today’s world security is not only a defence related matter but it is virtually concerned with economic amelioration and ecological protection. The model furnished by the European Economic community and the US Canada relationship may be adapted and adopted with necessary modifications to work out a cooperative framework for a comprehensive long term relationship between Nepal and India. But such an arrangement will undoubtedly call for magnanimity on the part of India as the larger neighbor with a higher level of economic development. India could help Nepal transform their bilateral relationship from dependence to interdependence through half a dozen multipurpose projects for power, industries, irrigation and water transport. It is high time for mutual trust, goodwill and understanding. There is no reason why a modus vivendi cannot be evolved to enable Nepal and India to undertake such mutually beneficial projects which may have far reaching implications.

REFERENCE Gyawali, D. 1992: Nepal-India Water Resource Relations: Negotiation Between Asymmetric Partners. Paper presented to processes of International Negotiations Project of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg. Forthcoming (1995) in J. Rubin (ed.) Power and Asymmetry in International Negotiations. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 331-340

MEDIA: THE MISSING 'FOURTH DIMENSION' OF WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

BINOD BHATTARAI1 AND RAJENDRA DAHAL 2

ABSTRACT

Public perceptions, irrespective of their scientific verity, are the major hurdles that have to be overcome to achieve water resource development. Greater transparency, a better understanding of science and economics supported by free flow of information can lead to better decision- making and popular acceptance of the development initiative. This paper attempts to discuss some failings of the media in this respect and proposes ways forward.

WATER DEBATE Mass opinion is like chewing gum, it can easily be manipulated. Media coverage on water resources in Nepal is generally replete with sentimentality and concerns. Many time such sentiments are genuine, but often alarmist too. They result from popular perceptions of national and bilateral decision-making on water resource projects. Poor information sharing between officials and the press and a media which appears to be guided more by interest and posturing, further influence the coverage. The debate on the Nepal-India treaty on the Tanakpur Barrage Project, which has been raging for over the last three years, demonstrates how public opinion can be, and is, influenced by the media. The outcome is a clear indication of how inadequate information can lead to partisan views steering a debate along irreconcilable paths. Those with knowledge about the technical, constitutional and legal intricacies of the project have behaved rather unprofessionally, and have also been unsuccessful in presenting facts to the public. The reporting on Tanakpur in some of the newspapers, which are backed by opposition political parties had little to do with water resources. Instead, they read like campaigns aimed at creating a climate for political vendetta. The reverse attitude has been apparent in papers backing the government line. The ‘politicisation’ of the Tanakpur issue, referring to what the opposition in Nepal has charged- ‘sell out’- has masked the basic issues in water resource development. The politicians have been concerned more with

1 Senior Editor, The Spotlight. 2 Senior Correspondent, Deshanter Weekly; Secretary, Asia Pacific Forum of Environmental Journalists. 332 BHATTARAI, B. AND DAHAL, R.

political overtones of the debate and less with the scientific truth. The media, on its part, seem to be grappling with whatever information has been available. Though some of the political parties have attempted to use the controversy to try and force the Prime Minister to resign, none of them have put forth clearly how they would go about achieving it, let alone resolve the debate with India. What is Nepal’s interest in bilateral water resources development and what should be its negotiating position, how should the cost and benefits sharing issue be resolved, and how should the apparent ‘procedural mistake’ that led to Tanakpur like situation rectified subsequently, are the issues not even touched. The only results have been frequent street protests and all pervasive confusion.

PUBLIC INTEREST More than just sustain all life forms, water is a major resource which can generate wealth for nations. Its use can prevent droughts, provide energy, enhance environmental quality, mitigate floods and create employment opportunities. If these benefits underwrite the necessity for expediting execution of projects, the fact that water development projects generally involve huge investments, have long gestation period, and are often accompanied by corruption and mis-management, demands public accountability. The proposed 10,800 MW Karnali Project, for example, assuming that designs are complete, funds are at hand, and project schedule is maintained, will take 15 years to complete after the first bulldoser moves in. If an elected government in Nepal survives its term, the project will have seen three governments, and Prime Ministers, before its commissioning. A wrong decision in a project of such a magnitude, at any point in time, can have serious consequences on the project and the nation as a whole. Keeping the public informed as development unfolds would provide some form of an insurance. It would lead to the creation of societal check and balances, which are essential to establish accountability in all spheres of public service. For the uninitiated, Tanakpur is an issue related with sharing of the waters of the Mahakali -a border river-between Nepal and India. Because of a historical past that led to land swapping between Nepal and the British India, the river, after debouching onto the Tarai, becomes an Indian river, then becomes a Nepali river after which it enters India and flows as Sarada. In 1984, the Government of India initiated the building of a 120 MW Tanakpur hydroelectric plant on a section of the river, in Indian territory. But the project needed an ‘afflux bund’ that had to be extended into Nepal. As per an agreement between the Government of Nepal and Government of India, which was signed in 1991 and modified in 1992 after much protest, the Nepali Government permitted India to construct the bund in return for 20 million units of electricity annually, and 150 cusec water from the project. The validity of the agreement was challenged, and Nepal’s MEDIA: THE MISSING 'FOURTH DIMENSION' OF WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 333

Supreme Court decreed that the treaty be ratified by the Parliament. An All-Party Parliamentary committee was formed to resolve the issue. However, even after three sittings of the Parliament, the committee has not even suggested a broad outline within which solution for resolving the problem could be sought. With its technical and political ramifications, the debate on Tanakpur, has careened into an impasse beyond hydro-dynamics and socio-political sensitivities. The impasse has been crated by a poor sense of social responsibility among professional, inadequate information, ill defined priorities of the media and political manipulations. The debate continues to remain in a ‘limbo’ and points perhaps to the ‘failure of both legal scholarship and political leadership' in the country. The in the country. The outcome has been a mess whose complexity would serve well to illustrate the problems that would be encountered in public education in water resource development.

FORTH DIMENSION Communication is a two process in its simplest form with serious implications for the policy markers. A sender transmits a message and receiver gets it. The extent to which a receiver is able to understand the message depends first, on how the information is transmitted and second, whether the receiver had the opportunity to para-phrase and comprehend the message. The quality of this transaction depends on factors that range from the quality of the original message, the communication mechanism used, the environment where the information exchange is taking place and the volume of information that is available. A failure in any of the above greatly reduces the effectiveness with which information is assimilated by the public. A communication process is sound, if it has a feedback mechanism,which helps to improve decisions much to the advantage of policy making. In reality, however, both bureaucrats and politicians disregard the need for effective communication and, instead, consider transparency as a major irritant to smooth project execution. A communication process is sound, if it has a feedback mechanism, which helps to improve decisions much to the advantage of policy making. In reality, however, both bureaucrats and politicians disregard the need for effective communication and, instead, consider transparency as a major irritant to smooth project execution. In water resources development planning, the three major elements are politics, economics and technology. Due to the nature of the resource and development projects, opinions, are formed and public interests often get deeply entrenched. Public perceptions thus formed can be defined as the ‘fourth dimension’ in development. Information, communication and dissemination-the elements of the fourth dimension- thus become important in the development process. But, these rarely figure during project planning stages. Only when a debate, and the resulting conflict reach a dead-end is the need for information and communication felt. In many ways, disregard of the fourth dimension 334 BHATTARAI, B. AND DAHAL, R.

has impeded development of water resource for national use, as well as cooperative bilateral and regional development. The state of information and its availability is a major limiting factor. Generally availability of data on natural processes such as hydrology, climate, glaciers and water quality is limited, and is a major drawback. The range and reliability of the available data also varies form country to country. Data in some countries still remains a secret. In South Asia, information is regarded as a high value commodity. Information is seen as power and officials rarely want to part with it for fear of loosing the monopolistic control-which could later be translated into writing and consultation assignments. Many times information is not used and ends up underneath files and racks of the ministry, or even donor headquarters. Unused information quickly loses its relevance. Data that would have been of immense value for progress had they been released and used early on are gradually getting lost. Retrieving them would require some efforts, but regeneration of data would need substantial additional cost. These home truth point to the necessity of preserving, analysing and using existing data. In Nepal water resource information is also regarded as a prised commodity. An apparent nexus between those with information and business interest seems to exist which hinders regular flow of information. The press, on rare occasions, has even been forced to rely on ‘unofficial sources’, though access to information is a right guaranteed by Nepal’s Constitution. An established procedure for dissemination (making documents public etc) has not yet been instituted, and transmission occurs mainly through other channels. On the Tanakpur Project, for example, despite increasing public concerns, the government was reluctant to provide the details of the agreement until the Supreme Court, while hearing the petition on the validity of agreement, decreed that the details be made available. In a recent case, human rights activists had to win a Supreme Court order to get hold of the document on the Arun III project. The basic question is improving access to information. Dissemination will be less of a problem once information is available. The Arun III is an instructive ‘bad’ example of media management and provides lessons for managing ‘conflict’ in a democratic governance. The largest infrastructure project Nepal has ever attempted to build, even in its scaled down ‘baby’ version, the risks involved in the project are substantial.2 Requiring an investment of over US $ 760 million (Nepal’s budget for the fiscal year 1995/1996 is $ 800 mission in which the total government earning is about $ 400 million) the project has a planned construction schedule of over 10 years, including the time to build a 122 kilometer to the project site from Hile, the entire stretch within very difficult mountain terrain with high rainfall.3 In such projects, increased access to information and informed media coverage are essential to ensure that assumptions including all possible impacts are rigorously analysed. The media’s dilemma in reporting on Arun III, however, has been that only scanty information is available. MEDIA: THE MISSING 'FOURTH DIMENSION' OF WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 335

After the advent of democracy in 1990, the Nepali government has deputed official spokesmen in all ministries, with the objective of improving interaction with the media. Unfortunately, the arrangement has not been effective in dissemination. The mid-career bureaucrats who are deputed as spokesmen are in effective, as none of them have any knowledge about public-relation and media management. The government also arranges a monthly meet-the-spokesmen programme, but thinning media attendance shows that these meetings are seldom worthy information sources. At the most, they serve to cross- check facts and collect government views on the different issues that are already in the public domain. For the Nepali bureaucracy, the controversy on Tanakpur Project and the lessons it provided, seems to matter little as far as media management is concerned. Response to public concerns for transparency, and initiatives for discussions by groups outside the government on various development issues is generally negative. Such a response was seen in a ‘public hearing’ on the Arun III held in 1993. Two members of the cabinet who had confirmed participation canceled their earlier commitment because of ‘important work’. Also the National Planning Commission (NPC), which could have immensely benefited from the discussions, not only preferred to stay away but also attempted to use its influence to get the hearing canceled.4 The ‘public hearing’, the first of its kind, was organised by a group of Nepali NGO. Following the first hearing, several other interactions on the questions raised by the project, organised by the government as well as public groups, have taken place. These discussions have identified suitability of the project in terms of its physics, though on several other counts, debates are still on - going. Public debates are positive trends which may eventually lead to the formulation of an appropriate policy to cater to the needs of the Nepali society.

