The Booth School of Business, University of Chicago Antebellum Tariff Politics: Regional Coalitions and Shifting Economic Interests Author(s): Douglas A. Irwin Source: The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 51, No. 4 (November 2008), pp. 715-741 Published by: The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business, University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law School Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/590131 Accessed: 10-04-2018 12:47 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms The University of Chicago Law School, The Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, The University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Law & Economics This content downloaded from 130.127.15.229 on Tue, 10 Apr 2018 12:47:14 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Antebellum Tariff Politics: Regional Coalitions and Shifting Economic Interests Douglas A. Irwin Dartmouth College Abstract Throughout U.S. history, import tariffs have been put on a sustained downward path in only two instances: from the early 1830s until the Civil War and from the mid-1930s to the present.