Policy Brief November 2014
The United Nations and a peace process strategy for Syria By Leila Hilal
Executive summary
The counterterrorism effort launched by the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition has side- tracked international attention away from a political resolution to the Syrian civil war. Offi- cials, analysts and peace practitioners alike are latching on to quick fixes aimed at mitigating violence at the local level. Although stakeholders are mindful of the need to match bottom-up de-escalation efforts with top-down interventions, a comprehensive approach is as elusive as ever. The United Nations (UN) secretary-general’s appointment of a new special envoy for Syria presents an opportunity for building an inclusive peacemaking strategy for the country. This policy brief provides a series of recommendations for the development of a strategy led by the UN with support from key countries.
Introduction An agreement to cease fire in Aleppo could bring some The appointment of the third special envoy for Syria, much-needed relief to Syrians fatigued by war. But a partial Staffan de Mistura, follows the resignation of former de-escalation of violence would not fill the political envoys Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi. Both the latter vacuum, which the Islamic State (IS) and other armed were seasoned diplomats. Brahimi held the post the factions have been exploiting. longest, serving for nearly two years and presiding over the only direct talks held between the Syrian government and A negotiation pause is warranted. The U.S.-led military the formal opposition in early 2014. The talks, based on the campaign in Iraq and Syria marks the convergence of Geneva Communiqué adopted by the international Action anti-jihadist interests among external powers fuelling the Group for Syria in June 2012, failed to produce common Syrian civil war. These interests could be leveraged into understandings between the parties or a change in the a deal to force leading warring parties to accept a political status quo. Brahimi subsequently resigned, blaming proxy transition and a complete end to armed hostilities. The five warfare and international and regional discord. permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (P5+) are best placed to shepherd a deal. De Mistura has embraced three priorities of comparative modesty: “anything to contribute to reduce the level of Sufficient Syrian national consensus will, however, be violence, anything we can do to increase the access of aid needed for a durable resolution to the conflict. The UN even across the borders and inside Syria, and promote the special envoy is the appropriate interlocutor to begin political process” (Sputnik International, 2014). building the foundations for productive Syrian negotiations while feeding into international and regional diplomacy for Since outlining these priorities, de Mistura has been a grand bargain. de Mistura should adopt and purse promoting a plan to freeze military hostilities in areas of a peace process support strategy in parallel to his efforts to Syria (“freeze zones”), beginning with the highly contested freeze fighting in certain locales. Aleppo governorate and working “bottom-up” (BBC, 2014). Following his second visit to Damascus, the Assad govern- ment indicated that it might accept the proposal while opposition representatives have expressed reservations or rejected it. NOREF Policy Brief – November 2014
The role of the special envoy: learning from a negotiated national solution to the Syrian crisis must the past also be part of the political dialogue. Once appropriate The failure of the Geneva II talks can be attributed to poor representatives have been identified, the special envoy timing, the exclusion of key Syrian representatives and an should sponsor, but not lead, forums to enable groups inappropriate format. The talks were convened 18 months to collectively analyse the conflict in all its relevant after the constituting document – the Geneva Communiqué forms, respond to options for a resolution and articulate – was agreed. The interim period saw a continuation of confidence-building measures. Alternatively, de Mistura international policies to either arm disparate insurgent can defer to external track III and II initiatives for this forces or back the Assad government at all costs, which purpose. Either way, it is essential that these tracks are precluded the diplomacy needed to shore up regional and appropriately sequenced and complementary to official global agreement for a transition. talks.
The talks were convened under intense media scrutiny, • Collate a road map for peace. Whether or not de Mistura with Russia and the U.S. holding competing visions of their leads a Syrian dialogue, his good offices should collate purpose. Iran was invited and then disinvited after U.S. outcomes into an actionable plan. Comparative experts intervention. The lack of international and regional coordi- can help fill in substantive conceptual gaps, drawing on nation contributed to mismatched party expectations. lessons learned from other conflicts. The road map can Conventional narratives of Geneva II failings have tended to provide a national framework against which localised overlook implicit compromises offered by the National interventions can be calibrated and scaled. Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC). But the Assad govern- ment came unprepared and unwilling to discuss transi- • Deepen regional and international diplomacy. The special tional issues and the SOC was unwilling to diverge to other envoy is now on his third round of consultations with topics. As Brahimi stated, the Syrian parties at the table concerned states. These consultations are critical to were both still convinced of their ability to achieve victory. reaching out to previously excluded actors like Iran. They are also opportunities to push the anti-IS coalition UN mediation in the interim period was also missing. While agenda beyond its current narrow counterterrorism the special envoy undertook shuttle diplomacy with states focus to include Syrian peace needs. As Syrian interests and consulted international organisations working on the become clearer to De Mistura, he in turn can use them ground, no serious steps were taken to create a forum to to inform regional and international players and nudge engage armed actors or lead mediation inside Syria. them toward a constructive accommodation of the Moreover, Brahimi reportedly refused the participation of Syrian dimension of the conflict. Meanwhile, targeted civil society representatives at the talks, including a diplomacy is needed