STATE OF MEDIA: NEPAL In Nepal, generally, a newspaper which runs a story of a top-politician demanding the Prime Minister’s resignation always attracts attention and generates more response from the reader than that covering technical, planning or development issues. Such a story, i.e one that seeks the Prime Minister’s resignation, is also more easily understood by the public. The press, therefore, appears to be playing more to the ‘peanuts gallery’. The public on its part also seem to absorb these (e.g. Prime Minister’s resignation) more effectively. Even through several questions related to the technical and diplomatic intricacies of the Tanakpur Project remain unexplained, its political ramifications seem to have been understood by the public. The media in general, however, appear to be myopic, biased, and even getting manipulated as the report by Nepali’s official media on the ‘public hearing’ showed. Using the report provided by the state-controlled news agency Rastriya Samachar Samiti (RSS), 336 BHATTARAI, B. AND DAHAL, R.

The Rising Nepal in its February 14,1993 edition, reported ‘a-hearing-was-held-and-so- and-so-participated’ bland story. Such reporting casts doubts on the independence of the official media, and also indicates that they are vulnerable to coercion. Unfortunately, media manipulation in some form exists across all countries of South Asia, not just Nepal. The manipulation was again evident in a Rising Nepal (December 7, 1993) report headlined ‘Nepal Poised For A Great Leap Forward’. This report was published when the controversies on Arun III had reached a newer height with more questions being raised, but unanswered. Referring only to the good aspects of the project, to which there had been little disagreement, the report seemed story try to convince the public of its indispensability. Though by-lined ‘By A Staff Reporter’, it was learnt later from reliable sources that the story was not written by any staff journalist of the newspaper. The report quoted government officials but independent views were ignored. Such ‘one-source’ stories (read: government) reflect the inherent contradictions within the media- especially the ones with state resources to back them-which could have made a difference in terms of informing and educating the public. Such a situation, however, seems fated to remain in Nepal as long as the private sector press does not upgrade its capability and offer credible alternative. Lately, however, the private press has demonstrated its ability to play a more independent role. When greater information was available, the nature and coverage has showed improvement. In the case of the ‘public hearing’, the reporting in the private news papers were comparatively comprehensive. The issues raised I the ‘hearing’ were reported by all major newspapers in the private sector, within the week that followed the event. Some of the newspaper headlines even reflected the general content of the reports: some said, ‘Officials Dodge Arun III Hearing’, ‘Donors Please Explain’, ‘Nepal ko Thaplo ma Ujyalo ko Dhani Nasaknu Bhar’, (A debt load for brightness which Nepal cannot afford). ‘The Finance Minister and Water Resources Minister don’t want to talk about Arun III’, ‘Electricity: Nepal is being taken for a ride’ etc.5 Mirroring, more accurately, the points raised at the hearing, these reported the social, economic and environmental questions about the project. There were at least two editorials based on the issues raised. Deshanter: ‘The Road To Drakness’, even used the news ‘peg’ provided by the hearing to detail the contradictions in Nepal’s hydropower development. The second editorial was in Samaj whose news report contrasted the Prime Minister’s statement i.e. ‘Development without public participation is like pouring water in sand’ with the attitude taken by the public officials, who boycotted the meeting. The media, however, is still unable to delve into the intricacies of power development. The case of the Arun III again highlights this limitation. Implementing the project requires, as donor’s conditionally, electricity tariff rise. Since 1991, the elected MEDIA: THE MISSING 'FOURTH DIMENSION' OF WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 337

government has effected over 200 per cent tariff increases. The direction to raise tariffs is only one among almost. The official position, however, has been that the decision to raise tariff are internal for Nepal Electricity Authority to meet its overheads. These are some of the issues which the media has failed to deal objectively.

REGIONAL PRESS While such has been the status of media coverage in Nepal, the role of regional (Indian) press, which is more mature, in covering issues related with water resource development, has all along been rather unsatisfactory. While the Tanakpur controversy had dominated newspaper coverage in Nepal for more than a year, for some reason, the issue did not draw the attention of editors in New Delhi or Calcutta. The Project’s background, development history, technical and other important aspects were rarely reported by the Indian press. And, even those that did report had the basic facts wrong. The Times of India (June 19,1993) had a report that said: ‘Tanakpur got political approval during [Prme Minister Girija Prasad] Koiral’s visit to New Delhi in 1992.’ Koiral had in fact visited India in December 1991 and not in January 1992.6 That the news media not cover the debate was rather inexplicable. At almost the same time, Tin Bigha case (land resource provided by India to Bangladesh for a small border settlement) was making headlines. In the later case, Indian newspapers carried extensive reports on ‘Indian magnanimity’. But on Tanakpur, where Nepal could be tagged as the ‘giver’, the same media, in what little was reported, appeared to have taken it for granted (a-something-has-been-built-in-India-is-no-story, attitude). In the case of Tanakpur, the Indian media has failed to educate and accurately informs its audience in India. Could the poor coverage have resulted because Indian journalists viewed the debate through the omnipresent but rarely defined, ‘National Interest’ glasses? If so, such an attitude not only has failed to appreciate the issue and Nepali concerns but also its possible impact on future ‘cooperation’ projects. Professionally and logistics-wise too, the Indian press could have done better. India has media representation in Nepal. In fact, the two Indian wire services, Press Trust of India and United News of India, All India Radio and the Hindustan Times, have their own correspondents based in kathmandu. Why should the regional (or Indian) media be writing about water resource development issues? The answer is simple and straightforward: Water resources has the potential for transforming the economy of South Asia. The floods in north India, for example ritually establish new records of damage every monsoon. The damage is variously estimated to be between three to fifty billion rupees annually, not counting human distress, indirect effects and ecological degradation.’7 But ‘[w]hen any specific water resources development project is proposed, there will be parties who gain and those who lose. However, all sides 338 BHATTARAI, B. AND DAHAL, R.

are damaged by delay-through floods, droughts, migrations, deforestation and absence of agricultural development that could occur under other circumstances.’ 8 Because of the stakes involved, the case for wider reportage in newspapers of Nepal and India is stronger. Most of the rivers in north Ganga plain originate in Nepal and any intervention upstream has some impact downstream. Bihar’s Chief Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav, was not unaware of this reality: ‘Without dams in Nepal, Bihar’s flood problem, irrigation-needs and power shortages would not be addressed,’ he total a seminar organised by the Center for Water Resources Studies (CWRS), Bihar College of Engineering in 1992.9 Indian mainstream editors in New Delhi who do not find critical reporting of water resources related stories interesting should interview Yadav and politicians in Bihar to solicit the depths of their concerns. Another reason, which makes the case for more coverage is the history of bilateral cooperation in water resources. Given Nepal’s experiences with the Kosi and Gandak project, the politicians will have to work extra hard to mould favorable public opinion-necessary for undertaking bilateral projects. The experience of the Kosi and Gandak still seem to haunt the Nepali populace, bureaucrats and politicians alike, whenever cooperative water resource projects are discussed. The technical design and economic viability of these projects were assessed poorly; the submergence in Nepal was underestimated and the benefits to Nepal proved marginal and negative.10 Participation of the Nepalis in the planning of the project had been poor, which has further contributed to shape perceptions. The debate on Tanakpur therefore, had deserved more coverage. But the reality has been different. Except for an isolated editorial or a mention in a once-in-a-while Nepal- India ‘cooperation’ story, the Indian public have read little on what Tanakpur debate was exactly about. In terms of the readership for the water-stories, the Nepali and northern Indian public will be interested in them because people share common hopes, through the benefits, that can be harnessed from the Himalaya-Ganga rivers. Unfortunately, the Nepal- based Indian press representatives-who do not miss reporting small accidents or even a barber’s strike in kathmandu-did not find Tanakpur ‘newsy’, enough to alert their editors in conflict with the positive role the media could play in building confidence between the two countries. Yet all this happened despite the fact that the ‘the challenge of diplomacy has always been how to bring not just power but intelligence to serve national interest beyond national sovereignty.’ 11

WAY FORWARD Media are not the cause of development, underdevelopment or overdevelopment.12 The reasons for these are rooted in the social structure, culture, and factors such as politics and economy. Media is responsible for providing a forum and allow for mediation between these elements, values and perceptions. The role is to generate favorable public opinion MEDIA: THE MISSING 'FOURTH DIMENSION' OF WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 339

which is vital for the creation of democratic values and a political will to lead to an optimal future. Consolidation of democracy in Nepal, among others, would also largely depend on the objectivity, independence any maturity of the media. Such a role can not be sacrificed to ‘myopic concerns’ or by shrugging away the responsibility society has bestowed on the fourth estate. Unfortunately, the path that would lead to promotion of a media that is healthy and independent, obligatory in an open and accountable system of governance, has not yet been identified in Nepal. Where does the dividing line between transparency, and state secrete lie? Who decides and how? Should the state continue its control of information management or should it be decontrolled? are fundamental questions that need to be answered with a cool head. Absence of credible information mechanisms, infrastructure and poor skill level of journalist are the major shortcomings to be improved which need immediate attentions. In Nepal, transparency, access to information and its dissemination must begin in all development projects, especially those implemented under foreign aid, as global politics, not just techno-economic feasibility seem to set the agenda of these. Enhancing public- relation skill of officers in ministries and parastatal bodies could make information flow more professional and improve effectiveness of the arrangement. Institutionalising public access to information would also eliminate the need for manipulations, and eventually help establish a healthy media. The need for openness is even more important at the regional level where mutual suspicion is rife. The challenge would be to be able to convert the distrust that exists into trust. Sharing of information at the regional level would begin to improve the situation. Further breakthrough may be possible through increased interaction among the media representative across the border. Journalists from Nepal should be encouraged to write and present their views in Indian papers and vice-versa. The setting up of national and regional water resource information centers, even one at the international level could help build trust especially in sharing scientific information between expects and the media. Such a body should encourage participation of professionals from the private and NGO sector in a manner which is different, more productive and less formal than the South Asian Association for Regional cooperation (SAARC) forum. Tempered by the region’s geo-physical constraint, coverage and distribution of information is rather unsatisfactory. The impact of information on issues which have cross- border implications is poorly understood. Assessment of the role of the conventional media and its effectiveness in communication is another grey area. Specialised ‘alternative’ media (public hearings, street plays, protest marches, wall newspapers, etc.) greatly assist in dissemination and their suitability should be explored, and pursued. These alternatives 340 BHATTARAI, B. AND DAHAL, R.

were also identified as possible vehicles for building of confidence during an interactive meeting of Nepali and Indian academicians from Bihar in Patna.13 What and how these should be done are matters for further investigation. Left as the situation remains today, the opportunity costs of non-cooperation, instead of the benefits the people have been told about, will continue to mount. In such an atmosphere, the reportage on Himalayan water resources too, will continue to remain muddy, the public will continue to be confused and mass opinion will remain antagonistic.

