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Copyrighted Material ind JWBK226/Bidgoli July 10, 2008 13:36 Char Count= Index Abrams v. United States, 476 American Arbitration Association (adr.org), 39 Access: American Bar Association Task Force, 98 codes, 842 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU): Digital Divide and, 524–525 ACLU v. Miller, 468 privacy and, 412 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 15, 59, 448 wireless attacks and, 753 challenges to Patriot Act and DHS Accessdata’s Password Recovery Toolkit (PRTK), 370 surveillance/investigation techniques, 165, Access Device Fraud Act (1984), 42 166 Access point (AP), 751, 779 defined, 556, Accountability, 414–415 Reno v. ACLU, 13, 14, 58, 59, 265, 447, 641 Account misuse detection, 712 American Express, 29, 30 ACLU. See American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co. v. Ingram ACPA. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Micro, Inc., 32 Act of 1999 (ACPA) American Law Institute (ALI), 325 ADA (American Dental Association), 556 American Libraries Association v. Pataki, 266, 348 Adapters, 505, 510 American Library Association v. United States, 63 Adaptive literacy, 518 American Management Association (AMA), 419, 421 Adbusters group, 307–308 American Mobile Satellite (AMSAT), 734 Address translation services, 504 American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Adjudication. See Criminal justice system X12N, 541–542, 555, 558 Ad networks, 426–427, 432 American Society for Crime Lab Directors/Lab ADRs. See Alternative dispute resolution techniques Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB), 377 (ADRs) Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), 801–802 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 365, 581 America Online (AOL): Affirmative defense, defined, 121 America Online, Inc. v. Does, 268, 272 Afghanistan, 150 America Online, Inc. v. Hawke, 254, 268, 272 Afternapster.com, 71 America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 223 Age. See Demographic groups and anonymity on, 12 Internet/technologyhttp://www.pbookshop.com use AOL versus CN Productions, 270 Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967), 801 domination of, 44 Air Force’s Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), employee e-mail and, 796 119 Geoff v. AOL, Inc., 19 Air traffic blackout, 129 spamming and spammers, 252, 267–268, 270, 276, Alappat, In re, 658 284 ALCOA case, 632 Ameritrade, 836 Al-Hussayen (UnitedCOPYRIGHTED States of America vs. Sami Omar A&M MATERIAL Music, 232 Al-Hussayen), 141 Amnesty International, 611 Al-Jazeera, 149 A&M Records v. Napster, 6, 71 AllAdvantage.com, 428 Amsan LLC v. Prophet 21 Inc., 25 Alta Vista Technology, 69 Analog, defined, 779 Alternative dispute resolution techniques (ADRs), Anonymity/identity on Internet, 457–478 38–39, 44 anonymous domain registrant, 473–477 Altus Net, 773 contrarians, 475–477 Amazon.com: court rulings, 466–468 Associate program, 40 determining identity on the Internet, 460–462 denial of service attacks, 26 Internet anonymity and the law, 468–469 one-click, patent, 12, 494, 658–659 mechanics of, 459–460 participants, 490, 614 overview/introduction, 457–458, 477 851 ind JWBK226/Bidgoli July 10, 2008 13:36 Char Count= 852 Index Anonymity/identity on Internet (Continued ) Authentication: remailers, 478 authorization and, 716 reverence for anonymity in U.S. political tradition, defined, 510, 587 465–466 electronic transactions security and, 843 secure socket layer (SSL), 463, 478, 739 services, 503 socks server, 478 Authenticity: subpoenas seeking identity of anonymous speakers, certificates of, 652 471–473 defined, 322 technical solutions, 462–464 Automated transactions, 327 terms defined, 477–478 Availability: wartime, anonymity during, 469–470 defined, 587 Anonymizers, 464, 705 disruption of, 727 (see also Denial of service (DoS) Anonymous DSL (digital subscriber line), 464, 477 attacks) Anonymous surfing site, defined, 477 efficient/effective operation and, 834 ANSI X12N, 541–542, 555, 558 e-government security, 568–573 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of classes of attacks (physical/logical), 572 1999 (ACPA), 8–9, 45 denial of service concerns, 570 Antiglobalization/anticapitalism movements, 315 fault-related availability concerns, 568–569 APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Council), 669, 681, individual or informally organized hackers, 686–688 570–571 APOP (authenticated post office protocol), 771, intrinsic availability concerns, 569–570 779 logical attacks, 572–573 Apparent identity, 459 nonstate organizations, 571–572 Apple, 7, 232, 301, 302 physical attacks, 572 Applied Info. Mgmt. Co. v. Icart, 345 sources of denial of service attacks, 570 Appropriation, tort of, 411 state-sponsored attacks, 572 Arizona’s Roosevelt Dam, 132, 133 e-government security mechanisms/techniques Arms Export Control Act (1978), 650 for, 578–579 Arpanet, 249 information assurance and, 748 ASCII, 392 wireless information warfare and, 727–732 ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), 669, 681, 682–683, 686 