EC-130J Commando Solo systems operator monitors broadcast during mission in support of Operation Inherent Resolve at undisclosed location in Southwest Asia, September 5, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Michael Battles)
What’s Not to Like? Social Media as Information Operations Force Multiplier
By Glenda Jakubowski
n June 2013, Vladimir Putin stated “focused on the U.S. population and icans, posed as individual Americans, that Russia must “break the Anglo- conducted operations on social media posed as American interest groups and Saxon monopoly on global informa- platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, political activists, hacked voter regis- I 1 2 tion streams.” By April 2014, Russia’s Instagram, and Twitter.” Four years tration data, and scraped social media Internet Research Agency (IRA) after the translator project began oper- profiles to influence U.S. elections and formed the “translator project,” which ations, Special Counsel Robert Mueller political processes. The information issued an indictment against three operations would be “the most effec- Russian companies and 13 Russian tive and efficient influence campaign Glenda Jakubowski is an Intelligence Analyst at individuals, alleging Russian actors in world history,” according to Clint the Defense Intelligence Agency. stole the identities of individual Amer- Watts, a senior fellow in the Center for
8 Forum / Social Media as Information Operations Force Multiplier JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Cyber and Homeland Security at The the Judiciary, five social media functions tweets; true tweets rarely reached as George Washington University.3 It was are necessary for “full-spectrum social many as 1,000 people, compared to social media that made Russia’s infor- media campaigns: reconnaissance, false tweets, which routinely reached mation operations so effective and effi- hosting, placement, propagation, and up to 100,000 people. Additionally, cient, particularly social media–enabled saturation.”6 Russia used all of these false information spread six times faster social engineering, identity theft, tar- in its information operations against than true information, and false political geted advertisements, profiling through the West. Briefly, reconnaissance in information spread even more quickly psychometrics, dissemination through social media equates to knowing the and was more viral.9 bots, trending algorithms, creation of target audience, and hosting refers to The data scraping enabled by firms false personas, and psychological hacks the site, such as YouTube, Facebook, such as Cambridge Analytica is an ex- to increase trust and verisimilitude. The or Twitter. Placement, during the Cold ample of reconnaissance. Cambridge psychology behind pleasure, rewards, War, referred to placing forged items Analytica brought “big data and social social groups, and fear makes social in news outlets that unknowingly pub- media to an established military meth- media addictive and credible. This is lished the items as authentic. In current odology—information operations—then the same psychology that makes social usage, it is placing “digital forgeries” turn[ed] it on the U.S. electorate.”10 media’s use in information operations on sites such as 4chan and Reddit that The company analyzed potential voters’ so pernicious and possibly impossible to then spread to mainstream sites, fueling social media profiles, then sent the users counter. conspiracy theories and false narratives. “micro-targeted” Facebook advertise- Russia has used social media to foster Propagation refers to spreading narra- ments to influence their voting behavior. conspiracy theories, plant rumors, and tives broadly and quickly, which social In 2017, the Cambridge Analytica chief spread fake news in Bulgaria, Denmark, media particularly enables through such executive officer (CEO) boasted at a Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, means as bots that cause news items to marketing conference that he had about Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, trend, increasing the likelihood they 5,000 separate bits of information on Lithuania, Montenegro, the Netherlands, will jump to mainstream media. Finally, each of 220 million Americans and that Norway, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the networked nature of social media his company had “played a significant the United Kingdom, and the United enables saturation in multiple types of role” in contributing to the success of States.4 Experts have correlated Russian media outlets, which lends credibility to the Presidential campaign. Cambridge information operations with the referen- false stories. According to Watts, Russia Analytica applied analysis to these dis- dums on Brexit, Scottish independence, is the first entity to incorporate the crete bits of information gleaned from and Catalonian secession from Spain, “entire social media ecosystem” into its Facebook profiles and from publicly and in one academic study, researchers information operations.7 available information to “send the right correlated Russian information opera- people to the right ads through cookie tions with changes in U.S. voter behavior The Social Media Ecosystem matching, mail shots, set-top box view- that possibly affected the outcome of the The combination of false news, social ing data matching, and highly targeted, 2016 Presidential election.5 media, politics, conspiracy theories, non-public, paid Facebook posts