NOTES 1 Karki, B.B. 1994: Tanakpur Committee: Stranded Marooned, Spotlight, April 22, Kathmandu. 2 Alliance News, Alliance for Energy, Kathmandu (various issues). 3 Report, ‘Public Hearing of the Arun III Hydro Project, Feruary 12, 1993, Kathmandu. 4 The Independent, ‘Officials Dodge Arun III hearing’, February 17, 1993; Deshantar, Falgun 3,2049 BS and Samaj, Falgun 6, 2049 BS. 5 Ibid, Report 1993. 6 Sharma, G. 1993: Role of Media in Nepal-India Relations. A paper presented at the seminar organised by SCOPE, November 24-25, Kathmandu. 7 Mehta, J.S.1992: Opportunity Cost of Delay in Water Resources management Between Nepal, India and Bangladesh in The Ganges-Brahmaputra Basin, (ed.) Eaton D.J., Ganges- Brahmaputra Basin: Water Resource Cooperation Beteen Nepal, India and Bangladesh, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas, Austin, page ix. 8 Eaton, D.J. (ed.) 1992: Ganges-Brahmaputra Basin: Water Resource Cooperation Between Nepal, India and Bangladesh, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affaors, The University of Texas, Austin, page xiii. 9 Dahal, R. 1992: Nepali Bihari Bhai Bhai, Himal, May-June, Kathmandu. 10 Ibid, Metta 1992 11 Ibid pp.2. 12 Galtung, J. 1990: The Media World-Wide:Well-eing and Development, Development Journal of The Society For International Development, Rome, Number 2, pp 17-22 13 Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology and Center for Water Resources Studies, 1993: A Report pertaining to the exercise of formulation of Collaborative Research Proposal on Indo- Indo-Nepal Water Resources, Proceeding of Interaction during the visit of the RONAT Team to CWRS in August. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 341-347

INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATER

THOMAS HOFER

Department of Physical Geography The UN University and University of Berne Hallerstrasse 12, 3012 Bern, Switzerland

ABSTRACT

Himalayan research has a long tradition at the Department of Geography of the University of Berne under Prof. B. Messerli. The overall concern of this research has always been the ecological interaction between the Himalayan highlands and the adjacent lowlands of the Ganga and the Brahmaputra rivers, including the impact of human activities on the environment. This paper presents some thoughts and ideas resulting from these research activities with regard to the main topic of the Kathmandu.

INTRODUCTION Inland waters are of great importance for human life and activities. River basins usually form large eco-systems and their management has to be considered as an integrated whole, from their source to their mouth. As most of these big river systems are divided through political boundaries, there are many sensitive problems linked with the use of international waters which result in political conflicts, particularly dominant in developing countries. In order to solve these problems and to assure the sustainable use of inland waters, cooperative development of water resources is an absolute must in future.

SALLENT CHARACTERISTICS OF INLAND WATERS Fresh water on earth is limited. As a result of high and still growing per capita water consumption, the pressure on inland water resources is also steadily increasing. The different types of water use often compete with one another. According to UNEP about one billion people in the world do not have access to clean drinking water. Availability of water can be highly variable within the annual cycle of a river. Abundance of water may cause floods or damage and paralyse human activities. Scarcity in the river flow also affects the livelihood of the population. In developing countries the financial and technological capacities are usually not sufficient to meet the challenges of such situations. Human activities like forest removal or land use intensification may cause watershed degradation which result in changed discharge characteristics of a river system. The exact 342 HOFER, T.

FIGURE 1. SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERS effects of such impacts appear to be negative, but have yet to be studied in detail. Return flow from agriculture, sewage from industry and domestic use lead to water pollution. Of the 3,500 km3 of water globally withdrawn for human use every year, some 1,400 km3 are returned to rivers and other water sources, mostly in a polluted condition. In industrial countries these problems can partly be solved through technical inputs, whereas this is not the case in developing countries, Pollution deteriorates the water quality in low-lying countries, resulting in diseases, changes in natural biological systems and decrease of sea water quality. Inland water resources are mostly managed on a country by country basis with insufficient international coordination. Related policies usually have adverse effects on neighboring countries. Particularly severe is the situation of those developing countries which lie in the lower part of at the mouth of large rivers. They are highly dependent on the water resources, but are confronted with all the adverse effects of water storage, water diversion, pollution etc, in the upper part of the watershed. Due to the lack of reliable data on hydrological characteristics, water quality and the ecological situation, knowledge of inland water is very poor. The exchange of data between countries sharing water from the same river system is often insufficient. Both factors complicate sustainable watershed management, research, monitoring of water quality and finally early warning of flood or pollution catastrophes. An additional problem is the comparability of data. Often monitoring infrastructure, methodology and frequency of measurements vary among the respective countries.

INLAND WATERS AS ECOSYSTEMS Anthropogenic activities which do not take into account the ecological principles of a INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATER 343

watershed may adversely affect the natural processes and thus human life and the economy of the downstream portion of the river system, releasing a chain of reactions. In the following example some adverse effects of the Farakka Barrage which was completed approximately in 1975 on the Ganga near the Indo-Bangladeshi border with the aim to improve the navigability of the Hooghly River and of Calcutta port is mentioned. This diversion has reduced the flow of the Ganga into Bangladesh leading to the following consequences.

Before the barrage, salt water normally intruded 170 miles inland; it now intrudes 270 miles. Salinity in the Bhairab river at Khulna has increased from 500-1,000 u mhos per centimeter to 14,000 u mhos in April, 1982. Fresh water plant life throughout the delta has completely degenerated. The Forest Department estimates that Bangladesh has lost some 50.72 million cubic feet of Sundari alone (the most important tree species in the coastal zone) since 1976 with a value of 00 million dollars. Because of high salinity in water, the largest power plant in the country’s western grid is forced to run its boiler on water imported from 30 miles upstream, which results increasing production and operating costs. In 1981electricity production had to be stopped for several months in order to replace the corroded condenser tubes. Stoppage of power supply caused production losses in the industrial belt of Khulna and Jessore. The groundwater table in the basin are has fallen. This has affected the use of low-lift pumps for irrigation. Bangladesh lost more than 1,000 million dollars worth of crops in the seven years after the Farakka Barrage was commissioned. The groundwater table in the basin area has fallen. This has affected the use of low- lift pumps for irrigation. Bangladesh lost more than 1,000 million dollars worth of crops in the seven years after the Farakka Barrage was commissioned. The reduced flow of the Ganga is no longer able to flush away the rotting vegetation, insecticides and industrial wastes which are dumped in the river. Water temperatures have increased resulting in a shortage of oxgen. The population of over 200 species of fresh water fish and 18 species of prawns, both very important in the economy of Bangladesh, have been seriously affected. The inland waterway traffic in south-west Bangladesh was reduced 11 million tons in 1975/76 and 1976/77. Throughout the country, the total length of waterways suitable for mechanically propelled vessels like motorised launches, steamers and coasters has shrunk from 15,000 miles to 3,000 miles.

INLAND WATERS AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS With regard to the statements in the previous sections it is understandable that the management of international inland waters may cause political problems. Such conflicts 344 HOFER, T.

impede coordinated activities and cooperation in watershed management among the countries involved, as well as block exchange of information. As a result of varying natural water potential and human water needs on the global scale, the political conflicts will be different from area to area. Whereas conflicts in the Rhine river system are mainly related to pollution, in the Brahmputra-Ganga basin the debate is on the sharing of water. In some cases, water may be used as a leverage in international conflicts also. During the gulf war in 1991, Turkey closed the Euphrates River to fill the Ataturq reservoir more rapidly than planned. Pressure on international waters is increasing. The more precious water resources become and the more scantly the per capita availability, the more political conflicts have to be expected.

CHALLENGES One of the main aims of the Kathmandu Meeting is to formulate first conceptual steps in the direction of cooperative development of Himalayan water resources and to give new ideas for the future. The question has to be asked: how do we want the situation to be in the year 2000 and consequently what concrete steps have the to be taken in order to be in order to achieve these goals? As a member of a University following research agenda for the cooperative development of Himalayan water resources is proposed.

ECO RESS CO a) Ecosystemic approach The integrated, ecosystemic approach for sustainable management of the Ganga and Brahmaputra basins is a basic need; whose rationale has already been explained in the earlier sections. Only through an ecological approach the processes in the watershed and possible adverse effects of technological inputs can be assessed. b) Research For understanding the processes and for sustainable and cooperative development of Himalayan water resources research plays a crucial role. A research strategy for different geographical scales as shown in Figure 2 is proposed as follows. Micro-scale: Within the catchment different test areas have to be selected in order to carry out detailed investigations on hydrology, erosion and sedimentation, vegetation, land use systems etc. These test areas have to be located in different ecological regions, at least one in the mountainous catchment, one on the transition between highland and INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATER 345

FIGURE 2. RESEARCH STRATEGY IN DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHICAL SCALES lowland, one in the plain and one near the mouth of the river system. This approach should lead to a detailed process understanding and thus provide important instruments for the decision making on hydropower, irrigation and other projects. The research methodology in the test areas has to be same in order to get a comparison of the processes in different sections of the watershed. Meso-or-linear scale: In has this scale the main focus of interest lies in understanding the fluvial processes. It has to be studied how the hydrological behavior, how the erosion and accumulation processes gradually change from upstream to downstream, with increasing size of the catchment area. This approach has important practical relevance in assessing the probable downstream effects of hydropower and other projects interventions in the highlands. Macro-scale: I this holistic approach, the focus lies on the entire basin. The aim is to understand the main, overall processes of the catchment which may be different from the findings in the micro-scale. It is obvious that for macro scale study, the data base and the depth of analysis can not be as detailed as in the case of micro-scale study. Existing and proposed studies in the different scales may well be incorporated into this research agenda. c) Cooperation The research agenda proposed above is not possible without cooperation between the riparian countries. 346 HOFER, T.