Backdoors, 753, 770 ASEANAPOL, 686 Backups files, 220–221, 838 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 15, 59, 448 Bailye, John, 474 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 116 Ballmer Steve, 310–311 Asia, 11, 193, 605, 639, 607, 820 Bally v. Faber, 16 cybersquatting, 11 Baltimore Technologies, 331–332 lack of civil society structures, 605 Bandwidth, communications, 724 Asian Productivity Organization, 530 Banks/financial institutions: Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC), 669 computer security, 487 Assent/consent, defined, 352 Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 Association for Interactive Marketing (AIM), 263 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), 13, 412, 432, Association of American Physicians and Surgeons 483 (AAPS), 556 http://www.pbookshop.comprivacy of records, 412 Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies terrorism and, 236–237 (AMWA), 168 Barbie Liberation Organisation, 309 Asymmetric: Barlow, John Perry, 628 defined, 587 Barnesandnoble.com, 659 response, 150, 172 Barron’s Online, 36 warfare, 731–732, 779 Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 229 Asynchronous transfer mode (ATM), 779 BBB Online Privacy Program, 78–79, 429 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 229 BEA Systems, 491, 509 ATM (asynchronous transfer mode), 779 Behavioral methods, information leak detection, ATM withdrawal, sequence diagram, 492 711 Atomic Tangerine, 193 BellSouth, 246 AT&T, 253, 529 Bench trial, defined, 121 Attack(s). See Wireless information warfare (WIW) Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., 799 Attack/defense scenario (A/D), 779 BestCrypt, 364 Attacker identification, 772 BGP. See Border gateway protocol (BGP) Attractors, 597, 598, 622 Bidder’s Edge, 41, 213 At-will employment, 798, 814–816, 824–825 Bill of rights. See Constitution of United States Australia, 36, 133, 188, 273, 529, 599, 606, 634, Biometric security measures, 607, 838, 839 653, 686–688, 820 Bird v. Parsons, 266 Authenticated post office protocol (APOP), 771, 779 Black-box testing, 379 ind JWBK226/Bidgoli July 10, 2008 13:36 Char Count= Index 853 Black lists, 248, 285 Canada: Blakey v. Continental Airlines, 26, 800 anonymity of juveniles, 26 Blocking programs, 450–452 antispam legislation, 280 Blogs/bulletin boards, 169, 705, 720 Canadian Human Rights Act, 61 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 799 Convention on Cyber-Crime treaty, 190, 673 Boeing, 529, 810 copyright law, 66 Bombing, Oklahoma City, 105, 572 Criminal Code, 185 “Bomb shelter” legislation (UCITA; Uniform democratic deficit, 608 Computer Information Transactions Act), fraudulent wrongful function of computer system, 324, 327, 345, 346–347, 349, 352 82 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 342 free speech, 55 Booher, Charles, 245 Group of 8, 681 Border gateway protocol (BGP), 148–150, 172 hate speech, 61 Bots/cyberbots, 223–224, 285, 731 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Bounce, 285 Documents Act, 14 Boureguard, In re, 658 privacy, 14, 73, 820 Bowers, Harold, 341 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Tech Crime Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 229, 230, 340, Unit, 188 341, 343 voting rights, 85 Boy Scouts, 410 Canexus.com, 72 BPP (business owner’s package policy), 32 CAN-SPAM Act. See Spam, federal CAN-SPAM Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 217 Act (Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Broadband, 520–521, 530–531 Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003) Broker-dealer operations, 27 Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 411 Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 24 Carbon Defense League, 308 Browser privacy issues, 422 Carnivore, 165, 166, 418, 470, 647, 648 Browsewrap agreements, 334–337 CART (Computer Analysis and Response Team), Browsewrap license, 352 FBI, 393 Brussels Convention, 635 Caruso, J. T., 136 Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Caspi v. Microsoft Network, 338 467, 468 Cato, 465 Buffer overflows, 755 CAUCE. See Coalition Against Unsolicited Bunner, Andrew, 16 Commercial E-mail (CAUCE) Burger King, 7, 8 Caveat emptor, 347–348 Business(es): CCIPS (Computer Crime and Intellectual Property corporate spying (see Corporate spying) Section), 187 corporate use of personal information, 77–78 CDA. See Communications Decency Act of 1996 cyberterrorism and, 158–161, 169–170 (CDA) employee privacy policies, 420–421 CDMA. See Code division multiple access (CDMA) global e-government and, 609 Cells, 736 government, compulsory/voluntary cooperation Cellular digital packet data (CDPD), 739, 779 with, 237–238 Cellular phones, 500, 779 privacy issues for, 419–421 Censorship, 437–453 terrorism and financialhttp://www.pbookshop.com institutions, 236–237 circumstantial, 438 USA PATRIOT ACT, and government spying, content filtering, 453 and, 236–238 defining, 438–439, 453 virus/worm attacks, estimates, 183 First Amendment and, 439–441 wiretap laws and, 418–419 government,
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