often Russia’s information operations suc- sensationalism—and human nature— referred to as ‘dark ads.’”11 cesses, however, are not uniform. Factors creates a perfect propaganda storm. In 2014, Cambridge Analytica pre- that contributed to or mitigated Russian Studying 126,000 news stories shared sented slides on how to disrupt elections information operations successes include from Twitter’s inception in 2006 to a Russian oligarch with strong ties to the target nations’ historical relation- until 2017 by approximately 3 million Vladimir Putin, ostensibly to solicit oil ships with Russia, percentage of ethnic people, researchers found that false contracts.12 Coincidentally, Russia around Russians in the population, ethnic homo- news spreads “further, faster, deeper, this time began to use micro-targeting geneity, racial conflict, migration, national and more broadly” than legitimate in social media to attempt to influence control of media and the Internet, and news—even more so for false news the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.13 In the level of trust between citizens and about political subjects compared to U.S. Senate committee hearings in 2018, their governments. Many of these factors items about “terrorism, natural disas- when asked whether the 126 million users make the United States, with its constitu- ters, science, urban legends, or financial the Russian IRA targeted with Facebook tional freedoms, Internet saturation, and information.”8 The researchers found ads were also among those whose data political and racial divides, particularly that bots speed the dissemination of Cambridge Analytica accessed, Facebook vulnerable to and less able to defend true and false stories equally; although CEO Mark Zuckerberg replied, “We be- against these information operations. bots may increase the amount of infor- lieve it is entirely possible.”14 mation spread through social media, it Whether or not Russia directly used Social Media Is a Game Changer is humans that spread false news more data gained from Cambridge Analytica, According to testimony by Clint Watts quickly than factual news. Thus, false by 2015 Russia was using social media before the U.S. Senate Committee on tweets reached more people than true to spread conspiracy theories to specific
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Jakubowski 9 audiences surrounding issues that would practicing war against its own states.”18 information operations message and most become 2016 campaign hot buttons, The Jade Helm 15 information operation likely to share it with similarly minded including gun rights, big government, is an example of hosting, placement, groups. In this manner, a false news item and Islamophobia. One of its targets, propagation, and saturation. can metastasize quickly from a small according to former Central Intelligence Russia’s social media–enabled infor- number of discrete cells to a trending Agency director Michael Hayden, was a mation operations continue to garner conspiratorial cancer in a matter of days 2015 U.S. military exercise conducted official responses, which give the impres- or hours. The Comet Ping Pong conspir- in seven southern U.S. states called Jade sion that Russia’s false news is authentic. acy provides an example. Helm 15.15 According to an NBC News report, The information operation involving Jade Helm 15 was a U.S. Special more than 40 celebrities and politicians the “news” that Hillary Clinton and other Operations Command joint exercise con- were “roped into retweeting or other- Democrats were pedophiles running ducted in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, wise engaging with accounts created a sex ring out of a restaurant, Comet California, Nevada, Utah, and Colorado by a Russian ‘troll factory’ to millions Ping Pong, in Washington, DC, almost from July 15 to September 15, 2015, of followers,” and 3,000 news outlets certainly began with the Russian military to improve special operations forces’ worldwide published articles containing intelligence service hack of John Podesta’s unconventional warfare capabilities.16 embedded Russian troll farm tweets email server on March 19, 2016. Among However, conspiracies propagated on in the runup to the 2016 election—an those emails were exchanges between Russia-controlled Instagram, Twitter, and example of stunningly successful place- Podesta and his friend, Comet Ping YouTube accounts and Russia-created ment.19 Cross-referencing a list of IRA Pong owner James Alefantis.22 WikiLeaks Facebook pages, such as Heart of Texas, Twitter handles with archived tweets by published the hacked emails on October claimed Jade Helm 15 variously was a nearly 900 politicians and celebrities, 7, 2016, and by late October, the first psychological operation to build compla- NBC found the list of influential people allegations about Comet Ping Pong cency about the military’s presence in the who have retweeted or engaged with appeared in a few posts on 4chan and affected states to enable an eventual inva- Russian propagandists includes President another anonymous message board that sion, an international or United Nations Donald Trump; his son, Donald Trump, purported to cater to New York Police (UN) operation to seize citizens’ guns, a Jr.; white nationalist Richard Spencer; Department (NYPD) users. Within hours military operation to round up political Trump political associate Roger Stone; of the putative NYPD post, a real person dissidents, a military operation to remove former