Social Media As Information Operations Force Multiplier
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EC-130J Commando Solo systems operator monitors broadcast during mission in support of Operation Inherent Resolve at undisclosed location in Southwest Asia, September 5, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Michael Battles) What’s Not to Like? Social Media as Information Operations Force Multiplier By Glenda Jakubowski n June 2013, Vladimir Putin stated “focused on the U.S. population and icans, posed as individual Americans, that Russia must “break the Anglo- conducted operations on social media posed as American interest groups and Saxon monopoly on global informa- platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, political activists, hacked voter regis- I 1 2 tion streams.” By April 2014, Russia’s Instagram, and Twitter.” Four years tration data, and scraped social media Internet Research Agency (IRA) after the translator project began oper- profiles to influence U.S. elections and formed the “translator project,” which ations, Special Counsel Robert Mueller political processes. The information issued an indictment against three operations would be “the most effec- Russian companies and 13 Russian tive and efficient influence campaign Glenda Jakubowski is an Intelligence Analyst at individuals, alleging Russian actors in world history,” according to Clint the Defense Intelligence Agency. stole the identities of individual Amer- Watts, a senior fellow in the Center for 8 Forum / Social Media as Information Operations Force Multiplier JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Cyber and Homeland Security at The the Judiciary, five social media functions tweets; true tweets rarely reached as George Washington University.3 It was are necessary for “full-spectrum social many as 1,000 people, compared to social media that made Russia’s infor- media campaigns: reconnaissance, false tweets, which routinely reached mation operations so effective and effi- hosting, placement, propagation, and up to 100,000 people. Additionally, cient, particularly social media–enabled saturation.”6 Russia used all of these false information spread six times faster social engineering, identity theft, tar- in its information operations against than true information, and false political geted advertisements, profiling through the West. Briefly, reconnaissance in information spread even more quickly psychometrics, dissemination through social media equates to knowing the and was more viral.9 bots, trending algorithms, creation of target audience, and hosting refers to The data scraping enabled by firms false personas, and psychological hacks the site, such as YouTube, Facebook, such as Cambridge Analytica is an ex- to increase trust and verisimilitude. The or Twitter. Placement, during the Cold ample of reconnaissance. Cambridge psychology behind pleasure, rewards, War, referred to placing forged items Analytica brought “big data and social social groups, and fear makes social in news outlets that unknowingly pub- media to an established military meth- media addictive and credible. This is lished the items as authentic. In current odology—information operations—then the same psychology that makes social usage, it is placing “digital forgeries” turn[ed] it on the U.S. electorate.”10 media’s use in information operations on sites such as 4chan and Reddit that The company analyzed potential voters’ so pernicious and possibly impossible to then spread to mainstream sites, fueling social media profiles, then sent the users counter. conspiracy theories and false narratives. “micro-targeted” Facebook advertise- Russia has used social media to foster Propagation refers to spreading narra- ments to influence their voting behavior. conspiracy theories, plant rumors, and tives broadly and quickly, which social In 2017, the Cambridge Analytica chief spread fake news in Bulgaria, Denmark, media particularly enables through such executive officer (CEO) boasted at a Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, means as bots that cause news items to marketing conference that he had about Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, trend, increasing the likelihood they 5,000 separate bits of information on Lithuania, Montenegro, the Netherlands, will jump to mainstream media. Finally, each of 220 million Americans and that Norway, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the networked nature of social media his company had “played a significant the United Kingdom, and the United enables saturation in multiple types of role” in contributing to the success of States.4 Experts have correlated Russian media outlets, which lends credibility to the Presidential campaign. Cambridge information operations with the referen- false stories. According to Watts, Russia Analytica applied analysis to these dis- dums on Brexit, Scottish independence, is the first entity to incorporate the crete bits of information gleaned from and Catalonian secession from Spain, “entire social media ecosystem” into its Facebook profiles and from publicly and in one academic study, researchers information operations.7 available information to “send the right correlated Russian information opera- people to the right ads through cookie tions with changes in U.S. voter behavior The Social Media Ecosystem matching, mail shots, set-top box view- that possibly affected the outcome of the The combination of false news, social ing data matching, and highly targeted, 2016 Presidential election.5 media, politics, conspiracy theories, non-public, paid Facebook posts often Russia’s information operations suc- sensationalism—and human nature— referred to as ‘dark ads.’”11 cesses, however, are not uniform. Factors creates a perfect propaganda storm. In 2014, Cambridge Analytica pre- that contributed to or mitigated Russian Studying 126,000 news stories shared sented slides on how to disrupt elections information operations successes include from Twitter’s inception in 2006 to a Russian oligarch with strong ties to the target nations’ historical relation- until 2017 by approximately 3 million Vladimir Putin, ostensibly to solicit oil ships with Russia, percentage of ethnic people, researchers found that false contracts.12 Coincidentally, Russia around Russians in the population, ethnic homo- news spreads “further, faster, deeper, this time began to use micro-targeting geneity, racial conflict, migration, national and more broadly” than legitimate in social media to attempt to influence control of media and the Internet, and news—even more so for false news the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.13 In the level of trust between citizens and about political subjects compared to U.S. Senate committee hearings in 2018, their governments. Many of these factors items about “terrorism, natural disas- when asked whether the 126 million users make the United States, with its constitu- ters, science, urban legends, or financial the Russian IRA targeted with Facebook tional freedoms, Internet saturation, and information.”8 The researchers found ads were also among those whose data political and racial divides, particularly that bots speed the dissemination of Cambridge Analytica accessed, Facebook vulnerable to and less able to defend true and false stories equally; although CEO Mark Zuckerberg replied, “We be- against these information operations. bots may increase the amount of infor- lieve it is entirely possible.”14 mation spread through social media, it Whether or not Russia directly used Social Media Is a Game Changer is humans that spread false news more data gained from Cambridge Analytica, According to testimony by Clint Watts quickly than factual news. Thus, false by 2015 Russia was using social media before the U.S. Senate Committee on tweets reached more people than true to spread conspiracy theories to specific JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Jakubowski 9 audiences surrounding issues that would practicing war against its own states.”18 information operations message and most become 2016 campaign hot buttons, The Jade Helm 15 information operation likely to share it with similarly minded including gun rights, big government, is an example of hosting, placement, groups. In this manner, a false news item and Islamophobia. One of its targets, propagation, and saturation. can metastasize quickly from a small according to former Central Intelligence Russia’s social media–enabled infor- number of discrete cells to a trending Agency director Michael Hayden, was a mation operations continue to garner conspiratorial cancer in a matter of days 2015 U.S. military exercise conducted official responses, which give the impres- or hours. The Comet Ping Pong conspir- in seven southern U.S. states called Jade sion that Russia’s false news is authentic. acy provides an example. Helm 15.15 According to an NBC News report, The information operation involving Jade Helm 15 was a U.S. Special more than 40 celebrities and politicians the “news” that Hillary Clinton and other Operations Command joint exercise con- were “roped into retweeting or other- Democrats were pedophiles running ducted in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, wise engaging with accounts created a sex ring out of a restaurant, Comet California, Nevada, Utah, and Colorado by a Russian ‘troll factory’ to millions Ping Pong, in Washington, DC, almost from July 15 to September 15, 2015, of followers,” and 3,000 news outlets certainly began with the Russian military to improve special operations forces’ worldwide published articles containing intelligence service hack of John Podesta’s unconventional warfare capabilities.16 embedded Russian troll farm tweets email server on March 19, 2016. Among However, conspiracies propagated on in the runup to the 2016 election—an