In the small-scale a comparison between the different test areas can only be achieved if the topics of research and the methodologies are more or less the same. That means that the involved countries have to work together. Research in the meso-and macro-scale is only possible if the data are shared and exchanged. The present restrictions of data accessibility within the basin need to be abolished. This is an urgent need. Cooperation is also required at international level. Gollaboration among scientists, economists, engineers and politicians within the different countries is essential. Decisions about significant technological interventions in the basin have to be taken has to be based on common interests of all the affected countries, not only on the interests of individual countries.

It is hoped that in the near future collaborative management of Himalayan water resources can be achieved and that big projects affecting the water resources of the whole basin will be based on process understanding and international agreement.

REFERENCS Choudhary, G.R. and Tauhidul, A.K. 1983: Developing the Ganga Basin. In: BISWAS, A.K.et al. (ed.: River basin development. Proceedings of the National Symposium on the River Basin development 4-10 December 1981, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Tycooly International Publishing Limited, Dublin. Crow, B. 1985: Political interference and the role of traditions in management. The making and breaking of agreement on the Ganges. In LINDQVIST, J., et al. (ed.): Strategies for river basin management. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht. Hofer, T. 1993 (forthcoming): Deforestation, changing discharge and increasing flood: myth or reality? Mountain Research and Development. Ives, J.D. and Messerili, B. 1989: The Himalyan dilemma. Reconciling development and conservation. Routledge, London. Khan, A. H. and Miah, S. 1983: The Brahmaputra River Basin development. In BISWAS, A.K. et al. (ed.): River basin development. Proceedings of the National Symposium on the River Basin Development 4-10 December 1981, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Tycooly International Publishing Limited, Dublin. Mehta, J.S. 1986: The Indus Water Treaty; a case study in the resolution of international river basin conflicts. In: Vlachos, E. et al. (ed.): the management of international basin conflicts. Proceedings of a workshop held at the headquarters of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, September 22-25, 1986. Messerli, B., Bisaz, A., Kienholz, H. and Winiger, M. 1987: Umweltprobleme and Entwicklung szusammenarbeit. Geographisches Institute der Universitat Bern. Geographica Bernensia, P16. Messerli, B. and hofer, T. 1992: Die Umweltkrise im Himalaya. Fiktion and Fakten. Geographische Rundschau, 44 (7-8), Braunschweing. Ministry of Power, Water Resources and Flood Control, Bangladesh 1983: International- river-the INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATER 347

experience of Bangladesh. In: United Nations: Experience in the development and management of international river and lake basins. Proceedings of the United Nations interregional meeting of international river organisations, Dakar, Senegal, 5-14 May 1981. Natural Resources/Water Series No. 10. New York. Rahman, M.G. 1986: Reducing the flow of the Ganga: The consequences for agriculture in Bangladesh. In Goldsmith. W. et al. (ed.): The social and environmental effects of large dams. Vol. 2: Case studies. Wadebridge Ecologica Center, U.K. Shahjahan, M. 1983: Regional cooperation in the utilisation of water resources of the Himalayan rivers. In: BISWAS, A. K. et al (ed.): River basin development. Proceedings of the National Symposium on the River Basin development 4-10 December 1981, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Tycooly International Publishing Limited, Dublin. World Resources Institute, UNEP 1990: World Resources 1990-91. New york. Zaman, M. 1983: The Ganges Basin development: a long-term problem and some short-term options. In: BISWAS, A. K. et al. (ed.): River basin development. Proceedings of the National Symposium on the River basin development 4-10 December 1981, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Tycooly International Publishing Limited, Dublin. WATER NEPAL, VOL. 4, NO. 1, 1994, 349-368

EPILOGUE

UNDERSTANDING THE HIMALAYA-GANGA: WIDENING THE RESEARCH HORIZON & DEEPENING COOPERATION

AJAYA DIXIT AND DIPAK GYAWALI

The Kathmandu Meeting on Cooperative Development of Himalayan Water Resources was held in February 1993 as part of a process that began in Patna in 1992. In what has come to be termed the ‘Patna Initiative’ the Patna Conference on Cooperative Development of Indo-Nepal Water Resources-Challenges, Prospects and Opportunities, made a fervent plea of increased interaction among academics of the region for mutual confidence-building. Subsequently scientists from Bihar in India and Nepal have begun to address, through joint research, some of the myriad questions relating to the prospects and challenges posed by the task of developing the Himalayan waters. These efforts have been propelled by a sense of social optimism. The need for intensified interaction is clear. ‘Development fatalism’ must banished from the realm of the Himalaya-Ganga, and the way in which we manage our waters must evolve and come a bit closer to grassroots concerns. This process-essentially a South Asian Water Forum-should continue, with the next meeting organised somewhere in Uttar Pradesh, the next in West Bengal, and next, Inshallah, in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nagland, Tibet, Pakistan, Myanmar… While the Meeting attempted to thematically address the challenges of development, it was clear that the solution was not in compartmentalisation of topics. The issues cut across disciplines and then on linkages of the parts with the whole, and between the parts themselves. The debate transcends the ideologically guided positions of large versus small, India versus Nepal or Bangladesh, or central ministries versus NGO’s and farmers. The participants at the Kathmandu Meeting looked out over the nu-researched frontiers and posed questions of risks and associated uncertainties. The capacity for risk resilience varies between nations, as well as between different actors within one nation. And it is how development is pursued that will further marginalise and privatisation in India is worrying critical thinkers in the ‘eastern arc’ metropolis-Gauhati, Patna, Calcutta-about their further margninalisation in the Indian 350 DIXIT, A. AND GYAWALI, D.

economy by the ‘western arc’ of Bombay, Ahmedabad and Delhi, Misapplied water resources development has the potential of furthering this socially debilitating process unless alternative thinking is pursued. The Meeting sought to broaden the discourse on the Himalaya-Ganga. The discussions pointed squarely to the need to develop a forward-looking and transparent policy regime. Merely highlighting difficulties can only perpetuate cynicism. What is needed is education ‘where the mind is free and the head is held high’, not horizon-shrinking propaganda reduced to time-serving slogans such as ‘India cheated Nepal’ or ‘the nagging and intransigent Nepalis’. A scientific temperament of fearless inquiry could still bridge the numerous disagreements in South Asia. The deliberations in Kathmandu could not escape gravitating around the poverty- stricken population of the Himalaya-Ganga. The imperative is to manipulate land and water to meet the development aspirations of this impoverished population. Water resources development therefore cannot simply be an intensification of the past approach of competition between business and trading houses to import and apply ever more exotic engineering tools. It must first bow humbly before the subject of all development-the poor of this region-and then seek to assess the objectives and methods of water resources development within the context of poverty, unstable natural systems, poorly understood ecology, resilience of the traditional institutions of subsistence economy, the resistance of the feudal political economy revolving around land and tenancy rights, as well as the limitations of state agencies as they presently exist. We must at least foresee the promise of change.

INSIGHTS FROM KATHMANDU MEETING The two days of deliberations at the Kathmandu Meeting across a spectrum of professions dealing with issues in the Himalaya-Ganga brought forth the following insights and judgments:

Ghosts of the Past Myths of science have a long life in guiding policy formulation. That deforestation in the hills has a severe negative impact on the agro-economies of upland micro-watersheds is well established. Almost equally well established is the fact that sedimentation at the regional level of the Himalaya-Ganga (as it affects the plains) is primarily a geological contribution and only marginally an anthropomorphic one. This simple distinction is yet to be drawn in macro-policy formulation either in the hills or in the plains, and devising response mechanisms to cope with floods is still pivoted, one way or the other, around the ill-defined concept ‘watershed management’ in the hills. UNDERSTANDING THE HIMALAYA-GANGA 351

COOPERATION Cooperation in the past has been based on sweet talk of ‘traditional historical and cultural ties’, ignoring existing conflicts in perception or newly emerging contradictions as those ties come under new forms of stress. For the future, cooperation should explore the implications of the new paradigm of environmental security, within and between nations. To actualise cooperation, a new way of thinking and approach is required which accords priority to conflict resolution methods on a basin-wide or region-wide basis. This process can begin through intensified cooperation at the scientific and media levels.

Bilateralism There exist inherent contradictions between the basin and bilateral approaches. While the former is more scientific, the latter is more expeditious in terms of pushing particular projects. Issues of regional development or cost externalities, however, must be seen in a wider basin context if sustainable solutions are to be found. There is an urgent need to move to an institutional framework which is not vitiated by the undercurrent of bilateralism, which comes part and parcel with secrecy and suspicion. New river basin level institutions of cooperation are needed, guided by scientific concerns and characterised by transparency of intent and action. The onus of this new step need not be left with the governments alone. In a period characterised by non-government participation in policy innovations and regional collaboration at all levels, the professional and social organisations should come forward to shoulder this responsibility, and governments must encourage such initiatives in enlightened self-interest.

Knowledge Sharing Such a move towards an open technical community, embracing all the nations and the people of the Himalaya-Ganga, would need to be led a policy that draws on an expanding but accessible scientific information base. Information-sharing among the regional countries is not about merely exchanging data. Indeed, that is secondary. What is needed are major analytical exercises at a regional level, where natural and social scientists interact on a regular basis in the course of joint studies across international divides. Scientific data sharing then not only becomes inevitable but validity of the data itself will be rigorously analysed leading to refinement and advance. The scientific community of the basin countries need to lobby their governments to be less paranoid.

Choice of Technology Technology bereft of its social context is often not benign. Choice of technology should be made with the decision making process as close to the grassroots as possible. This is necessary not only to encourage building local capability but also to prevent the past 352 DIXIT, A. AND GYAWALI, D.

experiences of ‘runaway technology’ where what is good for the technology overrides what is good for society. Projects involving larger share of local input should be given preference so that technological interventions do not rob the resilience of the local institutions and their ability to assess, take responsibility. High dams in the Himalaya are a technology that needs more careful assessment in terms of the risks involved. Technology of river regime intervention is subject to the hazards of seismology and sedimentation. The upstream population face the peril of displacement and marginalisation. The downstream population too is left unaware of the dangers it has to live with. All these risks must be made transparent in a society’s process of decision making itself. The need is for a loess technocratic approach. Increased participation from the informal and non-conventional sectors, such as ethnic groups, women’s groups, intermediary institutions, and experts not bound to state-dominated institutions would help change the present bias in favor of technocratic approach to one that places people first. Technology assessment for a more balanced basin development should address conceptual questions such as whether there is a ‘plains bias’, an ‘urban bias’, a ‘hill bias’, a ‘trader bias’ or a ‘manufacturer bias’ to technologies and policies being proposed.

