The Constitution. Vol. 7 . No.2, June 2007 PERVERSE BROKERAGE: GODFATHERS AND POLITICS IN

Olarinmoye Omobolaji Ololade

ABSTRACT The concept of godfatherism is firmly establishing itself as a guiding principle in contemporary Nigerian politics. The question is whether such guiding principle is a positive one, encouraging of democratic consolidation, stability and development most earnestly desired by a nation starved of hope. The activities of Godfathers, their use of violence to achieve control of government machinery make clear that the contrary is the case, that the godfather is the boss ofan organised political crime outfit against the Nigerian people. This paper argues that the current prominent role of the godfathers is due to the middleman role they play for politicians seeking political power and legitimacy in the face of an apathetic citizenry. It argues that the consequences of such brokerage activity by the godfather is a perverse one as their very existence and success has demanded terms ofexchange that lean heavily in their favor .

) and in which their control over economic and coercive resourcesfacilitates 9 0

0 the preservation and manipulation of the scarcities and insecurities 2

d experienced by the local populace. e t a d ( r e

h INTRODUCTION s i l b "One thing in politics is that you "I am the greatest godfather in u P

must believe in godfatherism. If Nigeria because this is the first e h t I did not believe in it, I would not

time an individual singlehandedly y b

be in daddy's place," put in position every politician in d e t --Reverend Jolly Nyame, the the state." n a r Governor of -- cited in Jubrin Ibrahim. g e

c northern Nigeria. n e The above quotes amply support the c i l "Whether you like it or not, as a r

e claim by JibrinIbrahim that "The concept d godfutheryou will not be a governor, n

u of godfatherism is firmly establishing you will not be a president, but you y a itself as a guiding principle in w can make a governor, you can make e t a a president." contemporary Nigerian politics" The G t e n i b

a Dr. Ololade, teaches at the Department of Political Science and Public S

y Administration, 19binedion University, Okada b d e c 33 u d o r p e R The Constitution, VoL], No.2, June 2007 question is whether such guiding institutions to meet developmental needs principle is a positive one, encouraging necessitates the need for a serious of democratic consolidation stability analysis of the phenomenon ofgodfather and development most earnestly desired in Nigerian politics. by a nation starved of hope. Who is the Godfather? What factors, The activities of Godfathers such as political, economic and social account Arthur Eze (Anambra), Emeka Offor for their emergence and sustenance? (Anarnbra), Chris Uba(Anarnbra)2 and What roles do they play? Whose needs Larnidi Adedibu (Oyo) in the last ten do they service and how? What is their years in'form of abduction attempts on modus operandi? What impact does the political office holders, their activities have on governmental impeachments of governors, deputy capacity to meet developmental and governors and leaders of state and local security needs of its citizens? These government legislatures, use ofviolence questions are fundamental to gaining an to achieve control of government adequate knowledge of a phenomenon machinery, make clear that the contrary that has taken Nigerian state and society is the case. by storm in the last ten years. . ) 9 0 0 2

The term godfather in Nigerian politics To understand the problematic of d e t has thus come to connote "the boss of godfather, this paper adopts an approach a d ( an organised political crime outfit against that emphasises a historical analysis ofthe r e h s the Nigerian people"3. "It is a term now production and distribution ofpower and i l b u reserved for God forsaken criminals wealth within the African state in order to P e

h who will go to any length; I mean any expose the motives and responsibilities of t y b length to achieve their set goals of the actors involved. The paper adopts a d e t wielding political power including arson, framework that pays close attention to the n a r

g intimidation, warning, flogging and opportunities and constraints. for the e c n sometimes assassination". accumulation and monopolisation oflocal e c i l economic and political power, which are r e d The violence unleashed and resulting n provided by the micro-and macro u

y stress placed on capacity of federal structures ofthe Nigerian state, a w e

t system to manage conflict, ensure a G societal stability and rebuild citizens The paper starts off with an attempt to t e n i confidence in capacity ofgovernmental understand the godfather as a service b a S y 34 b d e c u d o r p e R The Constitution, Vol. 7 . No.2, June 2007 provider and analyses the modus Political power thus involves as operandi of such service provision. Part expressed by Lacam44 "the conquest two focuses on understanding the of and conservation of one or several. evolution ofGodfatherism in Nigerian .. centers of decision-making". In politics from the inception ofself-rule in conquering and conserving control of early 1950s to present. Part three centers of decision-making, the assesses the impact ofGodfatherism on politician is confronted with a number state capacity to achieve development of constraints in the form of regulatory and democratic consolidation, It argues rules (electorallaws/political finance that there is a strong dissonance between laws)5 or contextual (cost of financing the accumulative needs ofthe godfather electoral campaigns6, all of which can and state aspirations for development as hinder quest for and conservation of both struggle for access to and control political power. of same source of resources. Part four, the conclusion argues that godfathers Politics thus is a matter ofrisk management hamperratherthan promote democratic with the successful politician been one governance with their current who successfully overcomes, personally