UN Ambassador Samantha posted about the alleged sex ring on state and local political leaders who Power; former Ku Klux Klan grand Facebook, citing her “NYPD source.” would oppose the Federal Government’s wizard David Duke; Senator John Coryn Four days later, the conspiracy theory– imposition of martial law, an operation (R-TX); Kellyanne Conway; Women’s themed show, Info Wars, broadcasted the using recently closed Walmarts to supply March coordinator Linda Sarsour; story. The conspiracy also was mentioned invading Chinese troops, or a military Michael Flynn, Jr.; Ohio senator Nina on a law enforcement Facebook page, plan to impose martial law and disarm Turner; Ted Cruz; former White House and from there a Russian bot posing as citizens in the wake of an apocalyptic communications director Anthony a U.S. Air Force veteran posted it on meteor strike predicted to occur the Scaramucci; former White House press Twitter. The bot, whose profile pic- same day Jade Helm 15 concluded.17 secretary Sean Spicer; Sean Hannity; ture shows a middle-aged woman, has As bizarre as they seem, the conspiracies Ann Coulter; Laura Ingraham; Jake followers that include former Trump surrounding Jade Helm 15 garnered Tapper; Lou Dobbs; Nikki Minaj; Sarah deputy assistant Sebastian Gorka and reactions from U.S. politicians—reac- Silverman; Trevor Noah; the Washington former National Security Adviser Michael tions that gave credence to the Russian Post; Breitbart; Buzzfeed; the Daily Mail; Flynn. Eventually, the Comet Ping Pong information operations. These included UN officials; academics; and authors conspiracy would be shared 1.4 million Texas governor Greg Abbott calling on from both the right and left.20 Celebrity times, including by at least 14 Russian the Texas State Guard (equivalent to the retweeters who agree with the original bots and by real people including Donald National Guard) to monitor the exercise, tweets add credibility to the Russian Trump, Jr.; Paul Manafort; Ann Coulter; Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) promising propaganda. But even when celebrities and Roger Stone. On December 4, 2016, to “look into” the exercise, Senator Ted disagree with the original sentiment, their a North Carolina man fired an AR-15 Cruz (R-TX) assuring constituents that celebrity status aids in the propaganda rifle in the occupied Comet Ping Pong he had inquired about the exercise from dissemination through the social media restaurant, seeking to free the children Pentagon officials “because the Federal phenomenon of trending. he thought were held there as sex slaves Government has not demonstrated itself Social media groups tend to share for the Clintons and their friends.23 As to be trustworthy,” and Representative worldviews, in a phenomenon called ho- of June 2018, a cursory search revealed Louie Gohmert (R-TX) demanding mophily.21 Homophily and data scraping multiple current social media posts on the military revamp the exercise “so the enabled Russia to target social media YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook claiming Federal Government is not intentionally network groups most likely to believe the “Pizzagate” is real and that the Clintons
10 Forum / Social Media as Information Operations Force Multiplier JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Comet Ping Pong façade in Washington, DC, December 11, 2016 (Courtesy Farragutful)
and Democrats are continuing to run pe- In early June 2016, the Web site and Katherine Fulton are fake personas dophile and human-trafficking rings. DCLeaks went live, featuring stolen created by Russian cyber actors. Their Why would Russia promote conspir- emails from the Democratic National posts targeted real Facebook users who acy theories as part of its information Committee. Eventually DCLeaks Russian cyber actors determined, through operations? Russia scholar Ilya Yablokov would post emails stolen from more psychometric profiling such as that done asserts it is because the conspiracy than 300 high-ranking government and by Cambridge Analytica, would be most theories are “a specific tool of Russian military officials. The U.S. Intelligence susceptible to their messages. In concert public diplomacy aimed at undermining Community assesses DCLeaks to be with the Facebook posts, hundreds of the policies of the U.S. Government.”24 linked to Russian military intelligence Twitter posts also linked to DCLeaks, Crucially, the conspiracy theories—and and the Russian hacking entity Guccifer Guccifer 2.0, or similar sites associated the information operations—are not 2.0.26 Within days of DCLeaks’s launch, with Russian intelligence. Many of these challenges to ideology; Russia’s informa- “Melvin Redick,” allegedly of Harrisburg, were fueled by bots, some hijacked tion operations today are not a reprise of PA, posted a link to DCLeaks on multiple legitimate Twitter accounts, and many in- Soviet-era communism-versus-capitalism Facebook group pages.27 Melvin Redick, cluded the Twitter handles of mainstream battles for hearts and minds. The current however, does not exist. He is a fake news organizations or influential ac- goal for Russia is to “undermine trust persona created by Russian actors using counts, including @realDonaldTrump.30 in information generally.”25 Among the stolen Facebook profile of a Brazilian These events are examples of reconnais- the ways to do so is to use specific, salesman.28 Similar posts by “Alice sance, hosting, placement, propagation, trustworthy messengers, which is where Donovan” and “Katherine Fulton” and saturation. Russia’s use of stolen social media profiles appeared on Facebook the same day.29 A Florida voter was one of the and micro-targeted outreach come in. As with Melvin Redick, Alice Donovan people Russia selected as part of its