Social and Environmental Issues Waters of the Himalaya-Ganga are linked to sentiments associated with a living religion. The right to these waters do not lie only with contending nation states and their agencies. There are aquatic and terrestrial non-human must ensure that these rights of the mute are assured in perpetuity. Water resource development interventions must come to terms with these sentiment before contending positions become intransigently entrenched. Even within the human social environment, the track record of compensation and re-settlement efforts are far from satisfactory in the Himalaya-Ganga. The call is for alternative social justice mechanisms under which to-be-affected populations have a role in decisions made regarding their livelihood and environment.

Financierís Role It is a truism that development projects should be initiated based on the recipient’s own priorities. In practice, however, financing institutions (whether international or national, or dealing with loans hard or soft) play a major role in choosing projects, technology and institutional modalities. The results have been the poor operation and maintenance of projects and their overall unsustainability. The current project identification approach, guided by dominant donors and plaint recipients oblivious of village-level concerns, should give way to one where, again, the grassroot feelings can be brought to center-stage. UNDERSTANDING THE HIMALAYA-GANGA 353

Water Management Himalaya-Ganga water management is a challenge to those working at the micro-as well as macro-levels. However, the ‘grand design’ macro approach of governments and state agencies have ignored or down-played down-to-earth grassroot concerns thus contributing to many of the ecological and management ills of today. Whether it is electricity generation, irrigation, flood control or fisheries and river transportation, addressing these issues at the micro-level management in both the hills and the plains at a sufficiently wide scale would ameliorate macro-level problem. In addition, the work could be done through locally, nationally and regionally available resource. The intended beneficiaries would then have their say in the decisions through democratic participation which honors such principles as transparency and accountability, leading to the creation of a better and open technical society.

Challenge of Interdisciplinary Research New initiatives are required for interdisciplinary research. What is of interest in the quest for a more harmonious environment is a better understanding of the existing living and non-living natural systems, the human-built system, the symbolic system, as well as the complex inter-linkages between them that are subject to constant change. On the one hand, there is the challenge of narrowly-focused reductionist research whether in specific branches of engineering, economics, sociology or any other discipline. On the other, there is an equally challenging need in the Himalaya-Ganga of scholars able to take the broader view, deeper perspective and foresee longer term ramification. In this regard, the message of the Kathmandu Meeting, in a nutshell, was that individual experts in every discipline begin to re-examine or-re-formulate the research agenda in their disciplines keeping foremost in mind the needs of the impoverished, the dispossessed and the marginalised that abound and are growing in this region. Esoteric, expensive and highly focused research are of value in themselves, but will avail of little if the social limits to growth are reached much before the physical limits.

OPERATIONALISING COLLABORATION The aftermath of the Kathmandu Meeting has seen a set of initiatives that began operationalising academic cooperation between Nepal and India through collaborative research. The focus has been on a specific basin of the Himalaya-Ganga: the Kosi which drains Tibet, a third of the Nepali hills and Bihar’s plains, and whose volatile nature has earned it the sobriquet ‘Bihar’s River of Sorrow’. The investigation is being undertaken by scholars from Nepal and Bihar. The collaborative research proposal was developed over a period of a year involving continuous interactions, including field visits to Bihar and Nepal, through the Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology and Patna University’s Center 354 DIXIT, A. AND GYAWALI, D.

for Water Resources Studies. The result was two independent reports and a joint research agenda to initiate cooperative scientific enquiry for mutually beneficial development. Through the initiative the objective, is to make an impact on planning for the optimum development of water resources of the basin to achieve following goals: Poverty Alleviation: Even forty years interventions for development were made in the Kosi basin, the region remains one of the most impoverished in South Asia. The research would emphasise development and management of the basin’s water resources for the provision of food security, industrial development, improved water supply, and better living opportu-nities for the region’s subsisting millions. Control and Mitigation of Water Induced Hazards: Inadequate data and means of forecasting, and lack of disaster preparedness extract a heavy toll in the basin due to drought and floods. The study will relate the nature of occurrence of hydrological extremes with the social dynamics in the plains and in the hills. In the two regions, the nature of flood problems is different, landslide, heavy top soil erosion and less warning time are the bane of uplands while extensive inundation and drainage congestion plague the low lowlands. The study will keep in purview not only how to control such hazards, but how best to manage them. Healthy Rural Economy: The region is predominantly rural and nearly 90 per cent of the population depends on agriculture or agriculture-related economic activities for their livelihood and sustenance. Hence, agrarian economy is the very basis of living of the people. This economy can be made healthy and vigorous by means of enhanced agricultural production. Development of irrigated agriculture will thus be a prime goal. Sustainable Urban Growth: Availability of abundant energy, enhanced agricultural production and other developments concomitant to compre-hensive water resources development in the basin will lead to increasing industrialisation and urbanisation in the region. it has to be ensured that such growth is balanced and sustainable. Protection of Ecosystem: Water resources development entails large-scale intervention in the natural regime and leads to several ecological consequences. Maintaining an ecological equilibrium and protection of the ecosystem in the long run is an important goal. Understanding Linkages: Improving the understanding and linkages between hill-plain and urban-rural, which are crucial for sustainable develop-ment in the basin would be the element for investigation. Managing Complementarities and Conflicts: In the development, management and utilisation of the water resources of the basin, there are obvious complementarities and understandable conflicts among various uses, various actors and at various stages. The proposed research will be aimed at demonstrating how the complementarities can be UNDERSTANDING THE HIMALAYA-GANGA 355

maximally taken advantage of as well as how the conflicts can be resolved. The research initiative seeks answers to the following broad questions:

What is the economic potential of the Kosi basin, how much of it can be developed, and how? What is an approximate benefit-cost picture of such development? What has been, and would be, the economic, social, ecological and political impact of these development? What would be an optimum plan of development of the basin’s water resources? What are the deficiencies in the data base? What are the institutional deficiencies in carrying out the task? What are the mechanisms for conflict resolution?

The Patna Conference and Kathmandu Meeting were merely the start of a process of intense creative enquiry into the complexity of the Himalaya-Ganga. The process can, and should, move to other basins and subjects areas. We have, since the Kathmandu Meeting, attempted to expand our enquiry into other spheres such as groundwater, water scarcity and local management response. For the Nepal Water Conservation Foundation, the process of collaboration has extended to the edges of the Thar Desert and deep into the Deccan plateau’s ‘hard rock’ region. The Foundation participated in the workshop on India’s groundwater challenges organised by VIKSAT, Ahmedabad on December, 1993. Because of the apparent plentitude of water from snow-melt and an obsession with high per capita runoff derived from annual averages, which is misleading, water scarcity has not yet been acknowledged as a management issue in the Himalaya-Ganga region. Drought and seasonal scarcity are leading causes of poverty, and the situation is also true for Nepal, even though drought has not been a subject of national study. In 1987, treatment of drought was alsmost impossible in preparing Nepal’s country paper on SAARC’s study of natural disasters. There was no data and no data and no study. The nature and pattern of rainfall in India in general and South Asia in particular have implication for flood mitigation as well as water management in a scarcity situation. In India, according to P.R. Pisharoty, at most of the stations, with 1000-1500 mm of monsoon rain, half of the total monsoon rainfall occurs in 15-20 hours distributed over the rainy season. And on these occasions, the intensity is 50-100 mm/hr, with each spell lasting an hour or less. The situation is almost similar in the Himalaya-Ganga where almost half of the average annual rainfall occurs in short spells spread over the monsoon. In 1993, the Kulekhani catchment south of Kathmandu received 540 mm rainfall in 24 hours, and over 50 per cent of the reservoir’s live storage as a large percentage of the water flows as 356 DIXIT, A. AND GYAWALI, D.

surface run-off with little scope for infiltration. In South Asia, including the north Ganga plain, where recharge is crucial for groundwater replenishment, precipitation needs to be collected wherever it occurs in the catchment rather than only where it concentrates as stream flow, such as at a gorge where a reservoir could be built. What strategy would lead to sustainable water management for the future in light of the uncertainties and range of issues identified? While strongly advocating intensified interaction at the horizontal level among the media, professionals, diplomats and lawyers, we propose moving into concrete collaborative activities. A beginning, howsoever small, must be made to address poverty and how water as a vehicle can be used to alleviate it. Past investments in irrigation development have not made a dent on underdevelopment and newer initiatives are needed that can transcend conventional outlooks and ways of doing business. The Ahmedabad workshop provided such a thrust by marking three directions for water management in scarcity situations. The three watersheds marked in the workshop were: scarcity rather than excess, management rather than new development, institutions rather than techniques. Through the approach was proposed for management of groundwater in ‘hard rock’ areas, they can be equally the new corner-stone for water resources management also in the Himalaya-Ganga. These three directions would provide the much needed impetus to break away from a project-centric mind-set and a paradigm of domineering ‘state posturing’ which has limited the thinking of basin governments in the past. The current India-Nepal engagement in water resource negotiation could be described more as how not to cooperate. Though it may sound harsh when Nepal-India relation are popularly pointed with much sentimentality, the lack of any ‘forward movement’ forces us to come to such a conclusion. There have been no significant outcomes, no judicious breakthroughs, except stalling and accusation. Nepali reluctance to acquiesce to Indian river development proposals comes from a lack of proper understanding of what India is trying to do, or not do, with the waters that flow from Nepal. Any Indian proposal to develop multipurpose or irrigation projects is popularly seen as attempts to rake off excessive benefits. The problems of agriculture in the Ganga plain is poorly understood in the hills; and vice versa, few in India appreciate the problems that its northern neighbor faces, especially those imposed by verticality in the hills and the myriad day-to-day concerns in the upper catchments. Indian proposal for water resources development have not moved beyond mentioning benefits in the abstract. Unless they relate concretely to improvements of living conditions in the country, Nepali reluctance will continue. The Indian position of not agreeing to downstream benefit assessment in planning for water resources development with Nepal may be linked to the sheer complexity of agriculture in the Ganga plain. An analysis of groundwater issues in eastern Uttar Pradesh UNDERSTANDING THE HIMALAYA-GANGA 357

by Ahmedabad management scientist Sashi Kolvalli and colleagues highlights these difficulties. Though abundant, groundwater cannot be utilised because of poor drainage conditions made worse by surface water schemes. Waterlogging and water tables close to the ground curtail crop response to inputs such as improved varieties and fertilisers. Agriculture productivity is far below that of Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh, and there is a plethora of organisations with conflicting objectives that are unable to work in collaboration with farmers. It is doubtful if anyone in the corridors of power in Delhi or Kathmandu has a handle on these complexities of the lower Ganga plain. It is even less justifiable to expect an understanding of the challenges in the highland catchments. Such inability could be one of the reasons why in water negotiations India cannot agree to benefit sharing. Given this reality should Nepal dogmatically continue to insist on its position for downstream benefits without offering alternative appraoches and solutions that have a hope of agreement. And how should India respond? Obviously not by sterile insistence that there are no downstream benefits to discuss. Only when resource use and sharing would be addressed through scarcity, management, and institutional needs, can we expect the posturing to cease and passions lowered. This new perspective would require all involved in Himalaya-Ganga water to depart from conventional approaches. If the key to increased agriculture productivity in the Ganga plain is groundwater management impeded by lack of energy, then a beginning should be made by identifying the energy sources. Rivers in Nepal offer potential options, but the energy developed must be cheap, and reliable. This requirement imposes the need for hydropower planning approach in Nepal that is different than which have prevailed since the panchayat years down to present. Given that the operation of the pumps would require electricity for an extended period, the requirement is for cheap base load energy. Storage projects currently on the agenda of development would only cater to the peaking industrial load and at best can subsidise operation of thermal power plants for pump operation-this while exacerbating drainage congestion, waterlogging and associated problems of the plain agriculture that large-scale regulated surface water application would bring. This is one simple scenario of a possible alternative approach to cooperation. There are doubtless many more. The way of the future should be increased interaction, starting with the academic, where the many problems of development can be systematically tackled, continuously.