to end the global networks feeding women’s delegation. These terms and conditions left the Syria’s war economy. Geneva II process disconnected from local realities, and without broad legitimacy or popular support. This in turn • Advocate for accountability on the part of all armed actors. further limited the negotiating parties. A peace process strategy will depend on adequate security space for a Syrian dialogue. The government and insurgent groups alike should be pressured to stop A renewed plan for UN diplomacy arrests, indiscriminate attacks and other human rights Four concentric circles of influence underpin the Syrian abuses undermining peaceful initiatives, including as conflict: local, national, regional and global. The outer two explicit elements of local ceasefires. Consistent private rings (regional and global) have received the greater focus and public leadership on this issue would also restore of analytical and diplomatic attention. While all four desperately needed values to diplomacy on Syria and spheres are intertwined, a peace process support strategy help shore up localised mediations. that works from the inside out and back again would constitute a fresh approach and complement ongoing • Empower Syrian women and other civil society actors. regional and international engagements. As part of the Despite a severe operating environment, Syrian women strategy, the UN special envoy should do the following: and their broader civil society networks have been leading the campaign for inclusive, non-violent change. • Expand dialogue to include a broader range of Syrian Not unlike other violent conflicts, they have been the stakeholders. Syria’s conflict has resulted in multiple first to accept that Syria has reached a stalemate social and political fissures. In order to preserve the necessitating mutual compromises. They are working to territorial integrity of the country and achieve stabilisa- mobilise their grass-roots constituents to support tion, Syrian understandings on a political horizon and a negotiated settlement. Mechanisms should be created governance systems are urgently needed. A neutral to ensure that their initiatives inform all four circles of third party will have to facilitate these understandings, influence. moving beyond limited government and formal opposi- tion circles to include civic, business and religious stakeholders. Armed actors who accept the principle of 2 NOREF Policy Brief – November 2014 Linking the local and national Conclusion Reducing violence and improving humanitarian access De Mistura’s appointment is an opportunity to improve on across Syria is essential to a peace process support past UN mediation efforts and lay the foundations for strategy. The special envoy should back local ceasefire productive Syrian talks. As the anti-IS campaign proceeds, efforts by moving between support for them and a national it will be vital to reach regional and international under- peace process strategy. standings, especially between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and including Turkey, Russia and the U.S., on stabilising Syria Numerous truces and ceasefires have been agreed across and the wider region. Yet longer-term stabilisation and Syria at military flashpoints (Integrity: Research and eventual peace will need to come from inside Syria. Consulting, 2014). They have garnered a great deal of Localised ceasefires appear to be stopgap measures to attention lately, with many analysts looking for short- to address the immediate military crisis in parts of Syria. medium-term solutions to address the Syrian conflagra- A peace process strategy that links them or other shorter- tion. One mediation group recommended that localised term stabilisation efforts to an overarching peace process ceasefires should lead to a national plan for elections strategy for the wider Syrian conflict would increase their (Ignatius, 2014). relevance to the special envoy’s mission and the chances of an eventual resolution. Whether or not local ceasefires constitute progress in parts of Syria is highly contested. Most Syrians and observers regard them as an extension of the government’s war effort References to reclaim territory and rehabilitate its international BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). 2014. “Syria standing. Indeed, in ceasefire talks the government is conflict: UN’s Staffan de Mistura hopeful.” November 11th. typically represented by state security or paramilitary
While more studies are needed to understand what – if any Sputnik International. 2014. “De Mistura: security response – conflict transformation opportunities flow from such not enough to deal with IS, need for political process.” localised ceasefires, obvious measures that could improve September 24th.
A UN-guaranteed ceasefire in Aleppo or other areas of the country could also give localised ceasefires more visibility and, in turn, more momentum to build in these guarantees. The possibility that a ceasefire would hold in Aleppo, however, appears increasingly dim, with mainstream rebel leaders calling for a nationalized process.
3 THE THE AUTHOR AUTHOR
LeilaSilke Hilal Pfeiffer is a senior was the fellow Colombia/Andes at the International director Security for the International ProgrammeCrisis Group at fromNew 2010America. to 2013. She Previouslycurrently focuses she led onthe governance, Americas TheThe Norwegian Norwegian Peacebuilding Peacebuilding Resource Resource Centre Centre politicaldepartment dialogue, at Transparency and civil society International in the Middle and Easttaught and at North the univer - NorskNorsk ressurssenter ressurssenter for for fredsbygging fredsbygging Africasities region. of Chile She and has Potsdam. led conflict Currently assessment she consults missions, on governance including forand Chatham conflict House, matters. the International Centre for Transitional Justice and the Euro-Med Human Rights Network. She holds a JD TheThe Norwegian Norwegian Peacebuilding Peacebuilding Resource Resource Centre Centre (NOREF) (NOREF) is isa a resource centre integrating knowledge and experience to strengthen from SUNY Buffalo Law School and an LLM from Harvard Law resource centre integrating knowledge and experience to strengthen peacebuildingpeacebuilding policy policy and and practice. practice. Established Established in in2008, 2008, it collaboratesit collaborates School. andand promotes promotes collaboration collaboration with with a widea wide network network of ofresearchers, researchers, policymakerspolicymakers and and practitioners practitioners in inNorway Norway and and abroad. abroad.
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