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Jakubowski 11 Soldiers from Bronco 71 Team, operating with members of civil affairs, psychological operations, and information operations trainers, tie M240B machine gun to saddle during mule packing training, August 1, 2017, Fort Irwin, California (U.S. Army/Austin Anyzeski) micro-targeting reconnaissance efforts. In were Russians.35 She received about $600 media that make it so effective as a force August 2016, a stranger sent her a private and a script from the Russians to don a multiplier in information operations. message on Facebook from a Russia- Hillary Clinton mask and an orange jail They show Russia’s use of psychological affiliated fake Facebook group called jumpsuit to participate in one of 20 pro- factors such as homophily, or retweets by Being Patriotic, asking her to organize a Trump rallies in Florida scheduled for trusted or influential people, or receiving pro-Trump rally. The Russians chose well the same day in August. And still another phone calls, emails, and private messages in targeting this woman, who showed up individual received a similar payment after from “friends,” to pressure its adversaries for the rally dressed as Hillary Clinton in Russians posing as Americans contacted to accept false stories as truthful. In addi- a prison jumpsuit.31 In addition to that him on the Being Patriotic Facebook tion to these, Russia also exploits the fact person (who was not paid), Russia used page, asking him to build a cage as part of that social media itself has been designed micro-targeting to pay multiple Floridians the same rally.36 to activate areas in the brain associated to build cages and pose as Clinton behind None of the targeted Americans, with rewards and addiction. bars.32 Another person, also from Florida, when informed of the Russian origins of According to neuroscientist Shannon responded to a Being Patriotic Facebook the requests for political activity, consid- Odell, people use social media such as request that he host a pro-Trump gather- ered the Russian interference a problem. Facebook and Twitter for two reasons: to ing.33 Similarly, another Floridian agreed They dismissed concerns over the Russian connect with people and to control the to wave pro-Trump signs at a rally after effort as a “waste of time,” insisted they impressions they make on others. The receiving a phone call in August 2016 would have held rallies for Trump or par- “like,” “share,” or “retweet” is positive from a stranger from a Russian front odied Clinton anyway without Russian reinforcement for both of those motiva- group called Florida Goes Trump.34 trickery, and claimed the Russian efforts tors, activating neural pathways for reward Yet another Floridian received a phone had no effect because the targeted voters and addiction.38 Additionally, when call out of the blue, followed by emails “didn’t need persuading.”37 users in one experiment were shown from people she thought to be college Many of the examples above demon- photographs, the photographs with students from Texas but who actually strate the psychological aspects of social more “likes” activated the brain’s reward
12 Forum / Social Media as Information Operations Force Multiplier JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 circuitry more than the photographs with Europe’s Answer to Russian propaganda, but “if you only focus fewer “likes.” People are apt to approve Information Operations on countering, you’re on their terri- of social media posts their friends approve Finland is the commonly cited example tory,” stated a member of the Strategic of, even if those “friends” are strangers.39 of how to counter Russia’s information Communications Center of Excellence in Yet another study corroborates the power operations. Finland’s tactics include Latvia.46 Finland is an outlier, then, and of the “like,” finding that social media a public diplomacy program with it seems unfair to suggest others use it users are more likely to adopt those support from the Finnish president, as a model, when the variable that likely emotions that are “over-expressed in their who declared it the responsibility works most toward Finland’s favor—its social network.”40 The level of emotional of every citizen to combat Russian homogeneity—is outside other nations’ “contagion” is significantly influenced information operations, and support control. Other European countries have when the agent seeking to spread an idea from the prime minister’s office, which been tackling the Russian information uses bots. Russian information operations enrolled hundreds of government operations problem, including, in some benefited from not only the mechanics of officials in programs to understand cases, the social media aspect of the oper- bot propagation and troll farm employees how disinformation spreads. Experts ations. Some examples follow: generating multiple “likes” and “shares” also credit Finland’s public educa- Tracking False News to influence trends algorithms, but also tion system—which ranks top in the •• • Britain, France, Germany, the the psychological tendencies of humans world—with building critical think- Czech Republic, the Netherlands, exposed to bot propagation