OPEN QUESTIONS FOR SYNTHESISING RUMINATIONS The purpose the Kathmandu Meeting not to try to give all the answers: indeed, wd have not even asked all the questions. We, however, feel that posing good questions may lead to good answers in the future. Our failing to do so means that not only will we have 358 DIXIT, A. AND GYAWALI, D.

failed today, but we will have also handicapped the coming generation. As custodians of our time and place, our generation must act with wisdom. Here we put forward some very broad issues, and pose possible items for investigation as a series of questions below. It is expected that they only be reflected upon in the best of research tradition, an not rushed to judgement in the best of well-marketed consultancy practice. The list is by no means exhaustive.

Political-Economic Large scale developments have long gestation periods and investment for such projects can become debt traps in the absence of transparent decision-making and in-built corrective mechanisms. The narrow technological and financial focus of the past has resulted in social insensitivity.

What and where is the vision which is sensitive to the social, economic, environmental and economic risks and which can tackle with confidence the issue of affordability, especially where foreign loans are concerned? Would those already benefitted further or will the benefits be spread more equitably in order to reverse the pauperisation of large segments of the society? What kind of relationship exists between present market trends and large-scale capital expenditures in infrastructure?

Despite a largely common heritage of language, culture, religion, and economic structures, an unrelenting race for arms supremacy regions over South Asia. This occurs even while politicians and other dream merchants sell visions of prosperity that would be heralded by large-scale water resources development.

What is the saddle point in the region where massive investments in the arms race end and those equally massive in water resources begin? Are the battle for control of the Siachen Glacier as a specific case, and the tension in Kashmir as a more general one, related to the unarticulated need to control the head waters of the Indus? What implications do emerging religious intolerance in the region have for equitable resource development in the basins of the Himalaya-Ganga? What cooperative research role should academics and diplomats play in this context? Regions in South Asia that have seen massive investments in water projects in the fifties, and an ushering of prosperity, have also faced militancy and armed conflagration.

Have the ‘green revolution’ methods in the Punjab or large-scale surface water schemes UNDERSTANDING THE HIMALAYA-GANGA 359

in Sri Lanka themselves contributed to the growth of militancy through in-built inequity in them that is yet to be examined?

Inflow of massive revenue from large-scale water developments have gone to one set of social carriers of development and related technologies in many parts of the Himalaya-Ganga. Disorders of other forms that threaten to tear apart the social fabric are endemic, which cut across countries.

Could it be that this is the cause of social unrest in South Asia, notably Chukha in Bhutan, Trisuli or Marsyangdi in Nepal, Damodar in Bihar/Bengal Jharkhand, Mahawelli in Sri Lanka, and Karnaphuli in the Chittagong Hills of Banglaesh?

The present approach of resources sharing negotiation between the countries of South Asia appears to be guided more by the exercise of power perceived in military terms. Hydro-ecological approach has received less attention.

How can a hydro-ecological approach replace the conventional state-centric paradigm of resource allocation? What are the forms of power in a pluralistic social context that impinge on resource allocation? How do the imperatives of a post-Cold War age affect the political-economy of international negotiations regarding shared resources (Nepal-India-Bangladesh-Bhutan)?

The major sticking point in harnessing the Himalayan waters has been the disagreement over the sharing of costs and benefits of the interventions. The increasing role of non-governmental groups in facilitating the changes for more productive cooperation has been recognised to be crucial.

How would we operationalise the seemingly intractable question of agreeing that regional benefits are there, articulating them in negotiations, and finally charting out the path for common action? Should facilitation of the process continue to remain ad-hoc and spasmodic as at present or should it occur through a framework supported by statutes?

Social-Environmental Large sections of the community in the Himalaya-Ganga still live in the hills which are accessible only after days of walking. Developments in communication technology are making aggressive inroads into their traditional lifestyles. 360 DIXIT, A. AND GYAWALI, D.

What relation is there between advertising and environmental degradation in general and in the hills in particular? How does promotion of ‘the good life from the North with their own subliminal overtones affect the symbolic environment of the Himalaya-Ganga? How do ethnic, linguistic and religious groups perceive and assimilate the highly commercialised television culture with its forms of entertainment? How is the issue of fairness perceived by community groups especially when they understand that they will never be able to afford Styrofoam take- aways and other such glitter?

Cultural values in the Himalaya-Ganga are rooted in harmony, tolerance and justice. The economy is mostly informal and non-market, and is likely to remain so in the near future.

In a culture where repay obligations are more flexible than the ‘divine right of capital’ to have inexorably increasing interest accumulations, what is efficiency’ What does ‘environmental sustainability’ imply within a non-market culture and what new tools and metrics would be needed for its evaluation? What impact would a globalised construction trade (international high dam builders) have on the environment as compared with the development of local construction capability? What are the stakes for trade and business communities in a sustainable environment and how is their commitment to the environment to be gauged and expressly acknowledged

Pauperisation of large sections of the population is occurring through distress migration arising out of continued marginalisation of the hill economy and involuntary displacement by project development. This trend can only increase, given the present development thinking. The outcome is also due to the prevailing plain and urban biases in the development path pursued.

Can the present bias towards the plain and urban sector be reversed or at least balanced with hill and rural concerns sand what will be the institutional preconditions? What are the implications of modern irrigation development within the context of the prevailing skewed distribution of the only productive asset, land, in an essentially agrarian economy? How would one harmonise the need for displacement with human rights, ethical, cultural and religious concerns? UNDERSTANDING THE HIMALAYA-GANGA 361

What alternative social justice mechanisms are feasible, and with what legal and institutional safeguards? How relevant are the existing statutes in each of the regional states? What changes would be needed to offer solutions to emerging problems?

Population transfer from the rural to urban areas is leading to explosive and uncontrollable urbanisation in South Asia generally, and in the Himalaya-Ganga in particular. In the hills, the transfer is occurring from higher catchments to lower valleys along newly opened roads, and river banks.

How would this phenomenon affect future resource use patterns as well Should roads in the hills be planned along the ridges or valley bottoms? What are the linkages between institutions, formal and informal, modern and traditional, state and non-state, with regard to managing, or coping with, increasing fresh water scarcity in these burgeoning settlements?

Along the course of the rivers in the Himalaya-Ganga, millions have adapted to the natural sequence of river ebb and flow for life and subsistence. High dams in the Himalaya with the objectives of regulating the rivers for year-round irrigation would replace the present sequence of low flow-floods, by a relatively constant flow.

What implication will flow regulation of the rivers have on the hydro-ecology as well as the adaptive capacity of the dependent social systems in the Himalaya-Ganga?

In the rivers of the Himalaya-Ganga, several large and small interventions have already been made for irrigation and hydropower applications. The impact brought about these interventions were not assessed. Many of the environmental assessment studies have been externally funded while implementation remains the responsibility of local bureaucracy which is facing increasing scarcity of resources.

What are the long term environmental costs/gains of such interventions? What is the cause-effect relationship between elements such as the aquatic system and terrestrial biotic resource uses? What values have they for human society and can this value be assessed in a way acceptable to all? How does one allocate a cost to aquatic lives or species and what are the tradeoff points? Can EIAs conditional to project funding be said to be imposed values on the Himalaya- Ganga institutions? 362 DIXIT, A. AND GYAWALI, D.

How do the need for assessing impact, enforcing mitigation and implementing ‘development’ match local aspirations and tolerance levels? Pollution of surface and groundwater is creating unusable pockets leading to newer conflicts as regions untouched by development are coming under the stress of increasing levels of exploitation. Even though tools and techniques exist for assessing possible extent of pollution before hand as well as specifying treatment measures, the cost of growth continues to be externalised.

What has been the cost of pollution to society both present and future in terms of water resources rendered unusable? How does one allocate costs to these externalities and what are management responses? What strategy, prescriptions and institutional designs need to be implemented so that fresh water continues to be available?

Technology Management As countries of the Himalaya-Ganga move towards democratic decentralisation by devolving powers to the local governments, the choice of technology would depend on who makes the plan and who is able to enforce them. Technological choice to harness natural resources such as land and water depends on the institutional set-up. a village with high seasonal surplus labour would, overall, find it cheaper to opt for labour intensive technology, and conversely, one with a shortage would find it more rational to opt for the reverse.

Will the investment and choice of technology in the water resource sector generate jabs, both during construction and in subsequent operations, and how many jobs will that be? Will the technology choice complement the labour pool or displace it? Will the allocation of debt burden incurred in applying technology be allocated in such a manner as to alleviate poverty or will it be exacerbated?

The actors in the development of waters of the Himalya-Ganga are not just South Asians. The resources needed for the scale of intervention envisaged is beyond the financing capacity of the SAARC nations, bilaterally and even collectively. The industrial world would become a partner financing large-scale interventions with its academic strength, diplomatic capability, skills possession, ability to manipulate conditionalities and terms of financing.