. prominence due to the opportunities and or through the assistance of external ) 9 0

0 constraints for accumulation and agent( s) the constraints that threaten to 2 d e monopolisation of economic and hamper his political career. It is as an t a d

( political power provided by the micro agent or risk manager that the godfather r e h and macro-structures of the state. achieves his prominence. 'The godfather s i l b is a power broker. His prominence is a u P

e I. fimction ofhis ability to help the politician h t

y POWER, CONSTRAINTS AND

b overcome constraints to the acquisition d e OPPORTUNITIES t ofpolitical power. n a

r At the heart of the phenomenon ofthe g e c godfather in Nigerian politics is an

n He overcomes constraints to clients e c i understanding of the intricacies of l

acquisition and sustenance of political r e d political power acquisition and control power through his ability to engage in n u

y by politicians. The major objective of resource conversion, that is engage in a w e the politician is the acquisition ofpolitical t an exchange that allows for the a G

power, political power defined as "the t transformation, the conversion of e n i ability to systematically influence state b resources of a certain nature (money, a S

decision-making processes".

y information, distribution offood, threat b d e c 35 u d o r p e R The Constitution, Vol. 7 , No, 2, June 2007 offorce,jobs, friendship, social status but extremely efficient and ruthless legal sanctions, votes, ethnic, religious) mechanism to successfully overcome into resources of another nature constraints to acquisition of political (economic political) with the aim of power. In return the political godfather reducing constraints to political power demands privileged access to state acquisition. resources. The godfather utilises his access to the state to accumulate The godfather is able to engage in economic resources, usually through resource conversion or transformation corrupt practices, a part of which is because he is an astute political invested in economic enterprises and entrepreneur who combines a bird-eye a part converted, through distribution view of the political systems and its to his clients, into symbolic capital in workings with ability to accumulate, the form of political support which restructure and deploy effectively legitimises his access to the state and political resources? such as money, its resources, information, distribution offood, threat offorce,jobs, friendship, social status It is thus by combining at least three legal sanctions, votes, to overcome registers of power, administrative/ . )

9 constraints, contextual or otherwise to bureaucratic, political and business that 0 0 2 a politician's successful acquisition and the godfather is able to create a system d e t

a conservation ofpolitical power. In other of personal rule that places him above d (

r words, he knows what appropriate all other parties in society. The e h s i

l resource to apply at the appropriate mechanics of godfather risk-aversion b u

P time to overcome a specific problem. activities and the benefits it brings him e h t He knows how to convert a particular become very clear through an y b form ofresource into another form that examination ofitinerat)' ofGodfatherism d e t

n will adequately resolve the problems in Nigeria since early 1950s. a r g

facing a clients. e c n

e II. c i l

r It is his skill in the art of resource ITINERARYOFGODFATIIERISM e d n conversion that the godfather places at IN NIGERIA u y a the disposal ofthe politician as means Civilian regimes in Nigeria have always w e t for overcoming the constraints to been confronted with an institutional a G

t acquisition ofpolitical power. The skill context ofpolitics that demanded high e n i b provides the politician with a flexible mobilisation of voters as key to gaining a S y b

36 d e c u d o r p e R The CQnstitution, VoU ' No.2, June 2007 control ofpolitical power. As political through a combination of vote buying, parties in Nigeria were not the coercion and electoral fraud (resource disciplined, ideological parties that conversion) existed in the West they faced a dilemma as to how to achieve the In return, political parties co-opt necessary condition for acquiring godfathers into their ranks by giving political power. As solution, most them positions in government and its political parties deploy Machine very many corporations (patronage). Politics, a strategy that achieves Through such positions godfathers are political mobilisation of electorate able to simultaneously satisfy the through the deployment of patronage9 accumulation needs ofthemselves and Government employment patronage, their supporters (prebendalism) and in the distribution of contracts, licenses return provide sure electoral support 11 and individual loans, the use of pork­ during elections • barrel grants and public works in localities, the centralised collection of The success of godfathers in helping kick-backs from large firms with political parties overcome constraints government contracts and the creation ofresource conversion that confronted . ) 9