and to “peer ing skills that help strengthen Finns Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, group” emotions. A user confronted with against disinformation. Additionally, Ukraine, Latvia, and Slovakia false news on social media that comes ap- Finns have a high level of trust in maintain sites to track false news pended with hundreds of bot-generated their government and a high level of and social media conspiracy “likes” is psychologically apt to believe distrust for Moscow. Finland also has theories.47 and spread the false news. demographics to thank for its ability • The EU’s EAST Stratcom Among the most pervasive questions to fend off Russian propaganda; the Task Force publishes a weekly regarding social media and false news Finnish population of 5.5 million is disinformation review in 18 lan- in the 2016 U.S. election is did they quite homogeneous, with a minimal guages—including calling out fake make a difference in the final vote tally. number of Russian speakers.43 Only 3.5 fact-checkers that appear to be the A definitive answer is difficult. However, percent of people living in Finland are work of Russia.48 according to one scholarly study and foreign born, one of the lowest rates Washington Post analysis, the data cor- in the European Union (EU), and the •• Working with Media, Social relate with an affirmative response. Using Russian population in Finland is 0.5 Media, and Advertisers multiple regression analyses, Ohio State percent, compared to 93 percent native • More than 1,400 advertisers in University researchers concluded that be- Finns.44 Finns are more alike than they Slovakia are boycotting a list of lieving false news encountered on social are different from one another, which false Web sites compiled by a non- media was among the top four variables makes it difficult for information cam- profit researcher.49 predicting that a voter who previously paigns focused on exploiting social rifts • The night before the French supported Barack Obama would “defect to take hold. presidential election, Russian mil- from the Democratic ticket in 2016.” Other Baltic nations, such as Latvia, itary intelligence hackers released Respondents to an Ohio State survey Lithuania, and Estonia, have been less hacked emails and documents who believed at least one false news item successful against Russian information connected to then-candidate plucked from social media were 4.5 times operations. These nations have larger Emmanuel Macron. Most French more likely to have voted against Clinton numbers of Russian speakers among their media outlets agreed to election than respondents who believed none of populations and the strong presence of commission requests to refrain the false news items in the survey.41 Using the Russian-language, Russia-owned tele- from publishing the hacked the Ohio State data in predictive proba- vision station, Channel One. In Finland, documents.50 bility analysis, the Washington Post polling the Russia-owned, Russian-language • Facebook agreed to requests from director assessed that false news likely Sputnik television station lacked enough France and Britain to disable mul- cost Clinton 4.2 percent of votes overall viewers to remain operational; in Latvia, tiple thousands of false accounts and approximately 2.2 percentage points Lithuania, and Estonia, government connected to elections.51 in the battleground states of Michigan, moves to block Russian programming • Sweden urges all mainstream Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. In the 2016 backfired, leading to protests from the media to fact-check news stories.52 election, Clinton lost Michigan by 0.2 Russian populations in those countries Mainstream media, of course, is percentage points, Pennsylvania by 0.72 and feeding the Russian propaganda not the major purveyor of false percentage points, and Wisconsin by 0.76 narrative of marginalization.45 The Baltic stories, and Sweden so far is percentage points.42 states do focus on countering Russian doing nothing about the Russian
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Jakubowski 13 U.S. psychological operations Soldiers with Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Iraq conduct radio-in-a-box training with members of Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service psychological operations team, in Baghdad, February 10, 2019 (U.S. Army/Sarah K. Anwar)
trolls that are averaging 2,000 right to know of data breaches •• Countermessaging comments per person, per inflam- within 72 hours, the right to • The United Kingdom, Germany, matory news item posted on a access their data from social Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are right-wing site.53 media companies and to know countermessaging Russia Today where and for what purpose their and Sputnik “news” items.59 Legal Measures •• data is used, the “right to be • Also, in Lithuania, citizen volun- • The French electoral code makes forgotten,” the right to data por- teers who call themselves elves it illegal to “broadcast to the tability, and the right to privacy “identify and beat back the ‘trolls’ public by any means of electronic by design—that is, the inclusion employed on social media to communication anything that of data protection from the onset spread Russian disinformation.”60 could be considered electoral of designing systems. Failure to propaganda.”54 Government Initiatives. In Sweden, abide by the GDPR can result in •• • The EU has enacted a code of the Swedish Civil Contingencies tiered