Who are the social carriers of large dam building technology in the Himalaya-Ganga? What is their ‘social contract’ with the marginalised poor of the region and what measured commitment will see the enforcement of the terms of those contract? UNDERSTANDING THE HIMALAYA-GANGA 363

Resource sharing negotiation/agreement between countries in the Himalaya-Ganga in the past has occurred at the central government level and is likely to remain as such. The administrative units (such as state electricity boards, electricity authorities, state irrigation departments, groundwater development boards etc.) with their own agendas (priorities, mandates, legacies) are responsible for operationalising the agreements. Electricity distributors in the basin countries face massive arrears of payment to generation authorities and state financial institutions. Grid in-discipline is chronic.

What are the matching interactive mechanisms among nations needed at the operational levels? How would the conflicting priorities of oragnisations be harmonised in a cooperative venture? What implications do the financial status of some of the electrical distribution utilities of the basin have for cooperative ventures? What are the implications of mal-administration and grid in-discipline for cooperative hydropower development between the basin countries?

The Ganga plain of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar appears to be floating in groundwater which can not be used because of poor drainage in the high water table areas. Surface water applications create further waterlogging and increase soil salinity.

What is conjunctive water management within such a scenario and what are the institutional and other requirements for implementing effective conjunctive management? How does access to market determine private investments in agriculture and groundwater development. What implications do agricultural practices and policies in the plains have in the negotiations for downstream benefits? How is the ability to invest in groundwater determined by possibilities of flood damage of the agriculture land?

Large-scale surface water irrigation schemes, with long main canals, have been notorious for high water-use inefficiency. Due to communication and operation difficulties, synchronicity does not exist between water demand and supply, which contributes to the high inefficiency as well as waterlogging.

What reforms would improve water application efficiency as well as crop diversification in light of past failures? 364 DIXIT, A. AND GYAWALI, D.

The Himalaya-Ganga is not water rich homogeneously. The ‘Doon’ valleys, the Siwalik and its southern belt, Bhabhar zone in Nepal, are seasonally water scarce. The population in the valleys is increasing rapidly and in Nepal ribbon settlement are expanding along the Highway which follow the Bhabhar.

How will these new and expanding settlements-basically nascent social systems-meet the need for management within a scarcity situation?

The on-going approach of water resources development in the Himalaya-Ganga has focussed only on the supply side, while demand management alternatives have been neglected. Energy produced by large hydroelectric projects is expected to be cheap and useful for groundwater pumping in the Ganga plain. Groundwater pumping in India accounts for 30 per cent of all electricity consumed.

When pump use efficiencies in India range from 13 to 25 per cent, as opposed to international ‘field’ efficiencies of the order of 50-60 per cent, will it be more economic to create new generation through high dams in the Himalaya or through improved efficiency and conservation?

In some of the dams build for flood control, the experience of flood mitigation has been otherwise, as the cushion that has to be left in the reservoir for attenuation of the incoming flood was overridden by the need to fill the volume to cater to irrigation and energy production requirements.

How would these inherently conflicting objectives of immediate revenue earning versus future risk insurance be met in the proposed cooperative projects?

Privatisation of water services is pursued to achieve grater efficiency. These run counter to the conventional practices of supplying subsidised water to achieve the socio- political objectives of promoting industrial growth, food security and better health. Even in western societies large-scale water resources development has occurred through heavy state subsidies.

What measures would prevent expropriation of water resources by the powerful while the genuine needy get marginalised? Under what mode will the expropriation be equitable and ensure sustainability? UNDERSTANDING THE HIMALAYA-GANGA 365

Natural Processes The complex physical elements of the Himalaya-Ganga are inter-linked, and exercise influence over the whole of the region in both space and time. A key element is the rainfall pattern. Rains during the monsoon and winter-rains feed the region’s agriculture but also cause devastations when, in high volume, bring floods.

How are the specific elements of inter-linkages between mountains and coastal zones which affect each other, hydrological and ecologically inter-related? How does the micro level rainfall pattern across the sub-basins and watershed of the hills contribute to their flow response? Is the variation adequately represented to support farmers’ need in different agro- climatic zones? how do the collected data and end-use requirements match? What is the nature of occurrence of extended periods of non-rainfall anomalies during the monsoon? And what implication do such phenomena have on agriculture practices and food security? What is the frequency of extreme rainfall events in the Himalaya-Ganga, and what is the time and rainfall relation?

Rainfall of extreme nature falling on saturated and steep hills have led to severe floods and devastations. In the past designs and hydrological analyses, these extreme events have been rejected as statistical outlier. Hydro-technical structures built with design flow thus derived have failed, as the flood events have been higher. Unlike the temperate climes of Europe and North America, in the Himalaya-Ganga, the wet season flow is almost one thousand times more than the dry season flow.

Do extreme floods in the Himalaya-Ganga have a pattern? In what type of project design could a flood event be considered an outlier and when not considered so? How do the extreme events add to the existing uncertainty imposed by a lesser understanding of other hydrological sub-processes in the Himalaya-Ganga. Are these extremes the result of changing climatic conditions? How should the design parameters developed for the rivers of temperate climes adapted for the Himalaya-Ganga? What role do the region’s hydrologists have in this exercise?

Himalaya-Ganga is also home to extreme events of different types such and Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) and Landslide Dam Burst Floods (Bishyari) which have begun 366 DIXIT, A. AND GYAWALI, D.

to be analysed scientifically only recently.

What happens in the water resource project planning exercise when these events are considered even stochastically and not ignored as outlier? How would one sensitise bureaucracies responsible for water management to deal with such phenomenon? Subsequently, how would institutions internalise their mechanism for addressing such threats?

Himalayan hydrology and geology are studies in instability. Greater stability means greater costs. In the Himalayan streams, seasonally un(der)employed labour has been profitably used to construct and maintain temporary structures and reap economic advantage till the monsoon floods wash such structures away. Such maintenance is within the resilience capacity of the villagers. This fact is relevant, especially as there is little guarantee that even the best designed structures can withstand the extreme events.

Should water planners be designing permanent structures even for small village irrigation schemes or should they give thought to studying the efficacy of less permanent structures such as ‘brushwood dams’? How can such village level resilience be internalised by the central agencies?

Data on hydrology and other natural processes are generally inadequate and unreliable in the region; and, is spite of concerns expressed over the years, efforts for augmentation have not been made. In the annual programe formulation by the basin governments, support for augmentation receives very little priority. Though the necessity of data and information bank at a regional level is felt, data sharing continues to be area of major disagreement.

How does one move beyond exhortations at seminars to see some concrete improvements in the hydrological data base? How can the reliability of the existing database be improved to a higher level of confidence? What is the minimum of data that can be shared on a regional basin? Where do narrow security concerns end and enlightened quest for better scientific knowledge begin? What is the diplomatic vehicle to initiate mechanisms to transcend this constraint?

Sediment transfer from the hills is high because there is sufficient material to be transferred and the process is initiated by variety of factors. Due to high sedimentation, UNDERSTANDING THE HIMALAYA-GANGA 367

lift irrigation schemes, settling tanks, and water treatments plants have a high rate of failure. Sedimentation lowers the performance of all contemplated interventions.

How do khet or bari land, marginal land, landslides, slope types and bank caving if different ecological zone contribute sediment, and how much? What is the dynamic sediment balance in the rivers of the Himalaya-Ganga? If high sedimentation in the rivers of Himalaya-Ganga is inevitable what are the design and management responses?

Reservoirs in India and Pakistan have actual sedimentation rates which are four to five times greater than that estimated during the design stages. The Kulekhani reservoir in Nepal which has been built in a seasonal tributary of the Bagmati river lost almost 70 per cent of its dead storage volume due to sediment inflow triggered by a single major could burst in 1993.

What lessons do high sedimentation level on the planing of reservoirs proposed to be built in the region, particularly in the major Himalayan rivers?

High sedimentation is one of the causes of river oscillations and floods. Rivers ‘jacketed’ within a narrow strip in their flood plain through embankments have experienced aggradation of its bed over the surrounding flood plain due to high sedimentation. The interventions measures have been rendered ineffective. During high floods risk due to breaching of embankments is high. High dams as proposed would essentially act as sediment traps, and at best defer present problems by few a decades, while introducing additional risks due to seismicity, lead to displacement and bring environmental disruptions.

What are the lessons from the failure of the bund and levee structures in the Mississippi or in the northern Chinese rivers for the embankments in the Kosi, Gandak and Bangladesh Flood Action Plan, etc? · How can flood mitigation be made more effective in light of these lessons? With these limitations in embankment technology and high dams, how can the bane of floods be offset? When does science stop and enlightened value judgments enter decision-making in society?

Sediment has always had a role both in maintaining productivity in the plains and at the same time it is contributing to soil degradation, as in the lower Kosi, where sand deposits following the Kosi Barrage Project is adversely affecting agriculture. 368 DIXIT, A. AND GYAWALI, D.

Where are the studies that would allow making some judgement on the role of the prospective quality of sedimentation to agriculture in the basins where interventions in the from of high dams are proposed? Are these studies that would help to make prediction about prospective scouring of bank and bed in the alluvial plains by silt-free water released from high dam reservoirs?

The assumption of infinite supply of groundwater has created an inequitable situation and led to social, economical and environmental unsustainability in hard-rock areas of South India. As the need for fresh water grows, there may be a shifting of water consuming industries from the ‘hard rock’ belt into the Ganga plain.

What is the recharge characteristic of the Ganga plain and how is it related to the Bhabhar zone in the north? What is the groundwater balance of the Ganga plain? What are the environmental consequences of wide scale groundwater development in the Himalaya-Ganga? What are the social implication of such a shirt, and are the social institutions in these areas prepared to meet this challenge?