0 of new state corporations for patronage politics, the constraint of 0 2

d patronage purposes. enforcement, placed godfathers in a e t a

d strong position to help military boys ( r e Central to success of distribution of resolve the major dilemma that faced h s i l

b patronage as means of mobilisation of their control of political power after u P electoral support is the capacity to 1966, the dilemma oflegitimacy. The e h t

lO • y enforce compliance It was not military on seizing power have always b d

e enough for resources to be distributed, to resolve the legitimacy dilemma. t n a

r parties had to ensure that those who Some military regimes created one­ g e c received such resources delivered the party states that could organise n e c i It elections and lay claim to popular

l desired electoral support. is in r e

d meeting the enforcement needs of mandates. Others like the Nigerian n u

y political parties that godfathers became case, co-opted godfathers into their a w

e central to the success ofpolitics in the governments and by so doing ensure t a G

first and second republics. Godfathers political mobilisation of citizens and t e n i deliver parliamentary seats or clusters of the legitimacy such mobilisation b a S

seats to their clients on election day confers. y b d e

c 37 u d o r p e R The Constitution, Vol. 7 , No.2, June 2007 For example, in northern Nigeria, the The result of indispensable services governor appointed by General provided to civilian and military Ironsi, Hassan U sman Katsina had politicians are powerful godfathers to lobby actively the godfathers in who sit a-top vast patronage r.orthern Nigeria especially those networks at the local, state and assoc;i3 ted with the late Saudana in federal level that presently dominate othe!' to have peace in the north as the political landscape in Nigeria. llc along with everyone associated Political outcomes are primarily a with the [ronsi regime were seen as function of titanic battles among these l2 j~aitors to the northern cause , In the magnates who bargain among \J·~sl. the military coup re-established themselves and-at the expense of the the dominance of the godfathers impoverished greater public-within a associated with Egbe Omo political context of multiple Oduduwa and Action group as the Ethnoreligious divisions. They have military governor Adekunle Fajuyi transformed the Nigerian federation had to rely on them to establish law into vast pyramid- structured and order and calm after the "Wild patronage network that is blatantly Wild West riots" of 1965, The neo-patrimonial and anti­ . )

9 subsequent government of Adeyinka developmental 15 • 0 0 2

Adebayo continued to rely on Egbe' s d e t network to govern the west a III. d (

r especially in the run-up to and during e h

s IMPACT OF GODFATHERISM i the civil warD. l b

u ON THE NIGERIAN STATE AND P e SOCIETY h t

In return for such co-operation, the y b

As pointed out earlier, the godfather

d military permitted godfathers e t n continued access to state resources demands as reward for his services a a r g

privileged access to state resources

e and to continue with the accumulation c n which enables him to accumulate e and restructuring of political c i l

r economic resources, usually through

e resources necessary for maintaining d n corrupt practices, a part of which is

u their political networks while ensuring y a .. if not support but at least the invested in economic enterprises and a w e t part converted, through distribution to a quiescence of the political society G

t his clients, into symbolic capital in the e vis-a-vis the militaryl4. n i

b form of political support which a S y

b 38 d e c u d o r p e R The Constitution, Vol 7 , No.2, June 2007 legitimises his access to the state and its participants in the installation of and resources. sustenance ofrapacious governments, civilian and, military since What is worth noting here is that the independence in 1960. They have accumulation process ofthe godfather enabled such regimes to avoid the is anti-development from the point of constraints of accountability, view ofthe majority ofthe citizens as especially vertical accountability, his accumulation is based on a diversion which presupposes government of resources meant for meeting the accolliltability to its citizens. developmental needs of the citizens. In other words, the godfather works for Similarly, horizontal accountability, himself, his relationship with his clients which presupposes the maintenance been more predatory than paternalistic, of the rule of law by government more coercive than clientelist. agencies, is negated because godfathers through their straddling As pointed out by Sidel, overall: (combining of multiple political positions) and prebendal activities "These 'local strongmen' work

. 17"