fines of up to 4 percent of practice against disinformation Agency, which is roughly equivalent profits or 20 million euros.56 aimed at social media com- to the U.S. Department of Home- panies that requires them to •• Political Cooperation. German land Security, monitors Web sites for prevent “disinformation and the political parties agree not to use false, inflammatory stories.61 manipulative use of platforms’ bots in their social media campaigns. infrastructure.”55 (Russia continues to use bots on What About the United States? • On May 25, 2018, the EU social media in Germany, however.)57 The United States shares some chal- enacted the General Data Protec- •• Public Diplomacy. Sweden distrib- lenges with its European partners in tion Regulation (GDPR), which utes pamphlets advising Swedes what fighting Russian information operations applies to all companies doing to do in case of war with Russia, or and also has some U.S.-specific chal- business in the EU regardless of terrorist attacks, in an attempt to lenges. The United States is far from the companies’ locations. The shape how Swedish citizens think homogeneous; according to the Census GDPR guarantees EU citizens the about Russia.58 Bureau in 2017, about 60.7 percent of
14 Forum / Social Media as Information Operations Force Multiplier JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Civilian role players help 80th Training Command’s psychological operations students learn to negotiate difficult terrain of cultural, social, and political differences during training exercise at Fort Hunter Liggett, California, February 6, 2019 (U.S. Army/Cynthia McIntyre)
the population is white, 18.1 percent is many in the United States feel toward to users what data are being collected on Hispanic (which can be any race), 13.4 government information programs. them, who has access to user data, and percent is black, 5.8 percent is Asian, Opponents claimed the reforms would how companies that have that access are 2.7 percent are mixed race, and 1.5 make Americans vulnerable to govern- using the data. The bill also allows users percent are other.62 Russia laser-targeted ment disinformation campaigns to “prop to opt out of having their data collected racial and social divides in America up unpopular policies” and “remove and to demand that Web sites delete any during the runup to the 2016 election, protections” against U.S. Government data that had been collected on them.66 as well as controversies over immigra- information campaigns targeting U.S. As of this writing, the proposal has been tion, gun control, Islamophobia, gay citizens that may be “inaccurate or com- sitting in the Commerce, Science, and rights, and other divisive topics. Russia pletely false.”65 That the opponents were Transportation Committee since late continues, post-election, to use social themselves presenting inaccurate infor- April 2018.67 media in information operations to mation about the new Smith-Mundt Act “create general distrust or confusion did little to reduce confusion surrounding Conclusion: A Social about information sources by blurring the reforms, but much to illuminate the Media Problem Requires a the lines between fact and fiction.”63 distrust many Americans likely would feel Social Media Solution The United States is unlikely to enact toward a domestic government informa- Measures such as the Code of Practice a domestic propaganda program such as tion campaign. on Disinformation, GDPR, and Social Finland’s. Reforms of the Smith-Mundt After Facebook CEO Mark Media Privacy Protection and Con- Act in 2013 allow domestic broadcasts Zuckerberg’s House and Senate testi- sumer Rights Act will mitigate social of State Department programming mony on Cambridge Analytica’s breach media–enabled information operations produced for foreign audiences, such as of users’ data, Senator Amy Klobuchar because they empower privacy and data Voice of America broadcasts, but forbid (D-MN) and Senator John Kennedy (R- protection. However, these measures broadcasting propaganda targeting LA) introduced the Social Media Privacy will not eliminate the psychological American audiences.64 However, reactions Protection and Consumer Rights Act, aspects of social media that make it from some politicians and defense officials which is similar to the GDPR. The bill re- such a powerful tool for information to the reforms indicate the suspicion quires social media companies to disclose operations. Humans are motivated by
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Jakubowski 15 4 desire and fear. Just as “likes” activate U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Military Secretly Planning for Giant Asteroid Relations, “Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on That Will Wipe Out Mankind in September,” areas of the brain associated with desire, Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications Daily Express (London), June 8, 2015, available conspiracy theories and false news about for U.S. National Security,” S. Prt. 115-21, at
16 Forum / Social Media as Information Operations Force Multiplier JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 28 Scott Shane, “Mystery of Russian Fake 43 Reid Standish, “Why Is Finland Able to world/2017/may/06/emmanuel-macron-tar- on Facebook Solved, by a Brazilian,” New York Fend Off Putin’s Information War?” Foreign geted-by-hackers-on-eve-of-french-election>. Times, September 13, 2017, available at JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Jakubowski 17