These questions call for a meeting of minds of all those concerned about a tomorrow being at least no worse than today. There are no easy answers awaiting identification. Only a process of fearless questioning and wider interaction among those concerned with the nature of the Himalaya-Ganga will unearth some truths which will lead towards a more prosperous region. All we can do at present is to push the intellectual probing forward, and intervene gently. Meeting Participants

C.R. Abrar, Assistain Professor, Department of International Relation, Dhaka University Mahesh P. Acharya, Energy Planning Engineer, Nepal Electricity Authority, P.O. Box 4188 Kathmandu, Tel. 410897 Arun Dhoj Adhikari, Planning Engineer, Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, Nepal, P.O.Box 1340, Kathmandu, Tel. 227699/228969 syed A. B. Jafor Ahmed, Counsellor, Banglaesh Embassy, Kathmandu Manisha Aryal, Associate Editor, Himal, P.O. Box 42, Lalitpur Nepal Huta Ram Baiday, Chairman, Nepal Agriculture Engineers’ Association, 2/14 Ka Tripureswor, Kathmandu, Telephone 214379 Jayanta Bandyopadhyay, Visiting Professor, International Academy for Environment, Chemin De Conches 4 CH-1231 Conches, Geneva, Switzerland, Gel. 41 (22) 789 1311, Fax 41 (22) 789 2538 Achyut N. Bhandary, Consultan Geologist, P.O. Box 3494, Katmanu, Tel. 411787 Binod Bhattarai, Senior Editor, Spotlight, P.O. Box 3799, Kamaladi, Kathmandu Damodar Bhattarai, Senior Divisional Engineer, Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, Singha Durbar, Kathmandu, Tel. 227699 Kalyan Dev Bhattarai, Director, East Consult, P.O. Box 2216, Kathmandu, Tel. 413267 ®, 412062 (O), Fax. 977-4-417895 Lila Nath Bhattarai, Hydropower Engineer, Nepal Water Conservation Foundation, Kamaladi, P.O. Box 2221, Kathmandu, Tel. 476247 Tara Nath Bhattarai, Environmental Consultant, Seva Sadan, Kaldhara, Cha 3-153, Kathmandu- 3 Tel. 216059, 211694 Cathrine Caufield, Journalist, 19 Edith St., San Francisco, CA 94133, Tel. 415-434-0796, Fax. 415-434-8728 Suresh Raj Chalise, Environmental Scientist, International Center for Intergrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), Jawalakhel, P.O. Box 3226 Kathmandu, Fax 977-1-524509, 977- 1-525313 Anil Chitrakar, ECCA, P.O. Box 3923 Pulchok, Lalitpur Nepal Neal P. Cohen, Ravi Bhwan, USAID, Kathmandu, Nepal, Tel. 270144. Rajendra Dahal, Senior Correspondent, Deshanter Weekly, Kamaladi, Kathmandu, Tel. 224552, 224685 or 227691 (NEFEJ), Fax, 977-1-226820, 412266 ® Tara Mani Dahal, Librarian, Royal Nepal academy of Science and Technology, New Baneswor, Kathmandu. Ajaya Dixit, Chairman, Nepal Water Conservation Foundation, P.O. Box. 2221, Kathmandu, Tel. 5528111 Kanak Mani Dixit, Editor, Himal, P.O. Box. 42, Lalitpur, Nepal, Tel. 523845, Fax. 977-1-521013 Lalit Mani Dixit, Former Director-in-Chief, Nepal Electricity Authority, Dhara hara, Ganabahal, Kathmandu, Tel. 227503 Pravven Dixit, Economic Liberalization Project, USAID, Kathmandu A.R. Ghanashyam, First Secretary, Embassy of India, P.O. Box. 292, Lainchaur, Kathmandu, Tel. 410900, Fax. 41313332 370

Drona Raj Ghimire, Lecturer, Institute of Engineering P.O. Box. 4067, Kathmandu, Nepal, Tel. No/Fax. 977-1-526722 Todd Greentree, First Secretary, The American Embassy, Kathmandu Dipak Gyawali, Pragya, Royal Nepal Academy of Science of Technology (RONAST), P.O. Box. 3323, Kathmandu, Nepal, Tel. 470358 Anug Gyi, Principal Programme Officer, Water and Land Resources, International Development Research Center, 11 Jor Bagh, New Delhi, 110003, India, Telex 31-61536 IDRC/IN, Tel. 4619411, Fax. 91-11-4622707 Thomas Hofer, Department of Physical Geography, The University of Berne, 12 Hallerstrasse, 3012 Bern Switzerland, Tel. 0041 31 65 8839 Fax 0041 31 65 8511 Prakash C. Joshi, Secretary General, Human Rights Organization of Nepal (HURON), P.O. Box 1192, lajimpat, Kathmandu Rajendra D. Joshi, Associate Professor, Institute of Engineering, Nepal. Tel. 525689 ® Mana Ranjan Josse, Former Deputy Representative UN, then Consulting Editor, The Independent, Cha 2/403 Boudha Mahankal, Chabel, Kathmandu, Tel. 471098 Pitambar D. Kaushik, Director, Center for the Study of Nepal, Benaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India Ratneshwar Lal Kayastha, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources, Singha Durbar Kathmandu, Tel. 228923 Ajaya B. Khanal, Reporter, The Kathmandu Post, Kathmandu, Tel. 214083 (0), 471774 ® Santosh Kumar, Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, Center for Water Resources Studies, Bihar College of Engineering, Patna-80005 India, Tel. 650125 ®, Fax. 91-612-652967 Prithvi Raj Ligal, Member, National Planning Commission, HMG, Kathmandu R.A. Mahto, Heas, Department of Geology, Patna University Patna 800005 India, Tel. 656247 ® S.K. Mishra, E.E. Master Planning , government of Bihar, Drabhanga Bihar Marcus Moench, Pacific Institute, Natural Heritage Institute, 114 Sansome Street, Suite 1200, San Francisco, CA 94104, (415) 288-0550, ax. (415) 288-0555 T.Nath, Chief Engineer, Master Planning, government of Bihar, Patna Mukunda P. Neaupane, Water Supply Engineer, TAEC Consult, Kathmandu, Nepal Danil Nelson, Down to Earth, F-6 Kailash Colony, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi 110048, Tel. 6438109/643394, Fax. 6433394 Iswer Raj Onta, President, Nepal Engineers Association, P.O. Box 1192, Kathmandu, Nepal Bikash Pandey, Programme Manager, Intermediate Technology Development Group, P.O. Box 2325, Kamaladi, Kathmandu, Tel. 220572 Vijay Paranjapye, Professor, School of Environmental Studies, University of Poona, ECONET, Durga, 92/2, Erandawane, Pune 411007 India, Tel. 9-212-332448 Guna Nidhi Paudyal, Team Leader, Danish, Hydraulic Institute House No. 33., Road 30, Gulshan, Dhaka Bangladesh, Tel. 883909, Fax. 880-2-883949 Ujjwal Pradhan, Acting Head, International Irrigation Management Institute, P.O. Box 3957, Kathmandu 371

Arun Praksh, Professor, Civil Engineering MIT, Muzaffarpur Institute of Technology, Muzaffarpur 84203 Bihar, India Nigam Prakash, Research Associate, Center for Water Resource Studies, Patna University, Bihar college of Engineering, Patna-800005 India, Tel. 0612-652967, Fax. 612-652967 Sanjeev Prakash, Mountain Ecologist, G-11 Saket, New Delhi-110017, Fax. 91 11-6444969 Kamala Prasad, Distinguished Visiting Fellow IRMA, Gujrat, B-605 Anandlok, Mayurvihar Ph 1, New Delhi 110092, India, Tel. 225-0315 Somashekhara S. T. Reddy, Research Fellow, Indian Institute of Management, Banneroghatta Road, Bangalore- 560076, India.Bhoj Raj Regmi, Deputy Director, Nepal Electricity Authoritym Head Office, Ratna Park, P.O. Box 4188, Kathmandu, Tel 216873 K.C. Sarin, Ex-superintendent Engineer C-155 Indiranagar, Lucknow 226016, Tel. 381318 (R) Hanspeter Schimd, Director, Helvetas, Nepal. Tel. 524925, 524926. Genesh Shah, Water Analysis Sercices, P.O. Box 46, Kathmandu Rishi Shah, Pragya- Secretary, Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology, P.O. Box 3323, New Baneshwor, Kathmandu, Tel. 313060, 215316, Fax. 977-1-228690 Rishikesh Shaha, Former Foreign and finance Minister, President, Human Rights Organization of Nepal (HURON), P.O. Box 224, Kathmandu, Tel. 411766 Surya Man Shakya, Member Secretary, Environment Protection Council, National Planning Commission, HMG, Nepal. Kiran Shankar, Director General, Department of Hydrology, P.O. Box 28211, Kathmandu, Nepal. Hari Sharma, Prime Minister,s Private Secretariat, P.O. Box 4569, Baluwatar, Kathmandu, Tel. 473857 Jan Sharma, Journalist, Currently with World Bank, Jyoti Bhawan, Kathmandu. Sudhindra Sharma, Social Scientist., 1/115 Kopundole, Lalitpur, Kathmandu, Tel. 523818. Dinesh Lal Shrestha, Water Resource Engineer, Kha-2-299, K.N.P.4, Chhauni, P.O. Box 4279, Kathmandu, Nepal, Tel. 270408, Fax. 229025 Govind Das Shrestha, Water Resources Consultant, P.O. Box 5627, Lalitpur, Nepal, Tel. 521662 Kapil Shrestha, Associate Professor, Political Science Department, Tribhuban University, P.O. Box 4499 Kathmancu, Tel 416877 Kadar L. Shrestha, Vice-chancellor, royal Nepal Science and Technology, P.O. Box 3323, New Baneshwor, Kathmandu, Tel. 313060, 215316, Fax. 977-1-228690. Tasneem Siddique, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Dhaka. S.R.P. Sjngh, S. E. Master Planning government of Bihar, Gainastipur, Bihar A.K.Sinha, Professor and Coordinator, Environmental Engineering Studies Programme, Bihar College of Engineering, Patna 800005 (India), Tel. 659020 ®, Fax. 91-612-562967 C.P. Sinha, Director, North Eastern Regional Institute of Water and Land Management, Dolabari, P.O. Kaliabhomora, Tezpur (Assam) 784027 India, Tel. 20685 (o), 21977 ®, STD CODE o3712 Bhim Subba, Himan Right Association of Bhutan, P.O. Box 172, Lalipur, Tel. 525890 S.B. Synghal, Professor and Head, Civil Engineering Department, M.M.M. Engineering College Gorakhpur (UP) India-273010, Tel. 333958, 338910 to 338914 (o), 336331 ® Indra Jung Thappa, Social Scientist, Kathmandu 372

Michael Thompson, The International Academy of the Environment-Geneva, and, The Musgrave Institute-London 52 Notholme RA, London N5 20x Mahesh Uniyal, Inter Press Service New Delhi, India Surya nath Upadhyaya, Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources, Singha Durbar, Kathmandu, Nepal Bharat Raj Upreti, Pioneer Law Associates, P.O. Box 4865, Bagbazaar Kathmandu, Tel. 221340, Fax. 226770 (Late) U.K. Verma, Former Engineer-in-Chief, Raghunath Kunj Buddha Colony, Patna, India 800001 B.K. Verma. Laison Officer Water Resource Department, Government of Bihar, P.O. Box 307, Kathamandu, Tel. 410592 (o), 411947 ® Philp B. Williams, President, International Rivers Network 1847 Berkeley Way, Berkeley, CA 94703 USA.

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