) encourage "encroachment and

9 to achieve positions of local 0

0 "corruption" 18, the two principal ways

2 monopoly, in which the terms d e of exchange between 'patron'

t by which horizontal democratic a d and 'client' lean heavily in their (

accountability is violated. r e favor, and in which control over h s i l economic and coercive b u resources facilitates the While sustaining state rapaciousness, P e

h preservation and manipulation the relationship ofthe godfather to the t

y of the scarcities and b state is predatory as the logic of d

e insecurities experienced by the t godfather accumulation and success n

a local populace"'6. r g demands that the state be weak and e c n remains dependent on the services of e Thus, a major source of Nigeria's c i l the godfather. Simply put, the position r llilderdevelopment can be traced to the e d n ofthe godfathers. of the godfather is a delicate one, his

u doorsteps y a economic accumulation and hence w e t political power is closely tied to the a Talking of underdevelopment, G t e godfathers, through the resource nature ofthe state. In a situation where n i b a strong state emerges, especially one a conversion skills they place at disposal S

y that is concerned with satisfying the b of politicians, have been active d e c u 39 d o r p e R The Constitution, VoL 7 , No.2, June 2007 developmental needs of its citizens, The present problems within Nigerian the godfather faces the threat of state, especially the crisis over third extinction. term of President Obasanjo can be traced to disenchantment of some It follows ipsofacto that godfathers will godfathers with the failure ofthe pact do an they can to prevent the emergence to produce the desired result. The ofa strong state, as its acti vities would failure of the pact is ascribed to a entail a diversion ofresources meant tendency or move by the candidate of for godfather private accumulation to the godfathers, Obasanjo, to transform ·)ther purposes, which from the himself into a godfather, the dominant godfather point of view was "anti­ one at the expense of other godfathers. developmental" and wasteful. This The conclusion is based on an analysis scenario helps to make sense of of the various policies instituted by politics of Nigeria's fourth republic. Obasanjo since he assumed office 21, which have had transformatory effects The fourth republic was a "pacted on the activities and power bases affair"'!) involving some arrangement for established by godfathers in all the power transfer negotiated by cartels of regions ofthe federation. . )

9 elite group interest, be they ethnic, social 0 0 2 class-based or both. In other words the His policies have denied certain d e t

a fourth republic resulted from series of godfathers access to state resources d (

r negotiations involving various godfather­ and hence weakened their hold on e h s i led political networks with military clients and local political institutions just l b u godfathers both within and without as such control was been hijacked by P e 20 h • t government playing a major role new actors seen as sympathetic to y b Obasanjo. The third term agenda came d e t

n Power was handed over to a person to be seen by disgruntled godfathers as a r g

whom the godfathers believed would not the culmination ofObasanjo's ambition e c n rock the boat, meaning would not deny e to become the "godfather of all c i l

r them continued access to state godfathers" with its success sounding e d n resources for continued accumulation the death kneel oftheir ambitions as key u y a and restructuring of political resources actors in Nigerian politics. w e t for personal use especially for the a G

t maintenance of control over political The various conflicts and violence that e n i b society. have characterised the six years ofthe a S y b

40 d e c u d o r p e R The Constitution~VoL 7 ,N~une ~907 fourth republic can be seen as reactions heavily in their favor and in which their to the policies of the Obasanjo regime control over economic and coercive aimed at installing a strong state able to resources facilitates the preservation dictate the pace of po liticallife which and manipulation of ' the scarcities and had long since been left to the dictates insecurities experienced by the local of the godfathers, even ifit was to take populace'. the form of replacing the present regionally based and semi-autonomous Godfathers have been acti ve networks of godfathers with one participants in the installation of and network of godfathers centrally sustenance of rapacious governments, controlled by Obasanjo. civilian and military in Nigeria since independence in 1960 as they assist CONCLUSION them in subverting the constraints of The presence and prominence of democratic accountability while godfathers on Nigerian political scene ensuring the continued is a function of needs ofpoliticians to underdevelopment of the state. overcome constraints to acquisition of Godfathers thus constitute the major political power, They help to overcome obstacle to entrenchment of . ) 9

0 such constraints through resource democratic consolidation in Nigeria. 0 2

d conversion skills, which they place at The latter would entrench a climate of e t a d disposal ofpolitical client. In return they accountability and bolster efforts at ( r e gain privileged access to state creating an amicable state-society h s i l b resources. The reality on ground in relations which would render u P

e Nigeria shows that godfathers are not unnecessary the resource conversion h t

y benign forces in Nigerian politics as skill of godfathers and bridge the gulf b d e their very existence and success has between the state and society in t n a r demanded terms of exchange that lean Nigeria. g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c 41 u d o r p e R Ipe Constitution, Vol. 7 , No.2. JI,me 2007 NOTES AND REFERENCES

I. Ibrahim, Jibrin, "The Rise of 8. Olarinmoye, 0.0, "Godfathers, Nigeria's Godfathers", BBC Focus Local Politics and Federalism in onAfricaMagazine, London, (2006) Nigeria", Paper Prepared for Centre for Research on Inequality, Human 2. Odili Paul, "The Inside Story of the Security and Ethnicity, Oxford Coup in ", Vanguard Workshop on Federalism, Newspapers, July 13,2003) Decentralisation and Conflict 6-7 October, 2006. 3. Ogbonmwan, Seo, "The Nigerian Godfather: as a Case 10. Scott, James C., Comparative Study", Paper presented at the 3rd Political Corruption, Prentice­ Annual Edo Global Organisation Hall International, INC, London, Conference, Budapest, Hungary, 14- 1972, p. 118, 16th October 2005. II. See the reports of Butcher 4. Lacam, J-F" Le Politicien Commission of Inquiry (1951); Investisseur: Un Modele Foster-Sutton Commission of] 956; d'interpretation de la gestion des Coker Commission, 1964, resources politiques, Revue

. Fran~aise de Sciences Politiques, ) J 2 Kane, Ousmane, «Un pluralisme 9

0 Vol. 38, I, 1988,

0 enquete de democratie 2

d Mobilisations musulmanes et regime e

t 5. Ndubisi, Obiora, " Political Finance a Militaire a Kano (Nord Nigeria»> d and Democracy in Nigeria: (

r in Constantin, F. et Coulon, C. (1997) e Prospects and Strategies for h

s (sous la dir. de) Religion et i l Reform, Centre for Law and Social b Transition Democratique en u Action (CLASDA), Lagos, 2004. P Afrique, Paris, Ed. Karthala, 1997. e h t

y 6. Garraud, Philippe, "Les Nouveaux b

13. Babarinsa, Dare, House of War, d Juges de Politique en France", e t Spectrum Books, Ibadan, 2003. n Critique Internationale, No.3, a r g

Printemps, 1999. e

c 14. A very good example is the n e c 7. Defined as " all means at the conscious courting of young military i l

r officers of northern extraction by

e disposition ofa political entrepreneur d n the activation of which by reducing Sheik Gumi. On political uses of the u

y the constraints facing the politician military see Adekanye, Bayo. J, a w "Politics in a Military Context", in e enlarges his field of possibilities, that t a is augment his initial autonomy and P.P. Ekeh, Patrick Dele-Cole and G t e development of his strategies", Gabriel Olusanya (eds.) Nigeria Since n i b Lacam, Ibid, p. 27 Independence: The First 25 Years, a S y b

42 d e c u d o r p e R The Constitution. Vol. 7 . No.2. June 2007 Vol. 5, 1989, pp. 186-205 and for personal use or for the benefit Adekanye, Bayo. J (1989) " The of associates. Quota recruitment Pol icy: its Sources and Impact on the Nigerian 19. Sklar, R.L. et al: Nigeria: Military", in P.P. Ekeh and E.E Completing Obasanjo's Legacy, Osaghae (eds.) Federal Character and federalism in Nigeria, 2006 Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, Ibadan. 20. Tafida group of late Yar A'dua led by present vice-president Atikl! IS. Sklar, Richard L., Ebere Onwudiwe, Abubakar and IBB group. and Darren Kew, Nigeria: Completing Obasanjo's Legacy, 21. Restructuring of mil itary, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, bureaucracy and executive and No.3, July, 2006. police to reflect federal nature of Nigerian state, a move which 16. Sidel John T, Capital, Coercion ended northern domination of the and Crime: Bossism in the key institutions of state in Nigeria, Philippines, East-West Center Impeachment of National Series on Contemporary Issues in Assembly leaders considered Asia and The Pacific, 1999. hostile to the administration and its pol icies like Senate President . )

9 Chuba Okadigbo, Astute use of the 0 17. Occurs when "one state agency 0 2 trespasses upon the lawful authority mass media to publice policies of d e t of another". the government to which the a d

( National assembly was perceived r e h 18. Occurs when "a public official to be hostile to e.t.c. s i l

b obtains illegal advantages, whether u P e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c 43 u d o r p e R